SACW #1 | 09-11 March 2004

[Harsh Kapoor]

South Asia Citizens Wire  #1 |  09-11 March,  2004
via:  www.sacw.net

[1] Pakistan: Inside The Nuclear Closet (Pervez Hoodbhoy)
[2] Pakistan-India: War minus the shooting (Mike Marqusee)
[3] Pakistan-India: Cricket not Politics (Kamal Mitra Chenoy)
[4] India: A Fair Unfair to Books (Mukul Dube)
[5] India: The BJP's publicity effect  (Arvind Rajagopal)

--------------



[1]


PAKISTAN: INSIDE THE NUCLEAR CLOSET
                       Pervez Hoodbhoy
                       3 - 3 - 2004  (published in www.opendemocracy.net)

Abdul Qadeer Khan, regarded as the "Father of Pakistans' Bomb" was accused
then pardoned by President Musharraf for his role in trafficking nuclear
technology. But what sort of man is Qadeer, and what does his story reveal
about the United States's role in Pakistan's nuclear proliferation? A
nuclear physicist from Pakistan sends an exclusive report.
----------

The president of Pakistan, General Pervez Musharraf, is in a
self-congratulatory mood these days, savouring the praise heaped upon him
by George Bush, Colin Powell , and the United States's under-secretary of
state for arms control, John Bolton. After surviving two recent
assassination attempts and overseeing a high-level summit meeting with
India, the great survivor of Pakistani politics acts as if the worst is
behind him. By way of celebration, he has announced new long-range missile
tests for March 2004.

The primary reason for Musharraf's current satisfaction is the way that
his treatment of Pakistan's  hugely popular nuclear hero, Abdul Qadeer
Khan -- forcing him to apologise on public television for his illicit
nuclear trafficking, yet also pardoning him for the offence -- allowed him
to please Washington without causing a massive uproar.

Many in the Pakistani press had warned that any attempt to punish Qadeer,
advertised for near two decades as the architect of Pakistan's and the
Islamic world's nuclear bomb, would provoke rampaging mobs to demand an
end to Musharraf's pro-US rule. As it turned out, Washington was thrilled
with the general's rebuke, while a disillusioned and disempowered
Pakistani public grumbled but did not take to the streets.

But neither Musharraf's satisfaction nor America's approbation is likely
to last long. For while Qadeer took sole responsibility for the
trafficking in his televised confession, the sheer scale of Pakistan's
secret exports raises at least two difficult questions that go far beyond
him and a handful of his colleagues.

First, Iranian and Libyan revelations since December have confirmed that
this was the most extensive nuclear smuggling in history. It involved the
illicit export of centrifuge designs and parts, used to enrich uranium
into fuel for nuclear reactors, or as fissile material for weapons (an
export reluctantly admitted by the Pakistani government itself); but it
also included complete centrifuges, together with a shipment to Libya of
1.5 tons of uranium hexafluoride gas. Could Qadeer and his cohorts have
moved such large pieces of equipment, and traveled extensively outside
Pakistan, without the knowledge of the military? The ultra-high level of
security in Pakistan's nuclear installations makes this unbelievable and
points to deeper level of complicity.

Second, documents handed over by Libya to the International Atomic Energy
Agency (IAEA) -- now being evaluated by US experts -- reveal that the
country had received old Chinese designs for a workable nuclear bomb that
had been passed to Pakistan in the late 1970s. Here lies a puzzle, and the
possibility of a huge embarrassment for the Pakistani establishment:
because, although Qadeer is widely advertised as the "father of the
Pakistani bomb", knowledgeable people are aware that he had nothing to do
with the design and manufacture of the bomb.

As a metallurgist, Abdul Qadeer Khan's expertise was exclusively in
producing weapons-grade uranium hexafluoride gas using the centrifuge
process. The rest of the work of creating a nuclear weapon -- including
metallisation, bomb design, manufacture, and testing -- was entirely the
responsibility of an unfriendly rival organisation, the Pakistan Atomic
Energy Commission.

How then did Qadeer happen to possess nuclear weapon design information
when, in fact, the real work of weapons design was being done elsewhere?


