[sacw] SACW | 17 July 02

[Harsh Kapoor]

South Asia Citizens Wire | 17 July 2002

South Asia Citizens Web:
http://www.mnet.fr/aiindex

South Asians Against Nukes:
http://www.mnet.fr/aiindex/NoNukes.html

__________________________

#1. Pakistan headed for its generals' idea of democracy. (M.B. Naqvi)
#2. Pakistan: The power of the Ahle Hadith (Khaled Ahmed)
#3. India: Reshuffling Two Empty Packs: The Hard Right takes over=20
(Praful Bidwai)
#4. India: Protest the closure of the Hoshangabad Science Teaching=20
Program by Government of MP (Vinod Raina)
#5. India: Batting for the future (Rajdeep Sardesai)
#6. India: 2 documents re the Godhra Incident And its aftermath etc.
- Affidavit by Amrish Patel to the Enquiry Commission of Justice=20
G.T.Nanvati And Justice K.G.Shah
- Spot investigation reports No.1 and 2 Forensic Science Laboratory,=20
State of Gujarat
#7.Book Announcement: 'Sowing Hate and Reaping Violence- The Case of=20
Gujarat Communal Carnage' by Dr. Asghar Ali Engineer, Shama Dalwai=20
and Sandhya Mhatre
#8. Book Announcement: 'Hindu Nationalism - Origins, Ideologies and=20
Modern Myths' by Chetan Bhatt

__________________________

#1.

What Pakistan seems to be fated to have as its political framework is=20
its generals' idea of democracy.
M.B. Naqvi
Karachi July 16

Pakistan President General Pervez Musharraf has now laid his main=20
cards on the table through a broadcast on Friday July 11. Although=20
some uncertainties remain but the main ones have been removed. These=20
latter concerned mainly his election through a questionable=20
Referendum; it is now implicitly final; he is there and perhaps will=20
be there till 2007 at least. He has also strongly delineated the main=20
features of his 'real' democracy that would be inaugurated by the=20
October 2002 general election under a massively altered Constitution=20
that he is scheduled to 'restore'.

There have been, and formally there still are, some uncertainties=20
about the precise procedure to be adopted for enacting these=20
Constitutional amendments that Musharraf's colleague, General T.H.=20
Naqvi, has proposed as head of the National Reconstruction Bureau.=20
Despite, the exact procedure of enactment to be adopted not being=20
known, the very elections are being held under the thus altered=20
Constitution. Their enactment as Presidential edicts has to be taken=20
for granted. Local commentators have divided the proposals of=20
amending the Constitution into two categories: one comprises the core=20
changes that Musharraf is bent upon making and the other is subject=20
to debate, further changes and indeed give and take. Insofar as the=20
core changes are concerned, their enactment procedure is immaterial:=20
they are there already and the elections are to follow those changes=20
as if they have been enacted already.

Thus there are any number of changes in Constitution that have taken=20
place without having being enacted under any recognisable procedure:=20
the National Assembly's strength has been increased: twenty five=20
seats have been added for women (Lower House) to be elected on PR=20
principles (transferable vote) and also 60 other new members=20
categorised as technocrats in the same National Assembly plus some=20
new general seats. Most of these are also to be elected by=20
transferable vote. It is still unclear whether, as some have=20
speculated in the press, the voters will have to show his preference=20
for a given party's list for Senators, technocrats and women in the=20
polls on October 10 or the directly elected Assembly will elect them=20
through the PR system.

A new feature is the direct election of Senate, the total seats of=20
which have also been increased though the new seats are no more than=20
13. But the heart of the core changes that Musharraf wants in the=20
Constitution lies in the, as he puts it, 'checks and balances' on the=20
powers of the three 'power brokers': the President, the Prime=20
Minister and the Army Chief. He also insists that the Army has been=20
in the political business all these many decades. Therefore its role=20
has to be formalised and presumably regulated. General Naqvi's claim=20
is that his amendments would only formalise army's permanent role in=20
politics. Other details are also interesting.

The President has laid down, as authoritatively as any authoritarian=20
ruler can, that the article 58(2)(b) of the Constitution must be=20
reintroduced in it. It was under this article that five elected Prime=20
Ministers were dismissed by, nominally, the President in the space of=20
11 years between 1988 and 1999, the last being a major hatchet job=20
performed for the Army Chief through a coup d'etat by other generals=20
on October 12, 1999. Further refinements in this article have been=20
made.

