[sacw] SACW #1. | 22 Jan. 02

Harsh Kapoor aiindex@mnet.fr
Tue, 22 Jan 2002 00:39:15 +0100


South Asia Citizens Wire #1 | 22 January 2002
[ apologies to all for the previous version off the dispatch with not=20
table of contents]

------------------------------------------

#1. Serves 'em right! (Irfan Husain)
#2. Girls victimised by early marriage - Women disempowered from the word '=
go'
#3. LIFE IN KABUL
Keeping Their Faiths Under Taliban Rule Drew Sikhs and Hindus=20
Together (Amy Waldman)
#4. Lend him your ears, Mr President (Lahori)
#5. September 11 & Muslim fundamentalism (Ishtiaq Ahmed )
#6. Vow to continue movement for ban on communal politics
#7. Letter from a South Asian Academic to organisers of an exhibit at=20
an American Museum not to give in to pressure from Hindu=20
Fundamentalists
#8.Bangaldesh: Lalsalu - an important feature film

________________________

#1.

DAWN
19 January 2002

Serves 'em right!
By Irfan Husain

Are human rights divisible? Are certain people more deserving of=20
sympathy and support than others? Or, to draw from George Orwell's=20
"Animal farm", are some animals more equal than others?
To judge by the treatment of Taliban and Al-Qaeda prisoners at the=20
hands of American forces, the answer to these questions would have to=20
be an unqualified 'yes'. As scores of prisoners are transported,=20
drugged and with their heads in burlap bags, to a base in Cuba, human=20
rights groups in Pakistan have been curiously silent. Whatever=20
protest there has been has been limited to the western media.=20
Similarly, the current draconian crackdown on suspected Islamic=20
activists has not been met with any objections from any quarter=20
except for a handful of religious leaders despite the dubious=20
legality of these widespread arrests.
Similarly, when hundreds of prisoners were bombed to bits in=20
Mazar-i-Sharif, or when detainees in Kandahar, transported in sealed=20
containers, suffocated to death, thee was very little anger or=20
indignation at these gross human rights abuses. Collateral damage?=20
Civilian casualties? Forget about it. We have stopped counting the=20
innocent men, women and children in Afghanistan who have paid with=20
their lives for the September 11 attacks.
Our callous attitude is a reflection of the polarization in our=20
society between a small, vocal and scattered secular minority that is=20
confronting a violent and well-organized fundamentalist lobby. For=20
decades now, they have been trying to set their own agenda for=20
Pakistan, and over the last twenty years, it seemed that the liberal=20
cause was lost. However, the reactionary parties overreached=20
themselves in their arrogance over both Afghanistan and Kashmir, and=20
suddenly find themselves without official patronage and at the=20
receiving end of the army's jackboot.
After years of being hounded by these elements, the liberal and=20
secular forces can perhaps be excused their barely-muted glee over=20
the predicament of the mullahs. Despite their relatively small=20
numbers, it is these people who have developed whatever human rights=20
activism has taken root in the barren soil of Pakistan. Reviled and=20
condemned as 'western agents' by government ministers and=20
fundamentalists, these brave souls have long been the conscience of=20
this nation against great odds. So if they quietly mutter "serves=20
them right!", they can be forgiven this expression of malice.
It is true that we are all highly selective in our support of the=20
downtrodden and our condemnation of the oppressor. Thus, while our=20
blood boils at the barbaric treatment meted out to the Palestinians=20
by Israeli authorities, how moved are we by the plight of, say, the=20
Tutsis in Rwanda? In numerical terms, this tribe has suffered far=20
more casualties than the Palestinians, and yet I do not recall a=20
single demonstration in their support.
History, religion and geography often combine to determine our=20
sympathies. But more importantly, we tend to rally round a victim if=20
he is 'one of us' Thus, when Najma Sethi, editor of Lahore's Friday=20
Times, was picked up one night three years ago by Nawaz Sharif's=20
goons and illegal confined for nearly a month, there was an uproar.=20
There were demonstrations, editorials and protests from governments=20
and organizations abroad. Eminent lawyers, journalists and human=20
rights activists jumped into the fray. And rightly so, as the free=20
press in Pakistan was seen as being under attack.
But when religious extremists are subjected to such highhanded=20
official action, thee is little or no outcry. The reason, of course,=20
is that they are viewed as the biggest human rights violators=20
themselves. Indeed, these people have scant regard or respect for=20
democratic norms and resort to vilification and violence to forward=20
their agendas. Loud, vociferous and often dangerous, they drown out=20
and intimidate the voices of liberalism and secularism.
Mercifully, religious parties have been rejected time and again=20
whenever elections are held in Pakistan. Indeed, they have yet to=20
gain over five per cent of the popular vote or have over half a dozen=20
members in the National Assembly. Their repeated electoral failure=20
has made it clear that they cannot come to power through the ballot=20
box, and hence their readiness to hitch their star to military juntas=20
and right-wing political groupings. But fundamentally, they have no=20
respect for democracy. Indeed, Islamic groups the world over have=20
shown their contempt for the rule of the majority as well as=20
parliamentary institutions. They feel they have a God-given right to=20
trample over individual liberties to further their cause.
Given these attitudes, it is difficult to see how such groups and=20
individuals can be accommodated in a democratic dispensation. Since=20
they do not recognize the right of elected, secular parties to=20
govern, they are an immensely destabilizing force, and one that has=20
been used in the past by the ISI as well as disgruntled and defeated=20
politicians to topple elected governments. Their assumption of a=20
divine mandate makes it difficult to conduct a dialogue or a debate=20
with them.
And yet, despite their limited numbers and support, they have managed=20
to shift the politics of Pakistan towards the religious right. This=20
is as much a victory for them as it is a defeat for secular elements=20
which, largely through their own incompetence and lack of spine, have=20
been pushed into a corner. The current drive to contain extremism is=20
an opportunity for them to get their act together and fight the=20
forces of darkness. Basically, they need to emerge from their drawing=20
rooms and actively engage in the political process.
It is entirely fitting that a military ruler should put the=20
fundamentalist genie back into the bottle after a predecessor had let=20
it loose. Zia, in order to create a constituency for himself, had=20
cynically encouraged the rise of the most fundamentalist elements in=20
the land. After his unlamented exit, his civilian successors sucked=20
up to these parties instead of marginalizing them. The ISI behind the=20
scenes used them in Afghanistan and Kashmir, thereby strengthening=20
them in every way.
But just as we thought all was lost, a conjunction of external and=20
internal forces and pressures has given us one last opportunity to=20
cleanse the system of this clear and present danger. A precondition=20
is that the political party that forms the government after elections=20
this year must ensure that it supports the current crackdown, and=20
does not knuckle under to extremist rhetoric and threats.
Meanwhile, if any human rights groups are planning a demo for the=20
release of the hundreds of jihadis in unlawful confinement, I hope=20
they won't wait for me to turn up.
_____

