[sacw] SACW | 19 July 02

[Harsh Kapoor]

South Asia Citizens Wire | 19 July 2002

South Asia Citizens Web:
http://www.mnet.fr/aiindex

South Asians Against Nukes:
http://www.mnet.fr/aiindex/NoNukes.html

__________________________

#1. India - Pakistan : Now comes the litmus test (Praful Bidwai)
#2. Sri Lanka: The Eastern Question (Jayadeva Uyangoda)
#3. Striving for India-Pakistan peace (Manal Ahmed And Deepti Mahajan)
#4. For Dissent Against Hindu Extremism (Angana Chatterji)
#5. Rising threat of Hindu extremism (H.D.S. Greenway)
#6. India - Documentary film : 'Lest we forget: memories of the emergency'

__________________________

#1.

"The News International", Pakistan, July 18, 2002

Now comes the litmus test

Praful Bidwai

The Vajpayee government has displayed some sobriety in not rushing=20
headlong into blaming Pakistan for the ghastly massacre of 27 poor,=20
innocent slum dwellers in Jammu, which has shattered the uneasy calm=20
since the May 14 Kaluchak killing. True, foreign minister Yashwant=20
Sinha pointed a finger at Pakistan's possible involvement. But his=20
statement preceded the Cabinet meeting, which adopted a cautious=20
tone pending investigation into the incident.

India's overall official reaction is markedly different from that=20
two months ago or after the December Parliament attack, when it not=20
only named "Pakistan-backed" terrorists, but threatened large-scale=20
military strikes. Islamabad too has condemned the incident without=20
ifs and buts, and said the "motivation" was to "escalate"=20
India-Pakistan tensions. Implied here is the two states' shared=20
interest in identifying and fighting a "common" enemy.

One can only hope that such non-coercive approaches prevail -=20
against domestic and external contrarian pressures. Such pressures=20
are not hard to identify. In India, there has been a further shift=20
to the Hindutva Right within the country's most conservative and=20
communal government since Independence. The dominant force in the=20
National Democratic Alliance is Deputy Prime Minister Advani whose=20
Hindu-sectarianism is inseparable from his viscerally anti-Pakistan=20
positions.

Besides, many policy-makers feel they must press home the advantage=20
India currently enjoys over Islamabad within Western perceptions -=20
by extracting all they can from Musharraf without reciprocating his=20
commitment to end "cross-border infiltration". There are also=20
genuine fears that extremist militants, whether supported by=20
Pakistan or not, might disrupt the Assembly elections due in Jammu &=20
Kashmir, so India must keep up the military pressure. This calculus=20
is related to the strategy of some policy-makers to substitute free=20
and fair elections for a dialogue on Kashmir with Pakistan.

In Pakistan, there is growing resentment at the West's, especially=20
the United States', "pro-India tilt", compounded by the suspicion=20
that Washington is not playing fair in Afghanistan. The second=20
instalment of Musharraf's "reforms" has not mitigated the hostility=20
provoked by the first, which enormously concentrated powers in the=20
President's office.

A particularly odious measure is to limit national and provincial=20
Assembly contests to graduates alone - 1.3 percent of the=20
population. This is an extraordinary notion of democracy, in some=20
ways more obnoxious than "property-owning democracy".

As The Washington Post notes, "Musharraf is coming under fire not=20
just from Islamic militant groups=8A but from middle-class Pakistanis,=20
including westernised intellectuals and professionals, many of whom=20
initially welcomed the military takeover". As Pakistan's national=20
elections near, Musharraf will have to do some fancy footwork to=20
regain a measure of credibility domestically and abroad. For=20
plainly, there has been a discernible shift in Western perceptions=20
of the India-Pakistan standoff and Kashmir.

I was personally struck by this during a visit earlier this month=20
to Germany. A majority of the people I met - diplomats, politicians,=20
academics and South Asia experts, including a couple from outside=20
Germany - now view Islamabad in a far more unflattering light than=20
before September 11. This would seem to be the case despite their=20
view that India is partly to blame for upping the ante at the border=20
and for not de-escalating adequately during the past four to five=20
weeks.

