SACW | 21 Oct 2004

[sacw]

South Asia Citizens Wire   |  21 October,  2004
via:  www.sacw.net

[1] Can Pakistan Work? A Country in Search of Itself  (Pervez Hoodbhoy)
[2] Pakistani Journalists in Kashmir:  View of 
the Valley - An Interview with Imtiaz Alam
[3] India: Turning of the Indian tide (Praful Bidwai)
[4] India: Limits of Law and Order Approach to 
the North-East (Walter Fernandes)
[5] India: The recent elections in Goa - Fight Saffron Plague  (Rajan Narayan)


--------------

[1]

Foreign Affairs
November/December 2004 [Book Review]

CAN PAKISTAN WORK? A COUNTRY IN SEARCH OF ITSELF
Pervez Hoodbhoy

The Idea of Pakistan. Stephen Philip Cohen. 
Washington: Brookings Institution Press, 2004, 
367 pp.

When he founded Pakistan in 1947, Muhammad Ali 
Jinnah-an impeccably dressed Westernized Muslim 
with Victorian manners and a secular 
outlook-promised the subcontinent's Muslims that 
they would finally be able to fulfill their 
cultural and civilizational destiny. Although the 
new nation arose from a bloodbath of ethnic 
cleansing and sectarian violence, and its 
fundamental premise was that Hindus and Muslims 
could never live together, its early years 
nevertheless held some promise of a liberal, 
relatively secular polity. But with time, 
Jinnah's Pakistan has grown weaker, more 
authoritarian, and increasingly theocratic. Now 
set to become the world's fourth most populous 
nation, it is all of several things: a client 
state of the United States yet deeply resentful 
of it; a breeding ground for jihad and al Qaeda 
as well as a key U.S. ally in the fight against 
international terrorism; an economy and society 
run for the benefit of Pakistan's warrior class, 
yet with a relatively free and feisty press; a 
country where education and science refuse to 
flourish but which is nevertheless a declared 
nuclear power; and an inward-looking society that 
is manifestly intolerant of minorities but that 
has never seen anything like the state-organized 
pogroms of India, Afghanistan, Iran, or China. 
[...].

[URL: 
http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20041101fareviewessay83611/pervez-hoodbhoy/can-pakistan-work-a-country-in-search-of-itself.html 
]

______



[2]


The Times of India - October 20, 2004 | Interview 
with Imtiaz Alam [The News / SAFMA / etc.]

VIEW OF THE VALLEY

What is the significance of the visit? How did it come about?

We have been asking for free movement of 
journalists across the border for a long time. We 
raised the issue with Yashwant Sinha at the SAARC 
foreign ministers' meet in Islamabad. Later, when 
foreign minister Mahmood Kasuri came to New 
Delhi, SAFMA, India, brought it up with him. Now 
that the process of composite dialogue is making 
headway, it became possible. The visit was 
'historic' in the sense that this is the first 
time that such an exchange has been permitted. A 
delegation of Indian journalists will be 
travelling to Pakistan next month.

What was your brief?

We were not carrying a brief from anybody. Nor 
are we here on a fact-finding mission. We just 
wanted to tell both sides that journalists are 
not partisan. That we can view things impartially 
and do a professional job.

How did people respond to your visit?

It was overwhelming. People came out on the 
streets in hundreds, there were welcome arches 
all over. There was a lot of excitement 
especially in the journalist commu-nity. It 
turned out to be a great exploratory mission, a 
great goodwill mission as well.Kashmiri Pandits 
demonstrated against you in Jammu.

Such things happen. We had to face angry protests 
because they feel that what has happened to them 
is because of Pakistan. They think that we 
represent the Pakistani government. We don't, 
neither is it our job to defend Pakistan. The 
Pakistani high commission is there to do that. We 
visited their camps and found them living in 
inhuman conditions. The delegation was deeply 
moved by their plight. It is the responsibility 
of the Central government to look after them. But 
it seems much of the aid is being swindled.

Who are these swindlers?

The rehabilitation agencies and officials 
involved in this work. The government of India 
has not involved the UN Commissio-ner for 
Refugees which could have done a good job. What I 
found disturbing was that Kashmiriyat has 
vanished from the Kashmiri Pandits. They now take 
positions close to the RSS. Their reactions are 
communalised. They are a Hindu enclave. That is 
my impression. Some of them demand a separate 
state.

Is there any justification for that?

There is a reason for this reaction but you can't 
say it is justified. Of course, not all Pandits 
feel this way. We met many groups who want to go 
back to the Valley. It is the job of the 
government and the security agencies to get them 
rehabilitated. In contrast, the response to the 
Pandits in the Valley was non-communal. All of 
them want the Pandits to be rehabilitated. In 
Kashmir people mostly blame Jagmohan for the 
exodus.

Did you find anything radically different from what you expected in the Valley?

The overwhelming demand for azadi came as a big 
surprise. Kashmiris across the board - young and 
old, men and women, workers, taxi-drivers, 
shopkeepers - more than 90%, I would say, are for 
azadi. Even senior cadres of political parties 
across the board share this sentiment. I haven't 
heard such a public clamour except in East 
Pakistan in 1970-71 when it was about to 
separate. They even castigated us for coming here 
on Indian visas. They felt this was tantamount to 
betrayal of the Kashmir cause.Everybody 
interprets azadi differently. They may be 
clamouring for civil liberties.

They are not just asking for civil liberties. The 
alienation in the Valley is complete. The human 
rights groups had a lot to say about violations. 
There were complaints against militants who were 
targeting civilians, but the complaints were 
overwhelmingly about state repression. A group of 
students in Srinagar university went to the 
extent of saying that the militants were a 
blessing in disguise. They argued that in every 
liberation movement people from other nations 
have joined. But that doesn't mean they want to 
accede to Pakistan.

