[sacw] SACW #1 | 31 Dec. 02

[Harsh Kapoor]

South Asia Citizens Wire #1 | 31 December 2002

__________________________

#1. Another Visit to Pakistan (Hassan N.Gardezi)
#2. The making of a riot narrative (Mahesh Daga)

__________________________

#1.

Another Visit to Pakistan

Hassan N.Gardezi

[30 December 2002]

As political and social unrest mounts in Pakistan with the passage=20
of time and I embark on yet another visit to the "homeland,"=20
grappling with a swarm of misgivings, I always seem to end up with a=20
feeling that there is still hope. Those elements and forces that are=20
driving the country to the brink can be stopped in their tracks one=20
day provided of course "the age of catastrophes" we are in, according=20
to Eric Hobsbawm, does not put an end to everything prematurely. The=20
reason for this optimism, misplaced as it may very well be, is the=20
older and younger Pakistanis I continue to have the opportunity to=20
meet who are keeping the vision of Pakistan as a peaceful,=20
enlightened and progressive society alive. So it was this time when I=20
left Canada for Pakistan on 22 November, 02, with war drums sounding=20
loud and clear from across the border in America.

Breaking journey in London I was in the hospitable company of=20
Pakistanis for Peace and Alternative Development (PPAD), Ayyub Malik,=20
Ahmed Shibli and visiting Arif Hasan with whom one can always share=20
convictions about the necessity of peace, social justice, human=20
equality, tolerance and pluralism to make life worth living in=20
Pakistan, South Asia and the world. During three days of their busy=20
time, we were even able to attend an educational meeting in a London=20
Mosque to listen to a post-modernist spin on the thesis of "clash of=20
civilizations."

At the Karachi airport an old friend, Nadera Ahmed had come to take=20
me home for a three day stay. Nadera is carrying on the work of late=20
Dr. Feroz Ahmed, an esteemed colleague and Marxist scholar/activist,=20
in her own way. She has single-handedly used her personal resources=20
to establish a school in a low income neighbourhood of Karachi and a=20
modern institute of mass communication at the Karachi University=20
campus bearing the name of Dr. Feroz Ahmed. A functionally and=20
esthetically well designed building for the institute is almost=20
complete and has caught the imagination of the ministry of education=20
which is promising to make it a state of the art place of learning=20
journalism and broadcasting.

Thanks to Nadera's hospitality and contacts, I was able to meet at a=20
short notice some of the most dedicated people of Karachi working for=20
progressive causes, among them Owais Hasin of PPAD, Rahat Saeed of=20
the Irtiqa Institute, senior journalist N. B. Naqvi, elder=20
sociologist/writer Hamza Alavi, the young director of the Pakistan=20
Studies Centre, Karachi University, Syed Jaffar Ahmed and many=20
others. There was much to be learned from their first hand knowledge=20
of the situation in Pakistan which at the moment represents a=20
precarious political patchwork being threatened from within and=20
without to fall apart any time..

In Lahore a more organized effort was on to launch a new democratic=20
party/movement of the left to meet the challenges of mass=20
depredations caused by globalization, militarism, religious=20
fanaticism and lawlessness. A circle of dedicated political workers,=20
journalists, academics and other professionals has been meeting=20
regularly to prepare the ground for this purpose. A discussion paper=20
produced by Professor Aziz-ud-Din Ahmed is already in circulation and=20
work is underway to bring out a periodical to serve as an instrument=20
of coordinating public input (The group can be contacted through=20
Liaqat ALI, P.O. Box 917, GPO, Lahore).

My introduction to this group took place as a guest speaker invited=20
to speak on the topic of the genesis of war on Afghanistan launched=20
by the United States and its coalition partners in pursuit of=20
al-Qaeda terrorists and their Taliban hosts, a monstrosity created by=20
the United States itself to begin with in the name of Jehad against=20
the Soviet Union.

