SACW | April 14-15, 2008 / Democratic Regression in Sri Lanka / Nepal: Ethno-nationalism / India: human rights | Glucose for Lok Sabha?

[Harsh Kapoor]

South Asia Citizens Wire | April 14-15, 2008 | 
Dispatch No. 2504 - Year 10 running

[1] Terrorism and Democratic Regression in Sri Lanka (Neil DeVotta)
[2] Nepal: Ethno-nationalism and federalism (Deepak Thapa)
    +  The rumblings in Nepal's Tarai Inside Nepal (Siddharth Varadarajan)
[3] India: 
(i) Human Rights Watch Letter to Prime Minister Manmohan Singh of India
(ii) India should investigate all allegations of 
enforced disappearances in Jammu and Kashmir 
(Amnesty Int'l)
[4] India: Glucose for Lok Sabha? (Jean Drèze and Reetika Khera)
[5] Announcements: PERSISTENCE/RESISTANCE - A 
Festival of Documentary Films (New Delhi, April 
28-30)

______


[1]

Economic & Political Weekly
April 5, 2008

TERRORISM AND DEMOCRATIC REGRESSION IN SRI LANKA

by Neil DeVotta

The military endeavour of the hardline Rajapaksa 
regime is only helping the chauvinist ideologies 
of ethnocentrism subscribed to by both the 
Sinhala nationalists as well as the separatist 
Liberation

Tigers of Tamil Eelam.

The ongoing war between the Sri Lankan government 
and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE)
is more intense than the violence that pre- ceded 
the February 2002 ceasefire agree- ment. In 
addition to fighting the Sri Lankan troops along 
front lines, the LTTE has targeted Sinhalese 
civilians in the south, thereby hoping to force 
the security forces to spread out, undermine the 
island's economy, and destabilise the Mahinda 
Rajapaksa government. The Sri Lankan government 
has made strategic gains in the eastern province 
and currently en- joys the upper hand in northern 
areas. It has in the process resorted to 
indiscrimi- nate bombing of LTTE controlled 
areas, targeted civilians using troops and para- 
military proxies, and tolerated the extor- tion, 
torture, and kidnapping of Tamils (and some 
Muslims).

The Rajapaksa government is not the first to 
believe it could impose a military solution to 
the ethnic conflict. But it is the and brazenly 
disregard international  opinion on minorities' 
fundamental human rights and tolerate insensate, 
insouciant, and even gratuitous violence against 
Tamil civilians. It does so because its ideology 
is rooted in Sinhalese Buddhist superordination 
and Tamil (and minority) subordination; it has 
the support of the majority Sinhalese Buddhists 
to end the conflict militarily (and this 
sentiment is most gung ho when they believe the 
military is being victorious and maybe why the 
defence ministry on a daily basis releases 
fantastic numbers on LTTE casu- alties); and the 
post 9/11 "war against terrorism" milieu 
tolerates states resorting to terrorism to defeat 
terrorism. The  Rajapaksa government thus loves 
parroting the phrase "terrorism anywhere is 
terror- ism everywhere" to vitiate accusations 
its own terrorist practices in the north-east.

Secessionism's Undermining

The recent military gains by the Sri Lankan 
government highlight two major lessons regarding 
separatism in the modern era. First, a 
secessionist movement with no regional or 
international help cannot succeed against a state 
willing to retaliate with brute force 
(indiscriminate bombings, murder, kidnappings, 
extortion, rape and torture). Second, a 
separatist move- ment must adhere to basic norms 
even as it militates against the state it seeks 
to separate from: not doing so undermines the 
movement. In this sense, Tamil sepa- ratism may 
have been justifiable, given the ethnocentrism 
and racism successive Sinhalese governments 
resorted to since 1956. But the means especially 
the LTTE adopted - assassinating non-LTTE Tamil 
militants, not tolerating even the slightest 
dissent among Tamils, forcibly recruiting 
children for combat, extorting Tamils in Sri 
Lanka and abroad, killing politicians (president 
Ranasinghe Premadasa and former prime minister 
Rajiv Gandhi), and murdering innocent Sinhalese 
using suicide bombers and other methods - 
undermined the moral imperatives justi- fying the 
demand for Eelam. Indeed, when the March 2004 
split within the LTTE and its subsequent 
reversals are taken into consideration, one may 
con- clude that it was not so much the Sri Lankan 
military forces but the fissures and 
contradictions within Tamil militancy that 
ultimately undermined the Tamil quest for 
secession.

Even if the LTTE was able to control the 
territory it claims as Eelam, the inter- national 
community cannot allow a sepa- rate state in Sri 
Lanka as that would be a victory for terrorism. 
But a military defeat of the LTTE would also be a 
victory for ethnocentrism, and this is what the 
current regime in Sri Lanka craves. For those who 
subscribe to the Sinhalese Buddhist nationalist 
ideology, the Tamils who dared challenge Sri 
Lanka's unitary status need to be defeated 
militarily and humiliated.  To their minds, the 
LTTE's past victories merely add to the colonial 
era humilia- tions Sinhalese Buddhists suffered; 
and the community's self-respect can be  regained 
and the nationalist project ad- vanced only if 
the LTTE (and Tamils) are in turn humiliated 
irredeemably.

Rajapaksa Dynasty

Furthermore, the Rajapaksas would like to create 
their own south Asian political  dynasty. What 
better way to do so than defeat the LTTE and 
claim to be protectors and preservers of the 
nation a la Dutugamunu (the second century BC 
Sinhalese Buddhist king who defeated a reigning 
Tamil king and whose embellished and dissembled 
exploits have been deftly used by Sinhalese 
Buddhist nationalists to whip up anti- Tamil 
sentiment). This narrative promot- ing the 
Rajapaksas is now being produced using rhetoric 
and varied imagery. There are quite a few signals 
that this regime in- tends to perpetuate its 
governance by hook or by crook - (1) The recent 
statement by the defence secretary (who is the 
presi- dent's brother) that a constitutional 
amendment should be introduced to ensure he 
continues as defence secretary irrespec- tive of 
who succeeds Mahinda Rajapaksa, (2) nearly 150 
relatives from the Rajapaksa clan being provided 
influential state ap- pointments and sinecures, 
(3) nearly 80 per cent of the country's budget 
being controlled by Mahinda Rajapaksa and his 
three siblings through their ministerial port- 
folios, and (4) the president's attempts to 
prevent the constitutional council taking effect, 
which allows him to arbitrarily make top 
government appointments.  Thus, the strategy to 
corral the eastern province for Sinhalese and 
pro-government Tamil paramilitaries is not only 
designed to further Sinhalese Buddhist coloni- 
sation in these predominantly minority are- as; 
it is also to ensure the votes of Tamils (who do 
not support the Sri Lanka Free- dom Party and 
loathe this particular gov-ernment) can be 
"controlled" in future elec-tions - especially 
during the next presidential election when 
Mahinda Rajapaksa seeks re-election.

The Rajapaksa government continues to claim that 
LTTE terrorism is the biggest threat facing Sri 
Lanka. It is correct,  although this represents a 
short-term  obstacle in that the LTTE, especially 
in light of recent reversals, cannot last as a 
potent military outfit indefinitely. Tamils in 
the  diaspora have taken heart upon seeing 
Kosovo's self-proclaimed independence recognised 
by leading states, and they be- lieve if the LTTE 
can hold out against the government's 
no-holds-barred military campaign the 
international community would have no choice but 
intervene more forcefully in Sri Lanka. But the 
Rajapaksa government is convinced that time is on 
its side and that the death of LTTE leaders, 
especially Prabhakaran, would cause the 
organisation to further splinter or com- pletely 
crumble. In the meantime, innocent civilians pay 
a devastating price enduring macabre injuries and 
lost lives.