Do you think azadi is a viable option?

It is none of my business. It's not my job to 
decide about the aspirations of the Kashmiris. 
But, there is realisation among all political 
parties in Kashmir, including the National 
Conference, that the Nehru-Sheikh accord has not 
worked.

Should then the LoC be made the international border?

That's India's position. I don't agree with it at 
all. There is a dichotomy in the Indian view. 
India wants all borders to be erased, but wants 
the LoC to be made permanent, how is that 
possible? The problem is that Indians still do 
not accept the Partition. They choose to call it 
an aberration of history. Someone asked me if the 
creation of Pakistan was justified? It was like 
asking me whether my birth was legitimate or not? 
If you don't respect my nationhood, why should I 
respect yours.

______


[3]


The News International
October 21, 2004

TURNING OF THE INDIAN TIDE

Praful Bidwai

The state Assembly elections in Maharashtra have 
delivered a nasty blow to the BJP-Shiv Sena and a 
handsome victory for the Congress-Nationalist 
Congress Party-led Democratic Front (DF). The 
ruling alliance faced heavy odds both from the 
burden of incumbency and inner-party rebellion by 
dissidents.

The DF ran a poor government in India's most 
industrialised state. Under it, Maharashtra sank 
into a debt of nearly Rs100, 000 crores. Hundreds 
of farmers committed suicide thanks to a drought 
and the DF's mismanagement of relief provision. 
More shamefully, 3,500 children died of 
malnutrition. The BJP-Sena thought it could win 
the Maharashtra election and present the recent 
defeat of the Vajpayee-led National Democratic 
Front in national elections as an aberration or a 
flash in the pan.

So how did the BJP-Sena manage to snatch defeat 
from the jaws of victory? The Congress-NCP 
focussed sharply on livelihood issues and 
affirmed secular, inclusive politics. The 
BJP-Sena couldn't convincingly counter them. The 
Sena-BJP campaign was fettered by the failing 
health of Atal Behari Vajpayee and Bal Thackeray, 
and further affected by the BJP's demoralisation 
from the loss of power nationally and by a bitter 
succession battle in the Sena. But a much 
weightier factor was the erosion of the two 
parties' social base, even in regions considered 
their strongholds.

Maharashtra showed that the Congress's 
traditional constituencies like the urban poor, 
Muslims, Dalits and Adivasis are returning to it. 
The Congress-NCP's increased attraction is in no 
small measure attributable to the Left-leaning 
National Common Minimum Programme of the Central 
government and to "populist" measures recently 
taken by the DF.

The BJP-Sena ran a highly divisive, vitriolic and 
negative campaign. During his sole public rally 
in Mumbai, jointly with Vajpayee, Thackeray 
launched a vicious attack on Mumbai's immigrant 
community, which forms 60 percent of its 
population, even as he brazenly peddled 
Maharashtrian chauvinism. Vajpayee acquiesced in 
this. This cost the BJP-Sena many non-Marathi 
votes. Even traditional BJP-Sena strongholds 
returned Congress candidates.

The BJP-Sena's "development" agenda didn't sell. 
Nor did the Hindutva appeal centred on the 
National Flag and on the controversial figure of 
V D Savarkar, the initiator of the 'Two-Nation 
Theory'. BJP "master-strategist" Pramod Mahajan 
turned out a dud in his home state. His cynical 
calculation, namely that the Dalit-based Bahujan 
Samaj Party would eat into the Congress's votes, 
enabling Sena-BJP victories, went awry. Nor did 
the fiery rhetoric of Uma Bharati, fresh from her 
rather ludicrous Tiranga Yatra, or the 
demagoguery of Sushma Swaraj, back from a 
pro-Savarkar Andaman Jail campaign, produce 
results.

The BJP had reckoned that a victory in 
Maharashtra would enable the National Democratic 
Alliance to turn things around and reaffirm its 
claim to being the "natural" party of governance, 
while undermining the UPA's credibility.

The opposite happened. After Maharashtra, the UPA 
has consolidated itself. Bye-elections in other 
states too showed that the Congress is expanding 
its social support-base. The next state 
elections, in Bihar, Jharkhand and Haryana, due 
in February, could result in a further setback to 
the NDA.

In Bihar, Laloo Prasad's RJD and the Congress 
form a formidable combination. In Jharkhand, 
tribal leader Shibu Soren's "martyrdom" through 
his arrest will work against the BJP. And in 
Haryana, Bansi Lal's return to the Congress will 
help the BJP's opponents. In the round of 
elections that comes later, in West Bengal, Tamil 
Nadu and Kerala in 2006, the BJP isn't even in 
the reckoning.

Recently, BJP leaders convinced themselves, on 
the basis of astrology(!), that the UPA would 
collapse by September 26. Then, they conjured up 
a scenario of a non-BJP-non-Congress "third 
front" - to be formed by Congress partners like 
the DMK and NCP quitting the UPA and eventually 
teaming up with the Samajwadi Party, Janata 
Dal(U), and others. The BJP would support such a 
front from the outside and topple the UPA.

The Rashtriya Swabhiman Manch, recently formed by 
George Fernandes, Chandrasekhar, and Sushma 
Swaraj, was to be a step in that direction. Now, 
the leaders of this platform have been put out of 
business - at least for some time.

