SACW #1 | 15 March 2004

[Harsh Kapoor]

South Asia Citizens Wire  #1  |  15 March,  2004
via:  www.sacw.net

[1] US Move Is Bad News for South Asian Security (Praful Bidwai)
[2] Bangladesh: Everything Falls Apart  (Ahmede Hussain)
[3] India: In The Name of Nationalism (K.N. Panikkar)


--------------

[1]

"antiwar.com", March 13, 2004

US Move Is Bad News for South Asian Security

by Praful Bidwai

Washington's policymakers might believe they have 
scored a diplomatic coup of sorts in South Asia 
by reportedly reaching a deal with Pakistan to 
allow US troops to be deployed in Pakistan to 
hunt down Osama bin Laden.

This deal with Pakistan President Gen. Pervez 
Musharraf is supposedly in return for the pardon 
that Musharraf gave to nuclear expert Abdul 
Qadeer Khan, who has admitted to selling nuclear 
secrets to Iran, Libya and North Korea, and 
Islamabad's not taking any further action on this 
confession.

The agreement was reported by Seymour Hersh of 
the New Yorker, but Pakistan officials have 
denied it.

But what the US government may believe to be a 
coup may turn out to be a delusion, if not a 
long-term liability.

If an intensified hunt for bin Laden succeeds, 
his capture will certainly boost President George 
W Bush's election campaign. After the 
U.S.-created political and security mess in Iraq, 
he may have something to boast of.

But the costs of this "success" might prove 
onerous, and out of proportion to the benefits. 
To start with, it is not clear that the al-Qaeda 
fugitive now effectively controls a large global 
network.

More important, the physical presence of US 
troops on Pakistani soil – especially Special 
Forces, like the elite commando unit Task Force 
121 that is reportedly being shifted from Iraq – 
will breed enormous resentment and discontent in 
Pakistan.

Its impact will be greatest in the sensitive 
areas adjoining Afghanistan: the North West 
Frontier Province (NWFP) and Baluchistan.

Already, radical Islamists rule the two 
provinces, catapulted into power there in 
elections by the unpopular U.S.-declared war on 
Afghanistan following Sep. 11, 2001. The 
resentment is likely to be extremely high in the 
turbulence-prone Pashtun "tribal agency" areas 
abutting Afghanistan.

Discontent will probably engulf all of Pakistan, 
including the country's non-Islamist, liberal and 
moderate opinion, if US troops are deployed.

Many Pakistanis, like other South Asians, did not 
strongly oppose the US action in Afghanistan 
against al-Qaeda in 2001 or vocally oppose 
Pakistan's "cooperation" with the US government. 
But foreign troops' presence on Pakistani soil is 
another matter altogether.

When those troops are from the United States, it 
will cause big hurt to "national pride," and 
injure widely prevalent ideas about 
"sovereignty," Pakistani observers have said in 
interviews recently. Bluntly put, the US 
government is not popular in Pakistan. It is 
widely seen as a hegemonic, over-ambitious and 
cynical power, which has treated Pakistan 
shabbily except when its cooperation is useful in 
Washington's short-term interests.

Even bin Laden's capture is unlikely to enthuse 
the public in Pakistan and Afghanistan – any more 
than deposed president Saddam Hussein's did in 
Iraq. In some ways, its impact may be worse.

The likely adverse reaction in Pakistan to a 
Khan-for-Osama deal with the US government must 
be understood in the specific context of South 
Asia's tortuous relationship with Washington. 
This has at least four significant components.

First, there is a history of resentment against 
and suspicion of Washington in both India and 
Pakistan. India was a leader in non-alignment 
during the Cold War and often faced US hostility.

Pakistan was a US ally from the 1950s onwards. 
But after the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, 
the United States downgraded it from a 
"frontline" state to a virtual pariah. It 
curtailed its access to armaments and technology 
to try to "cap" and "roll back" its nuclear 
weapons program, to which it had earlier turned a 
blind eye.

After the Cold War, the United States lost much 
of its economic, political and strategic interest 
in Pakistan. The 1998 nuclear blasts further 
marginalized Pakistan in the US scheme. Things 
changed after Sep. 11, because of Pakistan's 
location right next to Afghanistan.