The left intellectuals and activists in Islamabad were also bracing=20
to confront the political farce perpetrated on the people of Pakistan=20
by the military rulers in the form of October, 2002 elections and=20
subsequent maneuverings, a situation which promises to get worse as=20
the country bears the brunt of United States imminent war on Iraq. I=20
was introduced to these people as I was invited to speak at a largely=20
attended seminar on December 13, chaired by Dr. A. H. Nayyer held at=20
the Sustainable Development Policy Institute (SDPI). I was asked to=20
address the question, "Can American Unilateralism be Contained."=20
Putting the question in the context of Bush administration's domestic=20
politics of fear mongering and its foreign policy of threats, arm=20
twisting and bribery, I could find little reason to believe that The=20
United states will deviate from its openly declared imperialist=20
agenda of defining "axses of evil," waging wars of conquest,=20
occupying countries and controlling their oil and other resources.=20
The "war on terrorism" and exploitation of the tragedy of 9/11 is=20
merely an excuse to do what the United States did covertly before=20
under pretenses of international cooperation and consent. Now "you=20
are with the United States or against it," on its own terms.

By the end of the two hour seminar a consensus had developed among=20
the participants that the only viable resistance to American=20
unilateralism can come from a unity of peace and left forces on a=20
global level. The religious and jehadi forces could not play a=20
critical role as their strategies were backward looking and self=20
destructive. As I left the venue of the seminar, some organizers of=20
the meeting had stayed behind to plan a major demonstration against=20
the US determination to attack Iraq. They were proposing to form a=20
human chain to connect the twin cities of Islamabad and Rawalpindi as=20
part of their demonstration.

The flurry of left activity in Pakistan I observed had perhaps=20
something to do with the warning signals arising from the electoral=20
gains of the conglomerate of Islamist parties , the Mutahida=20
Majlis-e-Amal (MMA) in the October elections, an outcome that has=20
been interpreted by some as a major turning point to the right in=20
Pakistan's electoral politics. The total rout of the Awami National=20
Party (ANP) in the provincial elections of NWFP, the only party with=20
professed leftist credentials in Pakistan which had shown some=20
capacity in the past to use the instruments of electoral politics to=20
some tangible advantage, could surely be seen as an alarming prospect=20
for the left as for as its influence can be measured through the=20
ballot box.

But electoral politics in Pakistan is by no means a normal indicator=20
of public preferences for political parties or blocks. Each time a=20
military dictator engineers the electoral process to suit his=20
compulsion of political survival, new and more grotesque distortions=20
are introduced in the body politics of Pakistan. The Musharraf regime=20
manifestly broke all previous records of manipulating elections. The=20
General used his sole discretion to introduce 29 amendments to the=20
1973 constitution, a document already tempered with badly by his=20
military predecessor Gen. Zia. He put the intelligence agencies into=20
overdrive to create the so called king's party, Pakistan Muslim=20
League Qaid-e-Azam (PML-Q), and he disqualified a number of known=20
politicians from contesting elections on charges of corruption, while=20
allowing others under similar and worse indictments to run in return=20
for pledged loyalty to his regime (a number of these erstwhile=20
condemned men now occupy important ministerial positions in the=20
federal and provincial cabinets).

By the time I reached Pakistan the results of the October elections=20
were being largely ignored by people in general, while those among=20
the politically aware were inclined to dismiss the whole exercise as=20
a farce, except for the electoral gains made by the MMA. Whatever the=20
combination of reasons that have resulted in the upstaging of MMA,=20
and these have been analyzed from every angle by now, there is no=20
denying the fact that the long standing symbiotic relationship=20
between the Pakistan Army and the jehadi Islam has moved to a new=20
phase. The power of the maulanas, jehadi or otherwise, is now=20
ensconced in the formal structure of the state along with that of the=20
military, bureaucracy and the propertied classes ( popularly known as=20
feudal). This however does not mean that the maulanas are any closer=20
to create a Taliban style theocratic state in Pakistan. There are=20
several reasons for this.

To begin with the MMA conglomerate is not an Islamist monolith. It=20
consists on the one extreme of the two factions of=20
Jamiat-e-Ulema-e-Islam (JUI), the professed fundamentalists and=20
patrons of the Taliban and on the other a political faction of the=20
heterodox shiites who have borne the brunt of fundamentalist inspires=20
massacres. In between is the leader of the pack, the Jamat-e-Islami,=20
with modernist tendencies whose well-healed notables have no qualms=20
sending their sons and daughters to institutions of modern education=20
at home and abroad.

