[sacw] SACW | 18 July 02

[Harsh Kapoor]

South Asia Citizens Wire | 18 July 2002

South Asia Citizens Web:
http://www.mnet.fr/aiindex

South Asians Against Nukes:
http://www.mnet.fr/aiindex/NoNukes.html

__________________________

#1. Kashmiri families in the village of Khayar devastated by a=20
vicious and seemingly endless conflict (Muzamil Jaleel)
#2. Signposts for peace in South Asia (L. Ramdas)
#3. Pakistan: Account of Punjab Rape Tells of a Brutal Society (Ian Fisher)
#4. India: Male order - Liberal Muslims, men and women, must=20
condemn the male chauvinism of the All India Muslim Personal Law Board

__________________________

#1.

The Guardian (UK)
Wednesday July 17, 2002

Kashmir is grieving

Muzamil Jaleel meets Kashmiri families in the village of Khayar=20
devastated by a vicious and seemingly endless conflict

In Khayar, a remote village in north Kashmir,=20
mourning has become a way of life. People meet more often at the=20
small graveyard in the middle of their dusty, rundown village than=20
for any other social occasion. The Muslim festival of Eid has lost=20
its charm; the laughter of children is missing; even the merriment of=20
a marriage party is dominated by the memory of the young men and=20
women who have lost their lives over the years.

The villagers had gathered to console the family of a 70-year-old man=20
who had died of a heart attack during an identification parade=20
conducted by the army. Crowded in a small, dingy room, the tales they=20
told were like postcards explaining Kashmir's complex tragedy in=20
miniature.

Abdul Raheem Malik is the only male member of his family alive. One=20
of his sons and a brother died in the last 10 years while another son=20
is missing after being picked up by the army. Malik lost his job in a=20
private factory because he had neither the time nor the energy to=20
continue working.

``I spent all these years either mourning my family's dead or=20
wandering from one army camp to another looking for my son," he said.=20
``Then I became scared to leave my three daughters alone at home. The=20
eldest one is a widow."

Blighted by misery and poverty, the Malik household has been selling=20
off its family land to survive. Malik's wife, Amina, has developed=20
acute cardiac trouble. ``Tears have dried in her eyes and she cries=20
silently all the time," Malik said.

Amina's only remaining treasures are the few photographs of her sons.=20
She carries them everywhere to show to strangers, hoping someone=20
might provide a clue as to the whereabouts of Mohammad Riyaz Malik,=20
her missing son.

Riyaz was 20 and preparing for a school examination when, late in the=20
evening on July 4 1998, a group of masked gun men knocked on his=20
father's door. ``We opened the door. They were Ikhwanis=20
(counterinsurgents working with the local army unit). They asked for=20
Riyaz and took him along, never to return," Malik recalled.

``I touched their feet. My wife and daughters were hysterical because=20
we had already lost one boy, and now only Riyaz was left. But they=20
didn't listen to my pleas. They promised that he would soon be back."

Riyaz did not return, and a neighbour told them he saw him being=20
carried to the army camp at Dobban, up in the mountains. ``Abdul Ahad=20
Mir, a road coolie, had seen him and he came running to us. Even the=20
army first accepted he was with them. For 15 months they kept us=20
hanging and finally denied any knowledge of his arrest," Malik said.

Malik says that he approached everybody from army officers to the top=20
brass of the civilian government. ``Everyone promised an=20
investigation but nothing happened. Finally the government issued a=20
death certificate and closed the file.

"Every day we hear something that rekindles our hope that our son is=20
alive. I wanted to end this uncertainty permanently and ascertain his=20
fate. I filed a case in the court, but last February the army picked=20
me up and forced me to declare in writing that my son was not missing=20
in army custody. I could do nothing and now my family has to live=20
with this uncertainty for the rest of our lives."

The first tragedy to befall the Malik family came right at the=20
beginning of the turmoil. On October 4 1990, Malik's 30-year-old=20
brother, Ghulam Mohammad Malik, and 20-year-old son, Shakeel Ahmad=20
Malik, were killed in an army shootout.

As Malik was talking about his family, Amina was silent.=20
Occasionally, she would hide her face and sob but she did not utter a=20
single word. ``She has become dumb. She hardly reacts to anything=20
now," Malik said.

As he stopped talking, silence descended on the crowded room, but=20
another man was desperate to tell his story. Ghulam Hassan belongs to=20
same clan as Malik and his tale is equally tragic. Ghulam is a=20
50-year-old farmer and used to live in the neighbourhood. ``I fled=20
the village for the safety of my family," he said.

