[sacw] SACW | 2 Nov. 02

Harsh Kapoor aiindex@mnet.fr
Sat, 2 Nov 2002 01:58:22 +0100


South Asia Citizens Wire | 2 November 2002

__________________________

#1. Pakistan: The coming theocracy (Khurram Dastgir Khan)
#2. Elections in Pakistan - Turning Tragedy Into Farce (Shahnaz Rouse)
#3. India: Tolerant and Secular? (Mukul Dube)
#4.
#5.
#6.
#7.

__________________________

#1.

The News International
Saturday November 02, 2002

The coming theocracy

Khurram Dastgir Khan

Witnessing the endless disputes, the bitterness and bargaining of=20
partisan politics, a widespread mood of disgust manifested itself=20
under all kind of auspices, reactionary and ambitious. The ideas of=20
liberalism had scarcely any advocates but many potential adversaries.=20
There was a feeling that the country lacked the means to meet the=20
challenges of transition: that the available leadership was not equal=20
to the crisis."

The above passage describes post-election 2002 Pakistan very well. In=20
fact, it is Joachim Fest's description of Germany in the 1920s. The=20
economic and social disorder of 1920s gave rise to National Socialist=20
Party in Germany. Pakistan's economic and social disorder of late=20
1990s has given religious parties their first electoral gain. And if=20
present trends continue, it will not be the last.

The 2002 election has obliterated a long-held piece of conventional=20
political wisdom -- religious parties have the street power but not=20
the vote. MMA's electoral success has precipitated what Lawrence=20
Ziring called the enigma of Pakistan's political development. In=20
words of the late Eqbal Ahmed, "In Pakistan, the issue of the=20
relationship between religion and the state has remained a source of=20
confusion, instability, and misuse of Islam in politics, a phenomenon=20
which contributed greatly to the violent separation of East Pakistan=20
in 1971."

While proclaiming nationhood on the basis of Islam, Pakistan's=20
founders were all constitutionalists. "To them there was no=20
contradiction between the Islamic state and a polity governed=20
according to modern democratic principles," writes Professor Ziring.=20
On the other hand, almost all Ulema (Islamic clerics) of united India=20
opposed creation of Pakistan. Yet, after partition, the very same=20
Ulema laid immediate claim to ruling it. In this tug-of-war, the=20
constitutionalists have had the advantage so far. But the rope is now=20
slipping from their hands. Unimpeded, religious forces will pull=20
decisively in the not-too-distant future. The result: a nuclear-armed=20
theocratic Pakistan by 2010.

The theocratic impulse has two strands, militant and non-militant.=20
Until 1979, Islamic militancy was hard to find on Pakistani soil. Gen=20
Zia-ul-Haq used the momentum of the 1977 anti-Bhutto=20
Tehrik-e-Nizam-e-Mustafa to start his Islamisation programme that=20
was, writes historian Ayesha Jalal, an effort to "establish his own=20
legitimacy without having to court mass support". The 1979 overthrow=20
of the Shah in Iran -- the first authentic Islamic revolution of the=20
modern era -- provided an additional boost. Long denied the spoils of=20
power, religious parties rushed to support the military regime.

Zia's political need dovetailed with the American need to fight a=20
proxy war against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan. As the=20
US-newspaper CS Monitor wrote last year, "When the Soviets attacked=20
Afghanistan in December 1979, the initial prognosis in the West was=20
that the native population lacked the unity to resist. The answer,=20
agreed to in Washington, the Middle East, and Pakistan was -- Islam.=20
The creation of the mujahideen warriors was the result -- fighters=20
that would come from around the Muslim world and take up arms in the=20
name of a holy war."

The project succeeded quite well. A 'pipeline' of weapons, warriors,=20
and networks of engaged mullahs was established from the Middle East=20
through Peshawar, Pakistan -- and into Afghanistan. Money from the=20
Middle East and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) -- funnelled=20
through Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence Agency (ISI) -- was=20
used to buy food, clothing, supplies, weapons, and intelligence.=20
Local madaris became ideological training grounds for those who were=20
termed by everyone from President Carter to President Reagan as=20
'freedom fighters.'

The Soviet Union's departure was accompanied, not coincidentally, by=20
the end of Zia's rule. But the military establishment never=20
relinquished control of the Afghanistan/Kashmir policy and its=20
domestic nexus. With funding coming from overseas, supplemented by=20
ISI finds and local donations, writes Harvard 's Jessica Stern,=20
"Pakistani government has essentially allowed Sunni Saudi Arabia and=20
Shi'a Iran to fight a proxy war on Pakistani soil." Prof. Stern=20
quotes one Pakistani militant group as saying that 60% of the group's=20
funds come from outside Pakistan, mostly from contributors in the=20
Middle East and from Hajjis who heard the group's representative=20
speak during Hajj.

