SACW | Feb. 1-2, 2008 / Media Rights in Pakistan / Sri Lanka: More fighting
Harsh Kapoor
aiindex at mnet.fr
Fri Feb 1 22:09:44 CST 2008
South Asia Citizens Wire | February 1-2, 2008 |
Dispatch No. 2496 - Year 10 running
[1] Ending the downward spiral in Bangladesh (Irene Khan)
[2] Pakistan:
(i) For Journalists in Pakistan, That's the Way It Is (Nicholas Schmidle)
(ii) Cybercrime Law Infringes on Rights - Activists (Irfan Ahmed)
[3] Sri Lanka: An agreement to fight some more (Jayadeva Uyangoda)
[4] India: How To 'Carve Out A Terrorist' from an
Innocent Person And Say It Works? (Subhash Gatade)
[5] India: Salwa Judum PIL's (Nandini Sundar)
[6] India: Third Front or Third Rail? (I.K.Shukla)
[7] India's Hindu Right and the Assassination of Gandhi:
(i) Ambivalent views over Gandhi killer (Rajesh Joshi)
(ii) Delving into Gandhi killer's mind | Godse Cult
(iii) Anil Nauriya's Book Review of Lets Kill Gandhi
[8] India - Hindutva Flourishing in Orissa:
(i) Sign On Online Petition re Protection of
the Rights of the Christian Minorities in Orissa
(ii) Orissa: Sangh Parivar demands ban and burns textbook
[9] Intellectuals concerned over Taslima Nasreen's health
[10] Announcements:
(i) Public Meeting: 'Ensuring participation of
the public in making policy decisions' (New
Delhi, 3 February 2008)
(ii) PIPFPD event: "Crisis of Democracy:
Implications for Pakistan-India Peace Process"
(New Delhi, 5 February 2008)
______
[1] ENDING THE DOWNWARD SPIRAL IN BANGLADESH
23 January 2008
by Irene Khan, Secretary General of Amnesty International
As British Airways flight BA144 takes off from
Zia International Airport in the darkness of the
night, I look out of the window of the airplane
and think of the metaphorical darkness from which
the people of this country are seeking to escape.
For decades, Bangladesh has been caught in a
downward spiral of corruption, insecurity,
political violence and organized crime in which
human rights and the rule of law have been the
first casualties. Political leaders have shown
more interest in abuse of power for personal
gains than in poverty eradication. The powerful
and the privileged have acted with impunity, with
no fear of being called to account by weak and
ineffective state institutions.
Repressive laws, including laws granting special
or emergency powers, have been used and abused by
successive governments. Police and other state
officials have sided with the affluent and the
influential, so that the most vulnerable - women,
minorities, the poor and the marginalized - have
been the least protected.
The declaration of the state of emergency and the
installation of a Caretaker Government (CTG) in
January 2007 were desperate measures to save the
country from ever-increasing levels of insecurity
and political violence, further bloodshed and
mayhem, and set on track free and fair elections
for a democratic government.
During the Amnesty International visit to
Bangladesh, journalists constantly asked if the
human rights situation in 2007 was better than
that in 2006. They were disappointed when I
refused to give a simple "yes" or "no" answer.
And so, sitting on the plane, I turn on my laptop
in the hope of penning a more satisfactory
response than I have given so far.
Of course there has been an improvement in
physical security and a dramatic decline in human
rights violations related to political violence
in 2007 as compared to previous years. Government
figures also show a fall in the number of
extra-judicial killings by RAB and other security
forces from 195 in 2006 to 93 in 2007.
These developments are welcome but it would be
wrong to endorse them as indicators of
improvement in the human rights situation without
probing more deeply into what is being done - and
what more needs to be done - to ensure that these
positive trends will endure beyond the life of
the CTG.
We need to analyse more carefully the quality of
change being brought by the CTG to ensure that
they are not merely cosmetic. And we need to ask
- indeed demand - that the political parties will
uphold human rights and the rule of law when they
come to power so that what is being done now is
not undone in the future.
In a country where the state machinery - courts,
police and military - not only fails to deliver
justice and security but is often the instrument
of persecution, institutional reform is necessary
to convert perpetrators into protectors. The CTG
must be commended for taking some much-needed,
long-awaited reform measures but it needs to
undertake or at least set in motion some other
measures to ensure that the reforms are truly
effective.
Guaranteeing the independence of the judiciary
requires not only separation from the executive
but also other measures to ensure proper
recruitment, appointment and security of tenure
of judges without political interference. A new
Police Ordinance will not end police brutality
and inefficiency unless it includes clear
provisions for independent scrutiny and greater
accountability, for instance through the
establishment of an independent police complaints
mechanism.
The National Human Rights Commission must be
given real teeth to investigate and take action
against all organs of the state, including the
Joint Forces and RAB. The CTG must appoint
individuals to the National Human Rights
Commission who are not only competent and
qualified but command such a high degree respect
and credibility that no future government will
dare to sideline or undermine their work.
These institutional changes, if carried out
properly, will make a real difference to the
range of human rights violations, from police
brutality to gender violence, that plague the
lives of ordinary people.
There are two key factors that will determine the
ultimate success or failure of the human rights
reform agenda: first, the CTG's willingness to
close its credibility gap on human rights, and
second, the readiness of the main political
parties to embrace the changes and commit
themselves to upholding human rights and the rule
of law.
How can the CTG's initiative to separate the
judiciary from the executive be taken as a true
commitment to creating an independent judiciary
when there is widespread perception that the same
government is manipulating the criminal justice
system to deliver some pre-ordained outcomes in
high profile political cases?
When I stressed the need for the government to be
seen to be respecting due process, the Chief
Advisor responded that this government is using
existing laws and existing courts. Surely, that
is not a satisfactory answer when it is
well-known that these same laws and courts have
been subject to substantial political
interference in the past and so open to the same
level of interference now. A government committed
to the rule of law must show scrupulous regard
for due process.
How can the government's commitment to freedom of
information be taken seriously when overt and
covert pressure is exerted on the media? The
government was keen to point out to me that
although the emergency rules impose far-reaching
restrictions, they are not being enforced
rigorously. So, why leave them hanging like
Damocles' sword over the heads of media, creating
uncertainty and encouraging self-censorship?
With such emergency regulations in existence, the
chilling effect of a telephone call from a
Directorate of General Forces Intelligence (DGFI)
official to a TV station owner, or from the local
RAB commander to a district correspondent should
not be underestimated. Add to that a case like
that of Jahangir Alam Akash, who claims to have
been detained and tortured by RAB and charged in
2007 with extortion allegedly committed in 2004,
days after he reported an incident implicating
local RAB officials in an attempted
extra-judicial killing.
Democratic institutions cannot develop in a
climate of self-censorship. A period of
transition and change must be informed by a
diversity of views. That is why the government
must immediately lift the restrictions on freedom
of expression, assembly and association,
including restrictions on the media.
How can people have confidence in the CTG's drive
to create a culture of transparency and
accountability when the government has failed to
be transparent and accountable about
investigating reports of serious human rights
violations by RAB and the Joint Forces? Torture
allegations made by Rang Lai Mro, a prominent
leader from the Chittagong Hill Tracts remain
uninvestigated, as do the allegations by Jahangir
Alam Akash, or the death of Dulal in Bhola
reportedly at the hands of the Navy.
After much adverse publicity, the government set
up a one-man judicial commission to investigate
the death of Cholesh Richil, a Garo leader,
allegedly tortured by a Joint Forces unit in
March 2007, but has so far failed to publish the
report or open any criminal prosecution. I
welcome the statement by the Chief Advisor that
the NHRC should have the power to investigate
human rights complaints against military and
security officials, including RAB, in the future.
But justice delayed is justice denied.
The Richil case cannot wait. Only by publishing
the report of the judicial commission and by
following it up with criminal investigation and
prosecution in an open court of law can this
government show that it is determined to end the
culture of impunity that has hamstrung the rule
of law in this country.
The past year has been marked by a creeping
expansion of the role of the armed forces in
activities that should rightly be carried out by
a civilian administration, from law enforcement
to electoral registration and investigation of
extortion cases. I was told by the Army Chief
that this is because of the lack of capacity and
competency in the civilian administration. Be
that as it may, principles of transparency and
accountability, which lie at the core of human
rights, require that all activities by the armed
forces should be circumscribed by law and put
under civilian scrutiny and accountability.
