[sacw] SACW #2 (13 Dec. 01)

[Harsh Kapoor]

South Asia Citizens Wire - Dispatch #2 | 13 December 2001
http://www.mnet.fr/aiindex

------------------------------------------

#1. Kashmir: Guerrillas in the Mist (Will Bourne)
#2. The Pashtun Code (Isabel Hilton)
#3. Pakistan: FBI sees ISI heroin trail (Amir Mir)
#4. India: The business of war (Amit Sengupta)
#5. Book Review: 'Fractured Modernity Making of a Middle Class in=20
Colonial North India by Sanjay Joshi'
#6. India: Trust and hope are Malegaon's biggest casualties (Shashank=20
Mhasawade)
________________________

#1.

Fortune (USA)
December 10, 2001
section: First/Dispatch From Kashmir; Pg. 54

Guerrillas in the Mist
by Will Bourne

As the war in Afghanistan enters its mopping-up phase, the U.S. faces=20
a tricky task of regional diplomacy. No tinderbox has more deadly=20
potential than the valley of Kashmir, where Pakistan and India have=20
fought for half a century. Now, with nuclear arms on both sides and=20
Islamic fundamentalists waging holy war in the middle, the U.S. finds=20
itself thrust into a new relationship with Pakistan. Our man writes:

They say it's been a dry year in Srinagar, but it looks to have been=20
far longer than that. Despite a steady rain during my six days in=20
Kashmir, the rivers stayed flat and slow. Fingers of water lying=20
about the town-which must once have been sweet, circulating=20
extensions of the fabled Dal Lake-are now just bogs, enameled with=20
millweed, studded with trash and scuppered boats. The polo ground is=20
threadbare. A thousand houseboats, tethered to the floating garden=20
just off the shorefront, are empty, overtaken by lotus. The lake has=20
shrunk to half its size of just 50 years ago; the money intended for=20
dredging rarely finds its way to the water itself. The valley of=20
Kashmir, with Srinagar at its emotional heart, is 85 miles long,=20
slung between two lowish ridgelines in the Himalayas; it is divided=20
into irregular parts by the so-called Line of Control, the boundary=20
set in 1949 by the U.N. after India and Pakistan fought an=20
undeclared but bloody war over the "disputed territory" following=20
partition in 1947. The valley has seen periodic warfare-and ceaseless=20
tension-since that time. But a rigged election touched off a popular=20
uprising on the Indian side in 1989 that continues to this day,=20
grinding on as low-grade guerrilla war. As many as 40,000 lives have=20
since been lost, some by the Indian army and paramilitary forces=20
keeping a chokehold on the almost exclusively Muslim valley, many=20
more by the amorphous militants who are fighting for various, often=20
conflicting causes: independence, accession to Pakistan, or just the=20
right to the political voice denied them, they say, since partition.

Death barely makes the papers here. I arrived a few weeks after=20
suicide bombers had killed 38 people at the assembly building in=20
Srinagar. Dozens of others fell during my stay-mostly unidentified=20
militants, which has proved an endlessly useful category for the=20
disposing of the dead. A place of legendary culture and beauty, this=20
city of 725,000 is now a burnt-out case, a swamp of spies and=20
counterspies. Indian troops are everywhere, some emplacements so=20
ancient that the very sandbags are being reclaimed by the soil.=20
Homemade-looking black SWAT vans are forever swinging around corners,=20
carrying black-suited guys with machine guns. The gorgeous=20
bottomland of the valley to the west, full of maples and poplars,=20
apple orchards and silkworm farms, is a veritable garrison; even the=20
most inconsequential bridge is guarded by eight or ten soldiers.=20
Stop-and-search is constant. It seems a miserable life. Everyone is=20
used to it.

In a wretched squall my driver and I retrieved the man who would=20
guide us to Abdul Majid Dar, one of the senior-most figures of=20
Hizbul Mujahideen, the largest of Kashmir's many militant groups. The=20
three of us navigated the lanes of a neighborhood north of the town=20
center and stopped at an eight-foot iron gate. In a low room=20
furnished with a sheet of industrial carpet and a few pillows, I was=20
confronted by a man who looked nothing like my mental image of a=20
mujahid: Sitting against a powder-blue wall, poncho tucked tidily=20
around his bare feet, he wore no skullcap but had a neat beard gone=20
largely gray. His eyes were big, melancholic, like a Guernsey cow's.=20
He looked tired beyond words.

