[sacw] SACW #1 | 23 Jan. 02

[Harsh Kapoor]

South Asia Citizens Wire #1 | 23 January 2002

------------------------------------------

#1. Of the revival of secular sentiment in Pakistan, impressions from=20
a visit. (A.G. Noorani)
#2. Pakistan India: Now list wars
#3. Moral Asymmetry (Gautam Adhikari)
#4. Burying the Zia legacy in Pakistan (Saeed Naqvi)
#5. A vision for India-Pakistan collaboration (Akbar Ahmed and Amit Pandya)
#6. India Pakistan Arms Race & Militarisation Watch (IPARMW) # 61 |=20
23 January 2002
#7. Delhi Under a Cloud of Anti-Liberty Law

________________________

#1.

Frontline
Volume 19 - Issue 02, Jan. 19 - Feb. 01, 2002

Debating the dangers
Of the revival of secular sentiment in Pakistan, impressions from a=20
fortnight-long visit.

A.G. NOORANI

A TRIP to Pakistan, while troops of India and Pakistan were massed on=20
the frontiers of the two countries, yielded insights one could=20
scarcely have gained in rich nuances in normal times. There were,=20
most remarkably, no cries for war or belligerent action against=20
India. Nor were the political parties vying with one another in=20
striking patriotic postures. There was no sign of panic. But there=20
was concern lest the situation got out of hand; most thought that it=20
would not. Regret was universal at what was perceived as India's=20
recourse to threat of war. A good few were even bitter that=20
Pakistan's nuclear armoury, though small as compared to India's,=20
provided considerable assurance of security.

ARIF ALI/AFP
Human rights activists at the Wagah border on December 31.

It was on the issue of terrorism that one heard comments that find=20
scant space in the Indian press. There is not one journalist of any=20
significance, not one public figure of any standing - bar the 'usual=20
suspects' in the jamaatis and jehadis - who had anything but scorn=20
for the terror tactics used by these outfits within Pakistan itself.=20
The 'fundos' - as the fundamentalists are derisively called - have=20
overshot their mark. It would be premature, perhaps, to say that they=20
are a spent force. It would be correct to say that their decline has=20
set in sharply and public resentment at their misdeeds is now=20
expressed more openly than ever before.

Sadly, the present crisis in India-Pakistan relations erupted just as=20
Pakistanis had begun to ask themselves searching questions about=20
their country's future, its recent travails, especially since the Zia=20
era, and indeed, about its identity. As this writer has documented in=20
detail in these columns earlier (''Secularists in Pakistan'',=20
Frontline, April 23, 1999), Pakistan preserved, against all odds, a=20
significant secular segment in its society which few in India cared=20
to understand and appreciate. On the contrary, India's hardline=20
policies and the Sangh Parivar's rhetoric harmed the cause of=20
secularism in Pakistan. The truth is that in every neighbouring=20
country in South Asia there is a body of opinion which admires=20
India's democracy, its political and judicial set-up and its secular=20
commitments, despite its failures and failings on each count. India=20
has never quite appreciated the worth of such genuine admirers or=20
forged hands with them. (The less said about the publicity-hunters=20
who profess Indo-Pakistan friendship while espousing the hardline for=20
domestic opinion, the better.)

Debate on Pakistan's identity and the danger posed by the jehadis had=20
begun, ironically, after the military coup in Pakistan on October 12,=20
1999. Benazir Bhutto, whom the Indian establishment is busy promoting=20
with utter lack of scruple, was a hardliner vis-a-vis India (goli=20
chalao) and made an alliance with Maulana Fazalur Rehman's=20
Jamiat-i-Ulema-Islam when she was in power from 1993 to 1997. The=20
Maulana was made chairman of the National Assembly's Committee on=20
Foreign Affairs. Nawaz Sharif was sympathetic to the Islamists.

General Pervez Musha-rraf began with modest efforts such as reform of=20
the blasphemy law but was forced to beat a retreat. But he had,=20
meanwhile, nailed his colours to the mast by revealing his admiration=20
for Kemalist Turkey. He had to eat half an apple pie for this as=20
well. By June 5, 2001, he had, as it were, come into his own. He=20
bearded the lions (no pun intended) in their own den when he=20
addressed a conference of the clergy (Ulema) that day at the National=20
Seerat Conference convened by none other than his Minister for=20
Religious Affairs, Dr. Mahmood Ghazi, in order no doubt to provide an=20
opportunity to the General to speak out his mind. Which he did: "I=20
would like to talk on that (Prophet Mohammad's message) frankly,=20
simply and in my own idiom. I do not have a written text before me...=20
How does the world look at us? The world sees us as backward and=20
constantly going under. Is there any doubt that we have been left=20
behind all, although we claim Islam will carry us forward..."

