SACW | Feb. 3-5, 2008 / Sri Lanka: APRC's future on sixtieth Independence Day? / Pakistan: Shariat courts in Swat / India: Hindutva violence in Orissa / CNDP's Nagpur Declaration
Harsh Kapoor
aiindex at gmail.com
Mon Feb 4 21:43:58 CST 2008
South Asia Citizens Wire | February 3-5, 2008 |
Dispatch No. 2497 - Year 10 running
[1] Sri Lanka: The futile search for consensus in the APRC (Rohini Hensman)
[2] Pakistan: Why Shariat courts in Swat? (Wajih Abbasi)
[3] India: Charting the history of sangh parivar
violence in Orissa (Angana Chatterji)
[4] Is Gujarat Different From The Rest of India? (Daya Varma)
[5] India: Nagpur Declaration - Third National
Convention of Coalition for Nuclear Disarmament
and Peace
+ Third National Convention of CNDP Demands Release of Dr. Binayak Sen
[6] Announcements:
(i) Ecology, Environment and Capitalism (published by Azad Reading Room)
(ii) Panel discussion on the release of
'India's Popular Culture' (New Delhi, 06
February, 2008)
______
[1]
The Island
30 January 2008
THE FUTILE SEARCH FOR CONSENSUS IN THE APRC
by Rohini Hensman
What a fiasco! We were promised the long-awaited
APRC proposals would be released on January 23rd,
and what did we get? The 13th Amendment was taken
out of the corner where it had been mouldering
for twenty years; the cobwebs were dusted off,
and it was presented to us as the solution to our
problems, despite the fact that it failed in the
North-East because it did not ensure meaningful
devolution (apart from the fact that the LTTE
scuttled it), and was unpopular even among the
Sinhalese in the South! It has been reported that
the APRC was forced into this ignoble position by
the President: Does he think we are all idiots?
Why appoint the APRC and waste tax-payers' money
on 63 meetings over eighteen months if the only
purpose was to revive the failed 13th Amendment?
Once again, the government of Sri Lanka seems
determined to prove the LTTE right when it wrote
off the APRC process as eyewash. We should reject
this report, even as an interim measure, for the
same reason that we rejected the LTTE's Interim
Self-Governing Authority: because it constitutes
a massive obstacle to a democratic solution of
the current crisis. Before you take interim steps
to reach a certain goal, you need to know what
that goal is; otherwise you are in danger of
moving in the opposite direction, and that is
precisely what this proposal does. Credible
interim proposals cannot be made until the final
goal is clear, even if it is a long way off. We
must, therefore, demand that the real APRC
proposals - not the APRC acting as the mouthpiece
of the president, who is free to make his own
proposals but surely has a mouth of his own -
should be presented by the end of this month at
the very latest. If the president does not permit
this, the Left and minority parties who are still
part of the government should resign and the
proposals should be presented independently. I am
fully aware of the risk this entails for minority
party leaders who are already being targeted by
the LTTE, given Rajapaksa's vindictive policy of
withdrawing security from politicians who refuse
to toe his line. But, the only alternative is
that they betray their own constituencies in
order to be part of a government that is
determined not to be fair by the minorities.
Tissa Vitharana has been denounced by Ranawaka,
and no doubt the Left parties would face more
vilification or even violence from the JHU and
JVP, but they,too, cannot remain in an
anti-democratic government without betraying
their socialist principles. What is important is
not that the APRC should reach consensus, but
that the results of their deliberations should be
presented to the public for democratic debate.
Three Positions on the State(s) in Sri Lanka
There are essentially three positions on the
state(s) in the territory of what is now Sri
Lanka. The first is that of the LTTE, which
strives to constitute the Northeast as a separate
state of Tamil Eelam, an exclusively Tamil state
in which minorities can be subjected to
discrimination, persecution and ethnic cleansing.
The second is that of the JHU, JVP, MEP and their
fellow-travellers, who strive to establish the
whole of Sri Lanka as a unitary Sinhala-Buddhist
state in which minorities can be subjected to
discrimination, persecution and ethnic cleansing.
The third position essentially seeks to establish
Sri Lanka as a united, democratic state in which
citizens of all communities will enjoy equal
rights - including religious, cultural and
language rights - in all parts of the country.
Some variants of this position want Sri Lanka to
be a federal state, but most parties are willing
to forego full federalism provided there is
adequate and meaningful devolution of power,
especially to areas where there is a
preponderance of minority communities. The first
position, represented in parliament by the TNA,
has been excluded from the APRC so far, since
Mahinda Rajapaksa did not invite it to
participate. This detracted somewhat from the
legitimacy of the exercise, since it did not
include a large bloc of Tamil MPs. But, it could
also be argued that the TNA MPs owed their
position in parliament to election-rigging by the
LTTE, and would not have the freedom to represent
their constituents freely if their position
deviated from that of the LTTE. In mid-2007, APRC
Chairman Tissa Vitharana invited the TNA, too, to
participate.
The second position is represented by the JVP
(which has withdrawn from the APRC), JHU and MEP,
some elements of the SLFP and possibly also of
the UNP. They insist on the definition of the
state as 'unitary', retention of the special
place given to Buddhism, and tight limits placed
on devolution; indeed, the proposal of the SLFP,
subsequently withdrawn, that the unit of
devolution should be the district, would
effectively have made it impossible for any
substantial devolution of power to take place.
The third position is taken by the Left parties
and most of the minority parties. While there may
be differences of emphasis among them, they
concur in ruling out both a division of the
country and a unitary state, and in wanting
substantial devolution at the provincial level
combined with decentralisation at a lower level
and power-sharing at the centre. The EPDP is
ambivalent about this position. Without
dismissing it, the party wanted the APRC to
recommend implementation of the 13th Amendment,
with the establishment of interim councils in the
North and East. Preconditions for Consensus
Arriving at a consensus between parties holding
radically different positions is conditional on
their being willing to shift their positions in
the interests of agreement. Without that
willingness, any consensus is pie in the sky, and
the search for it is a futile exercise. So, what
are the chances of the APRC reaching consensus?
In principle, Prof. Vitharana is quite right to
invite the TNA to participate, since it is
supposed to be an All-Party committee. But
Prabakaran has made it very clear he is not
willing to budge from his goal of a separate
Tamil state ruled by the LTTE. It is, therefore,
impossible to envisage a consensus between the
TNA and the other parties in parliament. What
about the rest of the parties? The JVP, JHU, MEP
and sections of the SLFP insist on a unitary
state with limited devolution of power to the
provinces, while the Left and most minority
parties do not want a unitary state and want
substantial devolution of power to the provinces.
This is not just a quibble over a word; If Sri
Lanka is defined as a 'unitary' state, this will
automatically give the Centre powers to overrule
and even dismiss provincial governments which act
contrary to its wishes. Any devolution would then
be purely illusory, since it could be clawed back
at will by the Centre. Thus, in reality, there is
as little chance of consensus between these two
blocs of parties as there is between either of
them and the LTTE/TNA. Any 'consensus' that
emerges would be at the cost of the Left and
minority parties selling out their constituencies
by agreeing to a unitary state which is opposed
by them.
Does 'Unitary' Mean 'United'? The first excuse
for wanting to preserve the unitary character of
the state is that abandoning the unitary state -
and even, according to the JVP, allowing
devolution of any degree - would lead to the
division of Sri Lanka. This argument reveals its
proponents to be historical ignoramuses. The most
striking counter to it, is the example of the
Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, which,
under Tito, granted a high degree of autonomy to
its constituent republics and to the Serbian
provinces of Vojvodina and Kosovo, and remained
united. After Tito's death in 1980, the Serbian
nationalists attempted to curtail regional
autonomy, leading to the break-up of Yugoslavia.
Most significantly for Sri Lanka, Kosovo now
stands poised on the brink of independence from
Serbia after an armed struggle conducted by the
Kosovo Liberation Army, a force with a strong
resemblance to the LTTE. Here there is a clear
link between more autonomy and unity, while less
autonomy leads to separatism.
Indeed, we see the same pattern in Sri Lanka,
too. Sri Lanka's first Constitution did not
define it as a unitary state, nor was there any
special place for Buddhism, and there was no
separatist movement while it prevailed. The
Republican Constitution of 1972 proclaimed Sri
Lanka to be a unitary state, which, along with
Sinhala as the sole official language, the
special place given to Buddhism, and withdrawal
of protection for minorities, amounted to
establishing it as a Sinhala-Buddhist state.
Within a few years there was a separatist
movement for Tamil Eelam and an armed struggle to
realise it, which continues to this day. Once
again, the correlation is clear: No unitary
state, no separatism; unitary state, armed
separatist struggle.
So, the argument against removing the word
'unitary' is NOT an argument for preserving the
unity of our country, but the very opposite: It
is an argument for dividing Sri Lanka by defining
it as a Sinhala-Buddhist state, thereby
sustaining the separatist struggle of the LTTE.
Those who truly wish to defeat the LTTE would
want to remove the unitary label from our
constitution as soon as possible.
Reluctance to change the Constitution
The other reason given for opposing the deletion
of 'unitary' from the constitution is that it
would require a two-thirds majority in parliament
as well as a referendum. It is true this would
take time, but if we, therefore, give up the
struggle to change the constitution, we are, in
effect, giving up on democracy in Sri Lanka. To
take just one example, the virtually absolute
power held by the Executive President means that
the entire population is at the mercy of this one
individual. This is not merely a denial of the
democratic rights of the people, but also a
negation of good governance. The Organisation of
Professional Associations (OPA) deserves our
gratitude for its magnificent efforts to
reactivate the Constitutional Council (CC), which
was seen as counterbalancing the absolute power
of the President, but that is not enough. Will
the presidential appointees to posts that should
have been filled by CC appointees be replaced? It
seems unlikely. Nor will good governance in other
areas be ensured.