If the CTG has the courage to confront and close
these credibility gaps, then it will go a long
way in creating public confidence in the human
rights reforms agenda that no future government
will be able to undo.
Turning now to the political parties, I fully
agreed with the Chief Advisor when he said to me
during our meeting that institutional change is a
long term process and its success depends not
only on the CTG but on the commitment of future
governments.
That is why Amnesty International's
recommendations on human rights reform are
addressed not just to the CTG but also to
political parties. That is why we asked all
political parties represented in the previous
parliament to meet with us, and the Awami League,
one faction of the BNP (the other one led by
Saifur Rahman did not return our call for a
meeting) and Jamaat agreed to do so.
In these meetings, my colleagues emphasized our
call for political parties to include a human
rights agenda in their manifesto, and to support
human rights reforms when they are in parliament.
The test of the commitments which they declared
to have for human rights will be in what they
will say publically and will do in Parliament.
Regrettably, human rights have yet to enter the
lexicon of political parties. They have little
understanding about the relationship of human
rights to democracy and good governance, and even
less of their role as political leaders in
upholding human rights and the rule of law. They
are primarily preoccupied with protecting the
human rights of their leaders who are feeling the
brunt of the law.
They are yet to fully appreciate the irony that
they themselves created and nurtured the laws,
systems and practices of which they are now
complaining. Now that they are at the receiving
end of these repressive laws, policies and
practices, let us hope that they will take more
seriously Amnesty's oft-reiterated
recommendations, including repeal of the Special
Powers Act and the introduction of basic
safeguards against torture and ill treatment of
detainees.
Knowing the role that democratically elected
governments played in the past in undermining the
rule of law and human rights, civil society must
be vigorous in demanding that political parties
demonstrate a clear commitment to human rights.
They must call on the political parties to set
out their vision on human rights and to insert
clear commitments in their electoral manifesto.
In the run up to the elections, there is an
opportunity to educate the political leaders on
human rights as a means of good governance, and I
believe the more astute and progressive leaders
are ready to learn.
So, the right question is not whether the human
rights situation today is better or worse than
last year. It is whether one should be more
hopeful or less that this country will turn a
corner on human rights.
And there I am optimistic. The public today is
more aware of human rights than ever before.
Civil society is more determined than ever to
hold their political leaders to account. The call
for democracy is not simply for free and fair
elections but for a new style of governance that
is transparent, accountable and responsive to the
needs, demands and rights of the people.
I leave Bangladesh with a sense of hope, not
because of what the CTG has done, or what
political parties promise to do, nor even what
civil society is determined to do, but because
of the growing realisation and determination of
ordinary people to stand up for their rights.
The day labourers in my ancestral village in
Sylhet, the women in the legal literacy projects
in the village in Tangail, the fruit seller from
whom I bought oranges on the street corner in
Gulshan, the CNG driver who drove me to the
market - they spoke to me frankly and simply with
no sophisticated understanding of law or
politics. But in their voices I heard the
uncompromising demand for justice, equality and a
decent life and livelihood for all. No
government, caretaker or democratic, no leader,
elected or unelected, can afford to ignore that
call.
The flight is about to land at Heathrow and I
must turn off my laptop. But before I do that, I
remember the words of the man guarding the door
of the passenger terminal at Dhaka airport. As I
entered the building with my luggage trolley, he
recognised my face from TV and newspaper pages,
and came running after me. "You have said what
many of us want to say," he said. "We all want to
see change in Bangladesh." Then, as I waved
goodbye, he called out, "Apa, please do not
forget us."
How can I ever forget people like him who give me
hope that the struggle for human rights in
Bangladesh will endure!
______
[2] Pakistan
(i)
Washington Post
FOR JOURNALISTS IN PAKISTAN, THAT'S THE WAY IT IS
by Nicholas Schmidle
Sunday, February 3, 2008; Page
The police came for me on a cold, rainy Tuesday
night last month. They stood in front of my home
in Islamabad, four men with hoods pulled over
their heads in the driving rain. The senior
officer, a tall, clean-shaven man, and I
recognized one another from recent protests and
demonstrations. Awkwardly, almost apologetically,
he handed me a notice ordering my immediate
expulsion from Pakistan. Rain spilled off a
nearby awning and fell loudly into puddles.
I asked, somewhat obtusely, what this meant. "I
am here to take you to the airport," the officer
shrugged. "Tonight."
The document he'd given me provided no
explanation for my expulsion, but I immediately
felt that there was some connection to the
travels and reporting I had done for a story
published two days earlier in the New York Times
Magazine, about a dangerous new generation of
Taliban in Pakistan. I had spent several months
traveling throughout the troubled areas along the
border with Afghanistan, including Quetta (in
Baluchistan), and Dera Ismail Khan, Peshawar and
Swat (all in the North-West Frontier Province).
My visa listed no travel restrictions, and less
than a week earlier, President Pervez Musharraf
had sat before a roomful of foreign journalists
in Islamabad and told them that they could go
anywhere they wanted in Pakistan.
The truth, however, is that foreign journalists
are barred from almost half the country; in most
cases, their visas are restricted to three cities
-- Islamabad, Lahore and Karachi. In Baluchistan
province, which covers 44 percent of Pakistan and
where ethnic nationalists are fighting a
low-level insurgency, the government requires
prior notification and approval if you want to
travel anywhere outside the capital of Quetta.
Such permission is rarely given. And the
Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), where
the pro-Taliban militants are strong, are
completely off-limits. Musharraf's government
says that journalists are kept out for their own
security. But meanwhile, two conflicts go
unreported in one of the world's most vital --
and misunderstood -- countries.
There's no doubt that journalists in Pakistan,
and throughout Central and South Asia, face great
risks. Nine Central and South Asian journalists
were among the 65 newsmen and women worldwide --
more than in any other year in the past decade,
according to the Committee to Protect Journalists
-- who lost their lives while doing their jobs in
2007. Five were Pakistanis. One died in FATA and
one in the North-West Frontier Province, areas
where the Taliban operate with increasing
openness. Two others died in Taliban- or
al-Qaeda-related violence, one during the Red
Mosque siege in July and one in the terrorist
attack on Benazir Bhutto's motorcade as she
returned to Pakistan on Oct. 18, which left more
than 140 dead.
Also in October, in the Kyrgyz city of Osh, a
gunman using a silencer murdered Voice of America
reporter Alisher Saipov, a good friend of mine
and a fearless opponent of the regime in
neighboring Uzbekistan. More recently, Taliban
militants raided the exclusive and high-security
Serena Hotel in Kabul, Afghanistan, one
detonating himself in a suicide blast while the
others combed the hallways, seeking and firing at
targets; one Norwegian journalist died.
And yet throughout the region, journalism is
considered perhaps the noblest profession around.
In many of these countries, information is
hoarded by corrupt, authoritarian leaders. Trying
to expose it can be a liberating and empowering
experience. That's why the state of the media
there -- and the ability of foreign journalists
to report what's going on -- should concern the
West.
It's no secret that stifled societies often
produce frustrated, angry youth. Pakistan, for
example, is an amazing and fascinating country,
filled with amazing and fascinating people, but
every day, small numbers of young men and women
there are brainwashed into thinking that the only
answer to Musharraf's U.S.-backed regime is
terrorism.
I moved to Pakistan in February 2006 on a
research and writing fellowship. My wife left her
job and joined me soon after. We had been married
just three months; I convinced her that two years
in Pakistan would be like a honeymoon that just
wouldn't stop. We both learned to speak Urdu and
embraced local customs (and clothes). She
enrolled at the International Islamic University
(the only non-Muslim American ever to do so), and
I traveled extensively throughout the country.
Pakistan became our home. Unhindered by deadlines
and with a grasp of the language, I uncovered a
side of Pakistan that few other foreign writers
have been fortunate enough to experience.