Until two weeks ago Dar was Hizbul Mujahideen's "operations chief";=20
now, he said opaquely, he is awaiting a "new assignment." I wanted=20
to talk with him about Pakistan-our ally in the war against=20
terror-and its supposed role in the valley's unending terror. Many=20
have charged that Kashmiri militancy is being perpetuated not by the=20
exhausted and demoralized locals, but by a steady supply of men and=20
money coming in over the Line of Control from Pakistan. It is a=20
charge Pakistan denies: "We do not work with these groups, and we=20
have got nothing to do with them," a Pakistani general told the New=20
York Times recently, referring to Kashmiri militant organizations.

But most Kashmiris say otherwise. "Pakistan is part of the conflict.=20
Who can deny it?" Dar says over cups of cardamom tea served in=20
little fluted cups. He himself spent "five, six years in Pakistan,"=20
he says, but is quick to insist that the country does not have a=20
"dominant role" here. But then Dar's reticence is not surprising. The=20
Islamic tradition in Kashmir is predominantly Sufi, an ecstatic,=20
inward, nondogmatic movement that has never been much interested in=20
pan-Islamic jihad. Independence is an infinitely more popular cause,=20
however improbable, than acceding to Pakistan.

Liyaqat Ali Khan was more forthcoming. I met the fresh-scrubbed=20
president of the Jammu Kashmir People's Conference, one of many=20
homespun political groups trying to solve this conundrum, in yet=20
another cold cube of cement-this one guarded by the Indian army.=20
With his chubby, guileless face, Khan makes a pretty unlikely=20
warrior. Yet he said that in 1990 or 1991, he "went across to=20
Pakistan-controlled Kashmir, and then to one of the hundreds of=20
training camps in Afghanistan." There he mastered the use of=20
Kalashnikovs, rocket-propelled grenades, and other small arms. His=20
expenses, he said, were paid by the "ISI guys" [Pakistan's=20
intelligence service] training him. And then he was sent back to=20
Kashmir and over the Line of Control to the Indian side, where he=20
glumly acknowledged having been "involved in three or four=20
encounters."

Khan spent five years in the militant movement; he says he lost his=20
faith when it became clear that the campaign was doing little more=20
than pitting one Kashmiri militia against another.

Next stop: the end of a long, moldering hallway in a government=20
building in Srinagar, defended by a Kalashnikov propped against the=20
wall of the antechamber. There, a senior functionary well schooled in=20
India's counterinsurgency efforts told me he is up against "a=20
hostile country. Obviously Pakistan. They are trained, they are=20
equipped, all sorts of logistical support are given to them. We have=20
seized not less than 20,000 AK-47s in the last ten years. Along with=20
other equipment and explosives, that's enough to arm five infantry=20
divisions of any regular army." He claimed that Pakistan's direct=20
sponsorship of terrorism in Kashmir is not a question, citing=20
"confessional statements, foreign dead, Pakistan army and ISI=20
documents, and the recovery of arms and ammo bearing Pakistani and=20
Chinese markings."

It would be easier to discount this as Indian propaganda (of which=20
there is no shortage) were not just about everyone in Srinagar=20
saying the same thing. Even a Kashmiri ideologue like Azam=20
Inquillabi, a wispy mandarin who gave up militancy for politics=20
years ago (and who congratulates himself on his "visionary view of=20
the world"), allows that Pakistani money has corrupted the=20
liberation movement he helped begin. Asked about the integrity of the=20
All Parties Hurriyat (Freedom) Conference, a powerful umbrella group=20
for Kashmiri political organizations (and unofficially for the=20
militants as well), he replied with typical indirection, "Ask=20
yourself, Why are we-the people who founded this party-having to=20
remove ourselves from it now?"

Money is clearly a big part of the game here. One senior Kashmiri=20
journalist described a system of payoffs to the families of=20
militants who fall to Indian forces: "For every Kashmiri killed,=20
100,000 rupees come from Hurriyat. On average, until two years ago,=20
there were maybe ten killed per day." That made for about $ 20,000=20
daily flowing in from "Kashmiri groups based in the U.S. and Europe,=20
Saudi Arabia, militants crossing from Pakistan-controlled Kashmir,=20
even the Pakistan High Commission in Delhi." Ostensibly that cash=20
was for the families of slain mujahideen, but no one I spoke to had=20
heard of any of it making it that far down the food chain.

