[sacw] SACW | 3 Nov. 02

[Harsh Kapoor]

South Asia Citizens Wire | 3 November 2002

__________________________

#1. "People's Action" and the Consequences of Prolonged Negotiations (UTHR)
#2. Petition and Statement against escalation of US military funding=20
to the Nepal
#3. The Political Culture of Fascism (Jairus Banaji)
#4. Black, White, No Grey (Mukul Dube)
#5. No honour in these killings (Kalpana Sharma)
#6. Taslima's Pilgrimage (Meredith Tax)
#7. INSAF National Political Convention on "Threats of Global Fascism=20
& National Challenges" in Ahmedabad (November 23-26, 2002)

__________________________

#1.

University Teachers for Human Rights (Jaffna) [Sri Lanka]
Information Bulletin No. 29
Date of Release: 26th October 2002

The Meaning of "People's Action" and the Consequences of Prolonged Negotiat=
ions
http://www.uthr.org/bulletins/bul29.htm

______

#2.

Petition and statement, prepared by members of the Association for=20
Nepal and Himalayan Studies, against escalation of US military=20
funding to the Nepal government during this time of civil war in the=20
country. All details can be found at:

http://www.angelfire.com/empire2/nepal

Deadline for signatures is 7 November, 2002

______

#3.

South Asia Citizens Web | 2 November 2002
http://www.mnet.fr/aiindex/2002/BanajiSept02.html

The Political Culture of Fascism

Jairus Banaji

[Talk delivered at a Gujarat Seminar organised by the Vikas Adhyan=20
Kendra in Bombay, September 2002]

I called this talk the political culture of Fascism because I wanted=20
to draw attention away from the conventional emphasis in left=20
theories of fascism to aspects that are much less emphasised or not=20
even seen, precisely because they are so widespread. I want to do=20
this by starting with the most doctrinaire and, unfortunately, still=20
the most widespread of the left=B9s theories of fascism, which is the=20
line the Comintern officially endorsed and repeated, endlessly,=20
throughout the late twenties and 1930s, while the tragedy of fascism=20
was being played out in Europe. This was the Comintern=B9s conception=20
of fascism as what it called the "open terrorist dictatorship of the=20
most reactionary, most chauvinist and most imperialist elements of=20
finance capital". This was the Comintern=B9s official understanding. It=20
further states that fascism "tries to secure a mass basis (I lay=20
emphasis on the word =8Ctries=B9) for monopolist capital among the petty=20
bourgeoisie, appealing to the peasantry, artisans, office employees=20
and civil servants who have been thrown out of their normal course of=20
life, particularly to the declassed elements in the big cities, also=20
trying to penetrate into the working class" (cited Roger Griffin,=20
Fascism, p. 262). In short, in the Comintern=B9s line, fascism is the=20
dictatorship of the most reactionary elements of finance capital.=20
Now, the Nazi party described itself, formally at least, as a=20
"workers=B9 party". The Nazis saw themselves, at some superficial=20
level, in terms of rhetoric anyway, as appealing for the support of=20
workers. This suggests that there is something slightly specious=20
about trying to explain the rise of Nazism in the twenties simply in=20
terms of the dictatorship of capital.

Much of the Left still subscribes to the view that fascism is=20
primarily a product of the manipulations of capital or big business.=20
There are several things wrong with this view. It ignores the=20
political culture of fascism and fails to explain how and why fascist=20
movements attract a mass following. It embodies a crude=20
instrumentalism that conflates the financing of fascist movements by=20
sections of business with the dynamics of fascism itself. It also=20
views fascism in overtly pathological terms, as abnormality, thus=20
breaking the more interesting and challenging links between fascism=20
and =8Cnormality=B9. Finally, it contains a catastrophist vision: it sees=20
fascism as a kind of cataclysm, like some volcanic eruption or=20
earthquake, a seismic shift in the political landscape. So far as the=20
situation in India is concerned, this has surely demonstrated that=20
that is not how fascism grows. In India the growth of fascism has=20
been a gradual, step by step process where the fascist elements=20
penetrate all sectors of society and emerge having built up that=20
groundwork. So, if we in India have anything to contribute to a=20
theory of fascism, part of the contribution lies in disproving the=20
catastrophist element. This still leaves the other two perspectives,=20
which I called =8Cinstrumentalist=B9 and =8Cpathological=B9 respectively.=20
Both are dangerously wrong and part of the reason why the left has=20
failed to establish a culture of successful political resistance to=20
fascism.