My desire to explore regions and themes rarely
addressed in mainstream media coverage took me to
a number of areas often considered dangerous or
hostile to Westerners. And yet I found the people
there overwhelmingly hospitable -- and not at all
scary. I soon learned how to assess -- and, to
some extent, manage -- any potential hazards. I
almost always traveled with a local journalist or
two who knew the people, languages and customs
far better than I ever could. Besides
understanding which roads were safe to travel at
night, they would also be aware that interviewing
particular people might attract the unwanted
attention of Pakistan's intelligence services,
incuding the notorious ISI. When they advised, I
listened.
Foreign writers in Baluchistan have always
attracted the nervous attention of the
intelligence services. A year ago, agents burst
into the hotel room of a female New York Times
correspondent and physically assaulted her. (She
was reporting on the presence of top Taliban
leaders in Quetta.) Another foreign journalist
staying at the same hotel received a phone call
threatening that unless he left Quetta
immediately he would face the "consequences" like
Daniel Pearl, the Wall Street Journal
correspondent whom Islamic militants kidnapped
and beheaded in January 2002.
Following my last visit to Baluchistan, in
October 2006, intelligence goons stopped by my
house on a regular basis for weeks, demanding to
speak with me and asking my guard probing
questions about my wife and me. The guard quietly
shared these conversations with me out of earshot
of my wife. I laughed about it with fellow
writers and reporters, figuring that such visits
were just the price of researching and reporting
in Baluchistan.
But what makes Pakistan and the region an often
hostile place for journalists is the difficulty
of assessing the threat. While most fatalities
last year occurred in random bombings and
terrorist attacks, deadly incidents in years past
remain shrouded in mystery. For instance, in
December 2005, Hayatullah Khan, a journalist from
North Waziristan, filed a story with photographs
that gave evidence -- a piece of a U.S.-made
Hellfire missile -- that the United States was
conducting strikes against Taliban- and
al-Qaeda-linked targets inside Pakistani
territory. The photos were undoubtedly an
embarrassment to the government, which had
publicly insisted that U.S. military forays would
not be allowed inside Pakistan.
Just a few weeks earlier, Khan had written a
will, in which he stated, "If I am kidnapped or
get killed, the government agencies will be
responsible." The day after his story and the
photos were published, gunmen ran his car off the
road and kidnapped him. Six months later, his
body was dumped in the bazaar in Miram Shah, the
capital of North Waziristan.
A couple of weeks ago, a spokesman from the
Information Ministry said that "the media in
Pakistan is the freest ever in the history of the
country." In many ways, he was correct;
drawing-room columnists can be as critical as
they wish to be. But opinion-writing shouldn't be
confused with reporting. And every journalist
working in Pakistan knows that crossing certain
undefined lines can become a risky, often
life-threatening endeavor. Pearl and Khan were
both doing serious investigative work when they
were kidnapped and killed.
Hamid Mir, one of Pakistan's most respected TV
and print journalists, watched as his TV channel,
GEO TV, and his talk show were pulled off the air
after Musharraf imposed a state of emergency on
Nov. 3. (On Jan. 21, GEO resumed broadcasting,
albeit without Mir's show.) Mir recently e-mailed
me: "Musharraf believes in removing people from
the scene. . . . He cannot remove us from
history."
Journalism, as the cliche goes, is the "first
rough draft of history." If that's the case, then
Pakistan's history is suffering.
On that wet Tuesday night, I finally connected by
phone with an influential friend, who placed a
couple of calls and made the cops go home. But it
was obvious that my wife and I were no longer
welcome in Pakistan. My mobile phone had been
tapped for weeks. For the first time in two
years, I feared for our safety. The next morning,
we bought two one-way tickets back to the States.
Within two days, we had pawned off out cat and
packed or sold the rest of our belongings.
On our last night in Islamabad, a half-dozen
expatriate friends came over to send us off --
and help drink the rest of our wine. Yet saying
goodbye to our expat friends wasn't nearly as
emotional as saying goodbye to our Pakistani
friends and those who had done everything to
protect us in those final hours.
The day after my story about the Taliban
appeared, our guard, a gruff, bearded man from
the North-West Frontier Province, had rebuffed
the ISI inspector who'd arrived on a motorcycle
and demanded to be allowed inside to conduct an
investigation. A former ISI commando himself, the
guard apparently told the inspector that he would
never get past him and be allowed inside our
house. Hugging this man on our last morning, as
tears streamed down his face, was more difficult
than bidding my family farewell back in February
2006 had been. Honestly, I don't know when I'll
see him -- or Pakistan -- again. I miss them both
already.
nickschmidle at yahoo.com
Nicholas Schmidle, a Pakistan-based fellow with
the Institute of Current World Affairs from 2006
to 2008, is writing a book about Pakistan today.
o o o
(ii)
Inter Press Service
CYBERCRIME LAW INFRINGES ON RIGHTS - ACTIVISTS
by Irfan Ahmed
ISLAMABAD, Jan 23 (IPS) - An ordinance introduced
this month to curb electronic crime has come
under criticism for clauses that seem to be aimed
at censoring free speech and cutting civil
liberties.
Promulgated on Jan.10 by the caretaker government
of President Pervez Musharraf, the Electronic
Crime Ordinance - 2007 encompasses 18 different
offences that carry punishment ranging from a
couple of months' imprisonment and fines to life
imprisonment and even the death penalty.
The government claims that the main objective of
this law is to increase security, safety and
protection for those segments of society that use
or deal with information technology (IT). But
many believe that in reality the law will be used
to crack down on free expression on the Internet
because it prohibits the use of Internet and cell
phones to criticise authorities or send out calls
for rallies.
Blog sites and short messaging services (SMSs)
were used extensively by Pakistanis inside the
country and abroad to condemn the imposition of a
state of emergency, gagging of independent media
and other 'unconstitutional' acts of the
Musharraf government. Their use increased
exponentially after the government imposed
restrictions on electronic channels through
certain amendments in the Pakistan Electronic
Media Regulatory Authority Ordinance in June.
The new ordinance has been criticised by human
rights bodies, business community and citizen
groups as a piece of legislation that has too
many loopholes for misuse.
In a statement, the South Asian Free Media
Association (SAFMA) said that ''against the
backdrop of the use of Internet and cell phones
to criticise authorities or send calls for
rallies, the ordinance is liable to be
interpreted as a drastic measure aimed at putting
curbs on civil rights.''
SAFMA asked that the law not be used to obstruct
freedom of information and said that the way
ordinance defines cyber crime and 'terroristic
intent' allows it to be grossly misused.
Cyber terrorism has been defined by the ordinance
thus: ''Any person, group or organisation who,
with terroristic intent utilises, accesses or
causes to be accessed a computer or computer
network or electronic system or electronic device
or by any available means, and thereby knowingly
engages in or attempts to engage in a terroristic
act commits the offense of cyber terrorism.''
The ordinance also declares the sending of
unsolicited short messages over cell phones
(SMSs), pictures taken without the permission of
the person photographed, and e-mails carrying
obscene material as cyber crimes.
Jehan Ara, president of Pakistan Software Houses'
Association, told IPS that the law had been
drafted without consulting the stakeholders and
does little good to the industry. She says the
law does not adhere to the principles or
definitions of Cyber Crime Convention (Budapest,
2001) which has been signed by 42 countries.
She said Pakistan could have signed the Budapest
convention instead of coming out with an
ordinance which is full of errors, ambiguities
and socio-cultural influences. The law, she says,
allows investigating officers to take control of
computer networks and data without any chain of
custody. This means the data under the control of
the investigators can be corrupted, deleted or
amended by them. In short, no provision is made
to preserve the integrity of the data involved.
The law gives officers of the Federal
Investigation Authority (FIA) full powers to
confiscate equipment and arrest anyone who is
deemed by the government to be acting against the
'integrity of Pakistan' or having terroristic
intent, says Asif Bhatti, a software engineer
based in Lahore. Bhatti pointed out that the law
contains words like 'lewd', 'obscene' and
'immoral' which are not legal terms, and are
highly subjective. This gives the prosecuting
authorities a chance to use their discretion and
declare anything immoral or obscene, he added.
The Paris-based Reporters Without Borders (RSF)
has also condemned the ordinance. In a letter
written to Pakistan's ministry of information and
technology, the media watchdog says: "This law
prevents any blogger from posting photos or video
showing persons who have not given their
consent... Pakistan has understood its right to
give itself a law for fighting cyber crime, but
it is vital that this law should not obstruct
freedom of information."