Successive elected Pakistani governments in the 1990s found=20
themselves on their knees against sectarian violence. The state was=20
powerless to prevent burning of newspapers, lynching of alleged=20
blasphemers, and to compel frightened judges to issue verdicts=20
against guilty militants. Mansoora-like enclaves of different=20
religious groups sprung up across the country; mini-states that were=20
above the law because of their jihadi legitimacy.

It would be a mistake, however, to focus only on the militants.=20
Islamic rituals are more visible in Pakistani society now than they=20
were a decade ago. We see it in the ever-increasing number of males=20
of all ages wearing specific turbans; in a mass departure to perform=20
Umra during Ramazan; in lavishly-built mosques; and in the upsurge of=20
private and public gatherings for dars (teaching), prayer, and=20
hamd-o-naat (praise of Allah and the Holy prophet).

A new spiritualist movement has taken root, with a disparate but=20
better-educated group of murshad (spiritual leaders) catering to the=20
needs of people of all classes. This phenomenon has, strikingly,=20
spread from the middle classes upwards into the rich.

A readily perceptible part of the spiritualist trend is the Tableeghi=20
(evangelical) movement. From small beginnings in Raiwind near Lahore,=20
it has grown exponentially. Within Pakistan, this movement has=20
attracted men of all classes, ages, and professions. Its annual=20
prayer convention attracts nearly half a million delegates that come=20
from within and abroad.

The third important aspect of non-militant Islam is the brisk growth=20
in the number and scale of madaris (religious schools) across the=20
country. Madaris are evident particularly in cities, and a sizeable=20
number among these cater to females. These schools benefit from=20
philanthropy, which in Pakistan has always favoured religious=20
establishments and building mosques over other civil society=20
institutions.

These madaris have filled a need created by rising unemployment and=20
the collapse of state education. There is no entry test, no fees, and=20
room and board is free. For an unemployed, indigent teenager willing=20
to undergo the rigmarole, enrolment in a madaris provides an=20
ascriptive dignity, prospect of employment in new mosques and in the=20
burgeoning mehfil/dars industry, in addition to spiritual rewards and=20
salvation.

To be concluded

______

#2.

MERIP Press Information Note 109
October 18, 2002

Elections in Pakistan
Turning Tragedy Into Farce

Shahnaz Rouse

(Shahnaz Rouse, professor of sociology at Sarah Lawrence College,=20
serves on MERIP's editorial committee.)

The results of Pakistan's October 10 elections to the national and=20
provincial assemblies -- the first such contests since Gen. Pervez=20
Musharraf grabbed power in a bloodless coup in 1999 -- seem to have=20
surprised many observers both within and outside the country. On=20
election night and the morning after, US media commentary focused on=20
the gains made by the coalition of Pakistani Islamist groups, the=20
Muttahida Majlis-I-Amal (MMA). Not only did the Islamists garner=20
approximately a third of the seats in the National Assembly, but they=20
also won a definitive majority in Sarhad (Northwest Frontier=20
Province) and a majority of seats in the southwestern province of=20
Baluchistan.

Commentators also pointed to the fact that no party won an outright=20
majority in the votes cast for the National Assembly. The Pakistan=20
Muslim League (Q), an 18-month old party backed by Musharraf and the=20
army, gathered the most votes, but nowhere near enough to form its=20
own government. Musharraf's supporters will have to form a coalition=20
with one of the four main parties that also won seats at the national=20
level: the Pakistan People's Party (PPP), the Islamist coalition, the=20
Pakistan Muslim League (N) and/or independents.

Since the elections, leaders in the MMA have made headlines in the=20
West by pledging to "implement an Islamic system" in Pakistan and=20
demanding that US soldiers pursuing Taliban and al-Qaeda militants in=20
the northwest province leave the country. The MMA's victory in Sarhad=20
does indeed reflect dissatisfaction with the Musharraf regime's=20
alignment with the US in the war in Afghanistan and the ongoing "war=20
on terrorism," as well as militancy in the struggle between Pakistan=20
and India over the contested province of Kashmir. But Pakistani=20
Islamists' rebuke of Musharraf and the US is only part of the story=20
of the October 10 polling, and the success of the MMA in Sarhad and=20
Baluchistan is not simply a byproduct of events since September 11,=20
2001.

FRACTURED POLITY

The historical roots of the Islamists' electoral strength trace back=20
to ethnic identification between the Pashtuns on both sides of the=20
border between Afghanistan and Pakistan, and the involvement of=20
segments of the population in the border zone in the first US=20
intervention in Afghanistan -- the Reagan administration's=20
bankrolling, with the Saudis and the Pakistani military, of an=20
anti-Soviet jihad in the late 1970s and early 1980s. But more recent=20
catalysts for the MMA's success were the May 2002 referendum that=20
extended Musharraf's presidency by five years and constitutional=20
"reforms" two months later that further enhanced the power of the=20
military in Pakistani politics. Both of these measures made a sham of=20
Pakistan's electoral process, producing voter apathy which has=20
benefited the groups coalesced under the MMA rubric.