The hotels strung out along the edge of Dal Lake are packed not with=20
tourists, as they once were, but with some 1,500 or more local=20
militants who have surrendered to Indian forces. These boys and men=20
are given shelter, a meager allowance, and, most important,=20
protection against reprisals, in exchange for their not going more=20
than a stone's throw from where they're warehoused. In one of the=20
degenerate buildings-a sandbagged gunner on the balcony, its front=20
yard a midden of garbage and cats-I met a legless man of perhaps 60,=20
apparently condemned to wallow on the room's only bed, cared for by=20
an indeterminate number of roommates who make tea on a gas ring on=20
the floor. I was just beginning to interview him when security=20
forces barged in and demanded to know what was going on. It was a=20
quick discussion.

It is certainly no secret that the Indians have resorted to=20
appalling tactics in Kashmir. "I won't say there have not been=20
excesses," said the senior functionary when I asked about a story I'd=20
heard of a militant commander being captured by the Special Task=20
Force, his body later recovered with a bullet in his head and one=20
hand missing. "But when we are fighting a war, or a situation like=20
war, definitely some niceties have to be given the go-by."

As for Dar, even he is now "open to a political settlement," ready=20
to see it all end. As I got up to leave him, I asked the "big=20
fighter," as he's known in the town, whether he'd ever killed anyone.=20
"No, no," he replied with an involuntary smile. "That is not my job.=20
Thanks be to God." He gave me a little hug and was gone.

GRAPHIC: B/W PHOTO: PHOTOGRAPHS BY GARY KNIGHT--VII, Indian soldiers,
belonging to the Special Boat
Security Force, patrol on Dal Lake in the war-torn province.; B/W
PHOTO: PHOTOGRAPHS BY GARY KNIGHT--VII,
The Srinagar Mosque rises from the banks of Dal Lake.

Copyright 2001 Time Inc.

______

#2.

The New Yorker (USA)
December 3, 2001
SECTION: LETTER FROM PAKISTAN; Pg. 59

THE PASHTUN CODE;
How a long-ungovernable tribe may determine the future of Afghanistan.
by ISABEL HILTON

I arrived in Pakistan on a warm afternoon in October, and several=20
days later I set out by car, heading northwest, from the capital,=20
Islamabad, toward the borderlands with Afghanistan and the land of=20
the Pashtun. The American bombing raids had begun a few days before,=20
and from Afghanistan came murky television images, along with=20
messages of fear and despair from civilians and of defiance from the=20
leaders of the Taliban, who were, unbeknownst to most of us at the=20
time, entering a violent endgame. Here, along the border, another=20
drama was being played out, in the passions and politics of the=20
Pashtun people, men and women whose tortured loyalties reflected a=20
mystical attachment to a land that they believed was theirs. [...] .

{Full text of this article is available to all on the SACW lists.=20
Should you require a copy send on request to <aiindex@m...>}

______

#3.

Weekly Independent (Pakistan)
Vol 1, No.24, Regd No CPL-588
December 06-12, 2001

FBI SEES ISI HEROIN TRAIL
The US sleuths have listed at least 30 serving and retired army and=20
ISI officers who they say accumulated wealth through heroin smuggling
by Amir Mir