Little was left unsaid. But what was said is of direct relevance to=20
us when we appraise the kind of person our interlocutor is. Is=20
President Pervez Musharraf one with whom we can "do business"?=20
Pakistanis will have to decide whether he can deliver on his promise=20
to restore democracy.

"We claim it (Islam) is the most tolerant of faiths. How does the=20
world judge our claim? It looks upon us as terrorists. We have been=20
killing each other. And now we want to spread that violence and=20
terror abroad. Naturally, the world regards us as terrorists. Our=20
claim of tolerance is phoney in its eyes...

"Where do we see justice and equity? Do you see it? In Pakistan?=20
Where? Look at the judiciary's performance. Corruption is rampant and=20
misdemeanour the order of (the) day. Only sifarish works. Merit has=20
no takers. The poor are oppressed. To be poor in Pakistan is a curse.=20
Everybody oppresses him...

"This is the justice about which we brag so much that Islam provides.=20
But where is it in Pakistan? And for whom? For the rich, maybe. For=20
the powerful, maybe. What about mutual tolerance? It exists nowhere.=20
Instead, we are killing each other wearing masks...

"We know and the world knows that whenever we took up arms for Islam,=20
we did it openly, not hiding behind the masks, not through terror,=20
not firing a burst and then slipping away. This is not the way to=20
promote an ideology... This is sheer cowardice. Do it openly if you=20
want...

"One example comes to my mind. One hears the boast that we will hoist=20
our flag on the Red Fort (in Delhi). We will do this, we will do=20
that. Have your ever thought of the consequence of such talk on=20
Muslims in India...

"On the contrary, this provides India with the excuse to talk about=20
you as terrorists and to tell others to declare you as terrorists so=20
that prospective investors shy away from your country. When you kill=20
each other, who will consider Pakistan a safe place for investment?"

He concluded by saying "above all, religion should never be exploited=20
for political gains. Do not sully our great faith.''

The speech came as a shot in the arm for publicists who braved the=20
ire of the fundos and kept the flag of secularism flying even in=20
depressing times; most notably I.A. Rehman, a veteran of many battles=20
in the noble cause, and Khaled Ahmed, Consulting Editor, The Friday=20
Times.

December 13, 2001, had a mixed impact on this debate. Most argued=20
that India's military moves deprived Musharraf of the political space=20
he needed to continue his fight against the 'fundos'. But they=20
stressed that considerations of prestige should not deter him from=20
what he should be doing in Pakistan's own interests, anyway.

Significantly, in the clime generated by the intra-Muslim debate, the=20
minorities came forward and boldly ranged themselves on the side of=20
the liberals who, in turn, strove to offer amends for the past. Two=20
meetings held during the writer's tour merit particular mention. In=20
Islamabad on January 3, the Sustainable Development Policy Institute=20
organised a seminar on the Blasphemy Law, which has been abused to=20
target not only members of minority communities - Hindus and=20
Christians - but also Ahmadis. Aslam Khaki, an eminent jurist and=20
consultant of the Federal Shariat Court, pleaded for reform of the=20
law so that investigation precedes the lodging of a first information=20
report. "Even the execution of this law is illegal because Islam does=20
not allow such harsh punishments." The court's position on that law,=20
he said, was legal but un-Islamic. Islam did not allow such=20
punishments. He mentioned that fear of reprisals from extremists=20
deterred even judges of higher courts from deciding the cases. "We,=20
the silent majority, have let them carry out their activities which=20
need to be dealt with an iron hand."

