[sacw] SACW #2. | 22 Jan. 02

[Harsh Kapoor]

South Asia Citizens Wire #2 | 22 January 2002

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#1. Needed a coherent India policy (M. B. Naqvi)
#2. It Doesn't Start in Kashmir, and It Never Ends Well (Sam Gardiner)
#3. PAKISTAN: General Must Fall on His Political Sword (PAULA R. NEWBERG)
#4. Bangladesh: Rights and Wrongs
#5. The International Center for Research on Women (ICRW) Fellowships

________________________

#1.

[21 /1/2002]

Needed a coherent India policy

By M. B. Naqvi

Much mischief has resulted from the presence of intrinsically
destabilising presence of nuclear weapons during the current Crisis on
the borders. They do possess an inherent deterring quality. So the two
adversaries dare not use them and have made their confrontation look
foolish: unable to take it to its logical conclusion, they find it hard
to stand down while it appeared all too easy to mass troops menacingly
at the borders. There will be time enough to talk meaningfully about the
atomic arsenals later. Right now it is necessary to arrange mutual
withdrawal that the two cannot do alone; its pointlessness will be too
obvious. They needed a third party.

As it happens, both sides have been competitively wooing the Americans
and want them to help achieve their respective objectives. India=92s main
wish is to see cross-border terrorism stopped in Kashmir with US help.
Pakistan has sought American good offices to diffuse the border tensions
and help preserve peace in the Subcontinent. At least Pakistanis have
been asking the good offices of the US. The US was delighted in being
tacitly accepted as the honest broker by both the embattled nuclear
powers, enhancing its role in the region.

But in the US Secretary of State Colin Powell=92s strategy of keeping
peace in South Asia, the ordering of immediate objectives is peculiar:
he wants Pakistanis and Indians to begin talks on Kashmir and on =91all
other matters=92 for building mutual trust --- and only after that
confidence building mutual withdrawal of troops is to take place. This
is strange. Here are two countries that are not on speaking terms, ready
to rush at each other=92s throat, and they are being asked to start
elaborate negotiations first with a view to earning each other=92s
confidence. After mutual trust has returned, they will start withdrawing
their troops and equipment from forward attacking position. Lay people
would ordinarily advise these more than mere semi-cold warriors to start
pulling back from the borders first =91without prejudice to their
political positions=92. This withdrawal itself will be the primary
confidence building block. Formal talks can only begin after each side
is sure that the other side is unlikely to make a sudden mischievous
move. Why Secretary Powell has chosen an order of business that flies in
the face of commonsense needs to be inquired into. Anyway, the US can
only bring the two sides together; every other agreement has to be
arrived at by these two together.

At all events India and Pakistan have to live side by side in peace and
they cannot ask the US diplomacy to be eternally there to persuade
(force?) them not to go war or threateningly massing their troops on the
borders. They must have enough civilisation in themselves to coexist
peacefully without external aid despite their differences. As a matter
of fact, if the US good offices, --- the effectiveness of which is
obvious --- had not been available the two sides would still have to
de-escalate tensions first by mutual withdrawals for the good and
adequate reason that both are nuclear powers that simply cannot afford
to use them. The experience since Dec. 13 last should convince both New
Delhi and Islamabad that old-style coercive diplomacy, or gunboat
diplomacy, does not now work the way it used to. Similarly the way
Pakistan was conducting its Kashmir policy has proved to be
counterproductive though earlier suppositions indicated otherwise.
Hopefully they can now draw up the rules of coexistence in the special
conditions of South Asia, as shown by the recent experiences.

Doubtless, there is the frightfully difficult question of Kashmir with
its telltale history. Experience has shown that a radically dissatisfied
power, Pakistan, simply cannot use violent ways to agitate or take the
Kashmir Valley militarily, the only area of Jammu and Kashmir state it
wants. India would rather fight than allow any secession of Kashmir
Valley. The BJP and Sangh Parivar in India might also unleash forces
that would kill far too many Muslims in India, as Kuldip Nayar has
shown, should anything like that look like becoming a probability. War
is not an option now or later. But a recognition of this reality does
not mean that Pakistan must necessarily accept the finality of the
status quo. Only, it has to realise (a) that there is no quick solution
to the Kashmir problem; and (b) that Pakistan has to have a new and more
workable longer-term India policy that includes rational efforts to
secure a democratic solution to the Kashmir issue through democratic
means.