Many voters who might otherwise have gone to the polls became=20
convinced that the elections were nothing but a mask for continued=20
military power. The Islamist groups, on the other hand, followed=20
their historical tendency to choose moments when democracy has been=20
weak or non-existent to mobilize for additional clout within the=20
state, in this instance through the electoral process. Some political=20
commentators inside Pakistan would add an additional explanatory=20
factor: corruption among the leadership of the four major=20
non-Islamist parties which oppose Musharraf's regime. By this=20
reading, only the "easily intelligible slogans" of the religious=20
parties spoke to the average person's economic plight. The=20
combination of consolidated military rule and the inadequacy of the=20
alternatives created the space for the religious parties to far=20
exceed any mandate they had previously achieved in the electoral=20
history of Pakistan.

Meanwhile, the provincial assembly vote demonstrates clearly the=20
fracturing of politics in Pakistan. While the MMA swept the northern=20
and southwestern provinces, the PML(Q) dominates in the Punjab, the=20
backbone of the Pakistani state since independence. Punjab, the most=20
prosperous province, sees itself -- mythologically -- as resting=20
above party or sectarian politics. Anti-Indian chauvinist rhetoric is=20
strong, as is support for the military. In Sindh, the Pakistan=20
People's Party, though without its most famous politician,=20
ex-President Benazir Bhutto, won a significant number of votes,=20
followed by the Muttahida Quami Mahaz (MQM). The southwestern=20
province of Baluchistan -- site of a vibrant and radical left-wing=20
movement in the 1970s -- has undergone a huge demographic shift since=20
Pakistan's involvement alongside the US in the first Afghan=20
intervention in the 1980s, with Pashtuns gaining in numbers.=20
Pro-Taliban forces within Pakistan have used this region to gain a=20
foothold in Afghanistan.

SUGGESTIVE RESULTS

Two things become evident from these results: first, the nationality=20
question, which has plagued Pakistan since its inception in 1947, is=20
alive and well today. Does the average Pakistani identify with the=20
nation-state or with a particular, more localized nationality? Is the=20
average person Pakistani first or Pashtun or Baluchi? The nationality=20
question created the split between West and East Pakistan (now=20
Bangladesh), and continues to inflect present-day politics. The=20
October 10 elections suggest that there are now two contenders for=20
the national (all-Pakistani) mantle, the MMA and the pro-Musharraf=20
PML(Q), promoting two competing notions of national identity which=20
exist side by side -- one overtly religious, the other latently so,=20
with both propounding authoritarian and anti-democratic visions of=20
the state and its relation to civil society. The notion of identity=20
which the military dictator Zia ul Haq sought to promulgate in the=20
1970s, whereby the religious elements dominated, but did not compete=20
with, either the religiosity or authoritarianism of the regime, may=20
have ruptured.

Second, many Pakistanis of all political persuasions are in fact fed=20
up with the corruption of the regimes during and since the era of Zia=20
ul Haq. In the electoral campaign, both the PML(N), the party of=20
deposed President Nawaz Sharif, and the PPP were rightly seen as more=20
interested in holding onto power than in sharing it, and unable to=20
bring about meaningful change. Since progressive groups on the left=20
have either been forcefully repressed (especially under Zia), or=20
thrown their support behind Benazir Bhutto in the misguided belief=20
that her party would contain the Islamist elements, the ballot=20
presented no viable alternative for Pakistani voters. Even the PPP=20
and PML(N) collaborated with the religious elements, as demonstrated=20
by the close links between the Pakistani military and religious=20
groups throughout the tenure of these parties in the 1980s and 1990s.

"GUIDED DEMOCRACY"

Every Pakistani military regime has justified its intervention in=20
politics with promises to "clean up" the mess created by previous=20
civilian governments. When the military came to power under=20
Musharraf, capital flight had drained the economy of resources, and=20
inflation was soaring. As in the past, the military's seizure of=20
power further destabilized the economy at first. It also aroused=20
anxiety among Pakistanis about another prolonged period of military=20
rule. Musharraf's regime tried to allay concerns on both counts. To=20
address the economic issues, the regime set up the feared National=20
Accountability Board, which has successfully recovered monies that=20
had been taken out of the country by threatening state reprisal as=20
well as by actual prosecutions. Musharraf also promised to hold=20
elections within three years, forming the National Reconstruction=20
Bureau (NRB) under the direction of a military officer. These=20
measures explain the support initially enjoyed by Musharraf and his=20
fellow generals when they came to power three years ago.

