SACW | Feb. 3-5, 2008 / Sri Lanka: APRC's future on sixtieth Independence Day? / Pakistan: Shariat courts in Swat / India: Hindutva violence in Orissa / CNDP's Nagpur Declaration

Harsh Kapoor aiindex at gmail.com
Mon Feb 4 21:43:58 CST 2008


South Asia Citizens Wire | February 3-5, 2008 | 
Dispatch No. 2497 - Year 10 running

[1]  Sri Lanka: The futile search for consensus in the APRC (Rohini Hensman)
[2]  Pakistan: Why Shariat courts in Swat? (Wajih Abbasi)
[3]  India: Charting the history of sangh parivar 
violence in Orissa (Angana Chatterji)
[4]  Is Gujarat Different From The Rest of India? (Daya Varma)
[5]  India: Nagpur Declaration - Third National 
Convention of Coalition for Nuclear Disarmament 
and Peace
     + Third National Convention of CNDP Demands Release of Dr. Binayak Sen
[6]  Announcements:
    (i)  Ecology, Environment and Capitalism (published by Azad Reading Room)
   (ii) Panel discussion on the release of 
'India's Popular Culture' (New Delhi, 06 
February, 2008)

______


[1]

The Island
30 January 2008

THE FUTILE SEARCH FOR CONSENSUS IN THE APRC

by Rohini Hensman

What a fiasco! We were promised the long-awaited 
APRC proposals would be released on January 23rd, 
and what did we get? The 13th Amendment was taken 
out of the corner where it had been mouldering 
for twenty years; the cobwebs were dusted off, 
and it was presented to us as the solution to our 
problems, despite the fact that it failed in the 
North-East because it did not ensure meaningful 
devolution (apart from the fact that the LTTE 
scuttled it), and was unpopular even among the 
Sinhalese in the South! It has been reported that 
the APRC was forced into this ignoble position by 
the President: Does he think we are all idiots? 
Why appoint the APRC and waste tax-payers' money 
on 63 meetings over eighteen months if the only 
purpose was to revive the failed 13th Amendment? 
Once again, the government of Sri Lanka seems 
determined to prove the LTTE right when it wrote 
off the APRC process as eyewash. We should reject 
this report, even as an interim measure, for the 
same reason that we rejected the LTTE's Interim 
Self-Governing Authority: because it constitutes 
a massive obstacle to a democratic solution of 
the current crisis. Before you take interim steps 
to reach a certain goal, you need to know what 
that goal is; otherwise you are in danger of 
moving in the opposite direction, and that is 
precisely what this proposal does. Credible 
interim proposals cannot be made until the final 
goal is clear, even if it is a long way off. We 
must, therefore, demand that the real APRC 
proposals - not the APRC acting as the mouthpiece 
of the president, who is free to make his own 
proposals but surely has a mouth of his own - 
should be presented by the end of this month at 
the very latest. If the president does not permit 
this, the Left and minority parties who are still 
part of the government should resign and the 
proposals should be presented independently. I am 
fully aware of the risk this entails for minority 
party leaders who are already being targeted by 
the LTTE, given Rajapaksa's vindictive policy of 
withdrawing security from politicians who refuse 
to toe his line. But, the only alternative is 
that they betray their own constituencies in 
order to be part of a government that is 
determined not to be fair by the minorities.

Tissa Vitharana has been denounced by Ranawaka, 
and no doubt the Left parties would face more 
vilification or even violence from the JHU and 
JVP, but they,too, cannot remain in an 
anti-democratic government without betraying 
their socialist principles. What is important is 
not that the APRC should reach consensus, but 
that the results of their deliberations should be 
presented to the public for democratic debate. 
Three Positions on the State(s) in Sri Lanka 
There are essentially three positions on the 
state(s) in the territory of what is now Sri 
Lanka. The first is that of the LTTE, which 
strives to constitute the Northeast as a separate 
state of Tamil Eelam, an exclusively Tamil state 
in which minorities can be subjected to 
discrimination, persecution and ethnic cleansing. 
The second is that of the JHU, JVP, MEP and their 
fellow-travellers, who strive to establish the 
whole of Sri Lanka as a unitary Sinhala-Buddhist 
state in which minorities can be subjected to 
discrimination, persecution and ethnic cleansing. 
The third position essentially seeks to establish 
Sri Lanka as a united, democratic state in which 
citizens of all communities will enjoy equal 
rights - including religious, cultural and 
language rights - in all parts of the country. 
Some variants of this position want Sri Lanka to 
be a federal state, but most parties are willing 
to forego full federalism provided there is 
adequate and meaningful devolution of power, 
especially to areas where there is a 
preponderance of minority communities. The first 
position, represented in parliament by the TNA, 
has been excluded from the APRC so far, since 
Mahinda Rajapaksa did not invite it to 
participate. This detracted somewhat from the 
legitimacy of the exercise, since it did not 
include a large bloc of Tamil MPs. But, it could 
also be argued that the TNA MPs owed their 
position in parliament to election-rigging by the 
LTTE, and would not have the freedom to represent 
their constituents freely if their position 
deviated from that of the LTTE. In mid-2007, APRC 
Chairman Tissa Vitharana invited the TNA, too, to 
participate.

The second position is represented by the JVP 
(which has withdrawn from the APRC), JHU and MEP, 
some elements of the SLFP and possibly also of 
the UNP. They insist on the definition of the 
state as 'unitary', retention of the special 
place given to Buddhism, and tight limits placed 
on devolution; indeed, the proposal of the SLFP, 
subsequently withdrawn, that the unit of 
devolution should be the district, would 
effectively have made it impossible for any 
substantial devolution of power to take place. 
The third position is taken by the Left parties 
and most of the minority parties. While there may 
be differences of emphasis among them, they 
concur in ruling out both a division of the 
country and a unitary state, and in wanting 
substantial devolution at the provincial level 
combined with decentralisation at a lower level 
and power-sharing at the centre. The EPDP is 
ambivalent about this position. Without 
dismissing it, the party wanted the APRC to 
recommend implementation of the 13th Amendment, 
with the establishment of interim councils in the 
North and East. Preconditions for Consensus 
Arriving at a consensus between parties holding 
radically different positions is conditional on 
their being willing to shift their positions in 
the interests of agreement. Without that 
willingness, any consensus is pie in the sky, and 
the search for it is a futile exercise. So, what 
are the chances of the APRC reaching consensus? 
In principle, Prof. Vitharana is quite right to 
invite the TNA to participate, since it is 
supposed to be an All-Party committee. But 
Prabakaran has made it very clear he is not 
willing to budge from his goal of a separate 
Tamil state ruled by the LTTE. It is, therefore, 
impossible to envisage a consensus between the 
TNA and the other parties in parliament. What 
about the rest of the parties? The JVP, JHU, MEP 
and sections of the SLFP insist on a unitary 
state with limited devolution of power to the 
provinces, while the Left and most minority 
parties do not want a unitary state and want 
substantial devolution of power to the provinces. 
This is not just a quibble over a word; If Sri 
Lanka is defined as a 'unitary' state, this will 
automatically give the Centre powers to overrule 
and even dismiss provincial governments which act 
contrary to its wishes. Any devolution would then 
be purely illusory, since it could be clawed back 
at will by the Centre. Thus, in reality, there is 
as little chance of consensus between these two 
blocs of parties as there is between either of 
them and the LTTE/TNA. Any 'consensus' that 
emerges would be at the cost of the Left and 
minority parties selling out their constituencies 
by agreeing to a unitary state which is opposed 
by them.

Does 'Unitary' Mean 'United'? The first excuse 
for wanting to preserve the unitary character of 
the state is that abandoning the unitary state - 
and even, according to the JVP, allowing 
devolution of any degree - would lead to the 
division of Sri Lanka. This argument reveals its 
proponents to be historical ignoramuses. The most 
striking counter to it, is the example of the 
Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, which, 
under Tito, granted a high degree of autonomy to 
its constituent republics and to the Serbian 
provinces of Vojvodina and Kosovo, and remained 
united. After Tito's death in 1980, the Serbian 
nationalists attempted to curtail regional 
autonomy, leading to the break-up of Yugoslavia. 
Most significantly for Sri Lanka, Kosovo now 
stands poised on the brink of independence from 
Serbia after an armed struggle conducted by the 
Kosovo Liberation Army, a force with a strong 
resemblance to the LTTE. Here there is a clear 
link between more autonomy and unity, while less 
autonomy leads to separatism.

Indeed, we see the same pattern in Sri Lanka, 
too. Sri Lanka's first Constitution did not 
define it as a unitary state, nor was there any 
special place for Buddhism, and there was no 
separatist movement while it prevailed. The 
Republican Constitution of 1972 proclaimed Sri 
Lanka to be a unitary state, which, along with 
Sinhala as the sole official language, the 
special place given to Buddhism, and withdrawal 
of protection for minorities, amounted to 
establishing it as a Sinhala-Buddhist state. 
Within a few years there was a separatist 
movement for Tamil Eelam and an armed struggle to 
realise it, which continues to this day. Once 
again, the correlation is clear: No unitary 
state, no separatism; unitary state, armed 
separatist struggle.

So, the argument against removing the word 
'unitary' is NOT an argument for preserving the 
unity of our country, but the very opposite: It 
is an argument for dividing Sri Lanka by defining 
it as a Sinhala-Buddhist state, thereby 
sustaining the separatist struggle of the LTTE. 
Those who truly wish to defeat the LTTE would 
want to remove the unitary label from our 
constitution as soon as possible.

Reluctance to change the Constitution

The other reason given for opposing the deletion 
of 'unitary' from the constitution is that it 
would require a two-thirds majority in parliament 
as well as a referendum. It is true this would 
take time, but if we, therefore, give up the 
struggle to change the constitution, we are, in 
effect, giving up on democracy in Sri Lanka. To 
take just one example, the virtually absolute 
power held by the Executive President means that 
the entire population is at the mercy of this one 
individual. This is not merely a denial of the 
democratic rights of the people, but also a 
negation of good governance. The Organisation of 
Professional Associations (OPA) deserves our 
gratitude for its magnificent efforts to 
reactivate the Constitutional Council (CC), which 
was seen as counterbalancing the absolute power 
of the President, but that is not enough. Will 
the presidential appointees to posts that should 
have been filled by CC appointees be replaced? It 
seems unlikely. Nor will good governance in other 
areas be ensured.