After the latest defeat, L K Advani has taken 
over as BJP president. But the inner-party power 
struggle isn't going to end with this. This 
sudden move was meant to pre-empt a wholesale RSS 
takeover of the BJP - something the sangh has 
been pressing for. The move also cut Murli 
Manohar Joshi out from the race. It shows that 
the BJP's "second-generation" leaders (Venkaiah 
Naidu, Arun Jaitley, Pramod Mahajan, Rajnath 
Singh, Sushma Swaraj and Uma Bharati) aren't fit 
for the job. Indeed, no BJP leader, including 
Advani, has a real strategy or imagination for 
innovative politics. For far too long, the BJP 
flourished on slogans, catchy one-liners and 
gimmicky formulas. That isn't working anymore.

There is a reason for this. The BJP's rise since 
the mid-1980s was not primarily based on its own 
positive appeal centred on Hindutva. Rather, the 
BJP gained from circumstances of others' making, 
such as the long-term decline of the Congress 
system. The Left was unable to fill the vacuum 
this left in the centre of the political 
spectrum. The BJP entered that space from the 
Right.

For a period, mobilisation on Ayodhya/Babri 
mosque helped the BJP grow out of the confines to 
which its parent, the Jana Sangh, was 
restricted-geographically, largely to 
Northwestern states like Rajasthan, Madhya 
Pradesh and Gujarat; and in class/caste terms, to 
the rich and middle-class upper layers of the 
Hindu hierarchy - in some cases, downright 
reactionary feudals like the former princes and 
zamindars.

Between the mid-1980s and mid-1990s, the BJP 
implanted itself with aplomb in Uttar Pradesh, 
through a unique combination of mandal (low 
caste-based politics) and kamandal (Hindutva) 
represented by former UP Chief Minister Kalyan 
Singh. The Ayodhya mobilisation could help garner 
OBC, and to an extent, even Dalit, support for 
the BJP's pan-Indian "Hindu nation" project. For 
the first time, the party sank roots in North 
India. But this was reversed by the continuing 
"Forward March of the Backwards" (low castes), 
and the rise of the politics of Dalit 
self-representation. Barring Gujarat, and 
desultory gains in states like Jharkhand and 
Himachal, the BJP couldn't expand much beyond the 
old Jana Sangh zone of influence.

Today, the BJP faces a three-fold crisis-a crisis 
of strategy (it has no coherent counter to the 
Congress or the Left); an organisational crisis 
(its leadership structure is dysfunctional and 
lacks credibility); and a crisis of leadership 
succession. It's too heavily invested in 
globalisation and Right-wing neo-liberalism to be 
able to take an independent policy stance. It's 
too deeply mired in Hindutva to be able to 
broaden its appeal beyond a small, bigoted 
minority. It's too cravenly devoted to power to 
rejuvenate itself when out of office.

Today, the BJP is in danger of becoming too 
dependent on the RSS for coherence, mentorship 
and votes. This could be the kiss of death. The 
BJP has tried every trick in the Hindutva book, 
including Savarkar, Tiranga and terrorism. It has 
conjured up the spectre of Muslim demographic 
colonialism, and played the anti-Pakistan card. 
Nothing seems to work. As Vajpayee and Advani 
fade out, the party seems set for a long period 
of exile.


______


[4]

Economic and Political weekly
October 16, 2004

LIMITS OF LAW AND ORDER APPROACH TO THE NORTH-EAST

Treating the problems in the north-east simply as 
an issue of law and order is not the solution; 
economic and other causes of insurgency have to 
be dealt with. Generation of employment is 
essential and the issues of land and forests 
cannot be ignored for they are central to the 
economy of the region and the culture, religion 
and identity of the tribals. A possible solution 
is for the centre to tread the difficult path of 
negotiating with all the groups simultaneously 
and go beyond treating the problem as a question 
of the centre versus the rest.

Walter Fernandes

For several decades the decisionmakers in Delhi 
have asked: 'Can the north-east be saved for 
India?' Today one hears many in the north-east 
asking the same question in reverse, 'can the 
north-east be saved from the repression it has 
been suffering for decades?' Both the questions 
have the same source, the insurgency or armed 
struggle that the rulers in Delhi view only as a 
law and order issue. To counter it they have 
assumed extraordinary powers under the Armed 
Forces Special Powers Act, 1958 (AFSPA).

There is one set of reactions to the blasts in 
Assam on August 15 and in Dimapur and western 
Assam in early October. They are the reactions of 
a minority. The views of most others were 
probably symbolised in July 2004 when a group of 
women in Imphal, Manipur, bared their bodies in 
front of the Assam Rifles camp and displayed 
placards such as 'Indian army take our flesh' and 
'Indian army, rape us.' It was their way of 
saying 'enough is enough', after a 30-year-old 
woman was found dead the day after her arrest by 
the Assam Rifles. They demanded the repeal of the 
AFSPA, which has been in force in the north-east, 
as a whole since 1958, and in Manipur since 1980. 
It comes into force when the state government 
declares an area as disturbed and gives 
extraordinary powers to the armed forces, such as 
allowing them to arrest a person on the suspicion 
that he or she is planning a crime. If s/he is 
killed and declared a terrorist, the armed forces 
are not prosecuted and so they are not 
accountable to the civilian government.

There lies the source of abuse and 
disillusionment with the armed forces. One knows 
from the ongoing case in the Supreme Court that 
more than 2,000 young persons were killed and 
cremated anonymously in Punjab during the 
uprising in that state. The number of persons 
arrested and found dead has reached 26 in Manipur 
alone during 2004. In most cases the security 
forces claim that they were killed while trying 
to escape. That is why many in the north-east ask 
whether they will ever be freed from repression. 
Most civil society members who ask this question 
condemn human rights violations by the 
underground too. For example, human rights 
activists are in the forefront of those 
denouncing the underground for recruiting child 
soldiers but they feel that the state as a 
legally constituted body has greater 
responsibility than the underground to protect 
people's rights. In practice, violations by the 
state keep multiplying and it is against 
this background that the non-violent struggle 
led by 32 organi-sations is continuing in 
Manipur. Women are prominent among them.