September 11's seismic shock - and perceived danger from "Islamic=20
fanatics" to world "order" - is only one part of the reason. A much=20
deeper factor is the view that radical changes in South Asia's=20
boundaries, especially when pressed with militant-group violence,=20
could have cataclysmic consequences which go beyond South Asia.=20
Within such a rationale, the status quo power, in this case, India,=20
is "naturally" favoured. As is gradualism and negotiated autonomy=20
within existing state structures.

Supplementing this view is the deeper premise that Pakistan won't=20
develop a modern and pluralist notion of the state and self-identity=20
unless it jettisons its religious baggage from the past, including=20
the Two-Nation Theory as applied to Kashmir. So long as Islam is the=20
sole foundation of Pakistan's claim to Kashmir, this view will=20
remain persuasive.

One can differ with this perception for a number of reasons. It=20
situates Kashmir purely within a statist, bilateral, context, as if=20
it could be settled to the exclusion of the Kashmiri people. It=20
minimises the degree of their alienation from the Indian state=20
(which does not translate into supporting accession to Pakistan)=20
because of New Delhi's betrayal of its own Constitutional and=20
political commitments, besides repression. It does not take enough=20
account of India-Pakistan bilateral and international agreements and=20
commitments, including for a dialogue on Kashmir. And it imagines=20
that converting the Line of Control into a permanent border -=20
without much ado about a dialogue - is a "solution" that can satisfy=20
a majority of Pakistanis.

Whatever one's reservations, there is simply no denying the changed=20
perception of the India-Pakistan rivalry in many Western capitals=20
and think-tanks. Besides recent statements by Jack Straw and Richard=20
Armitage, this is further corroborated by, among other things, a=20
setback to the effort to move a resolution at the European Union's=20
Seville summit focusing on a dialogue on Kashmir. The final=20
resolution sternly asks Pakistan to take "further action to prevent=20
terrorist groups operating in and from territory under its control=8A"=20
and "stop infiltration" into Indian Kashmir.

This is also confirmed by a July 11 report of the International=20
Crisis Group, a "liberal" think-tank which figures former Finnish=20
president Marrti Ahtisaari, former Australian foreign minister=20
Gareth Evans, and US Congressman Stephen Solarz (www.crisisweb.org).=20
The report rightly says the basic dynamics of the India-Pakistan=20
conflict have not changed, and "the potential for strategic=20
miscalculations remains all too real =8A (B)oth Pakistan and India have=20
sought to use the US-proclaimed 'global' war on terrorism to their=20
own tactical advantage, increasing the risk of military missteps."

It continues: "The immediate cause of (the) recent fighting has=20
been the cross-border infiltration of militants=8A Pakistani President=20
Pervez Musharraf has yet to take decisive action to contain the=20
Pakistan-based Islamist extremists responsible=8A"

Again, "India is eager to demonstrate that increasing numbers" in=20
J&K are willing to engage in a "dialogue with New Delhi about=20
fundamental issues of self-rule and governance and to participate in=20
the Kashmir ballot". But, "in contrast, Pakistan is eager to keep=20
the pressure on India by supporting more militant factions that=20
continue to urge either independence or annexing Kashmir=8A Pakistan=20
clearly hopes that many political parties and groups in Kashmir will=20
boycott the coming elections. Its desire to deny legitimising=20
India's control of Kashmir could well be pushing it to encourage=20
cross-border incursions."

Thus, "in essence, the Musharraf government seems to be implying=20
that it is at the limits of the steps it can take against extremist=20
groups, and that the West should tolerate cross-border insurgency=20
operations in Kashmir or risk facing a new government that could be=20
far less accommodating."

This clearly marks a new set of parameters within which Musharraf=20
and Vajpayee will have to work, however unfavourable they might=20
seem. How ably they respond to Jack Straw's and Colin Powell's=20
nudging for more action during their coming visits will determine=20
whether they move towards serious reconciliation or yet another=20
confrontation.

There lies the litmus test of their sobriety.-end-

____

#2.

