SACW | April 16-17, 2008 / The Nuclear Nemesis / A New Nepal / The Tibet Myth / India's God Driven Secularism / Bangladesh: Pilger is wrong
Harsh Kapoor
aiindex at gmail.com
Wed Apr 16 15:15:25 CDT 2008
South Asia Citizens Wire | April 16-17, 2008 |
Dispatch No. 2504 - Year 10 running
[1] It is the ordinary citizens of Bangladesh who need a voice (Asif Saleh)
[2] Pakistan: Who killed basant? (Ahmad Rafay Alam)
+ The Nuclear Nemesis (Saleem H Ali)
[3] India's God Driven Secularism: 100 percent
religion / Zero percent non religion
(i) Growing Hinduisation of the public sphere in India (Meera Nanda)
(ii) Poor Kirtibhai? - Growing Nexus Between
'Spiritual' and 'Criminal' (Subhash Gatade)
[4] Tibet: Friendly Feudalism - The Tibet Myth (Micahel Parenti)
+ Why Tibet matters (Sonia Jabbar)
[5] Triumph of the new mainstream in Nepal (Siddharth Varadarajan)
[6] Publication Announcement:
Federalism, Nationalism and Development India
and the Punjab Economy (Pritam Singh)
[7] Event Announcements:
(i) 'Go Musharaf Go' seminar (Lahore, 16 April 2008)
(ii) Second Floor's Weekend of Culture
Jamming, Music and Movies (Karachi, 18-20 April
2008)
(iii) Gender of "Terror"- a one day conference (Los Angeles, May 2, 2008)
______
[1]
The Guardian,
April 3 2008
IT IS THE ORDINARY CITIZENS OF BANGLADESH WHO NEED A VOICE
On the 37th anniversary of its independence,
Bangladesh faces a human rights crisis
by Asif Saleh
John Pilger mounts an impassioned and spirited
defence of the Bangladeshi politician Moudud
Ahmed (The prisoner of Dhaka, March 12). "There
is a decent, brave man sitting in a dungeon in a
country where the British empire began," Pilger
says. "I have known him since a moonless night in
1971." Pilger does his reputation an immense
disservice with his erroneous and exaggerated
claims on behalf of Ahmed, by ignoring the real
issues at hand in favour of using his influence
to defend an old friend.
On the 37th anniversary of its independence,
Bangladesh faces a human rights crisis. Our
fledgling democracy - hard won in 1971, and
resurrected again in 1991 after years of military
rule - is in suspension. Thousands of ordinary
citizens have been rounded up and imprisoned
without cause, without due process, and with no
hope of release. It is true that Ahmed is one of
those people. He was arrested by the security
forces and is now in jail as a VIP prisoner.
Pilger says that Ahmed's "tumultuous life carries
more than a hint of Tom Paine". But the irony
here is that one of the men responsible for this
state of affairs is Ahmed himself, a man who has
benefited from every regime to have taken power
in Bangladesh, a man who has been a minister
under every party and almost every government,
whether democratic or dictatorial.
His record on human rights is evident from the
fact that he had no hesitation in supporting the
2003 indemnity ordinance which absolved the
security forces from prosecution for
extra-judicial killings perpetrated in 2002-03.
Ahmed detected no violation of human rights when
people were killed by law enforcement agencies in
"crossfire" between 2004 and 2006; he looked away
when religious extremists killed and tortured
villagers in North Bengal during that same
period. As minister of law, he supported his
government's decision, in 2004, to undermine the
independence of the supreme court by appointing
19 judges on the basis of their partisan loyalty,
even though he publicly acknowledged that he did
not know at least six of them, who had never been
known to practise in the high court.
To project Ahmed as a worthy "cause celebre" is
to demean all those people of conscience who have
fought for justice and human rights and suffered
imprisonment, as well as the ordinary citizens of
Bangladesh who continue to face lamentable
conditions which are a legacy of past corruption
and malgovernance.
Ahmed cries for justice now that his own life is
at stake. He calls in favours, calls on old
friends, and condemns the legal and political
system that has him languishing in jail. Where
was his conscience when he was law minister?
Where was his acute feeling for his country when
democracy shrivelled on his watch?
By all means, Mr Pilger, draw attention to
injustice in Bangladesh, but try to do so more
for those who have no voice, rather than for the
corrupt and powerful who have escaped justice for
decades. And please bring your investigation
skills to bear on the state of the justice system
in Bangladesh and some of those who have caused
it to become what it is, including your friend
Moudud Ahmed.
______
[2]
The News
April 14, 2008
WHO KILLED BASANT?
by Ahmad Rafay Alam
It takes some skill to kill a cultural
phenomenon. Last week, we were told that the
District Kite Flying Association decided to
cancel its plans for basant. They were in no mood
to shoulder the blame for any casualties this
year, and in no mood to be rounded up and hauled
to the nearest thana because someone else breaks
the law.
This will be first year the city of Lahore will
not witness the kite-flying festival that heralds
the arrival of spring. basant is, for all
practical purposes, dead.
For the past decade, the city's definitive
festival event has been tarred, feathered and
humiliated. It was only a matter of time before
even something "wedded to the soil" gave way to
relentless attack. That phrase isn't mine; it
belongs to Mr Justice Aqil Mirza who described
basant in those terms in his decision in Ramzan
Welfare Trust v. WAPDA (PLD 1997 Lah 235).
Who is responsible for this death? Who killed
basant? Last year, I had written that the burden
of delivering last year's basant was immense; in
that, if the efforts of the Planning and
Development Department's special committee
"failed to deliver . . . basant might be snuffed
out altogether." This year's cancellation would
implicate solely this special committee.
It's one year on from when I wrote those words
and I'm not totally convinced that this
implication is correct. I've been doing some
detective work, and it seems there may have been
more than one cause for this death. Just as in
Agatha Christie's Murder on the Orient Express,
the suspects and their motives are aplenty.
For years now, the religious right have repeated
a constant refrain: basant is a Hindu festival,
its celebration is un-Islamic. They quote the
18th century incident of Hakeekat Rai, the Hindu
teenager from Sialkot who refused an offer of
clemency if he converted to Islam. This was after
he blasphemed against the Holy Prophet (PBUH) and
was convicted to death. His death was said to
have been celebrated by flying kites, and hence
basant.
This is patently untrue and just another example
of how propaganda is used to wrongfully Islamise
and distort a South Asian history shared by
Muslim, Hindu, Sikh and Jain alike. You can trace
basant back to at least the 13th century -
hundreds of years before Hakeekat Rai was even a
glint in the milkman's eye - when Amir Khusro
sought to relieve his mentor, Nizamuddin Auliya
of Delhi, who was mourning the loss of a close
relative.
Khusro came across villagers dressed in yellow
and flying kites. He learnt they were celebrating
the arrival of spring and thought he would do the
same to cheer up his ustad. Today, kites still
fly in Delhi. Data Ganj Baksh, the patron Saint
of Lahore, brought the seasonal festival to
Lahore after observing it in Delhi.
Regardless of the historical origins of basant,
the religious right has fed this Islamising
historical propaganda into the many other strains
of opposition to this festival. When kite-strings
were blamed for causing frequent power outages -
the allegation made in the Ramzan Welfare Trust
case - it was the anti-Islamic sentiment that
fuelled the case against kite flying. In fact,
when Mr Justice Aqil Mirza made his "wedded to
the soil" comment, he was referring to basant as
a cultural festival and denying it had religious
connotations. The same is true for the argument
that basant is responsible for the deaths of
hundred of hundreds of people; that the
glass-coated metalled wire is responsible for the
decapitation of innocents. So fierce is the
pro-Islamist and anti-basant sentiment that it
blocks from view what is really going on.
basant was essentially a festival celebrated in
the Walled City and its immediate surroundings.
Some time in the late 1990s, the Government of
Punjab decided it would "nationalise" the event.
It was a money-maker. Tens of thousands of
families depended on it for seasonal income. It
was great for tourism and it projected a modern
and, dare I mention the phrase these days,
"enlightened," face of the country. All the
government had to do was distance the festival
from the Islamising propaganda. This they
attempted to do with cosmetic alterations, like
changing its name to Jashn-e-Baharan. It worked
like a charm. For the first few years, basant
grew in size and splendour. I even recall having
written it had the potential to rival Rio de
Janeiro's Festival as a world-class cultural
event.
