SACW | Feb. 1-2, 2008 / Media Rights in Pakistan / Sri Lanka: More fighting

Harsh Kapoor aiindex at mnet.fr
Fri Feb 1 22:09:44 CST 2008


South Asia Citizens Wire | February 1-2, 2008 | 
Dispatch No. 2496 - Year 10 running

[1] Ending the downward spiral in Bangladesh (Irene Khan)
[2] Pakistan:
    (i) For Journalists in Pakistan, That's the Way It Is (Nicholas Schmidle)
    (ii) Cybercrime Law Infringes on Rights - Activists (Irfan Ahmed)
[3] Sri Lanka:  An agreement to fight some more (Jayadeva Uyangoda)
[4] India: How To 'Carve Out A Terrorist' from an 
Innocent Person And Say It Works? (Subhash Gatade)
[5] India: Salwa Judum PIL's  (Nandini Sundar)
[6] India: Third Front or Third Rail? (I.K.Shukla)
[7] India's Hindu Right and the Assassination of Gandhi:
   (i) Ambivalent views over Gandhi killer (Rajesh Joshi)
   (ii) Delving into Gandhi killer's mind |  Godse Cult
   (iii)  Anil Nauriya's Book Review of Lets Kill Gandhi
[8] India - Hindutva Flourishing in Orissa:
   (i) Sign On Online Petition re Protection of 
the Rights of the Christian Minorities in Orissa
   (ii) Orissa: Sangh Parivar demands ban and burns textbook
[9] Intellectuals concerned over Taslima Nasreen's health
[10] Announcements:
(i) Public Meeting: 'Ensuring participation of 
the public in making policy decisions' (New 
Delhi, 3 February 2008)
(ii) PIPFPD event: "Crisis of Democracy: 
Implications for Pakistan-India Peace Process" 
(New Delhi, 5 February 2008)

______


[1]   ENDING THE DOWNWARD SPIRAL IN BANGLADESH

23 January 2008

by Irene Khan, Secretary General of Amnesty International

As British Airways flight BA144 takes off from 
Zia International Airport in the darkness of the 
night, I look out of the window of the airplane 
and think of the metaphorical darkness from which 
the people of this country are seeking to escape.

For decades, Bangladesh has been caught in a 
downward spiral of corruption, insecurity, 
political violence and organized crime in which 
human rights and the rule of law have been the 
first casualties. Political leaders have shown 
more interest in abuse of power for personal 
gains than in poverty eradication. The powerful 
and the privileged have acted with impunity, with 
no fear of being called to account by weak and 
ineffective state institutions.

Repressive laws, including laws granting special 
or emergency powers, have been used and abused by 
successive governments. Police and other state 
officials have sided with the affluent and the 
influential, so that the most vulnerable - women, 
minorities, the poor and the marginalized - have 
been the least protected. 

The declaration of the state of emergency and the 
installation of a Caretaker Government (CTG) in 
January 2007 were desperate measures to save the 
country from ever-increasing levels of insecurity 
and political violence, further bloodshed and 
mayhem, and set on track free and fair elections 
for a democratic government.

During the Amnesty International visit to 
Bangladesh, journalists constantly asked if the 
human rights situation in 2007 was better than 
that in 2006. They were disappointed when I 
refused to give a simple "yes" or "no" answer. 
And so, sitting on the plane, I turn on my laptop 
in the hope of penning a more satisfactory 
response than I have given so far.

Of course there has been an improvement in 
physical security and a dramatic decline in human 
rights violations related to political violence 
in 2007 as compared to previous years. Government 
figures also show a fall in the number of 
extra-judicial killings by RAB and other security 
forces from 195 in 2006 to 93 in 2007.

These developments are welcome but it would be 
wrong to endorse them as indicators of 
improvement in the human rights situation without 
probing more deeply into what is being done - and 
what more needs to be done - to ensure that these 
positive trends will endure beyond the life of 
the CTG.

We need to analyse more carefully the quality of 
change being brought by the CTG to ensure that 
they are not merely cosmetic. And we need to ask 
- indeed demand - that the political parties will 
uphold human rights and the rule of law when they 
come to power so that what is being done now is 
not undone in the future. 

In a country where the state machinery - courts, 
police and military - not only fails to deliver 
justice and security but is often the instrument 
of persecution, institutional reform is necessary 
to convert perpetrators into protectors. The CTG 
must be commended for taking some much-needed, 
long-awaited reform measures but it needs to 
undertake or at least set in motion some other 
measures to ensure that the reforms are truly 
effective.

Guaranteeing the independence of the judiciary 
requires not only separation from the executive 
but also other measures to ensure proper 
recruitment, appointment and security of tenure 
of judges without political interference. A new 
Police Ordinance will not end police brutality 
and inefficiency unless it includes clear 
provisions for independent scrutiny and greater 
accountability, for instance through the 
establishment of an independent police complaints 
mechanism.

The National Human Rights Commission must be 
given real teeth to investigate and take action 
against all organs of the state, including the 
Joint Forces and RAB. The CTG must appoint 
individuals to the National Human Rights 
Commission who are not only competent and 
qualified but command such a high degree respect 
and credibility that no future government will 
dare to sideline or undermine their work.  

These institutional changes, if carried out 
properly, will make a real difference to the 
range of human rights violations, from police 
brutality to gender violence, that plague the 
lives of ordinary people.

There are two key factors that will determine the 
ultimate success or failure of the human rights 
reform agenda: first, the CTG's willingness to 
close its credibility gap on human rights, and 
second, the readiness of the main political 
parties to embrace the changes and commit 
themselves to upholding human rights and the rule 
of law. 

How can the CTG's initiative to separate the 
judiciary from the executive be taken as a true 
commitment to creating an independent judiciary 
when there is widespread perception that the same 
government is manipulating the criminal justice 
system to deliver some pre-ordained outcomes in 
high profile political cases?

When I stressed the need for the government to be 
seen to be respecting due process, the Chief 
Advisor responded that this government is using 
existing laws and existing courts. Surely, that 
is not a satisfactory answer when it is 
well-known that these same laws and courts have 
been subject to substantial political 
interference in the past and so open to the same 
level of interference now. A government committed 
to the rule of law must show scrupulous regard 
for due process. 

How can the government's commitment to freedom of 
information be taken seriously when overt and 
covert pressure is exerted on the media? The 
government was keen to point out to me that 
although the emergency rules impose far-reaching 
restrictions, they are not being enforced 
rigorously. So, why leave them hanging like 
Damocles' sword over the heads of media, creating 
uncertainty and encouraging self-censorship?

With such emergency regulations in existence, the 
chilling effect of a telephone call from a 
Directorate of General Forces Intelligence (DGFI) 
official to a TV station owner, or from the local 
RAB commander to a district correspondent should 
not be underestimated. Add to that a case like 
that of Jahangir Alam Akash, who claims to have 
been detained and tortured by RAB and charged in 
2007 with extortion allegedly committed in 2004, 
days after he reported an incident implicating 
local RAB officials in an attempted 
extra-judicial killing.

Democratic institutions cannot develop in a 
climate of self-censorship. A period of 
transition and change must be informed by a 
diversity of views. That is why the government 
must immediately lift the restrictions on freedom 
of expression, assembly and association, 
including restrictions on the media.

How can people have confidence in the CTG's drive 
to create a culture of transparency and 
accountability when the government has failed to 
be transparent and accountable about 
investigating reports of serious human rights 
violations by RAB and the Joint Forces? Torture 
allegations made by Rang Lai Mro, a prominent 
leader from  the Chittagong Hill Tracts remain 
uninvestigated, as do the allegations by Jahangir 
Alam Akash, or the death of Dulal in Bhola 
reportedly at the hands of the Navy.

After much adverse publicity, the government set 
up a one-man judicial commission to investigate 
the death of Cholesh Richil, a Garo leader, 
allegedly tortured by a Joint Forces unit in 
March 2007, but has so far failed to publish the 
report or open any criminal prosecution. I 
welcome the statement by the Chief Advisor that 
the NHRC should have the power to investigate 
human rights complaints against military and 
security officials, including RAB, in the future. 
But justice delayed is justice denied.

The Richil case cannot wait. Only by publishing 
the report of the judicial commission and by 
following it up with criminal investigation and 
prosecution in an open court of law can this 
government show that it is determined to end the 
culture of impunity that has hamstrung the rule 
of law in this country.

The past year has been marked by a creeping 
expansion of the role of the armed forces in 
activities that should rightly be carried out by 
a civilian administration, from law enforcement 
to electoral registration and investigation of 
extortion cases. I was told by the Army Chief 
that this is because of the lack of capacity and 
competency in the civilian administration. Be 
that as it may, principles of transparency and 
accountability, which lie at the core of human 
rights, require that all activities by the armed 
forces should be circumscribed by law and put 
under civilian scrutiny and accountability.

