SACW | April 18-19, 2008 / Bangladesh: Patriarchy vs Women's rights / Pakistan: Zia's children / Tibet: No Shangri-La / India: Bhopal tragedy; A cemetery in Goa; Kashmir Violence / The Nuts from Vatican
Harsh Kapoor
aiindex at gmail.com
Fri Apr 18 21:38:24 CDT 2008
South Asia Citizens Wire | April 18-19, 2008 |
Dispatch No. 2505 - Year 10 running
[1] Bangladesh: Patriarchy vs Women's rights
(i) Mullah driven review body finds equal
rights for women "very objectionable"
(ii) Women's rights activists knew what was
coming, had already protested the formation of
review body
(iii) Cancellation of review body demanded by rights organisations
[2] Pakistan:
(i) The roots of violence (I.A. Rehman)
(ii) Countering Zia's children (Ayesha Siddiqa)
[3] India: Prevent a third Bhopal tragedy (Praful Bidwai)
[4] India - Goa: Six feet of land (Vidyadhar Gadgil)
[5] Tibet:
(i) The Torch Of Tibet (Antara Dev Sen)
(ii) No Shangri-La (Slavoj Zizek)
[6] Book Review: Kashmir: 'We Fight, Therefore We Are' (Gautam Navlakha)
[7] Truth & Consequence - A Look behind the
Vatican's Ban on Contraception (Catholics for
Choice)
[8] Announcements:
(i) The significance of the Constituent
Assembly Elections in Nepal (New Delhi, 19 April
2008)
(ii) Vasakh film festival '08 (Lahore , 23-27 April 2008)
(iii) Workshop : The US-India Nuclear Deal and the NPT (Geneva, 2 May 2008)
______
[1]
The Daily Star
April 18, 2008
National Women Development Policy
REVIEW BODY OPPOSES EQUAL RIGHTS FOR WOMEN
Recommends deletion of 6 provisions, change in 15
Star Report
The ulema committee formed to review the National
Women Development Policy has strongly opposed
equal rights to women, recommending deletion of
six sections of the policy and amending 15 others
as they said these sections "clash" with the
provisions of the Quran and Sunnah.
There are several sections in the policy which
are "very objectionable", said Mufti Mohammad
Nuruddin, acting khatib of Baitul Mukarram
National Mosque who headed the review committee.
"A woman cannot enjoy rights equal to a man's
because a woman is not equal to a man by birth.
Can there be two prime ministers--one male and
one female--in a country at the same time?"
Nuruddin told The Daily Star after submitting the
seven-page report to Law and Religious Affairs
Adviser AF Hassan Ariff yesterday.
The 20-member committee asked the government to
clarify the phrase "women's equal rights to
earned movable and immovable properties" and
follow Islamic provisions on inheritance if the
earned properties include inherited properties.
Suggesting inclusion of guidelines "in the light
of the Quran and Sunnah" while taking any
decision regarding women's rights, the ulema
recommended abolishing the section that suggests
steps to implement the UN Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination
against Women (CEDAW).
Asking the government to withdraw Bangladesh from
the convention, they said many sections in it go
against the belief, spirits and culture of the
Muslim ummah.
The ulema committee also opposed and asked the
government to eliminate the provision for keeping
reserved seats for women in parliament and local
government bodies and direct elections to those.
"This policy has strongly hurt the pious Muslims
of the country since many sections of it clash
with the Quran and Sunnah...It does not go with
Bangladesh's constitution, religious traditions
and culture," the report concludes.
Adviser Hassan Ariff expressed hopes that the
recommendations will remove the "language or
interpretation gap" created surrounding the Women
Development Policy.
The committee members did not support the
attempts by a section of opportunists to create
chaos by taking advantage of the situation, he
told reporters.
THE RECOMMENDATIONS
The committee said 15 sections of the National
Women Development Policy are against Islam and
should be revised or corrected while six sections
should be eliminated.
The Islamic scholars said not only is it
impossible to establish equal rights for men and
women in the country, but in some cases, giving
women equality would deprive them of their rights
in many sectors.
They proposed replacing the phrase "equality,
equal rights and affirmative action" with "just
rights".
The committee also said the ambition of
eradicating "existing disparities between women
and men" is unclear and should be replaced by the
phrase "existing disparities between women and
men in light of the Quran and the Sunnah".
On the section that asks for giving women equal
human and fundamental rights such as political,
economic, social and cultural, they said "just
rights" should be ensured for men and women in
light of the Quran and Sunnah.
They said the government must ensure
participation of ulema and muftis alongside
women's law experts while drawing up or
eliminating or amending any "existing
discriminatory" law.
They proposed inclusion of religion experts in a
committee to resolve any inconsistency regarding
women's interest arising from misinterpretations
of provisions of those religions.
They also opposed the provision of a child's
being identified by both the mother and father,
saying it "encourages sexual abuse" and
pre-marital cohabitation. They recommended
identifying a child by "legally married" parents.
The committee observed that the policy's proposed
penalty for child marriages is not in line with
Islamic policy as the legal marriage age of 18
should not apply here because Islam states that a
girl can be married as soon as she has "come of
age".
It recommended replacing the phrase "child
marriage" of the section concerned with
"discourage underage marriage".
The committee opposed inclusion of women in
peacekeeping missions, saying it would make women
insecure and it could tarnish Bangladesh's image.
The ulema proposed cancelling the provision.
They also opposed the provision that women "must
be given equal opportunities and participation in
wealth, employment, market and business", saying
it clashes with the Quran's teachings. They
proposed giving women equal opportunities and
participation in these sectors in light of
religious dictums.
The committee specifically said one's inheritance
rights should be determined by their own
religions.
The ulema asked the government to cancel the
initiative to reserve one-third parliamentary
seats for women to increase women's participation
in parliament and its application in local
elections.
A few Islamist parties started staging
demonstrations immediately after the chief
adviser announced the National Women Development
Policy 2008 on March 8.
On March 11, the law adviser told the ulema that
the caretaker government had not passed any law
regarding inheritance and there is nothing that
contradicts the Quran and Sunnah.
The next day, Women and Children Affairs Adviser
Rasheda K Choudhury asked people to refrain from
unnecessary criticism of a progressive document
like the policy without going through it.
On March 27, the government formed the 20-member
committee to identify inconsistencies in the
policy as per Islamic rules and suggest steps.
o o o
The Daily Star
March 30, 2008
Women Policy
FORMATION OF REVIEW BODY QUESTIONED
Staff Correspondent
The formation of a high-powered committee to
review the Women Development Policy 2008 by
keeping the women and children affairs ministry
in the dark has surprised many quarters,
including the government officials.
Law and Religious Affairs Adviser AF Hassan
Ariff, Home Adviser MA Matin, Communications
Adviser Ghulam Quader and LGRD Adviser Md Anwarul
Iqbal at a meeting on Thursday formed the
committee, tasking it with identifying anything
in the policy that may go against Islamic rules.
Rights organisations have questioned the
quartet's right to form such a committee once the
head of the government formally announced the
policy on behalf of the advisory council on March
8.
They plan to hand in a memorandum to the chief
adviser in a couple of days, protesting the
formation of the review committee and demanding a
clarification of the government position on the
long-awaited policy.
"After the policy was announced and we were
waiting for the start of its implementation, some
advisers have literally bowed to pressure from
individuals who have been opposing women and
social development over the last 50 years," said
Sultana Kamal, executive director of Ain O Salish
Kendra.
Rights organisations and women leaders said
forming such a committee goes against the
government's stated stand on national
development, equal rights and the establishment
of a corruption-free society.
Key features of the women policy include setting
aside one-third of the parliamentary seats for
women and arranging direct election to the
reserved seats as well as enacting new laws to
ensure opportunity for women and their control on
earned movable and immovable property.
Earlier, several advisers, including the law
adviser himself and Women and Children Affairs
Adviser Rasheda K Choudhury, made it clear on
several occasions that the new policy contains
nothing that goes against the rule and spirit of
Islam, but a section of the religious leaders
took to the streets to protest the policy,
clearly violating the emergency rules.