The Concerned Citizens Forum in Lahore has been holding interactive=20
dialogues since 1999. On January 5, it held one on the question which=20
Pakistanis are asking themselves today - "What kind of Pakistan do we=20
want?". The keynote speaker was one of Pakistan's ablest diplomats,=20
Iqbal Akhund. Others who spoke were Khaled Ahmed and Group Captain=20
(Retd.) Cecil Chaudhry, a national hero of the 1965 war fame, who is=20
an educationist and peace activist. He is a Christian. M.L. Shahani,=20
another speaker, is an advocate of the Supreme Court of Pakistan,=20
while S.U. Kaul is a social activist. The invitation card quoted=20
Jinnah's famous speech in the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan on=20
August 11, 1947, in which he said "...in course of time, Hindus would=20
cease to be Hindus and Muslims would cease to be Muslims, not in the=20
religious sense... but in the political sense as citizens of the=20
state." The speakers pulled no punches. Shahani reminded the audience=20
tartly that the Koran described god as the lord of the Universe=20
(Rabbul Alameen) and not as one of the Muslims alone (Rabbul=20
Muslimeen).

Two features of the debate must be noted. Not even the most ardent of=20
liberals or secularists favour abandonment of Pakistan's stand on=20
Kashmir. They advocate a compromise acceptable to all the sides - the=20
two states and Kashmiris - and denounce the use of violence. More to=20
the point, they remind us that in Pakistan, the fundos faced one=20
debacle at the polls after another. They used muscle power to make up=20
for want of electoral support. In India, they said, the 'fundos' are=20
in power at the Centre.

_____

#2.

The Frontier Post
Now list wars
Updated on 1/21/2002 11:04:10 AM

India had handed over a list of 20 wanted persons to Pakistan some time ago=
.
Of these, 14 are said to be Indian nationals, and the rest Pakistanis.
President Pervez Musharraf, when asked about this list and what he=20
intended to do in response to the Indian demand to hand them over,=20
said that there was no question of handing over any Pakistani=20
national.
However, he added if evidence were provided against them, they would=20
be prosecuted here.
As to the Indian nationals in the list, the president categorically=20
denied that the government knew anything about them or their=20
whereabouts.
They were certainly not in our custody, he said.
Now Foreign Minister Abdul Sattar has revealed during his joint press=20
conference with the visiting Canadian Deputy Prime Minister that he=20
has seen the Indian list and the government will examine it carefully.
He too echoed the president in saying that Pakistan would not hand=20
over any of its nationals to India.
As for extraditing wanted Indian nationals, he stated that it=20
involved a complex legal and political procedure.
He also said that some of these Indian nationals were allegedly=20
involved in old offences dating back for example to a hijacking=20
incident of 1981.
India has simply picked up some old files and made this demand, the=20
foreign minister asserted.
But he too was adamant that without any evidence, no action could be=20
taken, whether the person concerned was Pakistani or Indian.Mr Sattar=20
then went on to make the startling observation that Pakistan too has=20
a list of wanted persons who had taken refuge in India.
Although he did not reveal who these people were or what were their=20
alleged crimes, observers see this as a hint at the members of an=20
ethnic political group that was active in urban Sindh, and some of=20
whose members were thought to have fled to India some time ago to=20
escape the police action against them during the 1990s.
The thrust of Mr Sattar's remarks was centred on reciprocity in not=20
giving refuge to each other's criminals and wanted persons, and only=20
then could the 'complexities' of mutual extradition be resolved in a=20
satisfactory manner.
One report in the press now says that the Indians have moved the=20
goalposts again by demanding a list of all the Kashmiri groups and=20
their members fighting in Indian-held Kashmir.
Not only that, a list should be compiled to show who were the persons=20
who infiltrated from Pakistan into Indian-held Kashmir to conduct=20
militant actions.
Pakistan of course, has dismissed this as just a propaganda ploy,=20
aimed at trapping Pakistan into admitting that it has been militarily=20
supporting the armed struggle in Indian held Kashmir.
In the case of Pakistan-India relations, one is tempted to look for=20
hopeful signs.
But it is always better to prepare mentally for the worst This list=20
'war' promises to become the latest episode in a sorry history of=20
tit-for-tat rivalry between the two South Asian neighbours.
It would be too simplistic to assert that one-upmanship has motivated=20
the Musharraf government, irked by New Delhi's constant harping on=20
its 'wanted' list since December 13.
But the timing of Mr Sattar's remarks cannot be just a coincidence.
If India has played footsie with the issue of the 'wanted' list to=20
embarrass Pakistan and try to paint in the colours of a harbourer of=20
criminals and terrorists, Islamabad now seems to be gearing up to pay=20
India back in the same coin.
This is neither an issue which should delay de-escalation of tensions=20
or normalization of relations, nor something that should assume the=20
importance of a ping-pong war of words that it seems rapidly to be=20
acquiring.
If relations could be restored to an even keel between the two=20
countries, this is an issue quite capable of being resolved in a=20
rational, mutually acceptable manner.
But in the present climate, neither this nor weightier matters are=20
likely to see reasonable closure.