Ostensibly, the NRB was set up to "guide" Pakistan back to=20
"democracy." But it was clear by 2000 that the model of democracy=20
envisioned by the Musharraf regime was limited. Elections held for=20
various local bodies did not permit the participation of political=20
parties. This measure, it was suggested, would enable local figures=20
unconnected to existing party power structures to emerge, thereby=20
strengthening local participation and more closely reflecting local=20
concerns. But predictably, this system of representation reflected=20
and reproduced local hierarchies, more often than not favoring the=20
economically powerful. Musharraf's local bodies system closely=20
resembles the system of "Basic Democracies" introduced by the first=20
military regime in Pakistan under Ayub Khan. Most political activists=20
in Pakistan view Khan's system has having laid the groundwork for=20
assaults on genuine democratic process. Existing bureaucratic and=20
military interests are enhanced at the expense of politics itself.

More recently, the NRB shepherded two more regime initiatives into=20
being: the May referendum and the constitutional amendments of July.=20
The referendum in particular led to a precipitous decline, although=20
not a total collapse, in Musharraf's popularity; it was seen as a=20
ruse to stay in power, analogous to similar schemes pursued by Zia ul=20
Haq. Unlike Zia, however, Musharraf actually had a certain measure of=20
popular support -- not only because of his stance against militant=20
Islamic groups after September 11, but because earlier he had tried=20
to do away with the blasphemy laws introduced by Nawaz Sharif. Many=20
Pakistanis apparently hoped that what could not be achieved=20
politically -- through mass agitation against the draconian=20
legislation -- could be achieved by military fiat, though the same=20
military had begun the process of the country's Islamization in the=20
first place. The blasphemy laws are still on the books.

MUSHARRAF, VOICE OF REASON

In 1984, Zia ul Haq ran a referendum which asked "whether the people=20
of Pakistan endorse the process initiated by...the President of=20
Pakistan, for bringing laws in conformity with the injunctions of=20
Islam as laid down in the Holy Quran and the Sunnah of the Holy=20
Prophet (peace be upon him) and for the preservation of the ideology=20
of Pakistan, and for the continuation and consolidation of the smooth=20
and orderly transfer of power to the elected representatives of the=20
people?" In 2002, Musharraf's referendum question read: "Do you want=20
to elect President Musharraf as President of Pakistan for the next=20
five years for: survival of local government system; restoration of=20
democracy; continuity and stability of reforms; eradication of=20
extremism and sectarianism, and the accomplishment of the=20
Quaid-e-Azam's concept?" Language of reform and modernity aside, most=20
Pakistanis understood the referendum as a way for Musharraf to extend=20
his tenure as both president and army chief, and also to create a=20
constitutional role for the army in government decision-making.

Mounting domestic criticism following the referendum drive led the=20
military to fall back on constitutional amendments dictating the=20
parameters under which elections would be held. Again, a facade of=20
democracy was maintained: the amendments were introduced with great=20
fanfare on July 10, ostensibly for public debate and revision, but=20
few changes were made in the text. The constitutional amendments gave=20
Musharraf the right to dismiss the elected parliament. They created a=20
military-dominated National Security Council with the power to=20
override measures undertaken by future civilian governments. While=20
Musharraf claims to stand for "progress" and "sustainable democracy,"=20
his regime's initiatives exhibit curious similarities to the stated=20
beliefs of British colonial overlords and Zia ul Haq that "pure"=20
democracy does not suit Pakistan. Rather, the responsible ruler=20
appoints himself to establish a political system that "suits" the=20
needs of the country. The same military that encouraged the growth of=20
radical Islamism to support its covert wars in Afghanistan and=20
Kashmir now positions itself as the voice of reason and rationality.

PARTY OF ORDER

Though the election results are a repudiation of Musharraf, in the=20
short term, the constitutional amendments clearly continue military=20
interference in politics. Following the Turkish model for which=20
Musharraf repeatedly expresses admiration, the regime will pose as=20
the defender of a modernist government in Pakistan to justify=20
consolidation of its authority, a project which the MMA's=20
pronouncements in favor of introducing Islamic law throughout the=20
country can only facilitate. (Notably, Musharraf's first foreign=20
visit after the October 10 polls landed him in Turkey.) The divided=20
government and lack of national consensus indicated by the election=20
results is in fact precisely what the military would like. Posing yet=20
again, as the party of order, the military can return to direct rule=20
whenever it sees fit.

These deeper dynamics argue against single-minded fixation on the=20
MMA's victory in the Pakistani elections as a bad omen for the "war=20
on terror." The unfolding farce in Pakistan, once again, postpones=20
the ability of the Pakistani electorate to pick its own leaders, to=20
conduct its own politics (however messily) and to resolve issues of=20
internal dissension and ethnic difference. Narrow focus on Islamist=20
calls to oust US Special Forces misses sources of dissent --=20
especially military interference in politics -- that bode ill both=20
for US-Pakistani relations and for progressive internal=20
transformations in Pakistan.