The law adviser on March 11 told Islamic scholars
at the Islamic Foundation that the interim
government would not pass any law on inheritance.
The next day Adviser Rasheda urged people not to
criticise a "progressive" document like the women
development policy before going through it.
But Islamist organisations paid no heed to her
call. They accused the government of trying to
implement an anti-Shariah policy in the name of
women's development.
Mufti Mohammad Nuruddin, acting khatib of Baitul
Mokarram National Mosque, was made convenor of
the review committee. It will submit its report
within 21 days identifying the "inconsistencies
in the policy from the perspective of the Islamic
rules".
No official from the women and children affairs
ministry was present at the meeting that formed
the committee, said sources.
"We were not informed before the meeting and not
even after the committee was formed," a top
official of the ministry told The Daily Star on
condition of anonymity.
"Since the ministry played the key role in
formulating the policy and will have to implement
it, it is surprising that neither the ministry's
adviser nor any official was asked to attend the
meeting," he said.
When asked about this, staffers of the four
advisers' offices said the meeting was arranged
hurriedly.
"It seems to be a two-pronged policy. We need to
know whether forming the review committee is the
decision of the four advisers or the government
as we know the advisory council approved the
policy," said Ayesha Khanam, president of
Bangladesh Mahila Parishad.
Saying that all the deliberations over the past
few years on formulating the policy appear to
have been absolutely meaningless after the
government's bowing to the pressure of "those who
are talking against the constitution", Sultana
Kamal added, "I can't help asking who is running
the government?"
When contacted last night, Law Adviser Hassan
Ariff declined to comment on the issue over the
phone.
o o o
The Daily Star, April 17, 2008
Women Policy
Cancellation of review body demanded
Staff Correspondent
A number of socio-cultural organisations,
political parties and non-government
organisations (NGO) have demanded cancellation of
the committee formed to review the Women
Development Policy 2008 and immediate
implementation of the policy.
Samajik Protirodh Committee at a protest meeting
yesterday urged the chief adviser to implement
the Women Development Policy after cancelling the
review committee, ban political activities in
religious institutions, and clarify the stance of
the government on the matter. Dr Hamida Hossain
presided over the meeting held at the Central
Shaheed Minar.
Karmojibi Nari has also demanded cancellation of
the review committee and implementation of the
policy.
It also urged the government to initiate trial of
war criminals after forming a special tribunal.
Organisation President Shirin Akhter and General
Secretary Sharmin Kabir in a joint statement
yesterday said, "The Women Development Policy is
a significant step by the current government for
establishing equal rights and respect for women.
But the fundamentalists and war criminals in the
country are opposing the policy terming it an
anti-Islam policy."
Workers' Party of Bangladesh has condemned the
review committee's recommendations for omitting
six sections and amending 15 others of the Women
Development Policy.
It also called upon the government to implement
the policy for establishing the rights of women.
"When the entire nation is vocal about trial of
war criminals, a certain quarter is trying to
create anarchy in the country in the name of
religion," the party politburo said in a
statement.
The Workers' Party urged the government to take
actions against those responsible for instigating
violence near the Baitul Mukarram Mosque.
Samajtantrik Mohila Forum has condemned the move
for amending 15 sections and bringing changes in
the Women Development Policy.
Those who oppose the idea of establishing equal
rights for men and women are against the
democratic rights, it said in a statement.
Another NGO Steps Towards Development in a
statement signed by its Executive Director Ranjan
Karmakar said those who are opposing the Women
Development Policy are actually opposing the
constitution.
"The quarter that does not recognise the
country's constitution is opposing the Women
Development Policy," it said adding that the
review committee must be cancelled.
Gender and Development Alliance, an NGO working
for promoting gender equality, human rights and
good governance, said any opposition to the Women
Development Policy is similar to taking stance
against the constitution.
Urging the government to implement the policy
immediately, Bangladesh Trade Union Centre in a
statement said a certain quarter has challenged
the constitution by opposing the policy. The
organisation leaders called upon the caretaker
government to take actions against them.
______
[2] Pakistan:
(i)
Dawn
17 April 2008
THE ROOTS OF VIOLENCE
by I.A. Rehman
QUITE a few threats to Pakistan's stability are
regularly mentioned in public debate. Among the
less seriously acknowledged is the danger of
implosion due to the people's violent temper.
The roughing up of Arbab Ghulam Rahim without
regard to the dignity of the venue, the thrashing
of Dr Sher Afgan in a lawyer's protected chamber,
the lynching of poor Jagdish in defiance of the
bar to killing a human being, and the setting on
fire several innocent people are all symptoms of
a malady that can, if left untreated, completely
consume the state of Pakistan, its society, and
whatever good the people have managed to gather
to their credit. Common responses to acts of
depravity such as those witnessed over the past
fortnight prevent the community from realising
the gravity of the threat these occurrences pose.
First, take the pathetic refusal to believe that
any Pakistani Muslim, supposedly a paragon of
virtue, could have decided to blow up fellow
Muslim Pakistanis, including women, children and
defenders of the national frontiers. Countless
newspaper headlines can be recalled in which such
disclaimers have been issued by people whose lack
of intelligence has not obstructed their rise to
eminence.
Secondly, instead of uncovering the cause of an
ugly happening and the hands behind it, all blame
is placed on two scapegoats - the intelligence
agencies of external adversaries or the rulers at
home. Neither of the two is incapable of
committing the heinous atrocities attributed to
it but the tendency to stop at the most
convenient theory of conspiracy prevents a
rational diagnosis.
Thirdly, containing violence is usually put down
as one of the law-enforcement agencies' routine
chores and certainly not the most important one,
as the highest priority must always be the
protection of the VVIPs, however worthless in
comparison to Jagdish or anyone of those burnt
alive in Tahir Plaza some of them may be. Thus,
the agonising self-appraisal that the rising
level of violence in Pakistan demands is avoided.
What needs to be grasped is the fact that
Pakistani society has not only become thoroughly
intolerant, the tendency to eliminate all
dissenters through violence is becoming stronger
and more and more socially acceptable. Resort to
violence to resolve any issue is no longer an
aberration on the part of a few outlaws who can
be effectively dealt with by the law and order
agencies. It is a social phenomenon and needs to
be addressed as such. The exercise must begin by
assessing the various factors that have
contributed to the Pakistani people's descent
into the abyss of violence.
The fact is that we have been living by violence
for centuries. The long period of Muslim rule in
the subcontinent was based on the ability to
subjugate a more numerous people, and to wrest
the crown from a fellow Muslim by force, which is
another way to describe one's potential for
killing and pillage. All such violence was
justified, according to contemporary wisdom, as
violence by states, applied through their
recognised instruments for their protection or
expansion.
Let us leave history aside, although dreams of
conquering new lands can still be observed in the
psyche of our people, and concentrate on our
community's increasing indulgence in and social
approbation of violence since 1947.
The Partition riots marked the beginning of a new
fall from sanity when men were butchered and
women raped for no wrong done to the culprits.
Apart from the heavy toll of life and large-scale
destruction of property, significant harm done by
these riots - leaders of the Muslim community
were no less guilty than their counterparts on
the other side - there was legitimisation of
violence by non-state actors.
That experience provided a psychological
foundation for violence, which has been
legitimised sometimes in the name of religion and
sometimes as state necessity. It is the latter
phenomenon we are now concerned with because it
is the legitimisation of state violence against
citizens that gravely undermines all efforts to
overcome criminal gangs and pseudo-jihadis.
At its inception, the Pakistan state might have
been deficient in many ways; but it was not
lacking in the theory of imposing itself upon the
people by force. If the Pashtuns refused to
submit to Qayyum Khan's oppressive measures they
could be bombed. If the Khan of Kalat did not
understand the governor-general's command he
could be shown the long barrel of a cannon. If
Sheikh Mujib was not amenable to the rulers'
diktat, the entire Bengali population could be
put to the sword, no matter if all of them were
Pakistanis and most of them Muslims.