______

#3.

The Times of India
TUESDAY, JANUARY 22, 2002
LEADER ARTICLE
Moral Asymmetry
GAUTAM ADHIKARI
[ TUESDAY, JANUARY 22, 2002 12:47:52 AM ]
WASHINGTON, DC: Last Sunday's Washington Post carried an article by a=20
retired US air force colonel, Sam Gardiner, who began by chiding the=20
Indian Army chief Gen S Padmanabhan for saying, "If we have to go to=20
war, jolly good". He went on to tell his readers about the likely=20
horrendous consequences of such a war, between nuclear-armed India=20
and Pakistan, as generated by war games played at American war=20
colleges.
It was in part a descriptive and, therefore, informative piece. It=20
even made a point of some merit by arguing that Gen Padmanabhan had=20
sounded unnecessarily casual. The colonel, however, went on -=20
somewhat in the revelatory tone of a Sunday preacher - to suggest=20
that the Indians and the Pakistanis seemed to be unaware of what they=20
would do to themselves if they didn't change their ways. He concluded=20
with an anecdote from a war game scenario he had conducted in a=20
sophomore class at a local university, where at the end of the=20
exercise a young woman had asked," Why don't they do this kind of=20
game with the leaders of the countries so they won't let it happen?"=20
The colonel thought it was the kind of profound question he had never=20
been able to answer.
He would probably have found a few complex answers had he not assumed=20
that the South Asian stand-off was merely a case of two irritating=20
schoolboys misbehaving, in complete disregard of consequences, and=20
all that was required, as he was recommending, was teacher in the=20
shape of the United States knocking their heads together into talking.
It is as if half a century of subcontinental history has not=20
happened. It is as if the Pakistanis and Indians have never heard of=20
war games, that they have never played similar exercises in their own=20
war colleges. By implying throughout the piece that India as the=20
bigger boy should take bigger steps to withdraw from the brink of=20
catastrophe, he ignores the fact of a continuous low-intensity=20
conflict being waged from across the Line of Control in Kashmir for=20
over a decade in the clever but risky calculation that India would be=20
paralysed into inaction from responding conventionally because of the=20
nuclear fear.
He even makes the point that in the event of an actual war, the US=20
might have to side with Pakistan, which is the weaker power=20
militarily. His concern for military asymmetry makes an implicit=20
assumption of moral symmetry between India and Pakistan. This problem=20
of moral equivalence between the two in American eyes has a long=20
history, influenced by the exigencies of the Cold War. Today, most=20
Americans in influential positions in the administration and Congress=20
have begun to separate India and Pakistan. Each would have to be=20
treated differently, asymmetrically if necessary, they understand.
If the world desires stability in the South Asian region, it needs=20
quickly to appreciate an important regional truth: Pakistan must be=20
rescued from itself. And three communities must understand the=20
urgency of the need more than any other - the Pakistanis themselves,=20
we Indians and the Americans.
Most Pakistanis understand their predicament well. If they are not to=20
end up as a failed nation, they will have to rein in the one=20
institution that has made itself both the only reliable body to hold=20
the nation together through repeated crises as well as its nemesis -=20
the Pakistani military establishment. Time and again, it has=20
interfered with the political process ostensibly to enforce order,=20
which it has been able to bring about in the short run, but, in fact,=20
to strengthen its stranglehold on the system.
Democracy, that necessarily messy and imperfect process of conflict=20
management through incremental and error-prone steps within a=20
consensually devised system of institutional checks and balances,=20
never had a real chance to take root in Pakistan. The military=20
repeatedly intervened to short-circuit the process, no one more=20
egregiously so than the late Zia-ul-Haq, who took reckless steps=20
towards Islamicising the nation and its armed forces.
For the military rulers, their sway over Pakistan has been a bonanza.=20
As long as they can keep a large number of people convinced that=20
there are huge threats to the nation, internal and external, they can=20
not only justify their reign, they can regularly commandeer a=20
disproportionate chunk of the national budget for defence. In per=20
capita terms, Pakistan spends a whopping $24 for every citizen on=20
defence against India's $15, to cite just one relevant comparison.
Today, another army general is the best bet that the Pakistanis have=20
to dismantle the dangerous experiments of Zia and other military=20
rulers. Thanks to the current opportunity, delivered once again=20
unexpectedly by a turn of history, all democratic Pakistanis must=20
hold General Musharraf's feet to the fire over his promise to=20
democratise Pakistan within a set time-frame. For it is through the=20
determined practice of democracy alone that Pakistanis can hope for a=20
stable society that is at peace with itself and its neighbours.
New Delhi will cautiously have to recognise the general as a=20
relatively promising leader, if their goal is to turn Pakistan away=20
from the path of terrorist violence towards a path of possible peace.=20
India does not trust General Musharraf, who we know as the mastermind=20
of the Kargil misadventure. We rightly see that move by the Pakistani=20
military as an attempt to scuttle the peace dialogue started in=20
Lahore. But today, he has his own and his country's survival at stake.
A stable, democratic Pakistan is in India's vital national interest.=20
A splintering Pakistan, especially one in which no one knows who=20
controls the nuclear button, and from which millions of refugees=20
might flee across borders for cover from violence or for sheer=20
economic survival, is not in New Delhi's security interest. A=20
peaceful, democratic Pakistan - one with which India could trade=20
freely - would be good for everybody, except perhaps the Pakistan=20
military if its mindset remains unaltered by the new circumstances.

