SACW | 18 Dec 2004

[sacw]

South Asia Citizens Wire  | 18 Dec.,  2004
via:  www.sacw.net

[1] Kashmir - Pakistan - India:  Milestone 
Kathmandu conference (Edit., Daily Times)
[2] Kashmir issue - How not to dialogue (Balraj Puri)
[3] Kashmir: Elusive Solution (Gautam Navlakha)
[4] India - Pakistan: Yet another opportunity has been missed (MB Naqvi)
[5] Upcoming events :
(i) Invitation: Talk on "The MMA Govt in 
NWFP,Pakistan" (New Delhi, 23 Dec. 2004)
(ii) Second South Asian Workshop on Racism, 
Xenophobia, and Discrimination against Ethnic 
Minorities and Indigenous People (Lahore, March 
22-31, 2005)


--------------

[1]


Daily Times
December 17, 2004
Editorial

MILESTONE KATHMANDU CONFERENCE

The Pugwash Conference on Science and World 
Affairs has recently concluded a meeting in 
Kathmandu that brought together experts from 
India, Pakistan, the United States and some other 
countries. Even more significantly it had some 
leaders and analysts from the two sides of 
Kashmir - Azad Kashmir and Indian-Held Kashmir. 
This was a milestone conference for many reasons.
The stimulus for Pugwash came from a Manifesto 
issued in 1955 by eminent scientist Albert 
Einstein and philosopher Bertrand Russell. The 
manifesto "called upon scientists of all 
political persuasions to assemble to discuss the 
threat posed to civilisation by the advent of 
thermonuclear weapons". The forum got its name 
from Pugwash, a small village in Nova Scotia in 
Canada, birthplace of the American philanthropist 
Cyrus Eaton, who hosted the first meeting. Since 
that day, Pugwash has expanded to cover various 
areas of security and conflict resolution. It 
brings together, "from around the world, 
influential scholars and public figures concerned 
with reducing the danger of armed conflict and 
seeking cooperative solutions for global 
problems".
During the Cold War, Pugwash provided a forum to 
antagonists on both sides of the East-West divide 
to talk to each other candidly in private. This 
is why Pugwash meetings work on the principle of 
non-reporting. While the Einstein-Russell 
Manifesto sets the ideal goal, much of Pugwash's 
success - for instance, in relation to preventing 
the spread of nuclear weapons - was owed to its 
policy-oriented approach. In 1995, it got the 
Nobel Prize for Peace in recognition of the work 
it had done towards non-proliferation and arms 
control.
For the last four years, Pugwash has also been 
involved in reducing the risk of war between 
India and Pakistan - following the nuclearisation 
of the two countries - and has recently also 
joined efforts to try and work out a solution to 
the Kashmir problem. The Kathmandu conference was 
a follow-up on at least two earlier conferences 
in Geneva and New Delhi. However, this was the 
first time it managed to bring together leaders 
and opinion makers from both sides of the Line of 
Control.
What is good is the fact that the meeting was 
facilitated by the governments of India and 
Pakistan, though there were anxious moments when 
bureaucrats on both sides tried to throw a 
spanner in the works. Pugwash was also a little 
concerned about some press coverage in the run-up 
to the conference, some of which hinted at its 
(Pugwash) being part of the American efforts to 
work out a solution. That is wrong, as Pugwash 
was at pains to point out. It simply provides a 
forum for frank and candid exchange of ideas 
which, most would agree, is important as part of 
ongoing efforts to improve the atmospherics 
between India and Pakistan and keep the 
normalisation process on the rails. Additionally, 
this particular meeting proved significant 
because of the interface between Kashmiri 
leadership from AJK and IHK. It has been a 
longstanding demand of Pakistan as well as the 
All Parties Hurriyat Conference that Kashmiris on 
both sides should be allowed to meet and work out 
a joint strategy. Therefore, it makes eminent 
sense for Pakistan to support all initiatives, 
whether official or unofficial, which seek to do 
just that.
Given that the UN resolutions on Kashmir have 
become mostly moribund in the backdrop of India's 
refusal to accept them, it is important to come 
up with creative solutions. Also, no solution of 
Kashmir is likely to stick unless it is generally 
acceptable to the majority of Kashmiris. This is 
also the official position of Pakistan and 
General Pervez Musharraf has reiterated it 
consistently. A good upshot of the recent meeting 
has been the committees set up to intensify 
contacts between leaders on both sides and 
provide them the space to flesh out ideas 
discussed at the Kathmandu meeting. That is why 
this development should be welcomed by India and 
Pakistan. Both can use the Kashmiris to climb 
down from their maximalist positions without 
losing face. *

______


[2]

Deccan Herald
December 17, 2004

KASHMIR ISSUE - HOW NOT TO DIALOGUE
Apart from people-to-people contacts, there is 
need for internal dialogue to resolve the Kashmir 
issue
By Balraj Puri

Pugwash, a US-based think tank recently organised 
an intra-Kashmir dialogue between leaders of the 
Indian and Pakistani parts of state, "to resolve 
the Kashmir issue", at Kathmandu. The nearly 60 
participants included not only politicians, 
academicians and journalists belonging to the two 
sides but also former generals and diplomats of 
India and Pakistan.