Openly Selling Secrets

General Musharraf has claimed that Qadeer's export of centrifuge
technology was unknown to successive governments. Yet for over a decade,
Qadeer openly advertised his nuclear wares; each year -- including 2003,
when the proliferation controversy had already become intense -- colourful
banners festooned Islamabad advertising workshops on "Vibrations In
Rapidly Rotating Machinery" and "Advanced Materials". These workshops,
sponsored by the Dr. A.Q. Khan Research Laboratories (also known as the
Kahuta Research Laboratories), had obvious and immediate utility for
centrifuge technology, essential for producing bomb-grade uranium.

In earlier years, Qadeer and his collaborators had published a number of
papers detailing critical issues regarding the balancing of centrifuges
and magnetic bearings. These dealt with technical means for enabling
centrifuge rotors to spin close to the speed of sound without
disintegrating. The relevance of such work to the development of
weapons-grade uranium was already evident even to non-specialist
observers.

But to make the blatant absolutely certain in the minds of prospective
customers, Kahuta issued glossy sales brochures aimed at "classified
organisations". These advertised such nuclear products as complete
ultracentrifuge machines, high frequency inverters, equipment for handling
corrosive uranium hexafluoride gas, as well as hand-held ground-to-air
missiles.

In light of such persistent, egregious advertising of forbidden nuclear
wares, can successive governments of the sovereign nation really have been
-- as President Musharraf claims -- so ignorant?

An Empire Of Patronage

For all who cared to see, and as even his admirers admit, Abdul Qadeer
Khan was corrupt. Despite a salary of less than $3,000 a month, Qadeer had
bought vast amounts of the choicest real estate; owned restaurants and
colleges; purchased a hotel in Timbuktu which he named after his wife; and
claimed ownership of a psychiatric hospital. His belief that his historic
contribution elevated him above the country's laws and environmental
regulations even led him illegally to build a magnificent mansion along
the pristine Rawal Lake, the source of Rawalpindi's drinking water.

But Qadeer's insistence on his paternity of Pakistan's supreme status
symbol did not come free. He had to buy the loyalty of journalists,
military men, and scientists. His biographers and other sycophants were
amply rewarded; none of his relatives are poor anymore. Many of my
colleagues in the physics department of Islamabad's Quaid-e-Azam
University would receive cheques for substantial amounts merely by sending
him an obsequious note and asking for money.

He was not so generous with me. With a physics colleague, Abdul Nayyar, I
challenged in court Qadeer's bid to steal our university's land in 1996.
We eventually won, but he had me placed on the Exit Control List and I was
forbidden to leave Pakistan until I finally managed to clear myself of
various charges of being "anti-national". These included selling the
secrets of the Kanupp reactor to the United States and India -- a wildly
ridiculous charge given that Kanupp is under the full-scope safeguards of
the IAEA.

The Wind Blows Danger

It is said that General Musharraf has a strong personal dislike of Qadeer,
and it is unlikely that he approved his shady dealings. Yet when he
removed Qadeer as head of the enrichment facility in late 2000, allegedly
under US pressure, Musharraf did not order a thorough investigation; nor,
more recently, did he show much gratitude to the two countries which had
exposed an international crime ring.

Indeed, in the marathon press conference where he announced his acceptance
of Qadeer's petition for mercy, Musharraf excoriated Iran and Libya for
surrendering to the IAEA and meekly handing over documents on their
nuclear programmes that implicated Pakistan ("Our Muslim brothers did not
ask us before giving our names"). When asked if the state would
appropriate Qadeer's illicitly acquired wealth, Musharraf replied that
this was not necessary -- this even though Musharraf has been
incarcerating political rivals for many years on charges of corruption
that may be true but are yet to be proved in court.

But Pervez Musharraf is not the only one with some explaining to do in
this murky affair. So does the United States government, both for its past
and present policies towards Pakistan and for its role in nuclear
proliferation generally.

American policy on nuclear proliferation towards both Pakistan and Israel
has historically been driven by expediency. As these two nations, for
different reasons, set about building nuclear weapons decades ago, the US
chose to look the other way. While Pakistan fought America's war-by-proxy
against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan in the 1980s, the president of the
United States certified year after year that Pakistan was not attempting
to build a nuclear weapon thus allowing Pakistan to keep building the
bomb. But after the Soviets withdrew from Afghanistan in 1989, the US
imposed sanctions on Pakistan and accused it of making the bomb.

Such expediency -- to put it at its mildest -- continues to guide US
actions today. CIA director George J. Tenet claims that his agency had
penetrated deep into the nuclear technology smuggling ring in recent
years. This should not have been difficult, given Qadeer's shameless
advertising of his wares. But why then did the Americans not stop him?