Take, for example, the bizarre episode in London
when the president wanted to return to Sri Lanka
after a personal trip to see his son graduate.
The Sri Lankan Airlines flight was over-booked,
and chief executive Peter Hill, while offering to
accommodate Rajapaksa's immediate family, refused
to offload 35 confirmed passengers to accommodate
his entourage. And he was quite right to do so.
Imagine trecking all the way to the airport and
queuing up to check in, only to find that your
seat and those of 34 other passengers had been
hijacked by the president's hangers-on! Wouldn't
you think twice about flying Sri Lankan Airlines
in future? It would be the end of the airline as
a commercial enterprise! But, Mr Hill's reward
was to have his work permit and visa withdrawn,
as a result of which Emirates, which appointed
him, is withdrawing from the partnership with Sri
Lankan Airlines.
This is just one example of the mind-boggling
corruption and nepotism that is sending Sri
Lanka's economy down the drain. It is not just
working-class and middle-income groups who are
paying for it; even businesses cannot be run
under such conditions. Nor is it just a problem
for the present: Even the future of Sri Lanka is
being mortgaged by the high-interest loans taken
by this rapacious administration that is sucking
the life-blood out of our country. This is the
result of the progressive undermining of
democracy that has occurred from Independence
onward. First, the minority communities were
disempowered by depriving Hill-country Tamils of
their citizenship and franchise, passing the
Sinhala Only Bill, and so on. These were not just
attacks on minority rights but on equality, which
is the bedrock of democracy. The 1972
constitution not only deprived minority
communities of more rights but also centralised
enormous power in the hands of the ruling party,
thus disempowering Sinhalese, too. Finally, the
1978 constitution put absolute power in the hands
of the executive president. Again, it is not just
minorities who pay. On the contrary, in financial
terms, the Sinhalese pay more, since there are
more of them. Furthermore, there is the
ever-present danger of tens of thousands of
Sinhalese being slaughtered, as they were in the
late 1980s.
Restoring Democracy in Sri Lanka If all this is
to be reversed, the executive presidency has to
be abolished and democracy restored, which means
that we need a new constitution along the lines
proposed by the Tissa Vitharana report. The
chances of achieving this are not so hopeless as
the Sinhala chauvinists would have us believe.
Except for the TNA, all the minority parties
would support such a change, as would the Left
parties. While sections of the SLFP would oppose
it, others would surely support it, since their
own proposal for constitutional change in 1995
was very similar. At that time, the UNP sabotaged
the whole effort in an utterly shameful way; if
they do the same again, they would face
well-deserved oblivion, so perhaps the leadership
will think better of it; even if they don't,
there will be some party members who support a
democratic constitution. So a two-thirds
parliamentary majority supporting the change is
not impossible, if not immediately, then after
the next elections. As for getting it approved by
a referendum, I feel confident that if the issues
are explained and the people of Sri Lanka are
allowed to make an informed choice, they will
surely vote in favour of democracy.
However, before this can happen, the real APRC
report has to be presented to the public. Where
there is no consensus in the APRC, the different
positions of the different parties should be
presented honestly. The Ministry of
Constitutional Affairs and National Integration
should publish the proposals in all three
languages, and all those who have any commitment
to peace should ensure that they are debated
thoroughly by the public. This may take time, but
if the process starts immediately, it should be
complete before the next parliamentary and
presidential elections. In the meantime, it
should be made very clear that the president will
be held responsible for any violence whatsoever
against signatories of the report.
If the real APRC proposals are unveiled by
February 4th, we will have something to celebrate
on Independence Day. Otherwise it will be a day
of national mourning for the murder of democracy
over a period of sixty years.
______
[2]
The Post
February 2, 2008
WHY SHARIAT COURTS IN SWAT?
by Wajih Abbasi
The government is contemplating to establish
shariat (Qazi) courts in the Provincially
Administered Tribal Area (PATA), which consists
of districts of former Malakand Division,
including Swat, Upper and Lower Dir, Buner,
Malakand Protected Area, Shangla, Chitral and
Kala Dhaka of Mansehra District. Under the
programme, the nomenclature of the lower judicial
structure will be changed and members of lower
judiciary from judicial magistrate to district
and sessions judges will be given the name of
Qazi. Before being appointed to these positions,
these judges will be given a three- month crash
course on Islamic Sharia. In reaching to their
decision, Qazis will be assisted by a committee
of local clerics. The jurisdiction of the
Peshawar High Court and the Supreme Court will be
withdrawn from these areas and appeals against
decisions of the Qazi Courts could only be made
with the Federal Shariat Court (FSC).
It is also being reported that the government is
negotiating release of Maulana Sufi Muhammad with
Tehrik Nifaz-e-Shariat-e-Muhammadi (TNSM)
leaders. Maulana Sufi Muhammad is father-in-law
of Maulana Fazlullah, who is leader of the
present movement in Swat. The TNSM leadership,
however, has been expressing its disassociation
with Maulana Fazlullah.
The decision is being seen as an attempt on the
part of the government to appease the Taliban and
their supporters in Swat. It is to be seen
whether this decision will help cool down the
Taliban movement in the region or give it further
impetus. The Taliban influence in most of the
Pashto-speaking settled districts of the NWFP has
been expanding and appeasement like imposition of
such law will definitely encourage them.
Besides the Malakand Division, southern part of
the province, including Kohat, Hango, Tank,
Bannu, Lakki Marwat and D I Khan have been badly
affected. The Taliban have been attempting to
impose their social and religious code in most of
these areas. There is no reason that after
getting the Sharia courts in Malakand, where
cleric committees represented by them will make
all decisions, they will not try to get the same
for the southern districts. If the government
today accept their demands in the Malakand
Division, other districts of Peshawar, Mardan,
Charsadda, Swabi and Nowshera will fall in their
lap.
Governments, media, religo-political parties and
other influential groups have been presenting the
imposition of Islamic law as a panacea for all
social, political and economic ills. Inherent
connotation of the argument is that the present
legal, political and economic structure in the
country is un-Islamic, which has to be replaced
by an Islamic structure. The argument has been
the most potent ammunition of religious parties
which helped them to expand their base. The
perception has helped them reach the position
they are enjoying today where they are dictating
their terms with the power of gun.
It is not time to appease militants and
extremists but defend Pakistan as it was
envisaged by Allama Iqbal and Quaid-e-Azam
Muhammad Ali Jinnah. Pakistan is a Muslim country
where over 97 percent population follow the
Islamic faith. Their enthusiasm for the religion
has been exemplary. The religion is part of our
social norms, ethos, traditions, language and
culture. Most sections have seldom any conflict
with Islamic teachings. The Holy Quran and Sunnah
are supreme law of the land and courts are free
to decide whether a particular law is repugnant
to Islamic teachings or not.
The framers of Constitution also explicitly
prescribed that no law will be enacted in the
country against the teachings of the Holy Quran
and Sunnah and existing laws will be scrutinised
whether they confirm to the injunction of Islam
or not. For this purpose, the Council of Islamic
Ideology (CII) has been established. The Council
has been functioning for the last 31 years. If
anyone has any objection over any law, then he or
she must go to the CII and let it decide. The
parliament as embodiment of the sovereignty of
the people has right to amend existing laws in
accordance with the recommendations of the
Council.
The Qazi courts will deprive the Peshawar High
Court as well as the Supreme Court of their
jurisdiction over the PATA region. The FATA area
is already out of the jurisdiction of any court
and protection of basic human rights are not
available to the people of these areas. The
ouster of jurisdiction of High Court as well as
the Supreme Court will also deprive the people of
PATA of their human rights. At the same time, the
proposed law will create another parallel court
system in the country.
To keep the country united, efforts should be
made to establish universal legal system. To the
contrary, apologists and embodiments of
appeasement are devising strategies and policies
which result in shrinking reach of existing
institutions and putting large section of society
at the mercy of extremists.
The establishment of FSC was part of the
sycophant, hypocritical dishonest policies of
General Ziaul Haq under which he used the name of
Islam to expand his whimsical powers and crush
any resistance. The establishment of the court
enabled him to dump the 'erring' judges of High
Courts without their consent which otherwise he
could not normally do. The independence of judges
of the FSC is not ensured as is the case with
judges of High Courts and Supreme Court. They are
appointed for a three-year term by the president,
who can also give them extension, change their
terms of appointment or assign them any other
duty. Such powers are not available to the
executive vis-a-vis judges of any High Court or
Supreme Court.
Under Article 203-C (5) of the Constitution if a
judge of a High Court deems to have retired from
his office if does not accept appointment as
judge of the FSC. The clause allows a route to
the federal government to get rid of independent
minded judges of High Courts.
Under the relevant articles of the Constitution,
which were forced into the document by General
Ziaul Haq, the FSC has two functions to decide
whether a particular piece of legislation
confirms to injunction of the Holy Quran and
Sunnah or not. As already stated, the framers of
the Constitution had given this responsibility to
the CII and there is no need to have another
institution to do the same. Besides all courts
can make decision in this regard as the Holy
Quran and Sunnah is supreme law of the land.
Other function entrusted to the FSC is to hear
appeals against decisions of lower courts with
regard to cases pertaining to the Hadood
Ordinance. As already said this function is
better performed by high courts. It is time that
the FSC is abolished altogether and a uniform
court system is restored. Any attempt to expand
the jurisdiction of the FSC and at the expense of
higher judiciary, is a retrogressive act to
appease militants. It will further encourage them
to strike further deep in the country.