In Ghulam's case the perpetrators were militants. ``I and my=20
23-year-old daughter, Tahira, were picked up by the army last year. I=20
was released immediately, but my daughter was kept in custody for 11=20
days," he said. ``She was booked under the Prevention of Terrorism=20
Act, but was released because of massive protests".

Life for this branch of the Malik clan went relatively smoothly after=20
that, until May 6 of this year. ``We were about to have our dinner=20
that evening when there was a knock at the door," he said. ``It was a=20
group of Pakistani militants. I identified them because they used to=20
come to the village often for food and shelter. They didn't say a=20
word and immediately opened fire. Tahira was at the door and she was=20
hit in the chest. I jumped out of the window and saved myself but=20
Tahira died crying for help."

``I have no idea why they did it. What had my daughter done? She was=20
full of life. Did she deserve to be killed just because she was=20
arrested by the army?"

As Ghulam fell silent, there was a commotion. It seemed everyone in=20
the room had a story to tell and every tale had a different villain,=20
explaining and also confusing the larger story of Kashmir. Amid this=20
din, a young boy crawled up to me to whisper his story. He introduced=20
himself as Altaf Ahmad Khan, a school student.

``I live in a neighbouring village and I have lost three cousins," he=20
said. "Please mention them as well. They were killed in a firefight=20
between the army and the militants. The militants had barged into the=20
house. After a few hours the army came and there was a fierce=20
encounter. Nobody bothered about my cousins and, when the debris of=20
the house were searched next morning, their charred bodies were=20
recovered, too."

A little girl, sitting in the corner, was listening carefully to all=20
the stories. She did not even blink, and her face was devoid of=20
emotion. Who was this girl?

``She was one of six siblings; the eldest is just 12. Their father,=20
Ghulam Nabi Malik, was killed by unidentified gunmen and their mother=20
left them. There is nobody to support them and they are dependent on=20
neighbours," a village elder explained. Nobody in the village is sure=20
who killed their father. Nobody even wants to guess because to do so=20
is deemed too dangerous.

The story of Khayar village is nothing unusual. If you wander around=20
remote hamlets or even the wealthy parts of the Kashmiri city of=20
Srinagar, such stories repeat themselves everywhere. Kashmir's daily=20
death toll is 20, and it is a Kashmiri who dies by the bullet of=20
either side.

The separatist movement, which started as an indigeneous struggle for=20
Kashmir's freedom from both India and Pakistan, has been hijacked by=20
pan-Islamic jihadis, whose agenda runs counter to the very basis of=20
Kashmiri aspiration. As social rather than political change has=20
become the priority, religion has gained centre-stage in the struggle=20
and violence has become an end itself rather than a means to an end.

Why are Kashmiris fighting? For whom are they fighting? If the choice=20
is between Kashmir's becoming a jugular vein of Pakistan or a rose in=20
the bouquet called India, then the struggle is already over. They are=20
fighting in a struggle they cannot control. If they wish to hold a=20
dialogue with New Delhi, they have to seek permission from the=20
jihadis, who ironically do not believe in achieving their goals=20
democratically. If they want access to the remote controls in=20
Pakistan, to negotiate directly, they become caught up in the=20
political quagmire in New Delhi.

Some people protest against the killing of a militant by the security=20
forces one day and the next shout slogans against the militants for=20
perpetrating a murder. The case of two brothers in Srinagar who laid=20
down their lives for opposite causes, but were mourned by the same=20
people, is a glaring example of this confusion.

When a Hizbul mujahideen militant, Hamid Dar, died fighting security=20
forces in 1994, thousands of people protested and mourned his death.=20
After eight years, his elder brother Imtiaz Dar also died a violent=20
death, but this time at the hands of the militants. His death was=20
mourned with matching intensity. The family, however, is unable to=20
draw lines and is confused over which side to favour. They are=20
victims of both.

What will happen in Kashmir in the next 20 years? Ghulam Rasool Bhat,=20
an old gravedigger, pointed towards one of the security force's mud=20
bunkers in Srinagar. ``Soon that will be made from concrete," he said.

He may be right. Nobody in Kashmir wants war, but nobody pursues=20
peace either. The vested interests thrive on violence and hamper any=20
movement towards reconciliation and healing, leaving the wounds wide=20
open.

=B7 Muzamil Jaleel is a Srinagar-based journalist with the Indian Express

____

#2.

The Hindu (India)
July 18, 2002
Opinion - Leader Page Articles

Signposts for peace in South Asia

By L. Ramdas

As a gesture of honest intent, India and Pakistan must reduce the=20
levels of their security forces on the border.