Take, for example, the bizarre episode in London 
when the president wanted to return to Sri Lanka 
after a personal trip to see his son graduate. 
The Sri Lankan Airlines flight was over-booked, 
and chief executive Peter Hill, while offering to 
accommodate Rajapaksa's immediate family, refused 
to offload 35 confirmed passengers to accommodate 
his entourage. And he was quite right to do so. 
Imagine trecking all the way to the airport and 
queuing up to check in, only to find that your 
seat and those of 34 other passengers had been 
hijacked by the president's hangers-on! Wouldn't 
you think twice about flying Sri Lankan Airlines 
in future? It would be the end of the airline as 
a commercial enterprise! But, Mr Hill's reward 
was to have his work permit and visa withdrawn, 
as a result of which Emirates, which appointed 
him, is withdrawing from the partnership with Sri 
Lankan Airlines.

This is just one example of the mind-boggling 
corruption and nepotism that is sending Sri 
Lanka's economy down the drain. It is not just 
working-class and middle-income groups who are 
paying for it; even businesses cannot be run 
under such conditions. Nor is it just a problem 
for the present: Even the future of Sri Lanka is 
being mortgaged by the high-interest loans taken 
by this rapacious administration that is sucking 
the life-blood out of our country. This is the 
result of the progressive undermining of 
democracy that has occurred from Independence 
onward. First, the minority communities were 
disempowered by depriving Hill-country Tamils of 
their citizenship and franchise, passing the 
Sinhala Only Bill, and so on. These were not just 
attacks on minority rights but on equality, which 
is the bedrock of democracy. The 1972 
constitution not only deprived minority 
communities of more rights but also centralised 
enormous power in the hands of the ruling party, 
thus disempowering Sinhalese, too. Finally, the 
1978 constitution put absolute power in the hands 
of the executive president. Again, it is not just 
minorities who pay. On the contrary, in financial 
terms, the Sinhalese pay more, since there are 
more of them. Furthermore, there is the 
ever-present danger of tens of thousands of 
Sinhalese being slaughtered, as they were in the 
late 1980s.

Restoring Democracy in Sri Lanka If all this is 
to be reversed, the executive presidency has to 
be abolished and democracy restored,  which means 
that we need a new constitution along the lines 
proposed by the Tissa Vitharana report. The 
chances of achieving this are not so hopeless as 
the Sinhala chauvinists would have us believe. 
Except for the TNA, all the minority parties 
would support such a change, as would the Left 
parties. While sections of the SLFP would oppose 
it, others would surely support it, since their 
own proposal for constitutional change in 1995 
was very similar. At that time, the UNP sabotaged 
the whole effort in an utterly shameful way; if 
they do the same again, they would face 
well-deserved oblivion, so perhaps the leadership 
will think better of it; even if they don't, 
there will be some party members who support a 
democratic constitution. So a two-thirds 
parliamentary majority supporting the change is 
not impossible, if not immediately, then after 
the next elections. As for getting it approved by 
a referendum, I feel confident that if the issues 
are explained and the people of Sri Lanka are 
allowed to make an informed choice, they will 
surely vote in favour of democracy.

However, before this can happen, the real APRC 
report has to be presented to the public. Where 
there is no consensus in the APRC, the different 
positions of the different parties should be 
presented honestly. The Ministry of 
Constitutional Affairs and National Integration 
should publish the proposals in all three 
languages, and all those who have any commitment 
to peace should ensure that they are debated 
thoroughly by the public. This may take time, but 
if the process starts immediately, it should be 
complete before the next parliamentary and 
presidential elections. In the meantime, it 
should be made very clear that the president will 
be held responsible for any violence whatsoever 
against signatories of the report.

If the real APRC proposals are unveiled by 
February 4th, we will have something to celebrate 
on Independence Day. Otherwise it will be a day 
of national mourning for the murder of democracy 
over a period of sixty years.


______


[2]

The Post
February 2, 2008

WHY SHARIAT COURTS IN SWAT?

by Wajih Abbasi

The government is contemplating to establish 
shariat (Qazi) courts in the Provincially 
Administered Tribal Area (PATA), which consists 
of districts of former Malakand Division, 
including Swat, Upper and Lower Dir, Buner, 
Malakand Protected Area, Shangla, Chitral and 
Kala Dhaka of Mansehra District. Under the 
programme, the nomenclature of the lower judicial 
structure will be changed and members of lower 
judiciary from judicial magistrate to district 
and sessions judges will be given the name of 
Qazi. Before being appointed to these positions, 
these judges will be given a three- month crash 
course on Islamic Sharia. In reaching to their 
decision, Qazis will be assisted by a committee 
of local clerics. The jurisdiction of the 
Peshawar High Court and the Supreme Court will be 
withdrawn from these areas and appeals against 
decisions of the Qazi Courts could only be made 
with the Federal Shariat Court (FSC).

It is also being reported that the government is 
negotiating release of Maulana Sufi Muhammad with 
Tehrik Nifaz-e-Shariat-e-Muhammadi (TNSM) 
leaders. Maulana Sufi Muhammad is father-in-law 
of Maulana Fazlullah, who is leader of the 
present movement in Swat. The TNSM leadership, 
however, has been expressing its disassociation 
with Maulana Fazlullah.

The decision is being seen as an attempt on the 
part of the government to appease the Taliban and 
their supporters in Swat. It is to be seen 
whether this decision will help cool down the 
Taliban movement in the region or give it further 
impetus. The Taliban influence in most of the 
Pashto-speaking settled districts of the NWFP has 
been expanding and appeasement like imposition of 
such law will definitely encourage them.

Besides the Malakand Division, southern part of 
the province, including Kohat, Hango, Tank, 
Bannu, Lakki Marwat and D I Khan have been badly 
affected. The Taliban have been attempting to 
impose their social and religious code in most of 
these areas. There is no reason that after 
getting the Sharia courts in Malakand, where 
cleric committees represented by them will make 
all decisions, they will not try to get the same 
for the southern districts. If the government 
today accept their demands in the Malakand 
Division, other districts of Peshawar, Mardan, 
Charsadda, Swabi and Nowshera will fall in their 
lap.

Governments, media, religo-political parties and 
other influential groups have been presenting the 
imposition of Islamic law as a panacea for all 
social, political and economic ills. Inherent 
connotation of the argument is that the present 
legal, political and economic structure in the 
country is un-Islamic, which has to be replaced 
by an Islamic structure. The argument has been 
the most potent ammunition of religious parties 
which helped them to expand their base. The 
perception has helped them reach the position 
they are enjoying today where they are dictating 
their terms with the power of gun.

It is not time to appease militants and 
extremists but defend Pakistan as it was 
envisaged by Allama Iqbal and Quaid-e-Azam 
Muhammad Ali Jinnah. Pakistan is a Muslim country 
where over 97 percent population follow the 
Islamic faith. Their enthusiasm for the religion 
has been exemplary. The religion is part of our 
social norms, ethos, traditions, language and 
culture. Most sections have seldom any conflict 
with Islamic teachings. The Holy Quran and Sunnah 
are supreme law of the land and courts are free 
to decide whether a particular law is repugnant 
to Islamic teachings or not.

The framers of Constitution also explicitly 
prescribed that no law will be enacted in the 
country against the teachings of the Holy Quran 
and Sunnah and existing laws will be scrutinised 
whether they confirm to the injunction of Islam 
or not. For this purpose, the Council of Islamic 
Ideology (CII) has been established. The Council 
has been functioning for the last 31 years. If 
anyone has any objection over any law, then he or 
she must go to the CII and let it decide. The 
parliament as embodiment of the sovereignty of 
the people has right to amend existing laws in 
accordance with the recommendations of the 
Council.

The Qazi courts will deprive the Peshawar High 
Court as well as the Supreme Court of their 
jurisdiction over the PATA region. The FATA area 
is already out of the jurisdiction of any court 
and protection of basic human rights are not 
available to the people of these areas. The 
ouster of jurisdiction of High Court as well as 
the Supreme Court will also deprive the people of 
PATA of their human rights. At the same time, the 
proposed law will create another parallel court 
system in the country.

To keep the country united, efforts should be 
made to establish universal legal system. To the 
contrary, apologists and embodiments of 
appeasement are devising strategies and policies 
which result in shrinking reach of existing 
institutions and putting large section of society 
at the mercy of extremists.

The establishment of FSC was part of the 
sycophant, hypocritical dishonest policies of 
General Ziaul Haq under which he used the name of 
Islam to expand his whimsical powers and crush 
any resistance. The establishment of the court 
enabled him to dump the 'erring' judges of High 
Courts without their consent which otherwise he 
could not normally do. The independence of judges 
of the FSC is not ensured as is the case with 
judges of High Courts and Supreme Court. They are 
appointed for a three-year term by the president, 
who can also give them extension, change their 
terms of appointment or assign them any other 
duty. Such powers are not available to the 
executive vis-a-vis judges of any High Court or 
Supreme Court.

Under Article 203-C (5) of the Constitution if a 
judge of a High Court deems to have retired from 
his office if does not accept appointment as 
judge of the FSC. The clause allows a route to 
the federal government to get rid of independent 
minded judges of High Courts.

Under the relevant articles of the Constitution, 
which were forced into the document by General 
Ziaul Haq, the FSC has two functions to decide 
whether a particular piece of legislation 
confirms to injunction of the Holy Quran and 
Sunnah or not. As already stated, the framers of 
the Constitution had given this responsibility to 
the CII and there is no need to have another 
institution to do the same. Besides all courts 
can make decision in this regard as the Holy 
Quran and Sunnah is supreme law of the land.

Other function entrusted to the FSC is to hear 
appeals against decisions of lower courts with 
regard to cases pertaining to the Hadood 
Ordinance. As already said this function is 
better performed by high courts. It is time that 
the FSC is abolished altogether and a uniform 
court system is restored. Any attempt to expand 
the jurisdiction of the FSC and at the expense of 
higher judiciary, is a retrogressive act to 
appease militants. It will further encourage them 
to strike further deep in the country.