THE American Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) has compiled a=20
list of at least 30 army and Inter Services Intelligence (ISI)=20
officers, both serving and retired, who had allegedly accumulated=20
wealth through heroin smuggling.
Intelligence sources in Islamabad, working in tandem with the FBI=20
operatives, say that in their recent communiqu=E9 to the US=20
administration, the American spies have claimed that not only the=20
legitimate state economy, but also many senior officers of the army=20
and the ISI had benefited from the heroin dollars in the last decade.=20
"Resultantly, Pakistan's illegal heroin economy has kept its=20
legitimate state economy sustained since 1990 and prevented its=20
collapse. It has also enabled the country to maintain a high level of=20
arms purchases from abroad and finance its 'proxy war' in Kashmir=20
through the jehadi organisations", says the communiqu=E9.
The FBI findings say while it is difficult to estimate the money=20
spent by Pakistan on the 'proxy war', it is believed that about 80=20
per cent of its total external debt of $38 billion, that is, about=20
$30.4 billion, has been incurred on arms purchases since 1990. "This=20
includes its purchases of aircraft and missiles from China, missiles=20
from North Korea, for which payment was made partly in cash and=20
partly in imported US and Australian wheat, Agosta class submarines=20
from France, reconditioned Mirage aircraft from France, Lebanon and=20
Australia and other items from countries such as Ukraine. The=20
clandestine procurement of nuclear technology and material from=20
Western countries and the Chinese-aided nuclear power station at=20
Chashma were also financed through external borrowing", the FBI=20
investigations show.
The US investigators have claimed in their findings that the use of=20
heroin dollars to promote jehad started after the withdrawal of the=20
Soviet troops from Afghanistan in 1988. In the 1980s, they added, the=20
Internal Political Cell of the ISI, headed by Brig Imtiaz Ahmed=20
(retd), who worked directly under Lt Gen Hameed Gul (retd), started a=20
special cell for the use of heroin for covert actions. Although=20
circles close the two former generals vehemently deny these reports,=20
the FBI findings add: "The cell promoted the cultivation of opium and=20
the extraction of heroin in Pakistani territory as well as in the=20
Afghan territory under mujahideen control for being smuggled into the=20
Soviet-controlled areas in order to make Soviet troops heroin=20
addicts. After the withdrawal of the Soviet troops, the ISI's cell=20
started using its network of refineries and smugglers for smuggling=20
heroin to the Western countries and using the money as a supplement=20
to its legitimate economy".
The American investigators claim that not only the legitimate state=20
economy, but also many senior officers of the army and the ISI, both=20
serving and retired, and approximately 30 in number, benefited from=20
the heroin dollars.
Pakistan's military establishment has often been accused of indulging=20
in drug trade. Former prime minister Nawaz Sharif was the first one=20
to make startling disclosures in this regard in a 1994 press=20
interview. It was for the first time that a former prime minister=20
publicly accused all-powerful military establishment of having=20
contingency plans to pay for covert operations through drug=20
smuggling. While being interviewed by a Pakistani journalist, Nawaz=20
Sharif alleged that the then army chief and the ISI boss had proposed=20
him a detailed blueprint for selling heroin to pay for the country's=20
covert military operations in 1991. The military officials, however,=20
strongly refuted these 'charges'.
The FBI communiqu=E9 points out that a close associate of Nawaz Sharif=20
and former Intelligence Bureau (IB) chief Brigadier Imtiaz Ahmed=20
(retd) was arrested and convicted by a court on July 31, 2001, and=20
jailed for eight years. According to evidence produced in the court=20
by the National Accountability Bureau (NAB), Brig Imtiaz had foreign=20
exchange bearer certificates worth $20.08 million, a Pakistani rupee=20
account in the Union Bank with a balance of Rs2.13 billion, a US=20
dollar account in the Deutsch Bank with a balance of US $19.1=20
million, five residential houses, five commercial units and three=20
shops. The US investigators believe the brigadier accumulated this=20
huge wealth through heroin smuggling.
The FBI investigations accuse Pakistan's premier intelligence agency=20
of using drug money to fund various religious and fundamentalist=20
organisations operating in Jammu & Kashmir. The American spies, in=20
their communiqu=E9 to the US administration, have told it how the=20
narco-money was linked with Osama bin Laden and the fundamentalist=20
movements in various other parts of the world. "The present estimate=20
of Pakistan's annual earnings through heroin dollars is about $1.5=20
billion. It is difficult to come across precise, direct evidence for=20
such estimates. The estimate till now has therefore been based on=20
indirect evidence," says the FBI communiqu=E9.
The investigators say the first direct piece of evidence about the=20
total value of the heroin money being pumped into Pakistani economy=20
every year has come from an unexpected source - the Taliban. Before=20
1998, opium was being grown in the North-West Frontier Province=20
(NWFP) of Pakistan and in the Nangarhar province in=20
Taliban-controlled Afghan territory. All the Pakistan-owned=20
refineries for heroin extraction were located in the=20
Taliban-controlled territory. In 1998-2000, the Pakistani authorities=20
stopped the cultivation of opium in the NWFP. In 2000-01, the Taliban=20
too, under international pressure, ostensibly banned opium=20
cultivation in its territory, but did not dismantle the=20
Pakistan-owned heroin refineries.