FORTUNATELY, INDIA and Pakistan have stepped back from the brink of=20
war and nuclear holocaust. But the danger remains and the two sides=20
remain at the mercy of events they cannot fully control.=20
Fundamentalist elements in Pakistan bent on violence directed at=20
India and matched likewise by right wing groups in India, both of=20
whom aim to provoke war, hold the future of the region in their=20
hands. They will continue to do so unless the two Governments=20
institute measures to de-escalate the current confrontation and get=20
down to a dialogue.

The following objectives are interlinked and must be achieved: To=20
stop permanently infiltration from Pakistan into the Indian part of=20
Jammu and Kashmir; to stop all forms of human rights violations by=20
militants and security forces alike; to resolve the Kashmir issue=20
peacefully, keeping in mind the legacy of Partition and the ground=20
realities at present: the existence of the Line of Control as a=20
virtual boundary since the Shimla Agreement of 1972; to identify a=20
process for ascertaining the wishes of the people of Jammu and=20
Kashmir regarding their future; to defuse nuclear tensions and=20
eliminate the risk of nuclear war; and to open up the two countries=20
to normal movement of people and trade and create a climate, socially=20
and politically, that would promote good relations between the people=20
of India and Pakistan as well as in South Asia.

The elements that would pave the way for resolving these=20
long-festering issues could be as follows, keeping in mind the=20
history of the various agreements that India and Pakistan have signed=20
or almost signed, but have so far failed to implement. The approach=20
also factors in the new and overwhelming reality in South Asia - that=20
the acquiring by India and Pakistan of nuclear arsenals means the=20
threats of conventional and nuclear war are now inextricably linked.=20
If Indian and Pakistani leaders want peace, which is more than the=20
absence of war, resolving the issues of the relationships between the=20
people and in the communities within countries with equality,=20
tolerance and friendship is necessary for a sustained peace.

Pakistan has pledged to stop the infiltration into Kashmir=20
permanently. This will require monitoring. India has proposed a joint=20
patrolling of the border. This has not been agreed to by Pakistan.=20
The situation is further complicated by India's `allergy' to any big=20
power/third party interference in the Kashmir question. However, a=20
substantial role is already being played by the United States and=20
others in facilitating a communication between the leadership of the=20
two countries. It is therefore proposed that a force drawn from among=20
the members of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation=20
(SAARC) under a mutually agreed leadership could provide the=20
necessary compromise for the monitoring to be established. This force=20
could be provided with technical data gathered by other countries,=20
including the U.S., to better perform its duties. As a first step,=20
India should show its goodwill by beginning to reduce its forces=20
along the border and restoring all communication links including=20
road, rail and air traffic between the two countries. The aim should=20
be to bring the forces at the border to the pre-December 13 levels as=20
rapidly as possible.

There are three parties to the Kashmir question - India, Pakistan and=20
the people of Jammu and Kashmir, and it is essential that India=20
recognise this. By the same token, India and Pakistan must understand=20
the ground reality of a de facto partition of the erstwhile State of=20
Jammu and Kashmir by the acceptance of the Line of Control (LoC) as=20
the international border between the two countries. There is no=20
denying the fact that the people of Jammu and Kashmir have suffered a=20
great deal due to the India-Pakistan `tug of war' over five decades.=20
They seek peace and a cessation of all forms of violence. As a first=20
step in this direction and as a gesture of honest intent, India and=20
Pakistan must reduce the levels of their security forces on the=20
border in Kashmir. Pakistan should also close down all militant=20
training camps on its soil.

Central to any solution to the "Kashmir problem" must be a process of=20
ascertaining the wishes of the people of the entire erstwhile State=20
of Jammu and Kashmir, keeping in mind the ground realities of the de=20
facto partition of the State.

To facilitate the emergence of peace in the region as early as=20
possible, the following process as a via media could be considered:=20
First, Kashmiris on both sides of the border should be given the=20
choice of being the citizens of either India or Pakistan, and, if=20
they want to move from one side to another, be given the opportunity=20
to do so in peace and security. To implement this, both countries=20
should agree to some form of international supervision. This role=20
could be performed by a SAARC monitoring team as proposed earlier.=20
Second, the people displaced from their lands and homes by the=20
current conflict, such as the Kashmiri Pandits, should be allowed to=20
return in peace and security. Third, the border between India and=20
Pakistan in Kashmir should be kept porous to enable Kashmiris on both=20
sides to cross it for personal, family and business reasons without=20
too many hassles.