If Tenet's claim is correct, then the US knew -- but did not attempt to
stop -- centrifuge and bomb designs from being further copied, and
centrifuge parts being manufactured and distributed to other interested
parties. In effect this has made the difficult job of containing the
spread of nuclear weapons still harder. Such a role is itself a form of
complicity in nuclear proliferation. It is not clear why the CIA chose to
move so slowly and with such apparent indecision.

The more recent United States indulgence of General Musharraf has a
clearer explanation. The Americans want Pakistan to help eliminate the
al-Qaida and Taliban threat. Colin Powell's statement that Pakistan has
done "quite a bit to roll up the (nuclear) network" must be read in the
light of this urgent priority. But can Pakistan deliver on either account?

The way that nuclear organisations, in Pakistan as elsewhere, are
necessarily clothed in layers of secrecy raises questions about Powell's
optimism. It is also an open question as to whether Pakistani government
assurances, even if they are sincere, can prevent all in the country's
nuclear establishment from following in Qadeer's footsteps. Only two years
ago, as is well-known, senior members of the Pakistan Atomic Energy
Commission were ready to play their role in the jihad against America. In
a fit of Islamic solidarity they went to Afghanistan and met with Osama
bin Laden and the Taliban. It is difficult to believe that they were the
only ones so inclined.

_____



[2]

The Guardian [UK]
March 10, 2004

War minus the shooting
India's first cricket tour of Pakistan in 15 
years brings political opportunity and danger in 
equal measure

Mike Marqusee

India's superstar cricketers - among the 
country's most famous faces - will today visit 
Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee at his Delhi 
residence, to receive his official blessing 
before boarding a chartered flight for Lahore. 
It's a short hop, but a momentous journey - the 
start of India's first full cricket tour of 
Pakistan since 1989.

This is world sport's fiercest local derby. It 
arouses the greatest passions among the greatest 
number of people, and is over-stuffed with 
political, cultural and religious connotations. 
Its absence has been the hole in the heart of the 
world game, as well as a standing reminder of the 
near state-of-war prevailing between the south 
Asian neighbours. Its resumption is a welcome 
by-product of the current tenuous thaw.

There are dangers here as well as opportunities. 
Cricket, like other mass spectator sports, is a 
magnet for meanings, a malleable metaphor. And in 
the past, cricket between India and Pakistan has 
served as both a symbol of south Asian harmony 
and a prime example of what George Orwell called 
"war minus the shooting".

Sport is everywhere a major carrier of national 
identity, but cricket between India and Pakistan 
tends to promote a specific type of national 
identity, one defined - and sharpened - by its 
focus on "the enemy". In addition, this type of 
nationalism often targets an "enemy within". (In 
India, the cricket rivalry has been used as a 
Tebbit-style national loyalty test against Indian 
Muslims.) In recent years, the winner-takes-all 
ethic promoted by neo-liberalism seems to have 
inflated the values attached to victory and 
defeat on the field of play. The pressure on the 
players to succeed will be enormous. In both 
countries a special stigma is attached to failure 
against the sub-continental rival, while success 
is doubly rewarded. In the eyes of the more 
ardent cricket nationalists, the inescapable 
vagaries of luck and form are always suspect. On 
either side of the border, there's a tendency to 
respond to defeat with allegations of betrayal.

Pre-tour anxieties have focused on the security 
question. Reluctantly, the Pakistanis have agreed 
to play only one-day matches instead of five-day 
tests at Karachi and Peshawar - two of the 
country's major venues - in deference to Indian 
fears that a prolonged stay in either city would 
be unsafe. But the reality is that any number of 
unpredictable incidents could transform the 
temper of the series. When Pakistan played in 
Calcutta in 1999, a disputed run-out call 
precipitated a crowd disturbance; the spectators 
were cleared and the game was resumed before TV 
cameras in an empty stadium.

The series will unfold on many levels 
simultaneously: within the grounds but also on 
television, in workplaces and in the streets. How 
it unfolds on these various levels will tell us 
something about the societies in which it 
unfolds. Since 1989, the face of India has been 
transformed. Neo-liberal policies have led to an 
influx of multinational corporations and the 
emergence of a TV-saturated consumer class. 
Meanwhile, rightwing Hindu chauvinism - 
intolerantly nationalistic and anti-Muslim - has 
established itself at the centre of power and is 
the ideology of choice among the elite. Just how 
this "shining India", as the Vajpayee government 
dubs it, will cope with either victory or defeat 
in Pakistan will be interesting to see.