Women in many communities of the region have a 
long history of such interventions and of playing 
a significant role in times of war. Past 
initiatives, among the Meitei women of Manipur 
who are leading the present movement, is 
'nupilan' or resistance to British rulers 
exporting rice from Manipur to feed their 
soldiers by depriving the local people of their 
staple food. Today they have formed themselves 
into 'meira paibis' or torch bearing women who 
are at the forefront of peace initiatives. One 
knows of Naga and Kuki women in Manipur meeting 
each other during the ethnic conflict between 
them in the 1990s in an effort to stop the 
killings [Brara 2002: 193-94]. When some Naga 
tribes went to war with another tribe, women from 
the opposing sides established networks to 
negotiate peace [Kikon 2002:170-71].

The bare-bodied demonstration of women in Imphal 
has to be seen in this context; of a sense of 
despair and as a creative initiative for peace. 
It was also a mode of shocking the world into 
taking notice of their oppression because women 
have suffered the most during the years of armed 
struggle. The attack often comes from the 
security forces in the form of rape. The 
underground also goes against women when, for 
example, they pitch their tent in a village and 
ask the villagers to feed them. The woman of the 
house has to often part with supplies she had 
stored to feed the family with during the year. 
And yet, many women's groups have continued their 
peace initiatives, the best known among them 
being the Naga Mothers' Association and the meira 
paibis.

Background of the Unrest

However, the centre tends to view the unrest only 
as a law and order issue. The AFSPA has been its 
response. It thus ignores the causes of conflict 
such as the neglect of the region by economic 
decision-makers, encroachment of land by 
immigrants, denigration of the local culture and 
attacks on people's identity. The basic cause is 
the failure of persons from outside the region, 
who control its economy, to invest in industry 
and the consequent high unemployment. This 
failure cannot be attributed to the absence of 
qualified personnel because the level of 
education is high in much of the region. Tarun 
Gogoi, the chief minister of Assam stated in 
August 2001 that his state had a backlog of 20 
lakh unemployed persons. According to the state's 
economic survey, 2003-2004, the employment 
exchanges have 15,71,996 registered job seekers 
today against 15,24,616 in late 2001 (The Times 
of India, June 16, 2004). It is well known that 
employment exchanges underestimate unemployment 
because they exclude the rural and other sections 
of the informal sector, since most such 
unemployed persons are not registered [Rayappa 
1992: 362-63]. So even 20 lakhs may be an 
underestimate for Assam. The other states would 
account for at least 10 lakhs more. Thus, a 
minimum of 30 lakhs or 25 per cent of the active 
workforce are unemployed.

As a result, despite the high level of education, 
land continues to be the main source of 
livelihood but immigrants encroach on it and 
cause shortages. The Bangladesh is are one such 
immigrant group but not the only one. A much 
bigger number comes from the Hindi heartland of 
Bihar and UP. The number of Bangladesh immigrants 
is about 12 lakhs in the north-east [Bhuyan 2002] 
in an estimated total of 30 lakhs. Common to the 
Hindi states and Bangladesh is the feudal system, 
the lack of land reforms and consequent poverty. 
Thus, most immigrants are landless agricultural 
labourers who know cultivation techniques. They 
occupy the fertile land of the region, cultivate 
three crops and prosper. Most people of the 
region, on the contrary, have lived in a single 
crop culture. The 'zamindari' that the British 
introduced in Assam and Tripura resulted in the 
sharecropper system. Tenants had to give to the 
zamindar anything between half and two-thirds of 
their produce, so they lacked motivation to go 
beyond one crop. The hill tribes practised 'jhum' 
which is limited to a single crop [Barbora 1998]. 
Another factor is the control of the markets by 
outsiders who refuse to allow local people to 
prosper. For example, in the 1990s, the state 
government encouraged shallow tube well 
irrigation. This project had many shortcomings 
but it resulted in a bumper rice crop in 2000. 
However, those in control of the market refused 
to buy the rice and farmers had to sell it at a 
loss and with it died their motivation to grow 
three crops.

Many local communities resent the fact that 
immigrants prosper on the land they encroach 
upon, while they are left behind. This has led to 
many killings. For example, most attacks in the 
Karbi Anglong district of Assam have been on the 
Biharis who have occupied land there. The 
insurgency in Tripura is attributed to the influx 
of Hindu Bangladeshis who occupied tribal land 
and reduced their proportion in the population 
from 58 per cent in 1951 to 28 per cent in 1991. 
By the late 1960s, indigenous tribals had lost 
more than 60 per cent of their land to 
immigrants. That is when the state announced the 
Dumbur dam which submerged 46.34 sq km of their 
land, most of it level, the latter makes up only 
28 per cent of the state's total. The tribals 
protested but were forced off their land. By 
official count the dam displaced 2,558 families 
that had 'pattas'. Another 5,500 to 6,500 
families that depended on common property 
resources were not even counted though they 
sustained themselves on the same, according to 
customary law. Many attribute impoverishment as 
the cause of the unrest in the state, which began 
around the same time. Besides, today urban 
environmentalists consider the tribals enemies of 
nature since their only livelihood alternative is 
shifting cultivation in the catchment area, which 
causes environmental degradation [Bhaumick 
2003:84-85].