Personal level contacts and dialogue are 
certainly a better substitute for violence. To 
the extent that the Kathmandu conference creates 
an atmosphere for peace and amity between the two 
countries, it should be welcomed as should all 
other avenues of people-to-people contacts and 
Track II diplomacy. But if it creates 
expectations, as claimed by the organisers, that 
it would seek a solution of the problem, and if 
these expectations are not fulfilled, a backlash 
cannot be ruled out.

As none of the participants had authority on 
behalf of their constituencies or governments, 
they did not deviate from their formal positions. 
But an opportunity to know, first-hand, the views 
from the other side, might be a gain.

If it had been a meet of intellectuals and 
experts, they could have exchanged their 
knowledge and views and even prepared a road map 
for various stages that have to be covered before 
the final solution is attempted. But if 
politicians had also joined them, it would have 
been difficult to avoid a controversy over their 
representative character. Senior leaders of some 
of the parties, though invited, chose not to go 
to Kathmandu. They include Ali Shah Gilani, Yasin 
Malik, Mehbooba Mufi, Omar Farooq and Yusuf 
Tarigami. No representative of the Congress party 
and of the Ladakh region, nor of the Gujar and 
Pahari communities, was invited.

Would any concrete decision of the conference - 
apart from pious sentiments of mutual goodwill if 
at all reached - be acceptable to these 
absentees? It would be far better to persuade the 
two governments to allow the leaders and people 
on both sides of the LoC to visit the other side, 
interact with the persons of their choice and be 
acquainted with the realities on the ground, 
subject, of course, to the security concerns of 
the two governments. On return, they could 
discuss their impressions with their colleagues 
and if they like with their governments.

Internal dialogue needed
Again, this will not, in itself, obviate the 
necessity of internal dialogue. No two parties in 
Kashmir valley, at present, are on speaking terms 
with each other.

The Hurriyat which at one time claimed and was 
recognised by international media and foreign 
governments, as the sole representative of the 
people of the entire, or at any rate of the 
separatist camp, is split in at least four parts. 
The relations between what are called the 
mainstream parties, viz the ruling party, PDP, 
and the main opposition, the National Conference, 
are no better.

Much more serious damage that international 
conferences to find a solution for the Kashmir 
issue do, is to the internal coherence of the 
state. As external relations of the state become 
paramount, regions and communities will have a 
tendency to be pulled toward divergent directions.

Unless internal harmony between the aspirations 
and interests of all the diversities with which 
the state is endowed, is restored, the state 
cannot aspire for a stable and satisfactory 
status.

The only other alternative is to split the state, 
which inevitably would tend to be on religious 
lines. Can the state, India and the subcontinent 
afford another division on religious lines?

Any solution - merger with Pakistan, 
independence, status quo or autonomy of the state 
- in the absence of a systemic changes in the 
present over-centralised state, would be wrecked. 
It would further accentuate internal tensions and 
divisions. The Delhi Agreement in 1952, on the 
autonomy of the state, with the overwhelming 
popular support of the people of the Kashmir 
valley, it may be recalled, was wrecked, not by 
the government of India, but by a massive 
opposition to it by the people of Jammu, who were 
afraid that more autonomy to the state would 
increase the capacity of Kashmiri leaders to 
dominate over them.

Would any other solution like still greater 
autonomy or independence work if it does not 
provide for credible safeguards for Jammu and 
Ladakh? In 1952, my suggestion for regional 
autonomy to ensure such safeguards was accepted 
by Nehru and Sheikh Abdullah. But somehow it was 
never implemented.

Resolution adopted
Again, the J&K state People's Convention, 
convened by Sheikh Abdullah in 1968 and attended 
by each and every section of the Kashmir valley, 
adopted a resolution to seek a solution of the 
problem which kept in view the interests of all 
the regions. It offered to settle terms with 
either of the two governments, to implement a 
five-tier internal constitution of the state, 
which would define the distribution of powers at 
the state, region, district, block and panchayat 
levels.

If a dialogue is started and a consensus is 
reached within the Indian part of the state on 
the basis of the commitment of Nehru and Abdullah 
in 1952 and of the People's Convention or any 
modification thereof, it would be easier to 
initiate a dialogue on the external status of the 
state, with leaders across the LoC and the 
governments of the two countries. For there would 
then be a better appreciation by each community 
and region, of the aspirations of the others.

______


[3]

Economic and Political weekly
November 20, 2004

KASHMIR: ELUSIVE SOLUTION

It is time to discard an archaic approach to 
Kashmir that is grounded in the 19th century 
version of the nation which privileges territory 
over people. Eliciting the wishes of the 
Kashmiris will allow all sections to put their 
best foot forward and spell out what their vision 
of the future is. Talks between India and 
Pakistan will not by themselves resolve the issue.