Enduring Illiberalism

This means that the bigger (and long-term) danger 
facing Sri Lanka is the anti- democratic and 
illiberal forces currently holding sway and 
justifying their insidious practices by 
manipulating the war against the LTTE. Indeed, 
what is not been recognised sufficiently both 
domestically and abroad is that Sri Lanka is 
currently bur- dened with a venal and predatory 
political elite that is murdering democracy to 
fight terrorism with the intention of 
consolidating and perpetuating their control of 
the state. Defeating terrorism is presented as a 
panacea, but the methods and mechanisms used to 
do so are bound to also be em- ployed to 
consolidate and perpetuate the rule of these 
predatory elite. The culture of impunity among 
the armed forces and the regime's minions, the 
rampant nepotism, favouritism, and corruption 
tolerated at the highest levels, the utter 
disregard for  human rights, and the blatant 
assault against the independent media and the 
regime's opponents will continue even after Tamil 
militancy is defeated. The forces promoting such 
illiberalism and gangsterism would spread, become 
further emboldened and entrenched, and target the 
very Sinhalese who now tolerate such malpractices 
against minorities. Just like the United National 
Party thugs who murdered and terrorised Tamils 
during the 1983 riots turned against Sinhalese 
supreme court justices, civil society activists, 
Buddhist monks, Catholic clergy, and the 
opposition's supporters when they challenged the 
Jayewardene regime, today's brown shirts could be 
used to browbeat fellow Sinhalese and perpetrate 
authoritarianism. This may be comeup-pance for 
Sinhalese supporting the current illiberal 
practices, but it would bode  further ill for a 
post-civil war Sri Lanka.

* The comments are part of a presentation made at 
the conference on Internal Conflicts and 
State-Building Challenges in Asia, March 25-28, 
2008. The conference was sponsored by the 
East-West Center, Washington DC.
Neil DeVotta (DevottaN at hartwick.edu) is with the 
department of political science, Hartwick 
College, New York.


_______


[2]  Nepal

(i)

Himal South Asian
April 2008

ETHNO-NATIONALISM AND FEDERALISM

The evolution of an inclusive democracy in Nepal 
will depend on how the political parties deal 
with the ethnic question, even as the inequities 
of class that led to the launch of the Maoist 
'people's war' remain largely intact.

by : Deepak Thapa

In the two years since the sidelining of Nepal's 
monarchy in April 2006, and the restoration of a 
democracy that promised a more inclusive polity, 
the country has been characterised by a surge of 
ethno-nationalism. Communities that felt 
historically left out began to demand their own 
territorial space "in which they would be the 
masters, dominating politics, staffing the civil 
service, and controlling commerce", as historian 
Jerry Z Muller put it recently. Although the 
implicit understanding in the aftermath of the 
People's Movement of April 2006 was that the 
contours of both the Nepali state and the polity 
would be deliberated upon and decided by a 
Constituent Assembly (due to be elected on 10 
April, after having been twice postponed), there 
were simply too many groups unwilling to accept 
assurances from the current political leaders of 
a more just social and political order in the 
future. The reason for this mistrust is not hard 
to find.

Despite promises of a fresh start following their 
ignominious performance during the 1990s, Nepal's 
political parties have done precious little to 
alter the character of the state. Given that the 
major parties, as well as the state apparatus, 
are under the control of the same two dominant 
minority groups - Bahuns (hill Brahmins) and 
Chhetris - that together comprise around 30 
percent of the population, the concentration of 
power in their hands, and what benefits accrue 
from this power, was certain to be challenged as 
Nepal's political flux continued.

For a country that had just come out of a 
decade-long Maoist insurgency, it had seemed that 
bringing the Maoists into the political 
mainstream would begin the process of political 
and social reconciliation. But far from that, for 
more than a year Nepal was wracked by sometimes 
violent ethnic unrest, which effectively brought 
the country to a standstill for days on end. As 
Himal goes to press, an uneasy truce holds in the 
run-up to the Constituent Assembly elections, but 
there is no saying what form Nepal's politics of 
ethno-nationalism will take in the future.

Rise of the laggards
It is not surprising that ethnicity should 
suddenly appear as the most defining feature in 
contemporary politics, even though Nepal is 
neither a newly created country nor a product of 
decolonisation - both of which conditions are 
considered ripe for ethno-nationalist conflict. 
Nepal is one of the world's oldest states, having 
existed in more or less today's form since the 
mid-1700s. But having followed the empire model 
during its consolidation of territory and 
thereafter, ethnic markers remained notably 
vibrant. Ultimately, that Nepal stayed relatively 
stable for more than two centuries owes more to 
the state of underdevelopment ensured by the 
rulers than anything else.

Modernity, that precursor to ethnic mobilisation, 
is quite new to Nepal. Its advent, during the 
1950s, also saw a not-particularly-successful 
attempt to foist a single national identity on 
the scores of ethnic and caste groups that make 
up the Nepali population. That experiment failed, 
for a number of reasons, but mainly because many 
of the groups were denied citizenship rights in 
the fullest sense, even as they were made to 
conform to a nationality that was alien to most. 
As such, when modernisation arrived in its 
fullest force, during the 1980s and 1990s, it was 
inevitable that ethnicity should emerge as the 
most prominent way to define and express one's 
identity.

In his exposition on the power of ethnic 
nationalism, Muller explains this urge to 
emphasise ethnicity at the expense of all other 
factors - social, economic or political - in the 
struggle for control of the state. This struggle 
is, in part, sparked by modernity, for, as Muller 
writes,

     Modern societies are premised on the 
egalitarian notion that in theory, at least, 
anyone can aspire to any economic position. But 
in practice, everyone does not have an equal 
likelihood of upward economic mobility, and not 
simply because individuals have different innate 
capabilities. For such advances depend in part on 
what economists call 'cultural capital', the 
skills and behavioral patterns that help 
individuals and groups succeed. Groups with 
traditions of literacy and engagement in commerce 
tend to excel, for example, whereas those without 
such traditions tend to lag behind.

As it so happens, the laggards do rise up sooner 
or later. When they subsequently begin to claim 
their rightful place in the functioning of the 
state, these groups understandably feel the full 
emotions of being cheated. After all, the state 
is generally controlled by those groups that have 
what Muller refers to as 'cultural capital'. This 
was certainly the situation in Nepal, and it 
resulted in the upsurge of ethno-nationalism that 
Nepal has experienced over the past two years.

The commitment made by the political players to a 
federal state structure in the upcoming 
constitution has made ethnicity all the more 
salient, since each of the three major parties - 
the Nepali Congress, the Communist Party of Nepal 
(Unified Marxist-Leninist) and the Communist 
Party of Nepal (Maoist) - has accepted ethnic 
identity as one of the most important factors in 
determining the form of the constituent federal 
units. While this is partly an attempt drum up 
electoral support, it is also a recognition of 
the forces that have been unleashed by the Maoist 
movement. The Maoists themselves, after all, used 
the vocabulary of economic justice, as well as 
the issue of the 'nationality question' - which, 
in their own words, seeks to change the 
conditions whereby "dominated Mongoloid (or 
Tibeto-Burman) and Austric racial groups were 
suppressed under the unified state power and were 
left behind in the evolutionary process" - to 
create a powerful combination that sustained it 
throughout the years of fighting.