Thus, land encroachment by immigrants (not 
immigration in itself) and the refusal of persons 
from outside the region to invest in productive 
jobs are at the basis of the unrest. Sometimes 
the conflict is around jobs, for example, the 
Assamese-Bihari tension for 2,000 railway jobs in 
November 2003 but in most cases it is around 
land, which is the source of economic sustenance 
[Fernandes and Pereira 2004:83-84]. In saying 
that land and jobs are the basis of the 
conflicts, one cannot simplify the issue by 
calling it economic alone. The economic component 
is crucial but one cannot ignore the fact that, 
land and forests are the centre not only of the 
tribal economy but also of the culture, religious 
ethos and identity of tribals. Given their 
symbiotic relationship with the land and the 
close link between natural resources and culture, 
the affected ethnic groups view the land 
shortages also as an attack on their identity. 
Thus they view conflicts around land as defence 
of their culture, identity and livelihood 
[Acharya 1990:71-95].

The conflicts begin with attacks on outsiders and 
slowly turn into ethnic conflicts within the 
region. In the context of the land shortages 
caused by encroachment and the failure to invest 
in productive jobs, every group views the limited 
land and jobs as its exclusive right. So each 
community rewrites its history to claim an 
indigenous status and the exclusive right over 
resources in a given area. Ethnic conflicts are a 
direct consequence of such hardened ethnic 
identities and exclusive claims. Be it the 
Naga-Kuki conflict in Manipur [Fernandes and 
Bharali 2002:52-55], the Bodo-Santhal [Roy 1995] 
and Dimasa-Hmar tension in Assam (Telegraph, 
April 23, 2003) or the Tripura tribal demand for 
a homeland [Bhaumick 2003:84], all have their 
origin in the competition for land and jobs and 
result in massacres or the Assam-Bihar type of 
tension. Because of the ethnic consciousness that 
results from these conflicts, the local 
communities take their demands beyond land and 
jobs to livelihood.

Centre's Reaction

First, the response of the centre has been to 
reinforce the law and order machinery and view 
all unrest as secessionist, instead of solving 
the problems. Very little has been done for 
employment generation. In 1994 the region had 
only 166 large and medium industries. Many of 
them have closed down or have been declared sick, 
including all 12 in Nagaland [Ezung 2003]. The 
other alternative available to well educated 
youth is jobs in the administration but they too 
are declining. However, developments during the 
last few decades show that a focus on law and 
order does not solve the problems.

When the AFSPA was enacted in 1958, the main 
resistance was from the Nagas, while Mizo 
resistance was building up. Today, Mizoram has 
had peace for 17 years but the number of 
underground outfits has multiplied. There are at 
least two major Naga outfits, Assam has units 
such as United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA) 
and groups representing the Bodo, Dimasa, Karbi, 
Adivasi and several others. Manipur had two 
underground groups when the AFSPA came into force 
in 1980. Today it has nearly 30 such outfits. 
There are at least three such groups in Tripura 
and two in Meghalaya. One does not always know 
their origin. Some of them have an ideology but 
there are allegations that some others have been 
set up by the central intelligence agencies in 
order to counter groups with an ideology. Many 
others are allegedly purely extortionist groups 
that use the underground façade to their own 
advantage. It should be obvious from the enormous 
increase in the number of underground outfits 
that the AFSPA or a purely law and order view of 
the issues is not a solution to the problems of 
the region; social, economic and cultural issues 
have to be tackled.

Secondly, the centre tends to view the north-east 
only as a problem. The people of the region are 
different from those in what they call 'mainland' 
India. Many of them belong to the Mongoloid stock 
and are close to the peoples of south-east Asia. 
That can give the north-east a definite advantage 
if the difference is used as a gateway to 
south-east Asia and China. Instead, the centre 
seems to be obsessed with security and treats 
this diversity as a threat and the region only as 
a buffer zone against China. Within the region, a 
major obstacle to investment is the inner line 
permit that prevents even Indians from entering 
Nagaland, Mizoram and Arunachal Pradesh. Only 
recently have foreign tourists been given entry 
into Nagaland but only in groups of four. More 
than once I have had the experience of a bus, in 
which I was travelling, being stopped by security 
forces at the Nagaland border and all the Nagas 
and their luggage being searched. But two of us 
non-Nagas were not examined, thus the local 
people are treated as foreigners in their own 
land.

The third point relates to the centre's 
negotiations with individual underground outfits. 
For example, the Bodo have two main groups, the 
National Democratic Front of Bodoland and the 
Bodo Liberation Tigers (BLT) and the centre has 
negotiated and reached an agreement with the 
latter on a Bodo Territorial Council. It may be a 
good solution but by ignoring the other bigger 
outfit, it has ensured that the agreement will 
not work. Nagaland has two major outfits, the 
National Socialist Council of Nagaland 
(Isaac-Muivah) and (Kaplang) NSCN (IM) and NSCN 
(K). In the late 1990s the centre signed an 
agreement with NSCN-IM and ignored NSCN-K. The 
group that is ignored is bound to raise higher 
demands and make a permanent solution difficult. 
The solution would be to negotiate with all the 
groups together.

Fourthly, the centre deals with one issue or 
ethnic group at a time. The problems are 
inter-connected and tackling one at a time can 
create others. An example is the 2001 extension 
of the ceasefire with NSCN-IM to all the Naga 
inhabited areas in the neighbouring states. It 
resulted immediately in a conflict in Manipur 
where over half of the territory is inhabited by 
Naga tribes. The Meitei perceived it as a threat 
to the territorial integrity of Manipur. The 
agitation that followed has become as important a 
landmark in the history of resistance in Manipur 
as the present movement against the AFSPA. These 
and other piecemeal actions have in practice 
alienated all the factions from the centre.

Fifthly, the centre negotiates with the 
underground outfits and rehabilitates its cadres 
after reaching an agreement. In other cases it 
rewards those who surrender. For example, 
surrendered cadres of the ULFA have been 
rehabilitated with jobs or plots for small tea 
gardens. The BLT cadre are being integrated with 
the police or paramilitary forces. Besides, 
negotiations are conducted only with the 
underground outfits and civil society is ignored. 
A message is thus given to youth that those who 
join the underground will be rehabilitated and 
rewarded eventually. That renders the basic 
issues and civil society irrelevant and 
marginalises groups like the Naga Women's 
Association that are active in the search for 
peace. Human rights groups are even branded 
anti-national.