Now in contrast to the =8Cofficial=B9 view, there is another group of=20
theories of fascism which also emanated from the left, although a=20
more disorganized left, a left outside the Comintern, driven out of=20
Germany by Nazism, and not collectively represented by any school. I=20
have in mind two rather brilliant analyses that were developed in the=20
1930s against the background of German fascism; one by Wilhelm Reich=20
who was a practising psychoanalyst. In his clinical work in Berlin in=20
the early thirties, Reich would have come across literally hundreds=20
of active supporters of Nazism. He was a committed socialist who fled=20
Germany when it became impossible to live there, and died,=20
ironically, in a US jail in 1957.

Then there is Arthur Rosenberg, who is not very well known. He was a=20
Communist deputy in the Reichstag in the mid twenties and would later=20
become an important influence on Chomsky. He was a historian who=20
wrote a brilliant essay on fascism in 1934, which we translated for=20
the first time, in the seventies, in Bombay. That particular essay is=20
called Fascism as a Mass Movement. Reich=B9s book was called The Mass=20
Psychology of Fascism and first published in 1933. Already the titles=20
of these two works suggest to us a very different view of fascism.

Earlier I had emphasised the term "tries to secure mass support" in=20
the Comintern definition. This was said in 1933, after Hitler had=20
come to power in Germany. Imagine the Comintern trying to tell the=20
rest of the world that the fascists are "trying" to secure a mass=20
base! There is a way of characterising this. It is called living in=20
denial, bad faith, because if fascism has a mass base of any sort=20
then we have to try and understand the issue in different terms. How=20
is this mass base constructed? What allows for the construction of a=20
mass base by radical right-wing parties? These are the questions=20
that we need to confront, particularly if we want to confront our=20
problems in India. To answer these questions it is not enough to have=20
merely conjectural views on fascism, to say, =8Cfascism necessarily=20
presupposes a worldwide economic crisis=B9; or =8Cfascism is a product of=20
economic crisis=B9. This does not answer the question why people turn=20
to fascism, because equally they could have turned to the left. Or=20
why don=B9t they become liberals instead? In short, why do they support=20
fascism?=A0

The second group of theories of fascism is unified by a common focus=20
on the mass basis of fascism. =8CFascism differs from other reactionary=20
parties inasmuch as it is borne and championed by masses of people=B9,=20
wrote Reich in the book I referred to. The difference between Reich=20
and Rosenberg is that Reich is interested in the psychic structures=20
that explain why individuals and particular classes of individuals=20
(e.g., the lower middle class) gravitate to fascism, and explores the=20
susceptiblity to fascism in terms of a cultural logic, whereas Arthur=20
Rosenberg tries to explain the construction of a mass base in=20
historical terms. These are complementary perspectives, they=20
certainly do not contradict each other. Reich is interested in the=20
cultural background/politics and =8Ccharacter structures=B9 that sustain=20
fascism, the repressions that fascism presupposes and draws upon,=20
whereas Rosenberg looks at the broad sweep of European history=20
against whose background right-wing ideologies flourished and=20
conservative =E9lites found it possible to mobilise mass support. These=20
perspectives clearly support each other.

Rosenberg classified fascism in the most general terms as a species=20
of "anti-liberal mass movement". The emphasis here is on a secular=20
political liberalism that asserted the rights of the individual=20
against state authority and religious superstition, and on the defeat=20
of that liberalism in the latter part of the 19th century.

When I began to work on fascism in the 1970s, it became increasingly=20
apparent that German fascism was not the creation of the Nazi Party.=20
Rather, the Nazi party was, arguably, the creation of German fascism.=20
The whole groundwork of German society prepared the way for the rise=20
of the Nazi party.

German society in large parts had been =8Cfascisized=B9, if one can call=20
it that; the preparatory groundwork was ready for some charismatic=20
leader or party to come along and =8Cretotalise=B9/incarnate those=20
legacies to create the kind of political catastrophe that was created=20
in the 1930s. The groundwork had been intensively prepared, though in=20
an un-coordinated, non-centralised and dispersed fashion by, for=20
instance, the v=F6lkisch =8CAction groups=B9 that were active in the=20
twenties, organising pogroms and spreading hatred against the Jews;=20
by the numerous organisations of demobilized veterans who experienced=20
Germany=B9s defeat in the war as a terrible national humiliation, a=20
blow to the pride of all Germans. There were within the top ranks of=20
the German army which had suffered defeat many who were implacably=20
opposed to democracy, to the November revolution and its overthrow of=20
the monarchy. There were numerous radical right-wing organizations=20
prior to the Nazi party that prepared the ground for the success of=20
the Nazis.