The rise of ethno-nationalism was partly due to 
the failure of the Maoists themselves to 
adequately factor in the aspirations of Nepal's 
various 'nationalities' in their various 
agreements with the mainstream political parties 
- including in the first one, in November 2005, 
which paved the way for the Maoists' entry into 
the political arena. This happened despite the 
fact that the rebels had championed the same for 
years. The lapse is equally glaring on the part 
of the other parties, even though they were late 
converts to the 'nationality question'. For they 
failed to realise that, unlike the issue of fair 
redistribution of resources, ethno-nationalism 
appeals to and has the potential to mobilise 
everyone. As sociologist Anthony D Smith has 
observed: "Modern ethnic nationalisms Š make use 
of universal notions of 'liberty', 'spirit', 
'nature' and 'history', which are applicable to 
many ethnic communities and to different strata 
of the population. Hence, the 'multi-class', 
popular appeal of ethnic nationalism, as each 
class and each stratum has moulded its general 
precepts to fit their needs and ideals."

Taming predators
While a 'New Nepal' is in the making, to be 
defined according to the public rhetoric along 
the lines of an 'inclusive democracy', it would 
be pertinent at this point to take note of the 
precarious situation of democracies the world 
over. Political scientist Larry Diamond, in his 
analysis of 'predatory states' (in contrast to 
democratic ones), describes how, despite the 
nearly 100 countries that have begun making the 
transition to democracy since the so-called 
'third wave of democratisation' that began during 
the mid-1970s, there has been a gradual 
"democratic recession" in recent years.

Diamond argues that many of those countries 
currently seeing a retreat of democracy have 
problems of governance, as well as general 
disenchantment with constitutionalism. Together, 
these characteristics make such countries 
particularly susceptible to rule by strongmen. 
These 'at-risk' democracies are also usually 
plagued by a predatory state, in which the elites 
monopolise power for personal benefit. Diamond 
writes:

     In such states, the behaviour of elites is 
cynical and opportunistic Š Ordinary people are 
not truly citizens but clients of powerful local 
bosses, who are themselves the clients of still 
more powerful clients. Stark inequalities in 
power and status create vertical chains of 
dependency, secured by patronage, coercion, and 
demagogic electoral appeals to ethnic pride and 
prejudice. Public policies and programs do not 
really matter, since rulers have few intentions 
of delivering on them anyway. Officials feed on 
the state, and the powerful prey on the weak. The 
purpose of government Š is to produce private 
goods for officials, their families, and their 
cronies.

This analysis should sound very familiar to 
Southasians, and could also read true to the 'New 
Nepal' that is on the drawing board. The 
Constituent Assembly is likely to see some tough 
wrangling, as the ethnic nationalists find ways 
to accommodate each other, as well as fight the 
elite groups. But it would take a diehard 
optimist to believe that Nepal's overall pattern 
of governance is going to change much, either at 
the centre or in the federal units. Each will 
most likely be predatory in its own right, with 
the only difference being that the "masters" 
referred to in the quote at the beginning will be 
distributed among many more ethnicities. Class 
will resurface as a variable in the political 
sphere only after this stage has been reached. 
After all, Nepal's economic condition, with all 
of the inequities that provided the Maoists with 
the justification to launch the 'people's war' in 
the first place, has remained more or less 
unchanged since the day the fighting began.

o o o


(ii)

The Hindu
April 09, 2008

THE RUMBLINGS IN NEPAL'S TARAI INSIDE NEPAL

by Siddharth Varadarajan

Unless the situation is handled with sensitivity 
and care, Madhesism, not Maoism, will be 
Kathmandu's - and New Delhi's - next big problem.

- Photo: Siddharth Varadarajan

Identity Crisis: In Sunsari district 57 Pahadi 
families forced to leave their land by armed 
extremists from the Madhesi Tigers say they have 
no place to cast their vote.

The people of Nepal go to the polls on Thursday 
to elect a Constituent Assembly (CA). While the 
eyes of the world are focussed on what the 
results will mean for the Maoists and the 
Monarchy, what happens to the Madhesis and their 
movement for autonomy will, in many ways, be even 
more crucial. After spending nearly a week 
covering the election campaign in the eastern and 
western Tarai of Nepal, this correspondent came 
away with a sense of foreboding about the future. 
Though the 'Madhesi street' is calm, armed 
extremist groups operate with impunity, and it is 
not uncommon to encounter in the discourse of 
Madhesi activists a tinge of communalism and even 
separatism. Unless the legitimate grievances are 
addressed with sensitivity and grace, 
illegitimate aspirations will rise up to take 
their place. In a sense, this process has already 
begun.

The Tarai belt is Nepal's most densely populated 
region and accounts for half the country's 29 
million people. Not all of its residents are 
Madhesis, however. Janajati groups like the 
Tharus - the 'original inhabitants' before the 
swamps were cleared and Avadhi, Bhojpuri and 
Maithili-speaking migrants moved up from India - 
have a strong presence in the western plains 
districts. In the east, you have Limbus. And 
throughout the region, the Nepali-speaking 
Pahadis are present in significant numbers.

All told, the Madhesis form 31.2 per cent of 
Nepal's population. And though they are as 
stratified in terms of language and caste as the 
Pahadis, a shared sense of grievance inheres in 
all of them. "We have never been accepted as 
Nepalis," Anand Prakash Pandey, an activist of 
the Sadbhavna Party, said in Nepalganj. "Despite 
being Nepali citizens, we have always been called 
'Indians'."

The exclusion that Madhesi activists speak about 
is not just nomenclatural. There is bitterness 
over the extent to which Madhesis have been "kept 
out" of the state administration, and over the 
fact that Hindi - the link language between 
Maithils, Bhojpuris and Avadhis - finds no 
official recognition in Nepal.

In common with the rest of the erstwhile 
kingdom's citizens, Madhesis too wanted the CA to 
provide them the rights they have been denied all 
these years. But this is where the plot got 
complicated. When the Maoists began their 
'Peoples War' in 1996, they sought to win over 
the Madhesi population and launched the Madhesi 
Mukti Morcha. At a time when traditional Madhesi 
organisations such as the Sadbhavna Party took 
part in 'reformist' politics, the Maoists built 
up a strong network by addressing the Madhesis' 
ethnic grievances as well as the problems of 
marginalised groups such as Dalits.

Despite their overall profile weakening in the 
Madhes over the past year, the Maoists still have 
strong pockets of support in the Tarai. "When 
they were underground, it was the Maoists who 
saved all the Musahars here from being evicted 
from our homes," said Misri Lal Sada, a 
rickshaw-puller in Sunsari.

In the Tarai as well as in areas where the 
janajatis were dominant, the Maoist demand for a 
CA to be elected on the basis of proportional 
representation (PR) struck a deep chord. But 
after the Jan Andolan-II of March-April 2006, 
when Parliament was restored and the Maoists 
joined the government, the Nepali Congress and 
the Communist Party of Nepal (UML) forced the 
former rebels to drop their demand for PR. A 
compromise was struck for only half the seats to 
the CA to be allotted on PR basis. The political 
cost of this compromise has been tremendous. "The 
Maoists grew because they promised ethnic 
rights," Ravi Thakur of the Madhesi Manavadhikar 
Forum said in Taulihawa. "So when they dropped 
PR, the impact of this was immediately felt in 
the Madhes."