Across the border, the last 15 years have 
witnessed repeated crises and apparently cyclical 
transitions - out of and back into military rule, 
out of and back into favour with the US. General 
Musharraf's position remains precarious and is 
now deeply tied to the India-Pakistan peace 
process. He has a huge vested interest in this 
series unfolding without disruption. Others, on 
both sides of the border, will have different 
interests.

The series promises to be a huge moneyspinner, 
and broadcasters, sponsors and advertisers have 
been jostling for a piece of the action. While 
the corporations have pledged themselves to the 
cause of peace, the reality remains that the 
easiest way for them to maximise the return on 
their investment in the cricket is to infuse it 
with extraneous emotional significance. They'll 
be tempted to hype the series as the ultimate 
confrontation. A few years back the Star/ESPN 
channel (owned by Murdoch and Disney) promoted an 
India-Pakistan match-up in Australia as "qayamat" 
- apocalypse. It was tasteless and reckless.

Nonetheless, it is true that the intensity (and 
profitability) of this unique sporting rivalry 
derives as much from the common cricket culture 
that unites the two countries as from the history 
that divides them. And the series should be, at 
least in part, a celebration of that common 
culture, that enthusiasm for the game which can 
be found in parks and alleyways, bazaars and 
colleges on both sides of the border.

As one of an international army of committed 
neutrals, I'll be following the series as avidly 
as the most die-hard national partisan. 
Unburdened by the stress and anxiety of 
nationalist zeal, I suspect I may enjoy the 
cricket even more. In the end, though, the only 
victory worth celebrating will be the kind that 
both sides share equally.

· Mike Marqusee is the author of Anyone But England

_____



[3]


Sahara Time  [India]
March 13, 2004.
        
Cricket not Politics

--Kamal Mitra Chenoy

Politicians can never leave cricket alone. Even 
in selection committees and boards there is 
politics. Thus Jimmy Amarnath's famous one liner: 
"The selection committee is a bunch of jokers." 
The cricket tour to Pakistan has to bear 
additional burdens. In the first place, India 
alone has to win, and all true patriots must 
support it. Especially Muslims, secularists, 
cricket lovers and other such deluded people who 
mistaken that this is only a game, might support 
the best side on the day, thereby exposing their 
anti-national and Islamist credentials. Secondly, 
there is the problem of security. Security in 
Karachi and elsewhere where the Taliban and Al 
Qaida are yet to be seen? Of course stupid, its 
all about economics. Its India shining of course, 
at least until the elections. After that the 
Right politicians will shine. So if the team goes 
to Pakistan, and horror of horrors loses on 
Pakistani pitches in front of Pakistani crowds 
with anti-Hindutva umpires, 'feeling good' will 
turn into 'failing good,' as irreverent cricket 
historian Ramachandra Guha pointed out. The 
security of the government is at stake! It's very 
important! Tendulkar when 38 may be old, 
especially if he has already smashed every record 
in sight, but Atalji at 80 has no intention of 
moving.

But what about the moneybags? The Board, TNCs, 
advertising agencies, media, Pakistani tourism, 
etc., all outside the sainted 'parivar,' are 
making money. How can this be part of Indian 
shining? In which the poor, downtrodden, starving 
peasants whose total food intake is today lower 
than during the Bengal Famine of 1943, and 
unemployment and especially rural unemployment 
particularly of women is at record levels, 
apparently they, the majority, are making money. 
If not, are the already rich making money? No 
that can't be, that's old hat, not Generation 
Next. But India is shining: the Tatas,  Birlas, 
with an Aziz Premji thrown in. Are they actually 
making money to spend, say on mass marriages? 
That's just the media hype, not cricket. And even 
if they make money also on cricket, what's new. 
But not in the P word, not politics, but 
Pakistan. No benefit whatsoever to Pakistan. No 
money, only worry. No Inzy victory, only Indian 
curry. No Pindi blaster, only the little master. 
No India whining, only India shining.