Pakistan policies will grow from the Jan 12 televised speech of Gen.
Pervez Musharraf, although this should have come earlier, soon after the
U-turn in the Afghan policy. Its logic demands that all our stances,
approaches and policies must be based on peaceful, in fact democratic,
methodology. Pakistan itself has to democratise speedily in order the
better to employ democratic methodology. That is how it can be more
effective. The current military confrontation has shown that adequacy of
military forces, nuclear and conventional, has no bearing on problems
between India and Pakistan or for the solution of the Kashmir dispute,
issue or problem. One it is admitted that there is no military solution
of Kashmir issue, the whole military approach becomes inappropriate,
including Jihad with the gun. Political approach is the right response
to the Kashmiris aspirations.

Pakistan=92s substantial military build down, especially in the nuclear
sphere, will boost its credentials to talk peace and to gain high moral
ground. Whether or not India quickly responds, or is ready for early
negotiations, our policies must be based on patient, peace-promoting
ideas. We should now aim at exactly the opposite of what the Vajpayee
government did in December last: work for restoration of maximum
contacts between the Indians and Pakistanis, full normalisation of ties
between the two countries to at least the level they were before 1965
--- free mutual trade on the MFN basis, acceptance of SFTA and SAPTA
bases for the SAARC, seeking investments from Indians and investing in
India and of course maximum cultural exchanges. A people-to-people
friendship with India should be worked for, as the policy of controlled
hostility has resulted in the Crisis that grew out of December 13 attack
on Indian Parliament that left no way out for either side.

But what about Kashmir? It may be asked. Well, let us actually accept
what we verbally say: there is no military solution to the problem. If
so, all militaristic approaches or methods must be eschewed in favour of
recognising the true particulars of Kashmir imbroglio. If Kashmir issue
is to be peacefully and amicably solved, what it requires is that
Pakistanis have to mount a giant operation to convince the Indians that
India will actually benefit --- economically and even politically ---
more by being flexible and forthcoming to the Kashmiris. Indeed we must
ascertain and understand desires and psychology of Indians to determine
our policies: what precise quid pro quo can we offer, if any, to make
them accommodating on Kashmir and become cooperative friends with
Pakistanis.

Pakistan actually needs a growing pro-Pakistan lobby in India and it
should freely allow a pro-India lobby in this country. The basic
orientation of both countries being what it is, each has a stake in the
overall orientation of the other. A thoroughly democratic and secular
Pakistan is in India=92s interests. Similarly, Pakistan has a vital stake
in the Indian polity remaining secular, democratic and non-militaristic.
Let each state pursue this aim. The two countries and their peoples have
thousand and one commonalties of cultures, languages and literatures,
races and of course common history. Their social conditions are broadly
similar and both have to live and prosper in not only the Global Village
the world has become but in the globalised economy. There are plenty of
issues where they need to work together. Ecology of South Asia imposes
common tasks and makes cooperation an imperative.

To revert to the Kashmir issue that has caused so much trouble already,
it has to be seen that if it has to have an amicable solution, it will
be a long haul. It requires a two-pronged approach. Let approaches to
its proper democratic solution be sought by non-officials --- eminent
personalities of this big Village. It can be implemented in the fullness
of time, say 30 to 35 years. Meantime, there can be an interim and
neutral sort of arrangements for the Valley to be negotiated between New
Delhi and Islamabad. The issue of sovereignty needs to be fudged or
blurred, if it cannot be shared. Indeed, it need not affect
sovereignties but should mean an effective demilitarisation of that part
of Kashmir, full freedom to Kashmiris to travel to all parts of the old
Jammu and Kashmir State, to manage their own affairs democratically and
trade freely with both Pakistan and India, with the two countries
jointly picking up the tab insofar as the Valley is concerned. Let
Kashmiris progressively become a bridge between Pakistan and India ---
to pave the way of a rational and democratic solution of this problem.