Second, many Pakistanis believe that Musharraf 
did not drive a good enough bargain with 
Washington while offering unconditional support 
to its "war on terror." After Sep. 11, he fell in 
line without negotiating the terms for his 
support.

He allowed himself to be pressed into acting 
against domestic extremists and "diluting" 
Pakistan's traditional stand on Kashmir, favoring 
a plebiscite about joining India or Pakistan. 
(Indian policymakers take the opposite view of 
this.)

Third, there is a widespread perception that the 
US government has "tilted" toward India, 
especially since President Bill Clinton's 2000 
visit, and US economic relations with India have 
significantly improved.

By contrast, there is virtually no US investment 
or business interest in Pakistan. Some Pakistani 
commentators believe that the US government knew 
the truth about Pakistan's clandestine nuclear 
pursuits since the 1970s. Recent declassified US 
documents with the National Security Archive 
confirm these.

Washington chose to expose Khan at a time of its 
own convenience so it could mount effective 
pressure on Musharraf.

Fourth, the recent disclosures, many Pakistani 
analysts say, have put Pakistan's future nuclear 
activities in jeopardy. At the same time, the US 
government and India are building a close 
strategic partnership, including sharing 
"dual-use" technology. This is widening the 
asymmetry between India and Pakistan in relations 
with the United States.

Thus, nuclear specialist and journalist 
Shahid-ur-Rehman has been quoted by the British 
Broadcasting Corp. as saying Pakistan will now 
find it difficult to maintain and modernize its 
nuclear facilities. "Pakistan's program was based 
on smuggled, imported technology;" he says: "By 
contrast, India's program was not as 
sophisticated, but it was indigenous. If there 
are curbs on India, they will not suffer."

Argues Rehman, "If Pakistan needs a nuclear 
component, they will have to approach the 
international market. They will not sell it, so 
Pakistan will have to buy it on the black 
market." His conclusion: "Pakistan's nuclear 
program is now almost healf-dead."

This sounds exaggerated, but there is certainly a 
contrast between Pakistan and India. India 
adopted the technologically easier route to 
nuclear bomb-making by reprocessing plutonium 
from unsafeguarded reactor fuel – thus, India 
could keep its nuclear program largely 
indigenous. Sanctions and import restrictions 
would not kill it.

Pakistan's uranium-enrichment route uses a more 
sophisticated technology, involving centrifuges 
rotating at extremely high speeds like 1,000 
revolutions per second. Such machines and their 
components cannot be made domestically. Pakistan 
is far more vulnerable to external restrictions.

Adding to this asymmetry is growing military 
collaboration between India and the US 
government, and India and Israel.

In February, the US government and India 
conducted relatively advanced joint air 
exercises. Washington has invited India to 
participate in a major North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization exercise in Alaska. New Delhi 
strongly supports Bush's Ballistic Missile 
Defense plans and has offered to collaborate in 
developing that technology.

India has signed an agreement to buy the "Falcon" 
airborne early warning and control system from 
Israel, with US approval. This, Pakistani 
officials say, will "disturb the strategic and 
conventional balance in South Asia, and we will 
naturally take steps to redress the balance."

This spells an accelerated arms race, in addition 
to the India-Pakistan nuclear weapons 
competition. The US government will only 
destabilize the situation further if it pursues 
its present policy.

Washington can help improve matters if it becomes 
even-handed and balanced in its ties with India 
and Pakistan and does not act only out of 
expedient considerations. There can be no 
long-term stability and security in this troubled 
region short of a momentum for global nuclear 
disarmament. Is the United States ready to move 
in that direction?



_____



[2]

Magazine  The Daily Star [Bangladesh]
March 12, 2004
 
Everything Falls Apart

AHMEDE HUSSAIN

On that fateful Friday, Dr Azad, in jeans and 
fatua, had been sitting in the stall of Agami 
Prokashani at the Ekushey Book Fair. He left the 
stall at around 8:45 PM; "Dr Azad left the mela, 
telling me he would go home," says Osman Gani, 
owner of the publishing house. It was around 
9:30, a young man approached him for an 
autograph; Dr Azad crossed the road for a 
rickshaw after signing the autograph. And then 
two unknown assailants, armed with chopping 
knives hacked the 56-year-old writer on the jaw, 
lower part of the neck and hands, on the pavement 
outside the academy.