Unsporting? No stupid, win at any cost. We won at 
Pokhran [forget Chagai], when "Buddha 
smiled,"[1974] and "Buddha smiled again" [1998] 
because our initial vegetarian friendship became 
truly radioactive. There were a few hiccups 
during Kargil, but the final result was 'quite' 
all right according to our neutral umpires, as 
impartial as K. Subrahmaniam, George Verghese 
have certified. The grim fact that for many, the 
'quite' was the 'quiet' of the grave is 
unfortunate. But that's ok. We only need 22 yards 
plus for the cricket pitch. The damn Pakistanis 
never did play by our rules. We really must have 
our own security. For the Buddha to smile, of 
course. He was against violence, killing, 
non-vegetarianism? That was in the past, before 
Bofors and MacDonalds. He would know better now. 
Then he would smile again. Even if he doesn't, 
Saurav and Donna had better do. Otherwise Sachin 
and Anjali are always there. No insecurity for 
the ruling regime! Goodness, what would happen to 
the country, to cricket? May it rule forever 
under its ever youthful leaders.

This would actually be funny, if it was totally 
untrue. But it isn't. Cricket and cricketers bear 
impossible burdens. They bear the chauvinism of a 
whole nation, and its prejudices as a bonus. If 
they fail to do the impossible, their houses are 
stoned, they are reviled, and instant experts 
castigate them. Look at the money they are making 
on ads! We know its all declared. Doesn't even 
have to go before a inquiry committee or be 
filmed by Tehelka, or one of the Jogis. The more 
experienced ex-cricketers but verbal blasters 
join the BJP to pitch in the Lok Sabha. Why 
should the jokers be confined to the selection 
committees and boards?

For peace to prevail in the world, and especially 
in South Asia, politics must be divorced from 
sport. Peshawar must be divorced from the pesha 
of politics. The game must be played for what it 
is.  Teams might and must lose, but the game 
should win. To be 'Number One' you don't have to 
win everything, you have to be sporting, to play 
the game as it should be played. Winning is NOT 
everything. But the bucks the richies are making? 
That's part of neo-liberalism where winning is 
everything as long as you make the most money. So 
what is everyone cribbing about? Suppose 
Pakistan, the Pindi Express, Inzy and all win? 
Will people ask uncomfortable questions? What in 
the end is there in all this for us? You can't 
stupid, that's against National Security! Cricket 
may be a game, but wining is security. Only then 
is India shining.

_____


[4]

Mainstream [India]
vol. XLII, no. 10, 28 February 2004

A Fair Unfair to Books

Mukul Dube

Books have been in the news recently, for no fault of theirs. First
came the attack by the Sambhaji Brigade on the Bhandarkar Oriental
Research Institute of Pune, ostensibly over the "denigration" of
Shivaji by a historian who was only setting out the different ways in
which people have looked at that historical hero. Naturally, those whom
he had thanked for having helped him were bad people who therefore
became targets. Then rewards were announced, in Mumbai and in Kolkata,
for blackening the faces of the writers Salman Rushdie and Taslima
Nasreen, respectively. Hordes of avid bibliophiles everywhere, incensed
beyond endurance by bad books.

Finally came the World Book Fair which began in Delhi on 14 February
2004, organised as usual by the National Book Trust. It began,
according to the report published in the *Hindu* the next day, "amid
[the] chanting of Vedic mantras [and the] rendition of Saraswati
Vandana". This is, as we know, how public events commence all over
the globe, so the use of the word "World" in relation to this
book fair was entirely justified.

It was only to be expected that the speakers at all the major functions
in the book fair should be associated with the Sangh Parivar, which,
through the BJP-led coalition at the Centre, controls the National Book
Trust. This year, though, there was a change in the usual arrangements:
individual publishers who wished to hold book release functions or
"meet the author" events were required to obtain the prior
permission of the fair's organisers. The Chairman of the NBT, B.K.
Sharma, said that this was not aimed at censorship but represented
sound management and was meant to prevent possible disorder. It was only
"unavoidable circumstances" which kept the organisers from
allotting space for the release of Taslima Nasreen's book
*Dwikhandita*, at which the writer herself was to have been present.
None but the organisers of such a large event can understand the
immense problems involved, the great responsibility that weighs on their
shoulders.

A book represents, in now unfashionable terms, "superstructure"
or "ideology". It may contain the truth, as those who follow
"religions of the book" believe their particular books to
represent, or it may contain lies. With obvious exceptions, the reader
is free to evaluate a book. What is important is that in every modern
society, books are a symbol of the freedom of expression that is
guaranteed to every member of such a society. In our own country's
Constitution, this freedom is set out in Article 19 (1) (a); although
specific exceptions are listed which keep it from being absolute.