_____

#2.

Washington Post
Sunday, January 20, 2002; Page B01

It Doesn't Start in Kashmir, and It Never Ends Well
By Sam Gardiner

"If we have to go to war, jolly good." Those were the words India's=20
army chief, Gen. Padmanabhan, used at a news conference on Jan. 11 to=20
describe the prospect of war with Pakistan.

I'm sorry, general. Maybe you were trying to show resolve, or prove=20
that you're tough. But I can tell you from experience, war between=20
India and Pakistan would not be jolly good. It would be very bad.

I've fought in more than 20 "wars" between India and Pakistan. I've=20
seen skirmishes turn into conflagrations. I've seenferocious attacks=20
across the border, and defending divisions worn down. I've seen=20
Pakistani commanders turn tonuclear weapons to fend off=20
advancingIndian divisions. I've seen New Delhi -- a city of more than=20
11 million -- destroyed and hundreds of thousands of its residents=20
killed in a flash. I'm sorry, Gen. Sunderajan Padmanabhan, I've seen=20
nothing that came close to jolly good.

How have I seen these things? In "wars" that took the form of games=20
played out by American war colleges and military services over the=20
past decade -- ever since the United States began to seriously worry=20
about the consequences of a clash between India and Pakistan. These=20
are not fanciful intellectual exercises, but serious, two-week-long=20
simulations used to educate American officers, choose weapons systems=20
they will need for the future and better prepare the United States to=20
respond to complex international conflicts. In the past, these=20
"games" have proven to be extraordinarily good prognosticators of=20
events.In the case of India and Pakistan, the outcome was nearly=20
always catastrophic. And even after the carnage, the fundamental=20
problems dividing the two nations remained unresolved.

In each of the simulated conflicts in South Asia, some incident=20
provoked the two countries into putting their forces into a high=20
state of readiness along their border. Sound familiar?A recall by=20
Pakistan of its troops participating in peacekeeping operations=20
throughout the world was on our list of actions that would indicate a=20
conflict was near. My own sense of the gravity of the current=20
situation was sharpened when Pakistan recently took this action.

On the balance sheet, India has a stronger military force. India can=20
field more than a million soldiers; Pakistan around 650,000. For both=20
countries, most of these troops are infantry. But in a major attack,=20
the decisive forces are the armor and mechanized divisions, which=20
have large concentrations of tanks. Although the balance still favors=20
India, in this area the gap is not as great and Pakistan could=20
overcome some of the disadvantage by the wise use of its units.

That means striking quickly, and striking first. To wait is to be at=20
a disadvantage. When it became apparent in the simulations that=20
conflict was inevitable, one of the sides -- usually Pakistan --=20
always initiated combat. That's why face-offs such as the current one=20
make me extremely nervous.

The historical root and most visible cause of tension between India=20
and Pakistan has been Kashmir, the region controlled by India but=20
claimed by Pakistan as part of its territory. But in previous=20
real-life wars and in the "wars" I've seen, the important fighting=20
doesn't take place in that contested area. The mountains there just=20
don't offer a good place to fight a decisive battle. Both sides look=20
to other parts of the 2,000-mile border that divides them.

The critical terrain for both sides is the Punjab valley, where key=20
north-south roads lie. On the Indian side of the border, these roads=20
are the link to Kashmir. On the Pakistani side, they link the=20
southern part of that country with Lahore and Islamabad. These are=20
strategic lifelines for both nations.

In the earliest games I took part in, before we thought Pakistan=20
possessed nuclear weapons, the conflict tended to move in a=20
relatively benign pattern, based in part on the Arab-Israeli War of=20
October 1973. I recall a discussion with a colonel on the faculty of=20
the Pakistani defense college who told me that he had his students=20
study that war. I assumed he was interested in how the Israeli army=20
surrounded the Egyptian forces toward the end of the fighting. To my=20
surprise, he said they were interested in Egypt's strategy. They=20
thought it the best example of a weaker country that was defeated in=20
war but achieved its policy objectives.