Conscious but profusely bleeding, Dr Azad, who 
has authored over 70 books, was taken to the 
emergency unit of Dhaka Medical College Hospital 
(DMCH). According to newspaper reports, no doctor 
was available at the emergency unit of the DMCH. 
Later, Dr Azad was sent to the Combined Military 
Hospital (CMH).

Dr Azad's attackers, might have come right out of 
his book, Pak Sar Jamin Sadd Baad (Pakistan's 
national anthem: Blessed be the Sacred Land). It 
depicts the story of a religious fanatic who 
wants to establish a "Taliban-styled distorted 
Pakistan" in Bangladesh.

The protagonist, a member of the Jama'-e-Jihad-e 
Islam Party, says in a monologue, "We aren't 
alone. Our brothers all over the world are doing 
their work. If they fly an aeroplane into a 
building somewhere, if cars crash into a hospital 
or a hotel, or if a bomb blast kills 300 people 
in some recreational centre, then we know it's 
the work of our brothers; in other words, it is 
our work. This is Jihad."

The name, Jama'-e-Jihad-e Islam Party, is 
believed to be an allegory to the Jamat-e-Islami 
Bangladesh (JI), a partner in the ruling 
coalition; as another character in the book, 
Karim Ali Islampuri says, "We must seize power. 
Right now, we are with the power and the main 
party. At some point, power will come to us; we 
will become the main party. We are entering 
everywhere -- Islam will be established; 
(another) Pakistan will be created. There won't 
be any infidels, Malauns (Hindus); there won't be 
any Hindu or Jew in guise of Muslims."

Dr Azad's novel, however, meets a melodramatic 
end. The zealot goes through a dramatic change of 
heart-- he falls in love with a Hindu girl; and 
later abandons the path of religious bigotry and 
intolerance.

But in real life, Dr Azad had been fearing for 
his life since the novel was first published in 
the Daily Ittefaq's Eid supplement in 2003. In an 
email to Muktomona, an independent website, he 
wrote, "The Ittefaq published a novel by me named 
Pak Sar Jamin Saad Baad in the Eid issue in 
December 3. It deals with the condition of 
Bangladesh for the last two years. Now the 
(religious) fundamentalists are bringing out 
regular processions against me, demanding 
exemplary punishment. The attached two files with 
this letter will help you understand." Along with 
the mail Dr Azad sent JPG files that included 
news of protests against him.

In fact, on January 25, Delwar Hossain Sayeedi, 
an MP belonging to JI called for the introduction 
of the Blasphemy Act to block the publication of 
"such books". Besides Sayeedi--who once called 
for blood tests for journalists to see "if they 
are Muslims or not"-- many bigots have declared 
the maverick writer a murtad (apostate). From an 
anti-Ahmadiyya rally on December 12, Momtazi, 
emir of Hifazate Khatm-e-Nabuat Movement and the 
Imam of Rahim Metal Mosque demanded the 
professor's arrest and trial.

Nothing has ever deterred Dr Azad, perhaps, the 
lone outspoken writer in Bangla literature, from 
speaking out his mind. Azad has even denounced 
some of his contemporaries, describing their 
novels as opponnayash (degenerated novel). Be it 
in writing against military bureaucracy or 
dictatorship in the guise of democracy, Dr Azad, 
with his iconoclastic views, has always stood out.

Though, teachers at the university have been 
divided along the line of their political 
allegiance, Dr Azad has kept a safe distance from 
both the BNP backed White and AL backed Blue 
factions. In fact, Latifa Kohinur, Dr Azad's 
wife, cannot remember him going to the polling 
booths, even, to vote for the general elections. 
Though everyone does not subscribe to his 
opinion, Dr Azad's writings have always generated 
much enthusiasm among the readers for his fierce 
criticism of the establishment. But through his 
candid statements on the political use of 
religion, the writer has certainly earned the 
wrath of a certain quarter.