Overnight, new political groups emerged which 
took up the demand for, inter alia, a fully 
proportional electoral system. Since these groups 
were competing for the same political space as 
the Maoists, clashes erupted. Soon the entire 
Tarai was convulsed by the demand for greater 
representation and autonomy. The NC initially 
found this agitation useful since its immediate 
target was the Maoists. And Indian intelligence 
agencies took a benign view. Eventually, two 
armed groups also emerged - the Janatantrik Tarai 
Mukti Morcha (JTMM) of Jwala Singh, and Jai 
Krishna Goit. The latter is openly secessionist.

Among the politicians who seized the moment was 
Upendra Yadav, a former Maoist leader who spent 
time briefly in an Indian jail before abandoning 
his former comrades, disappearing from sight for 
a couple of years, and then reappearing at the 
end of 2006 to spearhead a new agitation for 
Madhesi rights. He is a charismatic and 
articulate speaker, but one of his own supporters 
described him as "not a fully transparent sort of 
person."

I caught up with him in Devangunj in Sunsari 
district. "The Madhes has awakened. This is a 
fight for azadi [independence]," he said. When he 
saw the look of surprise on my face, he added: 
"Of course, by azadi we mean svayyata (autonomy). 
We want the entire Madhes to be one autonomous 
province."

This demand of 'Ek Madhes, Ek Prades' is 
problematic because it will foreclose the real 
devolution and inclusion that Nepal's diverse 
ethno-linguistic groups aspire to. For the Madhes 
activist, federal Nepal consists of three 
horizontal provincial belts of the plains, the 
hills and the mountains. The NC and the UML have 
not elaborated their vision, but the suspicion is 
that they will push for geographically 'vertical' 
rather than 'horizontal' provinces in which the 
Madhesis will be denied a majority because of the 
inclusion of Pahadis through a process of 
gerrymandering.

On their part, the Maoists have put forward a map 
which comprises more than a dozen provinces, 
including a part of the Tarai called 'Madhes,' 
which is then divided into three sub-provinces of 
Abadh, Bhojpura and Mithila. The Tharus and 
Limbus get their own provinces in the western and 
eastern Tarai. Though some Madhesi activists 
support the idea of separate provinces within the 
Madhes - there is fear of the eastern Tarai 
dominating the west and of the hankering for jobs 
and positions that a process of subdivision will 
bring - most people accuse the Maoists of 
engaging in a policy of 'divide and rule.'

The problem for the Madhesi parties is that there 
are three of them and they did not manage to seal 
a pre-election understanding among them. This 
means that in most of the 80-odd Tarai 
constituencies where the Madhesis are in a 
majority, Upendra Yadav's Madhesi Janadhikar 
Forum (MJF), Mahanth Thakur's Tarai Madhes 
Loktantrik Party (TMLP), and the Sadbhavna Party 
will cut into one another's votes.

Anil Jha, a senior Sadbhavna leader, said he was 
not confident that the three parties would 
together win more than 20 to 25 seats in the 
601-strong Constituent Assembly. But does this 
really matter, since 31.2 per cent of the 335 
seats being contested on the basis of PR have 
already been allotted to Madhesis, and a 
reasonable chunk of the first-past-the-post seats 
will also be won by Madhesi candidates from other 
parties? "We do not think Madhesi members from 
other parties will represent the Madhes in the 
CA," Ram Pratap Sharma, an activist with the TMLP 
in Taulihawa, declared. "They will be bound by 
their party's whip and that whip will belong to 
the Pahadis." Said another leader: "The outgoing 
Assembly had 41 Madhesis in a house of 205. But 
they were powerless."

What to do with the Pahadis - who constitute more 
than a third of the population of the Tarai - is 
a question the Madhesi parties have not been able 
to deal with in a coherent way. Some like Upendra 
Yadav have sought to reach out to the Pahadis: 
his MJF has included several of them in its list 
of PR candidates. But others exhibit contempt. 
"[Upendra] Yadav should not have given so many 
Pahadis the ticket," said Pandey of the Sadbhavna 
party. "Our movement is for the Madhesis." Asked 
how many Pahadis had been given the ticket by his 
party, he replied: "There is no Pahadi in our 
list and we don't want any."

Apart from this sort of chauvinism, what makes 
the Tarai situation especially combustible is the 
admiration that activists and leaders of the 
three Madhesi parties have for the armed 
extremists. Thus, if the three parties do not 
make it to the CA with sufficient numbers, that 
fact will encourage the armed extremists further.

An added cause for wariness is the interest some 
United Nations officials as well as U.S. 
government agencies and non-governmental 
organisations (NGOs) have begun to show in the 
Madhesis. Sensing the prospect of the larger 
payoff that internationalisation might bring, one 
senior Madhesi leader said that if Nepal was not 
prepared to grant autonomy, the Madhes would look 
to India. "We are offering Kathmandu control over 
only defence, foreign affairs and 
communications," he said. "If Kathmandu does not 
want this, we can always offer Delhi the same."

When it was suggested to him that India would not 
be interested in the break-up of Nepal or any 
other neighbour for that matter, he replied: 
"India may feel compelled to step in if the 
problem gets internationalised."

This may be an unrealistic and foolish scenario. 
But it does drive home the point that India 
should refrain from adding its own spoon and 
ingredients to the witches' cauldron. With the 
right approach, Madhesi aspirations can easily be 
accommodated within the federal Nepal that all 
parties there are officially committed to.

India played a good role in helping to broker the 
last agreement between the Nepal government and 
the Madhesi parties. What it must do now is 
ensure that its territory is not used by 
extremist elements bent on sabotaging the 
possibility of a democratic solution.

_______


[3]  India: Human Rights

(i)

HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH LETTER TO PRIME MINISTER MANMOHAN SINGH OF INDIA
APRIL 10, 2008

Shri. Prime Minister Manmohan Singh
Prime Minister of India
North Block Parliament House
Government of India New Delhi 110001

VIA FACSIMILE

Dear Prime Minister,

We write to you about the Foreign Contribution 
(Regulation) Act (FCRA), which the Indian 
parliament passed in 1976 during a state of 
emergency, and a proposed new bill, the Foreign 
Contribution (Regulation) Bill, 2006 (FCRB), 
which your government introduced to the Rajya 
Sabha in December 2006. The new bill was referred 
to the parliamentary standing committee and is 
presently awaiting cabinet approval before being 
placed for enactment. If adopted, it will replace 
the FCRA.
Initially, the primary purpose of the FCRA was to 
prohibit political parties, politicians, and 
election candidates from accepting foreign 
material and financial support in order to ensure 
that Indian elections were not affected by 
foreign interests. However, provisions were also 
included which made it compulsory for 
associations considered to be of a "political 
nature" to obtain prior permission from the 
government before accepting any foreign 
contributions.

Through an amendment in 1985, the Act's emphasis 
on nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) 
increased. Organizations having a "definite 
cultural, economic, educational, religious or 
social programme" have also been required to 
either register themselves with the government or 
receive its prior permission in order to accept 
foreign donations and contributions.

To address poverty, inequality, human rights, or 
other social problems, many NGOs accept foreign 
funding to carry out their lawful activities. 
Over the years, the FCRA has been used to block 
funding for and harass organizations that have 
exercised their lawful right of questioning or 
criticizing government policies and practices. 
This is surprising in a robust democracy. The 
application of the law in such ways not only 
constitutes a breach of the right to freedom of 
association, it also violates the right to 
freedom of expression, both of which are 
protected under international law and by India's 
constitution.