Earlier the poor President was circumscribed by two conditions: if he=20
was gravely dissatisfied with the way things were being run by=20
elected officers of state, his only option was to dismiss the entire=20
elected lot, lock, stock and barrel; and the second limitation was=20
that he was bound to reorder a general election within 90 days of the=20
dismissal of the old Assemblies. Thus he had to go to the pother of=20
getting rid of the entire elected system in the provinces as well as=20
in the Centre, to be followed by a general election. An election=20
always carries an element of surprise. Now Musharraf wants his=20
discretion to be expanded either to do away with the entire system as=20
hitherto or dismiss only the offending Prime Minister and his Cabinet=20
while retaining the National Assembly; or to get rid of an offending=20
Chief Minister to be dismissed by the Governor similarly along with=20
his Cabinet. This would enable him to do a great deal of politicking=20
with and among the un-dissolved Assembly. Some would smell the rat of=20
political corruption in this.

There is another innovation. A National Security Council is to be=20
introduced. It will comprise the President, the Prime Minister, Lead=20
of the Opposition, four Chief Ministers, the three Services Chiefs=20
and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee. It will have=20
a total membership of 11 in which the President will have two votes,=20
maybe three: he is the President as well as the serving Chief of the=20
Pakistan Army. And if there happens to be a tie there will have an=20
additional casting vote of the President to decide the issue.

While the claim of General Naqvi that Army's role has been formalised=20
and made permanent is accurate, the presidential assertion that he is=20
after 'checks and balances' on the three 'power brokers' seems=20
questionable. Insofar as anyone can read the text of the (still)=20
proposed amendments, there is absolutely no check proposed on the=20
powers of either the President or the Army Chief, both being the same=20
person today. All the proposed 'checks and balances' are on the=20
powers of the Prime Minister.

In President Musharraf's words, the Prime Minister shall have all the=20
executive authority in the world to run the government, totally=20
unrestricted; he also said he is giving power (to run the=20
administration from day-to-day) and not taking any (new one). But=20
while explaining the functions of the NSC, he said that it will have=20
no executive or legislative function; it will merely watch over the=20
functions of the National Assembly in general and Cabinet and the=20
Prime Minister in particular. It can, if it has come to the gloomy=20
conclusion that the government is not being run well or in accordance=20
with the Constitution, recommend to the President to send it home.=20
Another body comprising power brokers have been foisted on Parliament=20
with power of judicially murder it. out goes the sovereignty of the=20
people through the Parliament.

Probably the only possible check on the powers of the President and=20
the COAS would be that he may graciously wait for such a=20
recommendation from the NSC in order to kill a government, with or=20
without the Parliament. If that is a check, well the check is there=20
on the President and the COAS as well. But how substantial this check=20
would be is hard to say. There is the general overhang of the Army's=20
influence on Pakistan's politics resulting from 50 years military=20
domination. The all-powerful President and the Army Chief (one man)=20
would sit in the NSC along with four other generals who are, at best,=20
colleagues and in reality his subordinates, insofar as he is going to=20
have the authority to appoint all the service chiefs as well as CJSC.=20
There would be six civilians on the Council against five generals, to=20
be sure; but they might not belong to one party or faction. The four=20
provinces may have possibly four different parties taking four=20
different views of any situation. Then there would be also the Leader=20
of the Opposition who may or may not vote with the PM or other CMs;=20
indeed the Opposition Chief might wish to side with the President,=20
the true locus of ultimate power, in the hope of his own party's=20
advancement. The President, after all, will have the power of life=20
and death over the entire elected system. The NSC, according to=20
independent observes here, is likely to be a rubber stamp for the=20
President and its function of watching over the functioning of the=20
government --- with the power to recommend its dismissal --- means a=20
super cabinet which may be an alternative or real cabinet of the=20
President, while the nominal federal cabinet would become a=20
subordinate body.

The President will have all other powers such as appointment of the=20
heads of all major constitutional offices like the Governor of the=20
State Bank, Chief Election Commissioner, Judges of the High Courts=20
and Supreme Court, the Chairman of the Federal Public Service=20
Commission, not to mention the Governors --- all in his discretion.=20
In point of fact he would have a position similar to that of the sun=20
in our solar system. And this would be the 'real' democracy, as the=20
President puts it. Where he has subordinated himself to any check or=20
having his powers balanced by that another office is hard to see,=20
despite his claim.

What Pakistan seems to be fated to have as its political framework is=20
its generals' idea of democracy. It is meant to protect their=20
existing political domination and make the Army's institutional power=20
and financial interests doubly secure. They are like Bourbons of=20
yore: have never learnt from their mistakes and are always ready to=20
make fresh, and similar, mistakes.

____

#2.