Possible Solutions

That is where one sees the need to re-examine the 
official as well as civil society approach to the 
issues facing the north-east. Treating the issue 
only as one of law and order is not the solution; 
the economic and other causes of insurgency have 
to be dealt with. Productive employment is 
essential and the land issue cannot be ignored, 
but they have to be taken together with the 
remaining social, cultural and identity issues. 
One has also to recognise that the people of the 
region have lost confidence in the centre so 
Delhi has to begin with confidence-building 
measures with the communities of the region and 
establish its credibility with them. It has to 
begin to trust its people and treat its cultures 
and communities with respect. If 
confidence-building measures are possible with 
Pakistan, one sees no reason why they should not 
be attempted with the people of the north-east.

That also involves treating the whole region as 
one. Dealing with one underground group at a time 
can only increase distrust between the ethnic 
communities of the region and make them feel that 
the centre is following a divide and rule policy 
in the region or even that it needs conflicts as 
a training ground for low intensity warfare. One 
has to add, however, that it is not going to be 
easy to deal with all the groups together because 
of the suspicion among them. For a unified 
approach to succeed the centre has to take a 
long-term view and not search for immediate 
solutions by dealing with one group at a time.

A possible solution is for the centre to tread 
the difficult path of negotiating with all the 
groups simultaneously and go beyond treating it 
as a question of the centre versus the rest. 
Instead, the centre has to give the message that 
it is ready to negotiate with the region as 
whole, if the groups first negotiate among 
themselves and come to some agreement, and then 
deal with the centre as a totality. That requires 
the involvement of civil society elements that 
have been keeping inter ethnic group peace 
networks alive during the last several decades of 
conflicts. It may take five or more years for the 
warring groups to come together but it has to be 
viewed as an investment in long-term peace and 
justice.

This is where economic issues find their place. 
Peace cannot be built in the absence of war alone 
but has to be based on justice. Conditions 
therefore, have to be created so that the people 
of the region take control of economic decisions. 
Immigration cannot be ignored but one has to 
desist from the temptation of giving it a 
communal colour by focusing on Bangladeshis 
alone. The fact that poverty pushes the people of 
Bangladesh, Bihar and UP out of their region has 
to be acknowledged. But one cannot ignore the 
fact that, it creates serious problems in the 
region. The ideal is to attempt the integrated 
development of the whole region including 
Bangladesh, Bhutan, the north-east and Myanmar. 
Obviously it is an ideal and cannot be attained 
overnight. But confidence building measures would 
include loud thinking about this long-term 
possibility. At present, the effort is only to 
increase trade with China and south-east Asia. If 
the centre is serious about confidence-building 
measures, Delhi can go to south-east Asia through 
the north-east and treat ethnic difference not as 
a problem, but as an opportunity for ongoing 
relations with this part of Asia. Basic to the 
approach is a move away from the present law and 
order view of the problems confronting the 
region. National security is important but 
genuine security is found not merely in defending 
physical boundaries but primarily in gaining the 
confidence of the peoples within them.

References

Acharya, S K (1990): 'Ethnic Processes in 
North-Eastern India' in D Pakem (ed), 
Nationality, Ethnicity and Cultural Identity in 
North-East India, Omsons Publications, New Delhi, 
pp 69-108.
Barbora, Sanjay (1998): Plantation Systems and 
Labour Movements in North-East India, unpublished 
Mphil thesis, Department of Sociology, Delhi 
School of Economics, Delhi.
Bhaumick, Subir (2003): 'Tripura's Gumti Dam Must 
Go', Ecologist Asia, 11, no 1, January-March, pp 
84-89.
Bhuyan, Jogesh Ch (2002): 'Influx from Bangla: 
Demographic Change in NE', Sentinel, May 4.
Brara, N Vijayalakshmi (2002): 'Breaking the 
Myth: The Social Status of Meitei Women' in 
Walter Fernandes and Sanjay Barbora (eds), 
Changing Women's Status in India: Focus on the 
North-East, North Eastern Social Research Centre, 
Guwahati, pp 193-201.
Ezung, Evorthung (2003): The Impact on Common 
People Because of Government Policy on 
Globalisation and Abolition of Supplies of 
Fertilisers, paper presented at 'Seminar on WTO 
and Food Security in the North-East', North 
Eastern Social Research Centre, Guwahati, August 
1-2.
Fernandes, Walter and Gita Bharali (2002): The 
Socio-Economic Situation of Some Tribes of 
Bishnupur and Palizi, mimeo, North Eastern Social 
Research Centre, Guwahati.
Fernandes, Walter and Melville Pereira (2004): 
Changing Land Relations in North Eastern India: A 
Comparative Study of Six Tribes and One 
Non-Tribal Community, mimeo, North Eastern Social 
Research Centre, Guwahati.
Kikon, Dolly (2002): 'Political Mobilisation of 
Women in Nagaland: A Sociological Background' in 
Walter Fernandes and Sanjay Barbora (eds), op 
cit, pp 174-82.
Rayappa, P H (1992): 'The Right to Work: The 1990 
Proposal and the 1991 Economic Policy', Social 
Action, 42, no 4, October-December, pp 361-73.
Roy, Ajay (1995): The Boro Imbroglio, Spectrum Publishers, Guwahati.