The writer is a freelance columnist
______
[3]
Communalism Combat
January 2008
KANDHAMAL: HINDUTVA'S TERROR
Charting the history of sangh parivar violence in Orissa
by Angana Chatterji
"Before the mob came we heard the sound of people
approaching. The sound of hatred. Our lives, our
faith, our existence is under attack and neither
the neighbours, the police nor the state care." -
Dalit Christian woman in Kandhamal
"We are waiting for the next riot. We do not know
where it will happen but we know that Kandhamal
was a warning, not the end." - Christian labour
organiser
Event
December 25, 2007: Seven churches, Catholic,
Protestant, Pentecostal, independent... burned in
Barakhama village, in west Kandhamal/Phulbani
district, central Orissa. December 23:
Hindutva-affiliated Adivasi organisations
organised a march, supported by sangh parivar
groups, rallying: 'Stop Christianity. Kill
Christians'. They called for a strike on December
25 and 26, demanding that Dalit Christians be
denied scheduled caste status. A Dalit Christian
leader from Barakhama testified: "On December 22,
hearing of plans to create trouble during
Christmas, we went to the local police and
informed them of the situation. They assured us
that things would be under control. On December
24, in the daytime, we heard voices of Bajrang
Dal, VHP, RSS, Shiv Sena people, chanting:
'Hindu, Hindu, Bhai, Bhai', 'RSS Zindabad',
'Lakshmanananda Zindabad'. They shut down shops.
That night they felled trees to block roads,
severed power and phone lines. On the 25th, we
went to the inspector in-charge of police again.
On the 25th, at 2.30, about 200 of us sat down to
Christmas prayer at our church and around 4 p.m.
we heard the mob approach."
The mob, about 4,000 persons, many bearing
symbolic tilaks, belonged to various sangh
parivar groups named above, incited local Hindus
into rioting. Estimates state 20 per cent of the
mob comprised of people from Barakhama, 80 per
cent from surrounding Balliguda, Raikia,
Phulbani, as far away as Behrampur. In Barakhama,
Christian homes were selected for destruction by
the mob, Hindu homes spared. A Dalit Christian
woman testified: "They broke the door to our
church. We ran. We fell and kept running." Women
and men were intimidated and assaulted. Cries of
'Jai Bajrangbali' rent the air. 'Christians must
become Hindu or Die. Kill Them. Kill Them. Kill
Them. Gita not Bible. Destroy their Faith.'
The crowd carried rods, trishuls (tridents),
swords, kerosene. They used guns, a first in
Orissa, weapons available in the market and
makeshift local fabrications. Predominantly
middle class caste Hindus participated in
looting, destroying and torching property. They
threw bombs to start the fire. The breakage was
systematic, thorough. Women and men hid for days
in forests in winter temperatures, later seeking
shelter in the Balliguda town relief camp,
returning to decimated Barakhama on January 2.
Engulfed in soot and sorrow, people attempted to
function amid charred remnants. A woman said:
"Everything burns down and we are left with
nothing. How little our lives are made (of). How
alone we are, so far away from everything."
In Balliguda, in one church, furniture was
dragged out, lit into a grotesque sculpture. The
private violated in public, made spectacle. A
Catholic church burnt, opposite the street the
fire station witnessed the incident but did not
intervene. A cow, dragged from a shed, set afire,
was beaten to death, identified as 'Christian'.
Earlier, on December 23, Hindu activists
organised a conversion ceremony for Pastor Digal
from Kutikia gram panchayat and 12 members of the
Christian community. Pastor Digal was beaten,
forcibly tonsured and then paraded naked as he
refused to reject Christianity.
On the morning of December 24, at approximately
11 a.m., activists from various Hindutva groups,
including Bajrang Dal, VHP, RSS, Vanvasi Kalyan
Ashram, organised vandalism of Christmas symbols
erected on the occasion of Christmas and
unleashed turmoil in Brahmanigaon/ Bamunigaon
village in central Kandhamal. Some among the
3,000-person mob of Hindutva activists were armed
with guns. Reportedly, shots were fired on
Christians, wounding two young boys. The Church
of Our Lady of Lourdes was decimated. Unarmed
police, present near the spot, failed to act.
After these events, on December 24, sources
state, the car in which Lakshmanananda Saraswati,
the influential, octogenarian Hindu proselytiser
who was travelling to the site of the incident to
organise a yagna to rouse Hindu sentiments
against Christmas, was stopped by Christians. The
vehicle and driver were knocked around. Saraswati
claimed to the press that he had been injured
while eyewitness accounts and doctors' statements
contradict this and his own activities point to
the contrary. Following Saraswati's allegations,
Hindutva groups called for a 36-hour strike on
the evening of December 24. Then followed the
violence across Kandhamal, stretching over a
three-day period in which Christian communities
were attacked by Hindutva groups and their cadre.
It has been stated by members of the Hindu
community that Christian display of religiosity,
and the economic privilege that allowed for such
exhibition, led to the rioting. It has been a
focus in the press that Christians in one area in
Brahmanigaon responded with violence. It must be
noted that Christians in one area did respond
with some, not proportionate, violence. In the
absence of state action in curbing Hindutva's
aggression, this might have aided the Christian
community in checking Hindutva's violence. It
must be noted that Christian retaliation in
Brahmanigaon did not endanger bodies but focused
on destroying property even while Hindutva's
violence explicitly sought to endanger Christian
bodies.
Minority failure to submit to state and
majoritarian (by the majority community)
subjection becomes a manifestation of 'evil'.
Dominant rationale reduces this to majority vs
minority communalism. This position appeals to
liberal notions of 'balance' and fails to
scrutinise state violence (often greater than,
and inciting of, group violence). Rather than
focus on systematic targeting of Christians,
their overwhelmingly peaceful submission to
Hindutva's violence and vast structural
injustices and differences in relations of power
between majority and minority, the scrutiny
appears to be focused on the failure of all
Christian groups to simply submit to dominance.
Impunity
'Bharatmata ki Jai (Hail to Mother India)' -
Hindu nationalist and militant organisations
Targeted: Balliguda, Brahmanigaon, Barakhama,
Bodagan, Chakapad, Daringbari, Goborkutty,
Jhinjirguda, Kalingia, Kamapada, Kulpakia,
Mandipanka, Nuagaon, Phulbani, Pobingia,
Sindrigaon, Ulipadaro villages Convents and
presbytery in Balliguda, Pobingia, Phulbani,
Brahmanigaon Two hostels each in Balliguda,
Brahmanigaon, Pobingia. Minor seminary and a
vocational training centre in Balliguda.
Organisational offices, as that of World Vision,
destroyed. Across Kandhamal, approximately 632
(some place the number at 700) Christian homes,
80-95 churches, mostly in villages, and 94-96
institutions were destroyed, vandalised and
torched. Homes and institutions were robbed,
cash, jewellery, implements, machinery and other
valuables looted. A Hindutva mob surrounded
Tikabali police station, two jeeps were torched.
In the week following the attacks, hundreds of
people were missing. Some remained lost to their
families three weeks after the event. Large
numbers sought refuge in the nearby forests,
including children, women, the elderly, persons
with disabilities, including mental illnesses.
Some sustained burn and other injuries. Women
were molested. Death counts remained inaccurate,
the unofficial number of deaths noted at 11, four
died under police fire. Following the violence,
the administration neither documented the
devastation nor participated in its expeditious
clean up. The police refused Christians seeking
to file FIRs while Hindutva activists filed
charges against members of the Christian
community. As well, Christians attempting to file
FIRs are confronted with Hindu religious symbols
ever present in (hostile) public places. The
Balliguda relief camp was skeletal, its
distribution discriminated against women.
As people returned to rows upon rows of
uninhabitable homes, the administration offered
people one blanket and a shawl, some clothes,
rations. Despite continuing tensions, police
presence abated within a week of the riots.
Confidence-building steps are absent.
The sangh parivar's charge that the riots are a
part of ethnic violence is contradicted by the
timing of the violence. Certain members of sangh
parivar organisations, especially the Bajrang
Dal, claim in private that some Hindutva
activists had come from Gujarat to offer support
in Kandhamal. Sangh parivar activists charge that
they will resume their attack against the
Christian community once the Central Reserve
Police Force withdraws, to 'teach them a lesson'.
Immediately following the event, relief,
compensation, reparation measures, were
incommensurate with the extent of social,
psychological and economic losses and segregation
experienced by communities.
Judicial inquiry commission
The extent of the violence and coordination of
attacks across mountainous terrain lead
independent investigators to conclude that the
violence was planned, that the police had prior
knowledge of Hindutva groups' intent to riot. The
pertinent district collector and superintendent
of police have been transferred, not discharged.
A Judicial Inquiry Commission (JIC) chaired by a
former (not sitting) judge has been appointed by
the Government of Orissa to investigate the
riots. Its power/legitimacy is in question. Its
mandate is not binding on the government. The
central government did not appoint an inquiry by
the CBI, even as it is apparent that the very
administration that failed to contain the riots
and delayed deploying adequate forces, and whose
officials at the district level may have been
involved in its execution, cannot administer
justice.
It is important to note that Chief Minister
Naveen Patnaik's celebration of his party's 10th
anniversary coincided with the riots. The
celebration had required that large numbers of
the state's police forces be moved out of
districts to the state capital, Bhubaneswar. This
made it difficult for the police to respond to
the emergent situation in Kandhamal on December
24-25. Certain bureaucrats allege that the Orissa
government initially directed forces against
intervening.