If the CTG has the courage to confront and close 
these credibility gaps, then it will go a long 
way in creating public confidence in the human 
rights reforms agenda that no future government 
will be able to undo. 
Turning now to the political parties, I fully 
agreed with the Chief Advisor when he said to me 
during our meeting that institutional change is a 
long term process and its success depends not 
only on the CTG but on the commitment of future 
governments.

That is why Amnesty International's 
recommendations on human rights reform are 
addressed not just to the CTG but also to 
political parties. That is why we asked all 
political parties represented in the previous 
parliament to meet with us, and the Awami League, 
one faction of the BNP (the other one led by 
Saifur Rahman did not return our call for a 
meeting) and Jamaat agreed to do so.

In these meetings, my colleagues emphasized our 
call for political parties to include a human 
rights agenda in their manifesto, and to support 
human rights reforms when they are in parliament. 
The test of the commitments which they declared 
to have for human rights will be in what they 
will say publically and will do in Parliament.

Regrettably, human rights have yet to enter the 
lexicon of political parties. They have little 
understanding about the relationship of human 
rights to democracy and good governance, and even 
less of their role as political leaders in 
upholding human rights and the rule of law. They 
are primarily preoccupied with protecting the 
human rights of their leaders who are feeling the 
brunt of the law.

They are yet to fully appreciate the irony that 
they themselves created and nurtured the laws, 
systems and practices of which they are now 
complaining. Now that they are at the receiving 
end of these repressive laws, policies and 
practices, let us hope that they will take more 
seriously Amnesty's oft-reiterated 
recommendations, including repeal of the Special 
Powers Act and the introduction of basic 
safeguards against torture and ill treatment of 
detainees.

Knowing the role that democratically elected 
governments played in the past in undermining the 
rule of law and human rights, civil society must 
be vigorous in demanding that political parties 
demonstrate a clear commitment to human rights. 
They must call on the political parties to set 
out their vision on human rights and to insert 
clear commitments in their electoral manifesto. 
In the run up to the elections, there is an 
opportunity to educate the political leaders on 
human rights as a means of good governance, and I 
believe the more astute and progressive leaders 
are ready to learn. 

So, the right question is not whether the human 
rights situation today is better or worse than 
last year. It is whether one should be more 
hopeful or less that this country will turn a 
corner on human rights.

And there I am optimistic. The public today is 
more aware of human rights than ever before. 
Civil society is more determined than ever to 
hold their political leaders to account. The call 
for democracy is not simply for free and fair 
elections but for a new style of governance that 
is transparent, accountable and responsive to the 
needs, demands and rights of the people.

I leave Bangladesh with a sense of hope, not 
because of what the CTG has done, or what 
political parties promise to do, nor even what 
civil society is determined to do,  but because 
of the growing realisation and determination of 
ordinary people to stand up for their rights.

The day labourers in my ancestral village in 
Sylhet, the women in the legal literacy projects 
in the village in Tangail, the fruit seller from 
whom I bought oranges on the street corner in 
Gulshan, the CNG driver who drove me to the 
market - they spoke to me frankly and simply with 
no sophisticated understanding of law or 
politics. But in their voices I heard the 
uncompromising demand for justice, equality and a 
decent life and livelihood for all. No 
government, caretaker or democratic, no leader, 
elected or unelected, can afford to ignore that 
call. 

The flight is about to land at Heathrow and I 
must turn off my laptop. But before I do that, I 
remember the words of the man guarding the door 
of the passenger terminal at Dhaka airport. As I 
entered the building with my luggage trolley, he 
recognised my face from TV and newspaper pages, 
and came running after me. "You have said what 
many of us want to say," he said. "We all want to 
see change in Bangladesh." Then, as I waved 
goodbye, he called out, "Apa, please do not 
forget us."

How can I ever forget people like him who give me 
hope that the struggle for human rights in 
Bangladesh will endure!


______


[2]   Pakistan

(i)

Washington Post

FOR JOURNALISTS IN PAKISTAN, THAT'S THE WAY IT IS

by Nicholas Schmidle
Sunday, February 3, 2008; Page

The police came for me on a cold, rainy Tuesday 
night last month. They stood in front of my home 
in Islamabad, four men with hoods pulled over 
their heads in the driving rain. The senior 
officer, a tall, clean-shaven man, and I 
recognized one another from recent protests and 
demonstrations. Awkwardly, almost apologetically, 
he handed me a notice ordering my immediate 
expulsion from Pakistan. Rain spilled off a 
nearby awning and fell loudly into puddles.

I asked, somewhat obtusely, what this meant. "I 
am here to take you to the airport," the officer 
shrugged. "Tonight."

The document he'd given me provided no 
explanation for my expulsion, but I immediately 
felt that there was some connection to the 
travels and reporting I had done for a story 
published two days earlier in the New York Times 
Magazine, about a dangerous new generation of 
Taliban in Pakistan. I had spent several months 
traveling throughout the troubled areas along the 
border with Afghanistan, including Quetta (in 
Baluchistan), and Dera Ismail Khan, Peshawar and 
Swat (all in the North-West Frontier Province). 
My visa listed no travel restrictions, and less 
than a week earlier, President Pervez Musharraf 
had sat before a roomful of foreign journalists 
in Islamabad and told them that they could go 
anywhere they wanted in Pakistan.

The truth, however, is that foreign journalists 
are barred from almost half the country; in most 
cases, their visas are restricted to three cities 
-- Islamabad, Lahore and Karachi. In Baluchistan 
province, which covers 44 percent of Pakistan and 
where ethnic nationalists are fighting a 
low-level insurgency, the government requires 
prior notification and approval if you want to 
travel anywhere outside the capital of Quetta. 
Such permission is rarely given. And the 
Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), where 
the pro-Taliban militants are strong, are 
completely off-limits. Musharraf's government 
says that journalists are kept out for their own 
security. But meanwhile, two conflicts go 
unreported in one of the world's most vital -- 
and misunderstood -- countries.

There's no doubt that journalists in Pakistan, 
and throughout Central and South Asia, face great 
risks. Nine Central and South Asian journalists 
were among the 65 newsmen and women worldwide -- 
more than in any other year in the past decade, 
according to the Committee to Protect Journalists 
-- who lost their lives while doing their jobs in 
2007. Five were Pakistanis. One died in FATA and 
one in the North-West Frontier Province, areas 
where the Taliban operate with increasing 
openness. Two others died in Taliban- or 
al-Qaeda-related violence, one during the Red 
Mosque siege in July and one in the terrorist 
attack on Benazir Bhutto's motorcade as she 
returned to Pakistan on Oct. 18, which left more 
than 140 dead.

Also in October, in the Kyrgyz city of Osh, a 
gunman using a silencer murdered Voice of America 
reporter Alisher Saipov, a good friend of mine 
and a fearless opponent of the regime in 
neighboring Uzbekistan. More recently, Taliban 
militants raided the exclusive and high-security 
Serena Hotel in Kabul, Afghanistan, one 
detonating himself in a suicide blast while the 
others combed the hallways, seeking and firing at 
targets; one Norwegian journalist died.

And yet throughout the region, journalism is 
considered perhaps the noblest profession around. 
In many of these countries, information is 
hoarded by corrupt, authoritarian leaders. Trying 
to expose it can be a liberating and empowering 
experience. That's why the state of the media 
there -- and the ability of foreign journalists 
to report what's going on -- should concern the 
West.

It's no secret that stifled societies often 
produce frustrated, angry youth. Pakistan, for 
example, is an amazing and fascinating country, 
filled with amazing and fascinating people, but 
every day, small numbers of young men and women 
there are brainwashed into thinking that the only 
answer to Musharraf's U.S.-backed regime is 
terrorism.

I moved to Pakistan in February 2006 on a 
research and writing fellowship. My wife left her 
job and joined me soon after. We had been married 
just three months; I convinced her that two years 
in Pakistan would be like a honeymoon that just 
wouldn't stop. We both learned to speak Urdu and 
embraced local customs (and clothes). She 
enrolled at the International Islamic University 
(the only non-Muslim American ever to do so), and 
I traveled extensively throughout the country. 
Pakistan became our home. Unhindered by deadlines 
and with a grasp of the language, I uncovered a 
side of Pakistan that few other foreign writers 
have been fortunate enough to experience.