The writer is a freelance columnist


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[3]

Communalism Combat
January 2008

KANDHAMAL: HINDUTVA'S TERROR

Charting the history of sangh parivar violence in Orissa

by Angana Chatterji

"Before the mob came we heard the sound of people 
approaching. The sound of hatred. Our lives, our 
faith, our existence is under attack and neither 
the neighbours, the police nor the state care." - 
Dalit Christian woman in Kandhamal

"We are waiting for the next riot. We do not know 
where it will happen but we know that Kandhamal 
was a warning, not the end." - Christian labour 
organiser

Event

December 25, 2007: Seven churches, Catholic, 
Protestant, Pentecostal, independent... burned in 
Barakhama village, in west Kandhamal/Phulbani 
district, central Orissa. December 23: 
Hindutva-affiliated Adivasi organisations 
organised a march, supported by sangh parivar 
groups, rallying: 'Stop Christianity. Kill 
Christians'. They called for a strike on December 
25 and 26, demanding that Dalit Christians be 
denied scheduled caste status. A Dalit Christian 
leader from Barakhama testified: "On December 22, 
hearing of plans to create trouble during 
Christmas, we went to the local police and 
informed them of the situation. They assured us 
that things would be under control. On December 
24, in the daytime, we heard voices of Bajrang 
Dal, VHP, RSS, Shiv Sena people, chanting: 
'Hindu, Hindu, Bhai, Bhai', 'RSS Zindabad', 
'Lakshmanananda Zindabad'. They shut down shops. 
That night they felled trees to block roads, 
severed power and phone lines. On the 25th, we 
went to the inspector in-charge of police again. 
On the 25th, at 2.30, about 200 of us sat down to 
Christmas prayer at our church and around 4 p.m. 
we heard the mob approach."

The mob, about 4,000 persons, many bearing 
symbolic tilaks, belonged to various sangh 
parivar groups named above, incited local Hindus 
into rioting. Estimates state 20 per cent of the 
mob comprised of people from Barakhama, 80 per 
cent from surrounding Balliguda, Raikia, 
Phulbani, as far away as Behrampur. In Barakhama, 
Christian homes were selected for destruction by 
the mob, Hindu homes spared. A Dalit Christian 
woman testified: "They broke the door to our 
church. We ran. We fell and kept running." Women 
and men were intimidated and assaulted. Cries of 
'Jai Bajrangbali' rent the air. 'Christians must 
become Hindu or Die. Kill Them. Kill Them. Kill 
Them. Gita not Bible. Destroy their Faith.'

The crowd carried rods, trishuls (tridents), 
swords, kerosene. They used guns, a first in 
Orissa, weapons available in the market and 
makeshift local fabrications. Predominantly 
middle class caste Hindus participated in 
looting, destroying and torching property. They 
threw bombs to start the fire. The breakage was 
systematic, thorough. Women and men hid for days 
in forests in winter temperatures, later seeking 
shelter in the Balliguda town relief camp, 
returning to decimated Barakhama on January 2. 
Engulfed in soot and sorrow, people attempted to 
function amid charred remnants. A woman said: 
"Everything burns down and we are left with 
nothing. How little our lives are made (of). How 
alone we are, so far away from everything."

In Balliguda, in one church, furniture was 
dragged out, lit into a grotesque sculpture. The 
private violated in public, made spectacle. A 
Catholic church burnt, opposite the street the 
fire station witnessed the incident but did not 
intervene. A cow, dragged from a shed, set afire, 
was beaten to death, identified as 'Christian'.

Earlier, on December 23, Hindu activists 
organised a conversion ceremony for Pastor Digal 
from Kutikia gram panchayat and 12 members of the 
Christian community. Pastor Digal was beaten, 
forcibly tonsured and then paraded naked as he 
refused to reject Christianity.

On the morning of December 24, at approximately 
11 a.m., activists from various Hindutva groups, 
including Bajrang Dal, VHP, RSS, Vanvasi Kalyan 
Ashram, organised vandalism of Christmas symbols 
erected on the occasion of Christmas and 
unleashed turmoil in Brahmanigaon/ Bamunigaon 
village in central Kandhamal. Some among the 
3,000-person mob of Hindutva activists were armed 
with guns. Reportedly, shots were fired on 
Christians, wounding two young boys. The Church 
of Our Lady of Lourdes was decimated. Unarmed 
police, present near the spot, failed to act. 
After these events, on December 24, sources 
state, the car in which Lakshmanananda Saraswati, 
the influential, octogenarian Hindu proselytiser 
who was travelling to the site of the incident to 
organise a yagna to rouse Hindu sentiments 
against Christmas, was stopped by Christians. The 
vehicle and driver were knocked around. Saraswati 
claimed to the press that he had been injured 
while eyewitness accounts and doctors' statements 
contradict this and his own activities point to 
the contrary. Following Saraswati's allegations, 
Hindutva groups called for a 36-hour strike on 
the evening of December 24. Then followed the 
violence across Kandhamal, stretching over a 
three-day period in which Christian communities 
were attacked by Hindutva groups and their cadre.

It has been stated by members of the Hindu 
community that Christian display of religiosity, 
and the economic privilege that allowed for such 
exhibition, led to the rioting. It has been a 
focus in the press that Christians in one area in 
Brahmanigaon responded with violence. It must be 
noted that Christians in one area did respond 
with some, not proportionate, violence. In the 
absence of state action in curbing Hindutva's 
aggression, this might have aided the Christian 
community in checking Hindutva's violence. It 
must be noted that Christian retaliation in 
Brahmanigaon did not endanger bodies but focused 
on destroying property even while Hindutva's 
violence explicitly sought to endanger Christian 
bodies.

Minority failure to submit to state and 
majoritarian (by the majority community) 
subjection becomes a manifestation of 'evil'. 
Dominant rationale reduces this to majority vs 
minority communalism. This position appeals to 
liberal notions of 'balance' and fails to 
scrutinise state violence (often greater than, 
and inciting of, group violence). Rather than 
focus on systematic targeting of Christians, 
their overwhelmingly peaceful submission to 
Hindutva's violence and vast structural 
injustices and differences in relations of power 
between majority and minority, the scrutiny 
appears to be focused on the failure of all 
Christian groups to simply submit to dominance.

Impunity

'Bharatmata ki Jai (Hail to Mother India)' - 
Hindu nationalist and militant organisations

Targeted: Balliguda, Brahmanigaon, Barakhama, 
Bodagan, Chakapad, Daringbari, Goborkutty, 
Jhinjirguda, Kalingia, Kamapada, Kulpakia, 
Mandipanka, Nuagaon, Phulbani, Pobingia, 
Sindrigaon, Ulipadaro villagesŠ Convents and 
presbytery in Balliguda, Pobingia, Phulbani, 
BrahmanigaonŠ Two hostels each in Balliguda, 
Brahmanigaon, Pobingia. Minor seminary and a 
vocational training centre in Balliguda. 
Organisational offices, as that of World Vision, 
destroyed. Across Kandhamal, approximately 632 
(some place the number at 700) Christian homes, 
80-95 churches, mostly in villages, and 94-96 
institutions were destroyed, vandalised and 
torched. Homes and institutions were robbed, 
cash, jewellery, implements, machinery and other 
valuables looted. A Hindutva mob surrounded 
Tikabali police station, two jeeps were torched.

In the week following the attacks, hundreds of 
people were missing. Some remained lost to their 
families three weeks after the event. Large 
numbers sought refuge in the nearby forests, 
including children, women, the elderly, persons 
with disabilities, including mental illnesses. 
Some sustained burn and other injuries. Women 
were molested. Death counts remained inaccurate, 
the unofficial number of deaths noted at 11, four 
died under police fire. Following the violence, 
the administration neither documented the 
devastation nor participated in its expeditious 
clean up. The police refused Christians seeking 
to file FIRs while Hindutva activists filed 
charges against members of the Christian 
community. As well, Christians attempting to file 
FIRs are confronted with Hindu religious symbols 
ever present in (hostile) public places. The 
Balliguda relief camp was skeletal, its 
distribution discriminated against women.

As people returned to rows upon rows of 
uninhabitable homes, the administration offered 
people one blanket and a shawl, some clothes, 
rations. Despite continuing tensions, police 
presence abated within a week of the riots. 
Confidence-building steps are absent.

The sangh parivar's charge that the riots are a 
part of ethnic violence is contradicted by the 
timing of the violence. Certain members of sangh 
parivar organisations, especially the Bajrang 
Dal, claim in private that some Hindutva 
activists had come from Gujarat to offer support 
in Kandhamal. Sangh parivar activists charge that 
they will resume their attack against the 
Christian community once the Central Reserve 
Police Force withdraws, to 'teach them a lesson'. 
Immediately following the event, relief, 
compensation, reparation measures, were 
incommensurate with the extent of social, 
psychological and economic losses and segregation 
experienced by communities.

Judicial inquiry commission

The extent of the violence and coordination of 
attacks across mountainous terrain lead 
independent investigators to conclude that the 
violence was planned, that the police had prior 
knowledge of Hindutva groups' intent to riot. The 
pertinent district collector and superintendent 
of police have been transferred, not discharged. 
A Judicial Inquiry Commission (JIC) chaired by a 
former (not sitting) judge has been appointed by 
the Government of Orissa to investigate the 
riots. Its power/legitimacy is in question. Its 
mandate is not binding on the government. The 
central government did not appoint an inquiry by 
the CBI, even as it is apparent that the very 
administration that failed to contain the riots 
and delayed deploying adequate forces, and whose 
officials at the district level may have been 
involved in its execution, cannot administer 
justice.

It is important to note that Chief Minister 
Naveen Patnaik's celebration of his party's 10th 
anniversary coincided with the riots. The 
celebration had required that large numbers of 
the state's police forces be moved out of 
districts to the state capital, Bhubaneswar. This 
made it difficult for the police to respond to 
the emergent situation in Kandhamal on December 
24-25. Certain bureaucrats allege that the Orissa 
government initially directed forces against 
intervening.

