SACW #1 | 2 Jul 2004
Harsh Kapoor
aiindex at mnet.fr
Thu Jul 1 22:00:26 CDT 2004
South Asia Citizens Wire - Dispatch #1 | 2 July, 2004
via: www.sacw.net
[1] Pakistan - India: Next Steps For Nuclear
Talks (Zia Mian, A.H. Nayyar, R. Rajaraman, M.V.
Ramana)
[2] Pakistan - India: When early warning is no
warning (Zia Mian, R. Rajaraman & M.V. Ramana)
[3] India: Peaceful vehicle Rally against Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation
[4] Massive Protest Rally in Bangalore
--------------
[1]
South Asians Against Nukes, July 2, 2004
URL: www.s-asians-against-nukes.org/nextStepsJune24_2004.html
NEXT STEPS FOR NUCLEAR TALKS
by Zia Mian, A.H. Nayyar, R. Rajaraman, M.V. Ramana
(The authors are all theoretical physicists - Zia
Mian is at Princeton University, USA; A.H. Nayyar
at Quaid-i-Azam University, Islamabad; R.
Rajaraman at Jawaharlal Nehru University, Delhi;
and M. V. Ramana at the Centre for
Interdisciplinary Studies in Environment and
Development, Bangalore)
June 24, 2004
It is talking time again. Pakistani and Indian
government officials met in New Delhi on June 19
and 20 to talk. The Foreign Ministers met briefly
in China on 21 June, the Foreign Secretaries will
apparently talk sometime in late July, and there
are suggestions of a possible summit meeting
between President Pervez Musharraf and India's
new Prime Minister Manmohan Singh. But while
talking is better than fighting, it is important
to remember the fact that India and Pakistan have
met and talked many times since the 1999 Lahore
summit, where the Prime Ministers claimed that
they shared "a vision of peace and stability
between their countries, and of progress and
prosperity for their peoples". What followed
Lahore however was not peace or stability but
instead the Kargil war, the armed stand-off in
2002 after jihadis attacked India's parliament,
spiraling military spending, missile test after
missile test, and the consolidation of nuclear
strategies.
Leaders on both sides seem to recognise that
their nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles cast
a dark, potentially fatal shadow over the future
of both countries. India's new Foreign Minister
Natwar Singh recently declared "To me personally,
the most important thing on our agenda should be
the nuclear dimension". General Musharraf claims
that "we have been saying let's make South Asia a
nuclear-free zone". He also suggested that "If
mutually there is an agreement of reduction of
nuclear assets, Pakistan would be willing". These
are hopeful indications. But we have heard such
words before.
After the recent meeting on reducing the risks of
nuclear weapons in the region, the joint
statement claimed the two states shared a
"positive framework, aimed at taking the process
forward, and making them result oriented". Sad to
say, the aim seemed more to portray themselves as
'responsible' nuclear weapons states and the
agreements that were actually announced amounted
to little more than a step sideways.
The only new measure is another hotline, this
time linking the two foreign secretaries, through
their respective foreign offices, "to prevent
misunderstandings and reduce risks relevant to
nuclear issues". There are several hotlines
already. J.N. Dixit, a former Foreign Secretary
of India and newly appointed as National Security
Adviser reports in his book "India-Pakistan in
War and Peace" that in November 1990 Prime
Ministers Chandra Sekhar and Nawaz Sharif met
during a SAARC Summit in Male, and "decided to
establish a direct hotline. They also took a
decision to activate the hotline between the
offices of the foreign secretaries and the
directors of military operations". In Mr. Dixit's
judgement "hotline conversations between the
director-generals of military operations remain
routine and the prime ministerial hotline has
seldom been used, as has the hotline between the
two foreign secretaries". The war, near war and
turmoil in the past five years certainly suggest
that these lines of communication are not very
satisfactory in preventing or defusing crises.