The atrocities committed in 1971 in East Bengal
in the name of the state and with the fullest
possible approval of the people in the western
wing, sanctified the gospel of violence for as
long as the people took to purge their minds of
the notion that violence was a legitimate means
of securing an objective. The people in today's
Pakistan made the terrible mistake of identifying
themselves with the perpetrators of the state's
war against its citizens living in Bengal and
thus grievously destroyed their sense of
revulsion at the wanton and gruesome killings.
Much is said about the brutalisation of society
during military regimes. True, Yahya Khan's war
against the Bengali Pakistanis and the hanging
and whipping in public during Ziaul Haq's reign
brutalised society. But to concentrate on such
events is to miss the point that all martial law
regimes in Pakistan have been innately
brutalising. Scrapping the Constitution is one of
the worst forms of violence.
The state by definition is an apparatus of
coercion but dictatorship is the most vicious
form of an oppressive state. Every time an
elected authority has been overthrown, the
message to the people is: any violence one can
get away with is legitimate. The element of
violence in the state has been directly
proportional to the degree of civilian exclusion
from public affairs. Violence is not bad, only
getting hauled up for it is. We thus find
violence in Pakistan rooted in the nature of the
state.
Another spring of violence has been kept running
by the state's failure to convince the people
that it deals with them justly and on the basis
of merit. The have-nots believe they cannot get
justice from the courts or the police; they go to
the local mafia to secure what is due to them.
Karachi's takeover by the mafia proves this. The
poor are also convinced that the affluent owe
their luxuries to force, favour or fraud. At the
slightest provocation, they are ready to vent
their anger on anyone who is better dressed or
looks better fed than them.
The struggle against pro-violence tendencies in
Pakistani society will be a long haul. Mere
police action will gain little. The solution lies
in changing the nature of the state, in
humanising it, and convincing the disadvantaged
that their needs are being addressed according to
the merit of their situation.
o o o
(ii)
Dawn
18 April 2008
COUNTERING ZIA'S CHILDREN
by Ayesha Siddiqa
THE PML-Q is no longer part of the ruling
coalition and the people are now too involved
with the new government. However, this should not
stop anyone from revisiting the party's election
manifesto which was noticeable for its emphasis
on encouraging Sufi Islam in the country.
Such a suggestion was made despite the fact that
numerous PML-Q leaders have good relations with
sources of Wahabism and extremism in the country.
Take for instance, the links between Ejazul Haq
and Chaudhry Shujaat Hussain and the clerics of
Lal Masjid. Perhaps, the leadership, like the
majority of Pakistanis, is confused about the
interpretation of religion.
Nevertheless, this critique does not reduce the
significance of looking at the proposal of Sufi
Islam as an alternative to extremism and the
radicalisation of segments of the population. How
does one bring back Sufi Islam which was
inherently more secular in its approach,
connected people from different religious
communities, and was a major source of the spread
of religion in the Indian subcontinent? A lot of
people refer to the Sufi tradition as
representing the Barelvi school of thought.
A glance across Pakistan shows numerous shrines
and mausoleums spread all over including in the
Frontier Province which is considered more
radical in terms of the people's faith. The Sufis
had come to the region from outside or were men
and women belonging to the region who preached
religion and spirituality. The names of shrines
like Data Gunj Bukhsh, Bari Imam, Golra Sharif,
Uch Sharif, Shahbaz Qalandar and others in
Pakistan or Nizam-ud-Din Aulia and Ajmer Sharif
in India are some of the many examples of the
Sufi tradition.
However, things began to change during the 1980s,
especially after the Soviet invasion of
Afghanistan when it became critical for the CIA
and ISI to prepare and train religiously inclined
segments of the population for greater
radicalisation so that a war could be fought. The
use of religious ideology as a source of
inspiration had been employed earlier as well
during the Bhutto regime as a means of countering
a move by Afghanistan's President Daud to
encourage the ethnic card in Pakistan.
Nevertheless, it was General Ziaul Haq who can be
held responsible for not only unleashing radical
Islamist forces but also encouraging them to
begin a phase of reformation in religion which
aimed at redefining a lot of concepts including
that pertaining to war and conflict. The state
machinery including the American CIA and
Pakistan's ISI sought a partnership with the
religious parties and militant groups to fight
the war in Afghanistan.
Now both sides make counter claims. The
Jamaat-i-Islami, for instance, says that it was
instrumental in inspiring the Afghans. The ISI
officials, on the other hand, claim that the
agency was instrumental in helping the Jamaat and
others to play a role.
In a nutshell, today's extremists were born of
the wedlock between General Ziaul Haq and radical
religious groups and parties with the US
initially playing the role of the groom's best
man. Even after the US had left the region
following the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan,
the linkage between the militant groups and the
ISI continued. The relationship was based on the
realisation that a firebrand kind of religious
ideology was critical in inspiring people to
fight a war and gradually changing the
geostrategic and geopolitical scene.
The period after the 1980s was critical in
redefining and fine-tuning the concept of jihad.
The war in Islam no longer remained a defensive
one but became an offensive war to be fought
against soft targets. In the more recent past,
this definition has been expanded to tactics such
as suicide bombings. Islam's radical clerics and
extremist elements see this as an effective tool
of war. Young children, men and women are now
told that this is essentially part of how jihad
was defined in their religion.
Unfortunately, the world of Islam still lacks an
institutionalised alternative voice from the
religious mainstream who can contest the
prevalent definition. The alternative voices
which preach peace and discourage extremism,
unfortunately, do not belong to the mainstream.
The professors teaching religious studies or
encouraging inter-faith dialogue in American
universities do not necessarily have any
influence on religious discourse in the Muslim
world.
Given the spate of suicide attacks in Pakistan it
is sad that most clerics and scholars of Islam
from the mainstream have shied away from
condemning such acts or expressing their opinion
on the issue. For instance, the question which
clerics from the Jamaat-i-Islami or others such
as Farhat Hashmi must address is whether killing
your own people is part of jihad. Condemning such
acts privately does not have the same effect.
The question now is whether Sufi Islam in
Pakistan can curb extremism? Logically, the
representatives or families of the Sufi tradition
have a direct interest in countering this
influence. Thanks to years of General Ziaul Haq,
we saw places known for Sufi culture giving birth
to extremism. Although the influence of Sufi
shrines continued to draw people and some
scholars claim that the number of Barelvis had
increased or remained constant, the fact is that
such areas also became known for greater
radicalisation.
The centres of spiritualism became a catchment
area for both the pirs and the extremists. The
power and influence of the militants, who were
now backed by government agencies, attracted
young men towards extremist values. For example,
in spite of the shrines in Bahawalpur and Sindh,
a limited number of people also started to follow
the Deobandi and Wahabi school of thought and
started to produce jihadis.
The existing Sufi tradition could not become a
bulwark against extremism because the pirs
themselves had stopped delivering to the people
in terms of their spiritual needs and had become
very much part of the institutional state power.
Traditionally, the Sufis and the pirs used to
negotiate between secular state forces and
spiritualism. However, the new generation of pirs
was subject to greater state intervention.
For example, General Zia was critical in bringing
about the change in the leadership of the dargah
of Bari Imam. Most pirs in Pakistan today no
longer negotiate between the religious and
spiritual and the secular. Instead, they have
become linchpins of state power and vie with the
authorities for greater political influence and
material benefits.
The obsession with power made it impossible for
these people to emphasise secular spiritual
values and teach a lesson of peace and amity.
There was least interest in countering the
proliferation of Wahabi ideology or radical
beliefs.
An alternative to radical Islam will not be
produced until such forces gain institutional
strength and are willing to engage the believers
in an equally powerful and substitute discourse. n
The writer is an independent strategic and political analyst.
______
[3]
PREVENT A THIRD BHOPAL TRAGEDY
Its a litmus test for India's claim that it can
deal with globalization without sacrificing
vulnerable citizens
by Praful Bidwai
More than 23 years after the world's worst ever
chemical industry accident at the Union Carbide
Corp. pesticides plant in Bhopal, its victims are
struggling to get a modicum of justice - and to
reaffirm their human dignity and the fundamental
principles of any civilized social compact.