______


[5]

From Goan Observer 15-21 Oct. 2004

FIGHT SAFFRON PLAGUE
NARKASURAS PREVAIL

Despite an unprecedented display of solidarity by the Opposition, money
and muscle power has prevailed in the Poinguinim bye-elections. The
Opposition needs to redouble its efforts to confront and destroy the
saffron plague, asserts RAJAN NARAYAN.

PEOPLE'S VERDICT
The Bharatiya Janata Party candidate, Isidore Fernandes, won the
Poinguinim bye-elections by a margin of 2,495 votes over his rival
Jagdish Acharya.


Isidore triumphs!

THE LESSON OF Poinguinim is that in the Kaliyug evil more often triumphs
over good. Despite an unprecedented display of unity by the Opposition
the Bharatiya Janata Party candidate, Isidore Fernandes, has won a
thumping victory. Dramatising that money and muscle power play a
decisive role in predominantly backward class constituencies. The
booth-wise figures also suggest that the minority community did not
support the common Opposition candidate, Jagdish Acharya.

Cover story. . . (Goan Observer, October 16-22, 2004.)

The Narkasura represented by Manohar Parrikar and his chief asura,
Babush Monserrate, outspent and outmuscled the combined Opposition by a
ratio of ten to one. The turncoat Isidore Fernandes also benefited from
the fact that the government machinery, particularly the police, openly
sided with the Judas who betrayed both the party whose ticket he was
elected on and the voters he represented in the Legislative Assembly.
The partisan role played by the police and the government machinery was
very much in evidence on polling day when the law and order forces
seemed to be exclusively preoccupied with Opposition leaders and looked
the other way when large scale violations of the electoral code were
committed by the BJP. Even though the BJP was caught red-handed
distributing money on election eve the district and police officials
refused to take cognizance of the incident.

The victory of Isidore bodes ill for Goa. The victory will embolden the
saffron brigade to more vigorously pursue its insidious agenda of
undermining and destroying Goa's tradition of communal harmony and
fusion. What is even more alarming is that it will give legitimacy to
monsters like Babush Monserrate who believes that he can subvert and
pervert the democratic process with money and muscle power. The lesson
of the Poinguinim elections is that the Opposition needs not only to
redouble its efforts to combat the saffron plague but also to start an
intense campaign to educate the people of Goa on the implications of the
victory of Isidore in Poinguinim. At a national level all political
parties need to take cognizance of the precedent that Poinguinim has
set. The new method of defection which Goa has just legitimatised.

It is the first time since liberation that not only all the warring
factions within the Congress Party but the entire Opposition came
together to confront the venomous communal Narkasuras who have been
systematically undermining the secular fabric of the State of Goa for
over five years now. The Poinguinim bye-elections saw all the political
heavyweights of Goa setting aside their jumbo egos and working
shoulder-to-shoulder to trounce the agent of the rakshashas, Isidore
Fernandes. It did take a little time for the combined Opposition and
warring Congress chieftains to realise the consequences of Isidore
Fernandes winning the bye-elections. But fortunately enlightenment
finally dawned and the Opposition came together in an awesome show of
strength and solidarity.

SOLIDARITY MEET
A SOLIDARITY which was dramatised at the meeting held at Gaondongri on
the eve of the elections on Sunday last. Seated in the front row of the
makeshift dais were all the former chief ministers excepting for
Shashikala Kakodkar. Indeed, this is the first time I have seen
Pratapsing Raoji Rane, Dr. Wilfred De Souza, Churchill Alemao, Luizinho
Faleiro, Ravi Naik, and Francisco Sardinha, all former chief ministers,
sharing the dais and talking and acting in unison. The Opposition
solidarity was further dramatised by the presence on the dais of the MGP
general secretary Kashinath Jalmi and the UGDP general secretary
Prashant Naik. Of the 15 Congress MLAs in the Legislative Assembly as
many as 14 were present and actively took part in the campaign. The only
exception was Loutalim MLA Alex Sequeira who claimed to be unwell. There
as also a considerable presence of former Congress MLAs including Fatima
D'Sa whose sasumai is from Canacona. The catalyst if not the adhesive
bond was the Lok Shakti with Datta Naik camping in Poinguinim for over a
fortnight.

It is not just the presence of so many Opposition stalwarts on the dais
on Sunday at the Gaondongri meet but even the tenor of their speeches
dramatised that the Opposition has finally woken up to the major truth.
The truth that if they continue to be divided Parrikar will pick them up
one by one and demolish and devour them. As the BJP wolf has done with
so many Opposition stalwarts who were taken in by his benign grandma
masquerade and his rhetoric of good governance and zero tolerance for
corruption. The Opposition stalwarts have not limited themselves to
making public speeches. Indeed, on polling day each of the Congress MLAs
and their Opposition comrades were allotted a polling booth each and
entrusted with the responsibility of not just getting the voter out but
persuading the electorate in Poinguinim to vote for the people's
candidate Jagdish Acharya.

The combined Opposition campaign in Poinguinim has been a very well
orchestrated symphony. The OBC leaders Kashinath Jhalmi and former MLA
Vasupai Gaonkar had concentrated on breaking Isidore's Velip vote bank.
And convincing the Velips that their interests would be better served by
backing the people's candidate Jagdish Acharya. Kashinath Jhalni was at
his persuasive best and repeatedly stressed the government's failure to
implement the central notification which confers on the Gaudis, the
Velips and the Kunbis the status of Scheduled Tribes. The deputy leader
of the Opposition and the the best strategist in the Congress camp
Dayanand Narvekar concentrated on wooing the Pagi community to which he
belongs. Similarly, the bamons both Catholics and Hindus in the combined
Opposition ranks wooed the saraswats and the Bhats to counter Manohar
Parrikar's pleas that they should vote for Isidore to ensure the
continuance of a fellow Saraswat as the CM. The undisputed leader of the
Bhandari Samaj, Ravi Naik, canvassed for Bhandari votes. And leading the
charge was Churchill Alemao.