The lessons of Egypt in 1973 were not lost on Americans playing the=20
role of Pakistani leaders in past years' games. They would engage in=20
some direct fighting, but would also carry out cross-border attacks=20
in areas where Indian forces were not present in strength. It was a=20
take-territory-and-go-to-the-U.N. strategy. It was a pattern repeated=20
from the earlier wars between the two countries.

But war games try to imagine the future, and the U.S. military's view=20
of South Asia's future changed around 1993, when we began to assume=20
that Pakistan would eventually acquire nuclear weapons. (Pakistan did=20
not test a nuclear weapon until spring 1998.) That changed the=20
strategy of the Pakistani leadership. Conventional forces were used=20
differently, and the wars certainly ended differently.

Since then, these war games have unfolded in much more lethal ways.=20
An initial attack by Pakistan generally cuts the Indian link to=20
Kashmir. India responds against the Pakistani units in India, but=20
rushes its main forces toward Lahore -- Pakistan's second-largest=20
city, and the country's cultural and intellectual center. The Indian=20
teams assume, probably correctly, that, as they advance, Pakistan=20
would be forced to withdraw from its forward positions.

As Indian units advance toward Lahore, which lies just 18 miles from=20
the border post, Pakistan realizes the war is reaching a critical=20
point. If the Indians take the city, they will split Pakistan in two=20
and the Pakistani nuclear weapons will be of little or nouse. The=20
Indians must be stopped and must be stopped quickly.

In our scenarios, the only way for Pakistan to do that is by using=20
nuclear weapons on India's forces inside Pakistan. Strange as that=20
sounds, using nuclear weapons on your own territory has some=20
political advantages, and bears some similarities to NATO strategic=20
options in place during the Cold War. The world would see it as a=20
defensive measure. India would be seen as the aggressor.

It takes three or four nuclear weapons to stop the massive Indian=20
attack. Pakistani forces also suffer heavy casualties from the blasts=20
and radiation, but the Indian advance is halted.

India is left with a dilemma. Does it retaliate against Pakistan with=20
nuclear weapons?Should it hit Pakistan's cities in its initial=20
strike? That would only further cede the moral high ground to=20
Pakistan. India picks four or five Pakistani military targets for its=20
first use of nuclear weapons, but the attacks also cause significant=20
civilian casualties.

In the simulation, Pakistan responds by dropping a nuclear bomb on New Delh=
i.

The casualties from this exchange vary depending on the exact targets=20
and the winds, but they would be measured in the millions. If=20
Pakistan drops a relatively primitive nuclear weapon of 20 kilotons,=20
50 percent of the people living within a one-mile radius of the blast=20
would die immediately. Fires would ignite as far away as two miles,=20
and blast damage would extend to buildings three miles from the point=20
of impact. People 3 1/2 miles away would suffer skin burns and=20
radiation could extend hundreds of miles, depending on the weather.

The participants in these games took no pleasure in unleashing their=20
weapons of mass destruction. To them, it represented failure. In=20
1998, when India and Pakistan first tested nuclear weapons openly,=20
many strategists said Cold War-style deterrence might prevent war.=20
Yet the danger is that Indian and Pakistani leaders still believe it=20
possible to have a small conventional conflict. Soviet and American=20
leaders didn't think that way during the Cold War. As a result,=20
Soviet and American forces never traded shots across the Iron Curtain=20
the way India and Pakistan have exchanged fire across the Line of=20
Control in Kashmir. NATO and the Warsaw Pact never went to the level=20
of mobilization in Europe that has emerged between India and Pakistan=20
over the past month.