Hindutva activists have lobbied the JIC to
organise its terms of reference premised on the
claim that an attack on Lakshmanananda Saraswati
by Christians in Brahmanigaon propelled the riots
which they allege to have been spontaneous. This
timeline, as explained above, is falsified.
Hinduisaton of Kandhamal
The Kandhamal riots were not unexpected. The
progressive Hindutvaisation of Hindus in
Kandhamal has enabled the sangh parivar to act
with impunity. Lakshmanananda Saraswati has been
overseeing Hinduisation there since 1969.
Adivasis, Dalits, Christians, Muslims, are
targeted through social and economic boycotts,
forced conversions to Hinduism (posed as
're'conversion which presupposes that Adivasis
and Dalits were 'originally' Hindus even while
they may/do not self-identify as Hindus) and
other violences. The Orissa Prevention of Cow
Slaughter Act, 1960 deployed against Muslims; the
Orissa Freedom of Religion Act, 1967, against
Christians. The district witnessed Hindutva's
violence in 1986, followed by the sangh parivar's
growth in the area. An Adivasi sangh leader from
Phulbani, a close associate of Lakshmanananda
Saraswati and a Vanvasi Kalyan Ashram teacher as
well as a self-proclaimed expert at
lathi-wielding, echoes the sentiments of
colleagues from the Nikhil Utkal Kui Samaj, a
sangh-affiliated Adivasi organisation that works
in the district: "We are promoting Hindu rituals
amongst vanvasis ('forest dwellers', derogatory
naming of Adivasis) who are all Hindus.
Lakshmanananda Saraswati has been a restraining
force on the Christians who were doing the
conversion work."
Through the Kandhamal riots of 2007, Hindutva's
discourse named Christians as 'conversion
terrorists'. In September 1999, Catholic priest
Arul Das was murdered in Jamabani village in
Mayurbhanj, followed by the destruction of
churches in Kandhamal. In August 2004, Our Lady
of Charity Catholic Church was vandalised in
Raikia and eight Christian homes burnt. Then too,
as this Christian leader stated: "They broke
everything in the church, the idols, and burnt
the holy book. They burnt some of our houses. The
parish priest saw all this helplessly. The people
who entered the church were traders and other RSS
activists but many were outsiders, maybe from
Kattingia, where there is an RSS stronghold. The
police were there but did not do anything." The
Raikia incident led to the economic and social
ghettoisation of the Christian community.
Raikia is proximate to G. Udaigiri town where
sangh parivar mobilisations significantly
increased between 2000 and 2004. In May 2007,
Pastor Pabitra Kumar Kota was beaten. In October
2005, converting 200 Bonda Adivasi Christians to
Hinduism in Malkangiri, Saraswati stated: "How
will we make India a completely Hindu country?
This is our aim and this is what we want to do.
The feeling of Hindutva should come within the
hearts and minds of all the people."
In April 2006, celebrating RSS architect Madhav
Sadashiv Golwalkar's centenary, the sangh
organised the Asthamatruk Rath Yatra, aimed at
converting Christians to Hinduism. Saraswati,
with VHP and RSS leaders in attendance, was
triumphant, as eight chariots, named after female
deities, travelled through Orissa carrying
sanctified water and soil from a multitude of
villages, calling on Orissans to assemble 'Akhand
Hindu Rashtra'. Presided by Saraswati, seven
yagnas were held, culminating at Chakapad in
Kandhamal district, at the Sammelan attended by
30,000 Adivasis from across the state. Hinduised
Adivasis are required to work with both sangh
parivar groups and ruling political parties. On
April 9, 342 Christians, and on April 10, nine
Christians from over 74 families were converted
to Hinduism. In September 2007, the VHP organised
a road and rail blockade in Orissa, against the
supposed destruction of the mythic 'Ram Setu'
(bridge). Hindutva militants, Praveen Togadia and
Subash Chouhan, returned to Orissa, rousing
sentiments for Hindutva's political and spiritual
victory. Between July and December 2007,
sangh-organised rallies travelled across
Kandhamal, raising sentiments against Christians
in the district.
Hindutva organisations have charged that
Christian conversions in the area and the
interventions of Maoist groups led to a
spontaneous outburst from Hindus, culminating in
the Kandhamal riots of 2007. Maoist groups are
not operational in the areas where the violence
took place, even as sangh parivar groups have
witnessed an upsurge in recent years in those
exact areas.
Numbers and rates of conversions to Christianity
are inflated by the Hindu Right and circulate in
retaliatory capacity even within progressive
communities who fixate on such conversions as
contributing to the communalisation of society.
Christian conversions are storied as debilitating
to the majority status of Hindus in Orissa while
Muslims are seen as 'infiltrating' from
Bangladesh, looting livelihood opportunities from
residents and dislocating the 'Oriya (and Indian)
nation'. Hindu nationalists place Christians and
Muslims in the liminal in-between, as
concurrently internal and external to the
nation/as enemy. Non-Hinduised Adivasis and
Dalits are perceived as 'unruly'.
Hindutva leaders rumour: 'Phulbani-Kandhamal is a
most important Christian area in Orissa with
rampant and forced conversions'. However, the
Christian population in Kandhamal district is
1,17,950 while Hindus number 5,27,757. Sangh
leaders claim: 'By the VHP data there are 927
churches in Phulbani district built on illegally
taken land'. Church leaders respond that there
are 521 churches in the district, on legally
acquired church property, and estimate as few as
200-300 consensual conversions and baptism
ceremonies annually in Phulbani town with a
faintly elevated figure in rural Kandhamal (per
the All India Christian Council, AICC, statement
of 2005). Many of these churches are administered
by the Church of North India, which was
inaugurated in Nagpur in 1970 and is registered
as a society under the Societies Act XXI of 1860.
While few members of certain Christian sects,
such as some Pentecostals, may preach in public
places, most, such as Catholics, do not.
Conversions to Christianity do not occur with the
intent to destabilise the Hindu or other
communities, and the content and programme of
church-based education does not foster communal
hatred or divisiveness in thought or deed.
The sangh parivar makes claims that are
unsubstantiated - that Christian missionaries
(who are mostly of Indian descent) and Muslim
traders have caused the destruction of tribal
culture and undertaken the illegal acquisition
and encroachment of tribal lands since the early
1980s. While the delegitimisation of Adivasi
rights to lands and their displacement from
customary and communitarian property are serious
and righteous grievances, Christian missionaries
and Muslim traders are not the primary reason for
the land grab and the paucity of land reforms in
Orissa. Such rumouring is acceptable to the
dominant caste groups, even as general caste land
grab is the primary reason for the
disenfranchisement-displacement of Adivasis from
traditional rights to land. In 1998 there was an
agitation for land reforms that did not translate
into practical implementation.
The situation is compounded by a decline in the
actual number of available employment and income
generating opportunities in the area. Kandhamal
remains socio-economically vulnerable, with a
large percentage of the population living below
the poverty line. In addition, 60 per cent of
state-operated schools are without teachers while
schools operated by Christian organisations are
usually available in townships. In a context of
disenfranchisement and poverty, and the need to
work and the unfeasibility of acquiring
employment after basic schooling, the rate of
student attrition within Adivasi communities, for
example, in G. Udaigiri, is very high at the
school level, with only three per cent continuing
through completion.
The Christian community too is economically
disenfranchised in Kandhamal. A majority of the
Christian population, local Christian leaders
state, is landless or marginal landholders, with
an average holding of half an acre per family.
Christian leaders said that the church does not
convert under duress or offer money in lieu of
conversions. In the 1960s and 70s, when there was
a thrust in conversions, Adivasis benefited
through accessing health care, education and
employment offered by Christian missionaries.
The politicisation of Adivasis and Dalits leads
them to claim that Hinduism is distant to them,
'outside' to them. This is dangerous to the sangh
parivar's ideology which uses the notion of
'Adivasis as Hindus' to connect Hinduism across
time in the space named India and 'Dalits as
Hindus' to maintain its numeric dominance.
Politicised Adivasis and Dalits are named
'terrorist', 'Maoist', 'militant'. Hindutva
rumours that Dalits are exploiting Adivasis and
that land is a major contention between them.
Dalits are posed as 'dangerous', as the claiming
of the identity of 'Dalit' is a politicisation
debilitating to the sangh parivar. (Dalit:
Marathi for oppressed or 'broken', from the root
'dal', which denotes dispersion (symbolic and
literal, of those that mistreatment has
violated). Term used by Dalit peoples and groups
for self-identification in politicised contexts.)
Hindutva rumours that Dalits have acquired
economic benefits, augmented by their
Christianisation. This is not borne out in
reality, as Dalits remain landless - in
Kandhamal, approximately 90 per cent of Dalits
are landless. Hindutva rumours that the 'success'
of the Dalit community is causing economic rift
in the area and the success of Christian Dalits
is causing communalisation. In reality, it is the
Hindu casted business community that maintains
economic privilege/dominance in the area. Their
economic power is however justified in the
interest of maintaining and growing the
('shining' Hindu/Indian) nation.
In Hinduising Adivasis and polarising relations
between them and Dalits in the area, the sangh
parivar has engineered rivalries between Kandha
Adivasis and Pana Dalit Christians in Kandhamal,
instigating against the latter's campaign for
scheduled tribe status. Dalit Christians, under
current law, forfeit their right to affirmative
action. In current law, Paragraph 3 of the
Constitution (Scheduled Castes) Order, 1950 held
caste and religion to be mutually exclusive: 'no
person who professes a religion different from
the Hindu (later amended to include the Sikh or
the Buddhist) religion shall be deemed to be a
member of a Scheduled Caste' (Ministry of Law and
Justice, 2006).