RSF has also urged the government to ''clarify
the content of some of the provisions that we
think are dangerous. With just one month to go to
legislative elections, some of the articles of
this law look like censorship.''
The organisation also condemns the clause under
which a service provider is required to retain
its traffic data for a period of 90 days or more
and make it available to investigating agencies
when required. "This gives the authorities
control over Internet users' data and our
organisation fears that this provision could be
abused," RSF said.
Zia Islam, who works for FIA's cyber crime unit,
told IPS the allegation that the ordinance does
not grant the suspects the right to defend
themselves is not true. "There may be some
ambiguities but we hope that they will be removed
with the passage of time."
Zia said that all the offences mentioned by the
ordinance, except three, are compoundable,
non-cognisable and bailable. The non-bailable
crimes are those which are serious enough to
merit punishments of seven years in prison or
more.
According to Zia, in order to make arrests
against non-cognisable crimes the law enforcing
authorities will have to secure warrants
beforehand. But in cases of electronic fraud,
forgery and cyber terrorism summary arrests can
be made.
Cyber terrorism, Zia said, is not a new concept
as terrorists have been using this means of
communication to accomplish their goals. For
example, those found involved in the February
2002 murder of Wall Street Journal reporter
Daniel Pearl, in Pakistan's port city Karachi,
communicated with each other over e-mail, he said.
Many believe that the ordinance was prompted by a
spate of jokes over e-mail and SMS that ridiculed
President Musharraf.
(END/2008)
______
[3]
Himal
February 2008
AN AGREEMENT TO FIGHT SOME MORE
With the formal abrogation of the Ceasefire
Agreement by the Colombo government, the conflict
in Sri Lanka is headed for a decisive phase. And
it will be bloody.
by Jayadeva Uyangoda
Sri Lanka's descent into a sorry state of war has
not been a source of great concern within the
country. Indeed, many outsiders are more worried
than Sri Lankans themselves about the inevitably
destructive consequences of the intensifying war.
Outside observers have been warning that there is
no military solution to the ethnic conflict, that
the war will produce only losers, and that an
escalation will only further intensify the
deepening humanitarian crisis. But within Sri
Lanka, many, including both the government and
the LTTE, seem to view the war as an inescapable
reality. How does one explain this puzzle?
The troubled story of the Ceasefire Agreement
(CFA) at least partly captures some crucial
dimensions of the conundrum of Sri Lanka's ethnic
conflict and multiple failed peace processes. The
CFA came into effect in February 2002 when Prime
Minister Ranil Wickramasinghe, of the United
National Front (UNF) government, and LTTE leader
Velupillai Prabhakaran signed the document as a
prelude to direct peace negotiations. Both the
CFA and subsequent negotiations were facilitated
by representatives of the Norwegian government,
who subsequently acted as representatives of the
so-called international community. The signing of
the CFA was followed by six rounds of direct
talks between the government and the LTTE, all of
which were held outside Sri Lanka.
A notable development in the negotiation process
was the understanding, reached in Oslo in
December 2002, to explore a federal solution to
the ethnic conflict. But the progress of
negotiations did not go beyond the Oslo
understanding, which the LTTE later disowned. The
talks reached a crisis point in April 2003, when
the LTTE 'suspended' its participation in the
negotiation process itself, alleging that the UNF
government was not committed to implementing
decisions taken at the negotiation table. Neither
the pressure from the international community,
nor the massive tsunami disaster of December
2003, could revive Sri Lanka's stalled peace
process.
Relapse and polarisation
The gradual relapse into war began with
violations of the CFA. While the LTTE was blamed
by international monitors for most of the direct
violations, such as smuggling weapons and killing
military intelligence operatives, the Colombo
government also contributed by not implementing
some of the major commitments made in the CFA.
The continual refusal by the government to vacate
villages in Jaffna District that had been brought
under military-maintained high-security zones was
a prominent case in point.
Rather than be enmeshed in the blame game of
apportioning responsibility for ceasefire
violations, an observer can gain good perspective
on some of the larger dimensions of Sri Lanka's
conflict by looking through the prism of the
actual politics of the ceasefire and related
negotiations. The CFA was originally meant to
provide the ground conditions of de-escalation,
as well as a framework for political engagement
between the state and the LTTE. While at the time
Colombo was willing to consider an advanced form
of devolution as a framework for a constitutional
settlement, the LTTE, which was advancing the
interests of a state-seeking ethnic minority, was
also exploring acceptable alternatives to
secession.
Addressing the need to fill the gap between these
two visions constituted the fundamental challenge
in the negotiations of 2002. Indeed, any success
was to depend on the capacity of the two sides to
work out a compromise that could go beyond
ordinary devolution, but which could also fall
short of outright separation. With the advantage
of hindsight, one can now say that, by 2002-03,
the conflict had not yet reached a point at which
such a huge compromise could have been considered
possible, or even feasible.
Equally important was the fact that the CFA and
the negotiation process - albeit unintentionally
- polarised the Sri Lankan polity into two camps:
those for and those against the agreement. This
situation was very similar to the polarisation
that took place following the 1987 Indo-Lanka
Peace Accord. In a deeply divided and fragmented
polity, a decisive move towards altering the
trajectory of the conflict could only sharpen
existing contradictions.
This polarisation was felt most dramatically in
the Sinhala polity. The fact that governmental
power had been fractured into two antagonistic
camps, one represented by President Chandrika
Kumaratunga and her People's Alliance, and the
other represented by Prime Minister
Wickramasinghe and his UNF. The agenda of the
People's Alliance, of toppling the UNF regime,
found an easy platform in opposition to both the
CFA and the UNF-LTTE negotiations that had not
produced a peace agreement as such. The People's
Alliance and its Sinhalese nationalist allies
appealed to the insecurities of the Sinhala and
Muslim masses, on the argument that the CFA
provided undue legitimacy to the LTTE, thereby
endangering their safety and security as well as
the country's sovereignty and territorial
integrity.
Ultimately, the obstacles to the agreement were
significant. The less-than-enthusiastic
commitment of the UNP leadership to a tangible
outcome of the peace process; the arrogance and
intransigence of the LTTE in violating the CFA;
and the short-sighted policies of the
international custodians of the peace process,
who tried out a 'neo-liberal' peace-building
strategy that pushed an agenda of economic
liberalisation, along with a minimalist programme
of democratisation - all of these eventually came
together to create a situation in which political
conditions necessary for the sustainability of
the peace process became less and less viable.
The moral of this part of the story quickly
became clear: that an incomplete peace initiative
can re-polarise the polity, sharpen its
contradictions, and make the peace initiative
itself a victim of those very contradictions.
The incomplete revolution
This takes us to another peculiar aspect of Sri
Lanka's conflict. Every failed (or partially
successful) attempt at restoring peace by
non-military means has eventually led to a return
to war with fiercer intensity. In other words,
the ethnic conflict has demonstrated a peculiar
capacity to reproduce and sustain itself, not
because there were no peace initiatives, but
because there have been peace initiatives that
have not led to the termination of the civil war
and a settlement agreement. Indeed, the
intractable conflict in Sri Lanka is, on a very
real level, propelled by unfinished peace
efforts: as an incomplete revolution digs its own
grave, the incomplete peace process inevitably
becomes its own negation.
The CFA has many critics, particularly in Sri
Lanka and India, and many of their arguments are
quite compelling. From the beginning they saw the
CFA as having given the LTTE unwarranted
political legitimacy on the LTTE's own terms,
because the CFA institutionalised the LTTE's
claim to a parity of status based on a military
balance of power. The CFA also formally
recognised that there were territories controlled
by the LTTE in the Northern and Eastern
provinces. In a way, this accepted a ground
reality that no other political party in Sri
Lanka would dare to accede.
In fact, the LTTE also made the point that it
accepted the CFA as the basis for negotiations
because, in their reading, the CFA gave
expression to a strategic equilibrium achieved by
military means. The UNF government did not
contradict the LTTE's claim to parity. On a
related point, many of those who would advocate
for a negotiated solution would want Colombo to
define the terms and scope of the settlement from
a position of military strength and asymmetry of
power. But the notion of strategic parity went
against this proposition. Therefore, undermining
the CFA and the negotiation process of 2002-03
was seen by many political and ideological groups
in Sri Lanka as not only necessary, but also a
just objective.