#2.

The Daily Star (Bangaldesh)
21 January 2002

Editorial
Girls victimised by early marriage
Women disempowered from the word 'go'

A UNICEF survey has been shockingly revelatory of the incidence of=20
early marriage among girls, the mean average age being put at between=20
14 and 15 years. About five per cent of girls, even in the 10-14 age=20
group, are married off, something of a body-blow to gender-based=20
progress. But the Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics puts the mean age=20
at 18.3 years which is where we start with the disadvantage of a=20
reduced recognition of the magnitude of the problem to address it=20
properly.

The Bureau of Statistics data in a way tend to confirm the=20
widely-held view that parents in the countryside overstate the age of=20
their daughters to skirt the law on minimum age for their marriage,=20
which is 18 years. This they are able to do because there is no=20
registration of births. Thus it is absolutely imperative that the law=20
requiring registration of births is enforced first, with teeth given=20
to its content, where necessary, before we can think of enforcing the=20
law on minimum marriageable age for girls.

What, however, will be key to remedying the situation is a strong=20
political will on the part of the government of the day to apply the=20
law of the land and the various international conventions on the=20
rights of the child, the girl child in particular. Simultaneously, a=20
campaign must be carried out to ensure a broad-based social awareness=20
of the ills of early marriage such as, denial of normal adolescence,=20
reproductive health and individuality so that the field is prepared=20
for the elimination of child marriage.

So long as we fail to strategically link the cause for women's=20
empowerment to that of removal of the bane of early marriage we will=20
not succeed in either.