The Friday Times (Lahore)
July 12 - 18, 2002

The power of the Ahle Hadith
Khaled Ahmed's Analysis

Ex-Senator Prof Sajid Mir, Amir of Markazi Jamiat Ahle Hadith

The Ahle Hadith have always exercised great influence in the big=20
cities of Pakistan. They campaign against the non-Islamic accretions=20
of custom and call themselves non- 'imitative'. Only 6 percent of the=20
seminaries belong to them but the recent increase in them has been=20
phenomenal. They are divided into many factions, some of them keeping=20
away from politics to concentrate on preaching, while Markazi Jamiat=20
Ahle Hadith has stayed loyal to the Muslim League of Nawaz Sharif
------------------------------------------------------------------------
ccording to a report by Islamabad's Institute of Policy Studies,=20
Pakistan has 6,761 religious seminaries where over a million young=20
men are taking religious training. The Ministry of Religious Affairs=20
has given out similar numbers in its report. But Herald (November=20
2001) says: 'According to the Interior Ministry, there are some=20
20,000 madrasas in the country with nearly 3 million students'. In=20
1947, West Pakistan had only 245 seminaries. In 1988, they increased=20
to 2,861. Between 1988 and 2000, this increase comes out to be 136=20
percent. The largest number of seminaries are Deobandi, at 64=20
percent, followed by Barelvi, at 25 percent. Only 6 percent are Ahle=20
Hadith. But the increase in the number of Ahle Hadith seminaries or=20
madrasas has been phenomenal, at 131 percent, going up from 134 in=20
1988 to 310 in 2000. Out of the total number of youth taking=20
religious training in the seminaries, 15 percent are foreigners.=20
Among the Ahle Hadith, there are 17 organisations active in Pakistan,=20
looking after their own seminaries. Out of them, six actually take=20
part in politics, three take part in jehad, and three are busy=20
spreading their mazhab or school of thought. They are all puritans=20
who do not follow the state fiqh and are also called wahhabi. Most of=20
them follow the lead of the ulema of Saudi Arabia and receive=20
assistance from rich Saudi citizens.

The Great Ahle Hadith tradition: There are 17 Ahle Hadith=20
organisations in Pakistan, out of whom six take part in politics and=20
three take part in jehad. Differences of ritual exist among them, as=20
also differences of strategy. At times these differences become very=20
intense and give rise to mutual vilification, as in the case of=20
Markazi Ahle Hadith of Allama Sajid Mir and the former=20
Lashkar-e-Tayba (Now Jamaat al-Dawa) of Hafiz Muhammad Saeed. Jamaat=20
Ghuraba Ahle Hadith holds that its supporters should quietly reject=20
the political system till the majority of the population becomes Ahle=20
Hadith, after which Pakistan will automatically become Islamic.=20
Jamaat al-Mujahideen thinks that the political system is batil=20
(false) and as long as a caliphate does not come into being, it will=20
not take part in politics but will struggle to establish an Islamic=20
government. Hafiz Saeed's organisation holds the same position.

There is a central executive committee (Majlis-e-Amal) which seeks to=20
guide the Ahle Hadith establishment in Pakistan. Under it, the=20
following parties occasionally meet to decide plan of action: (1).=20
Markazi Jamiat Ahle Hadith (Prof Sajid Mir); (2). Jamiat Ghuraba Ahle=20
Hadith (Maulana Muhammad Idrees Hashmi); (3) Jamaat al-Dawa (Hafiz=20
Abdus Salam Bhatvi); (4) Jamaat al-Mujahideen (Dr Muhammad Raashid=20
Randhava); (5) Mutahidda Jamiat Ahle Hadith (Maulana Ziaullah Shah=20
Bokhari); (6) Jamaat Ahle Hadith (Maulana Muhammad Hussain=20
Sheikhupuri); (7). Tehreek al-Mujahideen (Commander Owais Sajjad);=20
(8). Jamaat al-Dawa al-Quran Afghanistan (al-Sheikh Samiullah). The=20
Majlis-e-Amal has met only three times but one agreed resolution it=20
adopted was published in the Ahle Hadith monthly journal Sahifa Ahle=20
Hadith (Karachi) in January 2000: 'We believe that General Musharraf=20
does not represent Islam or Pakistan but America and its allies. We=20
condemn General Musharraf's decision and demand that he should not=20
sow the seeds of hatred between the people and the army simply to=20
extend his personal rule. He should stop giving statements against=20
mujahideen Muslims because America and its allies listen only to the=20
language of violence and will not negotiate till the Muslim umma=20
decides to break America into pieces through guerrilla war, as it did=20
in the case of Russia'.