However, the strength of Rosenberg=B9s essay was an analysis which=20
showed that fascism largely reiterated ideas that were widespread in=20
European society well before the first war. He saw the conservative=20
=E9lites of 19th cent. Europe adjusting to the era of parliamentary=20
democracy and mass politics with an aggressive nationalism divested=20
of its liberal overtones, canvassing active support for strong states=20
wedded to expansion abroad and containment of the labour movement at=20
home, and unashamedly willing to use anti-Semitism =8Cas a way of=20
preventing middle-class voters from moving to the left=B9 (Weiss,=20
Conservatism in Europe 1770-1945, p. 89). The more traditionalist=20
elements in Europe=B9s ruling =E9lites succeeded in defeating the=20
liberalism of 1848 with a populist conservatism that could garner=20
parliamentary majorities with xenophobic appeals and patriotic=20
agendas.

What replaced the discredited liberalism of the 19th cent. were new=20
ideologies of the Right, and it is against the background of these=20
ideologies (racism, militarism, imperialism, and the cult of=20
authority) that we need to situate the emergence of fascism in=20
Europe. I=B9d like to suggest that fascism has to be deconstructed=20
"culturally" at three levels. The first among these, the level that=20
Rosenberg=B9s work points to, is nationalism. The rational core of=20
every fascist ideology is nationalism. Fascist movements deify the=20
nation, so that fascism can even be seen as projecting itself as a=20
sort of =8Csecular religion=B9, and does this all the more effectively=20
insofar as the vocabulary (artefacts, myths, rituals, symbols) of=20
that deification is borrowed from religion itself. So when people=20
ask themselves how we fight fascism, one way of fighting it is by=20
confronting nationalism and beginning to build an opposition to it.

The second level of deconstructing fascism and offering elements of a=20
framework is cultures of authoritarianism and repression, be it=20
social repression, family repression, or sexual repression. For=20
instance, the emergence of a feminist movement in the postwar era of=20
the 1960s and 70s represented a significant advance, because for the=20
first time sexual politics arrives on the center stage. The emergence=20
of sexual politics in the shape of feminism does contribute to the=20
fight against fascism as an ideology. I strongly believe that had=20
feminism not been on the scene, neo-nazism would be much stronger in=20
Europe than it is today.

The third and final level has to do with the fascist use of what=20
Sartre (following Riesman) calls =8Cother-direction=B9, and with violence=20
as common praxis, that is, organised action or the =8Ccommon action=B9 of=20
organised groups. Rosenberg himself saw the peculiarity of fascism=20
not in its ideology, which he thought was widespread by the turn of=20
the century, but in its use of the =8Cstormtrooper tactic=B9. A form of=20
genocide or ethnic cleansing is implicit in the programme of every=20
fascist movement, as it is in that of the RSS, whose longest-serving=20
sarsangch=92lak even glorified =8CGerman race pride=B9 and the=20
extermination of the Jews. But the holocaust is only possible as the=20
culmination of a permanent mobilisation =8Cof=B9/=8Cfor=B9 violence. Fascis=
t=20
violence works through serial reactions which are retotalised at the=20
level of a common undertaking, that is to say, =8Creshaped and forged=20
like inorganic matter=B9 (Sartre, Critique of Dialectical Reason,=20
649-50). Thus fascism works best in a milieu of alterity (in our=20
case, communalism), where the oppression of blacks or Jews or Muslims=20
produces itself as a determination of the language of their=20
oppressors in the form of racism, where the inert execration of=20
oppressed minorities betrays countless symbolic murders (Sartre,=20
R=E9flexions sur la question juive, 58), and organised groups (criminal=20
organisations) fabricate religious mythologies to spur campaigns of=20
genocide. Mobilisation =8Cof=B9 violence: in the savage campaigns of hate=20
propaganda directed against Muslims in India, genocide becomes=20
=8Cvirtual=B9; "totalising" propaganda creates an enemy whose=20
extermination it posits as possible, alludes to, suggests, justifies,=20
or advocates openly. Hate propaganda clears the ground for physical=20
attacks and mass killings by producing a "climate" of violence where=20
communal =8Criots=B9 (i.e. pogroms) can =8Cflare up=B9 (be organised) at an=
y=20
time. The "climate" is worked matter, the object of a concerted=20
praxis.