Both countries should reaffirm the pledges to negotiate all=20
outstanding issues between them peacefully and not resort to war,=20
proxy or otherwise. This formulation should meet the concerns of the=20
two countries adequately. This means, first of all, a ceasefire along=20
the LoC. Pakistan should agree to a policy of no-first-use of nuclear=20
weapons, which India has already adopted. This is the equivalent of a=20
nuclear ceasefire. India and Pakistan could tap their best and=20
deepest traditions and not only avert war but make a real peace=20
between themselves. They could verifiably de-alert all nuclear=20
weapons with bilateral or SAARC monitoring and, in that context,=20
invite all other nuclear weapons states to do the same and together=20
take up leadership in the cause of global nuclear disarmament.

Only sustained peace can lift the clouds of war and the threat of=20
nuclear incineration of South Asia. At the dawn of the nuclear age,=20
Albert Einstein called on humanity to develop a new way of thinking=20
or perish. Leaders in the West have recklessly failed to heed that=20
warning and remain on the edge of a nuclear abyss, with the U.S. and=20
Russia maintaining between them more than 4,000 nuclear warheads on=20
hair-trigger alert, though they claim to be friends and at peace.

In a recently concluded workshop 'Initiative for Peace - Focus on=20
Kashmir' at the United World College in Singapore, 40 young people=20
from India and Pakistan came together for a week, and agreed on an=20
inspiring Statement of Common Ground. The final paragraph of the=20
statement reads: "We believe that we have the power to make this=20
generation and the generations to come, the best ever in the history=20
of humanity, or the worst. The choice is entirely ours; we have made=20
the choice for a better and peaceful world." This, rather than the=20
perpetual state of quasi-war that the countries are now maintaining,=20
would befit the region that gave the world Badshah Khan and Mohandas=20
Karamchand Gandhi and the most unique freedom movement the world has=20
known.

_____

#3.

The New York Times
July 17, 2002=20=20
Account of Punjab Rape Tells of a Brutal Society

By IAN FISHER

MEERWALA, Pakistan, July 14 =97 The same haunting detail surfaces in=20
the stories of everyone involved, including the woman, one of the=20
four men who raped her, and the imam who finally broke the silence=20
about the case. That detail is her pleading.

"When Khaliq dragged me away, I said, `Khaliq, I am like a sister to=20
you,' " said Mukhtaran Bibi, 28, who is now a thin, sleepless and=20
frightened woman. "He did not listen to me. I even said, `In the name=20
of the Koran, please forgive me.' I asked the whole council for=20
forgiveness, to save my honor."

"But nobody listened," she said. "They took me inside. And they raped me."

Gang rape, horrifying as it is, is not uncommon in this part of=20
southern Punjab. What has shocked Pakistan is that a tribal council=20
here, for the first time anyone can remember, decreed gang rape as a=20
punishment to avenge an episode of illicit sex =97 one that probably=20
never happened in the first place.

Ms. Bibi was raped on June 22, but word moved slowly out of this=20
dusty farming village, which lacks even a paved road. In the last=20
week, the government has arrested 18 people amid public angst that=20
many basics in Pakistani life collided to cause this crime: women's=20
low status, everyday violence, the weak reach of central authority,=20
the injustices of a feudal society obsessed with honor and revenge.

"A representative, consultative body, though it is informal and=20
illegal, sanctioned a gang rape," said Naeem Mirza, of the Aurat=20
Foundation, a women's rights group. "It has shocked the entire=20
conscience of a society."

The story of what happened is complicated, a tale of sex and power=20
and tribal custom in a part of southern Punjab Province that is "in=20
the back of beyond, even in Pakistan," as one government minister=20
described it. The dispute occurred between two tribal families here:=20
the Mastoi, who own much land and do well, and the lowly Gujar, who=20
own little.

Ms. Bibi's family is Gujar. On June 22, the family and the police=20
contend, three Mastoi men kidnapped Ms. Bibi's youngest brother,=20
Abdul Shakur, a tall boy who said he was 11 or 12. They took him to a=20
sugar cane field. Then they took turns sodomizing him =97 a fact that=20
medical experts later confirmed.

"They asked me if I would tell my family," Abdul recalled. "When I=20
said yes, they beat me up. Then they locked me up in a room."

The police were notified that Abdul was being held in the house of a=20
young Mastoi, Abdul Khaliq. When they arrived, they found Mr.=20
Khaliq's sister, Salma Naseen, in the same room with Abdul Shakur.=20
The Mastoi said the woman, who is in her late 20's, and the boy were=20
having an affair. (A government investigation later said Abdul was=20
too young to "meet the sexual lust of any opposite sex.")

The police took Abdul away, but held him in a cell. Meanwhile, the=20
Mastoi convened the tribal council, or panchayat, and decided to=20
avenge the honor of Ms. Naseen.

Panchayats have operated for centuries, settling small disputes=20
involving fights between families or over land. But in recent years,=20
many say, they have been handing down ever harsher punishments.