The fact that the Colombo ruling class continued
to remain fragmented and unable to work on the
basis of a broad consensus on key policy
challenges further contributed to the narrowing
down of the political space within which the CFA
needed to exist. It is useful to recall that when
Prime Minister Wickramasinghe signed the CFA in
February 2002, he did not consult the other
powerful faction of the ruling class, led by
President Kumaratunga. Wickramasinghe's strategy
was to make peace with the LTTE on the basis of
negotiations between two parties: his government
and the LTTE. But, as prime minister, he only
represented half of the Sinhala establishment. As
had also happened previously, the other half was,
in the meanwhile, waiting for an opportunity to
undermine the peace bid.
This is where the two factions of the politically
bifurcated Sinhala ruling class once again
demonstrated how its disunity could derail
opportunities for resolution of the ethnic
conflict. Backed by the extreme Sinhala
nationalist forces, President Kumaratunga
dismissed the UNF government in late 2003 on the
argument that both the CFA and the LTTE's
proposals for an Interim Self Governing Authority
posed a threat to the country's national security
and state sovereignty. After the LTTE's
unilateral withdrawal from peace talks in April
2003, this was the second stage in the trajectory
that saw the disintegration of the CFA and
negotiation process of 2002.
By mid-2004, following the regime change after
the parliamentary elections, Colombo had been
slowly moving in the direction of resuming the
war. The new regime of the United People's
Freedom Alliance (UPFA), led by President
Kumaratunga, was mainly a coalition of Sinhala
nationalist forces committed to undoing what they
saw as the 'damage' done by the UNF government
and the internationals, particularly Norway.
Continuing violations of the CFA, particularly by
the LTTE, led to the clamour for its abrogation,
especially among UPFA'a extreme nationalist
partners.
The LTTE's August 2005 assassination of Foreign
Minister Lakshman Kadirgamar, who had earlier led
a successful international campaign to ban the
Tigers in a number of countries as a 'terrorist'
entity, further added to the demand for the
annulment of the CFA. But President Kumaratunga,
now heading her own government, exercised
significant caution in her approach to both the
CFA and the LTTE. She renewed calls for the
return to negotiations, while the international
community (notably the European Union, the United
States and Japan) tried both threats and
diplomacy to persuade the LTTE to resume peace
talks. All met with failure. Towards the end of
2004, there was speculation that the LTTE was
making preparations for an offensive, in an
attempt to alter the balance of power with the
Sri Lankan Army, as a prelude to returning to
talks from a new position of military strength.
Lanka no Aceh
The tsunami of December 2004 significantly
altered the course of Sri Lanka's conflict,
during a year in which the country had seemed to
be moving in the direction of outright war. The
tsunami devastated vast stretches of coastal
areas inhabited by Sinhala, Tamil and Muslim
communities, but some of the worst-hit
communities were in the LTTE-controlled areas of
the Northern and Eastern provinces. The disaster
and accompanying humanitarian tragedy seems to
have changed the LTTE's decision to resume armed
hostilities. More importantly, the situation
opened up a new opportunity for the UPFA
government and the LTTE to work together in
humanitarian assistance - and subsequently to use
that space to resume political engagement.
The two sides did restart dialogue, and in July
2005 even signed an agreement to set up a joint
administrative mechanism called the Post-Tsunami
Operational Mechanism (PTOM). But this attempt
fell victim to the opposition mounted by the
newly mobilised Sinhala nationalists, led
particularly by the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna
(JVP), which opposed any resumption of political
engagement with the LTTE. The JVP, a powerful
member of the UPFA coalition with 39 members in
Parliament, filed a petition before the Supreme
Court that the PTOM agreement violated Sri
Lanka's Constitution. The Supreme Court upheld
some of the JVP objections, thereby effectively
nullifying the new institutional mechanism
formulated for the government and the LTTE to
work together, at the very least on humanitarian
issues. In contrast, across the ocean to the
east, the Indonesian government and the rebels in
Aceh were able to successfully use the
humanitarian space opened up by the 2004 tsunami
to work towards a peace agreement - one that
still holds today.
If 2005 was a missed opportunity for the
resumption of the peace process, 2006 marked the
momentum in a new trajectory towards the
resumption of war. The election of President
Mahinda Rajapakse in November 2005 was a crucial
turning point. Rajapakse won the election due to
two main factors: backing by the extreme Sinhala
nationalist forces, and the election boycott
imposed on the Tamil voters in the Northern
Province by the LTTE. After the leadership of the
Sri Lanka Freedom Party did not back him,
Rajapakse had been forced to establish a firm
ideological and political alliance with two
extreme Sinhala nationalist parties, the JVP and
the Jathika Hela Urumaya (JHU), with whose
support he ran an election campaign that was
marked by an essentially Sinhala Buddhist
nationalist agenda. Rajapakse won a narrow
victory over the UNP's Wickramasinghe, who had
run on a platform of returning to negotiations
for a federalist political solution to the ethnic
conflict. It was during 2006 that the new
administration of Rajapakse and the LTTE began
their 'undeclared war'.
Why did the LTTE leadership indirectly help
Rajapakse to win the election over
Wickramasinghe, for whom a vast majority of
Tamils would have voted in the absence of the
enforced boycott? The simple answer is that the
LTTE wanted a new phase of polarisation and
sharpening of contradictions between the Sri
Lankan state and the Tamil polity. Unfortunately,
the events of 2006 and 2007 served the LTTE's
strategic objective to a considerable measure.
In early 2006, President Rajapakse's new
administration and the LTTE decided to come back
to the negotiating table, and their
representatives met twice in Geneva. In the first
round of talks, in February 2006, they agreed to
'fully implement' the CFA, which at that time was
under severe stress in the Eastern province due
to a mini war between the mainstream LTTE and its
breakaway group, led by Karuna Amman. The
violations of the CFA during most of 2005 and
2006 occurred in the course of this internecine
conflict, during which the LTTE attempted to
invoke the clauses of the CFA that vested Colombo
with the responsibility of disarming paramilitary
groups. In fact, the split that took place when
Karuna broke away from the LTTE in early 2004 was
a crucial factor in pushing the ceasefire into a
major crisis, and the Sri Lankan Army seized the
opportunity to back the Karuna faction. As
eventually became clear, the Geneva talks were
actually a blatant smokescreen, as both parties
seemed intent on preparing for war.
For political reasons, neither side wanted to
formally withdraw from the CFA, though 2007 still
became a year of war between the two sides. The
conflict was considered 'undeclared' due to one
of the CFA's provisions, Clause 4.4, which
stipulated that either party could withdraw from
the CFA only after giving a specified notice to
the Norwegian government. The 'high point' of
this undeclared war was the military's early-2007
capture of the LTTE-held territory in the Eastern
province. A series of battles over several months
resulted in large-scale civilian displacement,
the deaths of many combatants on both sides, the
murders of humanitarian aid workers and serious
human-rights violations. Indeed, with the
escalating war, both humanitarian and
human-rights issues emerged as topics of
immediate concern. In fact, throughout 2007 both
the government and the LTTE treated the CFA with
scant regard.
Life after the CFA
It is in this context that many in Colombo have
welcomed President Rajapakse's decision, in early
January 2008, to abrogate the CFA. The epithets
used in the reactions are telling. For some who
welcomed the decision, the 'stinking corpse' of
the CFA has at last been buried; for others, the
CFA has long been a mere a piece of fiction,
anyway. For yet others, 'national pride' has been
restored. In Sinhala society, including among
political groups opposed to UNF-LTTE
negotiations, the absence of the CFA now paves
the way for the military defeat of the LTTE.
Perhaps for this reason, the LTTE's subsequent
statement, that it remained committed to the full
implementation of the CFA, was met with a
contemptuous response by Colombo officials. And
indeed, the LTTE's new love for the CFA needs to
be seen only as a political ploy to justify its
own military plans.
The empty rhetoric and past experience aside,
life in Sri Lanka without the CFA is going to be
very difficult. Despite the fact that it has been
subjected to repeated violations by both the
government and the LTTE, the existence of the CFA
and the presence of the Sri Lanka Monitoring
Mission in the conflict areas provided at least a
minimum assurance that the war would not descend
to the level of outright barbarism. In post-CFA
Sri Lanka, however, there is now no such external
check on the warring parties.