______

#4.

The Hindustan Times (India) | Thursday, December 13, 2001

THE BUSINESS OF WAR
by Amit Sengupta

Remember the frenzied super-nationalism of the ruling regime those=20
days, when bodies of soldiers were coming back in the coffins? It was=20
India's first television war. The images arrived from the high=20
altitudes of Tololing and Drass bringing with them the intimacies,=20
the violence and angst of war.

Young soldiers writing letters, thinking of home and warmth, fighting=20
till the last, dying suddenly. Their eyes, fingers, memories, their=20
olive green uniforms, their volleyball games, their long trek uphill=20
into the frozen valley of death.

There were other stories also. That they did not have the special=20
shoes which could protect them in the freezing cold of Kargil, that=20
they lacked proper equipment, that they were victims of intelligence=20
failure. The entire country knew that Pakistani mercenaries and=20
jehadis had entrenched themselves in Indian territory for long, that=20
they had equipment of international standards, even televisions, and=20
that they were perched in strategically advantageous terrain.

We also knew that the Indian defence establishment had badly goofed=20
up, for which the nation had to pay a heavy price. More than 500 dead=20
soldiers and officers, most of them in their 20s.

But these questions were buried in the BJP's (and Sangh parivar's)=20
war campaign against their favourite enemy; because the line between=20
Pakistan-bashing and Muslim-bashing is often so very thin. If you=20
dared to question they would shout back: "You are anti-national,=20
anti-India, ISI agent." They would doubt the patriotism of those who=20
stood against the unfolding tragedy of our young soldiers dying for=20
other people's mistakes.

But such was the hysteria created by war-mongering fanatics that=20
every form of dissent was crushed. Even journalists were not able to=20
write critically. Patriotism meant praising the government. There was=20
this invisible censorship everywhere. And the threat: You are either=20
with the war, or against the nation. The nation was left with only=20
one option: to run with the rabble-rousers.

We all thought they will drag the war to the ballot box. After all,=20
war is the most heady trump-card for any ruling party. Especially=20
when thousands starving to death or jobless, or the 350 crore people=20
below the poverty line do not even have a straw to float across.

For a divided, cynical nation which is economically sinking,=20
emotionally drained and morally battered, war is packaged as the=20
supreme aphrodisiac, the opium of the masses.

Thank god for Bill Clinton, who supposedly told Nawaz Sharif to back=20
off. Otherwise, who knows - they would have dragged the war till the=20
elections. That would have also meant more imported aluminium coffins.

Then came the elections. Rally after rally, the memory of the martyrs=20
of Kargil was sold by the BJP top brass and its allies in the=20
marketplace of crude vote bank politics. Such insensitivity can only=20
be the fort=E9 of fanatics. Not a thought was spared for the feelings=20
of mothers, fathers, lovers, who still felt the presence and the=20
absence of their lost ones; the music he played, his jogging tracks=20
still hanging on the door, the poster on the wall.

It's difficult to reconcile with a young son's death. It's more=20
difficult when the bell rings and he is not there. He will never be=20
there.

How will the mother whose son died in Kargil feel now? Now that she=20
has seen Bangaru Laxman taking a wad of cash with her own eyes? Or=20
the use of the defence minister's house to clinch defence deals by=20
shady agents? Or the shameless return of George Fernandes? The=20
hounding of Tehelka?

What does she feel about patriotism - now that the coffin's lid has=20
once again been thrown open, so that the entire nation can see how=20
they have sold the nation for a briefcase of cash?

______

#5.

Economic and Political Weekly (Bombay, India)
Book Review
01 December, 2001

A City and Its People

Sudha Pai

Fractured Modernity Making of a Middle Class in Colonial North India=20
by Sanjay Joshi; Sage Publications, New Delhi, 2001; pp 209, Rs 493.