A group of 50 Union Carbide accident victims have
walked to Delhi to ask the PM to keep his 2006
promise
Fifty of them have trudged the 800km distance
from Bhopal to Delhi to demand that Prime
Minister Manmohan Singh abide by his April 2006
promise to rehabilitate them fully, get the plant
site cleansed of the 9,000 tonnes of chemical
residues which continue to poison °©people, and
take the long-overdue legal action against
Carbide and its successor, Dow Chemical Co.,
incorporated in the US. It is on that assurance
that the survivors had called off their 21-day
dharna, including a six-day hunger strike in 2006.
In place of a high-level commission, the
survivors had asked Singh to set up a
"coordination committee". That committee has not
taken a single decision. Instead of affirming the
rule of law against Dow, the government is under
pressure to let it walk away from its
responsibility to clean up the Bhopal mess.
Meanwhile, more than 100,000 Bhopalis exposed to
the 1984 gas leak suffer from severe disabilities
and disorders, and 25,000 are forced to consume
groundwater contaminated with chemicals, which
cause birth defects, cancers and other health
damage.
Involved here is not just natural justice and the
rule of law, but a litmus test for "emerging
economic giant" India's claim that it can deal
with globalization without sacrificing some of
its most vulnerable citizens at the altar of
corporate profit. The Bhopal disaster killed more
than 3,000 people within a week and inflicted
grievous chemical damage upon more than 200,000.
This has since caused a further estimated
18,000-20,000 deaths.
Photographer: Manan Vatsyayana / AP
Dow fully bought Carbide in 2001, and by natural
law, takes over all its liabilities and assets.
Yet, it has offered to bear the cost of
(partially) cleaning the Bhopal site - but only
on condition that it's freed of all legal
liabilities, including criminal liability on
charges of culpable homicide.
Dow has been strenuously lobbying Indian
officials while holding out the lure of
large-scale investments - if it's let off the
liability hook. Between 2005 and 2007, numerous
influential people pleaded on its behalf,
including Planning Commission deputy chairman
Montek Singh Ahluwalia, finance minister P.
Chidambaram and commerce minister Kamal Nath,
besides top-notch US-India Business Council
office-bearers such as Ratan Tata and Dow chief
Andrew N. Liveris.
Dow has been illegally selling Carbide's
technologies in India through front companies
such as Mega Vista Marketing Solutions and Mega
Vista Global Services - in defiance of a 1992
court order, which directs the government to
confiscate all of Carbide's assets in India
because Carbide is a proclaimed absconder from
Indian law. Dow stands implicated in a series of
legal infringements and violations of due
process, including misrepresentation and attempts
to bribe agriculture ministry officials to
register pesticides.
In 1989, Carbide escaped civil liability for the
faulty plant design and gross negligence, which
caused the accident, by paying a paltry $470
million in a collusive and grossly unjust
settlement. But its criminal liability still
survives.
However, Carbide and its directors have refused
to stand trial in a Bhopal criminal court.
Meanwhile, Dow has been sheltering these
fugitives from the law and selling Carbide's
products, technologies and services in India.
Dow's offer confronts the government with a
critical choice. Either it cuts a deal with this
multinational in a mercenary fashion; or it sides
with the survivors.
The government is sharply divided. The ministry
of chemicals and fertilizers has held Dow legally
liable for cleaning the site, and demanded in
court that it deposit Rs100 crore as initial
payment. But the ministry of law has a
questionably lenient interpretation of Dow's
liability.
There's evidence that Carbide misrepresented the
truth by claiming it has no liabilities on
account of the gas disaster. In fact, Carbide,
some of its directors, including former chairman
Warren Anderson, and its Indian subsidiary stand
charged in India with causing death by a
negligent act. The Indian government has failed
to prosecute them. It claims it cannot trace
Anderson (whose address in a New York suburb has
been widely publicized).
Dow maintains that being an American company,
it's not subject to Indian jurisdiction. The
courts have not yet ruled on this, but only asked
that a part of the overground waste, 386 tonnes
secured in a warehouse, be removed and
incinerated. The courts are silent on what should
be done with the 8,000 tonnes of underground
waste, and also with the hundreds of tonnes
strewn all over the plant site.
In 2005, the victims' groups succeeded in getting
a contract between Dow and the public sector
Indian Oil Corp. annulled. This involved the
licensing of a proprietary Carbide technology.
Dow is now negotiating the sale of petrochemicals
technologies with Reliance Industries. All manner
of entrenched interests are helping Dow duck its
legal obligations. The Indian government seems
inclined to bow to their pressure by putting
corporate investment above the life and
well-being of its citizens.
Bhopal's second tragedy - the gas leak was the
first - was the terrible 1989 settlement under
which most victims received less than Rs7,000
each for grave injuries and a lifetime of
suffering, although a few with better access to
physicians and judges got 10 times more. Families
of the dead got as little as Rs2 lakh. Much of
this was siphoned off by judges, bureaucrats and
middlemen. Now, a third tragedy may unfold,
through Dow, unless Manmohan Singh listens to the
survivors - and his own conscience and promises.
Praful Bidwai is an independent columnist and environmentalist.
______
[4]
Gomantak Times,
29 March 2008
SIX FEET OF LAND
by Vidyadhar Gadgil
In one of Leo Tolstoy's most well-known stories,
"How Much Land Does a Man Need?" (James Joyce
once described it as the finest story ever
written), he presents to us a greedy protagonist
named Pahom, who is offered as much land as he
can walk the perimeter of in a single day.
Overcome by his avarice, Pahom tries to cover too
much ground, and finding that he is late and the
sun is setting, runs frantically to make it back
to the starting point in time, only to collapse
and die from exhaustion there. He is then buried
in an ordinary grave six feet long, thus
ironically answering the question in the title.
Tolstoy, always inclined towards moral
philosophy, uses this as a parable to illustrate
the futility of avarice, and how we should learn
to live within our needs rather than succumb to
our greed.
Of course, Tolstoy never considers that even the
six feet-which he probably considered a basic
minimum right-may be beyond reach, even when it
is a pressing need. But that is more or less the
situation that Muslims face in Salcete taluka
today when it comes to burying their dead.
In Margao, they have been making do with a
graveyard at Pajifond Hill which was donated to
the community about 125 years ago. This kabrastan
is now grossly inadequate for the needs of the
community, which has, like other communities,
seen a big rise in population. Besides, the
cemetery is at the top of a sleep slope, which
cannot be reached by vehicular transport-thus,
elderly people cannot attend funerals, and even
transporting bodies for burial to the kabrastan
becomes a problem. The pressures are such that
bodies sometimes have to be exhumed within a few
months to make space for new burials. The
location, being at the top of a hill, is mainly
hard rock, and graves have to be dug manually
through the rock since it is impossible to take
heavy earth-moving machinery up to the kabrastan.
It is not that no efforts have been made to solve
this problem. After sustained efforts by the
Muslim community, a unanimous resolution was
passed in 1999 in the Goa Assembly. Land
acquisition proceedings were initiated, only to
be subsequently dropped. Luizinho Faleiro, the
then CM, wrote to the presidents of masjids in
the Margao area in 2004: 'I was pained at heart
to see the pathetic condition of the kabrastan
and the hardships suffered by the people
attending the funeral...Once a resolution is
passed unanimously in the Legislative Assembly,
it reflects the will of the state and nobody
whosoever has got the right to neglect the same
and deny burial facilities...It is shocking that
the vested elements in the succeeding Governments
chose to cancel the said land acquisition
notification thereby adding to the hardships and
difficulties of the Muslim brethren..."