This tells us something unique about Sri Lanka's
ethnic conflict, as it is being enacted jointly
by the Rajapakse regime and the LTTE. Both
parties have managed to establish a distinct
measure of relative autonomy from the
international actors, in their decision-making
processes and actions with regard to the
conflict. The 2002 peace process
internationalised the conflict and its resolution
process to an unprecedented degree, symbolised by
the CFA. Both President Rajapakse and V
Prabhakaran have claimed this level of
internationalisation 'excessive'.
With the umbilical cord between Sri Lanka's
conflict-management process and the international
community, in the form of the CFA, having been
severed, both parties are now relatively free to
conduct the war in the way they feel suitable,
with no external pressures regarding human rights
or humanitarian consequences. In the coming
months, the conflict will become a war without
checks or balances, a war without inhibition.
______
[4]
HOW TO 'CARVE OUT A TERRORIST' FROM AN INNOCENT PERSON AND SAY IT WORKS?
by Subhash Gatade
(Judge: The papers on my table show he is
not Mukhtar. So what is his real name?
Officer: He is actually Aftab Alam Ansari.
Judge: That means you have arrested a
wrong person. How can this horrible blunder take
place?
The officer stayed silent.
Judge: If he is neither Mukhtar nor Raju,
why did not you write that in the petition
clearly? Have you written that? Please underline
that and show it to me.
As the officer began scanning the petition, he looked puzzled.
Judge: I'm not going to accept this
petition. Please go and make a fresh one.)
Aftab Alam Ansari, an electrician with a power
company in Kolkatta, is finally free. And the
ordeal through which he had to go through as a
'terrorist' is finally over.Recenly he met with
the Chief Minister of Bengal to apprise him of
the whole situation and seek help for his
mother's frailing health.
It is now history how he was arrested from
Baranagar in Kolkatta on 27 th November with
Bengal police's help supposedly for 'ferrying the
entire cache of explosives for the November
blasts in UP'.
It is now revealed that the Special Task Force of
the UP Police had been set on Aftab's trail by a
claim by two arrested militants - Mohamad Khalid
and Tariq Quazmi - that the mastermind of the
court blasts in the state called himself Aftab as
well as Mukhtar, Raju and Bangladeshi. The duo
however, had mentioned no middle name or surname.
Though Aftab is now free, Ayesha Begum - Aftab's
mother has other worries staring in her eyes.
Whether they would be able to live a normal life
and would ever be able to get out of the 'stigma'
attached to the whole operation and Aftab's brief
sojourn in Jail.
It is now clear that Aftab's arrest by the
overenthusistic UP STF was a case of mistaken
identity as he also hailed from Gorakhpur like
the ringleader of the November blast and also
shared his nickname 'Mukhtar'.
But now that Aftab, a innocent citizen of this
country is free at last, will it be OK to say
that the tragedy which befell Aftab would be the
last one of its kind. And henceforth no Aftab
living on this part of the earth would ever be
traumatised in a similar manner. Looking at the
track record of the Indian police and the bigotry
and sectarianism of the powers that be it would
be dishonesty to make any such grand claim.
In fact the day the news of Aftab's freedom in
jail appeared, one came across the strictures
passed by the Maharashtra high court against the
Maharashtra police's arbitrariness in handling
the Khwaja Yunus case. It is now history how
Khwaja Yunus, a Gulf returned software engineer,
was arrested by the police on December 27, 2002
and booked under the Prevention of Terrorism Act,
in connection with the Ghatkopar blast. On
January 7, 2003 Yunus was found dead amidst
police claims that he had escaped after the
vehicle in which he was being escorted to
Aurangabad had met with an accident. Later it was
revealed that Yunus was tortured to death by some
police officers. After persistent protests by
human rights activists about this custodial death
and struggle for justice launched by Yunus's
mother Aasiya Begum, FIR was lodged against the
guilty policemen. Of course the dillydallying on
part of the Maharashtra government continued
unabated.The highcourt 's query was simple 'Why
were ten top police officers initially named by
CID for their alleged involvment in the custodial
death of Yunus let off ?'
While Aftab is finally a free man, Mohammad
Moarif Qamar and Irshad Ali, two residents of
Delhi seem to be not so lucky even after
languishing in jail for more than two years. Both
of them were victims of well-planned conspiracy
hatched by the Special Cell of the Delhi Police
in collaboration with the intelligence bureau
operatives. CBI found to its dismay that IB
officials colluded with Delhi police personnel to
'plant' RDX on these youths who were arrested as
'Al Badr' terrorists. While Qamar was abducted
from his Bhajanpura residence on Dec 22, 2005
itself ; Irshad Ali had gone missing from his
Sultanpuri home 10 days earlier. Their relatives
had informed the police about their sudden
disappearance. On February 9, 2006 the family
members were told that both had been arrested
with 2 Kg RDX and pistols. It was clear that they
were kept in illegal detention by the special
cell all this while. One can just imagine if the
high courts had not intervened in the case and
directed the CBI to look into the matter, the
'terrorist' label on both these youths would have
stuck to them all their lives.
May it be the case of Aftab or for that matter
Khwaja Yunus, or Mohammad Qamar, Irshad Ali - it
is becoming increasingly clear that framing of
innocents and branding them as terrorist is the
latest norm among lawkeepers of the country.Of
course anyone familiar with the Indian situation
may easily notice the continuity in the rampant
misuse of various laws of detention and
confinement. Post 9/11 a significant change has
occured in the whole process. It is for everyone
to see that muslims as a community are
increasingly becoming the target of
criminalisation and terrorisation.
To be very frank, in all such cases it is
difficult to differentiate whether the people are
ruled by forces of the 'programmatic communalist
variety ( like the BJP or Shiv Sena) or the
'pragmatic communalists' like Congress.
It then becomes impossible to forget Mohammad
Afroz , who was arrested after 9/11by the Mumbai
police and was charged for planning a terrorist
attack . It was told to the pliant media then
that this 'dreaded terrorist' wanted to crash a
plane piloted by him on the British house of
Commons and Australia. A special team from Mumbai
police especially went to these countries but
could not bring back any evidence. Ultimately it
took the whole charge as a grand fabrication. It
was a time when Maharashtra was ruled by a
Secular front which comprised of parties like
Congress and NCP.
The 'dreaded terrorists' arrested in connection
with the five year old attack on the Raghunath
temple in Jammu also faced similar ordeal.The
courts finally absolved all the accused of any
charges and advised the police to properly use
its minds in handling sensitive cases of such
nature.These innocent people had to languish in
jail for such a long period for no fault of
theirs.
It is worth noting that despite many such fiascos
the powers that be never attempt to draw any
important lesson to avoid recurrence of such
incidents. On the contrary, the whole attempt is
to 'individualise' all such cases and proceed
with the established practice of stigmatisation
and brutalisation of the social and religious
minorities.
It is high time that they are told about the way
the Canadian government handled similar case.
Canadian-Syrian Mahel Arar - a young software
engineer - was seized by CIA operatives during a
stopover at New York in 2002 and was secretly
sent to Syria.Lodged in a grave like cell in
Syria, Arar was repeatedly tortured to extract
information which he did not know. Ultimately his
tormentors released him within a span of year and
half without ever being charged with a crime.
Looking back it is clear that Mahel Arar became a
victim of the Islamophobia manufactured by the
likes of Bush-Blair in the immediate aftermath of
9/11.
Last year Stephen Harper, Prime Minister of
Canada sought public apology for the ordeal which
Maher went through and for the role played by
Canadian officials in the whole affair . The
Canadian government also gave him nine million
dollars as compensation. Mr Harper said in full
public view of the media "On behalf of the
government of Canada, I wish to apologize to you,
Monia Mazigh (Arar's wife) and your family for
any role Canadian officials may have played in
the terrible ordeal that all of you experienced
in 2002 and 2003."
Is anyone listening ?