Gautam Navlakha 

To managers of India's 'national security' the 
government of Pakistan is talking from a position 
of weakness when it expresses its willingness to 
drop its demand for a referendum/plebiscite in 
Jammu and Kashmir from the agenda. It is held 
that Pakistan's room for manoeuvre is 
circumscribed by its army's engagement in the US 
war on terror and also against its own people as 
evident from Wana and Baluchistan operations in 
early 2004. Pakistan's army is planning five 
cantonments in Baluchistan; besides having to 
combat sectarian violence at home, it has seen 
the 'separatist' leadership splintered in J and 
K; and has its own internal compulsions to rein 
in the Lashkar-i-Tayyaiba and Jaish-i-Mohhammed, 
etc. However, even its worst detratctors will 
admit that Pakistan continues to wield a strong 
influence in J and K. Yet, the Congress-led UPA 
government appears to just trudge along the 
already failed policy of wearing down a people 
and pretending to talk from a position of 
strength!
  . Presumably it is a mark of strength that the 
Indian army wants to set up its fourth corps 
headquarters in J and K, called the XVII Corps, 
and is lobbying hard for clearance to establish a 
new south-west command. The belief that India can 
afford a long-drawn-out war of attrition because 
its size and strength give it resilience may be 
good for propaganda, but in political terms, this 
translates into pushing a reluctant people to 
accept accommodation within the four walls of the 
Constitution, accompanied with a caveat that this 
rules out autonomy and favours devolution. 
Matters are not helped by underplaying repression 
by the armed forces and overplaying armed 
militancy, or belittling aspirations while 
exaggerating 'fundamentalism'.

Uncharacteristically the prime minister in his 
very first meeting with the president of Pakistan 
in New York on September 24 showed a willigness 
to explore a variety of 'possible options' for a 
peaceful negotiated solution.1 It is good that 
the two governments are talking to each other - 
border shelling has ceased, and the level of 
rhetoric has come down. But that is where the 
buck stops. The war against the Kashmiris has not 
stopped. The operation of the Armed Forces 
Special Powers Act (AFSPA) remains in place, with 
heavy troop deployment much beyond what is 
ostensibly required to combat armed militants. 
And in keeping with the past, the two governments 
have not involved the people of J and K in the 
search for solutions. This places a huge question 
mark about the effectiveness of the bilateral 
effort. So low is the credibility of the 
government that the prime minister for the third 
time had to postpone his visit to Srinagar. (The 
PM began his Kashmir tour on November 17.) T!
  he reason is that none of the 'separatist' 
leaders is willing to talk to GoI without a 
condition - that they be allowed to visit 
Pakistan first. (The home minister, Shivraj 
Patil, said in early November that the government 
was not averse to such a visit.) Indian policy 
and opinion makers are much too fond of listening 
to their own compositions and would like nothing 
better than to sideline Kashmiris from 
substantive dialogue. And they exhibit a 
propensity to hegemonise resistance by declaring 
what is acceptable and what is not, what they can 
say and what they cannot. For instance, the 
plight of Kashmiri pandits is invariably invoked 
to raise doubts about the democratic credentials 
of the Kashmiri movement. By all means the 
political leadership must be blamed for driving 
the Pandits out of the valley in March 1990 and 
enabling an all-out attack on the Kashmiri 
Muslims by the security forces. But what about 
the responsibility of the Indian secularists? Is 
not their continued acquiescence in the 
occupation-like behaviour of the security force a 
bigger crime? At least the 'separatist' movement 
has recanted and has shown a healthy appreciation 
of the need to reach out to the Hindu minority in 
Kashmir.

Against this background the dissolution of the 
Ittehadi Force, following the unilateral decision 
of one of its major consituents, the 
Jamaat-i-Islami to support the Syed Ali Shah 
Geelani led Tehreek-i-Hurriyet (TiH) acquires 
importance. While this may have deepened 
divisions within the ranks of the 'separatist' 
leadership, the fact of the matter is that a 
divided All Party Hurriyet Conference lacked 
credibility when it began talks with the Indian 
government. In contrast, S A S Geelani is one of 
the few leaders who is respected even by his 
detractors in Kashmir for offering stubborn 
resistance to the Indian authorities. Besides, he 
is admired by the militants and, backed now by 
the organisational reach of the JeI makes the TiH 
led by him is formidable political force. While 
the TiH cannot become a rallying point for all 
those who speak for 'azaadi' because it has 
chosen to replace support for right of 
self-determination by a call for accession with 
Pakistan, this development  nevertheless portends 
ill for the Indian government.