The Americans are in a strong position to impress upon the Pakistan=20
military the need to reverse direction. They not only can help pacify=20
the country, they can convince the general to take steps towards=20
democratising Pakistan. And they have a powerful presence in the=20
World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, both crucial to=20
Pakistan's future as a nation. The Americans can make a real=20
difference.
They should, however, ignore the voices of those who still spout=20
patronising sermons to the two naughty little boys of South Asia.

______

#4.

Indian Express
January 18, 2002
WIDE ANGLE

Burying the Zia legacy
Saeed Naqvi

Instead of questioning Musharraf's sincerity, it's in everyone's=20
interest to help him along

BY delivering that speech last Saturday General Pervez Musharraf has=20
embarked on a path which will conclusively end (if he succeeds, that=20
is) the era inaugurated by General Zia-ul Haq. Both Zia and Musharraf=20
responded to external factors and navigated their state accordingly.

One came to power at a period during the Cold War when the US was=20
feeling particularly vulnerable. The joke in Washington in the '70s=20
was that detente was like going to a wife swapping party and=20
returning home alone. Musharraf's rise coincided with Pax Americana=20
at its height.

All was fair in the war against the Soviet Union, including Islamic=20
fundamentalism. Zia took advantage of this high tolerance level for=20
religious extremism and sank his nation in an Islam that would be=20
disengaged from the civilisational pull of Hindustan where, awkwardly=20
for him, resided the world's second largest Muslim population,=20
greater than Pakistan's.
It was America's high tolerance of Islamic extremism in the '70s=20
which over time bred the Al-Qaeda cells, which struck New York and=20
Washington on September 11. A shaken America, determined to exorcise=20
ghosts from the past, found in Musharraf a willing, even=20
enthusiastic, ally. As Henry Kissinger said the other day, it is=20
pointless speculating about Musharraf's sincerity: it is in=20
everyone's interest, including that of the Muslim world, India, China=20
and the West, to help him along the difficult journey.

To simplify the narrative for the purposes of the Bollywood movie=20
script, the scene must open at the OPEC headquarters after the=20
quadrupling of oil prices by the Arabs following the 1973 Yom Kippur=20
war. Western economies are rattled. The Sheikhs are everywhere - from=20
hotels (and hospitals) in Bombay to the Savoy and Dorchester in=20
London. Simpson's roasts are now from halal meat. Saville Row sets up=20
assembly lines to cater to the new clients from the Gulf. Even Marks=20
and Spencers had to put up signs in Arabic. Anti Christ had entered=20
the citadel.