My desire to explore regions and themes rarely 
addressed in mainstream media coverage took me to 
a number of areas often considered dangerous or 
hostile to Westerners. And yet I found the people 
there overwhelmingly hospitable -- and not at all 
scary. I soon learned how to assess -- and, to 
some extent, manage -- any potential hazards. I 
almost always traveled with a local journalist or 
two who knew the people, languages and customs 
far better than I ever could. Besides 
understanding which roads were safe to travel at 
night, they would also be aware that interviewing 
particular people might attract the unwanted 
attention of Pakistan's intelligence services, 
incuding the notorious ISI. When they advised, I 
listened.

Foreign writers in Baluchistan have always 
attracted the nervous attention of the 
intelligence services. A year ago, agents burst 
into the hotel room of a female New York Times 
correspondent and physically assaulted her. (She 
was reporting on the presence of top Taliban 
leaders in Quetta.) Another foreign journalist 
staying at the same hotel received a phone call 
threatening that unless he left Quetta 
immediately he would face the "consequences" like 
Daniel Pearl, the Wall Street Journal 
correspondent whom Islamic militants kidnapped 
and beheaded in January 2002.

Following my last visit to Baluchistan, in 
October 2006, intelligence goons stopped by my 
house on a regular basis for weeks, demanding to 
speak with me and asking my guard probing 
questions about my wife and me. The guard quietly 
shared these conversations with me out of earshot 
of my wife. I laughed about it with fellow 
writers and reporters, figuring that such visits 
were just the price of researching and reporting 
in Baluchistan.

But what makes Pakistan and the region an often 
hostile place for journalists is the difficulty 
of assessing the threat. While most fatalities 
last year occurred in random bombings and 
terrorist attacks, deadly incidents in years past 
remain shrouded in mystery. For instance, in 
December 2005, Hayatullah Khan, a journalist from 
North Waziristan, filed a story with photographs 
that gave evidence -- a piece of a U.S.-made 
Hellfire missile -- that the United States was 
conducting strikes against Taliban- and 
al-Qaeda-linked targets inside Pakistani 
territory. The photos were undoubtedly an 
embarrassment to the government, which had 
publicly insisted that U.S. military forays would 
not be allowed inside Pakistan.

Just a few weeks earlier, Khan had written a 
will, in which he stated, "If I am kidnapped or 
get killed, the government agencies will be 
responsible." The day after his story and the 
photos were published, gunmen ran his car off the 
road and kidnapped him. Six months later, his 
body was dumped in the bazaar in Miram Shah, the 
capital of North Waziristan.

A couple of weeks ago, a spokesman from the 
Information Ministry said that "the media in 
Pakistan is the freest ever in the history of the 
country." In many ways, he was correct; 
drawing-room columnists can be as critical as 
they wish to be. But opinion-writing shouldn't be 
confused with reporting. And every journalist 
working in Pakistan knows that crossing certain 
undefined lines can become a risky, often 
life-threatening endeavor. Pearl and Khan were 
both doing serious investigative work when they 
were kidnapped and killed.

Hamid Mir, one of Pakistan's most respected TV 
and print journalists, watched as his TV channel, 
GEO TV, and his talk show were pulled off the air 
after Musharraf imposed a state of emergency on 
Nov. 3. (On Jan. 21, GEO resumed broadcasting, 
albeit without Mir's show.) Mir recently e-mailed 
me: "Musharraf believes in removing people from 
the scene. . . . He cannot remove us from 
history."

Journalism, as the cliche goes, is the "first 
rough draft of history." If that's the case, then 
Pakistan's history is suffering.

On that wet Tuesday night, I finally connected by 
phone with an influential friend, who placed a 
couple of calls and made the cops go home. But it 
was obvious that my wife and I were no longer 
welcome in Pakistan. My mobile phone had been 
tapped for weeks. For the first time in two 
years, I feared for our safety. The next morning, 
we bought two one-way tickets back to the States. 
Within two days, we had pawned off out cat and 
packed or sold the rest of our belongings.

On our last night in Islamabad, a half-dozen 
expatriate friends came over to send us off -- 
and help drink the rest of our wine. Yet saying 
goodbye to our expat friends wasn't nearly as 
emotional as saying goodbye to our Pakistani 
friends and those who had done everything to 
protect us in those final hours.

The day after my story about the Taliban 
appeared, our guard, a gruff, bearded man from 
the North-West Frontier Province, had rebuffed 
the ISI inspector who'd arrived on a motorcycle 
and demanded to be allowed inside to conduct an 
investigation. A former ISI commando himself, the 
guard apparently told the inspector that he would 
never get past him and be allowed inside our 
house. Hugging this man on our last morning, as 
tears streamed down his face, was more difficult 
than bidding my family farewell back in February 
2006 had been. Honestly, I don't know when I'll 
see him -- or Pakistan -- again. I miss them both 
already.

nickschmidle at yahoo.com

Nicholas Schmidle, a Pakistan-based fellow with 
the Institute of Current World Affairs from 2006 
to 2008, is writing a book about Pakistan today.

o o o

(ii)

Inter Press Service

CYBERCRIME LAW INFRINGES ON RIGHTS - ACTIVISTS

by Irfan Ahmed

ISLAMABAD, Jan 23 (IPS) - An ordinance introduced 
this month to curb electronic crime has come 
under criticism for clauses that seem to be aimed 
at censoring free speech and cutting civil 
liberties.

Promulgated on Jan.10 by the caretaker government 
of President Pervez Musharraf, the Electronic 
Crime Ordinance - 2007 encompasses 18 different 
offences that carry punishment ranging from a 
couple of months' imprisonment and fines to life 
imprisonment and even the death penalty.

The government claims that the main objective of 
this law is to increase security, safety and 
protection for those segments of society that use 
or deal with information technology (IT). But 
many believe that in reality the law will be used 
to crack down on free expression on the Internet 
because it prohibits the use of Internet and cell 
phones to criticise authorities or send out calls 
for rallies.

Blog sites and short messaging services (SMSs) 
were used extensively by Pakistanis inside the 
country and abroad to condemn the imposition of a 
state of emergency, gagging of independent media 
and other 'unconstitutional' acts of the 
Musharraf government. Their use increased 
exponentially after the government imposed 
restrictions on electronic channels through 
certain amendments in the Pakistan Electronic 
Media Regulatory Authority Ordinance in June.

The new ordinance has been criticised by human 
rights bodies, business community and citizen 
groups as a piece of legislation that has too 
many loopholes for misuse.

In a statement, the South Asian Free Media 
Association (SAFMA) said that ''against the 
backdrop of the use of Internet and cell phones 
to criticise authorities or send calls for 
rallies, the ordinance is liable to be 
interpreted as a drastic measure aimed at putting 
curbs on civil rights.''

SAFMA asked that the law not be used to obstruct 
freedom of information and said that the way 
ordinance defines cyber crime and 'terroristic 
intent' allows it to be grossly misused.

Cyber terrorism has been defined by the ordinance 
thus: ''Any person, group or organisation who, 
with terroristic intent utilises, accesses or 
causes to be accessed a computer or computer 
network or electronic system or electronic device 
or by any available means, and thereby knowingly 
engages in or attempts to engage in a terroristic 
act commits the offense of cyber terrorism.''

The ordinance also declares the sending of 
unsolicited short messages over cell phones 
(SMSs), pictures taken without the permission of 
the person photographed, and e-mails carrying 
obscene material as cyber crimes.

Jehan Ara, president of Pakistan Software Houses' 
Association, told IPS that the law had been 
drafted without consulting the stakeholders and 
does little good to the industry. She says the 
law does not adhere to the principles or 
definitions of Cyber Crime Convention (Budapest, 
2001) which has been signed by 42 countries.

She said Pakistan could have signed the Budapest 
convention instead of coming out with an 
ordinance which is full of errors, ambiguities 
and socio-cultural influences. The law, she says, 
allows investigating officers to take control of 
computer networks and data without any chain of 
custody. This means the data under the control of 
the investigators can be corrupted, deleted or 
amended by them. In short, no provision is made 
to preserve the integrity of the data involved.

The law gives officers of the Federal 
Investigation Authority (FIA) full powers to 
confiscate equipment and arrest anyone who is 
deemed by the government to be acting against the 
'integrity of Pakistan' or having terroristic 
intent, says Asif Bhatti, a software engineer 
based in Lahore. Bhatti pointed out that the law 
contains words like 'lewd', 'obscene' and 
'immoral' which are not legal terms, and are 
highly subjective. This gives the prosecuting 
authorities a chance to use their discretion and 
declare anything immoral or obscene, he added.

The Paris-based Reporters Without Borders (RSF) 
has also condemned the ordinance. In a letter 
written to Pakistan's ministry of information and 
technology, the media watchdog says: "This law 
prevents any blogger from posting photos or video 
showing persons who have not given their 
consent... Pakistan has understood its right to 
give itself a law for fighting cyber crime, but 
it is vital that this law should not obstruct 
freedom of information."