Hindutva activists have lobbied the JIC to 
organise its terms of reference premised on the 
claim that an attack on Lakshmanananda Saraswati 
by Christians in Brahmanigaon propelled the riots 
which they allege to have been spontaneous. This 
timeline, as explained above, is falsified.

Hinduisaton of Kandhamal

The Kandhamal riots were not unexpected. The 
progressive Hindutvaisation of Hindus in 
Kandhamal has enabled the sangh parivar to act 
with impunity. Lakshmanananda Saraswati has been 
overseeing Hinduisation there since 1969. 
Adivasis, Dalits, Christians, Muslims, are 
targeted through social and economic boycotts, 
forced conversions to Hinduism (posed as 
're'conversion which presupposes that Adivasis 
and Dalits were 'originally' Hindus even while 
they may/do not self-identify as Hindus) and 
other violences. The Orissa Prevention of Cow 
Slaughter Act, 1960 deployed against Muslims; the 
Orissa Freedom of Religion Act, 1967, against 
Christians. The district witnessed Hindutva's 
violence in 1986, followed by the sangh parivar's 
growth in the area. An Adivasi sangh leader from 
Phulbani, a close associate of Lakshmanananda 
Saraswati and a Vanvasi Kalyan Ashram teacher as 
well as a self-proclaimed expert at 
lathi-wielding, echoes the sentiments of 
colleagues from the Nikhil Utkal Kui Samaj, a 
sangh-affiliated Adivasi organisation that works 
in the district: "We are promoting Hindu rituals 
amongst vanvasis ('forest dwellers', derogatory 
naming of Adivasis) who are all Hindus. 
Lakshmanananda Saraswati has been a restraining 
force on the Christians who were doing the 
conversion work."

Through the Kandhamal riots of 2007, Hindutva's 
discourse named Christians as 'conversion 
terrorists'. In September 1999, Catholic priest 
Arul Das was murdered in Jamabani village in 
Mayurbhanj, followed by the destruction of 
churches in Kandhamal. In August 2004, Our Lady 
of Charity Catholic Church was vandalised in 
Raikia and eight Christian homes burnt. Then too, 
as this Christian leader stated: "They broke 
everything in the church, the idols, and burnt 
the holy book. They burnt some of our houses. The 
parish priest saw all this helplessly. The people 
who entered the church were traders and other RSS 
activists but many were outsiders, maybe from 
Kattingia, where there is an RSS stronghold. The 
police were there but did not do anything." The 
Raikia incident led to the economic and social 
ghettoisation of the Christian community.

Raikia is proximate to G. Udaigiri town where 
sangh parivar mobilisations significantly 
increased between 2000 and 2004. In May 2007, 
Pastor Pabitra Kumar Kota was beaten. In October 
2005, converting 200 Bonda Adivasi Christians to 
Hinduism in Malkangiri, Saraswati stated: "How 
will weŠ make India a completely Hindu country? 
This is our aim and this is what we want to do. 
The feeling of Hindutva should come within the 
hearts and minds of all the people."

In April 2006, celebrating RSS architect Madhav 
Sadashiv Golwalkar's centenary, the sangh 
organised the Asthamatruk Rath Yatra, aimed at 
converting Christians to Hinduism. Saraswati, 
with VHP and RSS leaders in attendance, was 
triumphant, as eight chariots, named after female 
deities, travelled through Orissa carrying 
sanctified water and soil from a multitude of 
villages, calling on Orissans to assemble 'Akhand 
Hindu Rashtra'. Presided by Saraswati, seven 
yagnas were held, culminating at Chakapad in 
Kandhamal district, at the Sammelan attended by 
30,000 Adivasis from across the state. Hinduised 
Adivasis are required to work with both sangh 
parivar groups and ruling political parties. On 
April 9, 342 Christians, and on April 10, nine 
Christians from over 74 families were converted 
to Hinduism. In September 2007, the VHP organised 
a road and rail blockade in Orissa, against the 
supposed destruction of the mythic 'Ram Setu' 
(bridge). Hindutva militants, Praveen Togadia and 
Subash Chouhan, returned to Orissa, rousing 
sentiments for Hindutva's political and spiritual 
victory. Between July and December 2007, 
sangh-organised rallies travelled across 
Kandhamal, raising sentiments against Christians 
in the district.

Hindutva organisations have charged that 
Christian conversions in the area and the 
interventions of Maoist groups led to a 
spontaneous outburst from Hindus, culminating in 
the Kandhamal riots of 2007. Maoist groups are 
not operational in the areas where the violence 
took place, even as sangh parivar groups have 
witnessed an upsurge in recent years in those 
exact areas.

Numbers and rates of conversions to Christianity 
are inflated by the Hindu Right and circulate in 
retaliatory capacity even within progressive 
communities who fixate on such conversions as 
contributing to the communalisation of society. 
Christian conversions are storied as debilitating 
to the majority status of Hindus in Orissa while 
Muslims are seen as 'infiltrating' from 
Bangladesh, looting livelihood opportunities from 
residents and dislocating the 'Oriya (and Indian) 
nation'. Hindu nationalists place Christians and 
Muslims in the liminal in-between, as 
concurrently internal and external to the 
nation/as enemy. Non-Hinduised Adivasis and 
Dalits are perceived as 'unruly'.

Hindutva leaders rumour: 'Phulbani-Kandhamal is a 
most important Christian area in Orissa with 
rampant and forced conversions'. However, the 
Christian population in Kandhamal district is 
1,17,950 while Hindus number 5,27,757. Sangh 
leaders claim: 'By the VHP data there are 927 
churches in Phulbani district built on illegally 
taken land'. Church leaders respond that there 
are 521 churches in the district, on legally 
acquired church property, and estimate as few as 
200-300 consensual conversions and baptism 
ceremonies annually in Phulbani town with a 
faintly elevated figure in rural Kandhamal (per 
the All India Christian Council, AICC, statement 
of 2005). Many of these churches are administered 
by the Church of North India, which was 
inaugurated in Nagpur in 1970 and is registered 
as a society under the Societies Act XXI of 1860. 
While few members of certain Christian sects, 
such as some Pentecostals, may preach in public 
places, most, such as Catholics, do not. 
Conversions to Christianity do not occur with the 
intent to destabilise the Hindu or other 
communities, and the content and programme of 
church-based education does not foster communal 
hatred or divisiveness in thought or deed.

The sangh parivar makes claims that are 
unsubstantiated - that Christian missionaries 
(who are mostly of Indian descent) and Muslim 
traders have caused the destruction of tribal 
culture and undertaken the illegal acquisition 
and encroachment of tribal lands since the early 
1980s. While the delegitimisation of Adivasi 
rights to lands and their displacement from 
customary and communitarian property are serious 
and righteous grievances, Christian missionaries 
and Muslim traders are not the primary reason for 
the land grab and the paucity of land reforms in 
Orissa. Such rumouring is acceptable to the 
dominant caste groups, even as general caste land 
grab is the primary reason for the 
disenfranchisement-displacement of Adivasis from 
traditional rights to land. In 1998 there was an 
agitation for land reforms that did not translate 
into practical implementation.

The situation is compounded by a decline in the 
actual number of available employment and income 
generating opportunities in the area. Kandhamal 
remains socio-economically vulnerable, with a 
large percentage of the population living below 
the poverty line. In addition, 60 per cent of 
state-operated schools are without teachers while 
schools operated by Christian organisations are 
usually available in townships. In a context of 
disenfranchisement and poverty, and the need to 
work and the unfeasibility of acquiring 
employment after basic schooling, the rate of 
student attrition within Adivasi communities, for 
example, in G. Udaigiri, is very high at the 
school level, with only three per cent continuing 
through completion.

The Christian community too is economically 
disenfranchised in Kandhamal. A majority of the 
Christian population, local Christian leaders 
state, is landless or marginal landholders, with 
an average holding of half an acre per family. 
Christian leaders said that the church does not 
convert under duress or offer money in lieu of 
conversions. In the 1960s and 70s, when there was 
a thrust in conversions, Adivasis benefited 
through accessing health care, education and 
employment offered by Christian missionaries.

The politicisation of Adivasis and Dalits leads 
them to claim that Hinduism is distant to them, 
'outside' to them. This is dangerous to the sangh 
parivar's ideology which uses the notion of 
'Adivasis as Hindus' to connect Hinduism across 
time in the space named India and 'Dalits as 
Hindus' to maintain its numeric dominance. 
Politicised Adivasis and Dalits are named 
'terrorist', 'Maoist', 'militant'. Hindutva 
rumours that Dalits are exploiting Adivasis and 
that land is a major contention between them. 
Dalits are posed as 'dangerous', as the claiming 
of the identity of 'Dalit' is a politicisation 
debilitating to the sangh parivar. (Dalit: 
Marathi for oppressed or 'broken', from the root 
'dal', which denotes dispersion (symbolic and 
literal, of those that mistreatment has 
violated). Term used by Dalit peoples and groups 
for self-identification in politicised contexts.)

Hindutva rumours that Dalits have acquired 
economic benefits, augmented by their 
Christianisation. This is not borne out in 
reality, as Dalits remain landless - in 
Kandhamal, approximately 90 per cent of Dalits 
are landless. Hindutva rumours that the 'success' 
of the Dalit community is causing economic rift 
in the area and the success of Christian Dalits 
is causing communalisation. In reality, it is the 
Hindu casted business community that maintains 
economic privilege/dominance in the area. Their 
economic power is however justified in the 
interest of maintaining and growing the 
('shining' Hindu/Indian) nation.

In Hinduising Adivasis and polarising relations 
between them and Dalits in the area, the sangh 
parivar has engineered rivalries between Kandha 
Adivasis and Pana Dalit Christians in Kandhamal, 
instigating against the latter's campaign for 
scheduled tribe status. Dalit Christians, under 
current law, forfeit their right to affirmative 
action. In current law, Paragraph 3 of the 
Constitution (Scheduled Castes) Order, 1950 held 
caste and religion to be mutually exclusive: 'no 
person who professes a religion different from 
the Hindu (later amended to include the Sikh or 
the Buddhist) religion shall be deemed to be a 
member of a Scheduled Caste' (Ministry of Law and 
Justice, 2006).