The Ministry of Home Affairs, which is in charge 
of the Act's implementation, considers the FCRA 
to be a way of ensuring that foreign 
contributions are not used in ways that may 
jeopardize India's national security.1 This is a 
legitimate concern for all governments. However, 
the FCRA has little or no practical effect in 
preventing extremist groups from obtaining 
resources. Other laws, such as those relating to 
money laundering, are more effective, while the 
primary method of protecting national security is 
through strong law enforcement and intelligence 
gathering. Instead of protecting national 
security, the FCRA has had a stifling effect on 
the nongovernmental sector and a negative impact 
on the country's development as a whole, 
depriving many needy individuals and communities 
of desperately needed financial support.

Indian NGOs have for many years expressed their 
concerns about the FCRA and its implementation 
and have requested that the Act be amended. 
However, rather than addressing the problematic 
features of the FCRA, the FCRB introduces 
provisions which will further undermine the right 
of organizations to seek and receive financial 
support. Its explicit purpose, as stipulated in 
the preamble of the Bill, is to prohibit the use 
of foreign support for any activities detrimental 
to the "national interest." As you know from your 
time in the political opposition, the government 
of the day can define the "national interest" 
quite broadly, often equating the national 
interest with their more narrow political 
interests. In this way, the FCRA has been used as 
a political tool and lever against organizations 
critical of the government or its departments.

The FCRB, in Section 11(3), substantially expands 
the powers of the government to make its prior 
permission a condition for an organization to 
accept a foreign contribution. Under the Bill, 
the government can decide that prior permission 
should be required for:

* an entire class of associations;
* any specific geographic areas;
* any specific purposes; and
* any specific sources.

The government can thus decide, for instance, 
that religious organizations or human rights 
groups cannot accept any contributions. It can 
also decide that no contributions can be received 
by organizations in a particular state, or for 
work relating to a politically sensitive issue, 
or from a particular donor agency. Such 
restrictions would be a direct violation of 
international law.
Freedom of association and expression are 
regarded as fundamental rights in international 
law and are laid down in such instruments as the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights,2 adopted 
by the United Nations General Assembly, and the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights (ICCPR),3 to which India is a state party. 
They are also guaranteed under the Indian 
Constitution.4
While it is appropriate to regulate and 
scrutinize the financial affairs of 
not-for-profit organizations and NGOs to address 
corruption and legitimate national security 
concerns, both the existing FCRA and its proposed 
successor FCRB are too broad and unnecessarily 
impinge on the activities of bona fide 
organizations attempting to address social issues 
in India. Article 22 of the ICCPR, to which India 
is a state party, allows restrictions on the 
right to freedom of association only if they are 
"necessary in a democratic society." Neither the 
FCRA's nor the FCRB's provisions regarding 
associations are necessary in a democratic 
society.
Organizations of a "political nature" Of 
particular concern are limits on contributions to 
organizations of a "political nature." Section 4 
of the FCRA bans, among others, political parties 
from receiving any foreign contributions. Such a 
requirement is common in democratic states and is 
not in contravention of international human 
rights law. However, under Section 5 other 
organizations considered to be of a "political 
nature" are also required to obtain prior 
permission of the government before accepting any 
such contributions. Under Section 3(1)(f) of the 
FCRB, these type of organizations will face an 
absolute prohibition on receiving foreign funding 
in the same way as political parties. Both the 
FCRA and FCRB give broad discretionary powers to 
the government to declare an organization to be 
of such nature on the basis of its regard to the 
organization's (i) activities, (ii) ideology 
propagated, (iii) program, or (iv) association 
with any political party.
Such provisions are anathema to freedom of 
association and have no place in a democracy. The 
term "political nature" is a vague and undefined 
concept susceptible to arbitrary and 
discriminatory interpretation against critics or 
those unpopular with those who administer the 
law. Any use of these provisions in such a manner 
constitutes a violation of the rights to freedom 
of association and expression.
Organizations with a "definite cultural, 
economic, educational, religious or social 
programme" Under Section 6 of the FCRA, 
organizations which are not of a "political 
nature" but have a "definite cultural, economic, 
educational, religious or social programme" can 
only accept foreign contributions if they are 
registered with or receive prior permission from 
the government. The FCRA does not specify the 
grounds on which an association can be denied 
registration or prior permission, but the 
Ministry of Home Affairs has published a list of 
more than 20 common grounds for rejecting an 
application, including if "the credibility of any 
member of the governing body is in doubt," or if 
one of the office bearers/trustees is "a foreign 
national, other than of Indian origin."5 
Furthermore, registration is only granted to 
associations that have a proven track record of 
functioning in their chosen field of work for a 
period of no less than three years.6
The published list of common grounds is only to 
be regarded as "illustrations" and leaves it open 
for the Ministry to reject an application for 
other reasons. As with organizations of a 
"political nature," the organizations applying 
for registration under this section of the FCRA 
are subjected to the discretionary powers of the 
Ministry. This makes the decisions unpredictable 
and at times arbitrary.
Section 11 of the FCRB contains the same 
requirement as the FCRA for associations that 
have a "definite cultural, economic, educational, 
religious or social programme" to either 
reregister or obtain prior permission before 
accepting a foreign contribution. Section 12(3) 
of the FCRB sets out a number of conditions under 
which registration or prior permission should not 
be granted. For example, the government must be 
satisfied that the contribution is not likely to 
be diverted for "undesirable purposes," and that 
the organization "has not indulged in activities 
aimed at conversion through inducement or force, 
either directly or indirectly, from one religious 
faith to another." The organization must also 
have "prepared a meaningful project" or 
"undertaken meaningful activity in its chosen 
field that will benefit the people for which the 
foreign contribution is proposed to be utilized."
The terms "undesirable purposes," "meaningful 
project," and "meaningful activity" are not 
defined in the FCRB, leaving them susceptible to 
abuse. With regard to conversion from one 
religion to another, the terms "inducement" and 
"indirectly" lack clarity and leave room for 
arbitrary implementation.
Right to prohibit any organization from accepting 
a foreign contribution According to Section 10 of 
the FCRA, the central government may prohibit any 
association from accepting any foreign 
contribution if it is satisfied that the 
acceptance of a contribution is "likely to affect 
prejudicially (i) the sovereignty and integrity 
of India; or (ii) the public interest; or (iii) 
freedom or fairness of election to any 
Legislature; or (iv) friendly relations with any 
foreign State; or (v) harmony between religious, 
racial, linguistic or regional groups, castes or 
communities." Section 9 of the FCRB contains a 
similar provision, but adds harmony among 
"social" groups, castes, or communities to the 
grounds on which any association can be banned 
from accepting a foreign contribution. None of 
the grounds are further defined in FCRA or FCRB, 
making the risk of arbitrary decision making 
considerable.
Barring those convicted or facing prosecution

Under Section 12(3)(d and e) of the FCRB, none of 
the directors or office bearers of an 
organization can have either a past conviction or 
a pending prosecution for any offence. 
Prosecutions and past convictions which may be 
completely unrelated to the running of an 
organization do not constitute a legitimate 
ground for restricting freedom of association. 
Experiences from many parts of the world show 
that these types of provisions risk being used to 
unduly hinder individuals from establishing or 
managing organizations. In the Indian context, it 
may be worth noting that a person like Mahatma 
Gandhi, who established numerous voluntary 
organizations, spent several years in prison.