Then, within the same 3-4 year period, three
things happened. First, about 2000, a new,
high-tensile strength metalled wire was
introduced to the kite-flying market. Because of
its strength, it soon took over the old cotton
twine as one's boo-kaataa kite-string of choice.
Second, the Chaudhry juggernaut installed itself
in the city with the election of City District
Nazim Mian Amir Mahmood. The District Nazim's
connections with the religious right are well
known, as are those of the Chaudhry family.
Third, with post-9/11 remittances and foreign aid
pouring into a country at war with terror, the
city exploded in size and population.
The city now found itself run by an
administration inherently opposed to the Hindu
connotations of basant. Also, the city fathers
were unable to manage the needs of a modern
metropolis. They had allowed green belts and
residential areas to be commercialised, depriving
children of sufficient space to play near their
homes. They had not enforced building byelaws or
made sure they provided safety to home owners.
They failed to take action against the
manufacture of the dangerous glass-coated
metalled kite-string. And when people were run
over by automobiles, they didn't take
responsibility. They blamed basant. When children
fell off rooftops, they didn't take
responsibility. They blamed basant. And they
blamed basant when the kite-string began claiming
lives.
It came as no surprise when the Supreme Court of
Pakistan, taking suo motu notice of the loss of
life caused by the festival, decided to ban
basant in 2006. During this decade-long period,
stakeholders have done next to nothing.
They must also shoulder the blame for the death
of basant. Other than sit and watch other string
manufacturers grow rich while breaking the law,
the various kite-flying associations or string
manufacturers have done nothing to bring anyone
to book. Now, with Lahore stretching from Bedian
to Raiwind, most new districts and developments
are too far from the old city to absorb its
cultural heritage. The new city now dominates,
and basant also suffers the apathy of the
citizens of Lahore. basant is now no longer
something that belongs to the new Lahore. It is
now part of a Lahore that is lost. And that is
the story of the death of basant.
The writer is an advocate of the high court and a
member of the adjunct faculty at LUMS. He has an
interest in urban planning. Email: ralam at nexlinx
.net.pk
o o o
Daily Times
April 12, 2008
THE NUCLEAR NEMESIS
by Saleem H Ali
The greatest devastation can be caused by a
nuclear device when it is actually detonated
slightly above ground rather than on the ground
itself because the damage can be dispersed more
quickly
Ten years have passed since Pakistan conducted
its first fateful nuclear test. As if to
ominously commemorate this bittersweet
anniversary, we had the first recorded accident
at a nuclear facility this week at Khushab in
which two people were killed.
At the time of the nuclear tests in 1998, I wrote
a brief article about the environmental impact of
a nuclear explosion which the Pakistani media was
reluctant to cover, given the revelry of the
hour. It is perhaps time to revisit that theme
now that we are a more "mature" nuclear power.
My aim here is not to argue for or against
nuclear weapons but rather to present the facts
about their impact so we can keep our vision in
perspective. What would happen to our lives, and
those of other organisms, if there was an
above-ground nuclear explosion, either incidental
or accidental?
Though the probability of such an apocalyptic
event is relatively small, the impact has the
potential of being so cataclysmic that it
warrants serious discussion. When the photographs
and video footage of Pakistan's nuclear tests
were released, the Pakistani public was struck
with awe with the powerful glow which illumined
the mountain under which the explosions took
place. The glowing Chaghai mountain has been
immortalised now in a rather awkward sculpture in
Islamabad.
The magnitude of even a modest nuclear explosion
has not yet surfaced to cognition in most minds.
So let us try and recount what actually happens
when a nuclear bomb explodes, such as the
13-kiloton bomb which exploded over Hiroshima in
1945. Although this was a very primitive nuclear
device, it managed to kill over 45,000 people
within 24 hours of the blast and several
generations continue to languish as casualties.
Unlike conventional explosives which rely on the
energy generated by chemical combustion, nuclear
weapons rely on the extreme energy which is
generated when an atomic reaction takes place in
which one element is converted into another
element (for example when hydrogen is converted
to helium). The difference in the energy which is
generated is immense. A sphere of plutonium about
the size of a cricket ball is capable of
producing an explosion equivalent to 20,000 tons
of TNT.
There are basically three types of nuclear bombs
which have been developed. The first kind are
atomic bombs which use fission reactions, or the
splitting of atomic nuclei to generate energy.
This is the kind of bomb which was dropped by the
Americans on the Japanese cities of Hiroshima and
Nagasaki in 1945.
The second variety are thermonuclear devices
which use an atomic trigger and a uranium jacket
to start a fusion reaction in which lighter
elements such as hydrogen are forced to undergo a
fusion reaction to combine and form a heavier
element. The energy liberated from 0.5 kg (1.1
lb) of hydrogen-isotope fuel is equivalent to
that of about 29 kilotons of TNT, or almost three
times as much as from the uranium in an atomic
bomb. The environmental impact of both these
bombs would, however, be similar though the
magnitude would be greater in the case of a
thermonuclear device.
The third kind of nuclear weapon is the neutron
bomb which is a modified thermonuclear device
that does not have a uranium jacket and thus
reduces the chance of widespread radioactive
fallout. The neutrons generated from the
thermonuclear device can, however, generate
radioactivity within a small impact radius,
killing life but without causing widespread
fallout destruction to buildings and
infrastructure (the neutron bomb is thus a
tactical weapon).
The greatest devastation can be caused by a
nuclear device when it is actually detonated
slightly above ground rather than on the ground
itself because the damage can be dispersed more
quickly. The detonation of a nuclear device about
five hundred meters above land would first
generate an enormous fireball, whose radiant
energy would travel rapidly in all directions.
The intense heat generated at several thousand
degrees celsius would incinerate all organic
material within seconds. Even stable substances
such as sand would be thermally changed to glass.
The extreme temperatures would cause otherwise
harmless combustion processes to release deadly
pyrotoxins that would travel as gaseous clouds
beyond ground zero. For example, a woolen suit
when burned at extreme temperatures can release
enough hydrogen cyanide to kill seven people.
The shockwave generated by the blast would travel
at the speed of sound shaking the foundations of
buildings and bringing them down within a matter
of minutes. The damage radius increases with the
power of the bomb, approximately in proportion to
its cube root. If exploded at the optimum height,
therefore, a 10-megaton weapon, which is 1000
times as powerful as a 10-kiloton weapon, will
increase the distance tenfold, that is, out to
17.7 km (11 mi) for severe damage and 24 km(15
mi) for moderate damage.
Meanwhile, looming over the scene would be the
proverbial mushroom cloud. After the extreme heat
of the blast has dissipated, the debris cloud
would block sunlight, thereby decreasing the
proximate temperature below freezing. The effect
would be similar to the global temperature
decreases which occurred in 1991 when Mount
Pinatubo erupted in the Philippines.
The most insidious environmental damage of a
nuclear explosion would, however, result from the
release of radioactive materials that would
generate intensely penetrating energy capable of
causing cellular damage for years to come. In the
case of the Chernobyl disaster (which was not
even a deliberate explosion), a study conducted
by the US Centre for Disease Control and Yale
University estimated that out of the 115,000
people evacuated as a consequence of the 1986
incident, 24,000 would have a doubled risk of
acquiring acute leukemia.
This discussion may seem irrelevant to many
people who believe that since we are simply
developing the weapons as a deterrent, there is
no point in thinking about their actual use. What
we must remember is that there is always the
chance of an accident.
Even the usually reticent US Defence Nuclear
Agency has stated that "accidents have
occurred...which released radioactive
contamination because of fire or high explosive
detonations". It is very true that the West has
no moral authority to dictate terms of
disarmament to us when their own record is so
dismal. However, like other instances of colonial
emulation, must we South Asians also follow in
their footsteps when it comes to something as
supremely consequential as nuclear weapons?