Functioning against the right to freedom of
religion, per these provisions, Dalits who
convert to Christianity or Islam, Jainism and
Zoroastrianism, and other faiths, are divested of
scheduled caste status and affirmative action
afforded by the state via the 'reservation'
system for scheduled castes and tribes, and
refused benefits granted those that identify as
Hindu Dalits. This, Christian leaders contend,
impacts the ability of Dalit Christians to secure
resources routinely controlled by those from
upper caste backgrounds. Dalit converts to
Hinduism are not denied such rights.
Discriminated against on the basis of religion,
marginalised peoples that discard or function
outside Hinduism are barred from equal access to
affirmative action that their ethno-cultural and
class status allocates. This rejection disregards
that benefits reserved for scheduled castes and
tribes are premised on feudal, colonial and
post-colonial structural mistreatment of such
peoples, not religion alone. Religion functions
in a Hindu dominant nation as race did under
colonial rule, informing hierarchies that define
purity and impurity, belonging and un-belonging,
'norm' and 'other'.
State institutions are in internal disagreement
over the issue of affirmative action for
religious minorities. Responding to a writ
petition (No. 180 of 2004) filed by the AICC via
the Centre for Public Interest Litigation, the
Supreme Court of India asked the Government of
India for arguments and guidelines on broadening
the assistance of 'reservation' to scheduled
castes that convert to Christianity. Muslim
organisations too have campaigned for the
inclusion of Muslim Dalits in diverse forms of
affirmative action. The government deferred the
issue to the Ranganath Mishra National Commission
for Linguistic and Religious Minorities, even
while the Commission's jurisdiction was advisory
and did not extend to decision making on such
matters. The Mishra Commission's report was
released to the press on May 21, 2007 and its
recommendations advocated that the benefits of
'reservation' be extended to Dalit converts to
Christianity and Islam and that religion be
dissociated from scheduled caste status in
implementing affirmative action. On July 19, 2007
the Supreme Court referred the matter back to the
central (Congress) government for its decision
which remains pending.
Fascisation of Orissa
Hindutva mythologises the demise of Hinduism in
'Hindustan', legitimating violence as just
response, patriotic and pro-national.
Majoritarianism (assertions by the majority, here
Hindu, community toward acquiring and maintaining
social, economic, cultural, political, religious,
legal and state-nationalistic power, where
majoritarian aspirations are linked to 'truth'
and 'freedom') operates with an explicit mandate
to maintain dominance and Hinduise non-Hindus and
other marginal and secular groups, including
Christians, Muslims, Adivasis and Dalits, with
the goal of creating a Hindu state in India. The
record of majoritarian group violence against
disenfranchised sections of society in India
poses a threat to internal peace and security.
These communal groups and their affiliates and
cadre often operate outside the purview of the
law.
The sangh parivar titles itself as an adjunct
and/or adversary to the state that offsets
governmental failure by dispensing 'morality' and
'progress' to citizens. The sangh's governance in
Orissa parallels that of the state and
collaborates with it. In the last decade,
violence against minority groups in Orissa has
included social and economic boycotts, forced
conversions, intimidation, murder, arson, rape,
looting and other extralegal actions. The sangh
uses local militarism (as in Kandhamal) as
consort to state controlled militarisation (as in
Kashipur, where in December 2000, three Adivasis
were killed in police firing, and Kalinganagar,
where in January 2006, 12 Adivasis and a
policeman were killed in police firing).
Hindu cultural dominance organises Hindu
nationalism. Orissa amalgamated as a
majoritarian/Hindu state between 1866 and 1936,
consolidating its position as the earliest
linguistic province. The absence of structural
reforms and assertion of Hindu elites defines
post-colonial governance. The sangh has
proliferated into 10,000-14,000 impacted villages
through sectarian relief work in the aftermath of
the 1999 cyclone that left 10,000 dead.
The sangh parivar seeks to build a cadre
comprised of Hindus, men and women, and targets
Christians, Muslims, Adivasis and Dalits and
other disenfranchised and progressive and secular
groups in Orissa. Orissa has a population of 36.8
million (Census 2001). Of this, 7,61,985 - 2.1
per cent - are Muslims. Orissa Christians number
8,97,861 - just 2.4 per cent of the state's
population per the census of 2001 (in 1991, it
was 2.1 per cent and in 1981, 1.7 per cent).
There are 6.08 million Dalits in Orissa, 16.5 per
cent of the population. Adivasis are 8.14 million
in number, 22.1 per cent of the population, the
largest among all states in India.
The sangh has amassed between 35 and 40 major
organisations with numerous branches (including
paramilitary hate camps) in 25 districts in
Orissa, with a massive base of a few million
operating at every level of society, ranging
from, and connecting, villages to cities, and
Orissa to the 'Hindu nation'. Conscription into
Hindu activism is coordinated through political
reform, propaganda/thought control, cultural and
religious interventions, developmental/social
service and charitable work, sectarian health
care, unionisation and revisionist education. The
sangh has inaugurated various trusts and branches
of national and international institutions in
Orissa to aid fund-raising, including the Friends
of Tribal Society, Samarpan Charitable Trust,
Sookruti, Yasodha Sadan and Odisha International
Centre.
The RSS operates 6,000 shakhas in Orissa with a
1,50,000+ cadre. RSS graduates take an oath
affirming allegiance to the RSS as national duty:
'I will devote my body, mind and money (tana,
mana, bhana) to the motherland.' The sangh also
hires paid operatives to undertake mob activity.
Led by the RSS, Vidya Bharati (known as Shiksha
Vikas Samiti in Orissa) directs 391 Saraswati
Shishu Mandir schools in Orissa, including in
Balangir, Kalahandi, Koraput, Malkangiri,
Nabarangpur, Nuapada, Kandhamal and Rayagada
districts, with 1,11,000 students preparing for
future leadership.
Training camps in Bhadrak and Behrampur aim at
Adivasi youth. Vanvasi Kalyan Ashram runs 1,534
projects and schools in 21 Adivasi concentrated
districts. The sangh has initiated 1,200 Ekal
Vidyalayas in 10 districts in Orissa to target
Adivasis. In March 2000, the Hindu nationalist
Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP)-Biju Janata Dal
(BJD) coalition came to power. In October 2002, a
Shiv Sena unit in Balasore district formed the
first Hindu 'suicide squad'. The Hindu Suraksha
Samiti organises against Muslims. Revolting
slogans, 'Mussalman ka ek hi sthan, Pakistan ya
Kabristan (For Muslims there is one place,
Pakistan or the grave)', perforate neighbourhoods.
Political economy
The sangh parivar's agenda is enabled by the
staggering inequities present in the state, where
severe social and institutionalised forms of
caste, class, gender and heterosexist oppressions
and caste, class, gendered and sexualised
violence are rampant. Unemployment is on the rise
in Orissa and abysmal daily wages prevail; 47.15
per cent of the total population lives in poverty
while 57 per cent of the rural population is poor
(87 per cent of the state's population lives in
villages currently and per the 2001 census, there
are 51,352 villages in Orissa). Among the Adivasi
population, 68.9 per cent are poor while 54.9 per
cent of Dalits live in need. Among the Muslim
population, 70 per cent are poor in Cuttack,
Jagatsinghpur and Puri districts, where they are
concentrated.
The female to male ratio is a problematic 972 per
1,000 in Orissa and the Human Rights Protection
Committee and the Orissa Crime Branch reported
that in the last decade (1990-1999) the state has
recorded a 460 per cent increase in dowry related
deaths relative to the previous decade.
In Orissa, about 2.5 hectares of irrigated
agricultural land is required for a family of
five to meet subsistence requirements while the
average family owns about 1.29 hectares. Women
seldom hold joint or individual title to land,
which debilitates their ability to independently
secure livelihood resources. Additionally, only
21 per cent of all land available for cultivation
is irrigated. The cyclone of 1999 and the
droughts of 2000 and 2003, the floods of 2001,
2003, 2005, 2006 and 2007, have presented
overwhelming challenges for the environmental and
economic well-being of the state.
In Orissa, efforts at land redistribution and
reforms have been insufficient and state and
bilateral development, anti-poor and
pro-corporatisation politics and practices and
the privatisation of resources and development
have systematically deprived the poor of rights
to decision making over livelihood and survival
resources, led to rampant displacement, police
brutality and even deaths and denied them their
customary rights to public resources such as
forests and water.
Recommendations for action in Kandhamal
In Kandhamal, Hindu militant groups, neighbours,
the police, the chief minister, the central
government, acted with egregious impunity. The
activities propagated by Lakshmanananda Saraswati
and his followers are of serious concern to the
health of society and prompt seditious,
anti-minority propaganda and hate actions. The
BJD-BJP coalition government in Orissa refuses to
honour the constitutional mandate to maintain the
separation of religion and state. Political
parties, focused on politicking the issue, are
ill-equipped to respond to immediate and
long-term needs of people. The communal situation
in the state remains at par with an emergency.
The Government of Orissa has failed to respond to
these issues and the serious concerns they pose
to democratic governance in the state.
The state government has halted individual relief
measures, stating that such action escalates
tensions in the area. Church leaders organised to
provide relief, which has been targeted as an act
of missionising. The police have been reticent to
act against Hindutva activists who mobilise Hindu
contingents in and around relief camps, or take
action against sectarian relief organised in the
'Hindu Relief Camp' in Karadavadi village in
adjacent Ganjam district. State-organised relief
and rehabilitation measures have discriminated
against the Christian community and not met local
needs.