Both the Gujar =97 still unaware of what had happened to Abdul, who=20
remained at the police station =97 and the Mastoi now say they both=20
favored the same means of resolving the dispute: that Abdul would=20
marry Ms. Naseen. And, to satisfy the honor of the Mastois, one of=20
Abdul's five sisters would be given away in marriage to a Mastoi man.

But the Gujars say the panchayat was calling not for marriage but for=20
punitive rape. There seemed an escape hatch though, according to=20
Ghulam Farid, 60, Ms. Bibi's father. He said a member of the=20
panchayat said it would be enough if one of his daughters went before=20
them and apologized on behalf of the family.

Ms. Bibi, who is divorced and teaches the Koran to children, was chosen.

"I did not think anything like this would happen," she said. She went=20
to the cotton field where the panchayat was meeting and, begging for=20
mercy, was dragged away with the council's blessing by Abdul Khaliq,=20
the police say. Her father said he was held at gunpoint.

For an hour and a half, Mr. Khaliq and three other men raped her. A=20
police investigator said the Mastoi "danced in jubilation." Then Ms.=20
Bibi was forced, before perhaps 300 people, to walk home naked.

This year so far, there have been 72 gang rapes and 93 other rapes=20
documented in densely populated Punjab Province alone, according to=20
the Human Rights Commission of Pakistan. The rapists are often=20
higher-caste men, the victims usually lower-caste women, as in the=20
case here. In this case, the rape appears to have been meant as the=20
worst punishment possible.

"What happens in war?" asked Attiya Inayatullah, the nation's=20
minister for women's development. "Rape is used as a tool of war.=20
Similarly here, rape has been used as the ultimate humiliation."

Ms. Bibi's rape by decree might never have come to light; the family=20
was afraid to fill in the blanks for the police. But a local imam,=20
Abdul Razzaq, 40, heard about it. Though Ms. Bibi's father would not=20
say much, Mr. Razzaq took a risk with his own safety by addressing=20
the case during Friday Prayers almost a week later.

"I condemned this incident: that a poor girl had been raped and that=20
they had invited the wrath of Allah," he said. "Such a barbaric and=20
oppressive injustice has never been witnessed before."

Mr. Razzaq believes in the panchayat as a way for poor people to=20
resolve their disputes, often according to Islamic law. But this, he=20
said, was "against the spirit of Islam.

"This was not a panchayat," he said. "This was their cruelty."

After the imam's sermon, local journalists picked up the story and it=20
began to spread, in conflicting accounts that at first left out the=20
story of sodomy. Then the Pakistani government began moving, quickly=20
arresting all four men accused of raping Ms. Bibi, including a police=20
officer and some members of the panchayat.

So far, six men face the death penalty, among them Mr. Khaliq, 18,=20
and the reported leader of the panchayat, Faiz Bux, 34.

Today, the two men stood chained together in jail. Mr. Bux said it=20
was all a mistake and that his "heart melted" at Ms. Bibi's pleas for=20
forgiveness. The council did not hand down a sentence of rape, he=20
said: Mr. Khaliq did it all himself.

"This is his ignorance, his shortsightedness," he said. "He got=20
really emotional."

Mr. Khaliq, however, said he was in fact given permission to "take=20
revenge." But he said he listened to Ms. Bibi's cries for=20
forgiveness: "I didn't rape her. I just held her for two or three=20
minutes."

The case has prompted an outpouring of calls for the government to=20
crack down on the panchayats. Critics say a slow blurring of tribal=20
and Islamic law has increased the councils' authority as well as=20
their impunity.

"People are under the illusion there is something Islamic about the=20
councils, that somehow they have a sanction," said Beena Sarwar, a=20
journalist and women's rights activist. "So the government is very=20
careful not to offend them."

"They need to come down very heavily on the tribal councils," she=20
added. "This is the time to say there is no tribal law. This is the=20
time to say there is only one law of the land."

Ms. Inayatullah, the women's minister, and other officials say the=20
government has taken extraordinary steps both to punish the suspects=20
and =97 not least through publicizing the case =97 to prevent something=20
similar from happening elsewhere. But human rights officials say it=20
is too early to say whether a government with much on its plate also=20
has the will to improve the plight of poor women and monitor methods=20
of tribal justice.

A contingent of heavily armed soldiers now guards Ms. Bibi and her=20
family. The nation's military ruler, Gen. Pervez Musharraf, sent her=20
$8,300 as compensation. The government has promised the village a=20
paved road, electricity, a permanent police outpost and a school to=20
be named for Ms. Bibi, where she will be a teacher.