There were occasions in the past when the 
government of India could have politically 
undermined the territorial dimension of the 
Kashmir issue by addressing the aspirations of 
the people of J and K. The issue of territorial 
dimension returned to prominence in 1989-90 
precisely because of the estrangement of the 
Kashmiris. Since 1990 the GoI's record has been 
qunitessentially subversive. When 'free and fair 
elections' could have worked, the Kashmiris were 
awarded with rigging (from 1951 to 1987). When 
they showed a willingness to talk it was seen as 
a sign of their weakness (the JKLF in 1993 and 
the Hizbul Mujahideen in 1999). They refused to 
talk to Hurriyet when it was united. Either their 
representative character was questioned or they 
were accused of being proxy for Pakistan. When 
talks were held it was with a rump APHC in 2004. 
When the GoI was asked to create conditions that 
would give a fillip to 'talks' they responded 
with offering crumbs (just about 100 political 
prisoners out of an official list of 600 released 
over six months). Indeed, they made sure that no 
substantive gestures such as the release of 
political prisoners, ceasefire, or even a 
withdrawal of Armed Forces Special Powers Act, 
etc, were offered. Violations of human rights did 
not cease. But the frequency of assurances and 
their being breached did show an increase. Indeed 
the GoI's willingness to talk was made into a 
momentous event and, therefore, crumbs were 
passed off as concessions. The charade was meant 
to deflate the real issue: dialogue with those 
questioning Kashmir's accession to India. Having 
dealt with J and K as though it was a rebellious 
province of a far-flung empire - denying 
liberties to the recalcitrant people otherwise 
available to its citizens, lends a certain 
poignancy to the demand for self-determination. 
In other words, the time when people could be 
persuaded to agree to a solution through talks is 
well and truly past. And even the best, the most 
honourable agreement arrived between the two 
governments, will be rejected by the people 
because, very simply, they want to decide their 
future.

Once elections to the 14th Lok Sabha were 
completed, the GoI began to claim that more 
people turned out to cast their vote for the 
Indian parliament in April-May 2004 than they had 
in 1999 (but less than the 40 per cent claimed 
for 2002 assembly polls). It was read to mean 
that militancy is on the wane. With the 
leadership of the Hurriyet divided, the political 
space occupied by them was believed to have 
shrunk. And Pakistan's manoeuvrability vis-a-vis 
J and K was said to have diminished. All in all, 
an impression gained ground that the root cause 
of the conflict could be ignored. However 
important elections are for bringing about regime 
change through the ballot box, the procedure is 
not worth much in the absence of institutions or 
mechanisms which ensure accountability of the 
rulers and protection for the ruled. Where the 
armed forces call the shots, as in J and K, since 
October 1990 under the AFSPA, the legitimacy of 
elections becomes suspect; the AFSPA does not 
define a !
  crime, rather it empowers the security forces to 
restore authority in an area declared 'disturbed' 
even by killing someone on mere suspicion. The 
judiciary exercises no control over the security 
forces in J and K since section 6 of the AFSPA 
virtually indemnifies the personnel from the 
threat of prosecution. The J and K Bar 
Association pointed out in April 2004 that 60,000 
writs of habeas corpus filed in the high court 
since 1990 had been to no avail. Three thousands 
of them are still pending before the high court. 
Security forces simply ignored notices/orders 
issued against them and got away with lawless 
behaviour. Since November 2002 (until August 31, 
2004), under the Mufti government there have been 
69 instances of custodial killing. In 47 of them 
the government ordered inquiries. In just three 
cases the reports of the inquiry committees were 
made public. In each of these three cases it was 
confirmed that civilians were killed and that 
these civilians were passed off as militants. 
What is shocking is that the National Human 
Rights Commission, in its report for 2003, found 
not a single instance of custodial killing in J 
and K! The civil administration is unable to 
provide succour to all the 'victims of violence' 
claiming a resource crunch. Apart from resources, 
even the elementary civil liberties that Indians 
take for granted such as holding a dharna, 
staging protests, and taking out rallies stand 
virtually suspended. Of course, it is possible to 
take out a rally against the US occupation of 
Iraq but protests against 'enforced 
disappearances' in J and K and to submit 
memorandum to the UN office invites a 
lathicharge. In border districts villagers are 
disallowed from keeping more than a fixed amount 
of rations ostensibly to prevent them from being 
shared with militants. This inconveniences the 
villagers who have to travel every few days over 
hilly terrain to purchase rations. If we turn to 
the electoral process, the charade of 'free and 
fair' elections stands exposed.

Disenfranchised Electorate

The size of the electorate in J and K is 64 lakhs 
in which Jammu with a smaller population than the 
Kashmir region has more voters. How is this 
possible? Simply because there has not been any 
intensive revision (door-to-door survey) of 
electoral rolls in J and K since 1987. This was 
substituted by a summary revision. Presumably it 
was the game of percentages (votes polled) that 
was important and not a free and fair poll. Lest 
even this exercise was not disturbed, parties 
campaigning for a boycott were barred from 
entering an area where meetings were planned, 
they were simply detained for a day or placed 
under house arrest. The Election Commission, 
which otherwise enjoys a high reputation 
besmirched its image in J and K yet again by 
refusing to declare that just as people have a 
right to canvass for a vote they also have a 
right to campaign for a boycott. In any case 
where the writ of the government is imposed by 
soldiers, helped by armoured carriers, 
road-blocks and body sea!
  rches, 'free choice' is a misnomer.