Actually, according to Latifa, the writer used to 
receive phone calls "five or six years ago" that 
threatened to kill the linguist for writing 
"un-islamic" things. "I used to get phone calls 
five or six years agoŠThey would say, 'You will 
get Humayun Azad's corpse on the streetŠ You will 
be a widow soon', and so on," Latifa says. But 
the threats suddenly stopped coming in one day.

Even after the publication of Pak Saar Jamin Saad 
Baad, the family members did not receive any such 
call, Latifa says. But she became anxious for her 
husband's safety when "a religious fundamentalist 
outfit called for Dr Azad's trial and the banning 
of Pak Saar Jamin Saad Baad ". That anxiety 
turned into fear after Sayeedi's infamous demand 
in the parliament.

Latifa couldn't hide her anger on the night of 
February 27 at the CMH. "Fundamentalists 
(zealots) have done thisŠ Who else could do this? 
You know an MP even verbaly abused him in the 
parliament," she said. "Why didn't you take 
security measures to protect him after such an 
outrage in parliament?" Latifa asked Lutfuzzaman 
Babar, state minister for home, when he went to 
visit Dr Azad in hospital.

Though the police had claimed to have "cordoned 
off" the area immediately after the attack, the 
agitating students of Dhaka university, who had 
been demanding the home minister's resignation, 
recovered another blood soaked Chapati (chopping 
knife) from the spot on the following day.

The police, however, arrested Abbas, alias Boma 
Abbas, joint secretary of Sir AF Rahman Hall unit 
of Bangladesh Chatra League. "We have information 
about his presence near the spot before and after 
the incident. And there was a bomb explosion 
during the attack, he might be involved in the 
crime," Officer in Charge of Ramna Police Station 
Mahabubur Rahman said; Abbas has a history of 
bomb-making, the police officer alleged. The case 
was later handed over to the CID; and though the 
state minister for home has promised to give the 
case highest priority, the police are yet to 
unearth any motive behind the attack.

The attack on Dr Azad and the police's failure to 
nab the culprits have angered general people. The 
Dhaka University Teachers' Association has called 
an indefinite strike demanding the home 
minister's resignation. The anger turned into 
fury when armed hoodlums belonging to the 
Jatioyatabadi Chatra Dal (JCD), attacked peaceful 
procession of the general students on March 4. It 
is not clear, though, as to how a peaceful 
demonstration demanding the arrest of Dr Azad's 
killers can anger the ruling party's student wing.

To save its skin the government resorted to 
suspicious secrecy. When, immediately after the 
attack, the country held its breath to hear the 
latest condition of Dr Azad, the government even 
barred journalists from entering the CMH 
premises. It was an irregular, and in cases 
irresponsible, press-note of the Inter Service 
Public Relations that became the sole source of 
information for the anxious general people. The 
government's suspicious behaviour gave birth to a 
wide spread rumour of his death. Some government 
officials, when asked, came out with reports on 
his condition that were self-contradictory. 
Lately Azad's condition has, however, improved; 
and rumours died down when members of his family 
and Dr Azad's friends were allowed to visit him.

The attack on Dr Azad, in every sense, is 
shocking. Though religious fanatics have declared 
many writers and intellectuals as apostates, in 
fact, this is the first time in our history, that 
a writer was physically assaulted for his work. 
The attack, in front of Bangla Academy, one of 
the glorious products of our language movement, 
sends a chilling message to those who still 
believe in freethinking.

Everyone wanted to reap dividend from the attack 
on Dr Azad. While Dr Azad was fighting for life 
at the CMH, leaders of both the major political 
parities and intellectuals of their creeds kept 
themselves busy interpreting their own version of 
the event.

"I just want to see the man back home," says 
Latifa Kohinur. After 33 years of independence we 
cannot even be guaranteed security for our lives; 
forget free speech.


_____



[3]


Frontline
March 13 - March 26, 2004
COVER STORY

IN THE NAME OF NATIONALISM

K.N. PANIKKAR

The rise of Hindutva was neither sudden nor 
spontaneous. It owes much to the slow 
transformation in social consciousness as a 
result of sustained interventions in the cultural 
and religious life of the people.


INDRANIL MUKHERJEE/AFP

RSS members at a training camp in Bangalore.