Dr Saleem H Ali is associate dean for graduate
education at the University of Vermont's
Rubenstein School of Environment and on the
adjunct faculty of Brown University's Watson
Institute for International Studies. Email:
saleem at alum.mit.edu
______
[3] India's God Driven Secularism is 100 percent
religion and zero percent non religion
(i)
URL/ www.sacw.net/DC/CommunalismCollection/ArticlesArchive/MeeraNapril2008.html
www.sacw.net > Communalism Repository | 4 April 2008
GROWING HINDUISATION OF THE PUBLIC SPHERE IN INDIA
by Meera Nanda
"The world today is as furiously religious as it
ever was. ... Experiments with secularized
religions have generally failed; religious
movements with beliefs and practices dripping
with reactionary supernaturalism have widely
succeeded."
Peter Berger, Desecularization of the World
Those looking for evidence to back Peter Berger's
conclusion can do no better than take a closer
look at the religious landscape of India, the
"crouching tiger" of 21st-century global
capitalism.
India today is teeming with millions of educated,
relatively well-to-do men and women who
enthusiastically participate in global networks
of science and technology. The Indian economy is
betting its fortunes on advanced research in
biotechnology and the drug industry, whose very
existence is a testament to the naturalistic and
disenchanted understanding of the natural world.
And yet a vast majority of these middle-class
beneficiaries of modern science and technology
continue to believe in supernatural powers
supposedly embodied in idols, "god-men" or
"god-women," stars and planets, rivers, trees and
sacred animals. By all indications, they treat
supernatural beings and powers with utmost
earnestness and reverence and go to great lengths
to please them in the hopes of achieving their
desires.
According to the 2007 State of the Nation survey
conducted by the Centre for the Study of
Developing Societies among Indians, the level of
religiosity has gone up considerably in the past
five years. A mere five per cent of respondents
said that their religious belief had declined,
while 30 per cent said they had become more
religious. The same poll found that education and
exposure to modern urban life seem to make
Indians more, not less, religious: "Urban
educated Indians are more religious than their
rural and illiterate counterparts Š religiosity
has increased more in small towns and cities than
in villages."
Another measurable indicator of rising
religiosity is the tremendous rise in pilgrimages
or religious tourism. According to a recent study
by the National Council for Applied Economic
Research, "religious trips account for more than
50 per cent of all package tours, much higher
than leisure tour packages at 28 per cent." The
most recent figures show that in 2004, more than
23 million people visited the Lord Balaji temple
at Tirpuati, while 17.25 million trekked to the
mountain shrine of Vaishno Devi. Here I will
focus on Hindus, who make up nearly 85 per cent
of India's population. But they are not the only
ones who are becoming more religious: indicators
of popular religiosity are rising among Indian
Muslims, Christians and Sikhs as well.
Today's generation of Indian upper and middle
classes are not content with the de-ritualised,
slimmed-down, philosophised or secular-humanist
version of Hinduism that appealed to the earlier
generation of elites. They are instead looking
for "jagrit" or awake gods who respond to their
prayers and who fulfill their wishes - the kind
of gods that sociologists Rodney Starke and Roger
Finke, authors of Acts of Faith, describe as
"personal, caring, loving, merciful, close,
accessible Š all of which can be summed up in a
belief that 'there is someone up there who
cares'." The textual or philosophical aspects of
Sanskritic Hinduism have by no means diminished
in cultural prestige: they continue to serve as
the backdrop of "Vedic sciences" (as Hindu
metaphysics is sold these days), and continue to
attract a loyal following of spiritual seekers
from India and abroad. But what is changing is
simply that it is becoming fashionable to be
religious and to be seen as being religious. The
new elites are shedding their earlier reticence
about openly participating in religious rituals
in temples and in public ceremonies like kathas
and yagnas. If anything, the ritual dimension is
becoming more public and more ostentatious.
Not only are rituals getting more elaborate but
many village and working-class gods and goddesses
are being adopted by the middle classes, business
elites and non-resident Indians - a process of
Sanskritisation that has been called a
"gentrification of gods". Worship of local gods
and goddesses that until recently were associated
with the poor, illiterate and lower castes is
finding a new home in swank new suburbs with
malls and multiplexes. The enormous growth in the
popularity of the goddess called Mariamman or
Amma in the south and Devi or Mata in the rest of
the country is a case in point.
The natural question is why? What is fuelling
this middle-class devotion to "lesser" gods,
traditionally associated with the unlettered?
Devotees themselves provide a fairly cogent
explanation: they see these local gods as being
far more intimately familiar with, and responsive
to, the needs of ordinary people than the "great
gods" who live up there in the celestial sphere.
Rather than retiring their gods, as
secularisation theory expected, the emerging
middle classes in India are remaking them. The
local deities who were once considered guardians
of the village, and protected against scourges
like smallpox, are now being beseeched for
blessings for success in an increasingly
competitive urban environment.
How to explain this phenomenon? What motivates
educated, well-to-do urban sophisticates to
continue to believe in miracles and supernatural
beings? Social theory has only two standard
answers, neither of which fits the Indian data
very well.
The first answer has to do with economic
well-being. As has been recently shown with great
sophistication and care by Pippa Norris and
Ronald Inglehart in their book Sacred and
Secular, the level of belief in modern,
post-industrial societies bears a strong
correlation with the level of "existential
insecurity". On mapping religiosity against
income data from societies in North America,
Europe and Japan, Norris and Inglehart found that
the higher the income level, the lower the
religiosity as measured by frequency of prayer:
in aggregate terms, the poor turn out to be twice
as religious as the rich. The data from the
United States, for example, shows that two-thirds
of the least well-off prayed, compared with 47
per cent of the highest income group. According
to this view, religiosity does fall off and
people do become more secular in modern
industrial economies, except when they are caught
on the lower rungs of the economy in those
societies that do not provide public welfare.
This explanation does not adequately explain the
Indian data. Here we have the case of rising
religiosity among the already wealthy and the
upwardly mobile, whose level of material
well-being is fairly decent even by Western
standards.
The second explanation is that the growing
religiosity is a defensive reaction to
modernisation and Westernisation. Pavan Varma,
the author of the much-cited The Great Indian
Middle Class, treats religion as a refuge for the
alienated and lonely urbanites, uprooted from the
old, warm little communities they left behind in
villages. Varma simply assumes that the
transition to modern life in the cities must be
traumatic and drive the new middle classes to
seek out the consolation of God in the company of
fellow believers.
But insecurity and anomie do not appear to be the
most salient aspects of what is going on. There
is anxiety and insecurity among the newly
well-to-do as they face an increasingly
competitive economy with declining job security.
But there is also a sense of expanding horizons
and multiplying opportunities. The upwardly
mobile in urban India have, in the words of
researcher Maya Warrier, "done well for
themselves by seizing the educational and career
opportunities that came their way. Their
experience of the unprecedented pace and scale of
change had resulted not so much in a sense of
despair and alienation as in a sense of optimism
about multiple opportunities in most spheres of
life."
It is not despair or alienation, but rather
ambivalence over their new-found wealth that
seems a more plausible explanation of the growing
religiosity.
Modern gurus seem to ease this ambivalence by
giving new wealth a divine stamp of approval. "To
be rich is divine" is the message coming from
modern gurus who minister to the upper crust.
Swami Dayananda, the guru of successful
businessmen and women in Chennai, for example,
teaches a business-friendly version of Gita which
he sells as "a program for living" or a "plan for
life". Rather than renounce all desire, as Lord
Krishna teaches in the Bhagavad Gita, Dayananda's
version of the Gita teaches that "desires are a
manifestation of divinity that actuate people to
do things." "Practical moksha" does not mean
renunciation of these divine gifts but only that
they be brought under control of the will. Thus,
while claiming to teach the "eternal" message of
moksha which aimed at identification with the
Godhead, modern gurus dish out advice on how to
succeed in business.
Blessing the hyper-consumption of their
middle-class followers is only half the story.
Modern gurus also seem to help to take the edge
off guilt by teaching how to "balance" all that
consumerism with spiritual pursuits. Gurus like
Mata Amritanandamayi teach that "Western"
consumerism creates bad "karmic burden" which can
be negated, or at least "balanced", by performing
some of the rituals and pujas she prescribes. To
put it a bit flippantly, the cure for shopping is
more shopping - this time for spiritual products
and the services of gurus and priests. Surely a
win-win situation for all involved!