Maharashtra, ruled by a Congress-led coalition, banned James Laine's
book on Shivaji; and West Bengal, ruled by the CPI(M), banned Taslima
Nasreen's book. In both cases, the stated reason was that the books
hurt the "sentiments" of some people and were therefore potential
causes of trouble. Thus "law and order" were given primacy over
freedom of expression. It does not speak well for either state's
government that it considered itself unable to tackle the law and order
problems which *may* have arisen, choosing instead the easy way out -
simply banning the books.

We do not know if it occurred to the two administrations that they had
in the process trampled over a fundamental right granted by the
Constitution, the upholding of which was their duty. One is led here to
think of other administrations, those which included people who had
shaped the Constitution. Did they ban the writings of Golwalkar and
Savarkar, all of which not only caused but were *intended* to cause
hurt to the sentiments of millions of Indians and which recommended the
denial to these Indians even of ordinary citizens' rights? Of course
they did not. Perhaps some secretly agreed with the maniacs while
others saw no harm in letting the ranters rant on. Whichever way we
choose to look at it, freedom of expression was not denied even to
those who spouted poison.

One is led here to think also of what many stalwarts of the Sangh
Parivar have been permitted to say, without let or hindrance, in their
writing, in their public speeches, and in audio and video cassettes.
The likes of Narendra Modi, Pravin Togadia and Ashok Singhal, and, in a
comparatively restrained though no less obvious way, Deputy Prime
Minister Lal Kishenchand Advani himself, have freely painted India's
Muslims as Pakistani agents, as Pakistanis, and as terrorists, not to
speak of several references involving what is more directly called
obscenity. Of the many provisions in the Indian Penal Code which
prescribe punishments for such acts, I shall mention only those which
pertain to public tranquillity (chap. VII), religion (chap. XV) and
criminal intimidation (chap. XXII). Today's leaders are not governed
by those very laws which they are pledged to uphold: nor, of course,
are their "kin".

Literally silencing opponents is one use to which political power has
been put. The other side of the coin is the spreading of one's own
vicious ideas, their imposition on the nation, most particularly on its
children. Both run counter to the law of the land, but why should those
people bother who have political power in their grasp and who never
made much of the law of the land anyway? Their own agenda is primary,
and they use the laws only when they can be used against others:
otherwise they bend them or ignore them entirely. The law is only a
tool: it has nothing to do with natural justice or with principles.

Political power and the law can be misused to impose on people books
that are packed full of lies. Further, people can be compelled to
believe what these books contain because books which contain
alternative view-points can be made unavailable, again misusing the same
set of laws. Modern societies are liberal in that they grant great
freedom to their citizens as individuals, imposing restrictions only
when the exercise of this freedom impinges on the freedoms of other
citizens. Books, especially those that are used in school education,
are perhaps the finest example of how India, in the last decade or so,
has been sought to be taken back from liberal modernity to a mediaeval
suppression of individual freedoms, in large part through the obnoxious
and cynical promotion of superstition.

Anil Sadgopal, Arjun Dev, Bipan Chandra, D.N. Jha, Irfan Habib, Nalini
Taneja, Romila Thapar and Teesta Setalvad are some of the people who
have written, with cogent arguments and extensive documentation, about
the Sangh Parivar's organised effort to give a particular slant to
text books meant for school children. The preponderance of historians
is explained by the fact that it is chiefly our land's history which
the Sangh Parivar has sought to re-write, in such a way that it might
"prove" the ancient and eternal superiority of its ahistorical
and sociologically nonsensical construct of "Hindu" culture and
civilisation - a superiority which it says was marred by the coming
(always as invaders, naturally, for there could have been no simple
traders among them) of evil people who followed other faiths. To regain
that superiority non-Hindus must be disenfranchised, suppressed, thrown
out - or simply annihilated.

My fear is that the World Book Fair of 2004 may mark the co-option of
the National Book Trust, in the way in which the National Council of
Educational Research and Training was long ago co-opted, into the
service of the Sangh Parivar. If this happens, not just school books
but *all* books will sing the glories of Hindutva; and there will be
nothing else to read.

I saw recently a book which documents how, in Iran after the Islamic
Revolution, many banned books - not just Nabokov's *Lolita* but
also, strangely, the works of Jane Austen - were read in secret by girls
and young women with the encouragement of their brave teacher. Maybe
the time is not far when I shall have to hide when I read Tolstoy or
Hemingway - or Charlie Brown.