Scapegoating, racism, and virtual genocide thus form the third level:=20
all of these require detailed, intricate, elaborate organisation, and=20
point to fascism as the concerted action of organised groups working=20
on serialities. Fascist spontaneity is manipulated spontaneity,=20
organised spontaneity. No explosion of violence happens=20
spontaneously. It presumes massive organizational inputs, as Gujarat=20
clearly shows. At one extreme the organised group is the sovereign=20
group itself, the state using the resources of its machinery to aid=20
and abet the work of other organised groups. At the other extreme are=20
the non-organised series ("masses") who are the permanent objects of=20
=8Cother-direction=B9. Between them lie the organised groups that make up=20
the fascist movement itself and function as pressure groups on both=20
the sovereign and the series, exerting powerful networks of control=20
over both, and directing the violence. The reports filed by Teesta=20
Setalvad in the worst phase of the violence suggest that the genocide=20
was perpetrated by =8Cmobs=B9 of 5000 to 15,000 that =8Ccollected swiftly=
=B9=20
to execute the carnage =8Cwith precision=B9. =8CIt is not easy to collect=20
such large mobs even in a city like Mumbai, let alone Ahmedabad=B9 (=8CA=20
trained saffron militia at work?=B9, 7/3/02). In other words, these=20
ghastly mobs comprised both directing groups and directed=20
serialities, bound together in dispersive acts of murder and=20
destruction orchestrated by activists of the VHP and Bajrang Dal, who=20
formed an organised element extracting organic actions from inert=20
non-organised series. A democracy that cannot disarm these=20
stormtoopers is a democracy well on the way to its own destruction by=20
fascism.=A0

Thus the framework that I want to suggest to you consists of these=20
three levels. Nationalism as the rational core of fascist ideology,=20
with the "Nation" conceived as some living entity afflicted by=20
democracy, infected by minorities, in desperate need of renewal or=20
"rebirth" (what Sartre calls =8Chyperorganicism=B9, that is, the=20
simulation of organic individuality at the level of a constituted=20
dialectic); the level of male violence and male authority, of=20
repressive family cultures that indoctrinate women and youth in a=20
=8Cpassive and servile attitude towards the f=FChrer figure=B9 (Reich), and=
=20
root out of children everything that contributes to their humanity,=20
to a sense of who they are as individuals (the capacity to think=20
critically, to resist domination, to have friendships of their=20
choice). In India, of course, we not only have gender repression, we=20
have caste repression at work, the oppression of minorities, the=20
appalling indifference towards children, etc. Thus as a culture we=20
are replete with examples of subterranean repressive cultures in our=20
society. I call them =8Csubterranean=B9 because they are invisible in=20
their commonness, subtend the whole of our existence, and only become=20
visible in times of resistance. Finally, organised brutality or=20
violence as (common) praxis =AD the fabrication of religious and racial=20
mythologies and campaigns of genocide as concerted praxes of=20
organised groups acting on/conditioning serialities,=20
=8Cother-direction=B9.=A0

When all this is put together in terms of an agenda for opposing=20
fascism, we need to ask, have we seriously been pursuing an agenda on=20
any of these levels? Do we have an agenda for fighting fascism in=20
India? And wouldn=B9t such an agenda have to go to the heart of=20
mainstream culture to break the stranglehold of an oppressive=20
seriality where millions of people must feel helpless and confused by=20
their inert complicity in the politics of a movement that perpetrates=20
violence in the name of =8Call=B9 =8CHindus=B9.=A0

One way of addressing some of this is by breaking the culture of=20
silence. By talking about these issues, by debating them publicly and=20
at home. Whenever we get the chance, we must ensure that all these=20
issues are not swept under the carpet. For instance, one of my=20
friends wanted to discuss Gujarat with members of his union. They=20
were journalists, yet some of them felt quite uncomfortable and=20
asked, "why should Gujarat be raked up once again?" "What=B9s happened=20
is done and forgotten, so let=B9s forget about it". This attitude of=20
"let=B9s forget about it" is precisely what the Sangh Parivar thrives=20
on. The great Palestinian poet Mahmoud Darwish was actually living in=20
Beirut in August 1982 when it was intensively bombed by the Israeli=20
airforce and navy. The bombardment was spread over two months, and=20
almost every day about two to three hundred Lebanese and Palestinian=20
civilians were killed. To come to terms with that experience, he=20
wrote a diary which he called Dh=92kirah li-l-nisy=92n, =8CMemory for=20
forgetfulness=B9. It=B9s worth reflecting on what this title might mean.