(When quoting from this PIN, please cite MERIP Press Information Note=20
109, "Elections in Pakistan: Turning Tragedy Into Farce," by Shahnaz=20
Rouse, October 18, 2002.)

_____

#3.

http://www.mnet.fr/aiindex/2002/MukulDubeJul02.html

Tolerant and Secular?

Mukul Dube
[July 2002]

The actor Farooque Shaikh said on a discussion show on television=20
recently that no religion claims to be absolute. Chandan Mitra, the=20
journalist, added that all religions preach tolerance. The two=20
gentlemen were not unusual in uttering this pious rubbish. All those=20
people say this who do not ever trouble to question religions but=20
only wish them to coexist peacefully. They treat religions much as=20
they treat Nature itself: like immutable givens. They speak out of=20
habit, merely regurgitating received wisdom. They speak without=20
applying their minds.

Shaikh was of course entirely wrong. The fact is that every religion=20
claims to be absolute, to be the Ultimate Truth. If it did not make=20
such a claim, it would be left with nothing to stand on. Every=20
religion is by definition unquestionable and not subject to the usual=20
rules of reason, evidence and proof. Every religion demands of its=20
followers unquestioning faith. This act of surrender to the divine=20
has been romantically glorified over the centuries, in all religions=20
and in literatures across the globe, but equally we could argue that=20
such surrender reduces otherwise thinking, acting people to=20
brainless, spineless, grovelling supineness.

Mitra may have been right in saying that all religions preach=20
tolerance. After all, tolerance is a Good Thing, and it would be a=20
strong and foolish religion which could resist the urge to make a=20
claim to it. But claims can be tall. We must go on to analyse if any=20
religion does or even can practise this tolerance business. Such=20
statements are sometimes made by people who actually are saying,=20
"Look how grand and good and liberal we are. See how much better our=20
religion is than those other ones."

Sparing the life of a vanquished enemy is a fine chivalrous gesture.=20
But if it is known that the enemy will never change his colours, that=20
he will remain an enemy to be feared, then the fine gesture reveals=20
itself to be a foolish and suicidal one. Real life is not Sikandar=20
and Porus, it is not Arthur's Round Table. It is religions butchering=20
one another.

Can religions coexist peacefully? I believe they cannot, because two=20
alternative absolutes must inevitably come into conflict: neither can=20
be accepted without automatically denying the other. They might=20
trundle along side by side for years or centuries, but when push=20
comes to shove they are bound to be pitted against each other. All=20
this talk of religious tolerance is the purest humbug.

No system of beliefs which considers itself absolute and=20
unquestionable can accept the existence of another system of beliefs=20
which makes the same claims. As a kingdom cannot have two kings, so a=20
world cannot have two gods =AD just as, to give an example which will=20
be readily understood today, a corporation cannot have two CEOs.=20
There can be only one absolute, one single point at which everything=20
converges and stops.

Another journalist on the same show, Dileep Padgaonkar, edged nearer=20
to the truth in saying that each religion had at its core a system of=20
ethics, of definitions of good and bad; but he stopped short of=20
noting that each religion justified these definitions by reference to=20
one or other unquestionable absolute.

That a man should not pull his brother-in-law's moustache is a=20
perfectly sane and sound principle. But if someone were to question=20
me on the reason for it, I would not give the rational answer: that=20
moustache pulling can be painful and depilating and, when it happens=20
among relations, can lead to the disintegration of the kinship=20
network. Instead I would produce a cock-and-bull story about=20
mythological characters or divinities who created trouble for=20
themselves by engaging in the sport. The story will be swallowed=20
whole, for the reason that by definition it may not be questioned.

What is to prevent me, once I have tasted success, from setting out=20
other principles, each with its backing story which will be believed=20
because not believing is not an option? It is not a characteristic of=20
humankind to leave well alone, to not exercise a power which one has=20
seen oneself to possess. I can make up principles about beef or pork=20
or menstrual blood or alcohol or urine. In time I shall have a rule=20
for a person's every waking moment, for every conceivable situation=20
in which people can find themselves. This is just what religions have=20
done through history. Each religion has built up a body of rules and=20
principles to cover all eventualities. Should a new situation arise,=20
there are precedent analogues enough for it to rummage in its grab=20
bag and produce something to fit. If there are no analogues, it can=20
simply concoct a new rule, knowing that that will be accepted on the=20
basis of the acceptance given to so much else.

The bag is, of course, sacrosanct: all that comes out of it is by=20
definition correct and may not be challenged. My birth into religion=20
X obliges me to swallow all the tenets and rules of that religion=20
with my eyes closed, never mind what my reason tells me, never mind=20
that millions of people =AD who are essentially like me, certainly=20
neither better than me nor worse =AD go about swallowing different sets=20
of tenets and rules.