A NEW identity is being foisted on Hindus. The 
identity of Hindutva. Are Hindus being coerced to 
accept that identity, socially and culturally and 
indeed politically? Apparently, no society can be 
forced to own an externally induced identity. It 
has to emerge from within as a part of social 
dynamics. Yet, when ideas are implanted in social 
consciousness and nurtured through legitimising 
interventions, they do succeed in exercising a 
powerful influence in society. Hindutva is such 
an idea `invented' about 80 years ago, 
intellectually elaborated thereafter by several 
communal ideologues and recently given wide 
currency through state sponsorship, political 
support and socio-cultural mobilisation. Although 
alien to Hindu philosophical tenets and religious 
practices, Hindutva has gained legitimacy as a 
commonly shared heritage among a large section of 
Hindus. The implications of this development has 
pitch-forked Hindutva to the centre stage of 
contemporary Indian politics.

Hindutva and Hinduism

But then what is Hindutva? None of its 
contemporary advocates, including Prime Minister 
Atal Bihari Vajpayee and his less imaginative 
colleagues in the Sangh Parivar, have spelt out 
its character and its constitutive elements. For 
good reasons. They are seeking to evolve an 
overarching political ideology to bring together 
the followers of a highly differentiated 
religious faith. Hindutva is, therefore, 
conceived as an undefinable quality inherent in 
the Hindu `race', which cannot be identified with 
anything specific in Hinduism. Hindutva, in the 
opinion of Vinayak Damodar Savarkar, the 
progenitor of the concept, "is so varied and so 
rich, so powerful and so subtle, so elusive and 
yet so vivid" that it defies all attempts at 
analysis. Therefore, he had stopped short of 
defining it; instead he only tried to underline 
its relationship with Hinduism. He had asserted: 
"Hinduism is only a derivative, a fraction, a 
part of Hindutva." He, however, argued that this 
distinction would help to consolidate the Hindu 
community: "Failure to distinguish between 
Hindutva and Hinduism has given rise to much 
misunderstanding and mutual suspicion between 
some of those sister communities that have 
inherited this inestimable and common treasure of 
our Hindu civilisation... It is enough to point 
out that Hindutva is not identical with what is 
vaguely indicated by the term Hinduism. By an 
`ism' it is generally meant a theory or a code 
more or less based on spiritual or religious 
dogma or system. But when we attempt to 
investigate into the essential significance of 
Hindutva, we do not primarily - and certainly not 
mainly - concern ourselves with any particular 
theocratic or religious dogma or creed... 
Hindutva embraces all the departments of thought 
and activity of the whole Being of our Hindu 
race." Despite the above distinction, the 
relationship between Hindutva and Hinduism is 
well marked even in Savarkar's scheme. Savarkar 
had argued that a Muslim or a Christian, even if 
born in India, could not claim to possess the 
qualities of Hindutva. The essentials of 
Hindutva, according to Savarkar, are "a common 
nation (rashtra), a common race (jati) and a 
common civilisation (sanskriti)".

Later Hindu ideologues such as M.S. Golwalkar 
elaborated this idea to exclude all non-Hindus 
from the ambit of the nation. Hindutva, 
therefore, serves as an ideological justification 
for the construction of India as a Hindu nation. 
The statement of the Prime Minister that the 
demolition of the Babri Masjid is an expression 
of national sentiment and his reluctance to 
condemn the Gujarat massacre unambiguously 
demonstrate his commitment to the political 
ideology of Hindutva. So does the Sangh Parivar's 
general view that the rath yatra of L.K. Advani, 
currently enacting a repeat performance, 
represents the resurgence of India as a nation. 
In the Hindu communal practice, therefore, the 
distinction between Hindutva and Hinduism has 
disappeared, which has helped the militant 
communal Hindu politics to command the support of 
unsuspecting Hindu believers. In the last few 
elections, this strategy has returned high 
dividends.


V.V. KRISHNAN

The L.K. Advani-led rath yatra leaves for Ayodhya 
from Somnath in September 1990.