Going back to a more specific characterisation of each of these=20
levels, let me start with nationalism. As you know, nationalism=20
constitutes a terrain which is common to both the Right and the Left=20
in this country. This is partly the reason why the Left is forced to=20
conclude that really the Right wing is not serious about =8CSwadeshi=B9.=20
Actually the left sees itself as the defender of =8Cnational=B9=20
independence, which it interprets primarily in economic terms. The=20
left=B9s nationalism is isolationist, it views world economy as a=20
collection of relatively autonomous national economies and is=20
unwilling to accept that capitalism undermines national=20
self-sufficiency for ever, so that any attempt to go back to it=20
(rather than forward to further integration and rational collective=20
management of the world=B9s resources) is doomed to failure. The=20
nationalism of the fascist right is also deeply isolationist and its=20
rhetoric against =8Cinternational capital=B9 even more xenophobic. But=20
there is another aspect to its nationalism which is not apparent in=20
other political currents. Fascist movements subscribe to a particular=20
kind of nationalism based on a promise of renewal or =8Cpalingenesis=B9,=20
a term that comes from this book by Griffin, which is a collection of=20
readings by fascist writers (Griffin, Fascism, Oxford 1995).=20
=8CPalingenesis=B9 means regeneration. The idea is that there is some=20
living practical community, the =8CNation=B9, which is in a terminal=20
state of decline, suffering a kind of incurable disease, and fascism=20
projects itself as the panacea that will cure the =8CNation=B9 so that=20
=8Cit=B9 is healed and regenerated. This is a common thread that unites=20
all the classical fascist and neo-nazi writings. Thus in We or Our=20
Nationhood Defined Golwalkar speaks of =8Crevitalising=B9 the =8CHindu=20
Nation=B9 and of =8CNational Regeneration=B9. The programme he defines for=
=20
the RSS is one of transforming India into an ethnocratic state based=20
on the utopia of a fantasised Hindu community that recovers its=20
pristine identity. He also has a racial idea of the nation, since the=20
entire nation is identified with a particular =8Crace=B9, similar to=20
other Nazi race theories.

So far as the cultures of authority and oppression are concerned, I=20
think identification with authority is the crucial thing that we need=20
to tackle. It is a matter of the school, the workplace, the family,=20
communities, etc., all of which are factories of =8Creactionary=20
ideology=B9, producing serial individuals (conformists) in staggering=20
numbers, because in each of these sites of learning or socialisation=20
=8Ceveryone learns to be the expression of all the Others=B9, to =8Cfeel=B9=
=20
like the Others, =8Cthink=B9 like the Others, etc., so that what emerges=20
is a total suppression of the human, an annihilation of organic=20
individuality, and eventually the kind of externally unified,=20
regimented mass that images of fascist Europe depict as emblematic of=20
fascist power. But Reich=B9s point is that the roots of authority lie=20
deep within the institutionalised repression of sexuality and=20
manipulation of desires which through the family, pedagogy, etc.,=20
create an =8Cartificial interest=B9 which =8Cactively supports the=20
authoritarian order=B9.=A0

But we still require a totalising conception of how authority=20
operates in Indian society, and how that interlaces with political=20
strategies, with the increasing strength of the Right wing in this=20
country. Sexual politics is equally important because it is in the=20
interests of conservative, right-wing establishment forces to mould=20
individuals, to control and manipulate their desires, and make the=20
young in particular feel guilty and repressed about their sexuality.=20
This suppression of sexuality is a powerful factor in the=20
reinforcement of authoritarianism and the rise of fascist movements,=20
and there is no way we can respond to such movements without=20
encouraging reciprocity (that is, a free relationship between=20
individuals) and an active stake in freedom.

These three levels are so closely interlaced with each other that it=20
is difficult to separate them because violence and aggression run as=20
the common thread though all of them. If you look at nationalism in=20
its contemporary forms, for example in the Balkans, it is no longer=20
separable from the most horrific violence. The Serb nationalism of=20
Milosevic, as we all know, took the form of ethnic cleansing. At the=20
second level, of cultures of authority and repression, there is=20
always violence. The assertions of authority are petrified violence=20
and we have to be able to challenge them in their institutionalised=20
forms. At the third level - violence as praxis - the issue is, can=20
the =8Cother-direction=B9 of organised (fascist) groups be combatted by=20
anything short of the political action of other organised groups? In=20
which case, which groups are these, and where are they?

A final point relates to the fascist use of the spectacle. Fascism is=20
a politics of spectacles. The spectacle is a display of the power of=20
the organised group over the series. As such, it belongs to the=20
repertoire of forms of manipulation through which all authoritarian=20
movements seek to reinforce their hold over the =8Cmasses=B9, the serial=20
impotence of the latter, and their conditioning through the hypnotic=20
spell of symbols and images that resonate with serial meanings (the=20
spectacle as a Mass of alterity). Mussolini=B9s theatrical style was=20
strongly influenced by the theories of Gustave Le Bon who believed in=20
the intrinsic irrationalism of the =8Ccrowd=B9 and whose prescriptions to=20
politicians on how to control the crowd relied heavily =8Con the=20
French research on hypnotism of the late 1800s=B9. Le Bon argued that=20
the creation of myths would become the leader=B9s means to excite and=20
subordinate the =8Cmasses=B9, and encouraged politicians to play on the=20
power of representation and to adopt theatrical modes.=20
(Falasca-Zamponi, Fascist Spectacle: The Aesthetics of Power in=20
Mussolini=B9s Italy, 20). Religious processions and the artefacts and=20
iconographies of religion occupy a major place in the repertoire of=20
Hindutva precisely because spectacles play such an important role in=20
the political culture of fascism.