______

#3.

http://www.nytimes.com/2002/01/20/international/asia/20HIND.html

The New York Times
January 20, 2002

LIFE IN KABUL
Keeping Their Faiths Under Taliban Rule Drew Sikhs and Hindus Together

By AMY WALDMAN

KABUL, Afghanistan - The men emerge from the rubble like an=20
apparition, 10 of them, most bearded and turbaned. They move toward a=20
bruised, shuttered building whose roof has been caved in by a rocket,=20
and unlock the door. They pass through an interior courtyard, remove=20
their shoes and enter a vast room empty except for a barren altar and=20
perfumed smoke. They move down a path formed by incense holders and=20
fan out around the altar into a semicircle. Their voices echoing off=20
the emptiness, they pray
Every Sunday in the late afternoon, the Sikhs and Hindus of Kabul -=20
those few who are left - traverse a circuit of sorrow. Like family=20
members visiting a grave, they go to their five ruined houses of=20
worship, stopping to pray at each one. The temples were on the front=20
line during the factional fighting that devastated Kabul in the early=20
1990's. Only two survived intact.
The temples once held large crowds of worshipers. But the Sikh and=20
Hindu populations of Afghanistan have hemorrhaged over the last=20
decade - from around 50,000 in the early 1990's to 2,000 or fewer=20
today, in cities like Ghazni, Jalalabad and Kandahar. In Kabul there=20
are exactly 520 Sikhs and Hindus, in 40 Sikh and 10 Hindu families.
PHOTO: Chang W. Lee/The New York Times
War has left Sikhs and Hindus in Kabul with only two houses of=20
worship, including the Singh Saba temple.
The two religions are distinct - Hinduism, the majority religion in=20
India, recognizes both a single deity and other gods and goddesses as=20
his manifestations while Sikhism is a monotheistic religion founded=20
in the late 15th century - and in India, they have been at odds,=20
sometimes violently. But in Afghanistan their adherents have been=20
brought together by their depleted ranks and common language and=20
origins. So small are their numbers now, and so few are the places to=20
worship, that they pray together.
Many of the Sikhs and Hindus here were once prosperous merchants,=20
bankers, moneylenders or currency exchangers, in some cases=20
controlling the currency bazaars. But in the last decade they were=20
battered by war, sectarian violence and criminality. So they pulled=20
up roots hundreds - even thousands - of years old, and left for India=20
and Pakistan, Europe and America. A series of attacks on their=20
temples in late 1992 and early 1993, in retaliation for an attack by=20
militant Hindus on the Babri Masjid, a mosque in northern India, were=20
the most searing.

Those who remain here, often the least well off, reserve their=20
harshest criticism for the mujahedeen government of that period.=20
"They were looters and thieves," said Ravindar Singh, who runs a=20
school for Hindu and Sikh children.
Then, in 1996, came the Taliban, who offered security, but at the=20
cost of freedom.

Under Taliban rule, the Hindus and Sikhs made their Sunday=20
pilgrimages in secret, wanting to preserve what little was left from=20
a capricious leadership. They could not use microphones or=20
loudspeakers during their prayer services. Girls had to study in=20
secret. Their property was sometimes taken. At various points, the=20
Taliban government tried to force them to wear identifying yellow=20
cloth and fly yellow flags over their homes.
Now, with elements of the old mujahedeen government part of the power=20
structure again, the Sikhs and Hindus are watching carefully, as are=20
their co-religionists in exile. Many of them found life abroad=20
difficult, and they were often unable to find work. They are eager to=20
return.

The signs so far are positive. In December, an emissary of the=20
interim government came to meet with Sikhs and Hindus, assuring them=20
that they were part of Afghanistan, and to invite them to send=20
representatives to the inauguration.
Kartar Singh, who used to import clothes and other items from Dubai,=20
says he hopes that soon, if the new government holds, he will be able=20
to again. In the early 1990's the mujahedeen burglarized his house=20
and shop. "In the last years, we were broke," said Mr. Singh, who is=20
not related to Ravindar Singh, the school principal. Sikhs commonly=20
hold that surname.

Their spirits were broken too, but not completely; ritual and=20
spirituality have girded them. Each morning and evening, they gather=20
at one of the two remaining houses of worship, Singh Saba, in the=20
Karte Parwan district, to pray.
A 12-year-old girl, Balmed Kaur, has helped to lead the prayers, a=20
yellow scarf draped around her neck. She is a natural religious=20
leader, with a strong, confident voice and devoutness written on her=20
face. With the school behind the temple lacking for teachers, she has=20
been roped into religious instruction.