There is, however, another factor that is making
public expressions of religiosity fashionable,
namely the rising levels of triumphalism and
nationalism among the upwardly mobile. Polling
data from a Pew Global Attitude Survey revealed
that as many as 93 per cent of Indian respondents
- the highest in the world - agreed with the
statement "our people are not perfect, but our
culture is superior to others". In comparison,
Chinese, Japanese and even American public
opinion was far more self-critical and ambiguous
over the superiority of their cultures.
For educated Indians brought up on a steady diet
of religious, media and other cultural discourses
that constantly package Hindu signs and symbols
as the essence of Indian culture, it has become
almost second nature to conflate the two. Now
that India is becoming an important player in the
global market many are beginning to ascribe the
country's success to the superiority of "Hindu
values". This sentiment is being aggressively
promoted by gurus and tele-yogis like Swami
Ramdev, Swami Dayananda Saraswati, Sai Baba and a
host of others. Indeed, the public sphere is
replete with these messages of becoming more
Hindu in order to become more successful in the
global race for money and power.
On the face of it, contemporary popular Hinduism
appears to be the very epitome of a dynamic and
inventive religious tradition which is changing
to keep pace with the changing time. Clearly, all
the new gods, god-men/god-women, new temples and
rituals add up to an impressive inventory of
creative innovations that are allowing men and
women to take their gods with them as they step
into the heady, though unsettling, world
dominated by global corporate capitalism. But
there is an underside: the same innovations in
religious ritual and dogmas that are enabling the
"Great Indian Middle Class" to adjust to global
capitalism are also deepening a sense of Hindu
chauvinism, and widening the chasm between Hindus
and non-Hindu minorities. The banal, everyday
Hindu religiosity is simultaneously breeding a
banal, everyday kind of Hindu ultra-nationalism.
This kind of nationalism is not openly proclaimed
in fatwas, nor does it appear on the election
manifestos of political parties. Its power lies
in structuring the common sense of ordinary
people.
The net result is a new kind of political and
nationalistic Hinduism which is invented out of
old customs and traditions that people are fond
of and familiar with. Because it builds upon
deeply felt religiosity, it sucks in even those
who are not particularly anti-Muslim or
anti-Christian. Religious festivals, temple
rituals and religious discourses become so many
ways of "flagging" India as a Hindu nation, and
India's cultural superiority as due to its Hindu
spirituality.
The best way to describe the banality of Hindu
nationalism and the role of religion in it is to
show how it works.
The example comes from the recent inauguration of
Shri Hari Mandir, a new temple that opened in
Porbandar in Gujarat in February 2006. The grand
sandstone temple and the priest-training school
called Sandipani Vidyaniketan attached to it are
a joint venture of the Gujarat government, the
business house of the Ambanis and the charismatic
guru Rameshbhai Oza. The inauguration ceremony of
this temple-gurukul complex provides a good
example of how Hindu gods end up serving as props
for Hindu nationalism and Hindu supremacy.
According to the description provided by the
organisers themselves, the temple was inaugurated
by Bharion Singh Shekhawat, the vice-president of
the country, with the infamous chief minister
Narendra Modi in attendance. Also in attendance
were the widow of Dhirubhai Ambani and the rest
of the Ambani clan whose generous financial
donations had built the temple. Some 50,000
well-heeled devotees of Oza from India and abroad
crowded into the temple precincts to watch the
event.
The elected representatives of "secular" India,
in their official capacity, prayed before the
temple idols - something so routine that it
hardly evokes a response from anyone any more.
The prayer was followed by the national anthem
sung before the gods, followed by recital of the
Vedas by the student-priests, followed by a
Gujarati folk dance. This was followed by
speeches that liberally mixed up the gods and the
nation, with quite a bit of rhetoric about the
greatness of Hindu "science" thrown in for good
measure. Modi, the chief instigator of the 2002
Godhara riots between Hindus and Muslims, spoke
glowingly of the "tolerance" and "secularism" of
Hinduism. He went on to recommend that yagnas and
religious recitals be held all over the country
before undertaking any new construction because
Hinduism is "inherently ecological". Next came
Mrs Ambani, who urged mixing spirituality with
industry. The vice-president, in his turn, spoke
of how modern and scientific Hindu traditions
were, comparing the gods' weapons with modern
missiles and their vehicles with modern-day
helicopters.
The theme of the superiority of ancient Hindu
science was taken up a week later when the
president of India, Abdus Kalam, came down to the
temple-ashram complex to inaugurate its "science
museum", which highlights ancient Hindu
discoveries in astronomy/astrology, medicine
(ayurveda), architecture (vastu) and such.
Without ever questioning what validity the
Earth-at-the-centre astronomy/astrology of
Aryabhatta has in the modern world, the nuclear
physicist president went on to claim not only the
greatness of antiquity but also the continued
relevance of the ancients for "enriching" modern
astronomy. The ancients were smoothly turned into
the guiding lights of modern science - regardless
of the fact that their cosmology has been
falsified by it.
This is representative of how India's
state-temple-industrial complex works: the gods
become the backdrop, and the traditional puja the
medium, for asserting the Hindu-ness of India and
the greatness of both. Worship of the gods
becomes indistinguishable from the worship of
Hindu culture and the Indian nation. Devotees
come to listen to hymns sung to gods, but end up
worshipping a political ideology - and cannot
tell the difference. The cult of nation,
furthermore, is simultaneously turned into a cult
of "reason" and "science", without the critical
and empirical spirit of science.
Once the beloved and popular gods become
identified with the land and its culture, Hindu
nationalism becomes an everyday affair. No one
has to pass fatwas and there is no need to launch
a militant battle against the West. Hindu
nationalists have no use for such crude tools.
They would rather turn the worship of gods into
the worship of the nation and they would rather
beat the West by appropriating the West's
strengths in empirical sciences for their own
gods. The tragedy is that the religiosity of
ordinary believers provides the building blocks
for this banal, but far from benign, Hindu
nationalism.
Economic globalisation and neo-liberal reforms
have created the material and ideological
conditions in which a popular and ritualistic
Hindu religiosity is growing. Popular
religiosity, in turn, is being directed into a
mass ideology of Hindu supremacy and Hindu
nationalism.
This trend is a symptom of a deeper, more
fundamental malaise, namely the failure of
secularism. For all its professions of
secularism, the Indian state has not developed a
stance of either equal indifference to or equal
respect for all the many religions of India. It
has instead treated the religion of the majority
as the civic religion of the Indian nation
itself. The result is a deep and widespread
Hinduisation of the public sphere, which is only
growing under the conditions of globalisation.
This is adapted from Meera Nanda's forthcoming
book God and Globalization in India (Navayana
Publishers, New Delhi)
o o o
(ii)
URL: www.sacw.net/DC/CommunalismCollection/ArticlesArchive/gatade16ap2008.html
www.sacw.net > Communalism Repository | 16 April 2008
POOR KIRTIBHAI?
GROWING NEXUS BETWEEN 'SPIRITUAL' AND 'CRIMINAL'
by Subhash Gatade
Kiritbhai, a famous religious preacher, recently
found himself embroiled in a controversy of his
own making.
Forget the long speeches laced with religious
songs with devotees finding themselves
exhilarated, this time it was the turn of
Kiritbhai himself to listen to music albeit of a
different kind.
It was surprising to see him rushing to the
Bombay police complaining about the fraud
committed on him by a couple calling themselves
Jhunjhunwalas. In his complaint to the police the
religious preacher is reported to have told the
police that this fraudster couple won his
confidence and then took a loan from him and just
vanished.
The senior police officers rather found
themselves out of their wits when they discovered
that Kiritbhai, who preached a life of simplicity
and a turn away from the 'material world' had
loaned 35 million Rs. to the fraudster couple.