What can the United States do? One of the objectives of the war games=20
is to understand how the United States might make a difference, even=20
if it means using our own combat capabilities. After my 20 wars, I=20
still don't know how to do that once hostilities begin. Any use of=20
U.S. forces would mean taking sides; three-sided wars are not=20
possible. The United States would have to side with the weaker party,=20
meaning Pakistan. But that still might not prevent a cataclysmic=20
outcome.

A far better strategy would be for the United States to insert itself=20
strongly before armed conflict begins, and get India and Pakistan to=20
realize what they must do. We're not going to quickly solve the=20
underlying problem of Kashmir, but we can press the two sides to=20
stand down, start talking and recognize how easily they can stumble=20
forward to disaster. In the war games, we did not call a timeout and=20
allow the two countries to negotiate. India and Pakistan exchanged=20
messages through their actions. The current cycle might be broken if=20
the United States can bring about a pause for talks.

A few years ago, I ran a war game with my sophomore class at George=20
Mason University. With a little instruction on doctrine and weapons,=20
the two teams managed to fight their way to the all-too-typical=20
results. After the Pakistani team used nuclear weapons on Indian=20
combat formations,I stopped the game and asked them to reflect on the=20
experience.

I heard standard answers. "If we would have moved more divisions to=20
the point of attack, we would have been able to hold out," said one=20
student. "A heavy airstrike as the first move would have changed=20
things," said another. Toward the end of our discussion, one young=20
woman in the class asked a question I've never been able to answer:=20
"Why don't they do this kind of game with the leaders of the=20
countries so they won't let it happen?"

Now that, my dear general, would be a jolly good idea.

Sam Gardiner, a retired U.S. Air Force colonel, is a visiting=20
professor at the Air War College and the National Defense University.=20
His opinions do not necessarily reflect U.S. government policy.

=A9 2002 The Washington Post Company

_____

#3.

Los Angeles Times
January 20, 2002
PAKISTAN: General Must Fall on His Political Sword