Functioning against the right to freedom of 
religion, per these provisions, Dalits who 
convert to Christianity or Islam, Jainism and 
Zoroastrianism, and other faiths, are divested of 
scheduled caste status and affirmative action 
afforded by the state via the 'reservation' 
system for scheduled castes and tribes, and 
refused benefits granted those that identify as 
Hindu Dalits. This, Christian leaders contend, 
impacts the ability of Dalit Christians to secure 
resources routinely controlled by those from 
upper caste backgrounds. Dalit converts to 
Hinduism are not denied such rights.

Discriminated against on the basis of religion, 
marginalised peoples that discard or function 
outside Hinduism are barred from equal access to 
affirmative action that their ethno-cultural and 
class status allocates. This rejection disregards 
that benefits reserved for scheduled castes and 
tribes are premised on feudal, colonial and 
post-colonial structural mistreatment of such 
peoples, not religion alone. Religion functions 
in a Hindu dominant nation as race did under 
colonial rule, informing hierarchies that define 
purity and impurity, belonging and un-belonging, 
'norm' and 'other'.

State institutions are in internal disagreement 
over the issue of affirmative action for 
religious minorities. Responding to a writ 
petition (No. 180 of 2004) filed by the AICC via 
the Centre for Public Interest Litigation, the 
Supreme Court of India asked the Government of 
India for arguments and guidelines on broadening 
the assistance of 'reservation' to scheduled 
castes that convert to Christianity. Muslim 
organisations too have campaigned for the 
inclusion of Muslim Dalits in diverse forms of 
affirmative action. The government deferred the 
issue to the Ranganath Mishra National Commission 
for Linguistic and Religious Minorities, even 
while the Commission's jurisdiction was advisory 
and did not extend to decision making on such 
matters. The Mishra Commission's report was 
released to the press on May 21, 2007 and its 
recommendations advocated that the benefits of 
'reservation' be extended to Dalit converts to 
Christianity and Islam and that religion be 
dissociated from scheduled caste status in 
implementing affirmative action. On July 19, 2007 
the Supreme Court referred the matter back to the 
central (Congress) government for its decision 
which remains pending.

Fascisation of Orissa

Hindutva mythologises the demise of Hinduism in 
'Hindustan', legitimating violence as just 
response, patriotic and pro-national. 
Majoritarianism (assertions by the majority, here 
Hindu, community toward acquiring and maintaining 
social, economic, cultural, political, religious, 
legal and state-nationalistic power, where 
majoritarian aspirations are linked to 'truth' 
and 'freedom') operates with an explicit mandate 
to maintain dominance and Hinduise non-Hindus and 
other marginal and secular groups, including 
Christians, Muslims, Adivasis and Dalits, with 
the goal of creating a Hindu state in India. The 
record of majoritarian group violence against 
disenfranchised sections of society in India 
poses a threat to internal peace and security. 
These communal groups and their affiliates and 
cadre often operate outside the purview of the 
law.

The sangh parivar titles itself as an adjunct 
and/or adversary to the state that offsets 
governmental failure by dispensing 'morality' and 
'progress' to citizens. The sangh's governance in 
Orissa parallels that of the state and 
collaborates with it. In the last decade, 
violence against minority groups in Orissa has 
included social and economic boycotts, forced 
conversions, intimidation, murder, arson, rape, 
looting and other extralegal actions. The sangh 
uses local militarism (as in Kandhamal) as 
consort to state controlled militarisation (as in 
Kashipur, where in December 2000, three Adivasis 
were killed in police firing, and Kalinganagar, 
where in January 2006, 12 Adivasis and a 
policeman were killed in police firing).

Hindu cultural dominance organises Hindu 
nationalism. Orissa amalgamated as a 
majoritarian/Hindu state between 1866 and 1936, 
consolidating its position as the earliest 
linguistic province. The absence of structural 
reforms and assertion of Hindu elites defines 
post-colonial governance. The sangh has 
proliferated into 10,000-14,000 impacted villages 
through sectarian relief work in the aftermath of 
the 1999 cyclone that left 10,000 dead.

The sangh parivar seeks to build a cadre 
comprised of Hindus, men and women, and targets 
Christians, Muslims, Adivasis and Dalits and 
other disenfranchised and progressive and secular 
groups in Orissa. Orissa has a population of 36.8 
million (Census 2001). Of this, 7,61,985 - 2.1 
per cent - are Muslims. Orissa Christians number 
8,97,861 - just 2.4 per cent of the state's 
population per the census of 2001 (in 1991, it 
was 2.1 per cent and in 1981, 1.7 per cent). 
There are 6.08 million Dalits in Orissa, 16.5 per 
cent of the population. Adivasis are 8.14 million 
in number, 22.1 per cent of the population, the 
largest among all states in India.

The sangh has amassed between 35 and 40 major 
organisations with numerous branches (including 
paramilitary hate camps) in 25 districts in 
Orissa, with a massive base of a few million 
operating at every level of society, ranging 
from, and connecting, villages to cities, and 
Orissa to the 'Hindu nation'. Conscription into 
Hindu activism is coordinated through political 
reform, propaganda/thought control, cultural and 
religious interventions, developmental/social 
service and charitable work, sectarian health 
care, unionisation and revisionist education. The 
sangh has inaugurated various trusts and branches 
of national and international institutions in 
Orissa to aid fund-raising, including the Friends 
of Tribal Society, Samarpan Charitable Trust, 
Sookruti, Yasodha Sadan and Odisha International 
Centre.

The RSS operates 6,000 shakhas in Orissa with a 
1,50,000+ cadre. RSS graduates take an oath 
affirming allegiance to the RSS as national duty: 
'I will devote my body, mind and money (tana, 
mana, bhana) to the motherland.' The sangh also 
hires paid operatives to undertake mob activity. 
Led by the RSS, Vidya Bharati (known as Shiksha 
Vikas Samiti in Orissa) directs 391 Saraswati 
Shishu Mandir schools in Orissa, including in 
Balangir, Kalahandi, Koraput, Malkangiri, 
Nabarangpur, Nuapada, Kandhamal and Rayagada 
districts, with 1,11,000 students preparing for 
future leadership.

Training camps in Bhadrak and Behrampur aim at 
Adivasi youth. Vanvasi Kalyan Ashram runs 1,534 
projects and schools in 21 Adivasi concentrated 
districts. The sangh has initiated 1,200 Ekal 
Vidyalayas in 10 districts in Orissa to target 
Adivasis. In March 2000, the Hindu nationalist 
Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP)-Biju Janata Dal 
(BJD) coalition came to power. In October 2002, a 
Shiv Sena unit in Balasore district formed the 
first Hindu 'suicide squad'. The Hindu Suraksha 
Samiti organises against Muslims. Revolting 
slogans, 'Mussalman ka ek hi sthan, Pakistan ya 
Kabristan (For Muslims there is one place, 
Pakistan or the grave)', perforate neighbourhoods.

Political economy

The sangh parivar's agenda is enabled by the 
staggering inequities present in the state, where 
severe social and institutionalised forms of 
caste, class, gender and heterosexist oppressions 
and caste, class, gendered and sexualised 
violence are rampant. Unemployment is on the rise 
in Orissa and abysmal daily wages prevail; 47.15 
per cent of the total population lives in poverty 
while 57 per cent of the rural population is poor 
(87 per cent of the state's population lives in 
villages currently and per the 2001 census, there 
are 51,352 villages in Orissa). Among the Adivasi 
population, 68.9 per cent are poor while 54.9 per 
cent of Dalits live in need. Among the Muslim 
population, 70 per cent are poor in Cuttack, 
Jagatsinghpur and Puri districts, where they are 
concentrated.

The female to male ratio is a problematic 972 per 
1,000 in Orissa and the Human Rights Protection 
Committee and the Orissa Crime Branch reported 
that in the last decade (1990-1999) the state has 
recorded a 460 per cent increase in dowry related 
deaths relative to the previous decade.

In Orissa, about 2.5 hectares of irrigated 
agricultural land is required for a family of 
five to meet subsistence requirements while the 
average family owns about 1.29 hectares. Women 
seldom hold joint or individual title to land, 
which debilitates their ability to independently 
secure livelihood resources. Additionally, only 
21 per cent of all land available for cultivation 
is irrigated. The cyclone of 1999 and the 
droughts of 2000 and 2003, the floods of 2001, 
2003, 2005, 2006 and 2007, have presented 
overwhelming challenges for the environmental and 
economic well-being of the state.

In Orissa, efforts at land redistribution and 
reforms have been insufficient and state and 
bilateral development, anti-poor and 
pro-corporatisation politics and practices and 
the privatisation of resources and development 
have systematically deprived the poor of rights 
to decision making over livelihood and survival 
resources, led to rampant displacement, police 
brutality and even deaths and denied them their 
customary rights to public resources such as 
forests and water.

Recommendations for action in Kandhamal

In Kandhamal, Hindu militant groups, neighbours, 
the police, the chief minister, the central 
government, acted with egregious impunity. The 
activities propagated by Lakshmanananda Saraswati 
and his followers are of serious concern to the 
health of society and prompt seditious, 
anti-minority propaganda and hate actions. The 
BJD-BJP coalition government in Orissa refuses to 
honour the constitutional mandate to maintain the 
separation of religion and state. Political 
parties, focused on politicking the issue, are 
ill-equipped to respond to immediate and 
long-term needs of people. The communal situation 
in the state remains at par with an emergency. 
The Government of Orissa has failed to respond to 
these issues and the serious concerns they pose 
to democratic governance in the state.

The state government has halted individual relief 
measures, stating that such action escalates 
tensions in the area. Church leaders organised to 
provide relief, which has been targeted as an act 
of missionising. The police have been reticent to 
act against Hindutva activists who mobilise Hindu 
contingents in and around relief camps, or take 
action against sectarian relief organised in the 
'Hindu Relief Camp' in Karadavadi village in 
adjacent Ganjam district. State-organised relief 
and rehabilitation measures have discriminated 
against the Christian community and not met local 
needs.