Matters have dragged on since then. In 2005, the
Congress candidate Digambar Kamat assured in his
manifesto for the by-election to the Margao
assembly constituency: 'Pre-acquisition
formalities for a large area of land for the
purpose of a burial ground for the Muslim
population of Salcete have already made good
progress. This long standing need of the Muslim
community will become a reality within the next
six months.' Land acquisition proceedings to
extend the existing graveyard by acquiring land
for a kabrastan adjacent to the existing one at
Pajifond were to begin in 2007, but there were a
number of objections, and groups like the Bajrang
Dal actively mobilised opposition to the
proposal. The government dragged its feet on the
matter. Finally, Margao's Muslim community asked
the government to drop the land acquisition
proceedings. The reason given by the
Sunni-Jaamat-Ul-Muslameen General Secretary, Noor
Mohammed Shah, was that the Muslim community want
to live in harmony with other communities, and
that 'the other community has raised objections
for the acquisition.'
But there is considerable resentment within the
community over the denial of such a basic human
right as burial space. While the land acquisition
proceedings were hanging fire, Muslim youth
conducted a two-day hunger strike in front of the
Collectorate. All they got for their pains were
more assurances from various politicians. It is
now 2008, and Digambar Kamat is currently Chief
Minister. The assurances are repeated every once
in a while but there is no real progress on the
matter to date.
Meanwhile, the Muslim community has been getting
increasingly desperate. Deciding not to rely on
the government, they have purchased land in a
number of places. But just as in the Pajifond
kabrastan extension case, there were objections
in all cases-in Macazana, Aquem Alto, and in Sao
Jose de Areal. In 1997, in the ODP, the SGPDA had
proposed a common burial space for the three
major religious communities in Ambajim, Fatorda.
To this proposal too there has been opposition
from locals on various pretexts. Interestingly,
the opposition has come from both the Christian
and Hindu communities.
Members of the Muslim community in Margao express
disgust and anger over the denial of such a basic
right. Social activist Ranjan Solomon quotes a
Muslim from Margao: 'Our dead are being treated
as if it were a garbage issue. Just as nobody
wants garbage disposed of in their
constituencies, so do people reject the idea of
having a kabrastan in their vicinity. Our dead
are not garbage. They are our fathers, sons and
daughters, and sisters and brothers.'
The Muslim community continues to run from pillar
to post to get justice. Efforts are also going on
to get objections withdrawn through a process of
inter-community dialogue to convince people that
this is a legitimate need, and that a kabrastan
would not create any nuisance or problems. But
this alone cannot solve the problem-essential to
the process is political will on the part of the
government. Till then, that elusive six feet of
land to bury their dead with dignity will remain
a distant dream for the Muslims of Margao.
______
[5] Noise on Tibet:
(i)
The Asian Age
April 17, 2008
THE TORCH OF TIBET
by Antara Dev Sen
As you read this, the Olympic torch will be
hidden away somewhere in New Delhi. And for a
very short while, it will go out for a public
run, rushing through Rajghat concealed by several
protective rings of Indian and Chinese security
personnel. Thankfully, it won't take long - it's
only a 2 km journey. Then it can be stowed away
in some heavily guarded safehouse till it flies
off in its special Chinese plane. And we can
breathe again.
The excitement over the Olympic flame this time
is fascinating. It has nothing to do with the
spirit of the games, or with parading the
achievements or triumphs of the host country,
China. The excitement is about Tibet, a so-called
"autonomous region of China". This Olympic flame
illuminates the decades-long suffering of
Tibetans and the severe human rights abuses of
the Chinese. And it ignites protests. The sacred
flame is running scared.
Last time there was an Olympic torch relay in New
Delhi, for the Athens Games of 2004, it was
cheered through its 33 km parade by wildly
enthusiastic crowds.
It was indeed a celebration of the spirit of the
games, of the spirit of unity and cooperation.
The Athens Olympics slogan "Pass the Flame, Unite
the Word!" came alive with Gulzar's remarkable
theme song, Lau se lau jalti hai (One flame
lights another), sung by Kavita Krishnamurthy to
L. Subramanium's music. It reminded us that
nothing is impossible for the human spirit: Saat
samundar tair ke jaana, tej hawaa se haath
milaanaa /ghoomti machhli, aankh nishana, ek
ungli par globe ghumaana (To swim the seven seas,
to join hands with the mighty winds, to aim for
the eye of the spinning fish, to spin the globe
on one finger...). In a thundering cultural event
with hundreds of singers, dancers, actors,
sportspeople, politicians and others, the Olympic
flame rekindled in us the desire to reach for the
sun.
This time, it has rekindled in us our fear of a repressive regime.
As the flame scurries from country to country,
ducking demonstrators, lashing out at protesters,
leaving a trail of arrests, bitterness and mild
violence, it doesn't allow us to think of the
spirit of the Olympics, or even register the
theme this year: "Journey of Harmony". And the
slogan? No, it is not "Lay off Tibet, or Else".
It is, in fact, rather beautiful: "Light the
Passion, Share the Dream."
Unfortunately, it is not easy to share China's
dream, without sharing Tibet's grief. There are
other issues with China too - links to the Darfur
genocide, to the Burmese junta, trampling human
rights and free speech, threatening democracies
like Taiwan, and a general abhorrence of
democratic freedoms. Forget our own fears in
Aksai Chin and Tawang.
Unfortunately, the Dragon's way of "lighting the
passion" makes you cringe. It breaths fire at
anyone who dares to bring up Tibet, kills monks
and other protesters, and badmouths one of the
world's most respected spiritual leaders, calling
the Dalai Lama a lowly conspirer and "serial
liar".
The Olympic torch parade that was supposed to
celebrate China's rise as a superpower has become
a Flame of Shame highlighting ruthless arrogance
and contempt for democratic freedoms. It has in
fact made many innocents around the world sit up
and uncomfortably take notice of the country
behind the "Made in China" label that fills their
homes.
To add to China's woes, its burly "flame
attendants" have not been popular. These
tracksuited paramilitary forces have been widely
disliked for their brusque pushing and shoving
and rudely ordering the athletes about, and were
called "thugs" in London. In spite of their
efforts, there have been furious protests in
London, in Paris - where the flame was snuffed
out four times, then swiftly hidden in a bus to
save it from more ignominy - and in San
Francisco, where the administration lied to the
people about the route to mislead huge crowds of
protesters and allow the heavily-armed and
guarded torch a quick run on an empty stretch of
road. In Islamabad, the torch was confined to the
Jinnah Stadium. The space for the spirit of the
Olympic flame was shrinking alarmingly.
Thankfully, in spite of some Dragon growls, we -
the world's largest democracy - have stood our
ground about allowing dissent. Even though the
surprise Freedom Flame run by the Tibetan Youth
Congress two days before the torch relay landed
27 protesters in jail, adding to the hundreds who
have been jailed since protests began in March.
As the Olympic flame makes its short dash through
New Delhi, there is another parade planned, and
in the true spirit of celebration. The Parallel
Peace Run by the Tibetan Solidarity Committee,
led by the Tibetan government-in-exile, will
gather at Rajghat at 10 am and march to Jantar
Mantar to celebrate the non-violent struggle for
Tibet, and showcase Tibetan culture and identity.
This may be the rally to watch. It will not have
the Olympic flame, but it will bring alive its
slogan: "Light the Passion, Share the Dream."
For India was founded on dreams of democratic
freedoms, including the freedom to pray, to
believe, to be proud of one's own cultural
identity, to voice dissent. These are the
fundamental rights of everyone in India, whether
a citizen or a refugee. The Tibetans in India
have these rights. And as the host of 100,000
Tibetan exiles, as the country privileged to host
the Dalai Lama, and as a nation proud of its
moral principles, we are inclined to share the
dream of the Tibetans. This is not a secessionist
dream, just a vision of a future Tibet which is
truly autonomous, where people can have
religious, cultural and personal freedoms, and
the "cultural genocide" is stopped. This is the
true "Journey of Harmony". And hopefully it will
live on in our hearts, long after the torch relay
and the Olympics are over.