The state government must provide adequate
short-term supplies to the families whose homes
have been destroyed. Compensation must match the
values of demolished homes and enable people to
rebuild and restock their dwellings. Surveys to
determine losses must be undertaken
collaboratively with local people, rather than
ethnocentric treatment of them as a hindrance to
the process, as 'thieves' intent on profiting
from the situation.
Initially, in response to queries, the Orissa
state government had claimed that as many as
4,000 trees may have been felled to allow for the
blockade of roads and breakdown in
communications. According to the forest
department, it appears that as few as 351 trees
may have been felled. This indicates negligence
on part of the state's ability to respond and
points to the frailties in communication and
infrastructure networks. Faced with this, the
government must undertake the necessary steps to
provide adequate security to the Christian
community in Kandhamal. The centre and civil
society groups must monitor such action.
The CBI must immediately investigate the
activities of the Bajrang Dal, VHP and RSS, and
apply, as appropriate, relevant provisions of the
Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967.
Section 2G of the act, 'unlawful association'
denotes: (1) 'that which has for its object any
unlawful activity, or which encourages or aids
persons to undertake any unlawful activity, or
through which the members undertake such
activity'; or (2) 'which has for its object any
activity which is punishable under Section 153A
or Section 153B of the Indian Penal Code 1860
([Central Act] 45 of 1860) or which encourages or
aids persons to undertake any such activity; or
of which the members undertake any such activity'.
The status, actions and finances of communal
groups and their affiliates and cadre, and the
actions of their membership must be identified
and investigated. These groups must be
investigated and monitored, and, as appropriate,
requisite action must be taken and sanctions be
imposed on their activities, and reparations be
made retroactively to the affected communities
and individuals.
Certain organisations, such as the VHP and
Vanvasi Kalyan Ashram, have been registered as
charity organisations. As their work appears to
be political in nature, they should be audited
and recognised as political organisations. A
serious concern is whether the activities of
these fall within the objectives of a trust;
whether in fact these organisations should have
been registered as social trusts given the nature
of their activities; whether the monies collected
are indeed used for the purposes for which they
were collected; and whether illegal and political
activities are being carried out in the name of
social work. Given these concerns, the charitable
status and the rights and privileges enjoyed by
these groups must be reviewed.
The right of individuals to undergo religious
conversions is constitutionally authorised,
unless under duress. Historically, conversions
from Hinduism to Christianity or Islam have
occurred for multiple reasons, such as being a
form of resistance among the elite and as a way
to escape caste oppression and social stigma for
Adivasis and Dalits. Societal or Hindu 'feelings'
about conversions to Christianity or Islam does
not render these conversions inappropriate,
invalid or illegal. It is only in circumstances
where conversions occur coercively or are
undertaken with the intent of mobilising a
culture of hate, as, for example, undertaken by
Hindutva activists, that conversions must be
disallowed.
It must be noted that 'reconversion' strategies
of the sangh parivar appear to be shifting in
Orissa. In Kandhamal, for example, public and
exhibitionist conversion ceremonies that
particularly targeted (primarily Dalit and
Adivasi) Christian community members and
non-Christian Adivasis, forcing them to submit to
Hinduism, have been fewer in number in 2007 than
between 2004 and 2006. Converting politicised
Adivasi and Dalit Christians to Hinduism is
proving difficult for the sangh parivar. The
outcry against such ceremonies from the Christian
community and certain human rights groups might
have influenced a shift. The sangh parivar has
instead increased its emphasis on the
Hinduisation of Adivasis by making them a part of
Hindu rituals and ceremonies (as during the
Sammelan) which, in effect, 'convert' Adivasis
into Hinduism by assuming that they are Hindu.
Such 'conversion' tactics are diffused and no
longer have to negotiate certain legalities which
public and stated conversion ceremonies did. On
converting/'reconverting' to Hinduism, Adivasis
are expected to join Hindu caste society as
Sudras, a 'higher' placement than Dalits in the
caste hierarchy, sangh activists say.
Dalit Christians are doubly discriminated
against, as Dalits and as Christians.
Post-Hinduisation, Adivasis are being mobilised
against Christian groups. Adivasis are incited
into targeting Dalit Christians, both fomenting
Adivasi-Dalit divides and vitiating the
historical solidarities between them. This is
crucial to Hinduisation. It also acts to warn
non-Christian Dalits against conversion to
Christianity.
The Hindutvaisation of the Hindu community, and
Hinduisation of the secular, allows the sangh's
escalation. This process unfolded in
Brahmanigaon, for example, where the growth of
the business community has supported the rise of
the sangh parivar. Hindutva conversions served to
terrorise the Adivasi and Dalit community, via
which the sangh parivar achieved its preliminary
expansionist goals. While ceremonial conversions
continue sporadically, a more protracted and
dispersed strategy of Hinduisation through
incorporation and assimilation is aggressively
pursued as effective methodology.
The Orissa Freedom of Religion Act, 1967 must be
repealed. Provisions for preventing and
prohibiting conversions that commence under
duress and coercion already exist under the
Indian Penal Code (IPC). There is no basis for
the existence of a separate law, especially one
that sets draconian parameters and has been used
by communalists to target and prohibit voluntary
conversion within minority, especially Christian,
communities. The Orissa Prevention of Cow
Slaughter Act, 1960 too should be repealed.
Provisions for preventing and prohibiting cruelty
to animals already exist under the Prevention of
Cruelty to Animals Act, 1960 and there is no
basis for the existence of a separate law,
especially one which is utilised to intervene on
the livelihood practices of economically
disenfranchised groups with detrimental effects,
such as among Adivasis, Dalits and Muslims, who
engage in cattle trade and cow slaughter.
Postscript
The Kandhamal riots story betrayal, indifference,
negligence - of nation, government, humanity,
disregard for law and order, gendered violence
enacted with impunity. 'Minorities' and other
disenfranchised are denied self-determination.
The state endows the 'victor', the hegemon named
'majority'.
The Kandhamal riots of 2007 barely registered in
the nation's memory. Muslims targeted in the
Bhadrak riots of 1991 still await justice in
Orissa. The history of state accountability in
preventing and administering justice in instances
of majoritarian violence is frail. The incapacity
of the Communal Violence (Prevention, Control and
Rehabilitation of Victims) Bill, 2005, introduced
in the Parliament of India in December 2005 and
approved by the union cabinet in March 2007,
attests to this. The bill, advocated by citizen
motivated efforts for the prevention of genocide
and crimes against humanity, in its official
formulation as introduced by the Congress
government, remained deficient in defining
procedures for state and public answerability. It
failed to address issues of negligence displayed
by state authorities in preventing and
controlling communal violence, and in disbursing
timely and just compensation and psychosocial
rehabilitation, as well as establishing
parameters for witness protection and for
soliciting and recording victim testimonies. It
failed to chart measures to bring justice and
accountability with regard to gender and
sex-based crimes in the event of communal
violence (which is not effectively addressed by
the IPC or separate legislation), and in imposing
checks and balances on the state and its police
and security forces, whose inertia and
majoritarianist complicity in communal collisions
have been consistent.
In 2003, Subash Chouhan, then state convenor of
the Bajrang Dal, had stated: "Orissa is the
second Hindu Rajya (to Gujarat). Whatever happens
here, say politics happens, it will have to be
Hindutva politics, with Hindutva's consent." In
December 2007, Narendra Modi, Gujarat chief
minister, in command over police and law
enforcement machinery and as such culpable for
the participation of the Gujarat government in
the genocide of 2,000 Muslims, was re-elected. On
December 31, 2007, Prasant, upper caste RSS
worker in Orissa, stated: "Gujarat remains the
guiding light for Hindutva and our conscience as
Hindus." Recent atrocities in Kandhamal confirm
his assertion.
(Angana Chatterji is associate professor of
Social and Cultural Anthropology at California
Institute of Integral Studies and author of the
forthcoming book, Violent Gods: Hindu Nationalism
in India's Present. Narratives from Orissa, Three
Essays Collective, 2008.)
Note:
Readers will notice certain statistical and other
discrepancies in the two reports on the violence
in Orissa's Kandhamal district. A possible
explanation for this is the time-lag between the
two pieces. The preliminary report by the
fact-finding team was brought out within days of
the violence whereas Angana Chatterji's piece was
written some weeks later.
Given the nature and inaccessibility of the
terrain as well as the current status quo in
Orissa, exact figures will probably not be
available until some time later.
______
[4]
INSAF Bulletin 70 February 2008
International South Asia Forum
www.insaf.net
IS GUJARAT DIFFERENT FROM THE REST OF INDIA?
by Daya Varma
The victory of the Narendra Modi-led BJP
(Bhartiya Janata Party) in the December 2007
Assembly elections in Gujarat has been analyzed
by various observers. These analyses fall into
two categories. According to one, the Congress
lost because of the spoiler role by Bahujan Samaj
Party (BSP) of Mayawati, its failure to project
its Chief Ministerial candidate and inner
squabbles. The second view is that Congress lost
because Gujarat is unique, that Modi benefited
from the 2002 carnage and his virulent Hindu
communalism and evoked Gujarat chauvinistic
sub-nationalism which Congress failed or chose
to not counteract. While the first view has been
highlighted by traditional politicians like Ram
Bilas Paswan, the second explanation has been
offered by progressive circles such as by Asghar
Ali Engineer, Praful Bidwai and Prakash Karat
(General Secretary of the Communist Party of
India-Marxist or CPM).
It is important to understand the reasons for
Modi's victory for that alone can provide
ammunition to prevent India becoming Gujarat.
While there is some substance in all these
explanations, there is more to the victory of
Modi and defeat of Congress than electoral
tactics and the unique nature of Gujarat within
the India.