Daily News (Colombo), 6th July 2002

The Eastern Question
by Jayadeva Uyangoda

The incidents of Tamil-Muslim tension that flared up in the Eastern=20
Province last week appear to be now under control, as the government=20
swiftly mobilized the national political actors to manage the crisis.
The present state of curfew might help the dust to settle there, yet=20
the complexities of the Tamil-Muslim question in the Eastern Province=20
need to be addressed in a comprehensive manner. Prudent management of=20
this conflict in the East is crucial for the success of any ethnic=20
conflict resolution attempt in Sri Lanka. In fact, the Eastern=20
province constitutes the weakest link in Sri Lanka's chain of peace.=20
If the chain snaps there, the entire peace process might be in=20
serious jeopardy.
There are indeed many versions of what has happened in Muttur. I have=20
heard five different accounts and they probably describe five=20
different dimensions of the conflict there. Under conditions of deep=20
ethnic divisions and fragmentation, events like these also acquire a=20
life of their own. Such life is often a case of partially ethnicized=20
memories, interpretations and narrations. That is why different=20
versions of Muttur events would attempt to exculpate one ethnic=20
community or party while blaming the other.
Meanwhile, national as well as regional political parties have also=20
made their own contribution to the confusion by trying to gain=20
political advantage from the crisis. Some reports indicate that there=20
was politically motivated incitement among Muslim and Tamil people=20
thereby turning a rather insignificant conflict into organized=20
violence.
There probably was a role played by those who can be described as=20
'riot entrepreneurs' in provoking Tamil-Muslim tension in the Eastern=20
Province. As Professor Ashish Nandy has observed in relation to=20
India, contemporary 'ethnic riots' are seldom spontaneous; rather,=20
they are organized and executed by riot entrepreneurs, who are often=20
linked to professional politicians who know the political value of=20
communal violence.
Since early this year, the multi-ethnic Eastern Province has been=20
experiencing some relative peace owing to the cease-fire between the=20
government and the LTTE. The paradox of such a condition of relative=20
peace is that it, unlike the war, opens up the space for multiple=20
political actors to surface and act.
When there was war, there were only two actors in action, the state=20
armed forces and the LTTE rebels. The condition of no-war in the=20
Eastern province has changed the old equilibrium, creating a new=20
political disequilibrium and enabling quite a few other actors to=20
function. Similarly, issues that had remained hidden in the=20
conditions of war have also begun to surface in this new and uneasy=20
state of disequilibria there.
Meanwhile, the question of Tamil-Sinhalese-Muslim relations needs to=20
be acknowledged as crucial to the political life in the Eastern=20
province. The future of Tamil-Muslim relations has repeatedly come up=20
as an intractable issue in almost all attempts made to resolve Sri=20
Lanka's ethnic conflict. It has been there in the issue of the merger=20
of Northern and Eastern provinces, in the question of the unit of=20
devolution, in the proposal for the re-demarcation of district and=20
provincial boundaries for the Eastern province and in the question of=20
regional power sharing.
At present this issue has re-surfaced in relation to the issues=20
involved in the implementation of the MoU between the government and=20
the LTTE as well as the proposed interim administration. Reports=20
emanating from the Eastern province clearly indicate that there is=20
widespread fear and resentment among the Muslim people there=20
concerning any interim administration under the LTTE. Indeed, the=20
LTTE-Muslim relations in the past have not been smooth at all.
At the heart of the Tamil-Muslim conflict is the larger question of=20
the tension between Tamil and Muslim nationalisms. Muslim nationalism=20
in the Eastern province is qualitatively different from the=20
conventional Muslim politics in predominantly Sinhalese areas like=20
the Western or Central provinces. In the Eastern province, and in the=20
North as well, Muslim nationalism in recent years has evolved itself=20