For in any democracy, civil society is the real
torchbearer of freedoms and conscience. Forget
the shy flame flickering in the forest of Chinese
and Indian securitymen. Let's bring alive the
true spirit of the Olympics. Nothing is
impossible. We have already turned the Beijing
Olympics flame into the Tibet Torch. We need to
use it to light up the future and find a solution
to this 50-year-long saga of Tibet.
Antara Dev Sen is editor of The Little Magazine
o o o
(ii)
London Review of Books
Letters
Vol. 30 No. 8 · Cover date: 24 April 2008
NO SHANGRI-LA
From Slavoj Zizek
The media imposes certain stories on us, and the
one about Tibet goes like this. The People's
Republic of China, which, back in 1949, illegally
occupied Tibet, has for decades engaged in the
brutal and systematic destruction not only of the
Tibetan religion, but of the Tibetans themselves.
Recently, the Tibetans' protests against Chinese
occupation were again crushed by military force.
Since China is hosting the 2008 Olympics, it is
the duty of all of us who love democracy and
freedom to put pressure on China to give back to
the Tibetans what it stole from them. A country
with such a dismal human rights record cannot be
allowed to use the noble Olympic spectacle to
whitewash its image. What will our governments
do? Will they, as usual, cede to economic
pragmatism, or will they summon the strength to
put ethical and political values above short-term
economic interests?
There are complications in this story of 'good
guys versus bad guys'. It is not the case that
Tibet was an independent country until 1949, when
it was suddenly occupied by China. The history of
relations between Tibet and China is a long and
complex one, in which China has often played the
role of a protective overlord: the anti-Communist
Kuomintang also insisted on Chinese sovereignty
over Tibet. Before 1949, Tibet was no Shangri-la,
but an extremely harsh feudal society, poor (life
expectancy was barely over 30), corrupt and
fractured by civil wars (the most recent one,
between two monastic factions, took place in
1948, when the Red Army was already knocking at
the door). Fearing social unrest and
disintegration, the ruling elite prohibited
industrial development, so that metal, for
example, had to be imported from India.
Since the early 1950s, there has been a history
of CIA involvement in stirring up anti-Chinese
troubles in Tibet, so Chinese fears of external
attempts to destabilise Tibet are not irrational.
Nor was the Cultural Revolution, which ravaged
Tibetan monasteries in the 1960s, simply imported
by the Chinese: fewer than a hundred Red Guards
came to Tibet. The youth mobs that burned the
monasteries were almost exclusively Tibetan. As
the TV images demonstrate, what is going on now
in Tibet is no longer a peaceful 'spiritual'
protest by monks (like the one in Burma last
year), but involves the killing of innocent
Chinese immigrants and the burning of their
stores.
It is a fact that China has made large
investments in Tibet's economic development, as
well as its infrastructure, education and health
services. To put it bluntly: in spite of China's
undeniable oppression of the country, the average
Tibetan has never had such a high standard of
living. There is worse poverty in China's western
rural provinces: child slave labour in brick
factories, abominable conditions in prisons, and
so on.
In recent years, China has changed its strategy
in Tibet: depoliticised religion is now
tolerated, often even supported. China now relies
more on ethnic and economic colonisation than on
military coercion, and is transforming Lhasa into
a Chinese version of the Wild West, in which
karaoke bars alternate with Buddhist theme parks
for Western tourists. In short, what the images
of Chinese soldiers and policemen terrorising
Buddhist monks conceal is a much more effective
American-style socio-economic transformation: in
a decade or two, Tibetans will be reduced to the
status of Native Americans in the US. It seems
that the Chinese Communists have finally got it:
what are secret police, internment camps and the
destruction of ancient monuments, compared with
the power of unbridled capitalism?
One of the main reasons so many people in the
West participate in the protests against China is
ideological: Tibetan Buddhism, deftly propagated
by the Dalai Lama, is one of the chief points of
reference for the hedonist New Age spirituality
that has become so popular in recent times. Tibet
has become a mythic entity onto which we project
our dreams. When people mourn the loss of an
authentic Tibetan way of life, it isn't because
they care about real Tibetans: what they want
from Tibetans is that they be authentically
spiritual for us, so that we can continue playing
our crazy consumerist game. 'Si vous êtes pris
dans le rêve de l'autre,' Gilles Deleuze wrote,
'vous êtes foutu.' The protesters against China
are right to counter the Beijing Olympic motto -
'One World, One Dream' - with 'One World, Many
Dreams'. But they should be aware that they are
imprisoning Tibetans in their own dream.
The question is often asked: given the explosion
of capitalism in China, when will democracy
assert itself there, as capital's 'natural'
political form of organisation? The question is
often put another way: how much faster would
China's development have been if it had been
combined with political democracy? But can the
assumption be made so easily? In a TV interview a
couple of years ago, Ralf Dahrendorf linked the
increasing distrust of democracy in
post-Communist Eastern Europe to the fact that,
after every revolutionary change, the road to new
prosperity leads through a 'vale of tears'. After
socialism breaks down the limited, but real,
systems of socialist welfare and security have to
be dismantled, and these first steps are
necessarily painful. The same goes for Western
Europe, where the passage from the welfare state
model to the new global economy involves painful
renunciations, less security, less guaranteed
social care. Dahrendorf notes that this
transition lasts longer than the average period
between democratic elections, so that there is a
great temptation to postpone these changes for
short-term electoral gain. Fareed Zakaria has
pointed out that democracy can only 'catch on' in
economically developed countries: if developing
countries are 'prematurely democratised', the
result is a populism that ends in economic
catastrophe and political despotism. No wonder
that today's economically most successful Third
World countries (Taiwan, South Korea, Chile)
embraced full democracy only after a period of
authoritarian rule.
Following this path, the Chinese used
unencumbered authoritarian state power to control
the social costs of the transition to capitalism.
The weird combination of capitalism and Communist
rule proved not to be a ridiculous paradox, but a
blessing. China has developed so fast not in
spite of authoritarian Communist rule, but
because of it.
There is a further paradox at work here. What if
the promised second stage, the democracy that
follows the authoritarian vale of tears, never
arrives? This, perhaps, is what is so unsettling
about China today: the suspicion that its
authoritarian capitalism is not merely a reminder
of our past - of the process of capitalist
accumulation which, in Europe, took place from
the 16th to the 18th century - but a sign of our
future? What if the combination of the Asian
knout and the European stock market proves
economically more efficient than liberal
capitalism? What if democracy, as we understand
it, is no longer the condition and motor of
economic development, but an obstacle to it?
Slavoj Zizek
Birkbeck College, London WC1
______
[6]
Economic and Political Weekly
April 12, 2008
BOOK REVIEW
Violent Activism: A Psychological Study of Ex-Militants in Jammu and Kashmir
by Shobna
Sonpar; Aman Public Charitable Trust, New Delhi;
April 2007; pp 227.
'WE FIGHT, THEREFORE WE ARE'
by Gautam Navlakha
However much one decries recourse to violent
means to achieve political objectives, there is
neither any sign of it abating nor a decline in
at- tempts to suppress it violently. And while it
is known that violence affects everyone,
including the perpetrators, violence not only
begets violence but violence is perceived as the
way to end violence. This is akin to the
perception that only war against war can bring
about peace. It is, therefore, important to take
a close look at violence. One area of inquiry is
to understand why do people take to arms to meet
their political objectives? Is it that there are
personal psychological factors which drives them
to take to violent means? Or is it that they are
driven to it by circumstances? What happens to
them in the process, both during the time of
violent acts and after- wards? The book under
review is a psycho- social analysis of violence,
and an attempt to unravel and understand the role
of those who "have propelled their political
goals through violent means" (p 1). The study
seeks to "make visible the experience of
ex-militants", to "bring fresh in- sight to the
understanding of violence" and to help in
"rehumanisation of these people" (p 10). The
author does well to point out that "(i)n popular
discourse, the polarity is not violence against
non-violence. Rather, legitimate violence or
'good' violence is set against illegitimate or
'bad' violence". She then goes on to remind us
that "(m)odern torture has a practical rationale
in the arena of policing. It is integral to the
maintenance of the nation state's sovereignty
where national security needs override other
social values and legal rights. This legit mates
those forms of pain that the state can inflict
and those that are proscribed" (p 2).