The state government must provide adequate 
short-term supplies to the families whose homes 
have been destroyed. Compensation must match the 
values of demolished homes and enable people to 
rebuild and restock their dwellings. Surveys to 
determine losses must be undertaken 
collaboratively with local people, rather than 
ethnocentric treatment of them as a hindrance to 
the process, as 'thieves' intent on profiting 
from the situation.

Initially, in response to queries, the Orissa 
state government had claimed that as many as 
4,000 trees may have been felled to allow for the 
blockade of roads and breakdown in 
communications. According to the forest 
department, it appears that as few as 351 trees 
may have been felled. This indicates negligence 
on part of the state's ability to respond and 
points to the frailties in communication and 
infrastructure networks. Faced with this, the 
government must undertake the necessary steps to 
provide adequate security to the Christian 
community in Kandhamal. The centre and civil 
society groups must monitor such action.

The CBI must immediately investigate the 
activities of the Bajrang Dal, VHP and RSS, and 
apply, as appropriate, relevant provisions of the 
Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967. 
Section 2G of the act, 'unlawful association' 
denotes: (1) 'that which has for its object any 
unlawful activity, or which encourages or aids 
persons to undertake any unlawful activity, or 
through which the members undertake such 
activity'; or (2) 'which has for its object any 
activity which is punishable under Section 153A 
or Section 153B of the Indian Penal Code 1860 
([Central Act] 45 of 1860) or which encourages or 
aids persons to undertake any such activity; or 
of which the members undertake any such activity'.

The status, actions and finances of communal 
groups and their affiliates and cadre, and the 
actions of their membership must be identified 
and investigated. These groups must be 
investigated and monitored, and, as appropriate, 
requisite action must be taken and sanctions be 
imposed on their activities, and reparations be 
made retroactively to the affected communities 
and individuals.

Certain organisations, such as the VHP and 
Vanvasi Kalyan Ashram, have been registered as 
charity organisations. As their work appears to 
be political in nature, they should be audited 
and recognised as political organisations. A 
serious concern is whether the activities of 
these fall within the objectives of a trust; 
whether in fact these organisations should have 
been registered as social trusts given the nature 
of their activities; whether the monies collected 
are indeed used for the purposes for which they 
were collected; and whether illegal and political 
activities are being carried out in the name of 
social work. Given these concerns, the charitable 
status and the rights and privileges enjoyed by 
these groups must be reviewed.

The right of individuals to undergo religious 
conversions is constitutionally authorised, 
unless under duress. Historically, conversions 
from Hinduism to Christianity or Islam have 
occurred for multiple reasons, such as being a 
form of resistance among the elite and as a way 
to escape caste oppression and social stigma for 
Adivasis and Dalits. Societal or Hindu 'feelings' 
about conversions to Christianity or Islam does 
not render these conversions inappropriate, 
invalid or illegal. It is only in circumstances 
where conversions occur coercively or are 
undertaken with the intent of mobilising a 
culture of hate, as, for example, undertaken by 
Hindutva activists, that conversions must be 
disallowed.

It must be noted that 'reconversion' strategies 
of the sangh parivar appear to be shifting in 
Orissa. In Kandhamal, for example, public and 
exhibitionist conversion ceremonies that 
particularly targeted (primarily Dalit and 
Adivasi) Christian community members and 
non-Christian Adivasis, forcing them to submit to 
Hinduism, have been fewer in number in 2007 than 
between 2004 and 2006. Converting politicised 
Adivasi and Dalit Christians to Hinduism is 
proving difficult for the sangh parivar. The 
outcry against such ceremonies from the Christian 
community and certain human rights groups might 
have influenced a shift. The sangh parivar has 
instead increased its emphasis on the 
Hinduisation of Adivasis by making them a part of 
Hindu rituals and ceremonies (as during the 
Sammelan) which, in effect, 'convert' Adivasis 
into Hinduism by assuming that they are Hindu. 
Such 'conversion' tactics are diffused and no 
longer have to negotiate certain legalities which 
public and stated conversion ceremonies did. On 
converting/'reconverting' to Hinduism, Adivasis 
are expected to join Hindu caste society as 
Sudras, a 'higher' placement than Dalits in the 
caste hierarchy, sangh activists say.

Dalit Christians are doubly discriminated 
against, as Dalits and as Christians. 
Post-Hinduisation, Adivasis are being mobilised 
against Christian groups. Adivasis are incited 
into targeting Dalit Christians, both fomenting 
Adivasi-Dalit divides and vitiating the 
historical solidarities between them. This is 
crucial to Hinduisation. It also acts to warn 
non-Christian Dalits against conversion to 
Christianity.

The Hindutvaisation of the Hindu community, and 
Hinduisation of the secular, allows the sangh's 
escalation. This process unfolded in 
Brahmanigaon, for example, where the growth of 
the business community has supported the rise of 
the sangh parivar. Hindutva conversions served to 
terrorise the Adivasi and Dalit community, via 
which the sangh parivar achieved its preliminary 
expansionist goals. While ceremonial conversions 
continue sporadically, a more protracted and 
dispersed strategy of Hinduisation through 
incorporation and assimilation is aggressively 
pursued as effective methodology.

The Orissa Freedom of Religion Act, 1967 must be 
repealed. Provisions for preventing and 
prohibiting conversions that commence under 
duress and coercion already exist under the 
Indian Penal Code (IPC). There is no basis for 
the existence of a separate law, especially one 
that sets draconian parameters and has been used 
by communalists to target and prohibit voluntary 
conversion within minority, especially Christian, 
communities. The Orissa Prevention of Cow 
Slaughter Act, 1960 too should be repealed. 
Provisions for preventing and prohibiting cruelty 
to animals already exist under the Prevention of 
Cruelty to Animals Act, 1960 and there is no 
basis for the existence of a separate law, 
especially one which is utilised to intervene on 
the livelihood practices of economically 
disenfranchised groups with detrimental effects, 
such as among Adivasis, Dalits and Muslims, who 
engage in cattle trade and cow slaughter.

Postscript

The Kandhamal riots story betrayal, indifference, 
negligence - of nation, government, humanity, 
disregard for law and order, gendered violence 
enacted with impunity. 'Minorities' and other 
disenfranchised are denied self-determination. 
The state endows the 'victor', the hegemon named 
'majority'.

The Kandhamal riots of 2007 barely registered in 
the nation's memory. Muslims targeted in the 
Bhadrak riots of 1991 still await justice in 
Orissa. The history of state accountability in 
preventing and administering justice in instances 
of majoritarian violence is frail. The incapacity 
of the Communal Violence (Prevention, Control and 
Rehabilitation of Victims) Bill, 2005, introduced 
in the Parliament of India in December 2005 and 
approved by the union cabinet in March 2007, 
attests to this. The bill, advocated by citizen 
motivated efforts for the prevention of genocide 
and crimes against humanity, in its official 
formulation as introduced by the Congress 
government, remained deficient in defining 
procedures for state and public answerability. It 
failed to address issues of negligence displayed 
by state authorities in preventing and 
controlling communal violence, and in disbursing 
timely and just compensation and psychosocial 
rehabilitation, as well as establishing 
parameters for witness protection and for 
soliciting and recording victim testimonies. It 
failed to chart measures to bring justice and 
accountability with regard to gender and 
sex-based crimes in the event of communal 
violence (which is not effectively addressed by 
the IPC or separate legislation), and in imposing 
checks and balances on the state and its police 
and security forces, whose inertia and 
majoritarianist complicity in communal collisions 
have been consistent.

In 2003, Subash Chouhan, then state convenor of 
the Bajrang Dal, had stated: "Orissa is the 
second Hindu Rajya (to Gujarat). Whatever happens 
here, say politics happens, it will have to be 
Hindutva politics, with Hindutva's consent." In 
December 2007, Narendra Modi, Gujarat chief 
minister, in command over police and law 
enforcement machinery and as such culpable for 
the participation of the Gujarat government in 
the genocide of 2,000 Muslims, was re-elected. On 
December 31, 2007, Prasant, upper caste RSS 
worker in Orissa, stated: "Gujarat remains the 
guiding light for Hindutva and our conscience as 
Hindus." Recent atrocities in Kandhamal confirm 
his assertion.

(Angana Chatterji is associate professor of 
Social and Cultural Anthropology at California 
Institute of Integral Studies and author of the 
forthcoming book, Violent Gods: Hindu Nationalism 
in India's Present. Narratives from Orissa, Three 
Essays Collective, 2008.)

Note:

Readers will notice certain statistical and other 
discrepancies in the two reports on the violence 
in Orissa's Kandhamal district. A possible 
explanation for this is the time-lag between the 
two pieces. The preliminary report by the 
fact-finding team was brought out within days of 
the violence whereas Angana Chatterji's piece was 
written some weeks later.

Given the nature and inaccessibility of the 
terrain as well as the current status quo in 
Orissa, exact figures will probably not be 
available until some time later.

______


[4]

INSAF Bulletin 70 February 2008

International South Asia Forum
www.insaf.net


IS GUJARAT DIFFERENT FROM THE REST OF INDIA?

by Daya Varma

The victory of the Narendra Modi-led BJP 
(Bhartiya Janata Party) in the December 2007 
Assembly elections  in Gujarat has been analyzed 
by various observers. These analyses  fall  into 
two categories. According to one, the Congress 
lost because of the spoiler role by Bahujan Samaj 
Party (BSP) of Mayawati, its failure to project 
its Chief Ministerial candidate and inner 
squabbles. The second view is that  Congress lost 
because Gujarat is unique, that Modi benefited 
from  the 2002 carnage and his virulent Hindu 
communalism and evoked Gujarat chauvinistic 
sub-nationalism which Congress failed  or chose 
to not counteract. While the first view has been 
highlighted by traditional politicians like Ram 
Bilas Paswan, the second explanation has been 
offered by progressive circles such as by Asghar 
Ali Engineer, Praful Bidwai and Prakash Karat 
(General Secretary of the Communist Party of 
India-Marxist or CPM).

It is important to understand the reasons for 
Modi's victory for that alone can provide 
ammunition to prevent India becoming Gujarat. 
While there is some substance in all these 
explanations, there is more to the victory of 
Modi and defeat of Congress than electoral 
tactics and the unique nature of Gujarat within 
the India. 