To conclude, therefore, I would point out that at each of these=20
levels we have to define our theatres of resistance. Spaces for=20
intervention have to exist at all these levels, but that requires the=20
articulation of a powerful, anti-authoritarian politics that=20
encourages individuals to think critically, fosters relationships=20
based on reciprocity, and promotes a social and political culture=20
which values freedom sufficiently to resist and undermine the=20
hypnotic spells of nationalism, hierarchy, and serial domination.

_____

#4.

Mainstream, vol. XL, no.46, 2 November 2002.

Black, White, No Grey

Mukul Dube

A Muslim friend said something disturbing recently. I normally call=20
him just a friend, or at most a friend who happens to be a Muslim:=20
because it is ordinarily that identity, friend, which is important to=20
me. I have been specific here for the reason that he said what he=20
did, in the way he did, with a great degree of alarm and an=20
especially close understanding and pain, precisely because he is a=20
Muslim. I mention that particular because it is crucial.

Our religious identities have come virtually to define us =AD at the=20
expense of such other things as gender, age, profession, marital=20
status, economic position and roles, reading habits, hobbies, and so=20
on. Until some years ago my friend would have seen himself and=20
thought of himself as a Muslim only rarely if at all. Now=20
circumstances are such that he is a Muslim first and so many other=20
things only later. Now circumstances are such that he is made aware,=20
nearly every waking minute, that he is a Muslim.

He told me that the skull cap now to be seen on the heads of nearly=20
all the men coming out of mosques is a relatively new sight in our=20
land. People of his age group =AD he was born somewhat before=20
Independence and Partition =AD had always associated that kind of cap,=20
though worn differently, with Judaism. >From my own memories of=20
something over half a century, I too cannot recall such widespread=20
use of that now so very visible symbol of religious identity.

My response was to say that a people whose very being was threatened=20
in a fundamental way would probably tend to cling the more closely to=20
visible symbols of identity. My friend agreed, but he added =AD and=20
this is where the fear came in =AD that in our condemnation of the=20
Hindu Right inspired by its recent genocidal activities, we are in=20
danger of forgetting that organisations of the Muslim Right are no=20
less bloodthirsty, no less obscurantist, no less the enemies of=20
reason and humanity. If they have done relatively little mischief,=20
that is only because of their smaller numbers. They spread their own=20
brand of poison constantly =AD though not nearly so openly as the=20
Hindutva Borgias =AD and they lurk, watchfully, just under the surface.

They also enforce the wearing of skull caps. I must explain what I=20
mean when I say that they enforce it. There is probably no physical=20
coercion used: but there certainly is a great deal of social=20
pressure, based on the fear of being ostracised if one does not=20
conform. In much the same way, their counterparts on the Ayodhya Team=20
enforce the wearing of coloured marks on the forehead and the tying=20
of string around the wrist. Not to sport these signs is tantamount to=20
saying that one does not belong.

Several people, from all of the four religions most widely followed=20
in our land, have told me that it has become very difficult not to be=20
visibly religious. Those who earlier simply did not practise their=20
religions, though without making an issue of it, cannot easily=20
continue to do that. There is pressure on them to declare themselves,=20
to conform and be seen to conform. Had this been a sporting fixture,=20
no spectator could have been neutral or could merely have wished the=20
better side to win =AD it is necessary now for every spectator to don=20
the colours of one or other side and also to sit in the area reserved=20
for that group.

What is this absurd situation in which we have placed ourselves?=20
Ordinary Hindus are terrified of those who have declared themselves=20
to be the spokesmen and leaders of their religion. Ordinary Muslims=20
are terrified of the handful of people who have arrogated to=20
themselves the right to define Islam and speak for it. On paper we=20
are a modern nation whose civil society has the usual paraphernalia=20
of laws, police, judiciary and administrative mechanisms. Why has=20
religion, which is essentially not of the public sphere, come to=20
wield so much power over our lives, our polity, our very thinking?

The answer lies, I believe, in our having forgotten the meaning of=20
the word secular. We call ourselves that but use it mindlessly,=20
meaning all the wrong things by it. Secular denotes that which is not=20
religious: it means non-religious, other than religious. It does not=20
mean what most of us now use it as =AD merely multi-religious or=20
plural. A secular State is one which is not based on religion, one in=20
whose make-up religion has no place. A secular State treats religion=20
purely as a citizen's personal affair.

India, supposedly secular, is today ruled by a coalition headed by a=20
party which not only claims to be Hindu but actively works towards=20
the disenfranchising and economic strangulation of people who follow=20
other religions =AD even, as we have seen in Gujarat recently, their=20
physical extermination. This is, let us remember, the supposedly=20
modern 21st century. It is over half a century after the Republic of=20
India was formed ostensibly as a secular and democratic entity.