Markazi Jamiat Ahle Hadith: Markazi Ahle Hadith is the best known=20
party apart from Jamaat al-Dawa formerly known as Dawatul Irshad with=20
its jehadi wing, Lashkar-e-Tayba. The Jamiat traces it origins to a=20
congregation in Bihar (India) in 1906. After 1947, its two centres in=20
Lahore and Mamun Kanjan near Faisalabad kept alive the Ahle Hadith=20
tradition. It made its first show of strength in Lahore in 1986 under=20
the political activism of its leader, Allama Ehsan Elahi Zaheer. A=20
graduate from Saudi Arabia, his links with the Saudi religious=20
hierarchy and funds made him an important personality within the=20
Jamiat. Before he was assassinated (perhaps owing to some sectarian=20
tracts he wrote) he had transformed the Jamiat into a political party=20
aligned with the Pakistan Muslim League. In its manifesto, the party=20
explained the Nazriya Pakistan (Pakistan Ideology) thus: we believe=20
in the two-nation theory as the basis of Pakistan; and we believe in=20
the supremacy of the Quran and the Sunna in Pakistan. Other=20
resolutions conform the 'non-imitative' opposition to the established=20
fiqh, in this case Fiqh Hanafiya. The Jamiat also took the decision=20
to declare the rule of a woman as being against Islam. This caused=20
its opponents to label the Jamiat as a B-Team of the Pakistan Muslim=20
League. Mian Nawaz Sharif confessed that the Jamiat had served the=20
PML better than Jamaat Islami.

Very little has appeared in the press about the politics of Hafiz=20
Saeed's Lashkar-e-Tayba and its mother organisation, Dawatul Irshad,=20
because of the close coordination it enjoyed with its 'handlers'.=20
Hafiz Saeed in his early heady days took on Markazi Jamiat Ahle=20
Hadith (with whom he shared his wahhabi creed) and criticised their=20
inertia with regard to jehad. This objectionto the Jamiat is shared=20
by Jamaat Ahle Hadith of Maulana Sheikhupuri too. The Jamiat hit back=20
and discussed in detail some aspects of Lashkar-e-Tayba that no one=20
in Pakistan dared discuss for fear of the state. One 1993 cassette,=20
containing the khutba-e-juma in Faisalabad of Qari Abdul Hafeez of=20
the Jamiat, levelled the following charges: that despite the fact=20
that the leaders of Lashkar-e-Tayba held that a boy going for jehad=20
did not need the permission of his parents, their own sons did not go=20
to jehad because 'their mothers did not give permission'; that the=20
Abu Jandal Group of the Lashkar looted banks in Pakistan in the=20
(wrongly attributed) tradition of a Companion of the Prophet (PBUH)=20
who used to loot caravans to strengthen Islam; that members of=20
Lashkar abducted Barelvi girls and kept them as slaves, claiming that=20
Hafiz Saeed had allowed the custom of keeping slave girls; and that=20
colossal sums of money gathered in the name of jehad were pocketed by=20
the leaders of Lashkar.

Youth Force and Tehreekul Mujahideen: The greatest asset of Jamiat=20
Ahle Hadith is its central Wifaq al-Madaris which looks after the=20
wahhabi seminaries all over Pakistan. The Jamiat has offices in all=20
provinces but its more important support is gathered around its=20
branches in Faisalabad, Lahore, Dera Ghazi Khan, Khanpur, Jhelum,=20
Rahimyar Khan and Islamabad. It has eight subsidiary organisations,=20
among which Ahle Hadith Youth Force is quite important. Because of=20
its ability to mobilise and act, it is often called the 'spine' of=20
the Jamiat. Led by Hafiz Shahid Amin, it takes part in overtly=20
sectarian disputes, often against the Barelvi and Shia (but not=20
Deobandi) organisations in such cities as Dera Ghazi Khan where the=20
Shia community is strong. The Youth Force has fought legal and armed=20
battles with the Shias there, fully supporting the Sipah Sahaba=20
demand that Shias be declared non-Muslim. It also fights the Barelvi=20
acts of shirk against the Holy Prophet PBUH and takes over mosques=20
where such transgressions are committed. The next important=20
subsidiary is Tehreek al-Mujahideen which is a fighting outfit headed=20
by Sheikh Jameelur Rehman who heads also Pakistan's Muttahida Jehad=20
Council, the apex body of all militias fighting in the jehad. Tehreek=20
al-Mujahideen was born in Indian-Held Kashmir in 1989, but after it=20
started sending its fighters for training to Afghanistan, it first=20
aligned itself with Jamaat Ahle Hadith then 2000 onwards became=20
linked to Markazi Jamiat Ahle Hadith. It trains near Muzaffarabad in=20
Azad Kashmir and has resisted efforts for merger with Lashkar-e-Tayba.