The school was started 25 years ago, and used to have a roll of=20
thousands. Today there are 52 students.
In one room, two dozen or so children, ages 5 to 12, are sitting,=20
their small shoes strewn in the hall outside. They have one teacher.=20
Ravindar Singh, the principal, says the school cannot afford to hire=20
any more. On one recent morning, with the teacher outside, the=20
children quietly read to themselves, whispering the letters and words=20
of their books, the sound filling the room like rustling leaves.

When the students are older, the teacher, Autar Singh, 35, may=20
perhaps instruct them in the cruelties of human behavior and Afghan=20
history.
Mr. Singh is one of five brothers, born in Paktia Province, and is=20
the only one left. His last brother's death came as Muslims in=20
Paktia, and elsewhere in the country, were taking retribution for the=20
attack on the Babri Masjid in India in 1992. Hindu temples and Sikh=20
gurdwaras in Afghanistan - in Ghazni, Khost, Jalalabad and even Kabul=20
- were looted of carpets and other valuables, and in some cases=20
burned. Thousands of Sikhs and Hindus fled the country.

Hindus and Sikhs had always existed apart from the country's tribal=20
politics. They speak Punjabi at home and Dari or Pashto, depending on=20
where they live, in public. This was the first time they had felt=20
singled out for their religion, said Ravindar Singh, the principal.
"There had never been Hindu- Muslim problems," he said. "Hindus and=20
Sikhs here were not interested in politics. They were traders and=20
workers."
Even that commercial identity came under threat as the mujahedeen=20
looted their way across the country. Autur Singh, too, was a robbery=20
victim, at his house and shop, when the mujahedeen entered Kabul in=20
1992. Now, as a teacher at the school and assistant at the temple, he=20
is the breadwinner for 27 people.
"I do not believe in these people," he said of the new government.

In 1999, the Taliban fatwa, or holy order, came. It required all=20
non-Muslims to wear identifying yellow cloth and to fly strips of=20
yellow cloth over their homes as well. Non-Muslims were forbidden to=20
live in the same houses as Muslims, to criticize Muslims or to take=20
them to court. They were also forbidden to build places of worship.=20
Hindu women, who had been allowed to cover only their heads, were=20
ordered to wear burkas but also the identifying yellow cloth.
The decree was only sporadically enforced until last year, when=20
officials suddenly decided to hew to it strictly in Kabul. The=20
government said the decree was meant to protect Hindus - who, unlike=20
Sikhs, do not wear beards and turbans and who thus could be subject=20
to harassment by the religious police.

The Hindus and Sikhs rejected that explanation. "They wanted to=20
humiliate us," Kartar Singh said.

They protested, but to little avail. So they went to the Foreign=20
Affairs Ministry with a list of every Sikh and Hindu in the country,=20
and said, "If you do this by force, we will all evacuate the country=20
and go to India."

It seemed a sadly empty threat, given how few of them were left, but=20
combined with pressure from the United Nations, it worked. The=20
Taliban backed off.

Less than six months later the Taliban were gone, and the Hindus and=20
Sikhs were not. Today, by choice, they fly a yellow flag over the=20
Singh Saba temple, proudly proclaiming its presence, and theirs.

______

#4.