RSF has also urged the government to ''clarify 
the content of some of the provisions that we 
think are dangerous. With just one month to go to 
legislative elections, some of the articles of 
this law look like censorship.''

The organisation also condemns the clause under 
which a service provider is required to retain 
its traffic data for a period of 90 days or more 
and make it available to investigating agencies 
when required. "This gives the authorities 
control over Internet users' data and our 
organisation fears that this provision could be 
abused," RSF said.

Zia Islam, who works for FIA's cyber crime unit, 
told IPS the allegation that the ordinance does 
not grant the suspects the right to defend 
themselves is not true. "There may be some 
ambiguities but we hope that they will be removed 
with the passage of time."

Zia said that all the offences mentioned by the 
ordinance, except three, are compoundable, 
non-cognisable and bailable. The non-bailable 
crimes are those which are serious enough to 
merit punishments of seven years in prison or 
more.

According to Zia, in order to make arrests 
against non-cognisable crimes the law enforcing 
authorities will have to secure warrants 
beforehand. But in cases of electronic fraud, 
forgery and cyber terrorism summary arrests can 
be made.

Cyber terrorism, Zia said, is not a new concept 
as terrorists have been using this means of 
communication to accomplish their goals. For 
example, those found involved in the February 
2002 murder of Wall Street Journal reporter 
Daniel Pearl, in Pakistan's port city Karachi, 
communicated with each other over e-mail, he said.

Many believe that the ordinance was prompted by a 
spate of jokes over e-mail and SMS that ridiculed 
President Musharraf.

(END/2008)


______



[3]

Himal
February 2008

AN AGREEMENT TO FIGHT SOME MORE

With the formal abrogation of the Ceasefire 
Agreement by the Colombo government, the conflict 
in Sri Lanka is headed for a decisive phase. And 
it will be bloody.

by  Jayadeva Uyangoda

Sri Lanka's descent into a sorry state of war has 
not been a source of great concern within the 
country. Indeed, many outsiders are more worried 
than Sri Lankans themselves about the inevitably 
destructive consequences of the intensifying war. 
Outside observers have been warning that there is 
no military solution to the ethnic conflict, that 
the war will produce only losers, and that an 
escalation will only further intensify the 
deepening humanitarian crisis. But within Sri 
Lanka, many, including both the government and 
the LTTE, seem to view the war as an inescapable 
reality. How does one explain this puzzle?

The troubled story of the Ceasefire Agreement 
(CFA) at least partly captures some crucial 
dimensions of the conundrum of Sri Lanka's ethnic 
conflict and multiple failed peace processes. The 
CFA came into effect in February 2002 when Prime 
Minister Ranil Wickramasinghe, of the United 
National Front (UNF) government, and LTTE leader 
Velupillai Prabhakaran signed the document as a 
prelude to direct peace negotiations. Both the 
CFA and subsequent negotiations were facilitated 
by representatives of the Norwegian government, 
who subsequently acted as representatives of the 
so-called international community. The signing of 
the CFA was followed by six rounds of direct 
talks between the government and the LTTE, all of 
which were held outside Sri Lanka.

A notable development in the negotiation process 
was the understanding, reached in Oslo in 
December 2002, to explore a federal solution to 
the ethnic conflict. But the progress of 
negotiations did not go beyond the Oslo 
understanding, which the LTTE later disowned. The 
talks reached a crisis point in April 2003, when 
the LTTE 'suspended' its participation in the 
negotiation process itself, alleging that the UNF 
government was not committed to implementing 
decisions taken at the negotiation table. Neither 
the pressure from the international community, 
nor the massive tsunami disaster of December 
2003, could revive Sri Lanka's stalled peace 
process.

Relapse and polarisation
The gradual relapse into war began with 
violations of the CFA. While the LTTE was blamed 
by international monitors for most of the direct 
violations, such as smuggling weapons and killing 
military intelligence operatives, the Colombo 
government also contributed by not implementing 
some of the major commitments made in the CFA. 
The continual refusal by the government to vacate 
villages in Jaffna District that had been brought 
under military-maintained high-security zones was 
a prominent case in point.

Rather than be enmeshed in the blame game of 
apportioning responsibility for ceasefire 
violations, an observer can gain good perspective 
on some of the larger dimensions of Sri Lanka's 
conflict by looking through the prism of the 
actual politics of the ceasefire and related 
negotiations. The CFA was originally meant to 
provide the ground conditions of de-escalation, 
as well as a framework for political engagement 
between the state and the LTTE. While at the time 
Colombo was willing to consider an advanced form 
of devolution as a framework for a constitutional 
settlement, the LTTE, which was advancing the 
interests of a state-seeking ethnic minority, was 
also exploring acceptable alternatives to 
secession.

Addressing the need to fill the gap between these 
two visions constituted the fundamental challenge 
in the negotiations of 2002. Indeed, any success 
was to depend on the capacity of the two sides to 
work out a compromise that could go beyond 
ordinary devolution, but which could also fall 
short of outright separation. With the advantage 
of hindsight, one can now say that, by 2002-03, 
the conflict had not yet reached a point at which 
such a huge compromise could have been considered 
possible, or even feasible.

Equally important was the fact that the CFA and 
the negotiation process - albeit unintentionally 
- polarised the Sri Lankan polity into two camps: 
those for and those against the agreement. This 
situation was very similar to the polarisation 
that took place following the 1987 Indo-Lanka 
Peace Accord. In a deeply divided and fragmented 
polity, a decisive move towards altering the 
trajectory of the conflict could only sharpen 
existing contradictions.

This polarisation was felt most dramatically in 
the Sinhala polity. The fact that governmental 
power had been fractured into two antagonistic 
camps, one represented by President Chandrika 
Kumaratunga and her People's Alliance, and the 
other represented by Prime Minister 
Wickramasinghe and his UNF. The agenda of the 
People's Alliance, of toppling the UNF regime, 
found an easy platform in opposition to both the 
CFA and the UNF-LTTE negotiations that had not 
produced a peace agreement as such. The People's 
Alliance and its Sinhalese nationalist allies 
appealed to the insecurities of the Sinhala and 
Muslim masses, on the argument that the CFA 
provided undue legitimacy to the LTTE, thereby 
endangering their safety and security as well as 
the country's sovereignty and territorial 
integrity.

Ultimately, the obstacles to the agreement were 
significant. The less-than-enthusiastic 
commitment of the UNP leadership to a tangible 
outcome of the peace process; the arrogance and 
intransigence of the LTTE in violating the CFA; 
and the short-sighted policies of the 
international custodians of the peace process, 
who tried out a 'neo-liberal' peace-building 
strategy that pushed an agenda of economic 
liberalisation, along with a minimalist programme 
of democratisation - all of these eventually came 
together to create a situation in which political 
conditions necessary for the sustainability of 
the peace process became less and less viable. 
The moral of this part of the story quickly 
became clear: that an incomplete peace initiative 
can re-polarise the polity, sharpen its 
contradictions, and make the peace initiative 
itself a victim of those very contradictions.

The incomplete revolution
This takes us to another peculiar aspect of Sri 
Lanka's conflict. Every failed (or partially 
successful) attempt at restoring peace by 
non-military means has eventually led to a return 
to war with fiercer intensity. In other words, 
the ethnic conflict has demonstrated a peculiar 
capacity to reproduce and sustain itself, not 
because there were no peace initiatives, but 
because there have been peace initiatives that 
have not led to the termination of the civil war 
and a settlement agreement. Indeed, the 
intractable conflict in Sri Lanka is, on a very 
real level, propelled by unfinished peace 
efforts: as an incomplete revolution digs its own 
grave, the incomplete peace process inevitably 
becomes its own negation.

The CFA has many critics, particularly in Sri 
Lanka and India, and many of their arguments are 
quite compelling. From the beginning they saw the 
CFA as having given the LTTE unwarranted 
political legitimacy on the LTTE's own terms, 
because the CFA institutionalised the LTTE's 
claim to a parity of status based on a military 
balance of power. The CFA also formally 
recognised that there were territories controlled 
by the LTTE in the Northern and Eastern 
provinces. In a way, this accepted a ground 
reality that no other political party in Sri 
Lanka would dare to accede.

In fact, the LTTE also made the point that it 
accepted the CFA as the basis for negotiations 
because, in their reading, the CFA gave 
expression to a strategic equilibrium achieved by 
military means. The UNF government did not 
contradict the LTTE's claim to parity. On a 
related point, many of those who would advocate 
for a negotiated solution would want Colombo to 
define the terms and scope of the settlement from 
a position of military strength and asymmetry of 
power. But the notion of strategic parity went 
against this proposition. Therefore, undermining 
the CFA and the negotiation process of 2002-03 
was seen by many political and ideological groups 
in Sri Lanka as not only necessary, but also a 
just objective.