We are not in the Middle Ages, when people were burnt at the stake=20
for heresy and apostasy =AD nor are we in an even earlier mythical time=20
when all-powerful, semi-divine mendicants roamed the Earth and=20
apparently survived on nothing material. Our rivers are today of=20
curdled milk, the fruit upon our trees is rusted and tarnished.

That in whose shadow alone we can re-form ourselves into a=20
nation-state worthy of being called that, is the Constitution of the=20
Republic of India. The laws designed to keep our society running=20
without friction must be applied ruthlessly and even-handedly by an=20
administration untainted by religion. The secular must be nothing=20
other than the secular. There are specific duties written down and=20
assigned to the judiciary, the civil administration and the police.=20
All must perform these duties, for that is what they are paid to do,=20
that is the reason for their position in society, that is the oath=20
they all took on their appointment. And I must be compelled to=20
respect the law, never mind who I am or who I claim to be.

No more should maniacal bigots be allowed to pervert reason and=20
insult intelligence by saying that religion is beyond the courts,=20
above the laws, on a plane higher even than known history. No more=20
should they be permitted to openly defy the organs which civilised=20
society has created for itself to maintain order and justice. No more=20
should they be permitted to penetrate these organs like malignant=20
termites and corrupt them from within as they have done in Gujarat.

______

#5.

The Hindu
Nov 03, 2002
Magazine
http://www.hinduonnet.com/mag/stories/2002110300560300.htm

No honour in these killings

KALPANA SHARMA

The Shirkat Gah report on `honour killings' is about Pakistan. But=20
there are many parallels in India too. It, perhaps, implies that we=20
need to eliminate the murders, and not the women.

Praying ... for her life?

IN the name of religion, men with beards are getting elected =8B in=20
India and Pakistan. We have our Modis, they have their Fazlur=20
Rehmans. Indeed, if one was to look for a pattern in the=20
subcontinent, the results of the recent elections in Pakistan suggest=20
that the trend is veering towards this particular combination of=20
religion and politics.

Should we be worried? As women, we certainly do. Pakistanis have=20
lived through many political upheavals but in succesive elections,=20
the Islamic fundamentalists have never won more than five per cent of=20
the votes. This time things have changed, particularly in the=20
North-West Frontier Province (NWFP) and Baluchistan where a coalition=20
of six religious parties has shown a dramatically improved showing at=20
the polls. While the ascendance of these parties in provinces=20
bordering Afghanistan is a cause of worry politically, these results=20
come as a particular blow to the women's movement in that country.

Despite years of military dictatorship and many draconian laws, women=20
in Pakistan have fought bravely against unjust laws and customs that=20
perpetuate and institutionalise gender violence. They have=20
demonstrated, they have documented atrocities against women and they=20
have lobbied for a change. But the early signals of the impending=20
assault on women's rights in the provinces where the Muttahida=20
Majlis-e-Awal (MMA) is dominant can already be seen.

According to Khawar Mumtaz of Shirkat Gah, a leading women's=20
organisation in Pakistan, the pro-Taliban fundamentalists groups in=20
the NWFP began targetting organisations working with women soon after=20
the United States began bombing Afghanistan last October. And=20
although some of that stopped once it was evident that a change of=20
government was inevitable in Afghanistan, their determination to=20
hustle out all such activists remained undiminished. At one point,=20
eight offices of NGOs, many of them working in the areas of health=20
and education of women, were attacked and razed to the ground. The=20
homes of the directors of these organisations were also attacked. And=20
later, targetted killings and bomb blasts continued.

But it is not just the NWFP or Baluchistan where women face violence=20
of an unprecedented nature. In the name of religion and tradition,=20
almost one woman a day is being killed in the province of Sindh.=20
According to a report prepared by Shirkat Gah, The Dark Side of=20
"Honour" =8B Women Victims in Pakistan, out of 5,000 "honour" killings=20
worldwide in the year 2000, around 1,000 took place in Pakistan.=20
"Honour" killings are another term for murdering women for the=20
flimsiest of reasons =8B from suspected infidelity to wanting a divorce.

We cannot forget that the term "honour" killings became better known=20
when a middle-class woman was shot dead in Lahore on April 6, 1999.=20
The case of 29-year-old Samia Sarwar drew considerable media=20
attention. Daughter of a medical doctor and a prominent businessman,=20
Samia, who was studying law, wanted to divorce her abusive husband.=20
She agreed to meet her mother in her lawyer's office on that fateful=20
day. Instead of getting a chance to speak to her mother, she was shot=20
dead by a stranger who accompanied her mother. Although the link=20
between the killer and Samia's father was established, no action has=20
been taken against her parents. On the contrary, the Chamber of=20
Commerce of the NWFP and several religious organisations have come=20
out supporting him.