Even Maulana Fazlur Rehman of the puritanical JUI is not averse to=20
accumulating worldly wealth and power enjoying a secure position in=20
the transport and drug maffia of Sarhad, which has earned him the=20
popular nick name of Maulana Diesel. As MMA's chosen candidate for=20
prime ministership of Pakistan, the Maulana was bending backwards to=20
assure that "we are ready to work with General Musharraf." (Dawn,=20
Oct. 27, 02). In his eagerness to dispel the ferociously intolerant=20
Islamist communal image of his party, the Maulana was even citing the=20
JUI's pre-partition ties with the Indian National Congress through=20
its parent organization, the Jamiat-e-Ulema-e-Hind of Deoband.

No wonder than that on my arrival in Pakistan the post-electoral=20
scene, with no party with absolute electoral majority in the central=20
or provincial assemblies except that of the NWFP, had been=20
transformed into a grand show or tamasha. With principles and=20
promises thrown to the wind all party leaders big and small were=20
seeking to form a government or be part of a government by playing an=20
endless game of negotiations, compromises, shadow boxing, horse=20
trading, and party switching. All this spectacle was being watched,=20
perhaps with some sense of amusement or apprehension by General=20
Musharraf, having been sworn in earlier as president for the next=20
five years with unprecedented state powers. The Pakistan Peoples=20
party (Parlimentarian) PPPP with largest number of seats in Sidh was=20
to be kept out of power at all costs but any other odd combination=20
was acceptable so long as its loyalty to the military president could=20
be trusted. The funniest part of the show was that the members-elect=20
of MMA along with those of the PPPP and PML(Nawaz), having made all=20
the noises of refusal to be sworn into the parliament under the Legal=20
Framework Order (LFO) decreed by President Musharraf finally queued=20
up quietly to take oath under the disfigured Constitution of 1973 in=20
which the LFO was fully incorporated.

What all this means is that the biggest surprise of the October=20
election, the emergence of MMA as a major block in the national=20
parliament and a ruling party in NWFP, did not turn out to be such a=20
surprise after all. Some people did vote for this conglomerate in the=20
hope that it will address the horrendous problems of poverty of the=20
masses and hardships of the middle classes made worse by religious=20
extremism and violence, as promised in its election manifesto. But=20
they are likely to discover that it too is not going to deliver=20
anything other than the Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif elected=20
governments had to offer. Neither has the MMA used its electoral=20
gains to pose any challenge to Pakistan's participation in the US led=20
coalition against "war on terrorism," although it did cash in on the=20
anti-American sentiments in the aftermath of US attack and occupation=20
of Afghanistan. One must also remember that the Jamat-e-Islami, the=20
most vocal component of MMA has a long history of cooperation with=20
the United States dating back to the Cold War days. So far the=20
priorities voiced by the MMA central leadership and its NWFP=20
government consist of changing the weekend holiday from Sunday back=20
to Friday, banning co-education, closing down the cable TV and cinema=20
houses, banning the playing of audio and video cassettes in the buses=20
and halting public transport vehicles at prayer times if any=20
passenger wishes to say his prayers. If the setting of these=20
priorities is any indication of MMA's much trumpeted commitment to=20
democracy and social justice, one can imagine its future strength in=20
Pakistan's politics.

What else did I experience during three weeks of stay in Pakistan=20
this time? Here are a few impressions offered with due apologies to=20
those who consider my comments not very patriotic.

I found the customs and immigration clearance less of a hassle=20
compared to the 1990s and earlier visits for some reason, although=20
any bottle that shows up in the baggage x-ray is suspected to be=20
brimming with "wine." There is also little to suggest that you are=20
under surveillance by FBI agents looking for terrorists at busy=20
airports. The clouds of dust, smoke and fumes (made worse by the=20
constant burning of plastic shopping bags ) are now an integral part=20
of the air fellow-Pakistanis breath with little concern. The way one=20
is driven zig zag around a myriad of vehicles on the city roads is=20
indeed a marvel of navigation.

Much of my visit this time was spent in Multan where I had gone to=20
condole with my sister on the death of her young son. It was the tail=20
end of the month of Ramazan and the mosque loud speakers blaring at=20
all hours of the night robbed everyone of sleep. Days were spent with=20
family friends and relatives dropping in, with small talk invariably=20
turning to speculations on which scion of which prominent clan was=20
going to become a cabinet minister and which one was going to be left=20
out.