It is this acceptance of something without demur or question, this=20
justification of principles by reference to supra-rational sources,=20
which reduces the basically sound ethical system of a religion to a=20
travesty. It has happened, in every religion, that the sound core of=20
the ethical system has had added to it a mass of rules which are=20
nowhere near as sound. This shrubbery, this ornamentation, these=20
bodies of "hanger-on" principles, may have been born of historical=20
accidents or even of the idiosyncrasies of historical figures who=20
were important in the religions in question. That is a matter for=20
speculation. What is important is that each of these non-essential=20
"principles" is absolute, even the one that I should not pick my nose=20
in the dark while facing north-west; or east or south-east, as those=20
other religions have it.

Religions are all many centuries old. The believer today has no way=20
to tell myth or fairy tale from religious teaching devised by people=20
who had a grasp over realities and wanted to protect the followers of=20
their religions from dangers. Under-cooked pork can cause=20
trichinosis, for example, so pork and the meat of all cloven-footed=20
animals is banned. The faithful are told that the ban has a divine=20
origin, precisely because that justification is quicker and simpler=20
than a rational one, and because it is absolute.

Yet the pig is an important part of the diets of many peoples who are=20
in no way behind those who forbid the eating of pork.

Equally, later developments may supplant and obscure earlier=20
realities. Beef was eaten in Vedic India, for the reason that cattle=20
were reared and therefore available. But along the line vegetarianism=20
was imposed ex post facto on ancient India and the cow somehow became=20
holy (though not that other profusely lactating bovine, the water=20
buffalo) and so may not be eaten but has the right to freely obstruct=20
road traffic. (I do not think the prospect of bovine spongiform=20
encephalitis, "Mad Cow Disease", far in the future and on another=20
continent, was the original reason for the ban.) A large body of=20
myths and legends surrounding the cow has built up over the=20
centuries. Today the animal has come to be associated firmly with=20
gods and goddesses and sages, and who would dare to question=20
divinities and quasi-divinities?

Yet many peoples, in no readily apparent way inferior to the cow=20
venerators, routinely dine off that creature. (Some even attribute to=20
it an absence of intelligence, as seen in the insult commonly traded=20
between human females: "Stupid cow.")

Is India a secular country, as common wisdom holds it to be? No, it=20
is not: it is merely a multi-religious one. The two ideas have been=20
confounded so thoroughly that we no longer know the difference.=20
"Secular" means lay, of the world, not pertaining to religion. A=20
country or society cannot be described as secular just because it is=20
home to not one religion but many. To be secular in the full sense,=20
it must have no religion at all. In practice, of course, it is=20
usually considered sufficient if religion does not intrude into the=20
area of civil life.

But in Indian politics we have an excellent example of just such an=20
intrusion. All politics is not necessarily bad, as some with=20
anarchist tendencies hold: what is bad is politics tainted by=20
religion. Throughout history, across the world, religions have sought=20
to wipe out other religions because all have invaded the space of=20
political power and have twisted that power. Each religion has warped=20
political power by implicitly or explicitly declaring its own=20
expression of it justified by an unquestionable absolute.

This is the road of irrationality, and it leads inevitably to murder=20
and war and, as we saw recently in Gujarat, to genocide. In this last=20
example, the State in the province, required by the Constitution to=20
be secular, was blatantly religious. Its functioning was dictated by=20
one religion and its actions and its inaction were aimed at the=20
destruction of another religion. Whatever the framers of our=20
Constitution may have meant by secularism, certainly it was not this.

The future of our country has been questioned in a fundamental way,=20
and one of the paths open to us =AD along which some lunatic barbarians=20
wish to drive us =AD has been shown to us with great clarity. If that=20
is not the path we wish to take =AD and no sane person can want that =AD=20
we must decide very soon and very firmly just what is the role we=20
shall allow to religion. If religion is allowed to define and=20
dominate State, disaster is the certain consequence. The Vedic=20
Taliban will grab power, and its rule will be bloodthirsty and aeons=20
away from any kind of rationality.

Rationality is the key. Over the millennia, humankind has advanced in=20
every field because of the growth of rationality =AD except in=20
religion, where there simply is no space for it.

______

#4.

Abstract of forthcoming lecture by Batuk Vora being delivered at:
-Nov. 4 at Kondotty - Kerala in a Seminar Against Fascism organised=20
by the progressive writers association; and
-Nov. 9-10 at Bhopal conference on 'Divisive Trends in Society and=20
the role of Media, State and People'.