_____


[5]

The Hindu [India]
March 10, 2004

The BJP's publicity effect

By Arvind Rajagopal

The Bharatiya Janata Party's publicity management 
far exaggerates its real political strength.

INVITING ALL sections of society to vote for the 
Bharatiya Janata Party, Prime Minister Atal 
Bihari Vajpayee recently said, why focus on 
small, chut-put incidents of violence that may 
occur "here and there?" Instead why not come 
together to build a great nation?

In case you thought this meant the BJP had turned 
over a new leaf, the Deputy Prime Minister, L.K. 
Advani's forthcoming India Shining (Bharat Uday) 
yatra, which recalls his earlier blood-soaked 
rath yatra, proves that it is still the same 
party. We are being invited to cooperate to build 
the nation. But we should also discuss what kind 
of nation we are building.

The BJP protests that to identify Hindu 
nationalism exclusively with it, and against the 
Congress, is wrong. It is true that the Congress 
too sought votes on communal grounds, although 
more often from Muslims and lower castes, and 
seldom officially on a Hindu platform. It is also 
common knowledge that communal riots have been 
abetted by members of both parties at various 
times. Nevertheless, there remains a difference.

The Ahmedabad labour leader, Ashim Roy, has 
concisely expressed this difference as follows: 
whereas the Congress always localised the impact 
of communal violence, the BJP has invariably 
tried to nationalise it. Thus past riots in 
Meerut or Moradabad would be downplayed by the 
Congress leaders as local disturbances. Godhra, 
by contrast, was described by the BJP leaders as 
indicative not only of Muslim tendencies as a 
whole, but, going further, also as a Pakistani 
plot, in which Indian Muslims were 
co-conspirators.

There is another way in which the relation 
between the Congress and the BJP can be 
described. It is a formulation made (in a 
personal conversation) by Govindacharya: BJP 
minus Congress equals RSS. Although the BJP may 
appear increasingly as the successor to, and even 
imitator of, the Congress, the party's reliance 
on the Sangh for its grassroots force ensures 
that it will be different.

Today we are treated to the VHP's denunciations 
of the BJP for the alleged gimmickry of Mr. 
Advani's new yatra. Since for the Parivar, 
politics is declared to be an amoral activity, it 
is difficult to know whether such criticisms are 
seriously meant. At any rate, they illustrate the 
BJP's need to oscillate between strong and weak 
Hindutva, between satisfying its cadre and 
playing politics as usual.

This is mirrored in the supposed divide between 
Mr. Advani and Mr. Vajpayee. As they themselves 
repeatedly remind us, however, they work for the 
same party, and symbolise the way in which it 
works. The BJP's belligerent and diplomatic 
aspects are structurally linked, in a division of 
labour that still defines its organisational 
character today.

We are asked nowadays to treat the BJP as a 
centrist party, and as the rightful legatee of 
Indian nationalism. But the way in which the case 
is advanced makes it hard to believe.

To take only one example. When sustained episodes 
of violence have occurred, it is for the victim 
to show forgiveness, and for the judge to declare 
exoneration. Now, those arguing for the accused 
are themselves pooh-poohing the accusation. But 
if our Hindu past is important, surely what 
Hindus did and do is also important. Who decides 
what we should focus on and what we should 
ignore? We are being told: there is nothing here 
for you to see, so just move on!

This recalls what the historian Jacques Ranciere 
has phrased as the police concept of history. We 
are told to ignore certain things because they 
risk upsetting the status quo. It does not fit 
the picture of a Shining India. So it is better 
that we forget about it.

Note that this does not lead to burying the past. 
Rather, it is preserved as a forbidden space that 
we must all remember to ignore. In fact, because 
we are unable to forget the past, we must 
constantly be told to downplay it, and keep 
moving on.

Can the police concept of history be effective in 
a hard-to-police country like India? In the era 
of the Congress, many felt that there was no 
alternative. Today, a similar argument is being 
made about the BJP: that there is no alternative. 
You might say this is a police concept of 
politics: there is no one else for you to choose, 
so hand over your vote and move on!

How has it so quickly come to appear as if there 
is no alternative to the BJP? We might assume 
that in an era of coalition politics, the 
increased barter between parties would make 
political dialogue more transparent. But the 
opposite has occurred.