India and Pakistan need to go beyond just finding
ways and means to talk to each other about the
risks of nuclear weapons. They need to agree on
measures that will concretely reduce the nuclear
danger. A little common sense shows there are
some obvious things that they could do, if they
want to do more than just build 'confidence'
while their nuclear arsenals keep growing.
Both India and Pakistan have emphasised
repeatedly that they seek only a "minimum"
nuclear arsenal. General Musharraf's remarks
about Pakistan's willingness to consider a
"reduction of nuclear assets" makes clear that
this threshold has already been crossed. This
should be no surprise. Pakistan and India have
been making the fissile material (the nuclear
explosive) for their weapons as fast as they can
for decades. They already have enough for several
dozen nuclear weapons. The table below shows the
casualties that would be inflicted if they each
used only five of these weapons against the
others cities (assuming each weapon is about the
same size as those tested in May 1998) A total of
2.9 million deaths is predicted for these cities
in India and Pakistan with an additional 1.5
million severely injured.[r1] The experience of
death and destruction on this scale would be
beyond imagination for either country.
City
Total population within 5 km of explosion
Killed
Severely Injured
India
Bangalore
3,077,937
314,000
175,000
Bombay
3,143,284
477,000
229,000
Calcutta
3,520,344
357,000
198,000
Madras
3,252,628
364,000
196,000
New Delhi
1,638,744
176,000
94,000
Pakistan
Faisalabad
2,376,478
336,000
174,000
Islamabad
798,583
154,000
67,000
Karachi
1,962,458
240,000
127,000
Lahore
2,682,092
258,000
150,000
Rawalpindi
1,589,828
184,000
97,000
India and Pakistan can inflict much more than
this devastation, using only a fraction of the
nuclear weapons they already have. It is beyond
any understanding why they continue to produce
more fissile material for more nuclear weapons.
The two countries should stop making more fissile
material. And, no more of the existing fissile
material stockpile should be turned into nuclear
weapons. Each weapon could destroy a city.
It is clear that weapons like those tested in May
1998 are destructive enough to kill hundreds of
thousands of people in any major subcontinental
city on which they were used. This has not been
enough to stop India and Pakistan continuing with
research and development on nuclear weapons. Like
other countries with nuclear weapons, India and
Pakistan seek to make their nuclear weapons both
more destructive and more
compact.<outbind://14/#_msocom_2>[r2] A simple,
small, step towards nuclear restraint, and
building confidence, would be for both countries
to call a halt to the further development of
these weapons. This would be a clear sign that
the future can offer something other than the
paranoid logic of racing to build more and more
lethal weapons.
In the recent meeting, India and Pakistan
repeated their unilateral declarations to conduct
no further nuclear weapons tests. At the same
time, neither seems willing to sign the
Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT),
the 1996 international agreement banning
explosive nuclear weapons tests - which has been
signed by all the other nuclear weapons states
(US, Russia, Britain, France and China, as well
as Israel), and by 166 other countries. India and
Pakistan's reluctance is hard to understand.
Their joint statement says each state will
refrain from nuclear testing "unless, in exercise
of national sovereignty, it decides that
extraordinary events have jeopardized its supreme
interests". This conditionality is already there
in Article 9 of the CTBT, which allows a state to
withdraw from the Treaty, and by implication
carry out a nuclear test. Therefore, India and
Pakistan would lose nothing by signing this
Treaty.
By formally joining the Treaty, India and
Pakistan would help ensure that the international
community is better placed to restrain any
nuclear weapons state or would-be nuclear state
from carrying out a nuclear test. This was why
the idea of a treaty banning all nuclear tests
was floated in 1954 by Prime Minister Jawaharlal
Nehru. In the fifty years since then, there have
been over 2000 nuclear tests conducted around the
world. These made possible unimaginably
destructive nuclear arsenals, killed and injured
uncounted numbers of people through radioactive
fallout and contaminated the environment for
centuries to come. It was to stop this that the
CTBT was created. Now, even though it is a
signatory to the CTBT, US nuclear weapons
laboratories and nuclear hawks are seeking new
nuclear weapons for use against third world
countries. They want to resume testing, perhaps
in the next few years. If this is allowed to
happen, nuclear weaponeers and militaries in
other nuclear weapons states, including in
Pakistan and India, will surely push to follow
the US lead. It is important to prevent a second
age of nuclear weapons testing.