Ms. Bibi said she finds some comfort in this. But she cannot sleep.=20
Her family says she eats almost nothing. "I feel so enraged," she=20
said. "If these people came in front of me, I would kill them."

She said she has considered suicide, the route a teenager in a nearby=20
village recently took after she, too, was gang raped. But now, she=20
said, she wants to live to see her tormentors hanged.

"Initially, I thought it was a matter of great shame," she said.=20
"Now, I think there should be justice."

_____

#4.

The Eastern Question
by Jayadeva Uyangoda

The incidents of Tamil-Muslim tension that flared up in the Eastern=20
Province last week appear to be now under control, as the government=20
swiftly mobilized the national political actors to manage the crisis.
The present state of curfew might help the dust to settle there, yet=20
the complexities of the Tamil-Muslim question in the Eastern Province=20
need to be addressed in a comprehensive manner. Prudent management of=20
this conflict in the East is crucial for the success of any ethnic=20
conflict resolution attempt in Sri Lanka. In fact, the Eastern=20
province constitutes the weakest link in Sri Lanka's chain of peace.=20
If the chain snaps there, the entire peace process might be in=20
serious jeopardy.
There are indeed many versions of what has happened in Muttur. I have=20
heard five different accounts and they probably describe five=20
different dimensions of the conflict there. Under conditions of deep=20
ethnic divisions and fragmentation, events like these also acquire a=20
life of their own. Such life is often a case of partially ethnicized=20
memories, interpretations and narrations. That is why different=20
versions of Muttur events would attempt to exculpate one ethnic=20
community or party while blaming the other.
Meanwhile, national as well as regional political parties have also=20
made their own contribution to the confusion by trying to gain=20
political advantage from the crisis. Some reports indicate that there=20
was politically motivated incitement among Muslim and Tamil people=20
thereby turning a rather insignificant conflict into organized=20
violence.
There probably was a role played by those who can be described as=20
'riot entrepreneurs' in provoking Tamil-Muslim tension in the Eastern=20
Province. As Professor Ashish Nandy has observed in relation to=20
India, contemporary 'ethnic riots' are seldom spontaneous; rather,=20
they are organized and executed by riot entrepreneurs, who are often=20
linked to professional politicians who know the political value of=20
communal violence.
Since early this year, the multi-ethnic Eastern Province has been=20
experiencing some relative peace owing to the cease-fire between the=20
government and the LTTE. The paradox of such a condition of relative=20
peace is that it, unlike the war, opens up the space for multiple=20
political actors to surface and act.
When there was war, there were only two actors in action, the state=20
armed forces and the LTTE rebels. The condition of no-war in the=20
Eastern province has changed the old equilibrium, creating a new=20
political disequilibrium and enabling quite a few other actors to=20
function. Similarly, issues that had remained hidden in the=20
conditions of war have also begun to surface in this new and uneasy=20
state of disequilibria there.
Meanwhile, the question of Tamil-Sinhalese-Muslim relations needs to=20
be acknowledged as crucial to the political life in the Eastern=20
province. The future of Tamil-Muslim relations has repeatedly come up=20
as an intractable issue in almost all attempts made to resolve Sri=20
Lanka's ethnic conflict. It has been there in the issue of the merger=20
of Northern and Eastern provinces, in the question of the unit of=20
devolution, in the proposal for the re-demarcation of district and=20
provincial boundaries for the Eastern province and in the question of=20
regional power sharing.
At present this issue has re-surfaced in relation to the issues=20
involved in the implementation of the MoU between the government and=20
the LTTE as well as the proposed interim administration. Reports=20
emanating from the Eastern province clearly indicate that there is=20
widespread fear and resentment among the Muslim people there=20
concerning any interim administration under the LTTE. Indeed, the=20
LTTE-Muslim relations in the past have not been smooth at all.
At the heart of the Tamil-Muslim conflict is the larger question of=20
the tension between Tamil and Muslim nationalisms. Muslim nationalism=20
in the Eastern province is qualitatively different from the=20