- subhash gatade, h 4 pusa apts, rohini sector
15, delhi 110085 Ph: 011-27872835
______
[5]
SALWA JUDUM PIL's
by Nandini Sundar
[Jan 28, 2008]
Dear Friends
The PILs on Salwa Judum were heard by the SC
yesterday (Justices Balakrishnan, Raveendran and
Tarun Chatterjee). The newspaper reports on the
case need some correction. There are two PILs -
Nandini Sundar and ors vs State of Chhattisgarh
and Kartam Joga and ors vs State of Chhattisgarh
and Union of India. Notice in the first was
issued on May 17 2007, and the CG government
responded only on January 23rd 2008, after 8
months. The counter does not address any of the
specific allegations of violations, and denies
that there is any violation of rights. It instead
resorts to name calling. The CG government was
not successful in having the petition dismissed.
Notice on the second (Kartam Joga and ors) was
issued on October 12 asking for a reply within
four weeks. CG government has not responded even
to date. The Court has now given them three weeks
time to respond to this petition. This petition
is filed by three persons who are themselves
affected - one had his house burnt down and is
now a refugee, one was severely beaten by Salwa
Judum and had to have an operation, and one
barely escaped assault from Salwa Judum. The
petitioners are all current or former elected
representatives in Dantewada district. The PIL
provides a list of 537 persons who have been
killed by the Salwa Judum and security forces
from June 2005 till the present, including 33
children, 45 women, 416 men and 43 unnamed
persons. This is a small fraction of the likely
killings, most of which have gone unreported. At
least 2825 houses have been burnt in the
undivided district of South Bastar (Dantewada).
At least 99 women have been raped. The petition
includes
statements from the residents of over a hundred
villages detailing incidents of killing, rape,
arson and loss of property at the hands of the
Salwa Judum.
Nandini Sundar
Professor, Department of Sociology
Delhi School of Economics
University of Delhi, Delhi 110007
Co-Editor, Contributions to Indian Sociology
______
[6] India:
THIRD FRONT OR THIRD RAIL?
by I.K.Shukla
With elections looming on the political horizon,
CPI-M's doughty general secretary Prakash Karat
has begun floating the idea of a Third Front
which would band together all secularist parties.
It would keep BJP and Congress out and away since
these have been communally driven, and would
counter their hard (overt) and soft (covert and
coy) variants of communal virus. The voters would
be offered a choice between the peddlers of
theo-fascist terrorism which has cost the nation
thousands of innocent lives and the protagonists
of secularism which is antithetical to every kind
of discrimination.
Given the pervasive atmosphere of mayhem and
meanness that saturate the current political
landscape, Karat's idea, at first glance, comes
as a whiff of fresh air long sought and longingly
awaited. Any formation that promises some respite
from the death squad savagery of BJP and the
fecklessness of Congress that throws to winds the
victims of BJP's relentless series of communal
carnages would be more than welcome. But are good
intentions enough? Is it not true that sometimes
they pave the way to hell?
In terms of the electoral game, proudly touted as
democracy, is it realistic to hope for many
partisans of sincere and substantive secularism?
Is it merely temporizing, an electoral slogan, a
tentative tactic, or an ideological credo
affirming respect for and commitment to
republican India and its Constitution? Does CP-M
believe in the separation of religion and state?
Do its prospective associates? Secularism is not
visiting mandirs, mosques, churches and gurdwaras
by politicos and state functionaries who preside
over religiously marked events and noisily queue
up for iftar parties. This is, in fact, invasive
intrusion of religion in the affairs of the
state, and it breeds plethora of troubles as
manifest so far. It is not even equal respect for
all religions, platitudinous assertion to the
contrary notwithstanding. In fact it is vulgar de
rigueur, instrumentalizing religion in the bid
for personal power, just like US presidential
hopefuls holding a baby for the journalists'
cameras every poll season of carnival and charade.
Secularism posits egalitarianism, respect for
diversity, embrace of pluralism and rule of law,
equality between citizens, and justice for all.
These absent, secularism is reduced to an empty
shell.
Does Karat believe there are political parties
around which are devoutly so committed? Does he
believe secularism will or can be promoted
through the parliament? Were it so, why are child
marriage and bride burning still so rampant? Is
parliamentarism be all and end all of progressive
and socially transformative politics? How does he
square this solicitude for parliamentary path
with the fact that not just abominable characters
continue to become law-makers but also
yesteryear's rajas and ranis have morphed
overnight into custom-designed democrats?
It is identity-mired, caste-encrusted,
region-pulled, and individual-centred chiaroscuro
that is politics now all across India. Can he
eschew or escape it? Can he dent it, moderate it?
Very unlikely. Not to put too fine a point on it,
here are a few examples. Mayawati joined forces
with BJP several times, to the extent that she
stumped in Gujarat for Modi, the notorious
merchant of death! She also became cozy with
Congress, impelled not by noble motives like
secularism but by her calculus of power grab. The
cases of Jayalalita, Deve Gowda, and Chandrababu
Naidu are some of the stark disappointments.
Mulayam Singh-Amar Singh (Ambani pals)? If wishes
were horses we would ride them. Time servers and
opportunists, aya rams and gaya rams now form the
staple of poll politics, which is, in plain
words, power grab, all salivating for a piece of
the pie.
Urgently much needed and far more viable would be
a national left front to galvanise the masses,
not just the voters, and defeat the deadly
duopoly of Congress and BJP, as mooted by Kshiti
Goswami of RSP.
The Congress whine that the Third Front would
divide and weaken secularists is no more than
that, a whine, only to enable its sustenance in
power. Its secular credentials lie tattered all
over the length and breadth of India.
If he has not set himself the task of a modern
Vishwakarma for fabricating secularists on
demand, and clone them in sufficient numbers to
form a sizeable party, Karat's noble and
grandiose idea is just, alas, an idea, whose time
in the inimitable Indian political calendar has
not yet come, alas.
Joker's red nose: For Advani who has certified
RSS and BJP as "secular". He calculated, he
would thus pre-empt any prospective threat of
Parivar being banned as a communal fascist mafia.
Already "acting" as PM presumptive! Beware of
this instant "secularist" who believes
seditionist and serial killer to be synonyms of
secularist.
31 Jan 2008
______
[7] India's Hindu Right - Discourse and Action
(i)
BBC News - 30 January 2008
AMBIVALENT VIEWS OVER GANDHI KILLER
by Rajesh Joshi
BBC Hindi service
Mahatma Gandhi
Gandhi was killed by a Hindu nationalist
As India observes the 60th anniversary of Mahatma
Gandhi's death, Hindu nationalist groups still
grapple with the question whether to reject or
appreciate his killer.
Mahatma Gandhi was assassinated by a Hindu
nationalist Nathuram Godse on 30 January, 1948 in
Delhi's Birla House.
In the communally charged atmosphere during
India's Partition in August 1947, Godse and his
accomplices held Mahatma Gandhi responsible for
the miseries of the Hindus and accused him of
appeasing Muslims.
Right-wing Hindu nationalist organisations like
the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh, (Nationalist
Volunteers' Organisation) were banned and many of
its leaders were sent to jail following the
assassination of Gandhi.
The RSS is the ideological fountainhead of India's main opposition party BJP.
'Selfless act'
Nathuram Godse was later tried and hanged but the
RSS was exonerated and the government decided to
lift the ban on its activities.
Even though the RSS publicly rejects Nathuram
Godse, its leaders don't hide their appreciation
for what they call his "selfless act".
"We will have to accept that Nathuram Godse acted
with selfless spirit; he did not have any
self-interest in it. He must also have been aware
that he would be hanged for what he was going to
do. This spirit cannot be denied," RSS ideologue
Devendra Swaroop told the BBC.
"But he was wrong if he thought that Gandhiji was
taking history in a wrong direction and by
killing him he could correct the course of
history," adds Mr Swaroop.
"RSS firmly believes that Godse acted at the spur
of the moment and it was quite detrimental for
the Hindu society. Gandhi dead proved to be
stronger than Gandhi alive."
Mahatma Gandhi
Some Hindu leaders have condemned Gandhi's policy of non-violence
Leaders of the Bajrang Dal, another affiliate of
the RSS, believe that Godse's role in history
needs to be reassessed.
"People may object to his method but I don't
believe that he committed such an act (of killing
Gandhi) with some personal animosity," says
Prakash Sharma, head of the Bajrang Dal.
"He was concerned for the country and at that
time he did what he thought was right."