DAWN
21 January 2002
Features

Lend him your ears, Mr President
By Lahori

Shahid Nadeem, the television and stage director, playwright and=20
human rights activist, has made the following points in a letter he=20
wrote to President Pervez Musharraf on January 16.
The establishments controlling the electronic media and the=20
performing arts are mostly ill-equipped and are not committed to the=20
projection of an enlightened, modernist and tolerant image of Islam=20
and Pakistan. The professionals in these organizations need to be=20
educated and sensitized.
Enlightenment and progress cannot take place in a culturally barren=20
society, where freedom of expression is neither assured nor=20
encouraged. The culture of extremism and hatred can only be countered=20
by a culture of love, peace and tolerance.
Television is a vital instrument for the promotion and projection of=20
this new image of Pakistan at home and abroad. However, it is=20
controlled by people who are indifferent, if not hostile to the=20
President's policies. At a time when the international and Indian=20
channels have invaded our space and are capturing vast audiences in=20
Pakistan, our national TV networks are behaving in a schizophrenic=20
manner by either totally insulating themselves from the revolutionary=20
changes taking place in the media worldwide or aping rival channels=20
immaturely and clumsily.
In short, they scoff at Gen Musharraf's policies openly in their=20
offices just opposite to the President's House. They may be averse to=20
change but they are experts at making their immediate bosses happy.=20
No wonder then, that in the past two years, everything has changed=20
except the top TV management.
Citing his own case, Shahid Nadeem makes the following additional points:
He is one of the founders of the country's leading non-commercial and=20
socially committed theatre group, Ajoka. He has worked for Amnesty=20
International as their communications officer. He has only recently=20
completed a fellowship in Los Angeles where several of his plays have=20
been produced by leading American Arts organizations, which has been=20
a breakthrough for Pakistan.
He is a Sopore-born Kashmiri and was the first producer to come up=20
with trend-setting serials on Kashmir in the early nineties.
He has been associated with PTV as a producer and as a playwright=20
since 1979. He was the general manager of the Lahore centre of PTV in=20
1997, when the newly elected prime minister, Mr Nawaz Sharif, visited=20
the station and publicly threatened him with drastic action for=20
writing and producing a PTV serial, Zard Dopeher, which he (Mr Nawaz=20
Sharif) regarded as an attack on his person and politics. Soon=20
afterwards, he was sent on leave, demoted and transferred to Quetta.=20
Eventually, he was dismissed in August, 1998, for a press interview=20
in which he had criticized the misuse of PTV by the government then=20
in power.
Since then, Shahid Nadeem has been banished by PTV as a writer and as=20
a producer. If he visits PTV offices to meet old friends,=20
explanations are sought from the latter. If someone interviewing=20
someone so much as mentions his name, it is expunged.
Shahid Nadeem's TV serial on honour killings, Beghairat (2001), was=20
not allowed to go on air in spite of the government policy on=20
educating the people on the issue. His TV serials are not allowed to=20
be retelecast. His name on the list of general managers has been=20
removed in Lahore, the only instance since the PTV's inception in=20
1964. Even his press conference welcoming Mr Nawaz Sharif's removal=20
from office has been held against him. When the ministry of=20
information ordered his reinstatement, the order was not complied=20
with on one pretext or the other.
Since October, 1999, he has moved all authorities concerned but in=20
vain. It appears that a public snub by Mr Nawaz Sharif has been=20
enough to excommunicate him for more than two years after the former=20
prime minister's ouster from office.
Shahid Nadeem ends his letter on a personal note to the president. He says:
"I do hope that this letter reaches you and that you find time to=20
glance through it. ... I will continue to support your jihad against=20
extremism and obscurantism, which is crucial for the survival of our=20
country."
Well, I hope so, too. May Shahid Nadeem's travails come to an end=20
soon. But Gen Musharraf has so much on his plate that I don't think=20
he has the time or the inclination to attend to problems like Shahid=20
Nadeem is facing. It's like hoping against hope.

______

#5.

The Friday Times, 18 January, 2002

September 11 & Muslim fundamentalism

Ishtiaq Ahmed argues for a new vision for a world based on solidarity=20
and understanding

Muslim fundamentalism is a most complicated phenomenon. It is both a=20
reaction to Western domination and exploitation of the last two=20
centuries as well as an expression of profound crisis from within.=20
The internal crisis results from a worldview singularly unsuited for=20
accepting pluralism, individualism, and an open, democratic life=20
style. Most Muslims, however, do not subscribe to a literalist and=20
dogmatic conception of Islam.

Given the developments in the wake of September 11, what is therefore=20
needed is not an attack upon Islam, which is a great spiritual force,=20
but a concerted campaign to purge Muslims of fundamentalism that has=20
brought them suffering and humiliation. The West needs to look at the=20
phenomenon with greater understanding and empathy than has been=20
forthcoming so far. There was a time when Western governments,=20
especially the US, exploited the obscurantist forces within the world=20
of Islam for its strategic purposes. Now, the time has arrived to=20
correct that policy.