Something new this time was a question on the lips of every other=20
relative, acquaintance, shopkeeper or office Clark: What is the=20
plight of Pakistanis in America? The question was often accompanied=20
by a horror story of some body known to the questioner who had=20
suffered at the hands of US security and immigration police in the=20
land of the free. In Lahore my nephew, a surgeon, informed me that a=20
number of his medical colleagues who had been practicing in the=20
United States had suddenly returned. A blessing in disguise for=20
Pakistani patients? My nephew felt sorry for these returnees and=20
their families who were having "adjustment problems." You have to=20
grow up here and stay here if you want to enjoy what this city has to=20
offer, he added mischievously. I had to agree, of course, having=20
disembarked from a modern buss run by a Korean company watching=20
Lollywood movies on board all the way, thanks to an MMA free Punjab!

_____

#2.

Seminar (New Delhi
No. 519, November 2002

The making of a riot narrative

MAHESH DAGA

FOR a society where sectarian tensions are endemic and group violence=20
routine, India has produced surprisingly few, if any, comprehensive=20
works on what Donald Horowitz calls the 'deadly ethnic riot' (which=20
we refer to as communal violence). Academic studies of the phenomenon=20
suffer on two counts: one, a lack of scholarly ambition; two, the=20
limitations of interpretive frameworks.

At a level of abstraction, riot studies in India resolve into two=20
broad categories. On the one hand are 'causal' accounts of violence=20
and, on the other, 'hermeneutic' narratives that seek to understand=20
the meaning and symbolism of violence as a form of collective social=20
action. (Incidentally, this has parallels in the philosophy of social=20
science, particularly in the debate about cause vs. reason.)

In the first camp, which by and large dominates the Indian riot=20
scene, there is a preponderance of what was once loftily called=20
'political economy'. The inspiration here is basically 'Marxist'=20
(read, some form of economism) - often vulgarly so - but, depending=20
on the sophistication of the scholar, there is room for more,=20
including the autonomy of the political. A good example of this is=20
Asghar Ali Engineer, easily the most prolific of the riot=20
'specialists'. The other approach is concerned with violence as=20
social text. Or, questions of meaning, agency and symbolism.

The methodological impulse here draws heavily upon Durkheimian=20
sociology, but there is a fair sprinkling of social psychology and,=20
in the odd case, psychoanalysis as well. From the occasional writings=20
of sociologist Veena Das on communal violence, especially in the=20
context of the 1984 Sikh pogrom, to the meditations of Ashis Nandy on=20
nationalist hyper- masculinity or the analytical excavations of=20
Sudhir Kakar - the list represents a heady interdisciplinary mix.

While the latter approach has yielded many interesting insights into=20
the nature of communal prejudice and collective identities, it does=20
not raise, much less answer, the basic 'why' questions about=20
violence. To find an answer to these, one can do no better than look=20
at the causal accounts constructed by scholar-activists such as=20
Engineer.

In what follows, I offer a schematic reading of Engineer, pointing=20
out the limitations of the causal approach he and others like him=20
follow. The intent is to use Engineer as a stalking horse for David=20
Horowitz's encyclopedic work on the morphology and dynamics of ethnic=20
group violence.

According to Engineer, the roots of sectarian violence in India lie,=20
broadly speaking, in the conjunction of two systemic forces: uneven=20
capitalist development and competitive politics. Even assuming that=20
this is so, it begs several questions, starting with some very basic=20
ones concerning space, time and history. Why, for instance, some=20
cities and not others fall to repeated episodes of collective=20
violence. (After all, the forces Engineer invokes 'apply' equally to=20
the whole of India, if not the entire subcontinent). What explains=20
the timing of a riot? Why does the quantum and brutality of violence=20
vary from one riot to the next? If riots are a species of=20
purposive-rational action, then what explains the irrational brutal=20
and expressive forms that they invariably take? (In Horowitz's terms,=20
why do riots represent 'a bizarre fusion of coherence and frenzy'?)