Samia was killed because apparently she sullied the family's "honour"=20
by asking for a divorce. Women in the villages of Pakistan are killed=20
for no reason at all. The Shirkat Gah report brings out the nature of=20
"honour" killings and the distortions that have occurred to this=20
custom. It shows how modern-day politics uses and even reinforces=20
ancient customs that commodify women and distort religion. Variously=20
called Karo kari in Sindh, siyahkari in Baluchistan, kala kali in=20
southern Punjab and tor tora in the NWFP, "honour" killings are only=20
one end of a spectrum of specific and gendered violence of which the=20
only and exclusive victims are women.

The stories in the report are narrated with stark simplicity. They=20
are the stories of 25-year-old Nargis, of Iffat Bibi, of 12-year-old=20
Rahmatay, of 40-year-old Zainab and of 35-year-old Saba. United not=20
in life, but in death, all of them are victims of "honour" killings.=20
They were all accused, without any proof, of having had illicit=20
relations. The most heart wrenching of these stories is that of the=20
12-year-old who was bartered away by her father in exchange for a=20
woman to marry his son. This woman's brother insisted on marrying the=20
child. She was dressed in bridal pink. When the village mullah=20
hesitated at performing the nikah for such a young girl, the=20
bridegrooom put a gun to his head and the marriage was performed. But=20
that very night, the bridgegroom also pumped five bullets into his=20
young bride because, he claimed, she had confessed to having had sex=20
with her cousin.

There are many different aspects to this story but two things stand=20
out in the report. One, that the Hadood laws brought in during Zia=20
ul-Haq's time gave legal sanction to the belief that a woman deserved=20
to die if she was unfaithful. The burden of proof was entirely on=20
her. The Shirkat Gah report writes: "These laws, based as they are on=20
the most retrogressive interpretation of Islam, have served to=20
confirm the inferior status of women in a deeply misogynist society=20
and, in effect provided official sanction to their oppression". As a=20
result, "honour" killings, which were confined to tribal areas, have=20
now moved into cities.

The Shirkat Gah report is about Pakistan but there are many parallels=20
in India. Both Pakistan and India have signed the U.N. Convention on=20
the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW).=20
This requires that they do not "invoke custom, tradition or religious=20
consideration to avoid their obligations" under the convention. Even=20
one "honour" killing, or a sati, is a violation of this convention.=20
Unless we as a society recognise the immensity of these types of=20
crimes, and set out to eliminate them, we can never move ahead. We=20
need to eliminate the killings, not the women.

______

#6.

The Nation (New York)
November 18, 2002
Review

Taslima's Pilgrimage
by MEREDITH TAX

Meyebela, My Bengali Girlhood: A Memoir of Growing Up Female in a Muslim
World
by Taslima Nasrin; Gopa Majumdar, trans.

"A war was about to start. Knots of wide-eyed people gathered in
courtyards, in open fields, on street corners.... Others were
running...clutching bundles under their arms and children on their
shoulders. Running, they were running away from cities to villages.... The
sound of bullets echoed against the restless fluttering of pigeons' wings."

So begins Taslima Nasrin's memoir of her childhood. It is 1971 and
Bangladesh is fighting for its independence from Pakistan. Nine-year-old
Taslima is bundled into a carriage with her mother, grandmother and other
children to hide out with relatives in the countryside. [...]

{ Full Text at: http://www.thenation.com/doc.mhtml?i=3D20021118&s=3Dtax }

______

#7.

INSAF National Political Convention on "Threats of Global Fascism &=20
National Challenges" in Ahmedabad
November 23-26, 2002
Tentative Schedule:
Day I: November 23, 2002 (Saturday)
2:30 to 5:30 pm: Inaugural Session (Keynote Presentations on the Theme)
6:00 to 7:30 pm: Cultural Action
Day 2: November 24, 2002 (Sunday)
9:30 to 11:00 am: Reflections & Clarifications On Keynote Presentations
11:30 am to 1:00 pm: Identification of Issues & Challenges (In Groups)
02:30 pm to 5:30 pm: Presentations from States (Consolidation)
Day 3: November 25, 2002 (Monday)
9:30 am to 11:00 am: National Action Plan (What is to be done?)
11:00 am to 1:00 pm: What can we do/contribute? (State Groups)
02:30 to 5:30 pm: Presentation of Action Plans
06:00 to 8:00 pm: Cultural Action
Day 4: November 26, 2002 (Tuesday)
02:30 to 7:00 pm: Public Events (Rally & Mass Meeting, Cultural=20
Programmes etc.)

Those interested in participating may contact Wilfred D'Costa, INSAF=20
National Secretary (States Co-ordination), Ahmedabad at=20
<mailto:willy@v...>willy@v...

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