Definitely this was no small amount and it seems
they duly alerted the Income Tax people to know
for themselves the source of this income
As things stand today while the Bombay police is
trying to locate the fraudster couple, the income
tax people have also become active. For the
Income Tax sleuths the query is simple : how a
religious preacher who has no recognisable source
of income and who preaches virtues of Spartan
life could amass wealth to the tune of crores
which could be loaned at interest. ? And if one
were to believe a section of the media Kiritbhai
seems to have become incommunicado. When
'Newstoday' a hindi eveninger from Indore ( March
30 2008) tried to contact Kiritbhai to know his
version of the chain of events, he refused to
talk over this issue and claimed that he was
'right now in Bengal'.
It is for everyone to see that if Kiritbhai had
not rushed to the police and maintained silence
about this 'fraud committed on him', nobody could
have ever known the role monies play in the
spiritual world of jetriding sadhus and
globetrotting Bapus.
Of course, looking at the manner in which cases
against the high and the mighty are hushed up it
is not difficult to predict what would happen
next in this particular case. One fine morning
one can hear that Kiritbhai himself has 'decided'
(or one should say 'advised') to withdraw the
case to save himself from further embarrassment
claiming that it was a pure case of
miscommunication.
Our recent past is witness to a similar case of
coverup when CNN-IBN and Cobrapost had aired an
expose which showed godmen laundering money, in
the name of God, all for a commission (CNN-IBN
Posted Monday , May 07, 2007 at 08:11). The
government had then even promised 'swift and
strict' action in this case which had shocked the
entire country. Ramvilas Vedanti, Chairman of the
Ramjamabhoomi trust in Ayodhya, who is famous for
making inflammatory speeches against Muslims and
the secular fraternity, had appeared as a
pastmaster of money laundering and tax evasion in
the sting operation. He even shares a secret with
the interviewer that he has formed a separate
trust to facilitate his work of converting black
money to white money for a commission.
Looking at the fact that it was time of UP
elections and few of the godmen -who were caught
on the camera - had never tried to hide their
proximity to the Hindutva brigade, the expose had
then assumed political overtones. To offset the
damage to its image vis-a-vis the expose, the BJP
had questioned the authenticity of the sting
operation while the VHP had as usual tried to
raise the pitch over the fact that why hindus
were being victimised.
Titled 'Godmen turn Conmen, Taxman red' a writeup
on the group website had provided details of the
sting operation. (CNN-IBN Posted Sunday , May
06, 2007 at 20:30 Updated Monday , May 07, 2007
at 02)
New Delhi: Spiritual gurus, babas, Godmen - they
are known by many names and are often the
repository of a collective religious faith in
India.
But the faith has been maligned and many who
claim to be Godmen, promising to rid lives of
evil are nothing short of evil themselves.
After a CNN-IBN-Cobra Post investigation revealed
the ugly side of some the most popular Godmen,
sharp reactions have been pouring in.
The investigation caught these gurus - Pilot
Baba, a former Indian Air Force officer, Vedanti
Maharaj, former BJP MP and Guruvayur Surya
Namboodiri, who claims to be an astrologer - on
camera and showed how they used their positions
to launder money by bargaining like an
experienced conmen.
The Vishwa Hindu Parishad - to which Vedanti owes
his affiliation - seemed eager to distance itself
from the baba. VHP Vice President Giriraj Kishore
said Vedanti was not a part of the VHP and also
blamed the media.
"People like Vedanti are not worthy of being a
part of VHP. Also, I think a section of the media
is out to malign us. Otherwise what was the need
of Shankaracharya being arrested? All this is
being done to bring bad name to Hindus. This has
nothing to do with religion. Vedanti is not part
of any organisation," Kishore said.
As far as bringing these Godmen under law, it was
clear that criminal proceedings could have been
initiated against them. In a tete with the
CNN-IBN correspondent Shiv Pujan Jha spoke with
the former income tax commissioner Vishwabandhu
Gupta. Mr Gupta had strongly emphasised on
bringing these Godmen under the law. According to
him it was a "..[f]it case for criminal
proceedings. Two of the biggest religion mafias
are the Ram Janmanbhoomi Nyas and the Vishwa
Hindu Parishad amongst the Hindus. They have 10
bogus trusts floated from the same address. The
names are there (in our record) and so are the
addresses. They are getting money from 50
countries abroad and are also getting tax
exemptions. There are no accounts as well. You
see, this is a big menace. We have calculated and
found that religious leaders annually earn $3 bn
which is about Rs 10,000 crore -Rs 15,000 crore
worth of money. What they do is they get land at
throwaway prices. During the last government, 11
including that Sadhvi Ritambhara - whatever her
qualifications are - got a fantastic (sic) piece
of land at a throwaway price for the services
that she heads today. There have fraudulent
names, addresses, existences and expenditures.
They use it for spreading communal hatred. Money
has been used by Bajrang Dal cadres in Gujarat to
purchase Motorola, we have got receipts for
that." ( See : CNN-IBN Posted Sunday , May 06,
2007 at 20:30 Updated Monday , May 07, 2007 at 02)
Looking at the dilly-dallying by the state over
this expose Brinda Karat, leader of CPI(M) had
demanded action against the seven godmen who had
'admitted involvement in halwa operations on a
television programme' (The Hindu, 26 May 2007).
In a letter sent to home minister Shivraj Patil
she had categorically said : "These gentlemen run
Trusts and charitable foundations which are used
as cover for their nefarious and illegal
activities. They have cynically misused and made
a mockery of the faith of those who have become
their devotees. They have made crores through a
racket of helping tax evaders. But equally
important, the routes they have provided for
conversion of black money into white caneasily be
used [by] terrorist organisations and
anti-national elements to fund their activities,".
History bears witness to the fact that no action
was taken against the erring 'Godmen' despite
strong prima facie evidence against them.
Perhaps friends of Kiritbhai may ask the
government to emulate the approach adopted last
year.
______
[4] ON TIBET:
(i)
FRIENDLY FEUDALISM: THE TIBET MYTH
(updated and expanded version, January 2007)
I. For Lords and Lamas
Along with the blood drenched landscape of
religious conflict there is the experience of
inner peace and solace that every religion
promises, none more so than Buddhism. Standing in
marked contrast to the intolerant savagery of
other religions, Buddhism is neither fanatical
nor dogmatic--so say its adherents. For many of
them Buddhism is less a theology and more a
meditative and investigative discipline intended
to promote an inner harmony and enlightenment
while directing us to a path of right living.
Generally, the spiritual focus is not only on
oneself but on the welfare of others. One tries
to put aside egoistic pursuits and gain a deeper
understanding of one's connection to all people
and things. "Socially engaged Buddhism" tries to
blend individual liberation with responsible
social action in order to build an enlightened
society.
A glance at history, however, reveals that not
all the many and widely varying forms of Buddhism
have been free of doctrinal fanaticism, nor free
of the violent and exploitative pursuits so
characteristic of other religions. In Sri Lanka
there is a legendary and almost sacred recorded
history about the triumphant battles waged by
Buddhist kings of yore. During the twentieth
century, Buddhists clashed violently with each
other and with non-Buddhists in Thailand, Burma,
Korea, Japan, India, and elsewhere. In Sri Lanka,
armed battles between Buddhist Sinhalese and
Hindu Tamils have taken many lives on both sides.
In 1998 the U.S. State Department listed thirty
of the world's most violent and dangerous
extremist groups. Over half of them were
religious, specifically Muslim, Jewish, and
Buddhist. 1
In South Korea, in 1998, thousands of monks of
the Chogye Buddhist order fought each other with
fists, rocks, fire-bombs, and clubs, in pitched
battles that went on for weeks. They were vying
for control of the order, the largest in South
Korea, with its annual budget of $9.2 million,
its millions of dollars worth of property, and
the privilege of appointing 1,700 monks to
various offices. The brawls damaged the main
Buddhist sanctuaries and left dozens of monks
injured, some seriously. The Korean public
appeared to disdain both factions, feeling that
no matter what side took control, "it would use
worshippers' donations for luxurious houses and
expensive cars." 2
As with any religion, squabbles between or within
Buddhist sects are often fueled by the material
corruption and personal deficiencies of the
leadership. For example, in Nagano, Japan, at
Zenkoji, the prestigious complex of temples that
has hosted Buddhist sects for more than 1,400
years, "a nasty battle" arose between Komatsu the
chief priest and the Tacchu, a group of temples
nominally under the chief priest's sway. The
Tacchu monks accused Komatsu of selling writings
and drawings under the temple's name for his own
gain. They also were appalled by the frequency
with which he was seen in the company of women.