conventional Muslim politics in predominantly Sinhalese areas like=20
the Western or Central provinces. In the Eastern province, and in the=20
North as well, Muslim nationalism in recent years has evolved itself=20
in opposition to militant Tamil nationalism. Killing of Muslims and=20
ethnic-cleansing by the LTTE are a tragic part of that relationship=20
which has polarized the two communities. This led to greater=20
radicalization of Musilm politics. Some armed Muslim groups emerged=20
in the Eastern province in that context.
Meanwhile, there are very complex ground realities that have made=20
Tamil-Muslim relations volatile. Muslims believe that Tamils have=20
forcibly acquired their land and property after they were evicted=20
from their homes by the LTTE. Tamils in contrast believe that the=20
Muslim trading and fishing communities have thrived at the expense of=20
poor Tamils caught up in the war.
Even relative peace in the province would mean that these issues=20
would come up as everyday realities. This is an unavoidable paradox=20
of peace in a protracted ethnic conflict. But that paradox needs to=20
be addressed at a number of levels.
One approach would be to manage the tension through continuous=20
dialogue and agreements between the LTTE and Muslim leaders. The=20
Prabhakaran- Rauf Hakeem MOU, signed in April, was probably aimed at=20
a fresh political start for the two communities in a spirit of=20
reconciliation. But, there are no signs that the agreement between=20
the two leaders has really trickled down to the ground and community=20
level. An understanding between the leaders should be percolated to=20
the levels of local leadership, political cadres and the ordinary=20
citizens.
Tamil-Muslim reconciliation is the need of the hour for peace to=20
survive in the Eastern province. That is a task which requires=20
imaginative initiatives by Sinhalese, Tamil and Muslim political=20
leaders as well as civil society groups. The reason for taking the=20
Eastern question with seriousness is simple. No lasting solution can=20
be found to the ethnic conflict without establishing peace and=20
reconciliation among Sinhalese, Tamil and Muslim communities whose=20
demographic presence in the Province is almost equal. Often, there is=20
also a tendency among policy makers as well as analysts to describe=20
and understand Sri Lanka's ethnic conflict as one between two actors,=20
the state and the Tamil community, ignoring the Muslim ethnic=20
dimension there.
Meanwhile, Tamil nationalists have tried to subsume the Muslim issue=20
under the homogenizing concept of "Tamil-speaking people." Some=20
statements recently made by the LTTE leadership, using this old=20
formula, created much apprehension among the Muslim people, because=20
they thought that the LTTE was planning to totally dominate and=20
monopolize the Muslim political representation as well.
The recent tension in the Eastern Province has given a clear message=20
to both the Colombo government and the LTTE in Vanni that the Muslim=20
question has to be treated as an integral aspect of Sri Lanka's=20
ethnic conflict, and not just epiphenomenal to the 'Tamil national=20
question.'
Meanwhile, Sri Lanka's Muslim politics in general is also in deep=20
crisis. After Minister Ashraff's sudden death two years ago, the=20
community's leadership remains intensely divided. There seems to=20
exist a great deal of personal bitterness and animosity, particularly=20
among recently emerged young Muslim political leaders. These=20
divisions have also pushed Muslim politics to the mercy of major=20
political actors.
Among the Muslim youth in the Eastern province as well as those who=20
have grown up in the refugee camps, there is tremendous frustration=20
about their community's political leaders. The gap keeps widening=20
between the existing Muslim leadership and the new generation of the=20
Muslim youth who have experienced the harsh and violent conditions of=20
war. Some even have begun to talk about the need for a 'Muslim=20
Prabhakaran.' Prabhakaran or not, there is indeed the possibility of=20
a radical and uncompromising political leadership emerging in=20
post-Ashroff Muslim politics in Sri Lanka. Solutions to intractable=20
political conflicts are not easy to find. Yet, the recognition of the=20
complexity of the problem should be the first step in the direction=20
of finding strategies to manage the conflict.
The bottom-line however is that Sri Lanka has a tripartite ethnic=20
conflict which requires a tripartite settlement. This is perhaps a=20
new agenda item for UNF-LTTE deliberations before the Bangkok talks.