(1) Short introduction of Gujarat Lok Sangharsh Samiti which I=20
represent and my past and present role as a columnist-journalist in=20
the struggle against divisive trends in Gujarati society;
(2) Gujarat has become a live laboratory of the 'politics of=20
exclusion' or divisiveness in true sense of the word. We are=20
witnessing here a testing ground for a divisive vision of life=20
seeking legitimacy through acts of enmity, hatred and segregation day=20
in and day out even after so called normalcy was restored, with=20
active connivance of the state government against the constitutional=20
rule of law;
(3) A short description of the socio-economic background.=20
Communal carnage or genocide in Gujarat have posed a huge question=20
mark before the very roots of our democratic life, our identity as a=20
civilization and a consensual worldview that has held India together=20
over the last several centuries. Gujarat has a distinct personality.=20
We find Gujaratis spread out in 128 countries and almost half the=20
tourists of India come from Gujarat. One time glorious liberal=20
Gandhian and Mahajani culture exist no more now. Most outstanding=20
peculiarity of Gujarat is its total domination by vocal and lively=20
middle class which has changed sides in political battles several=20
times in the past according to serve its own short-term interests. A=20
fear psychosis and a sense of injustice among the majority community=20
is being constantly whipped up by divisive forces;
(4) A myth that Muslims were constantly favoured by the state and=20
by all those secular minded people, media and parties is being=20
systematically articulated and spread. Hindus are reminded through a=20
wide network of propaganda tools (handouts, magazines, schools,=20
cartoons, hoardings, posters, public speeches, press releases, etc)=20
saying that they were the apostles (upasak) of 'mahashakti', with=20
Trishul (trident) in the hands of Shiva, Sudarshan in the hands of=20
Krishna and Bow and Arrow with Rama. They should give up timidity,=20
tolerance and unmanliness and rise to destroy the enemies. Only the=20
riots afford an opportunity to 'teach' Muslims a lesson and avenge=20
the historical defear of Prithviraj Chauhan at the hands of Mohammed=20
Ghauri. Statues of Shivaji and Rana Pratap have been installed=20
wherever they can in the last three decades. Violence is publicly=20
applauded by the Sangh Parivar through a public posture hammering on=20
'we' and 'they' in their publications, posters, hoardings at the=20
entrance of each village saying 'Hindu Rashtra is welcoming you!'.=20
Post carnage, many of the 300 carnage affected village leaders=20
declare 'We have finished 'them' off for ever and not a single Muslim=20
lives here now!'
(5) Obsessed with idol worshipping, barefoot marathon walk to one=20
or the other god-goddess's abode, day and night loud and noisy=20
chanting of Rama, huge processions off and on in the name of this or=20
that god, a peculiar annual ceremony in a village near Ahmedabad=20
involves thousands of local people pouring tons and tons of pure=20
ghee on the streets and inside the temple'endless holidays to pray=20
one or the other deity'all this has become a thriving 'enterprise'=20
for a large number of middle class people who otherwise also have=20
been known for its entrepreneurship and hard work in business. Partly=20
this is also due to rising unemployment, stalled industrial=20
development, declaining agricultural growth and general economic=20
recession. Extremist Hindu and Islamic politicians have been taking=20
full advantage of this by merrily mixing religion with power politics=20
without any inhibition;
(6) Lastly, current situation of Gujarat, with the state assembly=20
election looming large on the concerned people, the state is actually=20
sitting on a volcano of not so hidden communal anger, alienation and=20
potential flare up. Gujarat has seen at least two dozen communal=20
flare ups within last couple of months, after so called normalcy was=20
restored. Neighboring state of Maharashtra has seen at least 57=20
communal clashes within last two years. Only difference is that=20
Gujarat government connives at such incidents while Maharashtra state=20
government takes care not to allow largescale conflagration'
(7) After the minority bashing, next declared target of the=20
extremist sections of Sangh Parivar are secular writers,=20
intellectuals, TV anchors, journalists, NGOs and social activists who=20
are all lumped together as 'pseudo-secular, pro-Musharraf,=20
pro-Muslim, anti-Hindu and even anti-India!'

______

#6.

The Week
Nov 3, 2002

Hate Rhetoric

The fire-breathers
Statements by Thackeray and Togadia
point to a dangerous trend in politics

By B. Krishnakumar

Their numbers have been growing ever since fundamentalism brought=20
India's liberal edifice crashing down in Ayodhya on December 6, 1992.=20
Ranged on either side of the communal divide, they have been spewing=20
venom. Yet they continue to be a minority.

Of late, those on the extreme fringe, wearing saffron and green,=20
respectively, have been blowing their hate horns with added fury.=20
Witness the Dussehra day rally blast from Shiv Sena chief Balasaheb=20
Thackeray: time for Hindus to form suicide squads and strike back at=20
the extremists in the Muslim community.

Blowing Hate horns: Balasaheb Thackeray

Like the holy day, his speech too has become an annual ritual looked=20
forward to with much enthusiasm by the faithful. The applause starts=20
when he throws down the gauntlet at enemies of Amchi Mumbai (topping=20
the current hate list are illegal Bangladeshi immigrants in the=20
metro), of Maharashtra and, of course, of India. It reaches a=20
crescendo when he warns such elements of dire consequences and then=20
dares the authorities with that unsaid taunt: touch me if you can.