Komatsu in turn sought to isolate and punish
monks who were critical of his leadership. The
conflict lasted some five years and made it into
the courts. 3
But what of Tibetan Buddhism? Is it not an
exception to this sort of strife? And what of the
society it helped to create? Many Buddhists
maintain that, before the Chinese crackdown in
1959, old Tibet was a spiritually oriented
kingdom free from the egotistical lifestyles,
empty materialism, and corrupting vices that
beset modern industrialized society. Western news
media, travel books, novels, and Hollywood films
have portrayed the Tibetan theocracy as a
veritable Shangri-La. The Dalai Lama himself
stated that "the pervasive influence of Buddhism"
in Tibet, "amid the wide open spaces of an
unspoiled environment resulted in a society
dedicated to peace and harmony. We enjoyed
freedom and contentment." 4
A reading of Tibet's history suggests a somewhat
different picture. "Religious conflict was
commonplace in old Tibet," writes one western
Buddhist practitioner. "History belies the
Shangri-La image of Tibetan lamas and their
followers living together in mutual tolerance and
nonviolent goodwill. Indeed, the situation was
quite different. Old Tibet was much more like
Europe during the religious wars of the
Counterreformation." 5 In the thirteenth century,
Emperor Kublai Khan created the first Grand Lama,
who was to preside over all the other lamas as
might a pope over his bishops. Several centuries
later, the Emperor of China sent an army into
Tibet to support the Grand Lama, an ambitious
25-year-old man, who then gave himself the title
of Dalai (Ocean) Lama, ruler of all Tibet.
[. . .]
FULL TEXT at: www.michaelparenti.org/Tibet.html
o o o
(ii)
Indian Express
April 15, 2008
WHY TIBET MATTERS
To sacrifice Tibet's interests would be to sacrifice our own.
by Sonia Jabbar
Is Tibet a nuisance for India, and when it
negotiates with China on the border issue, should
India unhesitatingly sacrifice Tibetan interests
to secure our own? While there has been much talk
about the burden of hosting the Dalai Lama and
1,85,000 Tibetan refugees for 50 years, few have
acknowledged India's debt to them and why
repaying that debt is not only a moral imperative
but a strategically self-interested one.
The first is a civilisational debt. When the
Dalai Lama teaches from the works of the
Vikramshila or Nalanda masters, he always
prefaces his teachings with, "these are Indian
treasures. We have only been its guardians in
Tibet for a thousand years, and now that the
teachings have faded in India we have brought
them back intact. This is the gift we return to
India." It is no small gift.
Few will recall the sacking of Nalanda, the
destruction of thousands of birch-bark books or
the fact that Buddhism itself disappeared from
Indian soil after the 13th century. Ask an
educated Indian whether Shantideva, Atisha,
Nagarjuna, Aryadeva, or Vasubandhu mean anything
to them and chances are you'll draw a blank. Ask
a Tibetan teenager and you're likely to hear the
history of the Indian Buddhist masters and the
journey of their teachings to Tibet from 7th-11th
century AD.
Nalanda, once the greatest centre of Buddhist
learning from the 5th to 12th centuries, today
lives in spirit not amongst its archaeological
remains in Bihar, but in the vibrant Tibetan
colleges of Sera, Drepung and Ganden, relocated
in Karnataka after the Tibetan exodus of 1959.
These are modeled on the Nalanda tradition,
transmitting India's ancient treasures to
meritorious students, many of whom are poor
Indian Buddhists from the Himalayan belt.
The second debt is strategic and vital to India's
future. The Government of India has been at pains
to 'reiterate' that they have 'always' considered
Tibet an integral part of China; our Communists
have insisted that the 'disturbances' are China's
'internal matter.' The fact is that the 'always'
is only five years old, and the 'internal matter'
a crumbling fantasy.
In November 1950, Nehru informed the chief
ministers, 'When news came to us that the Chinese
Government had formally announced military
operations against Tibet, we were surprised and
distressed. Immediately we sent a note of protest
[to Chou En Lai on 26/10/50] and requested the
Chinese Government not to proceed... To use
coercion and armed force, when a way to peaceful
settlement is open, is always wrong. To do so
against a country like Tibet, which is obviously
not in a position to offer much resistance and
which could not injure China, seemed to us to add
to the wrongness of this behaviour.'
India unilaterally 'recognised' the 'Tibet
Autonomous Region,' as 'a territory of China,'
for the first time during Vajpayee's China visit
in 2003. Before this, India's terminology in
official documents was deliberately left
ambiguous. In 1954 India described Tibet as a
geographic location: 'the Tibet region of China.'
In 1988, the Rajiv Gandhi government brought it
closer to China's position, but still kept it
vague enough with, 'Tibet is an autonomous region
of China.' The 2003 declaration toes the Chinese
line word-for-word.
What are the implications of accepting Tibet as
an 'integral part of China'? First, leaving aside
the distortion of Tibet's long history of
independence, the declaration contravenes the
treaty obligations between British India and
Tibet, which we have inherited under the Indian
Independence Act of 1947. Two treaties directly
affect our territorial integrity: the 1904
Convention Between Great Britain and Tibet, which
recognises the boundary between Tibet and Sikkim,
and the Anglo-Tibet Treaty of 1914, in which
India recognised Tibet as an independent nation
under the suzerainty (as opposed to sovereignty)
of China. In return, Tibet was to respect the Mc
Mahon Line, the eastern boundary between Tibet
and Arunachal. Until the Chinese invasion of
Tibet, both agreements held and the border was
peaceful.
China has never accepted Sikkim and Arunachal as
parts of India, even today claiming the latter as
its own. But when two countries have concluded an
agreement between them, China has no locus standi
as a third country. A sovereign state is one that
negotiates and sign treaties with other states.
Once a state exists it cannot simply be wished
away simply because another nation has invaded it.
That the world does not wish to challenge China's
illegal occupation of Tibet thus rendering it a
de facto (not de jure) part of China is another
matter. However, it is pertinent to ask why the
Government of India is so solicitous of China's
national interests at the expense of our own. If
China refuses to recognise the treaties signed by
India and Tibet, there is no reason for India to
recognise the 17-point 1951 agreement, thrust
upon Tibet under Chinese gunpoint. China
possesses no other legal documents to prove its
claims over Tibet.
We have learned few lessons in foreign policy.
India unilaterally surrendered its influence in
Tibet in the 1954 trade agreement with China by
removing its military personnel from the Tibetan
trading towns of Yatung and Gyantse, giving up
Indian rest houses, land, and Tibet's
communications including the postal, telegraph
and public telephone services operated by the
Government of India. The agreement had a validity
of eight years, and it is no coincidence that its
expiry coincided with the 1962 war. If those who
parrot the 'Tibet is an integral part of China'
line paused to think, they would realise that
they are unwittingly conceding China's claim over
83,743 sq km of Arunachal territory.
The Dalai Lama's 'middle way' position has been
clear since the mid-'80s: autonomy and not
independence. It begs the question why, if China
is willing to pursue a 'one country, two systems'
policy in the Han-majority areas of Taiwan, Hong
Kong and Macau, is it so hysterically opposed to
the Tibetan proposals. In 1999 Wang Lixion, a
prominent Chinese intellectual, pointed out that
an independent or autonomous Tibet under the
influence of the Dalai Lama, 'would naturally
orient it towards India,' taking 2.5 million sq
km or 26 per cent of China's land mass away from
China's sphere of influence into India's. To lose
this vast swathe of land would be to 'expose
[China's] fatal underbelly.' It should be
understood that it is not on its demerits that
the Dalai Lama's proposals are being rejected,
but because of India's potential influence.
While one is not advocating India's lebensraum or
hostilities with China, one should be aware that
China controls the headwaters of many Indian
rivers that originate in the Tibetan plateau.
India is already facing acute water shortages.
China has already anticipated its future water
problems by damming the headwaters of the Sutlej
and Brahmaputra. While the 'thirsty' provinces of
Xingjian and Gansu will undoubtedly benefit by
China's plans to divert the waters of the
Brahmaputra, India needs to wake up well before
our rivers begin drying up.