After all, what was the percentage of votes cast 
in 2004? Not more than 34 per cent. The army 
chief is on record as saying on April 26, 2004 
that at the beginning of the year, the number of 
militants was 3,400 which had come down to 1,800 
and "violence level is now a fourth of the 
violence during the assembly polls (in 2002)". 
The recently held by-polls in Pahalgam (18.66 per 
cent), Batmaloo (12.2 per cent), Akhnoor (61 per 
cent) and Basohli (58.25 per cent) assembly 
constituencies had an average vote percentage of 
38 per cent. What is significant is that by the 
government's own reckoning 66 per cent of the 
people boycotted the elections. Surely, if voter 
turnout is significant to show 'normalcy' then 
the nearly 70 per cent who boycotted must be 
decisive evidence of alienation? Thus, an 
overwhelming majority of people through a simple 
act of refusing to cast their vote reiterated 
their support for a demand that they be heard. It 
is unlikely that the managers of 'national sec!
  urity' do not know this. If the chief of the 
Indian army claims that armed militants are on 
the run and their numbers reduced to just about 
1,800, where is the need to persist with a 
massive deployment of security forces armed with 
the AFSPA? Is it not to deter people from giving 
expression to their demand for 'azaadi' and 
ensure that they do not take to mass political 
action? Because unarmed political manifestation 
would expose the fragility of the control 
maintained by a massive military presence. 
Despite the risk of sympathising with militants 
as well as feeling repulsed by many of their 
acts, people come out in large numbers to mourn 
the death of militants. In conditions where 
ordinary political activities are banned, these 
become the few ways in which an aggreived people 
express their pent-up anger. All in all the 
demons invented by the Indian government 
(fundamentalism, proxy war, cross-border 
terrorism) to dismiss the aspirations of a people 
will not change the one f!
  act that remains topical: there is a movement 
which is advancing a democratic demand that all 
the people of J and K (not the Muslims alone) be 
given an opportunity to decide their future.

Why Must People Decide

Unlike elsewhere, where one party spearheads the 
movement, in J and K there are a plurality of 
views/approaches contending for ascendancy - from 
those believing in independence, to advocates of 
accession with Pakistan, along with people who 
want the current status being accorded de jure 
recognition. Simultaneously, those who pass for 
their leaders often exhibit 'feet of clay'. There 
are honourable exceptions but the disunity does 
not inspire confidence. Therefore, when a faction 
of the APHC decided to hold talks with the 
central government there was no enthusiasm 
visible among people and, sure enough, the rump 
APHC failed to show anything for its labour. The 
Congress-led UPA government through its 
insistence on talks within the "four walls of the 
Constitution" provided them with an honourable 
exit.

This undercuts the first of the two-pronged 
approach of the government, namely, to appear to 
be talking to Kashmiris while dialoguing with 
Pakistan. Disunity in the Hurriyat was seen as 
keeping the separatists weak. And by appearing to 
be talking to a section of them, helped undercut 
Pakistan's claim. All this would have enabled GoI 
[Govt. of India] to win time. Now that talks with 
even the rump APHC are stalled, it will affect 
the dialogue between the two countries insofar as 
India's room for manoeuvre is circumscribed. 
Pakistan government has always maintained that 
India is insincere about resolving the dispute 
over Kashmir. At the same time they have insisted 
that only they can bring India to the table and 
force it to negotiate. Since Kashmiris are out of 
the picture and only an Indo-Pak dialogue will 
take place this is bound to lend weight to 
Pakistani claims that they alone can ensure that 
the aspirations of the Kashmiris are honoured. 
Under these circumstances, will not the onus from 
now on be on the Indian government to ensure that 
talks do not get de-railed? And if talks appear 
to be headed nowhere, then the demand for 
third-party mediation would pick up. In the 
short-run, India may be able to withstand such 
pressures. But the medium-term is another matter. 
Moreover, the US has declared Pakistan to be a 
major non-NATO ally. And has refused to share 
with India, so-called terrorism related 
information gathered by their intelligence 
agencies especially when related to India. Thus, 
interrogation reports of Fazlur Rahman Khalil, 
Qari Saifullah Akhtar and Mohamed Khan who were 
arrested earlier in the year and who were 
allegedly in contact with the al-Qaida network in 
India has not been provided to India. And the EU 
which had condemned the elections held in 2002 in 
Pakistan has now shifted tack and characterised 
the military regime as a key partner in their 
'war against terror', deserving of economic and 
military support. So much so they do not want 
general Musharraf to give up his post as army 
chief. It is notable that the EU's parliamentary 
team, after its visit to J and K, recommended a 
direct dialogue with Kashmiris and has asked that 
United Nations Military Observer Group in India 
and Pakistan (UNMOGIP) be allowed to conduct 
inspections on the LoC. For all we know this 
could be playing to the gallery. But the focus is 
now on India. In the past the US and EU have 
exhibited no compunction in fuelling an arms 
race, or using the tension between India and 
Pakistan over Kashmir for their own advantage. 
Now that India is pitching for a seat in the UN 
Security Council, it becomes legitimate for the 
international community to demand that India show 
proof that it is capable of fighting injustice in 
the world arena.