The right to development

Freedom of association is a right which states 
are required to respect and protect. But states 
must do more. Article 8(2) of the Declaration on 
the Right to Development, adopted by the UN 
General Assembly in 1986, obliges states to 
actively encourage popular participation in all 
spheres of society and, in Article 3(1), to 
create conditions favorable to the realization of 
the right to development. The FCRA has had the 
opposite effect.
India has long cited the existence of its vibrant 
civil society as a sign of the strength of its 
democracy. The Indian Government's National 
Policy on the Voluntary Sector states, for 
instance, that, "The voluntary sector has 
contributed significantly to finding innovative 
solutions to poverty, deprivation, discrimination 
and exclusion, through means such as awareness 
raising, social mobilization, service delivery, 
training, research, and advocacy."7

The National Policy on the Voluntary Sector 
started as a civil society initiative under the 
aegis of the Planning Commission, which you 
Chair. Not just a framework of partnership 
between the government and NGOs, it also stresses 
creation of an enabling environment to facilitate 
the development work of the voluntary sector. In 
this context, the FCRA and its proposed 
amendments should be made consistent with the 
provisions of the National Policy on the 
Voluntary Sector.

In order for people to be able to enjoy the right 
to freedom of association, NGOs must have the 
right to freely seek and receive financial and 
other resources for their management and 
activities. In recognition of this, Article 13 of 
the UN Declaration on Human Rights Defenders 
stipulates that, "Everyone has the right, 
individually and in association with others, to 
solicit, receive and utilize resources for the 
express purpose of promoting and protecting human 
rights and fundamental freedoms through peaceful 
means, in accordance with article 3 of the 
present Declaration."8 Considering that annual UN 
General Assembly resolutions, beginning in 1998, 
have called upon all states to promote and give 
effect to the Declaration, the Office of the 
United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights 
has urged states to ensure that there are no 
legislative obstacles limiting human rights 
defenders access to funding.9

However, as formulated and implemented, sections 
4, 6, and 10 of FCRA constitute such legal 
obstacles. In its draft form, the FCRB expands 
the grounds on which organizations are prohibited 
from receiving foreign support; it allows for 
rejection of an application for registration or 
permission for receiving foreign support on 
grounds that are not "necessary in a democratic 
society"; and it limits the right to freedom of 
association of people who have a pending 
prosecution - which can be used as a form of 
intimidation or for political reasons - or a past 
conviction.
The right of NGOs to receive needed international 
funding has been recognized by democratic states, 
as well as by international organizations. 
Article 50 of the Council of Europe's 
"Recommendation to Member States on the Legal 
Status of Non-governmental Organizations in 
Europe," states that, "NGOs should be free to 
solicit and receive funding - cash or in-kind 
donations - not only from public bodies in their 
own state but also from institutional or 
individual donors, another state or multilateral 
agencies, subject only to the laws generally 
applicable to customs, foreign exchange and money 
laundering and those on the funding of elections 
and political parties."10
There is no question that NGOs must be held just 
as accountable under law as any other 
organizations. However, existing laws can be used 
to prevent financial misdeeds and to ensure that 
no group is acting as a front to support human 
rights abuses by non-state actors. In order to 
make sure that legitimate NGOs can make their 
crucial and necessary contribution to the 
country's development, India should make it a 
priority to develop a legal framework which 
safeguards freedom of association and the right 
of NGOs to seek and receive funding.
We thus urge you not to place the FCRB to vote. 
Instead, we urge you to repeal those provisions 
of the FCRA which do not conform to international 
standards and potentially undermine the work of 
nongovernmental organizations.
In India and internationally it is regarded as 
good practice for governments and legislatures to 
consult broadly with organizations and 
constituencies that may be affected by any legal 
change which affect their existence and 
activities. In the process of considering the 
FCRB or revising the FCRA, we hope that a broad 
consultation, including with independent and 
critical individuals and groups, will take place.
Mr. Prime Minister, over the years India's FCRA 
has at best been a nuisance for legitimate 
nongovernmental organizations and at worst a tool 
to harass those that have been critical of 
certain policies, practices, and interests of the 
government of the day. In its present form, the 
FCRB will further exacerbate these problems.
Both the existing Act and the proposed Bill are 
in clear breach of international human rights law 
and other international standards. Instead of 
being in the company of other democracies, the 
FCRA and FCRB leave the world's largest democracy 
in the company of a number of autocratic states 
well known for their restrictive policies towards 
nongovernmental organizations and for their poor 
respect for freedom of association.
Yours sincerely,
Brad Adams Executive Director

1. Ministry of Home Affairs, Receipt of Foreign 
Contribution by Voluntary Associations: FCRA 
Annual Report 2005-2006, 
http://www.mha.nic.in/fcra.htm (accessed 27 
March, 2008).
2. Art. 19 and 20.
3. Art. 19 and 22.
4. Art. 19.
5. Ministry of Home Affairs, Common Grounds for 
Rejection of Application under FCRA, 
http://www.mha.nic.in/fcra/intro/rejection_grounds.pdf 
(accessed March 28, 2008).
6. Ministry of Home Affairs, Introduction to 
FCRA, 
http://www.mha.nic.in/fcra/intro/introduction.htm 
(accessed March 28, 2008).
7. Planning Commission, Government of India, 
National Policy on the Voluntary Sector, May 2007.
8. Art. 13, Declaration on the Right and 
Responsibility of Individuals, Groups and Organs 
of Society to Promote and Protect Universally 
Recognized Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 
A/RES/53/144.
9. Office of the United Nations High Commissioner 
for Human Rights, Human Rights Defenders: 
Protecting the Right to Defend Human Rights, 
Human Rights Fact Sheet 29, page 29 and 30, 
http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/FactSheet29en.pdf 
(accessed March 27, 2008).
10. Recommendation CM/Rec (2007) 14 of the 
Committee of Ministers to member states on the 
Legal Status of Non-Governmental Organisations in 
Europe, 
https://wcd.coe.int/ViewDoc.jsp?id=1194609&Site=CM&BackColorInternet=9999CC&BackColorIntranet=FFBB55&BackColorLogged=FFAC75 
(accessed March 27, 2008).


o o o

(ii)

Amnesty International India

INDIA SHOULD INVESTIGATE ALL ALLEGATIONS OF 
ENFORCED DISAPPEARANCES IN JAMMU AND KASHMIR 
FOLLOWING REPORTS OF MASS GRAVES

(India, April 4, 2008): Amnesty International 
urges the Government of India to launch urgent 
investigations into hundreds of unidentified 
graves discovered since 2006 in Jammu and 
Kashmir. The investigation must be independent, 
impartial and follow international standards. The 
grave sites are believed to contain the remains 
of victims of unlawful killings, enforced 
disappearances, torture and other abuses which 
occurred in the context of armed conflict 
persisting in the state since 1989. The graves of 
at least 940 persons have reportedly been found 
in 18 villages in Uri district alone.

Unlawful killings, enforced disappearances and 
torture are violations of both international 
human rights law and international humanitarian 
law, set out in treaties to which India is a 
state party and in customary international 
law.They also constitute international crimes. 
Amnesty International calls on the Government of 
India to comply with its international 
obligations in this regard, as well as act on the 
commitment displayed through its signing of the 
United Nations' Convention for the Protection of 
All Persons from Enforced Disappearances on 6 
February 2007 by ordering prompt, thorough, 
independent and impartial investigations into all 
past and current allegations of enforced 
disappearances

A report issued on 29 March 2008 by the 
Srinagar-based Association of the Parents of 
Disappeared Persons (APDP), Facts Under Ground, 
indicated the existence of multiple graves in 
localities which, because of their proximity of 
the Line of Control with Pakistan, are not 
accessible without the specific permission on the 
security forces. In response to the report army 
spokespersons again claimed that those found 
buried were armed rebels and "foreign militants" 
killed lawfully in armed encounters with military 
forces. However the report detailed testimonies 
from local villagers saying that most of those 
buried were local residents hailing from the 
state. These are serious allegations that must be 
fully investigated.