In the current election, BJP polled 49.12% of
total votes against 38% by the Congress. The
combined percentage of Congress, BSP (2.62%) and
Nationalist Congress Party (1.05%) totals 41.67%,
well short of the votes polled by BJP. While it
is true that Congress could have won in many
places had BSP not fielded its candidate and may
even have formed a majority government if it had
contested Gujarat elections with BSP, the fact
remains that the percentage of the population
voting for Congress-BSP is far short of that
voting for BJP. The hypothetical formation of a
Congress-BSP government would have duplicated
the American paradox of a President being elected
with minority popular and majority electoral
votes. In any case, the issue is not merely the
defeat of the Congress but rather the support by
nearly one-half the electorate (and by
implication the population) of Gujarat for BJP
and its overall policy of Hindu Rashtra.
The challenges posed by Narendra Modi through his
virulent Hindu communalism, appeal to Gujarati
hubris via a chauvinistic sub-nationalism
masquerading as Gujarati asmita (self-respect),
and an authoritarian personality cult need to be
analyzed and understood. The accuracy of Asghar
Ali Engineer's argument that "(Modi) could not
have won 2002 election without organizing that
carnage nor the 2007 election could he have won
without it" cannot be verified. His contention
that it is unique to Gujarat needs more
justification. It is more likely that Modi won
because he could combine the 2002 carnage with a
projection of Gujarat as a modern prosperous
state. He could show that pride in Hinduism goes
hand-in-hand with progress. The fallacy in Modi's
claim that Gujarat is shining, as pointed out by
Bidwai, is of little consequence because people
do not expect everything to be ideal. Moreover
what matters to the middleclass seems to
overweigh what happens to the marginalized sectio!
ns as long as the latter is not an overwhelming fraction of the population.
How should one look at the 2002 Gujarat carnage?
Can it be reduced to the Godhra train fire
followed by the brutalization of the Muslim
community with direct complicity of Narendra Modi
as the Tehelka tapes prove? If so, obviously it
cannot be duplicated. However, it is not true
that the same thing cannot be repeated with some
variation elsewhere. Gujarat carnage cannot be
separated from the 1992 demolition of the Babri
Masjid nor from the ensuing attack on Muslims in
Mumbai and a string of other anti-Muslim violence
with or without the direct involvement of BJP.
What all these events do is mobilize the ordinary
Hindu citizens of all castes, Dalits and Adivasis
alike, as something distinct from and superior to
non-Hindus, especially Muslims who are more
numerous than Christians. This in turn leads to
their sectarian assertion in the Hindu ownership
of India.
Democracy in India has only reached the level of
an institution of political assertion, a method
of acquisition of political power. In all other
ways, Indian society is not democratic and it can
be witnessed day in and day out in the manner
Dalits, workers, marginalized sections and
minorities are treated. It remains a society
where it is acceptable with pride to not share
food with another citizen. Neither Muslims nor
Dalits observe this practice but OBC's and Hindus
above that caste ladder do. Therefore if
political power can be grabbed more easily by
invoking unity as proud Hindus against the
historic legacy of India "adulterated by
intruders" as the communalists claim, so much the
better. There are many Hindus who would not like
Muslims to be butchered but there are fewer who
are appalled when they are and even fewer still
who would make it a condition for rejecting BJP.
It would take a mammoth effort to transform
India into a democratic society even coming close
to bourgeois democratic society. Gandhi and
Congress were able to suppress the simmering
Hindu superiority but they needed such alternate
programs as India's independence movement. How
to do it in the absence of any such universally
accepted problem? The only alternative is to show
that a Hindu Rashtra is not only bad for Muslims
but for India and for Hindus as well.
Fundamentalism does not necessarily manifest as
hostility against people of different religion.
Indeed the main target of fundamentalism is the
majority community. The Taliban in Afghanistan,
for example, asked Hindu women to wear
identification marks because they did not wish
their "Hindu sisters" to be subjected to rules
applying to Muslim women. Why would not various
wings of Sangh Parivar harass Hindus who do not
abide by their codes?
Obviously this requires efforts on the part of
all secular formations, not only the Congress.
But this does not seem to be the preoccupation of
any other political party and left intellectuals
with the exception of the Communist Party of
India (CPI) and a few individuals like Asghar Ali
Engineer, Ram Punyani and a handful of NGOs like
Communalism Combat and ANHAD. Unfortunately CPI
is stuck with the belief that BJP would die of
its own internal squabbles. But no organization
dies of internal bickering because no
organization can be or has been free from it.
Throughout its history Congress had internal
squabbles but that did not prevent it from
becoming the major organized movement in India.
Internal squabbles within BJP are also not new
but have not weakened it. All other parties have
secularism tucked away in their statutes and
documents but not as a recurring theme in their
programs and activities; even CPM is guilty of
this omission. As far as some of the left
intellectua!
ls of India are concerned, their recent
preoccupations seem to indicate they would rather
see the demise of CPM than of BJP. After all
Gujarat elections did not come as a surprise. If
Congress is not taking Hindutva head on, what
prevented others from doing it?
What had kept RSS (Rashtriya Swayamsewak Sangh)
in oblivion from its founding in 1926 till the
independence of India in 1947? It was Gandhi, the
Congress, the power of independence movement and
CPI. Things have changed since and especially
since the mid-1970's, and more particularly
since the 1990's. One aspect of this is the
organizational weakening of Congress because of
the dynamic personality of Indira Gandhi. The
other is the lack of or rather a weak
comprehensive program of the Congress for the
"Aam Aadmi". The development strategy of India
has given rise to a significant well-to-do middle
class, who form the base of Hindutva. It is no
accident that BJP came to power in Delhi first.
Sooner rather than later the middleclass would
dominate the politics of other states. Even in
relatively poor states like Bihar which has
witnessed one of the fiercest peasant movements
first under the leadership of CPI and then the
Marxist-Leninists, the winner at present is the
Samata Party, the closest ally of BJP. The
movements for the creation of Jharkhand and
Uttarakhand were initiated by left parties but
has been ruled by BJP. The same thing happened
earlier to the Samyukta Maharashtra movement a
half-century ago which was spearheaded by the
left but whose beneficiaries were the upper and
middle peasant castes led by Congress.
Of course there was the 2002 pogrom against
Muslims in Gujarat and not in other states which
are ruled by or were ruled by BJP. But the 2002
pogrom was executed as a target of opportunity;
there is no evidence that it was pre-planned like
the recent attack on Christians in Orissa nor is
there evidence that it will be repeated.
Therefore identifying certain incidents, no
matter how horrendous, should not lead one to
conclude that India is any safer under BJP rule
elsewhere than it is in Gujarat. Singling out
Gujarat ignores the reality that BJP is in power
alone or with its allies in more states of India
than any other single party. It is prudent to
devise strategy to prevent continuing rule of BJP
in all Indian states and in Delhi than make
Gujarat a unique scenario, which it is not.
______
[5] http://www.s-asians-against-nukes.org/nagpurCNDPfeb08.html
NAGPUR DECLARATION
The Third National Convention of Coalition for Nuclear Disarmament and Peace
· Resist Indo-US Nuclear Deal!
· Free South Asia Of Nuclear Danger!
· Abolish Nuclear Weapons Worldwide Now!
· Resist Mindless Drive for Nuclear Power!
The Third National Convention of the Coalition
for Nuclear Disarmament and Peace (CNDP), India
is held from 1st to 3rd February 2008 in Nagpur,
which has a glorious tradition of mobilising for
peace and justice. The two earlier conventions
were held in Jaipur in 2004 November and in Delhi
four years earlier. It bears reiteration that the
CNDP was founded to consolidate the nationwide
protests conducted in response to the May 1998
nuclear weapon tests by India, and then Pakistan.
The CNDP opposes these tests and the acquisition
of nuclear weapons by any country including
India. It may be recalled that the era of nuclear
threat began with the mindless atomic bombings of
the cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki by the USA
on 6th and 9th August 1945.
We, the assembled delegates at the Convention
representing the peace movements in India and
coming from various corners of the country, most
emphatically reaffirm our firm conviction in
reaffirmation of the Jaipur Declaration and our
foundational Charter 2000:
"Nuclear weapons are means of mass destruction
regardless of who wields them. They are weapons
of genocide. They can impose horrendous suffering
on victims across generations. They destroy the
ecosystem. The damage they do is lasting and
incurable. The sheer scale and character of the
devastation they can cause makes them a profound
and distinctive evil. For this and other reasons,
the possession, use, or threat of use of nuclear
weapons is absolutely immoral." We also with
equal emphasis reemphasise "that the use, threat
of use, or possession of, and even preparation
for making, nuclear weapons is immoral, illegal,
and politically unacceptable under "any
circumstances"." Not only that, "nuclear
deterrence" is absolutely "abhorrent to human
sentiment since it implies that a state if
required to defend its own existence will act
with pitiless disregard for the consequences to
its own and its adversary's people."
We again note with great concern the profoundly
destabilising effects of the nuclear blasts in
May 98. These have been most graphically and
irrefutably demonstrated through an extremely
dangerous (undeclared) border war in less than a
year followed by a ten month long eyeball to
eyeball massive confrontation all along the
international border and the LoC. These
confrontations were laden with the very real
threats of nuclear exchange. Despite this
experience and much opposition from the peace
movements and civil society, the rulers of these
two resource-starved countries persist with their
pernicious nuclear weapons programmes, which are
a tragic diversion from addressing vital social
needs. Though there have been no further blasts
since 1998, in the teeth of massive waves of
international censure, the continuing flight
tests of the Agni and Hatf missiles show that the
race for developing nuclear warhead carrying
missiles goes on unabated.