In the current election, BJP polled 49.12% of 
total votes against 38% by the Congress. The 
combined percentage of Congress,  BSP (2.62%) and 
Nationalist Congress Party (1.05%) totals 41.67%, 
well short of the votes polled by BJP. While it 
is true that Congress could have won in many 
places had BSP not fielded its candidate and may 
even have formed a majority government if it had 
contested Gujarat elections with BSP, the fact 
remains that the percentage of the population 
voting for Congress-BSP is far short of that 
voting for BJP. The hypothetical formation of a 
Congress-BSP  government would have duplicated 
the American paradox of a President being elected 
with minority popular  and majority electoral 
votes. In any case,  the issue is not merely the 
defeat of the Congress but rather the support by 
nearly one-half the electorate (and by 
implication the population) of Gujarat for BJP 
and its overall policy of Hindu Rashtra.

The challenges posed by Narendra Modi through his 
virulent Hindu communalism, appeal to Gujarati 
hubris via a chauvinistic sub-nationalism 
masquerading as Gujarati asmita (self-respect), 
and an authoritarian personality cult need to be 
analyzed and understood. The accuracy of Asghar 
Ali Engineer's argument that "(Modi) could not 
have won 2002 election without organizing that 
carnage nor the 2007 election could he have won 
without it"  cannot be verified. His contention 
that it is unique to Gujarat needs more 
justification.  It is more likely that Modi won 
because he could combine the 2002 carnage with a 
projection of Gujarat as a  modern prosperous 
state. He could show that pride in Hinduism goes 
hand-in-hand with progress. The fallacy in Modi's 
claim that Gujarat is shining, as pointed out by 
Bidwai,  is of little consequence because people 
do not expect everything to be ideal. Moreover 
what matters to the middleclass seems to 
overweigh what happens to the marginalized sectio!
ns as long as the latter is  not an overwhelming fraction of the  population.

How should one look at the 2002 Gujarat carnage? 
Can it be reduced to the Godhra train fire 
followed by the brutalization of the Muslim 
community with direct complicity of Narendra Modi 
as the Tehelka tapes prove? If so, obviously it 
cannot be duplicated. However,  it is not true 
that the same thing cannot be repeated with some 
variation elsewhere. Gujarat carnage cannot be 
separated from the 1992 demolition of the Babri 
Masjid nor from the ensuing attack on Muslims in 
Mumbai and a string of other anti-Muslim violence 
with or without the direct involvement of BJP. 
What all these events do is mobilize the ordinary 
Hindu citizens of all castes, Dalits and Adivasis 
alike, as something distinct from and superior to 
non-Hindus, especially Muslims who are more 
numerous than Christians. This in turn leads to 
their sectarian assertion in the Hindu ownership 
of India.

Democracy in India has only reached the level of 
an institution of political assertion, a method 
of acquisition of political power. In all other 
ways, Indian society is not democratic and it can 
be witnessed day in and day out in the manner 
Dalits, workers, marginalized sections and 
minorities are treated. It remains a society 
where it is acceptable with pride to not share 
food with another citizen. Neither Muslims nor 
Dalits observe this practice but OBC's and Hindus 
above that caste ladder do. Therefore if 
political power can be grabbed more easily by 
invoking unity as proud Hindus against the 
historic legacy of India "adulterated by 
intruders" as the communalists claim, so much the 
better. There are many Hindus who would not like 
Muslims to be butchered but there are fewer who 
are appalled when they are and even fewer still 
who would make it a condition for rejecting BJP.

  It would take a mammoth effort to transform 
India into a democratic society even coming close 
to bourgeois democratic society. Gandhi and 
Congress were able to suppress the simmering 
Hindu superiority but they needed such alternate 
programs as India's independence movement.  How 
to do it in the absence of any such universally 
accepted problem? The only alternative is to show 
that a Hindu Rashtra is not only bad for Muslims 
but for India and for Hindus as well. 
Fundamentalism does not necessarily manifest as 
hostility against people of different religion. 
Indeed the main target of fundamentalism is the 
majority community. The Taliban in Afghanistan, 
for example, asked Hindu women to wear 
identification marks because they did not wish 
their "Hindu sisters" to be subjected to rules 
applying to Muslim women. Why would not various 
wings of Sangh Parivar harass Hindus who do not 
abide by their codes?

Obviously this requires efforts on the part of 
all secular formations, not only the Congress. 
But this does not seem to be the preoccupation of 
any other political party and left intellectuals 
with the exception of  the Communist Party of 
India (CPI) and a few individuals like Asghar Ali 
Engineer, Ram Punyani and a handful of NGOs like 
Communalism Combat and ANHAD. Unfortunately CPI 
is stuck with the belief  that BJP would die of 
its own internal squabbles. But no organization 
dies of internal bickering because no 
organization can be or has been free from it. 
Throughout its history Congress had internal 
squabbles but that did not prevent it from 
becoming the major organized movement in India. 
Internal squabbles within BJP are also not new 
but have not weakened it. All other parties have 
secularism tucked away in their statutes and 
documents but not as a recurring theme in their 
programs and activities; even CPM is guilty of 
this omission. As far as some of the left 
intellectua!
ls of India are concerned, their recent 
preoccupations seem to indicate they would rather 
see the demise of CPM than of BJP. After all 
Gujarat elections did not come as a surprise. If 
Congress is not taking Hindutva head on, what 
prevented others from doing it?

What had kept RSS (Rashtriya Swayamsewak Sangh) 
in oblivion from its founding in 1926 till the 
independence of India in 1947? It was Gandhi, the 
Congress, the power of  independence movement and 
CPI. Things have changed since and especially 
since  the mid-1970's, and more particularly 
since the 1990's. One aspect of this is the 
organizational weakening of Congress because of 
the dynamic personality of Indira Gandhi. The 
other is the lack of or rather a weak 
comprehensive  program of the Congress for the 
"Aam Aadmi". The development strategy of India 
has given rise to a significant well-to-do middle 
class, who form the base of Hindutva. It is no 
accident that BJP came to power in Delhi first. 
Sooner rather than later the middleclass would 
dominate the politics of other states. Even in 
relatively poor states like Bihar which has 
witnessed one of the fiercest peasant movements 
first under the leadership of CPI and then the 
Marxist-Leninists, the winner at present is the 
Samata Party, the closest ally of BJP. The 
movements for the creation of Jharkhand and 
Uttarakhand were initiated by left parties but 
has been ruled by BJP. The same thing happened 
earlier to the Samyukta Maharashtra movement a 
half-century ago which was spearheaded by the 
left but whose beneficiaries were the upper and 
middle peasant castes led by Congress.

Of course there was the 2002 pogrom against 
Muslims in Gujarat and not in other states which 
are ruled by or were ruled by BJP. But the 2002 
pogrom was executed as a target of opportunity; 
there is no evidence that it was pre-planned like 
the recent attack on Christians in Orissa nor is 
there evidence that it will be repeated. 
Therefore identifying certain incidents, no 
matter how horrendous, should not lead one to 
conclude that India is any safer under BJP rule 
elsewhere than it is in Gujarat. Singling out 
Gujarat ignores the reality that BJP is in power 
alone or with its allies in  more states of India 
than any other single party. It is prudent to 
devise strategy to prevent continuing rule of BJP 
in all Indian states and in Delhi than make 
Gujarat a unique scenario, which it is not.


______


[5]  http://www.s-asians-against-nukes.org/nagpurCNDPfeb08.html

NAGPUR DECLARATION

The Third National Convention of Coalition for Nuclear Disarmament and Peace

·          Resist Indo-US Nuclear Deal!

·          Free South Asia Of Nuclear Danger!

·          Abolish Nuclear Weapons Worldwide Now!

·          Resist Mindless Drive for Nuclear Power!

The Third National Convention of the Coalition 
for Nuclear Disarmament and Peace (CNDP), India 
is held from 1st to 3rd February 2008 in Nagpur, 
which has a glorious tradition of mobilising for 
peace and justice. The two earlier conventions 
were held in Jaipur in 2004 November and in Delhi 
four years earlier. It bears reiteration that the 
CNDP was founded to consolidate the nationwide 
protests conducted in response to the May 1998 
nuclear weapon tests by India, and then Pakistan. 
The CNDP opposes these tests and the acquisition 
of nuclear weapons by any country including 
India. It may be recalled that the era of nuclear 
threat began with the mindless atomic bombings of 
the cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki by the USA 
on 6th and 9th August 1945.

We, the assembled delegates at the Convention 
representing the peace movements in India and 
coming from various corners of the country, most 
emphatically reaffirm our firm conviction in 
reaffirmation of the Jaipur Declaration and our 
foundational Charter 2000:

"Nuclear weapons are means of mass destruction 
regardless of who wields them. They are weapons 
of genocide. They can impose horrendous suffering 
on victims across generations. They destroy the 
ecosystem. The damage they do is lasting and 
incurable. The sheer scale and character of the 
devastation they can cause makes them a profound 
and distinctive evil. For this and other reasons, 
the possession, use, or threat of use of nuclear 
weapons is absolutely immoral." We also with 
equal emphasis reemphasise "that the use, threat 
of use, or possession of, and even preparation 
for making, nuclear weapons is immoral, illegal, 
and politically unacceptable under "any 
circumstances"." Not only that, "nuclear 
deterrence" is absolutely "abhorrent to human 
sentiment since it implies that a state if 
required to defend its own existence will act 
with pitiless disregard for the consequences to 
its own and its adversary's people."

We again note with great concern the profoundly 
destabilising effects of the nuclear blasts in 
May 98.  These have been most graphically and 
irrefutably demonstrated through an extremely 
dangerous (undeclared) border war in less than a 
year followed by a ten month long eyeball to 
eyeball massive confrontation all along the 
international border and the LoC. These 
confrontations were laden with the very real 
threats of nuclear exchange. Despite this 
experience and much opposition from the peace 
movements and civil society, the rulers of these 
two resource-starved countries persist with their 
pernicious nuclear weapons programmes, which are 
a tragic diversion from addressing vital social 
needs.  Though there have been no further blasts 
since 1998, in the teeth of massive waves of 
international censure, the continuing flight 
tests of the Agni and Hatf missiles show that the 
race for developing nuclear warhead carrying 
missiles goes on unabated.