Engineer has no real answers to any of these questions. His preferred=20
method is to call upon a number of 'contingent' factors - from=20
'precipitating' events to rumours to the collusive role of the state=20
machinery - to 'explain' particular episodes of violence. Admittedly,=20
Engineer devotes a great deal of attention to mapping out the macro=20
political context of violence but this is more in the nature of a=20
deux ex machina. The effort is marred by an apparent arbitrariness=20
and subjective license. From Shah Bano to Advani's rath yatra to the=20
Ramjanmabhoomi movement - to take a random sample - a small subset of=20
'political' events is chosen from a larger set to underline the=20
'communalisation' of the larger environment.

The point is not that this macro narrative is not relevant to=20
understanding the micro communal politics of a mofussil town. Rather=20
that the relevance has to be empirically demonstrated and precisely=20
delineated. Invoking a national political narrative is,=20
heuristically, a non-starter precisely because of its scope. It is=20
too general. Among the first principles of the sociological method,=20
there is one which says: What (potentially) explains everything,=20
actually explains nothing.

A second problem arises from Engineer's proto-Marxist belief that=20
communal riots are nothing but a species of class conspiracy which is=20
aimed at thwarting working class unity. This places Engineer in the=20
category of those who look at collective violence as instrumental=20
action, with the qualification that the instrumentality of the=20
violence is meant to uphold not the interests of those who carry it=20
out but of political elites who profit from it.

This is the old Marxian bogey of 'false consciousness'. The question=20
why the poor or the working class so easily succumb to a conspiracy=20
which is not in their material interest is never raised. To get=20
around the problem, there is sometimes a facile acceptance of the=20
popular-political myth that communal violence is the handi-work of=20
organised gangs of thugs hired by politicians or other vested=20
interests. But this does not take care of the problem. It simply=20
shifts it to a different level.

If violence is carried out by paid goons, then how does it win the=20
approval of the aggressor community? Engineer denies the possibility,=20
maintaining the fiction that communal violence is in the nature of a=20
moral aberration which has no sanction in larger society. Ironically,=20
there is sometimes a tacit acceptance of this approval in his=20
categorization of communalism as a political ideology. The villains=20
of the piece in such cases are communal organisations whose objective=20
it is to spread, through indoctrination, the message of communal=20
hatred so as to prepare ordinary Hindus (and Muslims) for the 'cause'.

The discerning will notice that common to both perspectives - whether=20
causal or hermeneutic - is what political scientist Partha Chatterjee=20
once called the assumption of Indian exceptionalism. Since=20
communalism is supposedly peculiar to India - a legacy of the Raj -=20
the investigation of its causes, forms and meanings cannot be located=20
in a comparative, cross-national framework. A communal conflagration=20
in Khurja or Moradabad cannot be helpfully compared with ethnic=20
strife elsewhere in the world. This is because communal violence is=20
not seen as a species of collective violence in general.

Speaking very broadly, the strength of this approach lies or, more=20
accurately, ought to lie in a closer attention to the historical=20
processes of how identities like 'Hindu' and 'Muslim' are formed, but=20
Indian scholarship often takes these as a datum. This might partly=20
have to do with a lack of 'history' in many of these studies.=20
Communalism or the politicisation of religious communities after all=20
is a process which played itself out, first, in a colonial context in=20
which the distinctiveness of the colonial state (as opposed to a=20
generic modern state) was a central driver. Historians such as Sandra=20
Freitag, David Gilmartin and, in a more oblique way, Partha=20
Chatterjee, Gyan Pandey and others have brought out the peculiar=20
non-universalist nature of the public sphere in colonised societies=20
and how that impacted on the formation of pan-Indian religious=20
identities such as Hindu and Muslim.

But this historical understanding of community formation is largely=20
absent in the here and now investigations of this or that riot. That=20
is perhaps inevitable, particulary because many of the riot studies=20
have been undertaken (by peace and civil rights activists)=20
specifically with a view to pressurizing the Indian state to=20
intervene in an ongoing episode of violence. Or to attend to the=20
process of rehabilitation and justice in the aftermath. Unfortunately=20
though, the same charge applies just as forcefully to less proximate=20
riot studies.