Tehreek al-Mujahideen is funded by Haramain Islamic Foundation which=20
funnels money from Saudi Arabia. (The contact with Saudi Arabia was=20
established after the Ahle Hadith of Pakistan started a movement of=20
protection of Mecca and Madina after the Shia tried to hold meetings=20
at Kaaba). In 1985, Imam Kaaba and a representative professor of=20
Madina University became members of the Foundation. Mansur bin Abdul=20
Rehman al-Qazi of Haramain Islamic Foundation declared in the Tehreek=20
journal Shahadat in July 2000 that he was satisfied by the Tehreek's=20
spreading of the salafi faith in Indian-Held Kashmir. It is also=20
supported by the Pakistani masses through the Tehreek offices in all=20
the districts of the country. Tehreek al-Mujahideen claims that 500=20
of its warriors died in the jehad in Kashmir after killing 3000=20
Indian soldiers and officers. Among the Pakistanis killed, 215 were=20
from Punjab, 49 from Sindh, 45 from Azad Kashmir and 19 from the=20
NWFP. In all, 70 Muslims of Indian-Held Kashmir also achieved=20
martyrdom. The Tehreek received a setback when in 1999 its commander=20
Abu Waseem Salafi was martyred by Indians. In February 2001, another=20
shock came when its leader Maulana Abdullah Ghazali was captured by=20
the Indians. The wahhabi-salafi warriors of Tehreek al-Mujahideen=20
have made efforts to spread their faith in Indian-Held Kashmir,=20
converting many Barelvi mosques in Poonch and Kupwara into Ahle=20
Hadith mosques.

Jamaat al-Mujahideen Ahle Hadith: By rights Jamaat al-Mujahideen=20
should have been the 'mother' organisation of Ahle Hadith because it=20
traces its origin in the mujahideen of Syed Ahmad Shaheed (d. 1831=20
AD) immortalised in two books by Maulana Ghulam Rasul Meher. Fighting=20
against the British, the Jamaat established its secret headquarters=20
in Bajaur. In 1948, it mobilised in the Kashmir jehad. Led by Ghazi=20
Abdul Karim Khan, it today holds that democracy be replaced with the=20
Islamic system of shoora, that jehad be institutionalised on a=20
permanent basis within the state structure, and that bidaa (popular=20
accretions) be removed from Muslim rituals. In 1979, Jamaat=20
al-Mujahideen joined up with Deobandi Maulavi Yunus Khalis of=20
Jalalabad and took part in the Afghan war in all the major battles.=20
More importantly, Jamaat al-Mujahideen became the 'mother'=20
organisation for all the Ahle Hadith warriors willing to take part in=20
the Afghan jehad. All the members of the Ahle Hadith organisations,=20
including the leadership of what later came to be known as=20
Lashkar-e-Tayba, first went into Afghanistan under the aegis of=20
Jamaat al-Mujahideen.

Jamaat al-Mujahideen Ahle Hadith has some basic differences with=20
Markazi Ahle Hadith, one being that it was not askari (militant) and=20
that it had succumbed to politics and had started defending the=20
democratic system in Pakistan. Other differences centre on the=20
ownership of certain seminaries. Markazi Jamiat removed the first=20
objection by absorbing Tehreek al-Mujahideen and entering the list of=20
jehadi organisations. Another Ahle Hadith organisation Jamaat Ghuraba=20
Ahle Hadith is known for its tough puritanism and focuses on the=20
building up of the madrasa system and stiffening the generally lax=20
faith of the Muslims. Its Jamia Muawiya in Lahore is well known.=20
Another Lahore seminary at Chowk Dalgran, Jamiya Ahle Hadith, is run=20
for Jamaat Ahle Hadith by Hafiz Abdul Ghaffar Ropari. In a famous=20
case of 'love marriage' the chief justice of the Lahore High Court=20
was swayed by the non-Hanafi concept of the wali. Many judges=20
continue to recommend the concept of wali,as against the freedom of a=20
girl to marry by her own choice, because of the growing influence of=20
the Ahle Hadith puritanism. On 20 May 2002, Jamaat Ahle Hadith, is a=20
session presided over by its leader Maulana Sheikhupuri, and assisted=20
by Maulana Abdul Ghaffar Ropari and Maulana Javed Ropari, warned the=20
Musharraf government to stop secularising Pakistan, begin the=20
enforcement of Islamic law, separate non-Muslims in the voters' list,=20
and release Hafiz Saeed, the leader of Jamaat al-Dawa (formerly=20
Lashkar-e-Tayba).

_____

#3.