The Lahore agreements and the announcement of the
new hotline recognise that, despite the best laid
plans and supposedly fool-proof technology,
accidents do happen. In particular, the two
governments committed themselves in Lahore to
"reducing the risks of accidental or unauthorized
use of nuclear weapons". These risks are directly
linked to the deployment of nuclear weapons;
deployment might involve for example putting the
weapons on ballistic missiles or keeping the
weapons at military airbases close to planes that
may carry them. If the nuclear weapons are not
given over to military forces and not kept ready
to use, there is much less danger of them being
used by whoever happens to have charge of them at
that moment, or of them being involved in an
accident. These are elementary safety measures.
All India and Pakistan need do, at least as a
start, is to announce that they will carry out
these non-deployment measures.
The two sides also agreed in Lahore "to notify
each other immediately in the event of any
accidental, unauthorized or unexplained incident
that could create the risk of a fallout with
adverse consequences for both sides, or of an
outbreak of a nuclear war between the two
countries, as well as to adopt measures aimed at
diminishing the possibility of such actions or
incidents being misinterpreted by the other." The
new hotline is meant to address the first part of
this agreement. The two states should go on and
agree to draw up together a list of all the
possible "accidental, unauthorized or
unexplained" incidents that they would like the
other side to tell them about. This would lay the
basis for sharing descriptions of what measures
each has taken to reduce the risks of possible
accidents and unauthorized incidents.
All the steps suggested here are no more than
commonsense. But this is often in short supply in
all countries with nuclear weapons. Advice on
nuclear issues in both India and Pakistan is
dominated by the nuclear weapons complex, the
military and the foreign ministries. Because they
deal with nuclear weapons, this advice is
shrouded in secrecy. Expert they may well be,
infallible no one is. And, like all institutions,
they inevitably have a vested interest in keeping
their power, influence and funding, and seeking
more. It is these very agencies that have brought
us to the point of having to worry about the risk
of a nuclear war that might kill millions and of
nuclear accidents. To find a way forward,
governments in both countries would do well to
seek out other perspectives, ask for second
opinions, find people from outside the government
establishments who can help develop new ideas,
and encourage an informed and open public debate.
It will be no easy path from our present
nuclear-armed confrontation to the "peace and
stability, progress and prosperity" promised at
Lahore and so far denied. We must walk it
together with courage and conviction.
_____
[2]
The Hindu
July 02, 2004
Opinion - Leader Page Articles
WHEN EARLY WARNING IS NO WARNING
By Zia Mian, R. Rajaraman & M.V. Ramana
Early warning systems in South Asia have no
significant utility. Rather, they increase the
danger of inadvertent nuclear war.
AS A concrete step that would reduce nuclear
dangers in South Asia, we have suggested that
both India and Pakistan agree not to install
nuclear early warning systems (The Hindu, June 4,
2004). This may seem counter-intuitive in that
such systems are supposed to give advance notice
of a nuclear attack; it is often argued that this
warning time is vital for responsible
decision-making. For example, in his letter to
the editor (The Hindu, June 21), S.
Lakshminarayanan worries that "Without an
effective early warning system, we will be taken
unawares."
The notion of early warning, like the deeply
flawed notion of deterrence, is a carryover from
the nuclear confrontation between the United
States and the Soviet Union. It refers to the use
of radars and satellites for detecting a nuclear
missile attack under way. Detecting the missiles
is only the first stage of an early warning
system. This has to be followed by an assessment
of its reliability and significance before
interpreting it as a real "warning." Once
confirmed, this `warning' of an imminent nuclear
attack needs to be conveyed to the appropriate
military and political authorities. They will
need time to consider the situation and determine
their response - this will involve monumental
judgments about the start of a possible nuclear
war. Since the target of the incoming missile may
be the military and political leadership itself,
all these must happen in the time between the
detection of the missile and its arrival at the
target. In the case of the U.S. and the Soviet
Union, this entire process was forced to fit into
the 30 minutes their respective missiles would
take to reach their target.