In hindsight, by building a fence (which can be 
breached) and upping the ante over 'cross border 
terrorism' the GoI has tied itself in knots. If 
the electrified barrier together with ground, air 
and space surveillance cannot stop 'infiltration' 
why expect anyone to accept Indian claims that 
trouble in Kashmir continues to be of 'foreign 
origin'? If the government cannot negotiate with 
those whom it claims are members of its 'integral 
part' why blame Pakistan? If the GoI is scared of 
listening to people talk secession and confines a 
solution to four walls of the constitution, why 
look far for reasons for a deadlock? Successive 
governments, spanning all permutations and 
combinations, in their disregard of the real 
issues and claims to infallibility, have brought 
about this situation. Let alone a debate on 
self-determination or self-rule in J and K, one 
would be hard-pressed to remember an occasion in 
parliament when a political party condemned the 
repeated imprisonment and ill!
  -treatment of SAS Geelani or Yasin Malik and 
others. There has not been a word of protest 
against the efforts of the government to suppress 
those who question accession to India. Once again 
non-bailable warrants were issued against SAS 
Geelani, Yasin Malik, Shabir Shah, etc, by a TADA 
court on a purported case of 'dishonouring the 
national flag', which was filed on August 20, 
1987. All because the government is worried that 
they will begin unarmed militant agitation. On 
the other hand, there has been plenty of 
grandstanding. One prime minister promised 
Kashmiris everything short of 'azaadi', another 
spoke of 'insaniyat' as the limit. The charade 
will carry on. No wonder trust is a scarce 
commodity in J and K, yet to be earned by the GoI.

A Way Forward

Be that as it may, disunity in the ranks of the 
self-determinists, which organisationally 
weakened the movement, paradoxically enhances the 
demand that people be allowed to decide. If the 
right of self-determination is what people 
exercise and not a choice imposed on them, then 
it lends strength to the fact that people want to 
decide for themselves and not be dictated to even 
by those claiming to represent their best 
interests or speak for them. This desire unites 
Kashmiris across all divisions including the one 
crafted by the LOC. Therefore, democratically 
harnessing this desire and translating it into 
representation, could provide a voice to the 
plurality of views that actually exists and 
offers one way out of this mess of India's 
making. It has the added incentive of helping 
delineate the agenda.

Why would Pakistan accept this proposition? 
Because notwithstanding the respect that S A S 
Geelani occupies in J and K it does not 
necessarily translate into endorsement for his 
politics. Despite TiH's support for accession to 
Pakistan, it is committed to respecting the 
people's wishes and cannot be seen as a proxy for 
the government of Pakistan. They insist that 
theirs is an autonomous voice of Kashmiris. 
Needless to add, their own credibility would be 
jeopardised were they to go against the tide of 
opinion. Thus it is unlikely that the two 
governments can ram a solution down the throats 
of a reluctant people. Were the wishes of the 
people actually ascertained, then it would 
scarcely be possible for anyone to ignore the 
fact that people do entertain choices other than 
accession to either India or Pakistan. Therefore, 
eliciting the wishes of the people prior to 
sitting across the table is a sensible option. 
This will change the prevailing circumstances and 
would enable the t!
  hree articulated options to put their best foot 
forward and spell out what their vision for 
future is. What do they favour: independence or 
accession? Where do they stand on the question of 
democracy and secularism? What is their position 
on autonomy and devolution? How will they share 
the water resources of J and K? What do they have 
to say about the protection of minorities - 
religious as well as political? How do they 
intend to address the issue of regional 
imbalances, etc? As of now, no side feels obliged 
to spell out its programme. Unless this status 
quo is disturbed and people are allowed to make 
informed choices, there can be no progress. This 
can help negotiations between India, Pakistan and 
Kashmiris in a way that the geo-strategic 
interests of the two countries and their 
contending historic claims can be reconciled with 
people's aspirations. So long as conditions of 
oppression continue to prevail in J and K, the 
bulk of people's time will be taken up in 
mediating !
  their way through draconian laws, while the 
security forces monitor their private and public 
lives. This lived reality defines for the people 
of J and K what it means to be an 'integral part' 
of India.

All in all, it is time to discard an archaic 
approach grounded in the 19th century version of 
the nation, which privileges territory over 
people. It is quite in keeping with democratic 
practice to let people decide their destiny. It 
is worth remembering that it is people who make a 
constitution and not the other way around. No 
doubt economic dependency has opened up India to 
global pressures, but there are also regional 
opportunities available to counter them. A major 
political initiative by India on Kashmir can pave 
the way for regional economic cooperation in 
south Asia which can help retrieve considerably 
more political ground than anything attempted so 
far. To believe that a south Asian community can 
be crafted on the foundation of injustice and 
that popular aspirations can be subsumed under a 
large entity is simply unacceptable. Enlightened 
self-interest demands an acknowledgement that 
grievious injustice has been inflicted on the 
Kashmiri people and rectifying this must form a 
priority.

Note

1 This article was written before the[ Indian ] 
P[rime] M[inister]'s Kashmir visit in 
mid-November.

______


[4]

INDIA - PAKISTAN: YET ANOTHER OPPORTUNITY HAS BEEN MISSED
by MB Naqvi
[Karachi December 17, 2004]

Yet another opportunity has been missed: Two 
groups of Indo-Pakistani officials met in 
Islamabad last week and failed to agree on 
anything except to continue talking. One group 
discussed CBMs (confidence building measures) and 
the possibility of strategic stability; the 
second discussed Sir Creek. This was a part of 
second round of composite dialogue, the first 
having ended in fiasco. It too appears to be 
going nowhere.