While the report alleges that more than 8,000 
persons have gone missing in Jammu and Kashmir 
since 1989, the central and state authorities 
state that the total amounts to less than 4.000, 
and that most of these went to Pakistan to join 
armed opposition groups. In 2006 a state police 
report confirmed the deaths in custody of 331 
persons and also 111 enforced disappearances 
following detention since 1989.,

Since the early 1990s, Amnesty International has 
issued a series of reports and statements on the 
human rights situation in Jammu and Kashmir 
detailing arbitrary detentions by the security 
forces and the state police and enforced 
disappearances.1 The organisation has also 
consistently opposed human rights abuses 
perpetrated by armed opposition groups, 
repeatedly appealing to them to abide by minimum 
standards of international humanitarian law which 
prohibit hostage-taking, torture and killing of 
people taking no active part in hostilities 
including members of the Hindu community and 
issued several statements documenting the same.

Amnesty International reiterates its grave 
concern that the state has failed to take 
responsibility to ascertain the fate or the 
whereabouts of a majority of the disappeared 
persons, especially in response to habeas corpus 
petitions filed in the state's courts.

In addition, while Amnesty International has 
welcomed efforts of the judiciary in a number of 
high profile cases - including the Chattisingpura 
case in which a series of court hearings 
established that the security service had 
extrajudicially executed five local residents 
while claiming lawful use of force against 
suspected "foreign militants" - the organization 
remains concerned that judicial inquiries into 
individual complaints are rare and the rights of 
victim to justice and redress remains unfulfilled.

In the light of the above, Amnesty International 
urges the Government of India to:

     * unequivocally reiterate condemnation of 
enforced disappearances in Jammu & Kashmir;
     * ensure that prompt, thorough, independent 
and impartial investigations into all sites of 
mass graves in Jammu and Kashmir are immediately 
carried out by forensic experts in line with UN 
Model Protocol on the disinterment and analysis 
of skeletal remains; make available adequate 
resources; and seek and accept offers of 
assistance and cooperation from international 
experts, both in carrying out the work itself, 
and in training local personnel engaged in the 
work. As an immediate step, the grave sites must 
be secured in order to preserve the evidence;
     * ensure that all past and current 
allegations of enforced disappearances are 
promptly, thoroughly, independently and 
impartially investigated and that, where there is 
sufficient evidence, anyone suspected of 
responsibility for such crimes is prosecuted in 
proceedings which meet international fair trial 
standards;
     * ensure that all victims of unlawful 
killings, enforced disappearance and torture are 
granted full reparations, including restitution, 
compensation, rehabilitation, satisfaction and 
guarantees of non-repetition;
     * consider assigning the civilian 
prosecutor's office with the jurisdiction to 
investigate all cases of suspected enforced 
disappearances, whichever military, security or 
law enforcement agency is suspected of being 
involved; and provide the civilian prosecutor's 
office with the mandate and authority necessary 
to be able to effectively investigate all such 
cases;
     * create a single authoritative and 
comprehensive database of the names and details, 
including where possible DNA information, of all 
individuals who have gone missing, who have been 
subjected to enforced disappearance, or abducted 
in Jammu and Kashmir since 1989, and create a 
single official database logging details of all 
unidentified bodies found in Jammu and Kashmir. 
Make both databases public and accessible to 
relatives of these people;
     * ratify without delay and without any 
reservations the UN Convention for the Protection 
of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance, make 
declarations pursuant to Articles 31 and 32 
recognizing the competence of the Committee on 
Enforced Disappearances to receive communications 
from individuals and states, enact effective 
implementing legislation and implement it in 
practice;
     * Ratify the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court;
     * facilitate the long-standing requests for 
visits to India including Jammu and Kashmir, by 
the UN Special Procedures, in accordance with 
their long established terms of reference for 
missions, in particular the UN Special Rapporteur 
on torture, the UN Special Rapporteur on 
extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions, 
and the UN Working Group on Enforced or 
Involuntary Disappearances by setting dates for 
them to undertake missions in the near future.

(ii)

Amnesty International urges the state authorities 
to support the actions of the Government of India 
and

     * ensure all detentions in the state are 
carried out in accordance with proper procedures, 
meeting the strict requirements of international 
law and standards, including by ensuring 
detaining officials are identifiable by wearing 
visible ID numbers and for the registration 
numbers of vehicles to be clearly visible; 
ensuring all detentions are properly logged; 
providing medical examination of detainees on 
entering, transfer and release from detention, 
ensuring all detainees have prompt access to 
family members, lawyers and independent courts 
where they may challenge the lawfulness of their 
detention, and ensuring accountability for any 
violations of such procedures;
     * ensure no one faces reprisals for seeking 
the truth about the fate of their disappeared 
relative; establish safeguards against reprisals 
in order to protect all complainants, victims and 
witnesses in accordance with international 
standards;
     * work with the Union government authorities 
and international experts to exhume the sites of 
mass graves in Jammu and Kashmir in accordance 
with international standards. Ensure the sites 
are protected from any interference pending such 
exhumation;
     * work with the Union government authorities 
to create a comprehensive database of the names 
and details of all individuals who have gone 
missing, who have been subjected to enforced 
disappearance, or abducted in Jammu and Kashmir 
since 1999 and to create a single official 
database logging details of all unidentified 
bodies found in the state;
     * provide full reparation, including 
restitution, rehabilitation, compensation, 
satisfaction and guarantees of non-repetition, to 
the victims and their families.


_____


[4]

Hindustan Times
April 14, 2008

GLUCOSE FOR LOK SABHA?

by Jean Drèze and Reetika Khera

Anyone who has illusions about the influence of 
corporate interests on public policy in India, or 
about the priorities of elected representatives, 
would do well to read the recent correspondence 
among the Biscuit Manufacturers Association 
(BMA), Members of Parliament and various 
ministries. The main issue in this correspondence 
is a proposal to replace cooked mid-day meals in 
primary schools with biscuits.

The trail begins with a letter from the BMA to 
MPs, signed by the BMA President, who is also an 
employee of Parle Products. The letter makes an 
elaborate plea for biscuits as an "alternative" 
for cooked mid-day meals in primary schools. 
There is a specific pitch for the Rs 3.75 glucose 
biscuit packet, which allegedly contains all the 
required nutrients and costs much the same as a 
cooked mid-day meal under current norms. As it 
happens, the biggest manufacturer of such glucose 
biscuit packets is none other than Parle Products.

Among other arguments, the letter mentions that 
biscuits have "higher recall". This is an 
interesting hint about the BMA's real motives. In 
the business world, 'recall' means the proportion 
of people who remember a particular brand, and 
recall data are used to track advertising 
effectiveness. It is not difficult to imagine 
that an advertisement campaign based on giving 
every child the same packet of biscuits every day 
(at the government's expense) would have high 
'recall'.

It is perhaps not surprising that biscuit 
manufacturers, like other businesses, should use 
their influence to sell their products. As Milton 
Friedman famously said, "The business of business 
is business." What is more disturbing is the way 
MPs reacted to this lobbying operation. How many 
of them received the BMA letter is not known. But 
what is known is that at least 29 of them wrote 
personally to Human Resource Development Minister 
Arjun Singh and urged him to consider the 
biscuits proposal. Quite likely, this is just a 
partial count, as the Ministry was "flooded with 
such letters", according to one senior official.