We have studied the utility of similar early
warning systems and decision-making procedures
for South Asia. Our assessment of the
effectiveness of such systems was published in
the journal, Science and Global Security, last
year. We explain here the results of this
analysis that showed how the combination of
missiles travelling many thousands of miles an
hour and the geography of South Asia allows at
best a few minutes of warning. We make clear why
this is no warning at all if there is to be a
serious effort at verification of incoming
signals and the time taken for responsible
decision-making. We also point out that any early
warning system would inevitably generate both
genuine signals of incoming attack as well as
false alarms. In the middle of a crisis, such
false alarms, combined with the short decision
time involved, can raise the prospect of
technological and human error leading to
inadvertent nuclear war.
We first estimated the missile flight time
between different locations in India and
Pakistan; examples could be a missile launch from
Sargodha towards New Delhi or from Agra to
Lahore, a distance of some 600 km. The shortest
flight times come from sending long-range
missiles to nearby targets. We found that it
would take only about five minutes for Pakistan's
Ghauri and India's Agni missiles to reach a
target 600 km distant. To protect Delhi or Lahore
would require an early warning system to work
within these five minutes.
The first step is detecting the incoming missile,
either by radars or special satellites in high
altitude orbits. Since India has acquired Green
Pine, a missile detection radar made in Israel,
we looked at its capabilities. We found that a
missile fired from Pakistan's Sargodha Air Force
base towards New Delhi may be detected by such a
radar, placed for instance at Ambala, around a
minute and a half after launch.
This is just the initial detection. Confirming
the signal is real takes longer. There are many
sources of false and unpredictable signals that
radars pick up. In the 2003 U.S. war on Iraq, the
advanced version of the Patriot system reportedly
generated many false radar signals. The source of
the problem can often be mundane. Radar systems,
for example, have mistaken a flock of birds for a
missile. Radar signals also bounce off regions of
the atmosphere where no apparent reflecting
sources exist. Weather can also affect
performance. To be reasonably confident that the
radar is indeed picking up a missile requires
double-checking the signal. This includes
tracking the object over a period of time to
determine its path. All this will take some time.
In the case of the U.S. and Russia, several
minutes were allotted for verifying radar signals
before they were passed on to military
authorities. Clearly, the five-minute missile
flights relevant to South Asia permit no time for
such a comprehensive verification.
Missile launches can also be detected by special
satellites with infra-red detectors that detect
the intense heat from the exhaust plume produced
by rocket engines. Neither India nor Pakistan has
such a system - nor for that matter does China or
the United Kingdom have it, while France is still
seeking to acquire this capability. Even if they
did, such satellites have problems of their own.
The heat radiation from the missile plume is
absorbed by water vapour and carbon dioxide in
the lower atmosphere, and scattered by rain and
dust. Nor does it penetrate clouds. Thus a
missile can be reliably detected by such a
satellite only when it emerges above the clouds,
which typically takes about a minute. In effect,
a satellite would provide warning no earlier than
a radar in South Asia. This is markedly different
from the case of the U.S. and Russia, where
satellites provided several additional minutes of
warning. It is clear that India or Pakistan would
gain little if they acquire or develop early
warning satellites.
Both the U.S. and Russia have elaborate
procedures for nuclear warning assessment and
decision-making. Technology and operating
procedures are both fallible and can combine at
times to create false alerts of early warning
systems. Typically every year there were about
2,500 false alarms from U.S. early warning
systems, due to causes varying from swarms of
geese to the rising moon. In some cases, the time
allotted for checking the signal proved
insufficient to determine that a warning was in
fact false.