The Praful Bidwai Column
July 15

Reshuffling Two Empty Packs: The Hard Right takes over

By Praful Bidwai
Should one see the reshuffles of the Vajpayee Cabinet and the=20
Bharatiya Janata Party as astute moves to infuse =E9lan and youthful=20
enthusiasm into them and strengthen the National Democratic Alliance?=20
Or do they mark a new stage in their growing crisis of legitimacy,=20
inaugurating an intensified internal power struggle which could lead=20
to the BJP's weakening and possibly the NDA's unravelling? Most=20
political analysts are not impressed by the reshuffles. Even pro-BJP=20
commentators do not exult over them. But not many BJP critics have=20
argued the second position. This Column does exactly that--as a=20
plausible hypothesis.

First and foremost, the essence of all the changes under way for the=20
past fortnight plainly consists in the ultra-conservative Right wing=20
of the BJP consolidating its grip over party and government. The=20
signals are unmistakable: elevation of Mr L.K. Advani as Deputy Prime=20
Minister, handing over of the party president's post to M. Venkaiah=20
Naidu, assisted by Arun Jaitley--both Advani loyalists--and putting=20
Hindutva zealots and pracharaks like Sanjay Joshi, Bal Apte, Rajnath=20
Singh and Shivraj Singh Chauhan in key organisational posts,=20
nationally and in major states. Crucial here is Mr Vinay Katiyar's=20
appointment as BJP president in Uttar Pradesh, followed by the likely=20
appointments of Ms Uma Bharati and Ms Vasundhararaje Scindia in=20
Madhya Pradesh and Rajasthan.

Mr Katiyar stands to the right even of the Vishwa Hindu Parishad. The=20
Bajrang Dal is the rough, rabble-rousing, street-fighting gang of=20
Hindutva lumpens. Mr Katiyar once (briefly) resigned as a BJP MP=20
because he thought the party had "betrayed" Hindutva. It is in his=20
house at Faizabad, next door to Ayodhya, that the conspiracy to raze=20
the Babri mosque was hatched in its minutest detail in the morning of=20
December 6, 1992. Mr Advani was personally present at this meeting.=20
Mr Katiyar's appointment represents the Modi-fication of UP--with=20
potentially horrible consequences.

The biggest Cabinet change undoubtedly is Mr Advani's elevation. This=20
does not merely "formalise" his de facto Number Two rank. It=20
significantly changes the balance of power within the BJP/NDA. Mr=20
Vajpayee has so far had a unique hub-and-spokes relationship with the=20
BJP's allies. He mattered to each of them much more than they=20
mattered to one another. Mr Vajpayee was the public face of the NDA.=20
This has changed. Mr Advani will now support, supplement and=20
substitute for, and might eventually supplant, his role. Mr Advani is=20
not only the PM-in-waiting. He, not the exhausted, ailing Mr=20
Vajpayee, will probably lead the BJP into the next elections.

Apart from being the undisputed leader of the BJP's Right wing, Mr=20
Advani has also been the most important bridge between the party and=20
the government. It is through him, and not Mr Vajpayee, that the=20
sangh parivar, the extended groupings comprising major organisations=20
like the VHP, Swadeshi Jagran Manch and Bajrang Dal, and some 200-odd=20
other fronts of the RSS, has conveyed its critical decisions to the=20
government for the past four years. This Vajpayee-Advani division of=20
labour goes back to the 1970s. Unlike Mr Vajpayee, Mr Advani knows=20
key party functionaries state by state, region by region. It is he=20
who has systematically infused the killer instinct among them ever=20
since his infamous rath yatra of 1990.

Mr Advani has become Deputy PM in circumstances qualitatively=20
different from those in which Charan Singh and Devi Lal were so=20
elevated, marked by factional or ego-related reasons. But all Deputy=20
PMs had one thing in common: they ended up destroying their=20
governments, despite their intentions. Mr Advani's intentions matter=20
less than the balance of power that put him where he is. Besides, he=20
is even setting up a new Deputy PMO. This could emerge as a rival to=20
Mr Vajpayee, making for incoherence and worse.

Some analysts have tried to suggest that Mr Advani's ministerial=20
performance has been not just competent, but excellent; further, that=20
he has recently moderated his political views and "positioned"=20
himself as a forward-looking half-"liberal". Both propositions are=20
specious. Mr Advani's record as Home Minister is embarrassingly=20
bad--witness the mess in Kashmir and the Northeast, the bluster about=20
a White Paper on the ISI and citizens' register (neither of which=20
materialised), and the numerous breaches despite the hyped-up concern=20
with the "national security" state.

Mr Advani would like to wear the mantle of "Iron Man" Patel, known=20
for his tough handling of law and order. But he merely watched as=20
Gujartat burned. He didn't bother to visit his Gandhinagar=20
constituency for the first 100 hours after February 27, when most of=20
the killing happened. Meanwhile, corruption, communalisation,=20
declining law and order, and erosion of the state's integrity have=20
all accelerated under the pseudo-Sardar.