Before the West can comprehend the phenomenon, the Iranian revolution=20
brings into focus a cleric with a novel headgear and long, flowing=20
gowns, avowedly Islamic and virulently opposed to the West. In fact,=20
the graffiti on the walls paints the US ''Shaitan-e-buzurg'', or the=20
senior Satan.

Once the Soviets occupy Afghanistan, Zia finds a role for himself,=20
boosted by the West and Saudi Arabia but often for distinct reasons.=20
The Iranian revolution is a direct challenge to the Saudi monarchy=20
for leadership of the Muslim world. The Saudis re-adjust, tone down=20
their kingly hues, call themselves the keepers of the holy places.=20
They then mount a counter attack by funneling large sums via Pakistan=20
into a project of Wahabiisation of Afghanistan which, in the long=20
run, will work as a bulwark against Iran's Shia Islam.

Zia has in the past served in Saudi Arabia, leading a Pakistani elite=20
special force brigade to protect the Saudi royal family. So he knows=20
the Saudis well. Americans, meanwhile, must defeat the Soviets in=20
Afghanistan. Zia, willingly, serves both these purposes - to set up=20
an anti-Iran Islam in Afghanistan and to mobilise this force in the=20
war against the Soviet Union.

A large Muslim country cannot set up an extreme variety of Islam in a=20
neighbouring country without setting itself up as some sort of a=20
model, becoming an embodiment of such beliefs. In this development=20
lay Zia's India policy: spread a hard shade of green across Pakistan=20
which makes Pakistan more of a West Asian state, divorced from South=20
Asian culture.

How Zia's Islamisation project, Nizam-e-Mustafa or government=20
according to Sharia, impacted on India has to be understood. Since=20
Nizam-e-Mustafa coincides with unprecedented wealth in Arab hands,=20
Indian labour with a heavy Muslim component turns up in the Emirates,=20
Saudi Arabia, and Iraq. Remittances which were to the tune of $8=20
billion begin to alter the sociology of Muslim enclaves like Calicut=20
and Hyderabad. Flushed with cash, the Arabs begin to fund madrasas in=20
the cause of Islam. The Sikh agitation in Punjab, Mrs Gandhi's=20
assassination, the widely published Meenakshipuram conversions - all=20
combine to create a Hindu backlash.

Muslims are seen as the Congress votebank and therefore an obstacle=20
in the way of the backlash manifesting itself. Begins a competition=20
between the Sangh Parivar and Congress for the Hindu soul. Rajiv=20
Gandhi opens the locks of the Ayodhya temple to please the Hindus; he=20
reverses the Shah Bano judgement to attract the Muslims. Loses=20
control of the game. The BJP, from two seats in Parliament in '84,=20
returns in '98 as the largest single party.

In this phenomenal rise of the BJP, the role of external influences=20
cannot be ignored - Nizam-e-Mustafa in Pakistan and a perception,=20
sometimes far in excess of the fact, of huge Arab investments in=20
''Arabisation'' of Indian Muslims. It was like water being made=20
''wetter''.

Musharraf has clearly seized upon the moment as one who has been able=20
to make a reappraisal of the Muslim predicament and its urgent need=20
for reform to meet the challenges of the modern world. In this he=20
deserves all our help not in any patronising sense but as partners.

______

#5.

The Christian Science Monitor
Commentary > Opinion
from the January 17, 2002 edition

JOHN OVERMYER

A vision for India-Pakistan collaboration
By Akbar Ahmed and Amit Pandya

WASHINGTON - With troops massed at the India-Pakistan border, and=20
communication and travel between the two nations frozen, we are=20
reminded of the perpetual possibility of armed conflict between these=20
nuclear-armed neighbors.

Rich in culture and resources, and the birthplace of several great=20
civilizations and world religions, the region is marked by poverty=20
and conflict. Despite its recent advances in cyberscience and its=20
mature spiritual traditions, India evokes images of disease and=20
social dysfunction. Pakistan suggests religious intolerance, and a=20
culture of irrational violence. For both of us - one Pakistani, the=20
other from India - this is a source of immense sadness.

Until modern times, the region was a model of financial and=20
administrative accomplishment. Its traders were wealthy, its=20
manufacturers highly productive, its craftsmen exquisitely talented.=20
The Muslim Moghuls ruled a predominantly Hindu population and=20
elaborated an Indian civilization that partook of both cultures.