Though both sides built in time for efforts to
verify the data from their early warning systems,
it must be stressed that assessment and
decision-making were forced to fit into the
available time before the missiles descended on
the decision-makers. U.S. procedures left its
President and senior officials only about 10
minutes for deciding whether to launch their own
missiles. Russian procedures left even less:
their national command authority is allotted
three minutes to discuss and authorise permission
to launch Russian missiles. Russia had serious
concerns that these procedures might not work as
planned and as a fallback installed a "dead hand"
that would automatically transmit launch orders.
Given that missiles can travel between India and
Pakistan in less than five minutes, of which a
minute and a half would have been lost before
they are detected, the information from radars
(and satellites, if ever available) would need to
be processed and evaluated, decision-makers
informed, and action taken within three minutes
(and at most nine minutes, in the case of very
distant targets in the region). To put it
differently, a false signal would need to evade
identification only for a few minutes before it
leads to the possible calamity of a nuclear
response based on a mistake.
This is an unprecedented constraint on procedures
for evaluation and confirmation of any electronic
warning (with all its uncertainties) and for
decision-making about the retaliatory use of
nuclear weapons. There would, in fact, be barely
enough time for the warning to be communicated to
decision-makers. There would be no time
whatsoever to consult or deliberate after
receiving this warning. There would be no
decision-making in any meaningful sense of the
term.
The available time would not permit anything more
than praying before "pressing the button." This
could only trigger some pre-planned response. It
could be the launch of one's own nuclear
missiles. In the event of a false signal, this
will start a nuclear war where there was none.
Alternatively, anti-ballistic missiles could be
launched in an attempt to shoot down what are
believed to be incoming missiles. Again, a false
warning could potentially lead to disaster, since
the other side's early warning system might not
easily be able to distinguish this response from
a nuclear attack. Is our faith in the
infallibility of technology and human judgment so
strong that we are willing to risk such a
catastrophe?
It is these considerations that persuade us that
early warning systems in South Asia have no
significant utility. Rather, they increase the
danger of inadvertent nuclear war. India and
Pakistan would do well to agree to abandon the
pursuit of such systems.
(The authors are all physicists - Zia Mian is at
Princeton University, U.S.; R. Rajaraman at
Jawaharlal Nehru University, Delhi; and M. V.
Ramana at the Centre for Interdisciplinary
Studies in Environment and Development,
Bangalore.)
_____
[3]
Date : 01-07-04
PRESS - RELEASE
Minority Christian Community organizes peaceful
vehicle Rally against Congress ruled Ahmedabad
Municipal Corporation for no-action taken in the
issue of Ranipur Graveyard.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
All India Christian Council's National
Executive Member & Joint Secretary Mr. Samson C.
Christian in a statement given before press
states that in Ranipur village of Ahmedabad.
Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation authorities had
demolished the graves in 143 yrs old Christian
graveyard by running tractors in the graveyard as
well as dumping & spreading sewage plants'
wastage in the entire Christian Graveyard & thus
Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation made the
Christian graveyard unholy. A.I.C.C. in response
to this inhumane act organized Dharna programme &
handed over written representation to Ahmedabad
Municipal Corporation's Mayor regarding various
other problems also but when no steps were taken
in this regard till date compelling the Christian
minority community to once again come down on
road to protest and as a part of that today on
01-07-04 afternoon at 3.00 pm peaceful vehicle
rally commence from Ranipur village's C.N.I.
Church & reached Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation
main building at Danapith in which various social
& religious leaders viz. 2000 had joined the
rally.
In the end of rally Christian leaders shall
hand over a charter of demands to the Ahmedabad
Municipal Corporation Commissioner & shall demand
the resignation of Ahmedabad Municipal
Corporation Mayor for his negligence towards
solving the problems faced by the minority
Christian community and warned that we want
solution in one week otherwise, the peoples and
leaders of the village Ranipur will go for
fast-unto-death agitation, based on Mahatma
Gandhi front side of Corporation Building. In
addition to that will make and object of road
blocking Narol circle to Sewage farm treatment
plant and all the responsibility will be
Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation.