A dialogue by bureaucracies can make no political 
deviation or concession; they are bound by 
earlier decisions of their governments. A 
secretary can only reiterate the laid down 
position. At best, these officers can better 
define the differences for politicians to decide 
whether they should alter their basic positions.

It means that only Ministerial level discussions 
are indicated. Not that Foreign Ministers will 
necessarily succeed. They too may not find it 
easy to make serious concessions. Proper forum 
for actual give and take on sensitive matters can 
be Summits. But Summits require elaborate 
preparations; a lot of hard work goes into them, 
not all of it by bureaucracies. Public opinion in 
both countries will have to play a crucial part 
in creating the political will necessary for 
substantive mutual accommodation on sensitive 
matters.

There is a certain credibility deficit: 
Persistent assertions in America about its 
facilitation between India and Pakistan for these 
talks suggest that both sides do not have their 
heart in the negotiations. They are going through 
the motions of negotiating in deference to 
American wishes. Whether or not this is true in 
India's case, Pakistan has been under American 
pressure to stop insurgents going into 
Indian-controlled Kashmir. The US wants a modus 
vivendi in the Subcontinent to prevent another 
2002 like confrontation. Anyway, both countries 
are strategic allies of America and it has 
expectations from both. Which is why it is 
cooperating with both.

But the issue of war and peace between India and 
Pakistan is primarily a concern of their peoples. 
Even if the Americans are knocking the heads 
together, peace, friendship and cooperation 
between the Indians and Pakistanis constitute a 
noble aim. The fact that the American are nudging 
the two sides toward the negotiating table does 
not mean that the Indo-Pakistan negotiations 
should not discontinue. This aim should be 
pursued resolutely and in good faith for its own 
sake.

That underlines the nub of the matter: what do 
the ruling elites of the two countries actually 
aim at and where their domestic preferences are 
likely to take their countries. Factually, the 
aims of the two are mutually incompatible. Which 
is why their officials are unable to agree even 
on things that are mutually beneficial. Factually 
the Indian political class is pursuing the 
objective of being recognized as a great power, 
with a veto-wielding permanent seat in the UN 
Security Council. India is therefore acquiring 
military means of projecting power and has gone a 
fairly long way toward the objective.

In contrast, Pakistan has viewed this as a threat 
to itself. Actually Pakistan is a national 
security state par excellence. It has 
subordinated everything else to what it conceives 
to be national security. Pakistani rulers' 
perceptions are based on the belief that Indian 
intentions are inimical. While India projects its 
great power role over large stretches of Asia, 
they see the net effect of its military build up 
is to radically threaten Pakistan. That 
perception has impelled Islamabad to counter 
India's overwhelming superiority in conventional 
armaments by an ever-growing reliance on nuclear 
weapons in addition to some modernization of 
conventional weapons.

Now nuclear weapons confound everything, 
producing profound uncertainty and instability in 
the region. For obscure reasons the Indian 
government decided in May '98 to test-explode 
five nuclear weapons. Pakistan felt compelled to 
follow suit and has created a nuclear deterrent 
against India. Nuclear weapons are a 
de-estabilising factor anywhere. They are far 
more so in the densely populated South Asia where 
attack time ranges between three to six minutes. 
In this duration no government can react 
meaningfully on a matter of highest importance. 
That forces both countries to remain on permanent 
high alert. That totally destroys trust between 
each other.

Nuclear weapons' mischief is enhanced by the 
reason of their birth. They issue from Kashmir 
dispute - clearly so in the case of Pakistan 
while the reasons for India going nuclear remain 
a mystery. But a Pakistani is not best suited to 
explore why Indians chose to become a nuclear 
power. Perhaps their quest for greatness made 
them acquire nuclear capability. But no matter 
what the Indians think or aim at, Islamabad 
believes that the Indian nuclear weapons are 
primarily aimed at Pakistan and can be fired the 
minute India so decides. That perception leads to 
counteraction in kind: Pakistan has to keep its 
nuclear deterrent in much the same state as India 
does. This results in an unending arms race for 
improving and increasing the number of nuclear 
weapons and constantly adapting their missiles to 
match the improved weapon designs and sizes. This 
creates a quasi-war atmosphere. The two sides 
have virtually been in this twilights zone ever 
since May '98. What chance do the peacemaking 
efforts have of succeeding?

Bomb-loving notables of both sides had advocated 
in earlier 1990s that nuclear weapons would 
reduce the need for high levels of conventional 
forces and the Bomb provides security on the 
cheap. They actually shortchanged us. The famous 
Neemrana Group made these virtual promises. The 
two governments bought them. The idea of peace 
and stability at smaller economic costs turned 
out to be a fraud; the two countries are not only 
updating the nuclear deterrent all the time, at 
great cost, they are also hectically accumulating 
conventional military hardware at ruinous prices.