The Moghuls developed a sophisticated and equitable tax system. This=20
structure was so well designed, the British emulated it in setting up=20
their local administration in India, itself the pride of the British=20
Empire. In the 16-century empire of Akbar the Great, the poorest=20
province had revenues larger than those of the United Kingdom.

Today, all must also acknowledge the contemporary accomplishments of=20
Pakistanis and Indians: abroad and at home, in education, business,=20
leadership of international financial institutions and UN agencies,=20
academic life, and literature. And though justifiably known for=20
women's oppression, both countries have had women political leaders,=20
activists, journalists, diplomats, novelists, and filmmakers.

As British India moved toward independence in 1947, greatness was=20
expected by all - Britons, secular Indian nationalists, Muslim=20
partisans of a separate Pakistan, and Hindu revivalists. India would=20
inherit British power and wealth, and revive its own ancient cultural=20
greatness.

Greatness was also expected of the relatively small and impoverished=20
new nation of Pakistan, so gifted was its leadership. The first=20
generation of Pakistanis sought to revive the greatness of Indian=20
Muslim civilization. They sought to represent the interests of all=20
Muslims of the subcontinent.

Between Rabindranath Tagore, the poet and first Indian to win the=20
Nobel prize in 1913, and the Pakistani physicist Abdus Salam who=20
shared the Nobel prize in 1979, came an extraordinary group. Nehru,=20
India's first prime minister, was an accomplished historian.=20
Radhakrishnan, its second president, was a renowned scholar and=20
philosopher, as was Iqbal, the poet and intellectual hero of=20
Pakistan's national movement. This firmament included women such as=20
India's Sarojini Naidu, the poet of national awakening. Greatness=20
will continue to elude both societies in the absence of prosperity=20
and security. Neither is possible without peace.

There are as many Muslims in India as there are in Pakistan. A=20
Pakistani who cares about the welfare of Muslims everywhere must=20
surely see that a weak and impoverished India is not in the interests=20
of Indian Muslims. And if the hostility persists, Pakistan's=20
greatness will remain hostage to it. Indian nationalists concerned=20
with India's strength, prosperity, and security (or chauvinists=20
aspiring to revive Hindu greatness) must see that a weak and hostile=20
neighbor is a liability.

The armed tension between them aggravates their poverty. Vast=20
portions of their budgets have been devoured by their relentless=20
search for military security or advantage with respect to the other.=20
Their rush toward nuclear weapons compounds this vicious cycle.

The stakes are enormous. India and Pakistan account for almost=20
one-fifth of the human race. But their common problems also offer the=20
occasion for cooperation. The populations of both are still=20
predominantly rural, and their national economies rely substantially=20
on the prosperity of farmers. River-based irrigation offers one of=20
the few means for scientific agriculture. In a water-scarce and=20
population-intensive environment, rivers are also key to the welfare=20
of urban dwellers.

One positive example of longstanding cooperation so far has been=20
their agreement and consultative mechanism for dealing with the=20
complex Indus River system that crosses their border. This could be=20
expanded and updated to allow more integrated and cooperative=20
planning for mutual benefit.

The two face common, even interrelated, problems of international=20
crime and terrorism and public-health issues such as tuberculosis and=20
polio. Cooperation on those would be of mutual benefit. Both also=20
face similar challenges of ending illiteracy, child labor, and=20
oppression of women. They could share experiences and learn from each=20
other.

The process of dialogue and collaboration on these practical problems=20
would also build understanding between Indians and Pakistanis. We can=20
imagine the peacemaking effects of Indian and Pakistani women=20
discovering in dialogue that what they have in common is greater than=20
what divides them.

The initiation of such a visionary enterprise must come from both the=20
political leaders and the business and cultural leaders of both=20
countries, as well as grass-roots organizations already addressing=20
these problems. Civil society can push politicians to do what is=20
right. Cooperation offers the almost certain prospect of more=20
prosperity for business, a richer culture, poverty reduction, and=20
popular empowerment.

In the process of collaboration, each could become what it aspires=20
to, and what the other would respect rather than fear.

* Akbar Ahmed, former high commissioner of Pakistan to the United=20
Kingdom, is the Ibn Khaldun Chair of Islamic Studies at American=20
University. Amit Pandya is a former US government official and a=20
member of the Washington Foreign Policy Group.