The fact that the Colombo ruling class continued 
to remain fragmented and unable to work on the 
basis of a broad consensus on key policy 
challenges further contributed to the narrowing 
down of the political space within which the CFA 
needed to exist. It is useful to recall that when 
Prime Minister Wickramasinghe signed the CFA in 
February 2002, he did not consult the other 
powerful faction of the ruling class, led by 
President Kumaratunga. Wickramasinghe's strategy 
was to make peace with the LTTE on the basis of 
negotiations between two parties: his government 
and the LTTE. But, as prime minister, he only 
represented half of the Sinhala establishment. As 
had also happened previously, the other half was, 
in the meanwhile, waiting for an opportunity to 
undermine the peace bid.

This is where the two factions of the politically 
bifurcated Sinhala ruling class once again 
demonstrated how its disunity could derail 
opportunities for resolution of the ethnic 
conflict. Backed by the extreme Sinhala 
nationalist forces, President Kumaratunga 
dismissed the UNF government in late 2003 on the 
argument that both the CFA and the LTTE's 
proposals for an Interim Self Governing Authority 
posed a threat to the country's national security 
and state sovereignty. After the LTTE's 
unilateral withdrawal from peace talks in April 
2003, this was the second stage in the trajectory 
that saw the disintegration of the CFA and 
negotiation process of 2002.

By mid-2004, following the regime change after 
the parliamentary elections, Colombo had been 
slowly moving in the direction of resuming the 
war. The new regime of the United People's 
Freedom Alliance (UPFA), led by President 
Kumaratunga, was mainly a coalition of Sinhala 
nationalist forces committed to undoing what they 
saw as the 'damage' done by the UNF government 
and the internationals, particularly Norway. 
Continuing violations of the CFA, particularly by 
the LTTE, led to the clamour for its abrogation, 
especially among UPFA'a extreme nationalist 
partners.

The LTTE's August 2005 assassination of Foreign 
Minister Lakshman Kadirgamar, who had earlier led 
a successful international campaign to ban the 
Tigers in a number of countries as a 'terrorist' 
entity, further added to the demand for the 
annulment of the CFA. But President Kumaratunga, 
now heading her own government, exercised 
significant caution in her approach to both the 
CFA and the LTTE. She renewed calls for the 
return to negotiations, while the international 
community (notably the European Union, the United 
States and Japan) tried both threats and 
diplomacy to persuade the LTTE to resume peace 
talks. All met with failure. Towards the end of 
2004, there was speculation that the LTTE was 
making preparations for an offensive, in an 
attempt to alter the balance of power with the 
Sri Lankan Army, as a prelude to returning to 
talks from a new position of military strength.

Lanka no Aceh
The tsunami of December 2004 significantly 
altered the course of Sri Lanka's conflict, 
during a year in which the country had seemed to 
be moving in the direction of outright war. The 
tsunami devastated vast stretches of coastal 
areas inhabited by Sinhala, Tamil and Muslim 
communities, but some of the worst-hit 
communities were in the LTTE-controlled areas of 
the Northern and Eastern provinces. The disaster 
and accompanying humanitarian tragedy seems to 
have changed the LTTE's decision to resume armed 
hostilities. More importantly, the situation 
opened up a new opportunity for the UPFA 
government and the LTTE to work together in 
humanitarian assistance - and subsequently to use 
that space to resume political engagement.

The two sides did restart dialogue, and in July 
2005 even signed an agreement to set up a joint 
administrative mechanism called the Post-Tsunami 
Operational Mechanism (PTOM). But this attempt 
fell victim to the opposition mounted by the 
newly mobilised Sinhala nationalists, led 
particularly by the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna 
(JVP), which opposed any resumption of political 
engagement with the LTTE. The JVP, a powerful 
member of the UPFA coalition with 39 members in 
Parliament, filed a petition before the Supreme 
Court that the PTOM agreement violated Sri 
Lanka's Constitution. The Supreme Court upheld 
some of the JVP objections, thereby effectively 
nullifying the new institutional mechanism 
formulated for the government and the LTTE to 
work together, at the very least on humanitarian 
issues. In contrast, across the ocean to the 
east, the Indonesian government and the rebels in 
Aceh were able to successfully use the 
humanitarian space opened up by the 2004 tsunami 
to work towards a peace agreement - one that 
still holds today.

If 2005 was a missed opportunity for the 
resumption of the peace process, 2006 marked the 
momentum in a new trajectory towards the 
resumption of war. The election of President 
Mahinda Rajapakse in November 2005 was a crucial 
turning point. Rajapakse won the election due to 
two main factors: backing by the extreme Sinhala 
nationalist forces, and the election boycott 
imposed on the Tamil voters in the Northern 
Province by the LTTE. After the leadership of the 
Sri Lanka Freedom Party did not back him, 
Rajapakse had been forced to establish a firm 
ideological and political alliance with two 
extreme Sinhala nationalist parties, the JVP and 
the Jathika Hela Urumaya (JHU), with whose 
support he ran an election campaign that was 
marked by an essentially Sinhala Buddhist 
nationalist agenda. Rajapakse won a narrow 
victory over the UNP's Wickramasinghe, who had 
run on a platform of returning to negotiations 
for a federalist political solution to the ethnic 
conflict. It was during 2006 that the new 
administration of Rajapakse and the LTTE began 
their 'undeclared war'.

Why did the LTTE leadership indirectly help 
Rajapakse to win the election over 
Wickramasinghe, for whom a vast majority of 
Tamils would have voted in the absence of the 
enforced boycott? The simple answer is that the 
LTTE wanted a new phase of polarisation and 
sharpening of contradictions between the Sri 
Lankan state and the Tamil polity. Unfortunately, 
the events of 2006 and 2007 served the LTTE's 
strategic objective to a considerable measure.

In early 2006, President Rajapakse's new 
administration and the LTTE decided to come back 
to the negotiating table, and their 
representatives met twice in Geneva. In the first 
round of talks, in February 2006, they agreed to 
'fully implement' the CFA, which at that time was 
under severe stress in the Eastern province due 
to a mini war between the mainstream LTTE and its 
breakaway group, led by Karuna Amman. The 
violations of the CFA during most of 2005 and 
2006 occurred in the course of this internecine 
conflict, during which the LTTE attempted to 
invoke the clauses of the CFA that vested Colombo 
with the responsibility of disarming paramilitary 
groups. In fact, the split that took place when 
Karuna broke away from the LTTE in early 2004 was 
a crucial factor in pushing the ceasefire into a 
major crisis, and the Sri Lankan Army seized the 
opportunity to back the Karuna faction. As 
eventually became clear, the Geneva talks were 
actually a blatant smokescreen, as both parties 
seemed intent on preparing for war.

For political reasons, neither side wanted to 
formally withdraw from the CFA, though 2007 still 
became a year of war between the two sides. The 
conflict was considered 'undeclared' due to one 
of the CFA's provisions, Clause 4.4, which 
stipulated that either party could withdraw from 
the CFA only after giving a specified notice to 
the Norwegian government. The 'high point' of 
this undeclared war was the military's early-2007 
capture of the LTTE-held territory in the Eastern 
province. A series of battles over several months 
resulted in large-scale civilian displacement, 
the deaths of many combatants on both sides, the 
murders of humanitarian aid workers and serious 
human-rights violations. Indeed, with the 
escalating war, both humanitarian and 
human-rights issues emerged as topics of 
immediate concern. In fact, throughout 2007 both 
the government and the LTTE treated the CFA with 
scant regard.

Life after the CFA
It is in this context that many in Colombo have 
welcomed President Rajapakse's decision, in early 
January 2008, to abrogate the CFA. The epithets 
used in the reactions are telling. For some who 
welcomed the decision, the 'stinking corpse' of 
the CFA has at last been buried; for others, the 
CFA has long been a mere a piece of fiction, 
anyway. For yet others, 'national pride' has been 
restored. In Sinhala society, including among 
political groups opposed to UNF-LTTE 
negotiations, the absence of the CFA now paves 
the way for the military defeat of the LTTE. 
Perhaps for this reason, the LTTE's subsequent 
statement, that it remained committed to the full 
implementation of the CFA, was met with a 
contemptuous response by Colombo officials. And 
indeed, the LTTE's new love for the CFA needs to 
be seen only as a political ploy to justify its 
own military plans.