The next election is another test case as to 
whether Hindus can be coerced in the name of 
their faith to act against the basic tenets of 
their own religion. Despite the new slogans of 
development and statesmanship, Hindutva would 
continue to be an issue in the forthcoming 
elections. For the Sangh Parivar cannot ensure 
the support even of its ardent followers without 
feeding them with irrational politics. Such 
politics commands wider support when imbued with 
cultural content. The Sangh Parivar is fully 
alive to this mobilising potential of culture, 
which accounts for the foregrounding of cultural 
nationalism as central to its politics.

Cultural nationalism

The concept of cultural nationalism conceived and 
propagated by Hindutva is based on a 
misrepresentation of the nature of national 
identity. Nationalism, like democracy, is 
indivisible, with its constitutive elements - 
political, economic and cultural - intermeshed 
with each other. Privileging any one of these 
attributes tends to undermine the holistic 
character of nationalism. There is no denying the 
importance of culture in the make-up of national 
identity; yet culture alone does not mould the 
nationalism of any country. This was true of 
India as well where nationalism emerged and 
evolved as a part of anti-colonial consciousness. 
Culture was deeply implicated in this process of 
national reconstruction, both by trying to 
develop a national culture, which was distinct 
from the colonial and the traditional, as well as 
by invoking culture as a locus of resistance. 
Yet, the struggle for national culture during the 
anti-colonial period either remained an 
epi-phenomenon, or an instrument of political 
mobilisation. Therefore, the cultural question 
was not adequately addressed during the 
anti-colonial struggle and Hindutva has 
appropriated the space thus left open.

Hindutva's conception of nationalism is rooted in 
the primacy of culture over politics. The meaning 
attributed to culture by the ideologues of the 
Sangh Parivar and their cultural practices 
further qualifies the character of cultural 
nationalism. According to their interpretation, 
culture "is but a product of our 
all-comprehensive religion, a part of its body 
and not distinguishable from it". It naturally 
implies that the national culture is Hindu 
religious culture. Cultural nationalism is, 
therefore, a euphemism invoked in order to mask 
the creation of a state with Hindu religious 
identity. Such a character of the nation was 
clearly spelt out by Golwalkar: "In Hindustan, 
the land of the Hindus lives and should live the 
Hindu Nation... Consequently, only those 
movements are truly `National' as aim at 
rebuilding, revitalising, and emancipating from 
the present stupor, the Hindu Nation."

The contemporary advocates of cultural 
nationalism and the movements they lead are 
engaged in creating a nation in which the Hindu 
religious identity coincides with the cultural. 
This is attempted through intervention in culture 
rather than cultural intervention. The importance 
of this distinction is realised by the activists 
of the Hindutva who, as a result, constantly 
intervene in the actual cultural life of the 
people in order to transform it in a religious 
direction. As a part of this endeavour, the Sangh 
Parivar has set up cultural organisations in 
almost every conceivable area. They are 
constantly engaged in imparting a Hindu religious 
character to the quotidian cultural practices of 
the people. The secular forces, on the other 
hand, even at the face of the successful cultural 
advance of Hindutva, continue to be trapped in an 
instrumentalist view of culture and persist with 
their faith in the transformative power of 
cultural performance.


The BJP's Bharat Uday Rath.

The multi-faceted cultural intervention of 
Hindutva is primarily intended to appropriate the 
cultural past as Hindu and to expropriate the 
`other' as anti-national. As a part of the 
former, a new Hindu cultural pantheon is being 
constructed. The icons of this pantheon goes back 
to the Indus Valley Civilisation, renamed now as 
Saraswati River civilisation, as a part of the 
attempt to impart to it a Hindu character. At any 
rate, the lineage of the Hindu nation is traced 
to the culture of the Vedic era and, though not 
yet firmly, to the Indus Valley. Identifying the 
roots of the Indian civilisational process to the 
achievements of the Harappan and the Vedic people 
is indeed unexceptionable. That, however, does 
not establish either its contemporary relevance 
or its being the sole source of national culture, 
as Hindutva seems to advocate. In doing so, the 
historical process, which has ushered in a 
fundamental transformation in social and cultural 
mores, is ignored. Nevertheless, it has admirably 
served its ends. It has given to the Hindu, 
culturally and psychologically ravaged by 
colonial subjugation, the knowledge of a credible 
and honourable cultural past. In the process, 
Hindutva has not only succeeded in creating a 
new, even aggressive, cultural confidence among 
Hindus, but at the same time cast itself as the 
defender and preserver of Indian heritage. 
Thereby Hindutva claims to represent the cultural 
interest of the Hindu `community' as a whole.