A subject like Siachin Glacier on which there was 
an initialed agreement hangs fire. During the 
current goodwill based solely on popular 
expectations the two can easily revive it to 
mutual advantage. There is Sir Creek where what 
is required is determining approximately 10 kms 
of sea frontier. Any basis for agreement on it 
would be beneficial to both. The recurring sight 
of two para-militaries flexing muscles to catch 
poor fishermen is silly. Pakistan arrests 45 poor 
fishermen accused of poaching in Pakistani 
waters. Somehow Indians quickly find 55 
illiterate Pakistani fishermen poaching in Indian 
waters. These wretches rot in each other's jail 
for extended periods and are released after 
elaborate negotiations. Commonsense and decency 
can prevent this farcical tragedy.

There are proposals such as a bus service between 
Srinagar and Muzaffarabad or the 
Monabao-Khokhrapar railway link. If giving relief 
to the people was intended the two countries 
should have agreed quickly. Indian government 
announced not too many months ago a unilateral 
decision, permitting certain categories of 
Pakistanis to obtain multiple visit visas easily 
and for the whole country. It has not been 
implemented. Perhaps Pakistan refused to make a 
matching decision. If so where is the unilateral 
part.

Kashmir is a major subject. But second is perhaps 
the biggest hurdle to friendly relations, though 
unrecognized; this is nuclear weapons in the two 
arsenals. The last one is not even perceived as 
the biggest hurdle to normal friendly relations.

But trade is mutually beneficial. Since Pakistan 
government has few cards up its sleeve, it has 
converted trade and people-to-people contacts 
into levers to apply on India. It is less than 
wise; it hurts Pakistan equally, if not more.


______


[5]  UPCOMING EVENTS

(i)

The Centre for the Study of Indian Muslims, 
Hamdard University, New Delhi, invites you to a 
talk on

"The Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal (MMA) Government in 
the North-West Frontier Province, Pakistan: 
Concepts and Politics"

By Dr. Dietrich Reetz, Senior Fellow, Centre for 
Modern Oriental Studies, Berlin

Venue: Board Room, Near VC's Office, Hamdard 
University, New Delhi (Near Batra Hospital)

Date: Thursday, 23rd December, 2004
Time: 3:00 pm

* Dr. Reetz has done extensive work on Islamic 
movements in India. More details on him and his 
work can be had on www.zmo.de/dietrich/reetz.html


o o o


(ii)

Dear friends/ colleagues,
South Asia Forum for Human Rights (SAFHR) is 
organizing the second South Asian training 
course on Racism, and issues of minorities and 
autonomy. Below is the notification of the 
training course to be held in Lahore, Pakistan. I 
would appreciate if you could help us in further 
dissemination of the notification to relevant 
institutions and individuals.

with kind regards,
Shahid Fiaz
Course Coordinator

o o o

Second South Asian Workshop on Racism, 
Xenophobia, and Discrimination against Ethnic 
Minorities and Indigenous People
March 22-31, 2005, Lahore, Pakistan


Applications are invited from South Asian 
countries (Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, 
Burma, India, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan, and Sri 
Lanka) for a 10-day residential training course 
in Lahore, Pakistan (22-31 March 2005) on racism, 
xenophobia, and issues of minorities and 
autonomy. The short-term training course is 
supported by the European Commission. It is being 
organised by the South Asia Forum for Human 
Rights (SAFHR) in partnership with Human Rights 
Commission of Pakistan, The Other Media (India), 
INSEC (Nepal) and EURAC (Italy). The course will 
focus on representatives of minorities and 
indigenous people, self-determination movements, 
people from autonomous regions, relevant 
scholars, jurists and NGOs from South Asian 
region including Afghanistan, Burma and Tibet.

The curriculum of the course will deal with 
themes of modern state formation, nation and 
nation state, nationalism, ethnicity, partition, 
national and international regimes of protection, 
political issues relating to regional trends in 
minority protection in South Asia, politics of 
control of natural and man made resources, media 
and European mechanisms for protection of 
minorities.

This is an advance level course. Applicants must 
have (a) five years experience in minority 
protection, movements for self-determination and 
self-government in the South Asian region. 
Proficiency in English language is a 
pre-requisite for participation. Besides giving 
all necessary particulars, application must be 
accompanied by two recommendation letters and a 
1000 word essay on how the training course is 
relevant to the applicant's work and may benefit 
the applicant. SAFHR will bear accommodation and 
other course expenses for all participants and 
will offer limited number of travel grants.

Applications, addressed to the course 
coordinator, can be sent by e-mail or post, and 
must reach the following address by 31 December 
2004 – Human Rights Commission of Pakistan, 
Aiwan-Jamhoor, 107-Tipu Block, New Garden Town, 
Lahore - 54600 Pakistan. Email: 
safhr-pk at cyber.net.pk

For further information, application form and 
brochure of the course please visit our website 
www.safhr.org


_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/

Buzz on the perils of fundamentalist politics, on 
matters of peace and democratisation in South 
Asia. SACW is an independent & non-profit 
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