in opposition to militant Tamil nationalism. Killing of Muslims and=20
ethnic-cleansing by the LTTE are a tragic part of that relationship=20
which has polarized the two communities. This led to greater=20
radicalization of Musilm politics. Some armed Muslim groups emerged=20
in the Eastern province in that context.
Meanwhile, there are very complex ground realities that have made=20
Tamil-Muslim relations volatile. Muslims believe that Tamils have=20
forcibly acquired their land and property after they were evicted=20
from their homes by the LTTE. Tamils in contrast believe that the=20
Muslim trading and fishing communities have thrived at the expense of=20
poor Tamils caught up in the war.
Even relative peace in the province would mean that these issues=20
would come up as everyday realities. This is an unavoidable paradox=20
of peace in a protracted ethnic conflict. But that paradox needs to=20
be addressed at a number of levels.
One approach would be to manage the tension through continuous=20
dialogue and agreements between the LTTE and Muslim leaders. The=20
Prabhakaran- Rauf Hakeem MOU, signed in April, was probably aimed at=20
a fresh political start for the two communities in a spirit of=20
reconciliation. But, there are no signs that the agreement between=20
the two leaders has really trickled down to the ground and community=20
level. An understanding between the leaders should be percolated to=20
the levels of local leadership, political cadres and the ordinary=20
citizens.
Tamil-Muslim reconciliation is the need of the hour for peace to=20
survive in the Eastern province. That is a task which requires=20
imaginative initiatives by Sinhalese, Tamil and Muslim political=20
leaders as well as civil society groups. The reason for taking the=20
Eastern question with seriousness is simple. No lasting solution can=20
be found to the ethnic conflict without establishing peace and=20
reconciliation among Sinhalese, Tamil and Muslim communities whose=20
demographic presence in the Province is almost equal. Often, there is=20
also a tendency among policy makers as well as analysts to describe=20
and understand Sri Lanka's ethnic conflict as one between two actors,=20
the state and the Tamil community, ignoring the Muslim ethnic=20
dimension there.
Meanwhile, Tamil nationalists have tried to subsume the Muslim issue=20
under the homogenizing concept of "Tamil-speaking people." Some=20
statements recently made by the LTTE leadership, using this old=20
formula, created much apprehension among the Muslim people, because=20
they thought that the LTTE was planning to totally dominate and=20
monopolize the Muslim political representation as well.
The recent tension in the Eastern Province has given a clear message=20
to both the Colombo government and the LTTE in Vanni that the Muslim=20
question has to be treated as an integral aspect of Sri Lanka's=20
ethnic conflict, and not just epiphenomenal to the 'Tamil national=20
question.'
Meanwhile, Sri Lanka's Muslim politics in general is also in deep=20
crisis. After Minister Ashraff's sudden death two years ago, the=20
community's leadership remains intensely divided. There seems to=20
exist a great deal of personal bitterness and animosity, particularly=20
among recently emerged young Muslim political leaders. These=20
divisions have also pushed Muslim politics to the mercy of major=20
political actors.
Among the Muslim youth in the Eastern province as well as those who=20
have grown up in the refugee camps, there is tremendous frustration=20
about their community's political leaders. The gap keeps widening=20
between the existing Muslim leadership and the new generation of the=20
Muslim youth who have experienced the harsh and violent conditions of=20
war. Some even have begun to talk about the need for a 'Muslim=20
Prabhakaran.' Prabhakaran or not, there is indeed the possibility of=20
a radical and uncompromising political leadership emerging in=20
post-Ashroff Muslim politics in Sri Lanka. Solutions to intractable=20
political conflicts are not easy to find. Yet, the recognition of the=20
complexity of the problem should be the first step in the direction=20
of finding strategies to manage the conflict.
The bottom-line however is that Sri Lanka has a tripartite ethnic=20
conflict which requires a tripartite settlement. This is perhaps a=20
new agenda item for UNF-LTTE deliberations before the Bangkok talks.