Even more hollow is Mr Advani's claimed "moderation". Just a year=20
ago, he tore up an India-Pakistan joint declaration draft after Mr=20
Vajpayee and Mr Jaswant Singh approved it, thus torpedoing the Agra=20
Summit. More recently, he endorsed plans for a "limited" kar seva at=20
Ayodhya (shot down by the Supreme Court), and repeatedly gave clean=20
chits to Mr Narendra Modi (the latest on July 7). Mr Advani is=20
certainly more focused and alert than Mr Vajpayee, but nothing makes=20
him a "moderate" on crucial issues: the political primacy of Hindus,=20
"cultural nationalism", Kashmir, or dialogue with Pakistan. The=20
philistine Advani Thesis, opposing Amartya Sen, that it is military=20
expenditure, not investment in health and education, that holds the=20
key to development, should put paid to all illusions about=20
"moderation".

Many other Cabinet changes at best reflect ineptitude: e.g. putting=20
Mr Jaswant Singh, who has invested so heavily in external affairs, in=20
charge of finance which he barely understands; entrusting health to a=20
C-grade Bollywood actor; putting a B-grade actor in charge of=20
culture; and giving Rollback Yashwant Sinha a portfolio a trifle=20
beyond his depth. That the reshuffle was executed without=20
consultation with the NDA's allies--only Mr Fernandes was=20
told--speaks of the BJP's growing contempt for its partners.

Partly, the partners are themselves to blame for this. By caving in=20
on Mr Modi's dismissal, they allowed the BJP to ride roughshod over=20
them and reduce the NDA to an assembly of obedient Cabinet ministers=20
by excluding regional heavyweights from its vital meetings--e.g. the=20
DMK's Karunanidhi, the Akali Dal's Badal, the BJD's Patnaik, and to a=20
large extent, the TDP's Naidu. Mr Advani's elevation would have been=20
simply unacceptable to NDA allies three, two, even one year ago. But=20
it is because they allowed the BJP to impose itself upon them, that=20
it could happen without even a murmur of protest. Gujarat was the=20
turning point: it shifted the balance of power in the NDA.

However, the principal reason for the allies' marginalisation is the=20
toughening attitude of the BJP thanks to its own Jana Sanghaisation=20
at the RSS's behest. The RSS has increasingly seen the BJP as a=20
liability because it has lost election after election and become a=20
flabby, corrupt cabal of power-brokers. It wants the BJP to return to=20
the original "trident" of Hindutva--Ram temple, Article 370 and=20
Uniform Civil Code. The RSS has reasserted itself as the BJP's=20
ideological-political master and organisational gatekeeper. The VHP's=20
latest volte face on the temple, and the swadeshi attacks on=20
privatisation must be seen in this perspective. Mr Naidu aggressively=20
affirmed that agenda on July 6 while addressing party cadres. It is=20
not just a coincidence that this was the birth anniversary of Jana=20
Sangh's founder Shyama Prasad Mookerjee. Mr Naidu says he isn't=20
"apologetic" about the hardline shift: he will march with the NDA=20
agenda in one hand, and the Hindutva trident in the other.

The BJP wants to fight the 10 state elections due next year with the=20
trident. Mr Naidu says: "Our aim should be to form a government on=20
our own " Another leader has been quoted: "Self-interest is paramount=20
at this point. If the BJP does not win at least half the states, it=20
will be left with no bargaining capacity vis-=E0-vis the NDA ." There=20
lies the rub. Sticking to the NDA's insipid and unconvincing agenda=20
means carrying the heavy negative weight of incumbency and=20
misgovernance. But selling Hindutva means considerably narrowing the=20
BJP's appeal--to the former Jana Sangh's narrow urban upper-caste=20
base. Both choices spell a likely decline for the BJP--in the absence=20
of a windfall development like a contrived crisis leading to war with=20
Pakistan.

There is yet another negative. Internally, the BJP is in the=20
vice-like grip of tension between those who stand for the jaded,=20
shop-worn, Jana Sangh agenda, and those who (e.g. Messrs Jaswant=20
Singh, Pramod Mahajan and Arun Shourie) want to promote rapacious and=20
grossly unethical forms of capitalism through predatory globalisation=20
and privatisation. For the public, these lobbies are nothing to=20
choose between. But they are crucial to the BJP's internal power=20
struggle. There is no way this struggle can play itself out without=20
further weakening the party, creating greater incoherence, unbridled=20
factionalism, and ultimately, poorer showing in the elections. All=20
that spells the B

_____

#4.