By PAULA R. NEWBERG
WASHINGTON -- Once again, Pakistan is at the center of a South Asian=20
storm. Following a terrorist attack on India's Parliament building=20
that New Delhi blames on Islamabad, President Pervez Musharraf is=20
working his way toward a new diplomacy. He is trying to stave off=20
Indian retaliation, rearrange the remnants of his country's old=20
Afghanistan engagements, contemplate new Kashmiri strategies, find a=20
way to combat intolerance at home and weave a path toward renewed=20
relations with the United States.
Embedded in his frantic activity is a brutal irony: Pakistan's army=20
is squeezing the country into the world's tightest corner, and=20
although everyone, including the West, is banking on Musharraf's=20
rule, Pakistan's survival depends on his capacity to relinquish power=20
and move toward democracy.
Since its founding, Pakistan has been ruled too often by generals=20
whose insecurity and poor judgment have left the country living on=20
edge. The army's interests--alliances to support nuclear experiments,=20
close relations with China, meddling in Afghanistan and Kashmir and=20
cheer for U.S. interests that did not always coincide with its=20
own--have emboldened the military while exposing Pakistan to every=20
danger that domestic instability and an unstable region could conjure=20
up. The first casualty of military rule is accountability. When the=20
army patronized extremists to do its bidding in Kashmir and=20
Afghanistan, who could say "no" to misadventures that were=20
endangering the state? When the same extremists broke the law by=20
fomenting hatred and violence at home, the army couldn't say "no,"=20
either--at least, not without risking its foreign policies. When=20
civil libertarians criticized the links between domestic insurgency=20
and cross-border terror, no one was able to defend them from=20
harassment.
Have things changed since the war against terrorism, the demise of=20
the Taliban, the Indian-Pakistani skirmishes and recurring fears of=20
war?
Judging by Musharraf's recent speech, the answer is "maybe." His plea=20
for social progressivism, vague though it was, drew praise from=20
foreigners and sighs of relief from the millions of anxious=20
Pakistanis who have been held hostage to creeping intolerance,=20
violence and, in Musharraf's words, internal strife that is "eating=20
us up like termites."
But a speech needs broadly-based policies, or it's only public=20
relations. Pakistan needs policies that rejuvenate its institutions,=20
and these, in turn, require an engaged public. These are not goods=20
that military governments usually value. Without them, however, the=20
fundamental contradictions within Pakistan's domestic and foreign=20
policies will easily betray Musharraf's determination to change=20
course.
When foreign policy is predicated on fraud and terror, when the army=20
advocates policies that require illegal actions to implement, when=20
militant groups have enough resources to challenge the state's=20
monopoly on force, only a complete house-cleaning will do. Last week,=20
Pakistan's military government banned more extremist groups, although=20
not enough of them to make a significant difference, and arrested=20
more than 1,000 of their members. But Musharraf has yet to confront=20
his hardest, most important jobs: overhauling foreign policy to=20
protect Pakistan's people, borders and economy, and ensuring that the=20
fight against internal instability protects the rights of all=20
Pakistanis.
This is why serious politics has to return to Pakistan, so that=20
government can help build a compassionate state where liberty is the=20
foundation for security. Not Musharraf's politics of constrained=20
public discourse, docile elected bodies and a paternalism mired in=20
old-fashioned feudalism. Rather, Pakistan needs political contests=20
that encourage open debate, enshrine the value of fundamental rights=20
and challenge--finally--the verities that army rule has persuaded=20
civil society to accept for too long.
It would be better, of course, if a political makeover did not emerge=20
from fear of war. Pakistan's crackdown on religious extremism looks=20
like a response to Indian pushing and U.S. pulling, even though it is=20
Pakistanis who have been trying--and until now, failing--to excise=20
extremism from within. Had Musharraf seriously gone after terrorism=20
when he took office in a military coup in 1999, Pakistan and its=20
neighbors would probably be much safer, peaceful places. Instead,=20
even some of Pakistan's embattled liberals now fear that Musharraf is=20
as good as they will get from an army laced with militancy.
This is why army rule has to go--because Pakistanis should be able to=20
choose, not cower and compromise. If Musharraf truly believes his=20
words, then he will ultimately have to stand habit on its head and,=20
like enlightened authoritarians elsewhere, do himself out of his job.
This is why Musharraf's patrons in London and Washington need to=20
measure their actions with care. For the moment, Musharraf may seem=20
like a pliable autocrat who sounds like a politician and thinks like=20
a general.
But those who believe that terrorism can only be countered by=20
military strongmen should take another look at Pakistan, where=20
authoritarianism and army rule have consistently fostered instability=20
and insecurity. And then they should ask how long Pakistanis should=20
pay for short-term thinking and politically empty, military-dominated=20
partnerships.
In the past, political change has come to Pakistan in the wake of=20
war, assassination and tectonic shifts in international politics. If=20
the silver lining in today's South Asian conflicts is a belated=20
recognition that civilians should run armies and armies should not=20
run states, then we may all be a bit wiser and much, much safer.
*
Paula R. Newberg is an international consultant who works in=20
conflict-affected regions and writes regularly about politics in=20
South Asia.

______

#4.

The Telegraph (India)
22 January 2002

EDITORIAL 2/ RIGHTS AND WRONGS

There have always been debates on the definition and scope of human=20
rights, but there cannot be any excuse for the state to take away=20
these rights. By setting the journalist, Mr Shariar Kabir, free on a=20
six-month bail, the Dhaka high court has clearly signalled its=20
disapproval of the Bangladesh government's decision to imprison him=20
on treason charges. It was an ill-advised move that put the=20
government, rather than Mr Kabir, on the dock in the public mind. The=20
arrest not only tainted the early days of Ms Khaleda Zia's new=20
government but also gave her political opponents an opportunity to=20
raise a din that prompted human rights watchdogs such as the Amnesty=20
International to cry foul. Worse still, the government's secular=20
credentials became open to question as Mr Kabir was arrested for=20
trying to highlight the plight of Hindus who had fled to West Bengal=20
in the wake of attacks on them in Bangladesh. It now looks as though=20
some overzealous advisors of Ms Zia were carried away by a desire for=20
vengeance as the media at home and abroad rapped the government for=20
failing to rein in the troublemakers. Since the majority of Hindus in=20
Bangladesh traditionally vote for the Awami League, the victory of Ms=20
Zia's Bangladesh Nationalist Party in last October's general=20
elections prompted a political backlash that looked communal as well.=20
Mr Kabir, a well-known name in the country's liberation war of 1971,=20
is a known League supporter. But the government's move against him=20
was widely condemned, not just as vendetta against the League, but as=20
an attack on civil and political rights.