_____

#3.

The Daily Times (Lahore)
July 19, 2002

Striving for India-Pakistan peace
Manal Ahmed And Deepti Mahajan

The participants of IFP have already begun working on peace=20
initiatives back in their home countries. The YIP movement is now=20
open to new members and is constantly growing
Last month (June 23-30), 38 young students from India and Pakistan=20
gathered at the United World College of South East Asia (UWCSEA) in=20
Singapore to participate in the first-ever IFP's Focus on Kashmir=20
conference. The Initiative for Peace (IFP) is an organization founded=20
by a group of students and teachers at the UWCSEA. The goal of IFP is=20
to create permanent conflict resolution programs around the world.=20
The Focus on Kashmir was the first such programme.
Facilitated by students and teachers of the UWC, the delegates, who=20
came from different countries -- the US, the UK, Germany and China --=20
engaged in a variety of activities during the eight-day conference,=20
building cross-border friendships as a first step in the search for=20
solutions to the Kashmir dispute. "Our goal is to foster good=20
communication, trust, respect and understanding between the peoples=20
of India and Pakistan. We believe that this is a vital step before=20
any tangible action to achieve a peaceful solution to the Kashmir=20
dispute can be undertaken."
Through these activities, the delegates addressed the following key=20
topics: the influence of history and the media in the conflict;=20
economic and social effects of the conflict upon the two countries;=20
the role of NGOs and governmental institutions; successful examples=20
of conflict resolution and youth leadership; and peace initiatives to=20
be implemented in the participants' home countries.
A number of prominent speakers also attended the conference and spoke=20
to the student delegates on several occasions. They included Gerson=20
Andr=E9s Fl=F3rez P=E9rez, the 16-year-old Nobel Peace Prize Nominee from=20
Colombia, and soldier-turned-peace activists Admiral Ramdas, former=20
Chief of Staff of the Indian Navy, and Brigadier Rao Abid Hamid,=20
Coordinator of the Human Rights Commission of Pakistan. The High=20
Commissioner of Pakistan in Singapore Mr. Moiz Bokhari was also=20
present as a guest speaker.
Towards the end of the conference, the participants reached a=20
consensus on a number of crucial points -

* The only viable solution to the Kashmir dispute isthrough=20
peaceful means. War is definitely not an option.
* The first and foremost step towards a peaceful solution is=20
dialogue - between the leaders and between the peoples.
* For dialogue to ensue, good communication between Pakistan=20
and India is essential. The governments must ensure and facilitate=20
safe and convenient cross-border travel, unhindered access to air,=20
land and sea facilities, re-opening of all telephone, radio and=20
satellite links, trade and commercial activity, student exchange=20
programmes, regional welfare projects and forums, cultural festivals,=20
and so on.
* Kashmiri representation is necessary in any future discussion=20
or forum pertaining to this issue. The will of the Kashmiri people is=20
of fundamental importance and must be taken into account for any=20
practicable solution to occur.
* Violence and human rights abuses in the disputed region must=20
be stopped immediately. By 'violence' we mean the violence=20
perpetrated by parties on both sides of the Line of Control.
These points were incorporated into the 'Statement of Common Ground',=20
which was the culmination of the efforts of the participants at the=20
conference. The Statement of Common Ground also marked the formation=20
of an independent peace movement, founded by the participants, called=20
the Youth Initiative for Peace (YIP). According to its mission=20
statement, YIP is "a youth movement united in its effort to build=20
mutual trust and understanding for sustainable peace."
YIP seeks to bring about effective change through -
* Education: The main aim is to remove misconceptions among=20
students that are a result of being taught subjective history, and=20
establish a common school network between India and Pakistan.
* Social Action: The movement aims at establishing a coalition=20
of NGOs and creating awareness by organizing social events such as=20
fundraisers, street plays etc.
* Media: The print and electronic media are the main tools to=20
provide objective information to the public, sharing experiences and=20
dispelling cross-border biases.
* Influencing Public Policy: Campaigning for effective=20
interaction between India and Pakistan and enlisting support from=20
government and administrative officials are important objectives of=20
the movement.
The participants of IFP have already begun working on peace=20
initiatives back in their home countries. The YIP movement is now=20
open to new members (www.initiativeforpeace.org) and is constantly=20
growing - "its power lies in the youth...so we encourage all young=20
people who have a strong commitment to working for peace in the=20
subcontinent to join us in our mission and help bring about a change,=20
a change for justice and freedom - a change for peace."
The writers are two young students from Pakistan and India

_____

#4.