With the shift from Congress dominance to BJP 
hegemony, we have a party that claims a radical 
break from the past, while denying that the 
campaign which brought it to power has any 
influence over it. And it is true that the appeal 
of Prime Minister Vajpayee for celebrities of all 
political hues and stripes suggests a "big tent" 
party in which anything goes, somewhat akin to 
the Congress itself.

The success of the BJP in being able to maintain 
its lofty stance and in creating the effect that 
"there is no alternative" is amazing. But it is 
certain that its publicity management far 
exaggerates its real political strength. The 
party is in fact vulnerable on numerous fronts.

For example, the BJP takes pride in having made 
India a nuclear power. But the Hindu bomb sparked 
off an Islamic bomb in reply, and India's 
overwhelming military advantage over Pakistan was 
wiped out by "nuclear parity" and "mutually 
assured destruction." Among other things, this 
confidence prompted the Kargil invasion. South 
Asia became for a while "the most dangerous 
region in the world," to quote Bill Clinton. The 
recent peace initiatives with Pakistan may be a 
partial counterweight to these events. But 
nuclearisation has brought irrevocable problems 
to the subcontinent, and escalated projected 
defence costs incalculably.

Then there are scandals such as the multi-crore 
stamp paper scam, Enron, disinvestment of PSUs, 
Tehelka, and the silencing of Satyendra Dubey, 
that have happened on the BJP's watch. Gujarat 
hangs over the party like a crimson question mark.

But the teflon party's image seems unscathed. How 
does this occur? This occurs, I suggest, because 
the BJP's publicity has been to create the 
impression of a unipolar politics. If we were not 
susceptible to such a publicity effect, it could 
not work, however.

Earlier, the Congress was in this position. The 
only unifying point for the Opposition at the 
time was "Indira hatao." It was left to Indira 
Gandhi to define a national agenda, which she did 
memorably with "garibi hatao." Today the BJP 
appears to be in a similar situation.

Although the Congress inaugurated liberalisation, 
the BJP was able to take credit for it, due to 
the Congress' decline and the resulting space for 
new formations. The BJP's Hindu nationalism 
provided the cultural and political accompaniment 
to liberalisation. With Hindutva, the BJP offered 
what seemed like a final chance for India to be a 
great nation.

But what kind of nation? There is an assumption 
that Hindutva can remain tacit and undiscussed, 
as the silent technology that will empower the 
nation's rise to global eminence. But there needs 
to be debate as we come to grips with the fate of 
secularism under the BJP, and as we acknowledge 
that democracy is being ensured by the presence 
of countervailing caste-based parties.

The habit of understanding politics in a unipolar 
fashion took shape in the Congress era. The party 
became identical to the state, which in turn was 
the foundation of nation-building. It was assumed 
that there was no alternative to the Congress, as 
the party of Indian nationalism. In a much more 
partial way, the BJP seeks to be its successor.

What kind of nationalism the BJP represents is 
perhaps too threatening to discuss impartially. 
All said and done, the state is the guarantor of 
national security, and is meant to define the 
practical limits of society. To challenge its 
philosophical basis would be subversive. Hence we 
seem to have a continuation of unipolar politics, 
with opponents clamouring ineffectively around 
the BJP. This is at least the impression one gets 
from most of the news media.

But this is a completely misleading impression. 
India is experiencing, as one writer has said, "a 
million mutinies now." Lower caste groups and 
regional parties are redefining the landscape, 
for better or worse. A democratic experiment more 
daring than anywhere else in the world is under 
way in India. In the West, poor people opt out of 
elections; in India it is the opposite. The poor 
vote in greater numbers here whereas it is the 
rich who opt out of elections.

The sense of a unipolar politics unwittingly 
reflects the complacency of the rich, rather than 
the struggles of the majority. It is our 
responsibility to respond to this to overcome 
this limitation. If we fail to do so, we will 
surely be swept away in the tide of popular 
forces that is sure to burst forth, together with 
our misconception that "there is no alternative."


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Buzz on the perils of fundamentalist politics, on 
matters of peace and democratisation in South 
Asia. SACW is an independent & non-profit 
citizens wire service run since 1998 by South 
Asia Citizens Web: www.sacw.net/
The complete SACW archive is available at: 
bridget.jatol.com/pipermail/sacw_insaf.net/

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DISCLAIMER: Opinions expressed in materials carried in the posts do not
necessarily reflect the views of SACW compilers.

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