The empty rhetoric and past experience aside, 
life in Sri Lanka without the CFA is going to be 
very difficult. Despite the fact that it has been 
subjected to repeated violations by both the 
government and the LTTE, the existence of the CFA 
and the presence of the Sri Lanka Monitoring 
Mission in the conflict areas provided at least a 
minimum assurance that the war would not descend 
to the level of outright barbarism. In post-CFA 
Sri Lanka, however, there is now no such external 
check on the warring parties.

This tells us something unique about Sri Lanka's 
ethnic conflict, as it is being enacted jointly 
by the Rajapakse regime and the LTTE. Both 
parties have managed to establish a distinct 
measure of relative autonomy from the 
international actors, in their decision-making 
processes and actions with regard to the 
conflict. The 2002 peace process 
internationalised the conflict and its resolution 
process to an unprecedented degree, symbolised by 
the CFA. Both President Rajapakse and V 
Prabhakaran have claimed this level of 
internationalisation 'excessive'.

With the umbilical cord between Sri Lanka's 
conflict-management process and the international 
community, in the form of the CFA, having been 
severed, both parties are now relatively free to 
conduct the war in the way they feel suitable, 
with no external pressures regarding human rights 
or humanitarian consequences. In the coming 
months, the conflict will become a war without 
checks or balances, a war without inhibition.


______


[4]

HOW TO 'CARVE OUT A TERRORIST' FROM AN INNOCENT PERSON AND SAY IT WORKS?

by Subhash Gatade


         (Judge: The papers on my table show he is 
not Mukhtar. So what is his real name?

         Officer: He is actually Aftab Alam Ansari.

         Judge: That means you have arrested a 
wrong person. How can this horrible blunder take 
place?

         The officer stayed silent.

         Judge: If he is neither Mukhtar nor Raju, 
why did not you write that in the petition 
clearly? Have you written that? Please underline 
that and show it to me.

         As the officer began scanning the petition, he looked puzzled.

         Judge: I'm not going to accept this 
petition. Please go and make a fresh one.)

Aftab Alam Ansari, an electrician with a power 
company in Kolkatta, is finally free. And the 
ordeal through which he had to go through as a 
'terrorist' is finally over.Recenly he met with 
the Chief Minister of Bengal to apprise him of 
the whole situation and seek help for his 
mother's frailing health.

It is now history how he was arrested from 
Baranagar in Kolkatta on 27 th November with 
Bengal police's help supposedly for 'ferrying the 
entire cache of explosives for the November 
blasts in UP'.

It is now revealed that the Special Task Force of 
the UP Police had been set on Aftab's trail by a 
claim by two arrested militants - Mohamad Khalid 
and Tariq Quazmi - that the mastermind of the 
court blasts in the state called himself Aftab as 
well as Mukhtar, Raju and Bangladeshi. The duo 
however, had mentioned no middle name or surname.

Though Aftab is now free, Ayesha Begum - Aftab's 
mother has other worries staring in her eyes. 
Whether they would be able to live a normal life 
and would ever be able to get out of the 'stigma' 
attached to the whole operation and Aftab's brief 
sojourn in Jail.

It is now clear that Aftab's arrest by the 
overenthusistic UP STF was a case of mistaken 
identity as he also hailed from Gorakhpur like 
the ringleader of the November blast and also 
shared his nickname 'Mukhtar'.

But now that Aftab, a innocent citizen of this 
country is free at last, will it be OK to say 
that the tragedy which befell Aftab would be the 
last one of its kind. And henceforth no Aftab 
living on this part of the earth would ever be 
traumatised in a similar manner. Looking at the 
track record of the Indian police and the bigotry 
and sectarianism of the powers that be it would 
be dishonesty to make any such grand claim.

In fact the day the news of Aftab's freedom in 
jail appeared, one came across the strictures 
passed by the Maharashtra high court against the 
Maharashtra police's arbitrariness in handling 
the Khwaja Yunus case. It is now history how 
Khwaja Yunus, a Gulf returned software engineer, 
was arrested by the police on December 27, 2002 
and booked under the Prevention of Terrorism Act, 
in connection with the Ghatkopar blast. On 
January 7, 2003 Yunus was found dead amidst 
police claims that he had escaped after the 
vehicle in which he was being escorted to 
Aurangabad had met with an accident. Later it was 
revealed that Yunus was tortured to death by some 
police officers. After persistent protests by 
human rights activists about this custodial death 
and struggle for justice launched by Yunus's 
mother Aasiya Begum, FIR was lodged against the 
guilty policemen. Of course the dillydallying on 
part of the Maharashtra government continued 
unabated.The highcourt 's query was simple 'Why 
were ten top police officers initially named by 
CID for their alleged involvment in the custodial 
death of Yunus let off ?'

While Aftab is finally a free man,  Mohammad 
Moarif Qamar and Irshad Ali, two residents of 
Delhi seem to be not so lucky even after 
languishing in jail for more than two years. Both 
of them were victims of well-planned conspiracy 
hatched by the Special Cell of the Delhi Police 
in collaboration with the intelligence bureau 
operatives. CBI found to its dismay that IB 
officials colluded with Delhi police personnel to 
'plant' RDX on these youths who were arrested as 
'Al Badr' terrorists. While Qamar was abducted 
from his Bhajanpura residence on Dec 22, 2005 
itself ; Irshad Ali had gone missing from his 
Sultanpuri home 10 days earlier. Their relatives 
had informed the police about their sudden 
disappearance. On February 9, 2006 the family 
members were told that both had been arrested 
with 2 Kg RDX and pistols. It was clear that they 
were kept in illegal detention by the special 
cell all this while. One can just imagine if the 
high courts had not intervened in the case and 
directed the CBI to look into the matter, the 
'terrorist' label on both these youths would have 
stuck to them all their lives.

May it be the case of Aftab or for that matter 
Khwaja Yunus, or Mohammad Qamar, Irshad Ali - it 
is becoming increasingly clear that framing of 
innocents and branding them as terrorist is the 
latest norm among lawkeepers of the country.Of 
course anyone familiar with the Indian situation 
may easily notice the continuity in the rampant 
misuse of various laws of detention and 
confinement. Post 9/11 a significant change has 
occured in the whole process. It is for everyone 
to see that muslims as a community are 
increasingly becoming the target of 
criminalisation and terrorisation.

To be very frank, in all such cases it is 
difficult to differentiate whether the people are 
ruled by forces of the 'programmatic communalist 
variety ( like the BJP or Shiv Sena) or the 
'pragmatic communalists' like Congress.

It then becomes impossible to forget Mohammad 
Afroz , who was arrested after 9/11by the Mumbai 
police and was charged for planning a terrorist 
attack . It was told to the pliant media then 
that this 'dreaded terrorist' wanted to crash a 
plane piloted by him on the British house of 
Commons and Australia. A special team from Mumbai 
police especially went to these countries but 
could not bring back any evidence. Ultimately it 
took the whole charge as a grand fabrication. It 
was a time when Maharashtra was ruled by a 
Secular front which comprised of parties like 
Congress and NCP.

The 'dreaded terrorists' arrested in connection 
with the five year old attack on the Raghunath 
temple in Jammu also faced similar ordeal.The 
courts finally absolved all the accused of any 
charges and advised the police to properly use 
its minds in handling sensitive cases of such 
nature.These innocent people had to languish in 
jail for such a long period for no fault of 
theirs.

It is worth noting that despite many such fiascos 
the powers that be never attempt to draw any 
important lesson to avoid recurrence of such 
incidents. On the contrary, the whole attempt is 
to 'individualise' all such cases and proceed 
with the established practice of stigmatisation 
and brutalisation of the social and religious 
minorities.

It is high time that they are told about the way 
the Canadian government handled similar case.

Canadian-Syrian Mahel Arar - a young software 
engineer - was seized by CIA operatives during a 
stopover at New York in 2002 and was secretly 
sent to Syria.Lodged in a grave like cell in 
Syria, Arar was repeatedly tortured to extract 
information which he did not know. Ultimately his 
tormentors released him within a span of year and 
half without ever being charged with a crime. 
Looking back it is clear that Mahel Arar became a 
victim of the Islamophobia manufactured by the 
likes of Bush-Blair in the immediate aftermath of 
9/11.

Last year Stephen Harper, Prime Minister of 
Canada sought public apology for the ordeal which 
Maher went through and for the role played by 
Canadian officials in the whole affair . The 
Canadian government also gave him nine million 
dollars as compensation. Mr Harper said in full 
public view of the media "On behalf of the 
government of Canada, I wish to apologize to you, 
Monia Mazigh (Arar's wife) and your family for 
any role Canadian officials may have played in 
the terrible ordeal that all of you experienced 
in 2002 and 2003."

Is anyone listening ?