July 18, 2002

For Dissent Against Hindu Extremism

By Angana Chatterji

The Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS), Vishwa Hindu Parishad (VHP), the
Bajrang Dal, and other Hindu extremist organisations, collectively known as
the Sangh Parivar (Hindu fundamentalist family of organisations), are
utilising religion to foment communal violence toward organising right-wing=
,
non secular and undemocratic nationalism in India. Once again, this year ha=
s
borne heartbreaking testimony to this. As the Sangh Parivar goosesteps to =
a
future predicated on injustice and bigotry, we, as ordinary citizens, must
not be lulled into complacent comfort that denies our own complicity.
Minorities in contemporary India are becoming the evil other that must be
annihilated or assimilated. For those of us not explicitly under attack, it
is time to examine our privilege and use it to empower the conscience of a
democratic and secular India, where necessary religious and social reforms
are enacted.=20

Hindu fundamentalism is well funded by Indians abroad. These organisations
receive substantial contributions from Hindus in the United States and
elsewhere. Outlook Magazine in its July 22, 2002, issue published an articl=
e
by A. K. Sen, titled, 'Deflections to the Right' highlighting a component o=
f
the chain of funding that sustains Hindu extremism. The article states that
the India Development and Relief Fund (IDRF) is one of the more conspicuous
charity organisations that fundraises in the United States to support RSS
battalions in India. IDRF lists Sewa International as its counterpart in
India. Sewa International and the various organisations that it oversees
receive over two-thirds of IDRF funding. Sewa International, in its mission
to transform India, states on its website in a section on 'Experiments and
Results' with 'Social Harmony', that social consolidation can be achieved
through social cohesion. Among other things, their website quotes Manya H. =
V.
Sehadarji, Sarkaryawah of the RSS,"The ultimate object of all these
endeavours is Hindu Sangathan -- consolidation and strengthening of the Hin=
du
society". Hindu extremism, like other xenophobic movements, functions
through carefully fashioning exclusionary principles whereby all non Hindus=
,
and dissenting Hindus, identified as Hindu traitors, become second class
citizens. In addition, justification of caste inequities, subordination of
Dalits ('lower' caste communities), women, adivasis (tribal) and other
minorities, and the consolidation of a cohesive middle class base are
critical to its momentum.

In the United States, where substantial funding is raised for Hindu extremi=
st
agendas, the government must act to ensure that organisations that broker
terror should not continue to enjoy their non profit status within the
country. It is interesting that in 1999, the VHP failed to gain recognition
at the United Nations as 'a cultural organisation' because of its
philosophical underpinnings. However the VHP of America is an independent
charity registered in the United States in the 1970s, where it has received
funds from a variety of individuals and organisations.

Non resident Indians and Americans of Indian descent must examine the
politics of hate encouraged by right wing Hindu organisations in the name o=
f
charity and social work. Indians, one of the most financially successful
groups in the United States, must take seriously their moral obligation to
ensure that their dollars are not funding malice and scrutinise the
organisations that are on the receiving end in India. The issue is not
whether these organisations are undertaking charitable work, but if they ar=
e
doing so to promote separatist and non secular ideals. Param Vaibhav Ke Pat=
h
Par (On The Road To Great Glory) written by Sadanand Damodar Sapre, and
published in 1997 by Suruchi Prakashan, Jhandewalan, New Delhi, the central
publication house of the RSS, lists the 40+ organisations maintained by th=
e
RSS in India for its multivariate programs.

In addition, VHP and other Parivar outfits target the communalisation of
education through the 'Vanavasi Kalyan Ashram' or 'Ekal Vidyalas' (schools)=
.
One strategy is to Hinduise adivasi communities, exploit divisions among th=
e
marginalised, and indoctrinate the youth, in order to both turn them agains=
t
one another and use them as foot soldiers in the larger cause of religious
nationalism. Such inculcation has had serious repercussions in Gujarat this
year where tribals were manipulated into attacking Muslims during the carna=
ge
in February and March. While Hindu fundamentalists do not have a monopoly o=
n
religious intolerance in India, their actions are holding the country
hostage. Well organised, wide spread and acting in the name of the majority
religion in India, Hindu extremism is positioned to silence diversity throu=
gh
force and terror, the rhetoric of Hindu supremacy, and the positioning of
minority groups as evil enemies who must be punished.

Indians at home and abroad must oppose the deep infiltration of the Hindu
brigade into the press, as well as the political, military, bureaucratic,
civic, business, educational, law and order institutions of India. Such
infiltration is creating a nation of thugs where the constitution is violat=
ed
by religious fundamentalists, with such violation tolerated by the state.
While the current government at the centre holds open and close links to
organisations within the Sangh Parivar, citizens are assured that secularis=
m
and democracy are sacred and secure. In reality, the government's handling =
of
communal violations and sanctioning of communalism jeopardises our capacity
to function as a nation.