This essay began with the claim that riot studies in India suffer=20
from lack of ambition. What I mean by this is that these studies fail=20
to raise some of the most obvious questions about group violence. Why=20
did the incident take place where it did and when it did? Why not at=20
any other place or time? Why is it that only some cities and not=20
others, with a comparable mix of Hindu and Muslim populations - both=20
economically and sociologically - are prone to the outbreak of=20
violence? What is the exact nature of state involvement in riots? Is=20
state connivance a crucial reason in the outbreak of violence or is=20
it only a subsidiary cause?

What is the role of trigger or precipitating events in a riot? Do=20
they affect the nature and course of sub-sequent violence? Was Godhra=20
incidental to the subsequent pogrom that took place in Gujarat or was=20
it a necessary condition? Would the scale or brutality of 'reprisal'=20
killings have been different had Godhra not involved the loss of so=20
many lives?

What is the role of rumour in a riot? Are riots spontaneous or are=20
they organised? Who are the actual participants in a riot situation?=20
Why does an aggressor community justify the aggression and laud the=20
rioters as heroes of the community?

Donald L Horowitz's study - The Deadly Ethnic Riot - takes on board=20
all of the above questions. And then more. Cutting across=20
disciplinary boundaries, Horowitz embarks on a comparative global=20
study of the structure and dynamics of violent group discord. In the=20
Indian context, the most important methodological departure made by=20
Horowitz is in the very title of the book. Rather than focus on any=20
one kind of identity conflict, he is interested in the whole lot of=20
them. For Horowitz, an ethnic riot is simply an instance of group=20
violence, an 'intense, sudden, though not necessarily wholly=20
unplanned, lethal attack by civilian members of one ethnic group on=20
civilian members of another ethnic group, the victims being chosen=20
because of their group membership.'

The only kind of group violence that is excluded from his purview is=20
that which is explicitly political in nature, one usually directed=20
against the state. The other violence that he excludes is targeted=20
political violence, as for instance in terrorist killings. This=20
definitional abstraction is obviously premised on the assumption that=20
the specificity of the ascriptive element in a riot situation is not=20
explanatory. Whether the groups involved in violence define=20
themselves in terms of their religious, linguistic or racial=20
identity, there is for the purposes of understanding a substantial=20
common core.

Ethnic conflicts of course presuppose some conception of ethnicity.=20
Horowitz distinguishes between 'hard' and 'soft' conceptions of=20
ethnicity. 'The first sees ethnic affiliations as being made of=20
stone, while the second sees them as made of putty.' For the hard=20
theorist, ethnic groups are 'ascriptive, firmly bounded entities'=20
which 'persist over time' and are 'liable to conflict behaviour based=20
on passion (even to the exclusion of calculation).'

For the soft theorist on the other hand, ethnic groups are entities=20
whose boundaries are 'problematic and malleable'. Group behaviour=20
here is strategic rather than affective, that is to say, based on a=20
calculation - often an individual calculation - of interests. A=20
corollary to the hard and soft distinction is the question about 'the=20
proper locus of riot investigation'; the choice being between 'macro=20
societal' and 'micro strategic'.

Horowitz's own preference is summed up in one line: 'Cleavage drives=20
culture, more than culture drives cleavage.' This, he is quick to=20
clarify, denies neither 'the social construction of ethnicity' nor=20
the role of 'cultural and political elites' who harness group=20
'passions for their own interests'. But it does deny that the elites=20
have a wide latitude in fomenting ethnic conflict and violence. 'The=20
constraints of the field in which group interactions occur limit what=20
elites can do and what interests they can pursue.'

If this sounds like common sense dressed up as academic specialism,=20
then Horowitz is not entirely to blame. The lack of analytical acuity=20
and the preponderance of well-meaning 'political correctness' in riot=20
studies has often led to na=EFve assumptions about who is ultimately to=20
'blame' for the violence. But what are the constraints that the=20
elites face? According to Horowitz, these constraints stem from the=20
'cognitive' basis of ethnic affinities and disparities. And with=20
this, he enters a terrain which is entirely foreign to Indian riot=20
scholars, namely, behavioural social psychology.

Without putting too fine a point on it, Horowitz's argument is that=20
sociality and group affiliation constitute universal human condition,=20
'antedat[ing] globalisation, the modern state, the industrial=20
revolution, even the printing press.' So there is no getting away=20
from ethnicity, indeed of the 'thick, Gemeinschaft variety.' The=20
upside is that this very condition also means that elites cannot pull=20
the strings as they wish, their options being limited by 'their=20
followers' definition of the situation and what they would be willing=20
to fight over.'