- subhash gatade, h 4 pusa apts, rohini sector 
15, delhi 110085 Ph: 011-27872835


______


[5]

SALWA JUDUM PIL's               

by   Nandini Sundar
[Jan 28, 2008]

Dear Friends
    
  The PILs on Salwa Judum were heard by the SC 
yesterday (Justices Balakrishnan, Raveendran and 
Tarun Chatterjee). The newspaper reports on the 
case need some correction. There are two PILs - 
Nandini Sundar and ors vs State of Chhattisgarh 
and Kartam Joga and ors vs State of Chhattisgarh 
and Union of India. Notice in the first was 
issued on May 17 2007, and the CG government 
responded only on January 23rd 2008, after 8 
months. The counter does not address any of the 
specific allegations of violations, and denies 
that there is any violation of rights. It instead 
resorts to name calling. The CG government was 
not successful in having the petition dismissed.
    
  Notice on the second (Kartam Joga and ors) was 
issued on October 12 asking for a reply within 
four weeks. CG government has not responded even 
to date. The Court has now given them three weeks 
time to respond to this petition. This petition 
is filed by three persons who are themselves 
affected - one had his house burnt down and is 
now a refugee, one was severely beaten by Salwa 
Judum and had to have an operation, and one 
barely escaped assault from Salwa Judum. The 
petitioners are all current or former elected 
representatives in Dantewada district. The PIL 
provides a list of 537 persons who have been 
killed by the Salwa Judum and security forces 
from June 2005 till the present, including 33 
children, 45 women, 416 men and 43 unnamed 
persons. This is a small fraction of the likely 
killings, most of which have gone unreported. At 
least 2825 houses have been burnt in the 
undivided district of South Bastar (Dantewada). 
At least 99 women have been raped. The petition 
includes
  statements from the residents of over a hundred 
villages detailing incidents of killing, rape, 
arson and loss of property at the hands of the 
Salwa Judum.
    

  Nandini Sundar
  Professor, Department of Sociology
  Delhi School of Economics
  University of Delhi, Delhi 110007
     Co-Editor, Contributions to Indian Sociology

______


[6] India:

THIRD FRONT OR THIRD RAIL?

by I.K.Shukla

With elections looming on the political horizon, 
CPI-M's doughty general secretary Prakash  Karat 
has begun floating the idea of a Third Front 
which would band together all secularist parties. 
It would keep BJP and Congress out and away since 
these have been communally driven, and would 
counter their hard (overt) and soft (covert and 
coy) variants of communal virus. The voters would 
be offered a choice between the peddlers of 
theo-fascist terrorism which has cost the nation 
thousands of innocent lives and the protagonists 
of secularism which is antithetical to every kind 
of discrimination.
Given the pervasive atmosphere of mayhem and 
meanness that saturate the current political 
landscape, Karat's idea, at first glance, comes 
as a whiff of fresh air long sought and longingly 
awaited. Any formation that promises some respite 
from the death squad savagery of BJP and the 
fecklessness of Congress that throws to winds the 
victims of BJP's relentless series of communal 
carnages would be more than welcome. But are good 
intentions enough? Is it not true that sometimes 
they pave the way to hell?

In terms of the electoral game, proudly touted as 
democracy, is it realistic to hope for many 
partisans of sincere and substantive secularism? 
Is it merely temporizing, an electoral slogan, a 
tentative tactic, or an ideological credo 
affirming respect for  and commitment to 
republican India and its Constitution? Does CP-M 
believe in the separation of religion and state? 
Do its prospective associates?  Secularism is not 
visiting mandirs, mosques, churches and gurdwaras 
by politicos and state functionaries who preside 
over religiously marked events and noisily queue 
up for iftar parties. This is, in fact, invasive 
intrusion of religion in the affairs of the 
state, and it breeds plethora of troubles as 
manifest so far. It is not even equal respect for 
all religions, platitudinous assertion to the 
contrary notwithstanding. In fact it is vulgar de 
rigueur, instrumentalizing religion in the bid 
for personal power, just like US presidential 
hopefuls holding a baby for the journalists' 
cameras every poll season of carnival and charade.

Secularism posits egalitarianism, respect for 
diversity, embrace of pluralism and rule of law, 
equality between citizens, and justice for all. 
These absent, secularism is reduced to an empty 
shell.
Does Karat believe there are political parties 
around which are devoutly so committed? Does he 
believe secularism will or can be promoted 
through the parliament? Were it so, why are child 
marriage and bride burning still so rampant? Is 
parliamentarism be all and end all of progressive 
and socially transformative politics? How does he 
square this solicitude for parliamentary path 
with the fact that not just abominable characters 
continue to become law-makers but also 
yesteryear's rajas and ranis have morphed 
overnight into custom-designed democrats?

It is identity-mired, caste-encrusted, 
region-pulled, and individual-centred chiaroscuro 
that is politics now all across India.  Can he 
eschew or escape it? Can he dent it, moderate it? 
Very unlikely. Not to put too fine a point on it, 
here are a few examples.  Mayawati joined forces 
with BJP several times, to the extent that she 
stumped in Gujarat for Modi, the notorious 
merchant of death! She also became cozy with 
Congress, impelled not by noble motives like 
secularism but by her calculus of power grab. The 
cases of Jayalalita, Deve Gowda, and Chandrababu 
Naidu are some of the stark disappointments. 
Mulayam Singh-Amar Singh (Ambani pals)? If wishes 
were horses we would ride them. Time servers and 
opportunists, aya rams and gaya rams now form the 
staple of poll politics, which is, in plain 
words, power grab, all salivating for a piece of 
the pie.

Urgently much needed and far more viable would be 
a national left front to galvanise the masses, 
not just the voters, and defeat the deadly 
duopoly of Congress and BJP, as mooted by Kshiti 
Goswami of RSP.

The Congress whine that the Third Front would 
divide and weaken secularists is no more than 
that, a whine, only to enable its sustenance in 
power. Its secular credentials lie tattered all 
over the length and breadth of India.

If he has not set himself the task of a modern 
Vishwakarma for fabricating secularists on 
demand, and clone them in sufficient numbers to 
form a sizeable party, Karat's noble and 
grandiose idea is just, alas, an idea, whose time 
in the inimitable Indian political calendar has 
not yet come, alas.
Joker's red nose:  For Advani who has certified 
RSS and BJP as "secular".  He calculated, he 
would thus pre-empt any prospective threat  of 
Parivar being banned as a communal fascist mafia. 
Already "acting" as PM presumptive! Beware of 
this instant "secularist" who believes 
seditionist and serial killer to be synonyms of 
secularist.

31 Jan 2008

______


[7]  India's  Hindu Right - Discourse and Action

(i)

BBC News - 30 January 2008

AMBIVALENT VIEWS OVER GANDHI KILLER
by Rajesh Joshi
BBC Hindi service

Mahatma Gandhi
Gandhi was killed by a Hindu nationalist

As India observes the 60th anniversary of Mahatma 
Gandhi's death, Hindu nationalist groups still 
grapple with the question whether to reject or 
appreciate his killer.
Mahatma Gandhi was assassinated by a Hindu 
nationalist Nathuram Godse on 30 January, 1948 in 
Delhi's Birla House.
In the communally charged atmosphere during 
India's Partition in August 1947, Godse and his 
accomplices held Mahatma Gandhi responsible for 
the miseries of the Hindus and accused him of 
appeasing Muslims.
Right-wing Hindu nationalist organisations like 
the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh, (Nationalist 
Volunteers' Organisation) were banned and many of 
its leaders were sent to jail following the 
assassination of Gandhi.

The RSS is the ideological fountainhead of India's main opposition party BJP.

'Selfless act'

Nathuram Godse was later tried and hanged but the 
RSS was exonerated and the government decided to 
lift the ban on its activities.
Even though the RSS publicly rejects Nathuram 
Godse, its leaders don't hide their appreciation 
for what they call his "selfless act".
"We will have to accept that Nathuram Godse acted 
with selfless spirit; he did not have any 
self-interest in it. He must also have been aware 
that he would be hanged for what he was going to 
do. This spirit cannot be denied," RSS ideologue 
Devendra Swaroop told the BBC.
"But he was wrong if he thought that Gandhiji was 
taking history in a wrong direction and by 
killing him he could correct the course of 
history," adds Mr Swaroop.
"RSS firmly believes that Godse acted at the spur 
of the moment and it was quite detrimental for 
the Hindu society. Gandhi dead proved to be 
stronger than Gandhi alive."