It is time we recognised that Tibet and India's
destinies are entwined. To sacrifice Tibet's
interests would mean to sacrifice our own. There
is no need to go down that road again.
The writer is a journalist who has studied Buddhism for the last 20 years
______
[5]
The Hindu
April 16, 2008
TRIUMPH OF THE NEW MAINSTREAM IN NEPAL
by Siddharth Varadarajan
By voting in the Maoists, the Nepali people have
chosen the party most likely to push for an
egalitarian society and inclusive republican
system in the Constituent Assembly. India must
not only respect the verdict but also help the
new government implement its democratic mandate.
After failing to recognise the obvious
groundswell of support that had built up for the
Maoists in the run-up to the Constituent Assembly
(CA) elections in Nepal, India needs to move
quickly to adjust itself to the new power
balance. Despite receiving reliable field reports
of the widespread support the Maoists were
enjoying across the country, South Block deluded
itself into believing that the former rebels
would be at best a distant third. Bogus surveys
commissioned by t he U.S. embassy in Kathmandu in
which the Maoists were shown as winning only 8 to
10 per cent of the popular vote started
circulating within the corridors of power in New
Delhi. Accordingly, the foreign office's
contingency planning revolved around coping with
the fallout of a poor showing by the former
rebels. Even here, the official assessments
showed scant understanding of the ground reality
with improbable scenarios like a Maoist "urban
insurrection" being bandied about.
Predictably, no attention was paid to exploring
the consequences of a Maoist victory. Indeed, so
confident was the Manmohan Singh government of
its assessment that National Security Advisor
M.K. Narayanan issued a certificate of approval
for the Nepali Congress barely a week before the
polling day. That India was extending a 'helping
hand' to the campaigns of the NC as well as the
Communist Party of Nepal (Unified
Marxist-Leninist) was not a secret. The Indian
role in boosting the profile of at least two
Madhesi political outfits was also quite
significant. But publicly taking sides on the eve
of elections was not only improper but unwise as
well. It is testimony to the statesmanship of the
Maoist leadership that it preferred quietly to
convey its concerns about Mr. Narayanan's remarks
to New Delhi rather than making public
accusations of Indian interference.
Though India was caught off-balance by the
Maoists' stunning victory, the government has
begun to correct the impression that it has been
discomfited by the verdict. External Affairs
Minister Pranab Mukherjee described the result as
a "positive development" and senior officials say
they are looking forward to working with the
Maoist-led coalition government which will rule
Nepal till the Constitution is finalised and
fresh elections are held in 2010. This is as it
should be. After all, India played an important
role in facilitating the Nepal peace process and
effecting a "soft-landing" for the Maoists. Where
New Delhi erred was in assuming that the NC and
the UML represented the Nepali "mainstream" into
which the Maoists were being brought. In reality,
years of compromise with the monarchy had
destroyed the credibility of these two parties
and the subterranean balance of forces inside
Nepal had already tilted in favour of the
Maoists. By the time of the Jan Andolan of 2006,
it was the Maoist demand for an end to the
monarchy and the election of a Constituent
Assembly which had captured the imagination of
the people, even if the Maoists were not at the
head of the mass movement in Kathmandu.
Over the past two years, the Maoists succeeded in
pushing the envelope further, winning popular
acceptance for their slogans of an inclusive,
federal republic as well as for a more equitable
voting system. Nepal's political elite and
sections of the Indian establishment who feared
losing control of the entire process sought to
derail the momentum the former rebels had built
up. The proposal for a fully proportional
election system was blocked and the Madhesi
agitation encouraged as a means of weakening the
Maoists. None of these efforts succeeded. The
Maoists contested the CA election as the creators
of the new mainstream. And it is hardly
surprising that the people of Nepal should have
chosen them to lead the process of writing the
country's constitution.
Consensual process
To be sure, this process will have to be a
consensual one. There is no way the Maoists will
win more than 250 seats in the 601-strong CA. In
any case, the Interim Constitution established
consensus or a two-thirds majority as the
principle for taking decisions. So, having even a
simple majority is of little practical
significance. The Maoists have been quick to
emphasise their commitment to running a coalition
government, but the NC and the UML have so far
not been forthcoming about where they stand.
Indeed, it is possible that hardliners within
these two parties may suggest staying out of
government in order to make life difficult for
the Maoists. What happens on the coalition front,
therefore, is the first major challenge the
Maoist leadership will have to deal with. Having
emerged victorious in a bitterly fought election
campaign marred by violence in some areas, the
onus is on the Maoists to reach out to all the
other parties, especially the big two. The
Maoists will have the right to name one of their
own as Prime Minister and also keep the Home,
Defence and Finance portfolios for themselves.
But every effort should be made to include the
other parties in the cabinet. To the extent to
which the UML or even the NC (under the
parliamentary leadership of Sher Bahadur Deuba)
may baulk at such an arrangement, India must be
prepared to offer its good offices to counsel the
two parties against playing the role of spoilers.
Madhesi issue
The second challenge for the Maoists will be the
inclusion of the Madhesi parties in the governing
coalition. Given the bad blood between the
Maoists and Upendra Yadav of the Madhesi
Janadhikar Forum, this is easier said than done.
Mr. Yadav is an unpredictable quantity with
questionable affiliations and associations. His
activists have been directly or indirectly
responsible for the killing of dozens of Maoist
cadres. If any outside power or agency were
interested in destabilising the Maoist-led
government, using the MJF would be their first
line of attack. Which is why the Maoists have to
find an effective way of neutralising this
threat. Inclusion in the coalition is one way.
Handling the underlying grievances of the Madhesi
people with grace and sensitivity is another.
The third challenge Nepal's new rulers will have
to confront immediately is in many ways the most
difficult one - overseeing the integration of the
People's Liberation Army with the Nepal Army.
Integration is a formal part of the peace process
and the seven party alliance is formally
committed to seeing it through. Until now, the
Nepal Army brass has publicly opposed integration
but with the Maoists likely to head the Defence
Ministry soon, the generals will have to fall in
line. Maoist leader Prachanda has said in the
past that Nepal does not need such a large army
but any drawing down of numbers will have to be
accompanied by a plan to re-absorb those being
demobilised into some kind of productive
employment. What form integration will take and
what the overall size of the Nepal Army should
be, thus, are issues that need sorting out. The
Maoist leadership needs to handle this question
with a great deal of sensitivity and tact. But it
is essential that the international community not
send out wrong signals on the question of
civilian control over the military.
The fourth hurdle to be overcome is the
continuing designation of the Nepali Maoists as a
terrorist organisation by the United States.
Former President Jimmy Carter has publicly called
for this designation to be withdrawn but no
organisation that has been so named by the U.S.
has ever been taken off the terrorist list. Here,
India will have to take the lead in counselling
Washington - its supposed 'strategic partner' -
to abandon its pig-headed approach to Nepal.
On the bilateral front, it is natural that
Nepal's relationship with India will undergo a
change. The relationship until now has been one
of unequals and the very public perception of
this inequality inside Nepal has actually served
to limit what India has been able to do on the
economic front. In the long run, India will find
that a democratic, self-confident Nepal will be a
far better friend and partner than the monarchy
which it supported for years ever was. In the
meantime, however, it is essential that New Delhi
not seek to press too hard on the gas pedal. The
internal political dynamics of Nepal first need
to recover from the shock the electorate has
delivered. Large hydroelectric projects, even if
scrupulously for mutual benefit, will have to
wait till then.
All told, the election results are good news for
both Nepal and India. Rather than looking at the
rise of the Maoists with fear and trepidation,
the Indian establishment needs to do what it can
to help Nepal's new coalition government fulfil
its democratic mandate.