The VHP, in its meeting with Muslim leaders in New Delhi on July 15, 2002,
stated that if Muslims agree to resettle Hindus in Jammu and Kashmir, Musli=
ms
in Gujarat would be rehabilitated. Hindus must understand that issues
connected to the democratisation of Pakistan, ethical resolutions to Kashmi=
r,
or gender reforms within Islam are separate from India's commitment to
upholding the rights of minorities or to reforms within Hinduism. Hindu
extremism against Muslims and other minorities in India collapses
distinctions that must be made to honour human rights in India. Also,
Hindutva's discourse of history posits Hindus and Hinduism as under siege a=
nd
preposterously asserts the idea of India as a Hindu nation. Such revisionis=
t
history strategically and hideously poses that a vengeful justice can be
found for the crimes of history committed under non Hindu rulers. Retributi=
on
is sought by attacking contemporary Indian Muslims, Christians, Sikhs and
others.

Hinduism is critical to the fabric of India, as are all the other cultures
and religions that inhabit this land and frame the imagination of this
nation. It will require considerable effort on our part to conceive a secul=
ar
nation where religion is indeed separate from the integrity of the state,
where pluralism guarantees rights and respect to the religious and
non-religious alike. Every Hindu and every citizen must denounce that to be
Indian is to be Hindu, challenge assertions that a secular constitution is
anti-Hindu, and refute the call for a Hindu nation in India as anti-nationa=
l.
Patriotism and nationalism demand that all social, political and religious
groups work for an India free of disenfranchisement, institutionalised
violence, corruption and rampant inequities. We cannot permit India's secul=
ar
and democratic fabric to be irreparably compromised. The politics of
segregation and hate cannot determine the century before us.

Angana Chatterji is a professor of Social and Cultural Anthropology at the
California Institute of Integral Studies.

_____

#5.

The Boston Globe

Rising threat of Hindu extremism

By H.D.S. Greenway, 7/12/2002

WHILE THE Western World worries about Islam, the specter of Hindu=20
nationalism carries the potential of threatening the stability of the=20
Indian subcontinent and the world beyond. A bit of bad news out of=20
New Delhi earlier this month was that the hard-line, Pakistan-bashing=20
home minister, Lal Krishna Advani, had been named the number two man=20
in the Indian government and a potential successor to the ailing and=20
aging Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee.

Whereas Vajpayee was the human face of the Hindu nationalist=20
Bharatiya Janata Party, which has led a coalition government for four=20
years, Advani is more in tune with the party's base of radical=20
nationalists who seek to undermine the secular India of Jawaharlal=20
Nehru and Mahatma Gandhi. In addition, Advani's policy towards=20
Pakistan is larded with nuclear threats and bellicosity.

With tensions between the two nuclear powers still high, any increase=20
in Advani's influence is a blow to compromise with Pakistan over=20
Kashmir and to India's time-honored secular political institutions.

Many Indians believed that the BJP's secular allies in the ruling=20
coalition would not accept such a hardliner as Advani as Vajpayee's=20
heir, but they have been proved wrong. And while it seemed that=20
Vajpayee was willing to downplay ''Hindutva,'' a concept of exclusive=20
Hindu identity dear to the party's heart, Advani can be expected to=20
emphasize it.

Like their Muslim extremist counterparts, Hindu nationalists seek to=20
expel Western secularism from their midst, persecuting non-Hindus,=20
trashing hotels that celebrate Valentine's Day or Christmas, and=20
demanding that cities with Islamic names, such as Allahabad, be=20
changed. Other religions - and there are more Muslims in India than=20
there are in Pakistan - are considered offshoots of a basic Hindu=20
entity that should submit to Hindutva. Hindu nationalists rant that=20
Hindi should be the national language, even though millions of=20
Indians speak other native languages.

The crowning moment of Advani's brand of Hindutva came exactly 10=20
years ago when an ancient mosque believed to have been built on a=20
Hindu site was torn down by a howling Hindu mob egged on by BJP=20
leaders including Advani. Militants shouting ''Hindustan is for the=20
Hindus'' and ''Death to Muslims'' rioted, and more than 1,000 people=20
were slaughtered, most of them Muslims.