Yours Sincerely
Samson C. Christian
National Executive Member
All India Christian Council
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
The memorandum has been given to the Municipal
Commissinor/Mayor in addition to try to destroy
purposefully the Ranipur Christian graveyard
which is under the teritory of Ahmedabad city and
about other Christian communitie's questions.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
To,
Date: 01-07-04.
The Resp. Municipal Commissioner/Mayor
Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation
Danapith,
Ahmedabad.
Resp. Sir/Mayor
Jay Bharat. It is to state that in Ahmedabad at
Sarkhej - Narol highwary there is Ranipur village
where there is 143 yrs. old Christian Graveyard &
on the direct instructions/orders of Ahmedabad
Municipal Corporation Pirana Sewage treatment
plant's incharge officer & Addl. City Engineer
Shri D.K.Begda & Deputy City Engineer Shri
B.G.Satani their sub-ordinate staff demolished
the graves by running tractors on them. Moreover
the staff also dumped & spread the sewage waste
of Pirana Sewage treatment plant all over the
graveyard & thus made the Christian gaveyard
unholy & hurt the religious sentiments of
minority Christian community.
In response to this inhumane act we the
National level organization of minority Christian
community had organized a Dharna programme on
10-05-04 at Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation's
main building at Danapith & further we handed
over a 11 point written representation by our
social & religious Christian leaders to the Mayor
of Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation a copy of the
same is enclosed as Annexure - 'A'.
After giving a written representation on 10-05-04
to the Mayor of A.M.C. once again the Christian
leaders approached to A.M.C.'s Mayor on 25-05-04
& met him personally & discussed regarding this
inhumane incident & also invited his attention
towards problems of other Christian graveyards &
requested him to take necessary steps in this
regard but till date no other action except
clearance of sewage waste from Christian
graveyard has been carried out. Therefore we the
A.I.C.C. has organized a peaceful vehicle rally
from Ranipur C.N.I. Church to A.M.C.'s main
building at Danapith inorder to focus attention
towards Christians problems & injustice. And we
further demand the resignation of A.M.C.'s Mayor
who has been neglecting such inhumane incidents
of injustice to the minority Christian Community
because if you don't work for the public welfare
then you got no right to remain in power.Finally
we request you to take a note & solve the
problems faced by minority Christians on a fast
track.
Thanking you
Place: Ahmedabad.
Rev. Manoj Gohil Saheb
Samson C. Christian
Pastor
National Executive Member &
C.N.I. Church, Ranipur
Joint Secretary
Ahmedabad.
All India Christian Council
_____
[4]
MASSIVE PROTEST RALLY IN BANGALORE
TO THE CHIEF MINISTER'S RESIDENCE
DATE: 02/07/2004 TIME: 10 AM
PLACE: Chikkalalbagh to Old Central Jail
We demand the immediate arrest of four Byappanahalli Policemen:
1. Ashwat Narayana (Inspector of Police),
2. Krishnappa (Sub-Inspector of Police),
3. Ramakrishna (Constable), and
4. Roshan Ali Khan (Constable),
who have sexually abused and tortured Kokila, a hijra.
--------------------------
Dear Friends
Since 23/06/2004, we have been sitting on a
DHARNA (protest sit-in) in front of the Mahatma
Gandhi Statue, MG Road, Bangalore, to demand the
immediate arrest of four Byappanahalli Policemen:
Ashwathanarayana (Inspector of Police),
Krishnappa (Sub-Inspector of Police), Ramakrishna
(Constable) and Roshan Ali Khan (Constable), who
have tortured and sexually abused Kokila, a hijra
(transsexual woman), in the Byappanahalli Police
Station on 18th June, 2004. We have yet to
receive any response from the government. Using
goondas, the Policemen involved in the torture
have been threatening Kokila and Chandini, as
well as other hijras and human rights activists,
to intimidate them into withdrawing the
complaint. They have even threatened to throw
acid on Kokila and other hijras. We take this
threat very seriously as many women in Bangalore
City have been attacked with acid in the recent
past. From now on, should any hijra in Bangalore
City be attacked with acid, we will hold Byappana
halli Police responsible for it.