By and large, those in and out of power refrain from responding to=20
'the same old Dussehra day ritual'. At the most, some senior=20
politicians would call their political rival-personal friend and=20
counsel restraint. The issue would then be papered over.

The scene changed after Chhagan Bhujbal broke away from the Sena and=20
hitched himself on to Maratha strongman and Nationalist Congress=20
Party (NCP) leader Sharadrao Pawar's bandwagon. On July 23, 2000,=20
Bhujbal ordered the police to take all precautions to ensure peace=20
after a court issued an arrest warrant against Thackeray in a case=20
relating to inflammatory speeches and editorials in party organ=20
Saamna back in 1992-93. The Congress-NCP government in the state,=20
where Bhujbal is home minister, has now asked the police to file a=20
complaint under the Indian Penal Code for 'promoting enmity between=20
different group; and doing acts prejudicial to maintenance of=20
harmony'.

The government was reacting to Thackeray's comments on a recent=20
communal flare-up in Solapur: sections of the Muslim community had=20
gone on the rampage in response to a comment made by a US-based=20
preacher, the Rev. Jerry Falwell, about Prophet Mohammed. "[There=20
was] no outcry in Pakistan or even the Arab countries. Why then did=20
Solapur burn? They said Pakistan flag was burnt. So why did you get=20
incensed? If this is what you Muslims feel about Pakistan, you should=20
really leave this country. People tell me I should lead the country.=20
I say give me the Army. I will rein in everybody, flush out the=20
Muslims." This utterance incurred a lot of opprobrium the next day.

Thackeray has been all praise for Gujarat Chief Minister Narendra=20
Modi, especially after what he calls was a 'reaction to the burning=20
of the train bogies in Godhra'. They have a lot in common: they brook=20
no opposition.

When it comes to breathing fire, they have two more of a kind to=20
propagate Hindutva-Vishwa Hindu Parishad president Ashok Singhal and=20
general secretary Dr Pravin Togadia. Singhal has been matching=20
Thackeray comment for comment on everything from the issue of=20
minorities to questioning Sonia Gandhi's legitimacy in heading the=20
Congress, to accusing the Bharatiya Janata Party of being spineless.=20
Of late, even the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh has come in their line=20
of fire for going soft on the Hindutva mandate.

Togadia's reference to Sonia Gandhi as Italy ni kutri (dog from=20
Italy) at a public meeting in Kutch drew fire from the media and his=20
political friends and foes alike. "One may not agree with the=20
politics of Sonia Gandhi or her party's programmes, but that does not=20
mean that she should be criticised by stooping to this level," said=20
Pawar, a former Congressman who had raised Sonia's foreign origins as=20
a political issue.

"Hindu culture has taught us to respect women," said Bhujbal. "Though=20
Togadia advocates Hinduism, he does not seem to have understood it=20
himself. His Hinduism is only meant for political purposes."=20
Maharashtra Health Minister Digvijay Khanvilkar was equally vehement=20
in rejecting Togadia's remarks.

Congress spokesperson Anand Sharma said Togadia's statement was an=20
example of a disturbing trend in Indian politics. "It is imperative=20
that political leaders across spectrum come together and restore the=20
dignity of political life," he said.

VHP was hardly apologetic. Its spokesperson Visheshwar Dewedi said=20
the Congress was not above blame. "Let the Congress apologise for all=20
its past misdeeds, then Togadia will tender an apology."

A thumping of chests, similar to that of the Hindutva brigade, is=20
happening among the extremist fringe of the Muslim community, too.=20
Consider this: Get our leader (People's Democratic Party leader Abdul=20
Nazar Madani) out of jail in Tamil Nadu and keep him in a Kerala jail=20
or else we will resort to direct action, warned a leader of the party=20
in a televised press conference. It was such elements that caused a=20
tear in the delicate fabric of communal peace in Solapur.

Even as Hindutvaites are instigating the 'Hindu fraternity' to take=20
on the 'enemies', atrocities on the Dalits have been revived with a=20
vengeance-the most recent horror being the lynching of five of them=20
at Jhajjar in Haryana. The lower castes are still not allowed inside=20
some temples in Rajasthan, and in highly literate Kerala, discord=20
reigns after a lower caste man is made a temple priest.

The violent vibes have gained an ethnic flavour with the=20
Tamil-Kannadiga face-off over Cauvery waters. It has become a=20
reel-life kind of melodrama with heroes, heroines, directors,=20
producers et al lining up on either side of the water divide.

Time for the frenzy-making charismatic leaders to do a rethink: will=20
they be able to control the vengeance-seeking mobs they are=20
tongue-lashing into ethno-religious formations? Or they may end up=20
victims of the demoniac forces they are unleashing.

With Dnyanesh Jathar/Mumbai and Kartikeya Sharma/Delhi

_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/

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