Date: Tue, 16 Jul 2002 10:22:10 +0530
From: vinod raina
Subject: Closure of HSTP

Dear Friends

You would be aware by now about the decision of the Government of=20
Madhya Pradesh to close down the Hoshangabad Science Teaching=20
Program. As a person involved with HSTP since its inception, and as a=20
co-founder of Eklavya, I feel completely outraged at the decision and=20
the manner in which it was taken. It has now come to notice that the=20
Government had prepared a note for the closure, which was never=20
shared with Eklavya. This note, circulated by Mr. Gopalakrishnan to=20
some people who protested the decision is not only superficial and=20
motivated, but even dangerous in its political philosophy. I have=20
added my responses to it and am attaching it with this mail.
It should also be clear that the Government of MP, belonging to the=20
Congress party, has taken the decision to close the program on the=20
basis of a complaint of a BJP MLA. This also raises serious questions=20
regarding the ideological stance of the present Government vis a vis=20
communal elements. I have highlighted that in an article, which is=20
also being attached.

You can send protests to the Chief Minister at: Digvijay Singh=20
<cm@m...> and R. Gopalakrishnan at: "R Gopalakrishnan"=20
<gopalkr@s...>

Regards,

Vinod Raina

Background Documentation:
Closure of Hoshangabad Vigyan [=20
http://www.mnet.fr/aiindex/Closure_HoshangabadVigyan.html ]
* HSTP report-Resposes.doc [=20
http://www.mnet.fr/aiindex/HSTPreport-Resposes.doc.pdf ]
{*All this who wish to receive the full text of this document in Word=20
should drop a note to <aiindex@m...> with the subject line HTSP=20
report]

_____

#5.

The Indian Express
Tuesday, July 16, 2002

Batting for the future
Rajdeep Sardesai
http://www.indian-express.com/full_story.php?content_id=3D6056

____

#6.

BEFORE THE ENQUIRY COMMISSION
OF JUSTICE G.T.NANVATI AND JUSTICE K.G.SHAH
(Constituted under Section 3 of the Commissions of Inquiry Act, 1952)

In the matter of Inquiry into the Godhra Incident And its aftermath etc.
AFFIDAVIT by Amrish Patel
http://www.mnet.fr/aiindex/GodhraAffidavit.html

o o o

Forensic Science Laboratory, State of Gujarat
New Mentle Corner, Ahmedabad -16
Date : 17-5-2002
Spot investigation reports No.1 and 2 regarding CR No. 9/2002, Godhra=20
Railway Police Station
http://www.mnet.fr/aiindex/FSLreport_Godhra.html

____

#7.

Date: Tue, 16 Jul 2002 11:32:13 +0530

A new book on Gujarat has been published by Centre for Study of=20
Society and Secularism. The book titled Sowing Hate and Reaping=20
Violence- The Case of Gujarat Communal Carnage written by Dr. Asghar=20
Ali Engineer, Shama Dalwai and Sandhya Mhatre is now available for=20
Rs.75/- in India, and for US$10/- outside India (Except Bangladesh=20
and Nepal) Postage Extra. Please order your copy at your earliest at=20
the following Address.

The Circulation Manager,
CSSS,
9B Himalaya Apts., 1st Floor, 6th Road,
Santacruz (E),
Mumbai:- 400 055. [India]
E-mail:- <mailto:csss@v...>csss@v...

(Cheque/DD should be drawn in favour of Centre for Study of Society=20
and Secularism)

____

#8.

Hindu Nationalism
Origins, Ideologies and Modern Myths
by Chetan Bhatt

December 2001
192pp bibliog, index

Chetan Bhatt Senior Lecturer in Sociology, Goldsmiths College,=20
University of London

The rise of authoritarian Hindu mass movements and political=20
formations in India since the early 1980s raises fundamental=20
questions about the resurgence of chauvinistic ethnic, religious and=20
nationalist movements in the late modern period. This book examines=20
the history and ideologies of Hindu nationalism and Hindutva from the=20
end of the last century to the present, and critically evaluates the=20
social and political philosophies and writings of its main thinkers.

Hindu nationalism is based on the claim that it is an indigenous=20
product of the primordial and authentic ethnic and religious=20
traditions of India. The book argues instead that these claims are=20
based on relatively recent ideas, frequently related to western=20
influences during the colonial period. These influences include=20
eighteenth and nineteenth century European Romantic and Enlightenment=20
rationalist ideas preoccupied with archaic primordialism, evolution,=20
organicism, vitalism and race. As well as considering the ideological=20
impact of National Socialism and Fascism on Hindu nationalism in the=20
1930s, the book also looks at how Aryanism continues to be promoted=20
in unexpected forms in contemporary India.

Paperback
ISBN 1 85973 348 4
http://www.bergpublishers.com/
Berg Publishers, 150 Cowley Road, Oxford, OX4 1JJ [UK].
--=20
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