Muslim modernisers and Western opposition
Recent writings often ignore the fact that the West has played a=20
crucial role in undermining attempts by Muslim leaders to break out=20
of the stranglehold of medieval Islamic dogma. Two examples would=20
illustrate this. The modernist-secular revolution initiated by=20
Mustafa Kemal Atat=FCrk in Turkey from 1919 onwards saw the combined=20
strength of the British, French and Greek forces invading Turkey.=20
Having first defeated and dismembered the Ottoman Empire, the British=20
now wanted the sultan/caliph, virtually their prisoner in Istanbul,=20
to be recognised as the legitimate ruler instead of Atat=FCrk. Had that=20
claim prevailed, Turkey would today be a rump state somewhere in the=20
backyard of Anatolia ruled by incompetent and absolutist kings. The=20
Allies gave up the idea of crushing Atat=FCrk only when it became clear=20
that he was not a Bolshevik agent and in fact admired Western=20
democratic institutions.

King Amanullah Khan of Afghanistan, who in the late 1920s embarked=20
upon a most ambitious programme to modernise his medieval state and=20
society, was not so lucky. Deeply impressed by the Kemalist model he=20
undertook a major modernisation programme. The British, who then=20
ruled the Indian subcontinent, suspected Amanullah of harbouring=20
pro-Soviet sympathies (without any good reasons except that he sought=20
to normalise relations with the USSR). Consequently, British agents=20
conspired with the most reactionary Afghan cleric of the time Mullah=20
Shor Bazar (an intellectual forbear of Mullah Omar) and had him=20
overthrown in 1929 and replaced by Bacha-yi Saqao, a rogue and a=20
bandit.

Cold War and the Dulles doctrine
After the Second World War, the internal struggles of the Muslim=20
world between conservative-reactionary regimes, on the one hand, and=20
modernising-secular regimes, on the other, were subjected to the=20
geopolitical concerns of the Cold War. Given the peculiar=20
circumstances of the decolonised Muslim world the=20
conservative-reactionary regimes invariably found support from the=20
metropolitan colonial powers and the USA while the=20
modernising-secular regimes were courted by the Soviet Union. For=20
example, the strongly nationalist regime of Dr Mussadegh in Iran was=20
overthrown in 1953 in a coup masterminded by the CIA. Conservative=20
Iranian clerics were involved in that coup. A foreign policy doctrine=20
was propounded by President Dwight D. Eisenhower's Secretary of=20
State, John Foster Dulles. The Dulles Doctrine assumed that in Asia=20
the bulwark against Communism could not be provided by indigenous=20
liberal forces because they were weak and small. The only effective=20
counterweight was the religious forces. Consequently in the Muslim=20
world good relations were sought with conservative regimes and where=20
radical ones were in power, clerical opposition against them was=20
helped in different ways, including through financial and other=20
support. Consequently struggles for democracy and human rights were=20
subordinated to bracing fundamentalist parties and movements. In=20
realist terms, the Dulles Doctrine was indeed ingenious since it=20
subordinated international politics and relations to the main=20
security concern of the United States: to contain and defeat the=20
spread of Communism. However, such policy proved disastrous for those=20
regimes in the Muslim world that were struggling to eliminate poverty=20
and ignorance through land reforms and other egalitarian measures.

The Dulles Doctrine paid full dividends when the Soviet Union=20
intervened in Afghanistan in 1979 with a view to helping the=20
Communist coup of 1978 to stabilise. Centred on Saudi Arabia, an old,=20
trustworthy, enormously rich ally, and including the various=20
Sheikhdoms of the Persian Gulf, the CIA and veteran British colonial=20
officials with first hand experience of the Afghanistan frontier were=20
able to mobilise Islamic warriors from far and wide. Osama bin Laden=20
was one of those younger cadres who came to conduct jihad against the=20
infidels. The indoctrination of militant Muslim youths by US and=20
British experts meant that jihad against the infidels became a duty=20
of the mujahideen. >From the 1980s onwards, Islamism began to receive=20
academic respectability it hitherto had been denied. Wholesale=20
literature highlighting an Islamic peculiarity of inextricably=20
linking religion and politics was accorded an essentialist and=20
authentic property. The high priests of such orthodoxy were not=20
Muslim ideologues but American and European professors conferring=20
scholarly respectability to such formulae. Pakistan became the=20
citadel of this fundamentalism, which wreaked havoc upon Pakistani=20
society in terms of sectarian attacks, harassment of women and=20
persecution of non-Muslims. Externally the jihadis began to entertain=20
hopes of creating an Islamic superstate including Pakistan,=20
Afghanistan and liberated Kashmir.
A new vision for a world based on solidarity
and understanding
Now, of course, the West, in particular the US, is keen to eliminate=20
the threat posed by Muslim fundamentalism and has unleashed a=20
systematic campaign to attack the bases and strongholds of the=20
jihadis. Such punitive action however will not suffice. A new vision=20
needs to be developed in which terrorism as a means of challenging=20
asymmetries of power may become increasingly marginal. To begin with,=20
the West should learn to get away from its confrontational rhetoric=20
recognising only civil and political rights as valid and legitimate=20
human rights and debunking social and economic rights as mere=20
ideological claims. No serious student of human rights will deny that=20
human rights of all kinds are interrelated and mutually reinforcing.=20
What is needed are comprehensive strategies of promoting the complete=20
package of rights. Such a change need not be seen as a threat to the=20
market economy. Just because command economies were flawed should be=20
no reason to thrust the neo-liberal economic formula on the whole=20
world. Without economic justice there cannot be genuine and lasting=20
peace in the world. Also, the US must use its influence to bring=20
about a fair solution to the Israel-Palestine conflict as well as=20
that over Kashmir between India and Pakistan.