The success of Hindutva was its ability to 
implant its Hindu representative character in 
social consciousness. Through a series of social 
and cultural undertakings, initially at the 
grassroots level, such an impression was slowly 
but surely created. An interesting example is the 
movement for the renovation of village temples, 
which were in decay. The members of the Sangh 
Parivar positioning themselves in the forefront 
of this movement received the general approval 
and approbation of the Hindus of the locality. It 
was believed that they were acting not only to 
maintain a religious place of worship but also to 
preserve the cultural tradition. At a national 
plane, the Ram Janmabhoomi issue provided an 
unprecedented opportunity, which was used by 
celebrating Ram as a national icon and by 
undertaking the popularisation of symbols linked 
with him. The agitation centred around the 
temple, including the rath yatra of Advani, 
established Hindutva's claim to represent Hindus. 
The effort, however, goes on. Bhojshala in Madhya 
Pradesh and Baba Budangiri in Karnataka are the 
new sites invented to defend Hindu interests.

In order to realise this claim socially and 
culturally, the Sangh Parivar has adopted an 
aggressive policy of homogenising the diverse 
groups among Hindus. Many were taken by surprise 
when Dalits participated in the Gujarat pogrom or 
when Adivasis supported the Bharatiya Janata 
Party in the recently held elections to the State 
Assemblies. But it is not altogether surprising 
as the ideology of Hindutva has been at work 
among these groups for a long time in order to 
inculcate a Hindu identity in them. An indication 
of this change is the transformation in their 
worship pattern. Their traditional places of 
worship are being refashioned as Hindu temples 
and their modes of worship are being replaced by 
those of the Brahminical order. The Hinduisation 
thus taking place amounts to cultural denial and 
oppression. Yet, a large number of Dalits and 
Adivasis are attracted to the lure of 
sanskritisation, which is a major achievement of 
Hindu consolidation.

Appropriation of cultural tradition

SHANKER CHAKRAVARTY

Atal Bihari Vajpayee with RSS Sarsanghchalak K.S. 
Sudershan (right) and other leaders at a 
Navaratri pooja function in New Delhi in October 
1997.

A selective appropriation of cultural and 
intellectual traditions and their privileging 
through the intervention of innumerable 
organisations have lent credence to Hindutva's 
claim to represent Hindu interests. It is 
selective because it excludes those with 
non-Hindu affiliations. Even in the Hindu past 
only what is ideologically useful is invoked. The 
purpose of this appropriation is to inscribe on 
Hindutva the stamp of the authentic tradition of 
the nation. As a part of this endeavour, Hindu 
religious events have been turned into national 
cultural celebrations, even when they are alien 
to regional cultures or unknown to different 
sections of Hindus. Rakshabandhan and Ganapati 
festivals, for instance. Sponsored by the Sangh 
Parivar, they have now become public celebrations 
even in South India where they were earlier 
unknown.

The appropriation is not limited to cultural 
tradition alone; even political and intellectual 
leaders of the past are being turned into Hindu 
nationalist icons. Ancient and medieval rulers, 
even if they had followed the principles of 
secular governance, are claimed as Hindu. So are 
those who fought against colonial rule. Kerala 
Varma Pazhassi Raja, Velu Thampi, Nana Saheb and 
Kattabomman are being made into Hindutva's cult 
figures. Similarly, Hindu religious reformers of 
the 19th century, such as Dayananda Saraswati, 
Vivekananda and Aurobindo, who gave much 
importance to the universalist spirit in all 
religions, are celebrated as the progenitors of 
Hindu nationalism. But their ideas of inclusive 
nationalism are completely overlooked. 
Vivekananda, for instance, had argued that the 
union of Hindu and Islamic civilisations offered 
an ideal solution for India's regeneration. 
Aurobindo's concept of nationalism was riven with 
contradictions and at any rate he did not 
subscribe to a Hindu denominational nationalism 
in which the followers of other faiths had no 
place. Even Mahatma Gandhi and Bhagat Singh are 
in the process of being co-opted into the 
Hindutva fold!