The recent political turmoil in Pakistan has
graphically underscored the horrifying
possibilities of nuclearisation of South Asia
spearheaded by India's ugly ambitions.
Nevertheless, *the most dangerous development
since the last CNDP convention has been the
Indo-US Nuclear Deal, which is (still) in the
process of operationalisation. Starting with the
July 18 2005 joint statement issued by George
Bush -
Manmohan Singh in Washington DC, the process of
trying to fashion and complete a deal has
aggravated the nuclear danger both globally and
also regionally. It, on the one hand, severely
undermines the prospects of global nuclear
disarmament by (selectively and arbitrarily)
legitimising India's nuclear status and, in the
process, the possession of nuclear weapons by the
existing Nuclear Weapon States - both recognised
and unrecognised - and also the aspirations of
other actual and potential aspirants. On the
other, it would also further intensify the arms
race between India and Pakistan - both nuclear
and conventional. Pakistan, in fact, made a
strong plea for a similar deal. And the brusque
refusal by the US, instead of dissuading it,
would only further inflame its passions and
thereby turn the dangerous nuclear mess in South
Asia all the more dangerous. Furthermore, the
consequent shift in focus in favour of highly
expensive nuclear power, as and when and if at
all the deal comes into operation, will
significantly distort India's energy options at
the cost of efforts to develop environmentally
benign and renewable sources of energy. This deal
is also an utterly reprehensible move to bring
India closer to the US orbit as a regional ally
to facilitate the execution of its global
imperial ambitions.* **The CNDP remains
unwavering in its consistent and high-pitched
opposition to this deal.** With this deeply
disturbing background in mind, the Convention
further resolves as under:
I. Nuclear Weapons Free Region in South Asia
The CNDP, in active collaboration with other
peace movements in the South Asian region and the
Pakistan Peace Coalition in particular, will work
towards a Nuclear Weapons Free Region in South
Asia. It will also try to promote the idea of
Nepal as a 'nuclear weapon-free- nation' on the
lines of Mongolia and Austria to initiate and
reinforce move in that direction. CNDP will also
similarly work towards declaration of the whole
of erstwhile state of Kashmir, both under Indian
and Pakistani control, as a zone of peace.
This move is expected to provide a clear focus
and strong momentum to the peace movements in the
region and reinforce the forces of peace and
radically bring down the nuclear danger by
working on a concrete and workable action plan.
This is also expected to deeply affect the global
mindset and provide a strong, if not decisive,
push towards universal nuclear disarmament - our
central and abiding goal
A regional convention of the peace activists from
the region will be convened in the near future to
work out a collective charter.
II. Global Convention on Nuclear Disarmament
The CNDP, in tandem with the essence of Rajiv
Gandhi action plan for "A World Free of Nuclear
Weapons" - which was submitted to the United
Nations on June 9 1988, will work towards a
global disarmament convention, under the auspices
of the UN, in collaboration with global peace
movements towards this objective. The CNDP, in
this context, notes with serious concern the
total eclipse from the agenda of the UN of the
McCloy-Zorin accord on general and complete
Disarmament, which had been adopted by the United
nations General Assembly on December 20 1961.The
CNDP urges the UN to forthwith reinitiate action
on the same.
The projected global disarmament convention would
chart out a clear and unambiguous road-map
towards universal, complete and
non-discriminatory nuclear disarmament within a
defined time-frame. This would also enforce, in
the run up to the final goal, all nuclear weapon
states - declared and undeclared, immediately
commence on progressively lowering down the
operating statuses of their nuclear weapons,
continue with the moratorium on explosive nuclear
tests, freeze the programmes for developments of
upgraded nuclear warheads and delivery/intercepti
on systems, freeze production of fissile
materials, provide negative security assurance to
all non-nuclear states outside of any "nuclear
umbrella", credibly commit to "no-first-strike"
and such other measures in consonance with the
goal of nuclear disarmament.
The CNDP will proactively coordinate with various
sections of global anti-nuke peace movements and
unwaveringly work towards this goal.
III. Intensification of Struggles against
Ignoring Safety and Hazardous Impact of
Nuclear Power
The, yet to be operationalised, Indo-US nuclear
deal has radically fired up the fantasies of the
Indian nuclear establishment. Undeterred by its
appalling past performance in terms of power
production and also safety records, it is all set
to embark upon a very ambitious plan of setting
up mega nuclear plants dotting the entire coastal
belt criminally unmindful of severely traumatic
social and potentially disastrous ecological
impacts. The CNDP, in keeping with its consistent
track record and the mandates of its founding
Charter, will actively collaborate with the
grassroots people's movements, many of whom are
its constituent members, to resist such mindless
moves - singularly lacking in transparency and
accountability, and provide all necessary and
possible assistances in this regard.
IV. Demand for End of US Occupation of Iraq
and Afghanistan, Just Resolution of the Palestine
Issue to Ensure Global Peace and Facilitate
Nuclear Disarmament
The ugly ambitions of the US ruling elite to
establish its unilateral dominance over the whole
of the globe by foregrounding its awesome
military might, including its nuclear arsenal, to
compensate for the increasing inadequacies of its
otherwise huge diplomatic/politica l clout and
economic muscles has emerged as the most major
threat to the prospects of global nuclear
disarmament. The wars on and occupation of Iraq
and Afghanistan are vital components of this
grand project, also known as the Project for the
New American Century (PNAC). The continuing US
support for the apartheid Zionist regime of
Israel and its inhuman oppression of the
Palestinian people is just another facet of this
ugly venture.
Consistent with the goal of global nuclear
disarmament, the CNDP demands immediate
withdrawal of occupation forces from Iraq and
Afghanistan. The CNDP also solidarises with the
legitimate struggles of the Palestinian people.
The CNDP consequently commits itself to actively
associate, in all possible manners, with all
global, regional and local moves in these
directions.
V. Other Related Issues
The CNDP clearly recognises that the spurts in
national-chauvinist , majoritarian and militarist
ideologies and political practices under whatever
political banner, and the state at times playing
a role of an active facilitator, by their very
nature pose a major threat to anti-nuclear peace
movements in India.
The CNDP hence rededicates itself to fight all
these pernicious tendencies in all its
manifestations in collaboration with other forces
fighting for a just, peaceful and harmonious
order.
Consistent with its core values, the CNDP
reiterates its demand that Indo-Pak peace process
be accelerated. It also demands visa-free travel
facilities all over the SAARC region towards this
goal. It furthermore demands 10% progressive cuts
in the so-called "defence" budgets of all the
countries in the region. The CNDP commits itself
to ally itself with all regional efforts towards
these goals.
o o o
Third National Convention of CNDP Demands Release of Dr. Binayak Sen
http://www.freebinayaksen.org/?p=105
______
[6] Publication Announcements:
(i) Azad Reading Room announces the publication of:
ECOLOGY, ENVIRONMENT AND CAPITALISM
Essays in Understanding & Change
This publication brings to the reader essays by
Neil Smith (NY City, USA) and J. Martinez-Alier
(Barcelona, Spain) in ARR's Watan O Desh booklet
series. The publication includes an introduction
re. Environmental facts as well as a map
underscoring the worldwide inequalities generated
by the impact of corporate globalization policies
& programmes.
For info. And orders please contact AZAD READING ROOM
at: azadreadingroom2 at yahoo.com
umbi56 at rediffmail.com; Mobile Phone - 40 9346988639
BULK DISCOUNTS ARE AVAILABLE FOR 3 OR MORE COPIES
Local postage rates + packaging costs apply.
_____
(ii)
Marg Publications, India International Centre,
and Asia Society (India Centre) cordially invite
you to a panel discussion on Marg's latest
publication
INDIA'S POPULAR CULTURE
Iconic Spaces and Fluid Images
Edited by Jyotindra Jain
Venue: The Auditorium, IIC Annexe,
40 max Mueller Marg, New Delhi 10003
On Wednesday, February 06, 2007, at 6:30 pm
Panel:
JYOTINDRA JAIN (Professor at the School of Arts and Aesthetics, JNU, New Delhi)
SUMATHI RAMASWAMY (Professor of History at Duke University, North Carolina)
YOUSUF SAEED (Independent filmmaker and
researcher, also associated with Tasveer Ghar)
======
MARG REFLECTIONS (a discussion forum and an educational initiative)
www.marg-art.org
======
Contents of the book
Introduction: image mobility in India's popular culture.
Jyotindra Jain
Of Gods and Globes: the territorialization of Hindu deities in popular
visual culture.
Sumathi Ramaswamy
"The Accidental Ramdev": the spread of a popular culture
Christopher Pinney
Optics for the Stage: curtains of the Surabhi Company
Anuradha Kapur
India's Republic Day Parade: restoring identities, constructing the nation
Jyotindra Jain
Mecca versus the Local Shrine: the dilemma of orientation in the
popular religious art of Indian Muslims
Yousuf Saeed
The Bombay Film Poster: a short biography
Ranjani Mazumdar
The Family Archive: photo narratives from Goan villages
Savia Viegas
The Enclaved Gaze: exploring the visual culture of "world class
living" in urban India
Christiane Brosius
_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/
Buzz for secularism, on the dangers of fundamentalism(s), on
matters of peace and democratisation in South
Asia. SACW is an independent & non-profit
citizens wire service run since 1998 by South
Asia Citizens Web: www.sacw.net/
SACW archive is available at: http://insaf.net/pipermail/sacw_insaf.net/
DISCLAIMER: Opinions expressed in materials carried in the posts do not
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