Daily News (6th July 2002)

_____

#5.

>From Communalism Combat
July 2002
Comment

Male order=20=20
=
=20
Liberal Muslims, men and women, must condemn the male chauvinism of=20
the All India Muslim Personal Law Board

There are at least two good reasons why liberal Muslims, men and=20
women, must demand that the All India Muslim Personal Law Board can=20
retain the acronym, AIMPLB, but change its name to All India Male=20
Privileging Laws Board. Firstly, it should be evident to any one with=20
even a little knowledge of Islam that while pretending to defend the=20
Shariah, or the Islamic way of life, all that this assorted body of=20
Muslim clerics actually does is to protect the privileges of Muslim=20
males.

One has only to do a quick comparison with laws governing family=20
relations - marriage, polygamy, divorce, maintenance and custody -=20
prevailing in most Muslim majority countries, including those that=20
call themselves Islamic to realise how shockingly anti-women India's=20
Muslim personal laws are. (That the separate personal laws for all=20
religious communities in India discriminate against women does not=20
concern us here.)

Secondly, just as the Hindutva-inspired Dharam Sansad gives a bad=20
name to the very religion it claims to represent, the AIMPLB gives=20
Muslims and Islam a bad name. It publicly proclaims and defends=20
social practices that millions and millions of Indian Muslims would=20
find too abhorrent to even contemplate.

Take, for example, the decision of the AIMPLB at its recent conclave=20
in Hyderabad to challenge the Child Marriages Restraint Act, 1929,=20
which stipulates 18 years as being the minimum marriageable age for a=20
girl. The moulvis say that the Shariah says marriage is permitted the=20
moment a girl or a boy attains puberty. So they now propose taking a=20
case before the Supreme Court of India to argue that Indian Muslims=20
be kept out of the purview of the law against child marriages!

(It is the same worthies, remember, who in the '80s had raised a=20
nationwide storm forcing the then Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi to=20
bring in a new legislation putting Muslims out of the purview of=20
section 295 of the Criminal Procedure Code - Shah Bano case).

To appreciate what this demand amounts to in practice, please note=20
that for a variety of reasons, in recent decades the age at which=20
girls attain puberty has been going down. So it is no longer unusual=20
for a girl to start menstruating when she is barely 10 or 11. Now=20
imagine a situation where, heaven forbid, the Supreme Court or some=20
future government concedes the outrageous demand of the male=20
privileges board. The moment this happens, an aged Muslim male would=20
be at perfect liberty to marry a girl child since there is nothing=20
either in the secular laws of India or the shariah that puts a=20
ceiling on the age gap between a man and a woman (or girl) of=20
marriageable age.

So what happens if a 70-year-old Muslim husband gains the 'blissful'=20
company of an 11-year-old wife? In the best possible scenario, as in=20
the case of the repugnant practice of instant talaaq, moulvi sahebs=20
compelled to condemn it as "socially repugnant" will nonetheless have=20
to defend it as "theologically unexceptionable." But the rest of the=20
modern world has a different word with which to describe such a=20
relationship - paedophilia!

The wise men from the All India Male Privileging Laws Board may not=20
know or couldn't care less that paedophilia is today considered one=20
of the worst forms of child abuse and there is a growing worldwide=20
movement against this obnoxious practice. Campaigns have been=20
launched against paedophiles from the West who are shamefully=20
exploiting the poverty in developing countries to satisfy their=20
sexual lust, the hapless child's welfare be damned. But once the=20
'Islamic paradise' the Indian mullahs dream of prevails in India,=20
western paedophiles need only fly to India convert to Islam and, hey=20
presto, acquire a 10-year-old wife!

My God-fearing sister Nikhat, a housewife, expresses outrage when I=20
ask her what she thinks of the ulema's latest agenda. Irfan Khan (24)=20
lives in Malavni, a large colony of mostly lower middle-class Muslims=20
in Malad in Mumbai. He cannot think of a single Muslim marriage he=20
has attended over the years where the girl getting married was a=20
minor.

"These moulvis are mad. Who listens to them in any case?" says Irfan.=20
Well, Varsha Bhosle, does. To this saffro sister, who obviously has=20
serious problems with Islam and with Muslims, the Hyderabad conclave=20
served up a delicious headline for her weekly column in rediff.com on=20
a platter: 'Paedophilia and the Muslim Board'.

For the last 10 years, the maulanas on the Board have doggedly=20
stonewalled an elementary demand from Muslim women: their endorsement=20
of a model nikaahnama that is entirely within Islamic principles and=20
which, if popularised, could give a lot of succour to Muslim women.=20
Amongst other things, it would put a check on the obnoxious instant=20
talaaq practice.

It is time Muslim men and women realised that the AIMPLB, which hides=20
behind the shariah, is a bastion of male privileges. To expect=20
deliverance from these misogynists who have nothing but chadar and=20
chardiwari to offer Muslim women (the Hyderabad meet also proclaimed=20
purdah to be part of a Muslim woman's 'Islamic' identity) is naivete=20
to say the least. To go no further than the experiences of the past=20
15 years, it is clear that the courts of secular India remain the=20
only forum from which Muslim women can expect some justice.

_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/

SACW is an informal, independent & non-profit citizens wire service run by
South Asia Citizens Web (http://www.mnet.fr/aiindex) since 1996.
To subscribe send a blank message to:
<act-subscribe@yahoogroups.com> / To unsubscribe send a blank
message to: <act-unsubscribe@yahoogroups.com>
________________________________________
DISCLAIMER: Opinions expressed in materials carried in the posts do not
necessarily reflect the views of SACW compilers.
\\|//\\|//\\|//\\|//\\|//\\|//\\|//\\|//\\|//\\|//|//\\|//|//\\|//|//\\|//|=
//\\|//|//\\|//