At the same time, what is excluded from the 
nationalist tradition helps to reinforce 
Hindutva's religion-based concept of nationalism. 
Liberal and tolerant rulers such as Ashoka, 
Akbar, Jai Singh, Shahu Maharaj and Wajid Ali 
Shah do not figure in Hindutva's list of national 
heroes. Among those who revolted against the 
British, Bahadur Shah, Zinat Mahal, Maulavi 
Ahamadullah and General Bhakt Khan, are 
conspicuous by their absence. Even syncretic 
traditions such as the Bhakti movement are 
generally ignored. It is quite interesting that 
the advocates of religious universalism, 
including modernisers such as Rammohan Roy and 
Keshab Chandra Sen, do not figure in the Hindutva 
pantheon.

The selective appropriation is based on the 
premise that national regeneration and resurgence 
would require the recreation of an authentic 
culture by reclaiming the indigenous and purging 
the exogenous. Hindutva's cultural project, 
encoded in the slogan `nationalise and 
spiritualise', therefore, is twofold: First, to 
retrieve and disseminate the cultural traditions 
of the `golden' Hindu past; and second, to 
eliminate all accretions that had become part of 
the heritage. The educational policy as 
adumbrated by the BJP-led government is inspired 
by the first. The entire exercise of curriculum 
revision undertaken by government agencies during 
the last few years was mainly intended to achieve 
this end.


Deputy Prime Minister L.K. Advani.

The involvement of the government, obsessive and 
lopsided, with the pursuit of Vedic knowledge is 
an obvious example. The government, it appears, 
is spending an enormous amount of money for 
research in Vedic studies, which in itself is not 
undesirable. But it is a different matter when 
undertaken to prove certain preconceived 
assumptions. It is reported that several science 
organisations funded by the government are 
scouting for scholars and institutions who would 
be willing to testify the golden age thesis. Such 
efforts are likely to create false notions about 
India's past.

The authentic cultural tradition Hindutva seeks 
to construct does not respect either the 
trajectory of its own historical evolution or the 
importance of external influences in its make-up. 
It, therefore, takes a static view of cultural 
tradition, ignoring its inherent dynamism. One of 
the consequences of this attitude is the 
intolerance of different interpretations and 
conflicting representations for which the Indian 
cultural tradition is justly famous. The plural 
cultural traditions, therefore, have been 
continuously under attack. Well-known examples 
are the vandalising of M.F. Hussain's paintings 
of Hindu goddesses, disruption of the shooting of 
Deepa Mehta's film, the campaign against the 
Malayalam writer Kamala Suraiya and the 
destruction of SAHMAT's exhibition on Ayodhya. 
The instances in which the Hindu cultural police 
has intervened, often in a violent and 
intimidatory manner, in defence of Hindu cultural 
tradition are far too many to cite. The 
denigration of secular historians, writers and 
journalists are also done with the same purpose.

These fairly orchestrated assaults are meant to 
silence any opposition to the communal 
colonisation of the cultural sphere. The 
legitimacy Hindutva has managed to garner is the 
most decisive development in contemporary Indian 
politics. A marginal force until about 10 years 
ago, it is now in a position to dictate the 
political and cultural agenda of the nation. Yet, 
the rise of Hindutva was neither sudden nor 
spontaneous. It owes much to the slow 
transformation in social consciousness as a 
result of sustained interventions in the cultural 
and religious life of the people. The decline of 
the Congress(I) and the inability of the Left to 
emerge as an alternative provided the space for 
Hinduva to imbue such interventions with a 
political content. It was compounded by the 
willing collaboration and cooperation of secular 
formations, particularly after the Emergency, 
which lent to Hindutva the legitimacy it lacked 
before. Hindutva thus succeeded in integrating 
politics with culture. Hence cultural nationalism 
is the real shining motif of Hindutva. Given its 
exclusivist character, however, cultural 
nationalism is anti-democratic and anti-national. 
The existence of India as a nation is possible 
only with the rejection of cultural nationalism.

K.N. Panikkar is the Vice-Chancellor of the Sri 
Sankara University of Sanskrit, Kalady, Kerala.



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Buzz on the perils of fundamentalist politics, on 
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