Gandhi and his thoughts have more than once posed
a challenge to the ideology of Hindu nationalists.
Some Hindu leaders openly condemned Gandhi's
policy of non-violence and friendship between
Hindus and Muslims during the anti-Muslim riots
that broke out in India's western state Gujarat
in February 2002.
'Abandon Gandhi'
Pravin Togadia of the Vishwa Hindu Parishad
(World Hindu Council) said in a public gathering:
"Until the day we give up Gandhi's ideology of
non violence and the ideology of surrendering
before the Muslims, terrorism cannot be defeated."
"My brothers, we will have to abandon Gandhi."
However, RSS spokesman Ram Madhav denies that his
organisation faces a dilemma about Godse.
Gujarat riots, 2001
The 2002 Gujarat riots left many Muslims isolated
"This issue had been resolved decades ago that he
(Godse) had nothing to do with RSS and Gandhiji's
assassination had nothing to do with RSS," he
said.
But Mahatma Gandhi's great grandson Tushar Gandhi
is not impressed - he accuses the RSS of
doublespeak.
"Whenever an organisation uses a weapon to
achieve its agenda, it abandons the weapon after
using it. They use and throw it like a condom,"
he said.
"I have seen a deep feeling of devotion in the
Sangh Parivar (or the RSS family) for Nathuram
Godse and I know how they cherish him. But they
do it secretly because they lack the courage."
(ii)
DELVING INTO GANDHI KILLER'S MIND | GODSE CULT
Suchetana Ray / CNN-IBN / CNN-IBN - Jan 30, 2008
http://www.ibnlive.com/news/delving-deeper-into-the-mind-of-gandhi-killer/57734-19.html
http://www.ibnlive.com/videos/57734/delving-into-gandhi-killers-mind---godse-cult.html
(iii)
FROM THE PAGES OF HISTORY
by Anil Nauriya (The Hindu, January 29, 2008)
Book Review of Tushar Gandhi's book 'Let's Kill
Gandhi' - A Chronicle of His Last Days, the
Conspiracy, Murder, Investigation and Trial |
Rupa & Co, 7/16, Ansari Road, Daryaganj, New
Delhi-110002. Rs. 995.
http://www.hindu.com/br/2008/01/29/stories/2008012950021400.htm
______
[8] INDIA: HINDUTVA FLOURISHING IN ORISSA
(i) Sign On Online Petition Re Protection Of The
Rights Of The Christian Minorities In Orissa
To: Prime Minister of India
To,
Dr. Manmohan Singh
Prime Minister of India,
Prime Minister's Office, South Block,
Raisina Hill, New Delhi, 110011, India
Fax : (+) 91 -11- 2301 9545/23016857
Email : manmohan at alpha.nic.in/pmosb at pmo.nic.in
Honourable Prime Minister,
Protection of the Rights of the Christian Minorities in Orissa
We write with deep concern over the communal
violence that engulfed the district of Khandhamal
in Orissa since the eve of Christmas. The
violence has led to the death of persons; injury
to many and thousands of people have been
rendered homeless and penniless. Many houses have
been torched and looted. Hundreds of people have
fled to the woods. The victims of this violence
have been Christians. The timing of the attack
and the way it has been carried out reveal that
there is a dangerous attempt by some forces to
eliminate Christians and to annihilate
Christianity.
The State has failed in its duty to protect the
rights of Christians - to protection of life and
personal liberty and to freedom of conscience and
free profession, practice and propagation of
religion - the very rights enshrined in the
Constitution of the country (Articles 21 & 25)
and in the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights (ICCPR Articles 18 & 27) to
which the Government of India is a party.
In this context, we appeal to you, Sir, to initiate suitable measures so as to:
* Protect the rights and the lives and the properties of Christians in Orissa
* Provide immediate relief and adequate
compensation to the victims as per ICCPR Article
2.3.1
* Ensure peace and harmony in the State so that
people may live without fear and freely practise
their faith.
Thanking you,
Sincerely,
[Petition URL
http://www.petitiononline.com/orissa/petition.html ]
o o o
(ii)
(iv)
ORISSA: SANGH PARIVAR DEMANDS BAN AND BURNS TEXTBOOK
http://www.telegraphindia.com/1080201/jsp/frontpage/story_8848254.jsp
______
[9]
The Times of India - 31 Jan 2008
INTELLECTUALS CONCERNED OVER TASLIMA NASREEN'S HEALTH
NEW DELHI: Concerned over the health of
controversial writer Taslima Nasreen, a group of
intellectuals have asked the Centre to ensure
that she leads a "normal" life.
"We are highly concerned about the health and
well being of Taslima Nasreen who is for the last
three months being kept in a virtual detention in
a secret place in Delhi," the intellectuals led
by the former Prime Minister I K Gujral said in a
letter to Home Minister Shivraj Patil.
They also expressed concern over the
"implications the treatment being meted out to
her would have on the values of freedom, human
rights and human dignity".
"We have come to know that Nasreen is not allowed
to stir out of her house and no friend or
acquaintance from outside is allowed to meet
her," the letter said asserting that the
deprivation from leading a normal life was
affecting her health and creative work.
"Last week inadequate medical attention and
bungling by doctors arranged by the government
proved life threatening for her," they alleged.
The letter was written by besides Gujral,
sociologist Ashish Nandy, veteran journalist
Kuldip Nayar, Sumit Chakrabarty and Muchkund
Dubey.
"We are convinced that if she is allowed to lead
a normal life again, nobody will pose a threat to
her life except some fringe extremist elements
who must be dealt with by the government
according to the law of the land," it said.
Nasreen, who has been kept in an undisclosed
location by the Centre, was hospitalised for a
couple of days at the AIIMS following complaints
of uneasiness due to adverse reaction to some
medicines.
______
[10] Announcements:
(i)
Dear friend ,
The Jan Pratinidhi Manch is organising a public
meeting on Sunday, February 3, 2008, from 1:30
p.m. onwards, at the Gandhi Peace Foundation.
The topic of discussion is 'Ensuring
participation of the public in making policy
decisions'.
You will recall the active campaign that Jan
Pratinidhi Manch carried out during the Delhi
Municipal Corporation elections in March 2007, to
field candidates selected by the residents in
several words in Delhi, in order to challenge the
stranglehold of the established political parties
over the political process. The JPM has also put
forward a series of proposals to ensure
accountability of the elected candidates to the
people of their constituency. This entire
experience has to be taken forward by all of us,
so that we, the residents of Delhi, do not
continue to remain mere vote banks, but are able
to assert our right to influence important policy
decisions that affect our lives.
Please do attend and give your views addressing
the issue, as well as participate in the panel
discussion that will follow.
There will also be a discussion on 'strategies
for people's participation in the 2008 Delhi
Assembly elections'.
Looking forward to your active participation in the above event,
With regards,
Sucharita, Pankaj Gupta, Birju Nayak, Amjad, K. Mitroo,
On behalf of the Coordination Committee
Jan Pratinidhi Manch
Phone:- 9818575435 Bijju Nayak for further information.
___
(ii)
Pakistan India People's Forum for Peace and Democracy
Delhi Chapter
Cordially Invites You To
A Symposium On the Occasion of its Annual Convention
"Crisis of Democracy: Implications for Pakistan- India Peace Process"
(Speakers: Muchkund Dubey, Anuradha Bhasin, Praful Bidwai, Kamla Bhasin)
February 5, 2008, 4.00 - 6.15 PM
&
Music Program By Vidya Shah (06.30 07.30 PM)
Venue: Conference Hall, Ground Floor
Indian Social Institute (ISI) 10 - Institutional Area, Lodi Road
New Delhi - 110003
Contact : B - 5/136, First Floor, Safdarjung Enclave, New Delhi - 110029
Tel: 011-26195534/35, Ravi Hemadri - 9871415186, Bipin Kumar - 9899840820
Programme
03:00 - 04:00 PM: PIPFPD Organization meeting (For Members Only)
04:00 - 04:15 PM: Tea
04:15 - 06:15 PM: Symposium
06:30 - 07:30 PM: Cultural Programme
_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/
Buzz for secularism, on the dangers of fundamentalism(s), on
matters of peace and democratisation in South
Asia. SACW is an independent & non-profit
citizens wire service run since 1998 by South
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