The government would do well to withdraw the untenable charges=20
against Mr Kabir. This is necessary to assure not only political=20
opponents but also international organizations and donor countries=20
that the new government is committed to the country's secular and=20
democratic values. Ms Zia needs to reiterate her commitment to these,=20
particularly because of the composition of the coalition that she now=20
leads. The presence of the Jamat-e-Islami in her government has=20
raised some questions about the future of certain principles on which=20
the country was founded. Sporadic attacks by Jamat activists on some=20
non-governmental organizations, in which women play leading roles,=20
have been seen as portents of a less tolerant political culture. Ms=20
Zia and her party will have to take the blame if personal freedoms=20
and human rights are threatened by any partner of the coalition.=20
Bangladesh's economic interests will be harmed if international=20
opinion, especially that of the donor countries, turns against it=20
because of a backslide in people's basic rights. Ms Zia got a mandate=20
last October to improve on the people's economic and political=20
rights. It would be a pity if she were to lose the trust so early.

______

#5.

The International Center for Research on Women (ICRW), Washington, DC,
with funding from Ford Foundation, India is pleased to announce a
fellowship program for Indian development and human rights specialists,
activists, lawyers, economists, and academics. The program provides six
fellows with three month sabbaticals at ICRW Washington to explore
conceptual and programmatic issues related to the following question:

How can a rights-based approach to development build upon the links
between economic, political, and social rights to improve the economic
condition and promote the full human development of women who are poor
and/or belong to marginalized castes, religious, or ethnic groups?

Fellows may choose to examine this questions in one of several ways -
through research, documentation of success stories, design of programs
or strategies, or in other ways that they deem important. It is
envisioned that while the Fellows' work will represent the extension of
their work within their home institutions, the collection of studies and
findings generated through the Fellows program will also contribute to a
deeper understanding of the relationship between human rights and
development and the means to operationalize that relationship. Based on
their work done at ICRW, fellows will present two in-house seminars and
prepare a summary report to be presented at an end of program conference
held in India in 2003.

Fellowship applications must include a completed application form, a
resume or curriculum vitae, two letters of recommendation from
professional colleagues or professors, and a short sample of recent
written work that illustrates the candidate's research interests and
abilities.

For further information and application forms please see a detailed
fellowship announcement at www.icrw.org or email fellowsapp@i...

Applications must be submitted by February 10, 2002 via e-mail, fax,
mail, or online submission to:

Project Director, Fellows Program
1717 Massachusetts Avenue, NW, Suite 302
Washington, DC 20036
FAX: 202-797-0020
e-mail: fellowsapp@i... (Reference: DevNetJobs.org)
online submission: www.icrw.org/fellowfrm.htm

The International Center for Research on Women (ICRW) is an independent
non-profit organization established in 1977 with the mission to improve
the lives of women in poverty, advance women's equality and human
rights, and contribute to broader economic and social well-being.

ICRW accomplishes this, in partnership with others, through research,
capacity building and advocacy on issues affecting women's economic,
health and social status in low and middle income countries. We
concentrate on the following strategic areas: poverty reduction and
economic growth; HIV/AIDS and development; social change, norms and
institutions; reproductive health and nutrition; and adolescence.

ICRW has offices in Washington, DC, USA and New Delhi, India.

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SACW is an informal, independent & non-profit citizens wire service run by
South Asia Citizens Web (http://www.mnet.fr/aiindex) since 1996. To=20
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