Thus rehumanisation is necessary because the
militants have a stake in post- conflict
reconstruction and without the participation of
armed groups a stable social order and peace
building cannot be achieved.
The author analyses the phenomenon from the
perspective of 24 ex-militants in Jammu and
Kashmir through a qualitative method. "This
consisted of a long semi- structured interview
with individual res- pondents and one focus group
discussion with another group of ex-militants" (p
11).
Through a review of the literature "significant
themes" were identified and were the "aims and
objectives of the study". All the 24 persons were
now in civilian life and comprised both the
"released" mili- tants, i e, those who were
captured and then, having served their time,
released, as well as those who "surrendered". All
of this is based on the lives of the ex-
militants she studied through their own
narratives. She points out that "(n)arratives
matter because a narrative's metaphors and images
can tell us a lot about how individuals and
groups understand the social and political worlds
in which they live, and reveal the deep fears,
perceived threats and past grievances that drive
a conflict" (p 23). But the analysis goes beyond,
to find out what befell them and their own
subjective account of their life experiences.
The Life of a Militant
She points out that "the capacity, and even
appetite, for violence is human and familiar. But
being difficult to own and morally integrate, it
is externalised. As an external phenomenon, its
abhorrent nature is visible and magnified.
However, when approached from within it always
presents [itself] in a cloak of moral
righteousness. Indeed, it no longer appears as
'violence'. It is rather the restoring of honour,
the redeeming of injustice, the struggle for
liberation, the safeguarding of the nation, the
purification of a people and so on" (p 17). In
this sense, in "theorising about violence, the
study has implications for three broad areas: the
polarisation of violence into 'good' and 'bad',
the perpetrator-victim-perpetrator cycle that
hinges on trauma and sense of victimisation, and
the dynamics of violence of subordinate or
oppressed groups compared to violence 'from
above' - that is, from the state or dominant
groups" (p 100). Again, as the author points out,
"(t)he legitimisation of violence by the state in
terms of national imperative makes it likely that
violence will be more extensive and will have a
larger impact. Oppressed groups that take to
violence are usually small and weak and need to
attract supporters. This sets limits to the use
of violence. But state-organised violence is
based on the power of a government and need not,
to the same extent, seek support for its actions.
Further, there may be laws that permit a culture
of impunity for state- sponsored violence..." (p
102).
Chapter III of the book, 'Findings and
Discussion', after highlighting the demo- graphic
and other factors which cast doubt on the notion
that the militants were un- educated, poor,
misguided and disaffected youth, shows that many
of the ex-militants were people who, prior to
militancy, had engaged in a variety of activities
and were drawn to militancy out of a sense of
humiliation and victimisation. The nationalist/
religious ideology offered the shared common
space which acted as both motivation and
sustenance. "Violent action not only provides an
outlet for rage, but helps to restore control and
agency as well as counteract the toxic effects of
shame and humiliation on self-esteem" (p 36). But
life as a militant has a mixture of bonding,
freedom, isolation and fear...It's a "closed
world where criticism and the influence of ideas
from outside....are severely restricted" (p 48).
There is an "almost universal, intimate bond
between warrior values and conventional notions
of masculinity" (p 49). The author discusses how
the respondents gave grounds for their violent
acts in terms of their ideology so that "their
acts become appropriate and morally defensible in
their own eyes" (p 56). Finally, the
post-militant phase covers what happened to the
respondents after their capture and subsequent
release. There is the re-emergence of a sense of
victimisation as they struggle to engage in
civilian life.
The analysis is far richer than what is mentioned
above and there are nuances, details, discussions
and comparisons/ parallels with other studies of
a similar nature, which make for absorbing
reading. For instance, the sub-section on 'Prison
and Interrogation' brings out the pervasive
nature of torture employed by the Indian state
against the people, whether they were militant or
not, or had engaged in violent acts or not. Few
studies mention this crime. Indeed, the fact that
successive governments have refused to sign the
Convention Against Torture has hardly ever
figured in public debates. But here we have the
first systematic account of what befell people
when military suppression was unleashed.
The account of the ex-militants "of imprisonment
and interrogation are painful and shocking. For
some, their experiences in custody continue to
evoke strong feelings of fear, anger and shame,
or have led to post-traumatic stress symptoms.
For most, there is a renewed sense of
victimisation. These experiences are invariably
related to torture....(and) have continued even
after their release from prison" (p 58). "Torture
was physical, mental and sexual" (ibid).
Insight into Violent Activism
While this meticulous study deserves to be read
and re-read, there are questions that rear their
head. It is significant that out of all the 24
ex-militants who had re- joined civilian life,
not one of them refers to any legal proceedings
against their torturers or even an expression of
a desire to pursue the matter as a way of
retribution or redemption. Is this a result of
fear? Or a desire to suppress the memory of
torture? Or to let bygones be bygones? Whatever
the answer, it has a direct bearing on peace
building and reintegration. The author is mindful
of the need for justice as part of a peace
settlement. But it is not clear how this is to be
done "while steering a path between vengeance and
forgiveness, between impunity and accountability
for crimes committed during the period of
political violence" (p 98).
Again, one cannot help wonder if, and how far,
the issue of gender and dissent are context
bound? Is there a difference between the life
experience of militants in national, religious
and revolutionary movements? What is the life
experience of armed groups which comprise large
number of women combatants? On a different tack,
where does one place the militants in J&K today
when they have committed themselves to be held
accountable for their acts and to abide by
inter-national conventions and protocols? How
does this undermine intolerance of dissent? What
does it show in terms of their subjective role as
victim and as perpetrator of violence? What
impact would this have, if any, when theorising
about violence?
These questions, however, do not detract from the
scholarship and merit of the book, rather they
enhance its value. The book's remarkable
intellectual transparency invites, nay demands,
the engagement of the reader. It offers a rare
insight into the perceptions of those in J&K who
took to violence to meet their political
objectives without fudging the upside or the
downside of "violent activism". It does so by
according humanity to the perpetrators and agency
to the victims. Indeed, it opens a door into a
variety of issues which somehow get lost in the
unidimensional public debates over violence and
militancy. Also the 24 interviews allow the
readers to form their own judgment. While
democratic politics, as the study argues, is an
attempt to "rehumanise" those who have been
demonised, it could be argued that those
marginalised, or issues which are marginalised,
must be brought to the centre stage in order that
the appeal of violent activism gets eroded. Aman
Public Charitable Trust must be congratulated for
sponsoring and publishing this study.
______
[7]
TRUTH & CONSEQUENCE - A LOOK BEHIND THE VATICAN'S BAN ON CONTRACEPTION
14 April 2008 - On the eve of the pope's visit to
the US, Catholics for Choice released a
publication examining the impact of 40 years of
Humanae Vitae, the Vatican document that cemented
the ban on contraception.
Full Text at:
www.catholicsforchoice.org/topics/reform/documents/TruthConsequencesFINAL.pdf
______
[8] Announcements:
(i)
Public Meeting
The significance of the Constituent Assembly Elections in Nepal
Date: April 19, 2008
Time: 5 PM- 8 pm
Venue: Deputy Chairman's Hall, Constitution Club, Rafi Marg, New Delhi
Members of the All India Council of the Lok Raj
Sangathan were in Nepal during the historic
elections to the Constituent Assembly, as
international observers. They witnessed at close
sight the seriousness and enthusiasm with which
the people of Nepal participated in the elections.
These are exciting times for the people of Nepal.
They are also difficult times, as the internal
and external enemies of the people of Nepal will
leave no stone unturned to block the forward
march of the people. Lok Raj Sangathan stands
with the people of Nepal in the ongoing struggle
for realising their aspirations to decide their
own destiny.
We in India are fighting for political power in
the hands of people, and we can see how the
existing system of multi party representative
democracy throttles the people and marginalises
them.