The recent rioting in Gujarat, in which hundreds of Muslims were=20
killed while the police looked on, came as result of the controversy=20
surrounding the Hindu nationalist demand that a Hindu temple be built=20
where the mosque stood. In a country riven with communal violence,=20
Advani is unusually provocative.

Most disturbing is Advani's advocacy of nuclear threat. He once said=20
that India's nuclear bomb would ensure that India would triumph in=20
Kashmir. India's much bigger conventional army could have prevailed=20
in any war with Pakistan, but ironically, India's bomb brought forth=20
a Pakistani bomb, and now India's numerical advantage in conventional=20
weapons and troops counts for less.

Indians have said that their nuclear bomb was as necessary to=20
counterbalance China as Pakistan, but to men like Advani having a=20
nuclear bomb is part of Hindutva and the greater glory of Indian=20
culture and destiny that lost out to the West during colonialism. The=20
feeling of grievance and greatness deprived is as much a part of=20
militant Hindu culture as it is among Islamists.

When India brought forth its bomb to become a nuclear power, Hindu=20
nationalists talked of it as a Hindu bomb, and they spoke of building=20
a Hindu temple on the desert test site. Many quoted the lines from=20
the Hindu epic, the Bhagavad Gita, that Robert Oppenheimer uttered in=20
Alamogordo at the dawn of the atomic age: ''I have become Death/ The=20
destroyer of worlds.''

India will not be a safer or a more secular place if Advani comes to rule.

H.D.S. Greenway's column appears regularly in the Globe.

This story ran on page A15 of the Boston Globe on 7/12/2002.
=A9 Copyright 2002 Globe Newspaper Company.

_____

#6.

Synopsis of ``Lest we forget: memories of the emergency''

Director: E.K.Santha
Format: Beta (also available on VHS and VCD)
Duration: 45 minutes.
Language: Malayalam.

It is over 25 years now since the emergency was lifted. The story of Raja=
n,
an engineering college student killed by the police, of plantation worker
Rajan, his wife Devaki and Salim of the Calicut Medical College who
committed suicide to escape from more torture by the police, the story of
several of the young men who stood up for democracy is slowly fading out of
people's memory. Beneath the tragedy, there is a story of resistance in all
these.

The film, is an attempt to go back to those who resisted emergency and
recall the political climate that prevailed then and the factors that
motivated them to stand up and be counted among those who cherished freedom=
.

Based on interviews with the activists of the period, the film includes
discussions on the political context in which the emergency was imposed, th=
e
crisis which Indira Gandhi sought to tide over and the manner in which a
number of young men, most of them being the cream in society, were subjecte=
d
to third degree torture.

Beginning with narratives by a cross section of prominent men in present
day Kerala -- P.Govinda Pillai, Sachithanandan, K.N.Ramachandran,
T.K.Ramachandran -- on the context in which the emergency was imposed, the
film then moves on to the spirit among the youth then and what led to the
resistance. This aspect is introduced by K.Venu, among those who influenced
a whole lot of young men in the seventies in Kerala, the film then slide
into the participants in the various ``actions'' against the emergency
recalling their own experience.

There are graphic descriptions about the torture inflicted on the suspect=
s;
but then the story is not at all one of pathos but one where the victims
make it clear the they do not regret. The thread to the narrative is that o=
f
Rajan, the student from REC, who was killed. Rajan's father, Eachara Warrie=
r
too recalls his experience. The then Principal of REC Calicut, Prof.
Bahauddin too narrated his own travails in search of his boys who were take=
n
to the torture camps.

There are then, frames where Karunakaran, who was the Home Minister then
who justifies the emergency and also of P.K.Vasudevan Nair, CPI leader who
still thinks the emergency was not all that horrendous in Kerala because th=
e
CPI's Achuta Menon was the Chief Minister.

In order to avoid monotony, visuals of the old building where the torture
camps were located, the colleges from where there was resistance have been
inserted.

Contact eksantha@y...
or
krishna@t...

for information and for copies.

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