These 29 letters, obtained by the Commissioners 
of the Supreme Court in the 'right to food' case, 
are quite edifying. The signatories include 
members of most major political parties 
(Congress, BJP, RJD, Samajwadi Party, and so on) 
except for the Bahujan Samaj Party and the Left 
parties. Nine of them represent constituencies in 
Maharashtra (which has a thriving biscuit 
industry), and six belong to the Shiv Sena. 
Familiar names in the list include K. Natwar 
Singh (Congress), Ramdas Athawale (Republican 
Party), Syed Shahnawaz Hussain (BJP) and Susheela 
Laxman Bangaru (BJP). What is interesting is that 
the letters read much the same across authors and 
parties. For instance, the letters signed by 
Natwar Singh and Athawale are almost identical 
from top to bottom. Similarly, several MPs 
confidently argue for biscuits on the grounds 
that "the ratio of carbohydrates, proteins, fats 
and glucose is quite balanced and beneficial to 
human health of all age group especially for 
children (sic)."

The clue to this telepathy is not far to seek: 
most of these statements are lifted straight from 
the BMA's promotion material. In other words, 
these enterprising MPs saw nothing wrong in 
re-hashing the BMA letter and forwarding it to 
the Minister under their own signature. All this, 
of course, is done in the name of the welfare of 
children.

To be fair, some of these MPs may genuinely feel 
(despite much evidence to the contrary) that 
schoolchildren would be better off with biscuits 
than with cooked meals. Even then, troubling 
questions remain. For instance, did they form 
this view on the basis of serious enquiry? Or 
were they swayed by the BMA's tutorial? If it was 
based on enquiry, why did they need to cut and 
paste from the BMA's letter to make their case? 
And is this kind of plagiarism appropriate in any 
case?

The letters also reveal the central role played 
in this campaign by Abu Asim Azmi, MP (Samajwadi 
Party) from Maharashtra. Aside from contributing 
one of the 29 gems sent to the Ministry, Azmi 
wrote similar letters to other ministries, 
seeking appointments with a host of bureaucrats 
and ministers. These letters repeatedly state 
that the BMA has presented "the merits of 
substituting biscuits with the existing 
pre-cooked meal". This sentence, aside from 
exposing Azmi's innocence of the matter (there is 
no such thing as an 'existing pre-cooked meal'), 
is one indication - among many - that the 
intention is to replace cooked meals with 
biscuits, and not just add biscuits to the menu.

It is not the first time that Azmi bravely risks 
his reputation. During the last few years, he has 
battled a spate of allegations about his role in 
recent incidents of communal violence in Mumbai, 
including an affidavit filed in 1997 by the then 
Bombay Police Commissioner claiming that he had 
links with Dawood Ibrahim. He has also been 
chargesheeted by the Economic Offences Wing for 
siphoning off government funds in the multi-crore 
cobbler scam of 1995. Whatever the truth of these 
allegations (the system often confuses victim 
with criminal), Azmi seems to live dangerously.

The silver lining is that the biscuit lobby 
received a fitting reply from the HRD Ministry. 
The response was well-considered, coming as it 
did after a round of consultations with state 
governments. Most of them shot down the proposal 
for replacing cooked meals with biscuits. So did 
nutrition experts such as Dr B Sesikeran, 
Director of the National Institute of Nutrition, 
who clearly stated that the mid-day meal scheme 
"is supposed to provide one wholesome meal to 
schoolchildren and biscuits cannot replace it". 
Following on this, Arjun Singh sent a strong 
rejection letter to the BMA. Similarly, when this 
issue came up in the Lok Sabha on February 26, 
Mohammad Ali Ashraf Fatmi, HRD Minister of State, 
clarified that the biscuit approach does not 
"fulfill the nutritional norms, dietary 
requirement and satiety of children and further 
it also deprives many intrinsic benefits that are 
being derived through present pattern of 
implementation".

All is well that ends well in this case. It is 
worth mentioning, however, that this is not an 
isolated attack on cooked mid-day meals for 
children. Just to cite another example, Real 
Contracts Private Limited recently approached the 
HRD Ministry with a proposal to replace freshly 
cooked mid-day meals with 'Ready to Cook and 
Serve Hot' meals - dehydrated food that would 
just require boiling before serving. As Arjun 
Singh himself put it in a recent letter to Chief 
Minister Mayawati on this issue: "We are, indeed, 
dismayed at the growing requests for introduction 
of pre-cooked foods, emanating largely from 
suppliers/marketers of packaged foods, and aimed 
essentially at penetrating and deepening the 
market for such foods."

According to recent media reports, the BMA has 
not given up. Undeterred by the rebuttal on 
mid-day meals, it has now written to Renuka 
Chowdhury, Minister of State for Women and Child 
Development, with a similar proposal for 
supplying biscuits to children below the age of 
six years under the Integrated Child Development 
Services (ICDS). Let us hope that Chowdhury will 
deliver them as straight an arrow as the fearless 
Arjun Singh.

Jean Drèze and Reetika Khera are development 
economists at the Delhi School of Economics


______


[5] Announcements:


Magic Lantern Foundation
J 1881 Chittaranjan Park, Basement, New Delhi 110019
P: +91 11 41605239 and 26273244
E: magiclantern.foundation at gmail.com/ magiclf at vsnl.com
W: http://www.magiclanternfoundation.org


PERSISTENCE/RESISTANCE- A FESTIVAL OF DOCUMENTARY FILMS, NEW DELHI, APRIL
28-30

(Apologies for cross posting)

Dear friend,

We are happy to invite you to Persistence 
Resistance: a festival of contemporary 
documentaries, made in the last 10 years, which 
will screen over 100 films in a multitude of 
spaces. Films will be shown in two auditoria, in 
open air venues and also in unique video booths, 
where people can check out a film of their choice 
from a temporary 'library', as well as in loops 
on video monitors around the venue. The festival 
will showcase retrospectives of the work of four 
among the documentary filmmakers working in India 
today: R.V.Ramani, Sehjo Singh, Paromita Vohra 
and Madhusree Dutta.
The festival celebrates a rich, exciting moment 
in the history of the Indian documentary film: 
its diverse subject and forms, its independent 
spirit and aesthetics and its complex political 
voice.

Along with the screenings there will also be 
presentations on each evening which will explore 
the linkages between art, literature, theatre, 
comics,
animation and censorship with films.

We will also carry a section on international 
documentaries in an attempt to explore the 
notions of internationalism in the present day 
scenario of neo-liberal globalisation. The work 
of the well known South  African filmmaker Rehad 
Desai is also included in the retrospective 
section.

THE FESTIVAL SCHEDULE is up at: <http://www.magiclanternfoundation.org>
Dates: April 28-30
Venue: India International Centre, 40 Max Mueller Marg, Lodhi Estate, New
Delhi 110003
Entry Free


Please do come and circulate this information to people who would want to
attend or write about the festival

Gargi Sen
Ranjan De
Priyanka Mukherjee



_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/

Buzz for secularism, on the dangers of fundamentalism(s), on
matters of peace and democratisation in South
Asia. SACW is an independent & non-profit
citizens wire service run since 1998 by South
Asia Citizens Web: www.sacw.net/
SACW archive is available at: http://insaf.net/pipermail/sacw_insaf.net/

DISCLAIMER: Opinions expressed in materials carried in the posts do not
necessarily reflect the views of SACW compilers.