Mrs. Philomina Peres, chairperson of the
Karnataka Commission for Women, recently visited
our DHARNA site, and has demanded the DGP to
immediately take drastic action against the four
policemen. She called it a human rights violation
against hijra sex-workers, and has promised to
petition the government for justice for Kokila.
We welcome the Commission's response, but
unfortunately, this has been the only government
agency to respond to Kokila's situation
positively.
The leaders of Janatadal (secular), Mr. T.
Prabakar (state general secretary), Mr. Srikanta
Murthy (president, Bangalore City) and Mr. Dr.
D.C. Prakash (general secretary, Bangalore City)
have visited the DHARNA site and have promised to
bring Kokila's perpetrator's to justice. They
have also promised to work towards government
recognition of hijras as woman and the
decriminalization of sex-work.
Dr. Siddhanagowda Patil, state general secretary
of the Communist Party of India (CPI), has taken
part in our DHARNA. In fact, many progressive and
human rights organisations from Karnataka and all
over India are participating or supporting the
DHARNA. Human rights organisations from all over
the world are putting pressure on the chief
minister, through email, to take action against
the four cruel policemen.
We are organising a MASSIVE PROTEST RALLY to the
chief minister's residence (Chikkalalbagh to Old
Central Jail) on 2nd July, 2004, at 10 AM, to
demand for the immediate arrest of the four
Byappanahalli Policemen. More than 1,500 people
will participate in the rally.
PLEASE JOIN US IN LARGE NUMBERS
The organizers of this rally include:
Sangama, Vimochana, Sanchaya Nele, Garment
Workers' Union, Dalitha RashtriyaAndolane, Social
Action Committee, Communist Party of India (CPI),
Communist Party of India - Marxist (CPI-M),
Karnataka Rajya Ratha Sangha (KRRS), Dalitha
SangharshaSamithi, Dalitha Sangharsha Samithi
(Ambedkarvada), Praja Vimochana Chaluvali (PVC),
Karnataka Janandolana Sanghatane (K. Mariyappa),
Lankesh Patrike, Karnataka Vimochana Ranga (KVR),
Madiga Meesalathi Horata Samithi (MRHS),
Karnataka Kaumusouhardha Vedike, Janadvani Yuva
Vedike, People's Democratic Forum (PDF), New
Socialist Alternative, Mahila Jagruthi, Stri
Jagruthi Samithi, People's Union for Civil
Liberties - Karnataka (PUCL), Dalitha Matthu
Mahila Chaluvali (DMC), Dalit Christian
Federation (DCF), Human Rights Forum for Dalit
Liberation (HRFDL), SICHREM, Grama Swaraj
Samithi, Jagruthi Mahila Sangha, Vividha, Swathi
Mahila Sangha, Samraksha, NESA, Contract
Paurakarmikas Union, Jathi Vinasha Vedike, Karna
taka Domestic Workers Union, Bahumuki, Sakya
Balaga, DISC, Focus India, Pipal Tree, Dalitha
Hindulidavara Alpasamkyaathara Samithi, FEDINA,
YDF, Alternative Law Forum Š
--------------------------------------
For more information contact:
Sangama, Flat 13, 3rd Floor, 'Royal Park'
Apartments, 34 Park Road, Tasker Town, Bangalore
- 560051, Karnataka, India (behind Hotel
'Harsha,' near Shivajinagar Bust Stand),
telephone: 91 80 22868680/91 80 22868121, mobile:
91 9844013413 fax: 91 8022868161, email:
sangama at sangama.org
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Buzz on the perils of fundamentalist politics, on
matters of peace and democratisation in South
Asia. SACW is an independent & non-profit
citizens wire service run since 1998 by South
Asia Citizens Web: www.sacw.net/
The complete SACW archive is available at:
bridget.jatol.com/pipermail/sacw_insaf.net/
South Asia Counter Information Project a sister
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