In this connection, it is important that people
and those political forces in our country who are
interested in ensuring power in the hands of the
people, study the experience of the ongoing
developments in Nepal.
Lok Raj Sangathan urges you to participate in this discussion.
Sincere regards
Prakash Rao
Bijju Nayak
Convenor, All India Council
Secretary Delhi Regional Council
Lok Raj Sangathan
---
(ii)
vasakh at gmail.com
Date: Fri, 11 Apr 2008 14:27:34 +0500
Subject: vasakh film festival '08, lahore
hello everyone,
The 5-day Vasakh Film Festival is showing best
documentaries from all over South Asia from 23rd
to 27th April or 10th to 14th of Vasakh, our
month of harvest and renewal.
Previously known as 'matteela film festival', the
event remains essentially the same with award
winning films from Travelling Film South Asia
being the hightlight.
The screenings are at our usual venue of HRCP. As
always, tickets will be available for a donation
at the venue during the festival.
However if you'd like to support the festival by
purchasing in advance a Festival Pass valid for
all 26 screenings, please email us back.
We are expecting a huge response this time
around. To see why, have a look at the schedule
below.
For more info and updates, you can visit under
the Film Section of www.danka.com.pk or call the
Interactive Resource Centre (IRC) at 042-5313038
or email: vasakh at gmail.com
Venue: Dorab Patel Auditorium, HRCP, 107 Tipu
Block, New Garden Town, Lahore. Near Shakir Ali
Museum.
***Bags not allowed inside the hall***
S C H E D U L E (All times, 'pm')
23rd April WEDNESDAY
6.30 - 7.10 (Double Screening)
Emergency Plus (15')
Interactive Resource Centre
A record of a popular resistance growing stronger
against a brutal crackdown in Pakistan.
The Baloch Battlefield (35')
followed by Q&A with Dir. Munizae Jahangir
Rare footage of a violent conflict and Bugti's last interview.
7.30 - 8.45
The Sky Below (75')
Sara Singh
A visual artist's contemporary portrait of the India-Pakistan 'mind-frontier'.
9.00 - 9.40
Taropa Bharr Laeay Langhar da (Come stitch the torn) (40')
Huma Safdar
1857's forgotten uprising in Punjab is still alive in the songs of the Ravi.
24th April THURSDAY
4.00 - 5.00
A Life with Slate (59')
Dipesh Kharel
Hard life & cooperation among labouring families of Nepali mountains.
5.20 - 6.20 (Double Screening)
The Miseducation of Pakistan (30')
Syed Ali Nasir
Write 'Cat', Read 'Dog'. Story of a generation lost to corruption.
Talking Faith (30')
Naveen Qayyum
Azam and Sarah,two students of FC College, one
Muslim, one Christian, talk about faith,
politics, traditions and a lot more.
6.40 - 7.45
Rabba Hun Kee Kariye (Thus Departed our Neighbours) (65')
Ajay Bhardwaj
Genocides of 1947 recounted in countryside Punjab.
8.00 - 9.50
Continuous Journey (87 min)
Ali Kazmi
1914. A little known incident exposes the British Empire's myth of equality.
25th April FRIDAY
4.00 - 5.00
Ayodhya Gatha (60')
Vani Subramanian
Post Babri Masjid, this town no longer belongs to its residents.
5.20 - 7.00
An Inconvinient Truth (100')
Davis Guggenheim
In case you're still unconvinced about global warmingŠ
7.20 - 8.00
In Spirit and in Flesh (35')
followed by Q&A with Dir. Maheen Zia
Hira Mandi: The unglamorous reality of a misunderstood community.
8.20 - 9.40
Tales of the night fairies (74')
Shohini Ghosh
Shonagachi: Calcutta's sex workers fight for their rights.
10.00 - 11.30
Eisenfresser (Ironeaters) (85')
Shaheen Dill-Riaz
The Sisyphus of the seasonal workers at Chittagong's shipbreaking yards.
26th April SATURDAY
4.00 - 5.00
Chaama Deu! Tara Nabirsa! (Forgive! Forget Not!) (59')
Pranay Limbu
Ordeal of a journalist detained by Nepali Army for 15 months.
5.20 - 6.00
A Certain Liberation (38 min)
Yasmine Kabir
East Pakistan 1971: A woman witnessed something and went mad.
6.20 - 7.00
The Baloch Battlefield (32')
followed by Q&A with Dir: Munizae Jahangir
Rare footage of a violent conflict and Bugti's last interview.
7.20 - 8.20 (Joint Event)
Emergency Plus (15')
Interactive Resource Centre
A record of a popular resistance growing stronger
against a brutal crackdown in Pakistan.
A People War: Story & Images of Nepal's Maoist Movement and After (45')
A presentation by filmmaker activist Kiran Shrestha followed by Q&A.
8.20 - 9.40
Remembrance of Things Present (81')
Chandra Siddan
A woman returns home to ask, "Why did you marry
me off as a teenager?" and other questions.
10.00 - 11.15
The Sky Below (75')
Sara Singh
A visual artist's contemporary portrait of the India-Pakistan 'mind-frontier'.
27th April SUNDAY
1.45 - 2.45
City of Photos (60')
Nistha Jain
Imaginary worlds in neighbourhood photo studios.
3.00 - 4.00
From Dust (60')
Dhruv Dhawan
They wait in tents while government makes a profit from the Tsunami aftermath.
4.20 - 5.50
Eisenfresser (Ironeaters) (85')
Shaheen Dill-Riaz
The Sisyphus of the seasonal workers at Chittagong's shipbreaking yards.
6.10 - 6.50
Taropa Bharr Laeay Langhar da (Come stitch the torn) (40')
Huma Safdar
1857's forgotten uprising in Punjab is still alive in the songs of the Ravi.
7.10 - 8.10
Short Docs
1st year NCA Film & TV Department.
- Pakhi Vas (12')
- PET Processing (07')
IRC Community Filmmakers
1. Faqiro ki Moortian
2. Dil Pardesi ho Gya
3. Balram Ghubaray Wala
4. Kamil Pur ki Kahani
5. Ghamaas (Pashto Music Video)
8.30 - 9.30
Akola Boxers (50')
followed by Q&A with Dir: Radhika Bordia
An enthusiastic boxing coach gets the women punching
in backward Maharashtra.
9.50 - 10.40 (Double Screening)
The Miseducation of Pakistan (30')
Syed Ali Nasir
Write 'Cat', Read 'Dog'. Story of a generation lost to corruption.
Nar Narman (22')
Mazhar Zaidi
Ifti from Pakistan, the famous gay poet-activist of Chicago.
11.00 - 12.00
Every Good Marriage Begins with Tears (62')
Simon Chambers
Two rebellious London sisters are forced to
return to Bangladesh for arranged marriages.
For more info:
Tel: 042-5313038
Web: www.danka.com.pk
---
(ii)
The Preparatory Committee (PrepCom) for the 2010
Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on
the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT)
will hold its second session from 28 April to 9
May 2008 in the Assembly Hall at the United
Nations Office in Geneva. This meeting is the
second of three sessions that will be held prior
to the 2010 Review Conference.
www.un.org/NPT2010/SecondSession/index.html
During the NPT Prepcom, A workshop on the
US-India nuclear deal will be held on Friday May
2, 2008 between 10 am and 1 pm in the NGO Room.
The title of the workshop is "The US-India
Nuclear Deal and the NPT: The Role of Nuclear
Weapons States and Non-Weapon States". The
speakers will be Zia Mian (Princeton
University) and M.V. Ramana (Centre for
Interdisciplinary Studies in Environment and
Development, Bangalore). If you plan to attend
the PrepCom, please consider attending this
workshop.
---
(iii)
_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/
Buzz for secularism, on the dangers of fundamentalism(s), on
matters of peace and democratisation in South
Asia. SACW is an independent & non-profit
citizens wire service run since 1998 by South
Asia Citizens Web: www.sacw.net/
SACW archive is available at: http://insaf.net/pipermail/sacw_insaf.net/
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