The Lok Shakti, of course, was here, there and everywhere. Smoothening
ruffled feathers, tempering and dousing smouldering egos and appealing
to the sense of honour of voters stretching across community and caste.
The appeal of Lok Shakti strummed at the heartstrings of the voters.
"Selling packaged milk is fine. But how can you vote for a man who wants
to sell his mother's milk?" The Lok Shakti was able to play a catalytic
role in the Jagdish Acharya campaign because unlike the other political
parties and individual politicians it neither sought cash nor credit and
was single-minded in reminding everyone involved in the fray that the
fight was for dharma . For upholding basic democratic values. For
preserving the secular character of Goa and safeguarding Goa's tradition
of communal harmony and fusion.

During my visits to Poinguinim and particularly when I saw the
unprecedented display of unity and solidarity among the warring congress
factions and the opposition leaders it struck me very forcefully that
united the opposition can completely obliterate the saffron plague. The
combined opposition, even if one takes into account just the warring
factions within the Congress has collectively five to ten times the
money power than the BJP in Goa can ever marshal. With or without the
support of Babush Monserrate.

The combined opposition particularly if you take into account the Alemao
clan and the Victoria Fernandes clan have more muscle power than the BJP
and a hundred Babush Monserrate. After all Churchill Alemao and Victoria
Fernandes are the original Godfather General and the Godmother General
of Goa. It was under the benign or malignant protective umbrella of the
Protectors led by Rudolf Fernandes that Babush Monserrate developed his
now thriving money lending and extortion rackets. The combined
opposition has more brain power than the BJP and its collaborators. If
the likes of Dayanand Narvekar and Dr Wilfred D' Souza and Ravi Naik and
Khasinath Jhalmi can strategise together they can outthink and out
manoeuvre all the Parrikars and the Digambars and the Monserrates. In
every way the combined opposition has a clear and almost unbridgeable
advantage over the BJP and its collaborators.

In the churning which has taken place in Goa's politics in the last few
years a lot of poison has surfaced. Venomous poison in the form of
communalism. The brand of poison that is created and spread by the likes
of the Vishwa Hindu Parishad chief Pravin Togadia and his ardent
disciples like the "Chief Monster of Gujarat" Narendra Modi and his
equally notorious counterpart in Goa, Manohar Parrikar. The kind of
venom which labels Muslims as Rahus and Catholics as Ketus. It will be
recalled that Pravin Togadia on a recent visit to Goa exhorted the
people and presumably his chela Manohar Parrikar to use and discard the
Rahus and Ketus.

The Poinguinim bye-elections sought to consolidate the reign of the
saffron rakshashas on secular Goa. The Poinguinim bye-elections sought
to perpetuate the politics of hate. The polarisation of the staunchly
secular people of Goa along communal lines. To undo Goa's legacy of
cultural harmony and fusion. Manohar "Narkasur" Parrikar became
increasingly apprehensive that the Ketus he had hoodwinked into joining
the saffron brigade if not the Rahus might discover his true colours and
desert him. As Micky Pacheco did. The Parrikar government was in danger
of being de-throned. Of being reduced to being a minority with the
possibility that the MGP MLA Sudhin Dhavilikar, the UGDP MLA Mathany
Saldana and the independent MLA Philip Neri would all abandon the
saffron ship. It was against this backdrop that Manohar "Narkasur"
Parrikar and his principle asura Babush Monserrate engineered the
bye-elections in Poinguinim.

DOUBLE BETRAYAL
IT WAS A double betrayal. On the one hand Isidore "Judas" Fernandes was
induced to resign his Poinguinim Assembly seat. He was subsequently
bribed into re-contesting the resulting bye-elections on the Bharatiya
Janata Party ticket. Even Judas betrayed Jesus Christ only once. But
Isidore betrayed the people who voted him to the Assembly twice over.
And absurdly enough Isidore's alibi for resigning from his seat as a
Congress legislator to re-contest the very same seat on the BJP symbol
was that the development of his constituency had suffered. And the only
way of ensuring the development of his constituency and fulfilling his
commitment to the voters was for him to become part of the ruling party.
Never mind that both within the Legislative Assembly and the outside the
same Isidore Fernandes had vehemently reiterated that one need not be
either a minister or a member of the ruling party to secure the
development of his or her constituency.

Poinguinim is a symbol of opposition unity. But whether the unity will
be sustained is a question mark. There is a fatal flaw in the Persian
carpet woven together so painstakingly to defeat Isidore Fernandes.

MAJOR WEAKNESS
The weakness, the Achilles heel of the combined opposition is greed. The
weakness of the combine opposition is lust bordering on obsession with
power of its senior leaders. Unlike the BJP which has just one
undisputed leader - never mind all of Babush talk about being equal to
the chief minister - the opposition has five former chief ministers and
half a dozen aspiring chief ministers. The weakness of the combined
opposition is that every one of the leaders wants atleast a cabinet
berth. They will not even settle for a corporation. And the limitation
on the size of the cabinet has only made things even more difficult of
the opposition to come together. The opposition has put up a magnificent
show of solidarity in Poinguinim. Not because of any great love they
have for each other. But because they are united in their fear if not
hate for Parrikar. Our apprehension is greed will overcome fear. And the
obsession with kodels will be able to shatter the beautiful
stained-glass windows of opposition solidarity.

The writing on the wall is clear. It is not enough for the Opposition to
come together. They also have to put their hands into their deep pockets
and put their money where their mouth is. Whether we like it not money
has become a major if not decisive factor in electoral politics in Goa.


_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/

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