______
[6] Publication Announcement:
FEDERALISM, NATIONALISM AND DEVELOPMENT INDIA AND THE PUNJAB ECONOMY
Author: Pritam Singh
ISBN: 978-0-415-45666-1 (hardback) 978-0-203-93020-5 (electronic)
Originally Published On: February 2008
Series: Routledge Contemporary South Asia Series
Subjects: Economics and Development; Politics &
Development; South Asia - Regional Development;
Publisher: Routledge, UK
Summary
This book throws new light on the study of
India's development through an exploration of the
triangular relationship between federalism,
nationalism and the development process. It
focuses on one of the seemingly paradoxical cases
of impressive development and sharp federal
conflicts that have been witnessed in the state
of Punjab. The book concentrates on the federal
structure of the Indian polity and it examines
the evolution of the relationship between the
centre and the state of Punjab, taking into
account the emergence of Punjabi Sikh nationalism
and its conflict with Indian nationalism.
Providing a template to analyse regional
imbalances and tensions in national economies
with federal structures and competing
nationalisms, this book will not only be of
interest to researchers on South Asian Studies,
but also to those working in the fields of
politics, political economy, geography and
development.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction 2. The Geography and the
Political Economy of Punjab: An Historical
Overview of Punjab-Centre Relations 3.
Federalism, Nationalism and India's Development
Strategy: An Historical Overview 4. Federal
Financial Relations in India and their
Implications for Centre-Punjab Financial
Relations 5. Centre-State Relations in
Agriculture and their Implications for Punjab
Agriculture 6. Centre-State Relations in
Industry and their Implications for the Pattern
of Industrial Development in Punjab 7. Summary
and Conclusions. Appendix: Ranking of States and
Union Territories According to Population 1991
and 2001
Reviews
'India's sub-nationalisms come draped in
discourses of culture but Pritam Singh's thesis
is that the paramountcy of the project of Indian
nation-building has forced individual states to
play idiosyncratic roles - with profound
consequences for the character of their
sub-nationalisms. He illustrates this
dramatically with the case of Punjab. Through
flows of public finance the agricultural wealth
of this culturally and geopolitically distinctive
state has been harnessed nationally to the
detriment of its balanced development. By 1991,
Punjab was a curious paradox - a rich food bowl
with a stunted industrial economy. Through his
fine-grained research, Pritam Singh has made a
significant contribution to our understanding of
the politics of cultural aspiration and the
political economy of federalism.' - Barbara
Harriss-White, University of Oxford, UK
'Dr Singh's book must be read by those interested
in modern India. It deals with the central issue
in Indian politics and planning at a pivotal
stage in the nation's development.' - Ceri Peach,
University of Oxford, UK
'This book is a major contribution to the
political economy of the Punjab, to the analysis
of centre-state relations in the
post-independence Indian union, and to the study
of regional economic development in
federally-organised states. One of its strengths
is its wide reach in terms of scholarship and
analysis - it integrates knowledge from economic
history, ethnic studies, geography and
constitutional analysis.' - Colin Clarke,
University of Oxford, UK
______
[7] ANNOUNCEMENTS:
(i)
April 15, 2008
Invitation
Dear Sir/Madam
Joint Action Committee for Peoples Rights is
holding a seminar on Wednesday 16th April 2008 at
03:30pm to 05:30pm at Lahore Press Club. The
Topic of the Seminar will be "GO MUSHRAF GO".
Please join.
Kind Regards
Shahtaj Qizilbash
Convener
JAC
---
(ii)
THE SECOND FLOOR: A WEEKEND OF CULTURE JAMMING, MUSIC AND MOVIES
Compelling Conversations: The Manufacture of Consent
Date: 18th April 2008 | Time: 7:00 pm
The dominant public role of our time has shifted
from citizen to consumer. Respondents in polls
typically cite entertainment, shopping, and other
consumer activities as their top free time
preferences. Advertising creates environments
carefully constructed to avoid politics and real
world problems that might disturb these consumer
impulses.
Join us this Friday for short films and graphic
design that examine the dangers inherent in an
industry that has forgotten the difference
between the public good and the bottom line.
The work of Rabeea Arif, a Karachi-based graphic
design graduate of Karachi University, will be on
display.
Date: Friday, 18th April 2008
Time: 7:00 pm
Gurus Trilogy Live at The Second Floor
Date: 19th April 2008 | Time: 9:00 pm
This Saturday, join us at T2F for a performance
by Gurus Trilogy. The lineup features:
Glenn John on Vocals
Mohsin Shehbaz on Keyboards
Sayyam Rana on Guitar
Yasir Ijaz on Bass
The show, which will be opened by Gunnah, features two special guests:
Alfred D'Melo of Mizmaar on Drums
Shehzad Naseem of Mizraab on Rhythm Guitar
Date: Saturday, 19th April 2008
Time: 9:00 pm
Minimum Donation: Rs. 200
Sunday Screenings at The Second Floor: HAIR
Date: 20th April 2008 | Time: 3:00 pm
HAIR is a 1979 film based on the 1968 Broadway
musical of the same name about a Vietnam war
draftee who meets and befriends a tribe of
long-haired hippies on his way to the army
induction center. Directed by Milo” Forman, the
musical tells the story of a group of politically
active, long-haired "Hippies of the Age of
Aquarius" fighting against conscription to the
Vietnam War and living a bohemian life together
in New York City. They struggle to balance their
young lives, loves and the sexual revolution with
their pacifist rebellion against the war and the
conservative impulses of their parents and
society.
Running Time: 121 Minutes
Date: Sunday, 20th April 2008
Time: 3:00 pm
Minimum Donation: Anything you like
Venue: The Second Floor (t2f)
6-C, Prime Point Building, Phase 7, Khayaban-e-Ittehad, DHA, Karachi
538-9273 | 0300-823-0276 | info at t2f.biz
---
(ii)
GENDER OF "TERROR"
May 2, 2008
9:15am to 5:30 pm
California Room, UCLA Faculty Center
Co-sponsored by the Division of Humanities; the
Division of Social Sciences; School of Theater,
Film, and TV; Center for India and South Asia;
Department of Anthropology; Asian American
Studies Center; Department of Women's Studies;
Department of Comparative Literature; Department
of Asian American Studies.
The conference is free and open to the public.
Schedule
8:45 - 9:15 Breakfast
9:15 - 9:30 Opening Remarks by Purnima Mankekar
9:30 - 11:30 am Session 1
The State/Civil Society
Focusing on the role of states, civil societies,
and NGOs in the politics of terror,
counter-terrorism, state-endorsed terror, and
peacekeeping
Panel Chair: Susan Slyomovics
Respondent: Akhil Gupta
SUSAN BUCK-MORSS
Race, Gender, Terror, and The End of an Era:
National Elections in the Global Public Sphere
MALATHI DE ALWIS
Politicizing Grief in the Wake of Atrocity
INDERPAL GREWAL
Gendering Domesticity, Security and Terror
11:30 - 1:00 Lunch in Hacienda Room
1:00 - 3:00 pm Session 2
Mediation
Investigating the representational practices that construct terror
Panel Chair: Kathleen McHugh
Respondent: Purnima Mankekar
LORI ALLEN
Who Speaks the Nation's Suffering
Mothers of Martyrs in the Palestinian Intifada
PAOLA BACCHETTA
The Construction of "Terror" in the Bush Regime's Discourses
JENNIFER TERRY
Shock and Awe on the Internet
Viral Video and New Tactics of Terror
3:00 - 3:30 Break
3:30 - 5:30 pm Session 3
The Law/Citizenship
How legal discourses and practices of citizenship
constitute the very category of terror.
Panel Chair: TBD
Respondent: Juliet Williams
VEENA DUBAL
When Gandhi Left Gujarat
Legal Trials (and Failures) Amidst State Terror
SUNAINA MAIRA
"Good" and "Bad" Muslim Citizens
Feminists, Terrorists and U.S. Orientalisms
SHERENE RAZACK
Racial Terror and the Trade in Mythologies
5:30 - 6:30 pm Closing Remarks/Reception
UCLA CENTER FOR THE STUDY OF WOMEN
Box 957222 * Public Affairs (formerly Public
Policy) 1500 * Los Angeles, CA 90095-7222 *
campus mailcode: 722203
310-825-0590 (T) * 310-825-0456 (F)
Email: csw at csw.ucla.edu * Director: Kathleen McHugh
_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/
Buzz for secularism, on the dangers of fundamentalism(s), on
matters of peace and democratisation in South
Asia. SACW is an independent & non-profit
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