The writer is Associate Professor, Department of Political Science,=20
Stockholm University

______

#6

The Daily Star
21 Jan 2002

Vow to continue movement for ban on communal politics

UNB, Dhaka
Speakers at a discussion meeting of Ekatturer Ghatak Dalal Nirmul=20
Committee on Saturday made a fresh call to root out the killers and=20
collaborators of 1971 from the soil of Bangladesh.
They also expressed their firm commitment to continue movement for a=20
ban on communal politics and demand or an end to repression on the=20
minorities across the country.
The discussants recalled with deep respect the contributions of late=20
Jahanara Imam, who had played pioneering role in the movement against=20
killers and collaborators of 1971.
Prof Muntasir Mamun, vice president of Nirmul Committee, chaired the=20
meeting marking the 10th founding anniversary of the committee, at=20
the Liberation War Museum auditorium.
National Professor Kabir Chowdhury, Barrister Shawkat Ali Khan, Prof=20
BK Jahangir, Abed Khan, Wahidul Huq and Nirmul Committee general=20
secretary Kazi Mukul spoke on the occasion.
Prof Kabir Chowdhury said Nirmul Committee has been agitating for the=20
last 10 years to promote a spirit against fanatics, fundamentalists,=20
communal forces and killers of 1971.
"The country is not moving ahead. It is running backward to the=20
mediaeval age. The government is misguiding the youth distorting the=20
history of Liberation War and erasing the name of Bangabandhu Sheikh=20
Mujibur Rahman," he said.
Prof Borhan Uddin Khan Jahangir said the political leaders of the=20
country could not build a 'cultured society,' for which the common=20
people are now suffering.
"The present government is aiming at uprooting the spirit of=20
liberation war and establishing a government by those people who have=20
no links with the liberation war," he added.

Columnist Abed Khan said the process of turning the country into a=20
'Taliban State' is going on in a very smooth way.

Wahidul Huq said the state acted shamelessly with writer-journalist=20
Shahriar Kabir filing a false case against him.

_____

#7.

[18 January 2002

To: Elaine Charnov
Director, Public Programs and Artistic Director, Margaret
Mead Film & Video Festival
American Museum of Natural History
79th St. at Central Park West
New York, NY 10024
USA
Email: Charnov@a...

Cc: Ms. Laurel Kendall
Curator of Hinduism Exhibit
Anthropology Dept.
American Museum of Natural History
79th St. at Central Park West
New York, NY 10024
USA
E-Mail: LKendall@a...

Dear Elaine Charnov and Laurel Kendall,
I am writing this to you as an academic working on South Asia=20
regarding the showing of two films by Anand Patwardhan in your=20
planned exhibition on Hinduism. I have come to know that some Hindu=20
fundamentalist groups are against the screening of the films by=20
Patwardhan. Of these two films, I have seen In the name of God. It=20
was shown on the British television some years ago. I and my wife=20
who is philosophy lecturer watched the film together. Both of us=20
were highly impressed with the content and form of the film. It was=20
a bold and imaginative film which weaved together different range of=20
materials to tell a story of the destruction of the Ayodhaya mosque=20
which made the viewer aware of the complex forces behind this tragic=20
event. I would request you not to succumb to the pressure of the=20
narrow minded sectarian forces who do not want any ideas to be=20
projected which challenge their narrow-minded world view.