The recent political turmoil in Pakistan has 
graphically underscored the horrifying 
possibilities of nuclearisation of South Asia 
spearheaded by India's ugly ambitions. 
Nevertheless, *the most dangerous development 
since the last CNDP convention has been the 
Indo-US Nuclear Deal, which is (still) in the 
process of operationalisation. Starting with the 
July 18 2005 joint statement issued by George 
Bush -
Manmohan Singh in Washington DC, the process of 
trying to fashion and complete a deal has 
aggravated the nuclear danger both globally and 
also regionally. It, on the one hand, severely 
undermines the prospects of global nuclear 
disarmament by (selectively and arbitrarily) 
legitimising India's nuclear status and, in the 
process, the possession of nuclear weapons by the 
existing Nuclear Weapon States - both recognised 
and unrecognised - and also the aspirations of 
other actual and potential aspirants. On the 
other, it would also further intensify the arms 
race between India and Pakistan - both nuclear 
and conventional. Pakistan, in fact, made a 
strong plea for a similar deal. And the brusque 
refusal by the US, instead of dissuading it, 
would only further inflame its passions and 
thereby turn the dangerous nuclear mess in South 
Asia all the more dangerous. Furthermore, the 
consequent shift in focus in favour of highly 
expensive nuclear power, as and when and if at 
all the deal comes into operation, will 
significantly distort India's energy options at 
the cost of efforts to develop environmentally 
benign and renewable sources of energy. This deal 
is also an utterly reprehensible move to bring 
India closer to the US orbit as a regional ally 
to facilitate the execution of its global 
imperial ambitions.* **The CNDP remains 
unwavering in its consistent and high-pitched 
opposition to this deal.** With this deeply 
disturbing background in mind, the Convention 
further resolves as under:


I.                     Nuclear Weapons Free Region in South Asia

The CNDP, in active collaboration with other 
peace movements in the South Asian region and the 
Pakistan Peace Coalition in particular, will work 
towards a Nuclear Weapons Free Region in South 
Asia. It will also try to promote the idea of 
Nepal as a 'nuclear weapon-free- nation' on the 
lines of Mongolia and Austria to initiate and 
reinforce move in that direction. CNDP will also 
similarly work towards declaration of the whole 
of erstwhile state of Kashmir, both under Indian 
and Pakistani control, as a zone of peace.

This move is expected to provide a clear focus 
and strong momentum to the peace movements in the 
region and reinforce the forces of peace and 
radically bring down the nuclear danger by 
working on a concrete and workable action plan. 
This is also expected to deeply affect the global 
mindset and provide a strong, if not decisive, 
push towards universal nuclear disarmament - our 
central and abiding goal

A regional convention of the peace activists from 
the region will be convened in the near future to 
work out a collective charter.

II.	Global Convention on Nuclear Disarmament

The CNDP, in tandem with the essence of Rajiv 
Gandhi action plan for "A World Free of Nuclear 
Weapons" - which was submitted to the United 
Nations on June 9 1988, will work towards a 
global disarmament convention, under the auspices 
of the UN, in collaboration with global peace 
movements towards this objective. The CNDP, in 
this context, notes with serious concern the 
total eclipse from the agenda of the UN of the 
McCloy-Zorin accord on general and complete 
Disarmament, which had been adopted by the United 
nations General Assembly on December 20 1961.The 
CNDP urges the UN to forthwith reinitiate action 
on the same.

The projected global disarmament convention would 
chart out a clear and unambiguous road-map 
towards universal, complete and 
non-discriminatory nuclear disarmament within a 
defined time-frame. This would also enforce, in 
the run up to the final goal, all nuclear weapon 
states - declared and undeclared, immediately 
commence on progressively lowering down the 
operating statuses of their nuclear weapons, 
continue with the moratorium on explosive nuclear 
tests, freeze the programmes for developments of 
upgraded nuclear warheads and delivery/intercepti 
on systems, freeze production of fissile 
materials, provide negative security assurance to 
all non-nuclear states outside of any "nuclear 
umbrella", credibly commit to "no-first-strike" 
and such other measures in consonance with the 
goal of nuclear disarmament.

The CNDP will proactively coordinate with various 
sections of global anti-nuke peace movements and 
unwaveringly work towards this goal.


III.	Intensification of Struggles against 
Ignoring Safety and Hazardous Impact of
Nuclear Power

The, yet to be operationalised, Indo-US nuclear 
deal has radically fired up the fantasies of the 
Indian nuclear establishment. Undeterred by its 
appalling past performance in terms of power 
production and also safety records, it is all set 
to embark upon a very ambitious plan of setting 
up mega nuclear plants dotting the entire coastal 
belt criminally unmindful of severely traumatic 
social and potentially disastrous ecological 
impacts. The CNDP, in keeping with its consistent 
track record and the mandates of its founding 
Charter, will actively collaborate with the 
grassroots people's movements, many of whom are 
its constituent members, to resist such mindless 
moves - singularly lacking in transparency and 
accountability, and provide all necessary and 
possible assistances in this regard.

IV.	Demand for End of US Occupation of Iraq 
and Afghanistan, Just Resolution of the Palestine 
Issue to Ensure Global Peace and Facilitate 
Nuclear Disarmament

The ugly ambitions of the US ruling elite to 
establish its unilateral dominance over the whole 
of the globe by foregrounding its awesome 
military might, including its nuclear arsenal, to 
compensate for the increasing inadequacies of its 
otherwise huge diplomatic/politica l clout and 
economic muscles has emerged as the most major 
threat to the prospects of global nuclear 
disarmament.  The wars on and occupation of Iraq 
and Afghanistan are vital components of this 
grand project, also known as the Project for the 
New American Century (PNAC). The continuing US 
support for the apartheid Zionist regime of 
Israel and its inhuman oppression of the 
Palestinian people is just another facet of this 
ugly venture.

Consistent with the goal of global nuclear 
disarmament, the CNDP demands immediate 
withdrawal of occupation forces from Iraq and 
Afghanistan. The CNDP also solidarises with the 
legitimate struggles of the Palestinian people. 
The CNDP consequently commits itself to actively 
associate, in all possible manners, with all 
global, regional and local moves in these 
directions.


V.	Other Related Issues

The CNDP clearly recognises that the spurts in 
national-chauvinist , majoritarian and militarist 
ideologies and political practices under whatever 
political banner, and the state at times playing 
a role of an active facilitator, by their very 
nature pose a major threat to anti-nuclear peace 
movements in India.

The CNDP hence rededicates itself to fight all 
these pernicious tendencies in all its 
manifestations in collaboration with other forces 
fighting for a just, peaceful and harmonious 
order.
Consistent with its core values, the CNDP 
reiterates its demand that Indo-Pak peace process 
be accelerated.  It also demands visa-free travel 
facilities all over the SAARC region towards this 
goal. It furthermore demands 10% progressive cuts 
in the so-called "defence" budgets of all the 
countries in the region.  The CNDP commits itself 
to ally itself with all regional efforts towards 
these goals.

o o o

Third National Convention of CNDP Demands Release of Dr. Binayak Sen
http://www.freebinayaksen.org/?p=105

______


[6]  Publication Announcements:

(i)  Azad Reading Room announces the publication of:

ECOLOGY, ENVIRONMENT AND CAPITALISM
Essays in Understanding & Change

This publication brings to the reader essays by 
Neil Smith (NY City, USA) and J. Martinez-Alier 
(Barcelona, Spain) in ARR's Watan O Desh booklet 
series. The publication includes an introduction 
re. Environmental facts as well as a map 
underscoring the worldwide inequalities generated 
by the impact of corporate globalization policies 
& programmes.

For info. And orders please contact AZAD READING ROOM
at: azadreadingroom2 at yahoo.com
umbi56 at rediffmail.com; Mobile Phone - 40  9346988639

BULK DISCOUNTS ARE AVAILABLE FOR 3 OR MORE COPIES
Local postage rates + packaging costs apply.


_____

(ii)

Marg Publications, India International Centre, 
and Asia Society (India Centre) cordially invite 
you to a panel discussion on Marg's latest 
publication

INDIA'S POPULAR CULTURE
Iconic Spaces and Fluid Images
Edited by Jyotindra Jain

Venue: The Auditorium, IIC Annexe,
40 max Mueller Marg, New Delhi 10003
On Wednesday, February 06, 2007, at 6:30 pm

Panel:
JYOTINDRA JAIN (Professor at the School of Arts and Aesthetics, JNU, New Delhi)

SUMATHI RAMASWAMY (Professor of History at Duke University, North Carolina)

YOUSUF SAEED (Independent filmmaker and 
researcher, also associated with Tasveer Ghar)

======
MARG REFLECTIONS (a discussion forum and an educational initiative)
www.marg-art.org
======

Contents of the book

Introduction: image mobility in India's popular culture.
Jyotindra Jain

Of Gods and Globes: the territorialization of Hindu deities in popular
visual culture.
Sumathi Ramaswamy

"The Accidental Ramdev": the spread of a popular culture
Christopher Pinney

Optics for the Stage: curtains of the Surabhi Company
Anuradha Kapur

India's Republic Day Parade: restoring identities, constructing the nation
Jyotindra Jain

Mecca versus the Local Shrine: the dilemma of orientation in the
popular religious art of Indian Muslims
Yousuf Saeed

The Bombay Film Poster: a short biography
Ranjani Mazumdar

The Family Archive: photo narratives from Goan villages
Savia Viegas

The Enclaved Gaze: exploring the visual culture of "world class
living" in urban India
Christiane Brosius

_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/

Buzz for secularism, on the dangers of fundamentalism(s), on
matters of peace and democratisation in South
Asia. SACW is an independent & non-profit
citizens wire service run since 1998 by South
Asia Citizens Web: www.sacw.net/
SACW archive is available at: http://insaf.net/pipermail/sacw_insaf.net/

DISCLAIMER: Opinions expressed in materials carried in the posts do not
necessarily reflect the views of SACW compilers.



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