______

#6.

India Pakistan Arms Race & Militarisation Watch (IPARMW) # 61 | 23=20
January 2002 is up on the web.

http://groups.yahoo.com/group/IPARMW/message/72

______

#7.

Dated: January 21, 2002

Dear Sir/ Madam,

Commonwealth Human Rights Initiative is an international, non-=20
partisan NGO advocating for human rights and police reform.
The recent piece of legislation passed by the Delhi Police to combat=20
organised crime impinges on citizen's rights. We condemn both the Act=20
and the action of the Delhi Police to take such shortcuts. We are=20
sending our views on the MCOCA and related legislations in 650 words.

We hope that our views will find a place in your column "letters to=20
the editor".
Best wishes,
Sincerely,
Dr. Doel Mukerjee
(Project Officer)

Delhi Under a Cloud of Anti-Liberty Law

When the TADA grew into a monstrous act and there was immense public=20
criticism both at home and abroad, the government let it lapse.=20
However, soon the rulers found that it is inconvenient to function=20
and over the last five years the country has seen several pieces of=20
legislation which are similar to the TADA with well camouflaged names=20
such as: Prevention of Terrorism Act (POTA) 1998; Maharashtra Control=20
of Organised Crime Act (MCOCA) 1999; Karnataka Control of Organised=20
Crime Bill 2000 and Andhra Pradesh Control of Organised Bill 2001 are=20
all waiting assent of the President. To complete the picture the=20
Prevention of Terrorism Ordinance 2001 was like a grand finale to the=20
concert of instruments of crime control.

As the civil society had not quite recovered from the onslaught of=20
the POTO, the Delhi Police quietly sprung the sibling of MCOCA on an=20
unsuspecting elected government and the citizens. The excuse for=20
implementation of such a law being that crime syndicates can be=20
tackled better by comprehensive laws such as the MCOCA.

The MCOCA like the TADA is undemocratic and contrary to the rule of=20
law of the country as guaranteed under the Constitution. The MCOCA=20
will help Delhi to be a zero tolerance crime zone and provides=20
immense powers to an already power intoxicated trigger happy police=20
force. The new legislation has the following features that are:

1. The period of detention will be 30 days instead of 15 days.=20
Article 9 of the ICCPR states that anyone arrested on a criminal=20
charge shall be brought promptly before a judge and shall be entitled=20
to a trial. The above stated period of detention is frightening as=20
the detenu will be held incommunicado and in the process be=20
terrorised by the legal procedure even though he is ultimately proved=20
innocent.
2. The accused will not be given a reason for the arrest. It=20
is ironical that in a democracy a person can be held in custody for=20
over a week without knowing exactly what he has done wrong but this=20
is precisely what is possible under this law. This will also prevent=20
the detenu from effectively applying for bail. This clause is=20
contrary to article 9 (2) and 14 3(a) of the ICCPR.
3. Confession before a DCP rank officer will be admissible in court.
4. Telephones can be tapped. Hence we have no privacy as this=20
will effectively become a police state.
5. Property of the accused can be attached.

Now the question arises as to why we must traverse the same route as=20
TADA where it is a well known fact that the conviction was only 1%=20
and Gujarat and Maharashtra gained notoriety with the large number of=20
people incarcerated in the already overflowing jails. It is also a=20
fact that Maharashtra inspite of having such a police friendly law=20
has shown no relent in extortion cases, kidnapping and contract=20
killings. Obviously MCOCA is ineffective in controlling crime.

It also amazes the members of the civil society that only last week=20
the Delhi Police Chief at a press conference claimed that all cases=20
of dacoity, kidnapping, robbery, motor vehicle theft have gone down,=20
obviously with effective policing, good intelligence collection and=20
above all meticulous investigations. This statement itself that the=20
crime graph is showing an all time low is enough proof that we do not=20
need such short cuts to crime control. Besides we as citizens are awe=20
struck by the ever-increasing police expenditure and police strength=20
in the capital to combat crime. Short-cuts through encounters or=20
through implementation of laws have never been effective mechanisms=20
in crime control. They encourage police personnel to be=20
irresponsible, lazy and authoritarian. Hence as members of the civil=20
society we condemn the legislation as it is non-participatory, ruler=20
friendly and takes Delhi of the 21st century back to the dark ages.

_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/

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