Mahatma Gandhi
Some Hindu leaders have condemned Gandhi's policy of non-violence

Leaders of the Bajrang Dal, another affiliate of 
the RSS, believe that Godse's role in history 
needs to be reassessed.
"People may object to his method but I don't 
believe that he committed such an act (of killing 
Gandhi) with some personal animosity," says 
Prakash Sharma, head of the Bajrang Dal.
"He was concerned for the country and at that 
time he did what he thought was right."
Gandhi and his thoughts have more than once posed 
a challenge to the ideology of Hindu nationalists.
Some Hindu leaders openly condemned Gandhi's 
policy of non-violence and friendship between 
Hindus and Muslims during the anti-Muslim riots 
that broke out in India's western state Gujarat 
in February 2002.

'Abandon Gandhi'

Pravin Togadia of the Vishwa Hindu Parishad 
(World Hindu Council) said in a public gathering: 
"Until the day we give up Gandhi's ideology of 
non violence and the ideology of surrendering 
before the Muslims, terrorism cannot be defeated."
"My brothers, we will have to abandon Gandhi."
However, RSS spokesman Ram Madhav denies that his 
organisation faces a dilemma about Godse.

Gujarat riots, 2001
The 2002 Gujarat riots left many Muslims isolated
"This issue had been resolved decades ago that he 
(Godse) had nothing to do with RSS and Gandhiji's 
assassination had nothing to do with RSS," he 
said.

But Mahatma Gandhi's great grandson Tushar Gandhi 
is not impressed - he accuses the RSS of 
doublespeak.
"Whenever an organisation uses a weapon to 
achieve its agenda, it abandons the weapon after 
using it. They use and throw it like a condom," 
he said.
"I have seen a deep feeling of devotion in the 
Sangh Parivar (or the RSS family) for Nathuram 
Godse and I know how they cherish him. But they 
do it secretly because they lack the courage."


(ii)

DELVING INTO GANDHI KILLER'S MIND |  GODSE CULT
Suchetana Ray / CNN-IBN / CNN-IBN - Jan 30, 2008
http://www.ibnlive.com/news/delving-deeper-into-the-mind-of-gandhi-killer/57734-19.html
http://www.ibnlive.com/videos/57734/delving-into-gandhi-killers-mind---godse-cult.html


(iii)

FROM THE PAGES OF HISTORY
by Anil Nauriya (The Hindu, January 29, 2008)
Book Review of Tushar Gandhi's book 'Let's Kill 
Gandhi' - A Chronicle of His Last Days, the 
Conspiracy, Murder, Investigation and Trial | 
Rupa & Co, 7/16, Ansari Road, Daryaganj, New 
Delhi-110002. Rs. 995.
http://www.hindu.com/br/2008/01/29/stories/2008012950021400.htm


______


[8] INDIA: HINDUTVA FLOURISHING IN ORISSA

(i) Sign On Online Petition Re Protection Of The 
Rights Of The Christian Minorities In Orissa

To:  Prime Minister of India

To,
Dr. Manmohan Singh
Prime Minister of India,
Prime Minister's Office, South Block,
Raisina Hill, New Delhi, 110011, India
Fax : (+) 91 -11- 2301 9545/23016857
Email : manmohan at alpha.nic.in/pmosb at pmo.nic.in

Honourable Prime Minister,

Protection of the Rights of the Christian Minorities in Orissa

We write with deep concern over the communal 
violence that engulfed the district of Khandhamal 
in Orissa since the eve of Christmas. The 
violence has led to the death of persons; injury 
to many and thousands of people have been 
rendered homeless and penniless. Many houses have 
been torched and looted. Hundreds of people have 
fled to the woods. The victims of this violence 
have been Christians. The timing of the attack 
and the way it has been carried out reveal that 
there is a dangerous attempt by some forces to 
eliminate Christians and to annihilate 
Christianity.

The State has failed in its duty to protect the 
rights of Christians - to protection of life and 
personal liberty and to freedom of conscience and 
free profession, practice and propagation of 
religion - the very rights enshrined in the 
Constitution of the country (Articles 21 & 25) 
and in the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights (ICCPR Articles 18 & 27) to 
which the Government of India is a party.

In this context, we appeal to you, Sir, to initiate suitable measures so as to:

* Protect the rights and the lives and the properties of Christians in Orissa
* Provide immediate relief and adequate 
compensation to the victims as per ICCPR Article 
2.3.1
* Ensure peace and harmony in the State so that 
people may live without fear and freely practise 
their faith.

Thanking you,
Sincerely,

[Petition URL
http://www.petitiononline.com/orissa/petition.html ]

o o o

(ii)

(iv)

ORISSA: SANGH PARIVAR DEMANDS BAN AND BURNS TEXTBOOK
http://www.telegraphindia.com/1080201/jsp/frontpage/story_8848254.jsp
______


[9]

The Times of India - 31 Jan 2008

INTELLECTUALS CONCERNED OVER TASLIMA NASREEN'S HEALTH

NEW DELHI: Concerned over the health of 
controversial writer Taslima Nasreen, a group of 
intellectuals have asked the Centre to ensure 
that she leads a "normal" life.

"We are highly concerned about the health and 
well being of Taslima Nasreen who is for the last 
three months being kept in a virtual detention in 
a secret place in Delhi," the intellectuals led 
by the former Prime Minister I K Gujral said in a 
letter to Home Minister Shivraj Patil.

They also expressed concern over the 
"implications the treatment being meted out to 
her would have on the values of freedom, human 
rights and human dignity".

"We have come to know that Nasreen is not allowed 
to stir out of her house and no friend or 
acquaintance from outside is allowed to meet 
her," the letter said asserting that the 
deprivation from leading a normal life was 
affecting her health and creative work.

"Last week inadequate medical attention and 
bungling by doctors arranged by the government 
proved life threatening for her," they alleged.

The letter was written by besides Gujral, 
sociologist Ashish Nandy, veteran journalist 
Kuldip Nayar, Sumit Chakrabarty and Muchkund 
Dubey.

"We are convinced that if she is allowed to lead 
a normal life again, nobody will pose a threat to 
her life except some fringe extremist elements 
who must be dealt with by the government 
according to the law of the land," it said.

Nasreen, who has been kept in an undisclosed 
location by the Centre, was hospitalised for a 
couple of days at the AIIMS following complaints 
of uneasiness due to adverse reaction to some 
medicines.


______



[10] Announcements:

(i)

Dear friend ,
The Jan Pratinidhi Manch is organising a public 
meeting on Sunday, February 3, 2008, from 1:30 
p.m. onwards, at the Gandhi Peace Foundation.

The topic of discussion is 'Ensuring 
participation of the public in making policy 
decisions'.
You will recall the active campaign that Jan 
Pratinidhi Manch carried out during the Delhi 
Municipal Corporation elections in March 2007, to 
field candidates selected by the residents in 
several words in Delhi, in order to challenge the 
stranglehold of the established political parties 
over the political process. The JPM has also put 
forward a series of proposals to ensure 
accountability of the elected candidates to the 
people of their constituency. This entire 
experience has to be taken forward by all of us, 
so that we, the residents of Delhi, do not 
continue to remain mere vote banks, but are able 
to assert our right to influence important policy 
decisions that affect our lives.
Please do attend and give your views addressing 
the issue, as well as participate in the panel 
discussion that will follow.
There will also be a discussion on 'strategies 
for people's participation in the 2008 Delhi 
Assembly elections'.
Looking forward to your active participation in the above event,
With regards,

Sucharita, Pankaj Gupta, Birju Nayak, Amjad, K. Mitroo,

On behalf of the Coordination Committee

Jan Pratinidhi Manch

Phone:- 9818575435 Bijju Nayak for further information.

___


(ii)

Pakistan India People's Forum for Peace and Democracy

Delhi Chapter

Cordially Invites You To

A Symposium On the Occasion of its Annual Convention

"Crisis of Democracy: Implications for Pakistan- India Peace Process"

(Speakers: Muchkund Dubey, Anuradha Bhasin, Praful Bidwai, Kamla Bhasin)

February 5, 2008, 4.00 - 6.15 PM

&

Music Program By Vidya Shah (06.30 – 07.30 PM)

Venue: Conference Hall, Ground Floor

Indian Social Institute (ISI) 10 - Institutional Area, Lodi Road
New Delhi - 110003
Contact : B - 5/136, First Floor, Safdarjung Enclave, New Delhi - 110029
Tel: 011-26195534/35, Ravi Hemadri - 9871415186, Bipin Kumar - 9899840820

Programme

03:00 - 04:00 PM: PIPFPD Organization meeting (For Members Only)
04:00 - 04:15 PM: Tea
04:15 - 06:15 PM: Symposium
06:30 - 07:30 PM: Cultural Programme

_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/

Buzz for secularism, on the dangers of fundamentalism(s), on
matters of peace and democratisation in South
Asia. SACW is an independent & non-profit
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