On balance then Horowitz stands with the primordialists who emphasise=20
the 'thick, compelling character of group membership' but he wants=20
them to appreciate better the sensitivity of ethnic boundaries and=20
conflict to 'changing contexts'. In any event, even identities that=20
are so intense and deeply-held as to seem almost primordial to an=20
external observer can quite easily be 'recently constructed'.

Moving from ethnicity to ethnic violence, Horowitz calls into=20
question what he calls the 'ontology of the riot': Is a particular=20
riot a single event or is it a series of distinct events? 'If, on=20
February 1, members of group A kill three members of group B and=20
then, on (sic) February 15 to 18, kill 30 members of Group B, is this=20
one riot or two?' Suppose that in the second instance, members of=20
Group B killed members of Group A, 'were the riots of February 1 a=20
warm-up, a precondition, or an integral part of the events of two=20
weeks later?'

If this is not enough of a problem, then one can add the further=20
dimension of the different shifts and stages in a single episode of=20
violence. What's more, you have to assign a place within this=20
narrative to nonviolent events? If this seems like pointless academic=20
hair-splitting, then it is very far from Horowitz's intent. He is=20
especially concerned about precision in marking out the ontology of=20
riots because 'an excess of connectedness' and 'too little=20
individuation' can destroy 'the concept of an event' and will=20
invariably shift attention away from 'immediate causes to remote=20
causes.' It will also de-emphasise agency 'in terms of who did what=20
to whom?' In other words, specifying the spatio-temporal contours of=20
a riot has an immediate and direct bearing on the causal narrative.=20
Was Godhra the trigger, or was it merely a link in a long chain?

There is a larger question/point in all this: Horowitz quite simply=20
is not satisfied with any taken for granted assumptions about a=20
conflict situation. His attempt is to construct an exhaustive=20
analytical and conceptual taxonomy which renders every known and=20
little-known facet of ethnic conflict open to inquiry. Thus he raises=20
and, where possible, answers questions about under-investigated areas=20
like the temporal rhythm of conflict, the nature and function of=20
rumours, the meaning of expressive or amok vs. non-amok violence, the=20
puzzle about targeting or victim selection, the characteristics=20
associated with target groups, the organizers and participants, the=20
flashpoints that trigger violence, the broader social environment=20
that sanctions violent conflict, the location, diffusion, function=20
and meaning of violence and, finally, a fascinating typology of=20
violent emotions - arousal, rage, outrage and wrath.

In each instance, whether or not one agrees with him, there is a=20
breadth and depth of scholarship which is, without exaggeration,=20
stunning and possibly unparalleled. In the process, Horowitz=20
systematically debunks a number of popular myths that have marred=20
riot studies in India. Among them, those that see a communal riot as=20
sudden, unstructured frenzy, an aberrational act of deviancy, an=20
escalated personal quarrel, a cynically organised plot by=20
manipulative leaders, an attempt to redress specific grievances, a=20
manifestation of straight-forward hatred of otherness or difference.

On the positive side, Horowitz identifies 'the concatenation of four=20
underlying variables' that in his view best explains the deadly=20
ethnic riot. These are: 'A hostile relationship between two ethnic=20
groups', 'events that engage the emotions of one of the=20
collectivities', 'a keenly felt sense of justification for killing',=20
and, not least, 'an assessment of the reduced risks for violence that=20
facilitates disinhibition.' None of the four, taken in isolation,=20
sounds particularly acute or compelling, but in this Horowitz does=20
not perhaps do enough justice to the complexity of his own=20
investigation. The real insights of the Horowitz study lie in the=20
empirical and analytical richness of detail.

This is not to say that there are no shortcomings to Horowitz's=20
cross-cultural approach. In his emphasis on the social psychological=20
origins of ethnicity, for instance, he runs the obvious risk of=20
underplaying the complex social, political, economic and historical=20
processes by which ethnic identities are articulated and formed. In=20
that sense, there is an inevitable element of reification in his riot=20
narrative.