I have not seen the other film" We are not your monkeys" and=20
therefore, feel not competent to comment on that. However, I have=20
seen the synopses of that film and to the extent, this film portrays=20
the historical dimensions of the existing social reality of Dalit=20
life in India, it contributes to widening our understanding of=20
Indian culture and history. Some years back, I saw another film by=20
Patwardhan on the agricultural labourers in Canada and was highly=20
impressed by the professional quality and the message of the film.=20
I also read some years ago a brilliant film review by him in the=20
Economic and Political Weekly journal published from Mumbai. I have=20
never met Patwardhan and did not have the opportunity to discuss his=20
work but what I know about his work, I can say without hesitation=20
that he is a brilliant, courageous and imaginative film maker whose=20
work endeavours to better the human condition. Works by artists like=20
him need as much coverage as possible and it is all the more=20
important to give an opportunity to artists like him who are under=20
attack from the Hindu establishment both in India and abroad. With=20
best wishes
Yours sincerely
Pritam Singh
Senior Lecturer in Economics and Member Editorial Board International=20
Journal of Punjab Studies.

Pritam Singh Oxford Brookes University Business School Oxford OX33 IHX=
, UK
TEL +44 1865 485875 Fax +44 1865 485830 Email psingh@b...

_____

#8.

The Daily Star
21 January 2002

Cinema
Lalsalu clears censor

Culture Desk
Lalsalu, a feature film of alternative nature, is all set to hit the=20
silver screen. Based on one of the most celebrated novels of=20
contemporary Bengali literature, written by Syed Waliullah, the=20
cinematic version is a fine production from top filmmaker Tanvir=20
Mokammel.
The Censor Board has recently issued clearance certificate to the=20
novel-based feature film that was the sole obstacle for its late=20
release.
The Premiere show of Lalsalu will be held in the city on third week=20
of February and a tentative date in this regard has been fixed on the=20
16th of next month.
The synopsis, in short, features a considerably large number of=20
character among whom the figures of Majid, Jamila, Rahima, Awal Pir=20
and those of several other names come under limelight to reign and=20
influence the entire plot.
The settings of the story happen to reveal some marshy rural district=20
of the country during the mid-40's. Majid, a very poor bearded=20
Maulana arrives at the village, to be a complete stranger among the=20
innocent yet superstitious inhabitants.
With his religious appearance and behaviour, the fake Majid manages=20
to take control of the villagers' psychology, hence begin his=20
exploitative commercial business of Pirism.
Majid, one day, declares an old, dilapidated grave of an unknown=20
person behind the bamboo forest that to be of some famous Pirs'.=20
Unaware villagers, nervous of superstition, accept the mysterious=20
theories of Majid and turn into obedient disciples of the=20
mazar-oriented bearded Maulana.

Soon Majid finds himself amidst wealth and property when he decided=20
to marry Rahima, a robust, middle-aged peasant woman. Within months=20
his lustful urges force Majid to bring a second wife, this time, a=20
beautiful teenager, Jamila.
Majid carries on with his ritualistic recitation of holy verses=20
beside the grave, he claims to be a 'shrine'. Villagers regard him as=20
their guardian angel except the intelligent Jamila who smells=20
something fishy of her husbands' actions. Final part of the film=20
bring cruel downfall of the hypocritical Majid, initiated by his=20
nemesis in the form of Jamila.
Main casts include Raisul Islam, Munira Yousuf, Chandni, Aly Zaker,=20
Towkir Ahmed, Rowshan Jameel, Chitralekha Guha, Amirul Haque=20
Chowdhury, Masud Ali Khan, Tamanna Yasmin Tithi and others.

A bold protest and means of awareness against fundamentalism, Lalsalu=20
is directed by Uttam Guha. Anwar Hossain took responsibility of the=20
video unit while music direction has been done by Syed Shabab Ali.

_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/

SACW is an informal, independent & non-profit citizens wire service run by
South Asia Citizens Web (http://www.mnet.fr/aiindex) since 1996. To=20
subscribe send a blank
message to: <act-subscribe@yahoogroups.com> / To unsubscribe send a blank
message to: <act-unsubscribe@yahoogroups.com>
________________________________________
DISCLAIMER: Opinions expressed in materials carried in the posts do not
necessarily reflect the views of SACW compilers.