To wit, a Hindu-Muslim riot in Bijnore in the 1990s belongs in the=20
same category as an inter-racial conflict in mid-1940s America. Space=20
and time are by themselves not relevant causal categories in=20
understanding riots. Then again, most of the empirical material that=20
he draws upon is already premised on the assumption that a particular=20
ethnic description quite easily 'fits' a particular episode of=20
violence.

Unfortunately, Horowitz does not always read his 'source material'=20
too critically. What's more, when he is not dealing with larger=20
theoretical questions relating to violence, his narrative tends to=20
lapse into treating communities as fully-formed entities who act as=20
more or less coherent actors. The antipathy between communities can=20
wax and wane but the lines of division between the communities are=20
themselves fairly distinct and inviolate.

But lest this should create the impression that Horowitz is=20
insensitive to or cannot account for complex, cross-cutting and=20
imperfect motivations at play in a riot, then that is an=20
overstatement. Horowitz is at pains to distinguish between the=20
'ethnic' dimension of a riot from others, the destruction of state=20
property for instance. Or the fact that an episode of violence,=20
lasting over several days, can sometimes be a coalescing of more than=20
one kind of conflict. In this regard, he makes a particular mention=20
of the Gujarat violence of the early eighties where what began as=20
caste violence soon took on a communal colour.

But to fault Horowitz on specific matters of detail or one or another=20
aspect of his meta-theory is to miss the wood for the trees. You can=20
argue with this or that part of his argument, but it is impossible=20
not to be overwhelmed by its sheer scope and vision. What it yields=20
is a fascinating analytical schema in which every small and seemingly=20
inconsequential, even inexplicable, aspect of a riot is carefully=20
dissected, categorized and systematically accounted for.

The final question: Is there a practical pay-off at the end of=20
Horowitz's breathtaking effort? The answer is: yes and no. In a=20
fascinating excursus in the concluding chapter, Horowitz raises the=20
question about the decline, if not disappearance, of the deadly=20
ethnic riot in the West. On the negative side, he discounts obvious=20
candidates such as material prosperity or democracy as causes for the=20
decline, focusing instead on what he called 'important attitudinal=20
changes', particularly a variety of state-sponsored proposals to=20
counter 'prejudice' and reduce discrimination. This, he argues, stems=20
from a post-War political consensus in the West that nationalism, or=20
extreme manifestations of ethnic sentiment, is to be discouraged and=20
discredited. In other words, the declining legitimacy of ethnic=20
antipathy eliminated support for the deadly ethnic riot in the West.

Because of this steadfast commitment from the state, he argues, the=20
police in theWest cannot be counted on for indifference in the event=20
of group violence, the public authorities cannot be counted on for=20
impunity, and the targets themselves cannot be counted on for=20
passivity. Whether or not this accurately corresponds to the=20
political history of western democracies in the last fifty years, it=20
does point to important normative concerns. Stopping a deadly=20
communal riot is not just a law and order problem - although it is=20
also that to a substantial degree - but it is also looking at the=20
systemic prejudice and discrimination that make minorities easy=20
targets of riots.

The irony of course that post-9/11, racial prejudice, particularly=20
prejudice against Arabs, Muslims and Islam is making a dramatic=20
comeback in the West, aided and abetted by the millenarian rhetoric=20
of leaders like Bush Jr. But that's a story which takes nothing away=20
from Horowitz's majestic effort.

If nothing else, The Deadly Ethnic Riot sets a definitive analytical=20
benchmark that we in India can only ignore at our own peril and=20
theoretical impoverishment.

* The Deadly Ethnic Riot by Donald L. Horowitz. Oxford University=20
Press, New Delhi, 2002.

_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/

SACW is an informal, independent & non-profit citizens wire service run by
South Asia Citizens Web (www.mnet.fr/aiindex) since 1996.
To subscribe send a blank message to:
<act-subscribe@yahoogroups.com> / To unsubscribe send a blank
message to: <act-unsubscribe@yahoogroups.com>
________________________________________
DISCLAIMER: Opinions expressed in materials carried in the posts do not
necessarily reflect the views of SACW compilers.
\\|//\\|//\\|//\\|//\\|//\\|//\\|//\\|//\\|//\\|//|//\\|//|//\\|//|//\\|//|
--=20