The book under review is a historical account of the rise of the=20
middle class as a social force in colonial north India, during the=20
period 1880 to 1930, using the city of Lucknow as a case study.=20
Earlier treatises on the subject such as the pioneering work of B B=20
Mishra, dealt with the significant role of western education and=20
economic development, introduced by the colonial government, in the=20
formation of the middle class. In the present study, Sanjay Joshi has=20
a larger project than tracing the rise of this phenomenon in Lucknow.=20
His aim is to show that the middle class through its social and=20
political activities in the colonial 'public sphere' redefined the=20
conception of 'modernity' that underlies the Indian nation. In this=20
process, colonial policies particularly the introduction of western=20
education and economic development played a salient role, but Joshi=20
argues that it simultaneously drew upon the past, which could not be=20
erased, thereby creating a 'fractured modernity'. The study also=20
provides a historical explanation of the present-day phenomenon of=20
Hindutva, which he argues is a creature of middle class politics and=20
has within it the same fractured discourse seen in the colonial=20
period. In this exercise, Joshi stresses the need for scholars to=20
abandon the notion of an 'ideal-type' of the category, obtained from=20
a rather simplistic reading of European history. In most studies, the=20
middle class in the non-western world is compared with this ideal=20
type and described as a 'failed' project responsible for many=20
problems within these societies. Joshi points out that the deviations=20
from the pattern of ideal-typical western modernity, visible in=20
middle class constructions in colonial India, are similar to=20
modernist projects in other parts of the world, including the west.=20
Everywhere such projects were constructed out of a combination of=20
traditional and new ideas about the organisation of social and=20
political relations, a typical feature of modernity being its=20
fractured nature. Therefore, he argues for the 'provincialisation' of=20
the middle class in Europe, i e, to understand the middle class in=20
all parts of the world, as full of contradiction and ambivalence and=20
none as superior.

In keeping with recent studies, Joshi uses the concept of the 'public=20
sphere' to describe the socio-political arena in which the middle=20
class constituted themselves and carried out their activities. Aware=20
of the problems of transporting the concept, put forward by Jurgen=20
Habermas, of a liberal public sphere from its 18th century setting in=20
Europe to a colonial setting, he argues that notions of 'public-ness'=20
emerged in Lucknow, but through a different route because the=20
colonial state had an important presence in it. In building the=20
public sphere, the middle class initially drew upon social and=20
cultural policies introduced by the colonial administration to=20
further imperial interests, but by the late 19th century=20
they appropriated this arena for their own purposes. The public=20
sphere was therefore, not the exclusive sphere of the colonial state.=20
Hence, Joshi feels that the fact that this public-ness drew upon the=20
history of the colonists to replicate the bourgeois sphere did not=20
prevent it from becoming a part of the culture of Indian politics.

Lucknow ranked fourth among the cities of colonial India after the=20
three main presidency towns, and eighth among the cities of the=20
British empire in the 1880s, is a good selection for tracing the rise=20
of the middle class in north India. It was the seat of the erstwhile=20
Shia Muslim Nawabs who had attracted the best Urdu writers, poets and=20
artists and created a cultural synthesis and pluralism in their=20
courts. On the other hand, by the late 1800s Lucknow was an important=20
centre of commercial publishing and nationalist activity with many=20
important Congress leaders. The middle class of this city arose=20
neither from the rich traditional elite or the poorer sections, but=20
from erstwhile 'service' families under the Nawabs who took to=20
western education. Joshi focuses not so much on their educational=20
abilities, which are well known, but on their role as 'cultural=20
entrepreneurs' consciously undertaking a project of self-fashioning.

This project was undertaken in the late 19th and early 20th century=20
in Lucknow through the new publishing industry and establishment of=20
civil associations of both the communal and secular variety,=20
sponsored by the educated class. Men such as Munshi Newal Kishore who=20
bought and ran the Oudh Akbar after the Mutiny of 1957, and novelists=20
such as Ratan Natan Sarshar, played a self-conscious role in=20
introducing new questions of religion and culture into the public=20
domain. The establishment of reading rooms and libraries helped=20
newspapers and magazines to reach to the public. Through these=20
instruments the middle classes succeeded in 'redefining=20
respectability', i e, creating a moral, cultural and political code=20
consciously different from both the traditional elite and lower=20
classes, which eventually helped in distinguishing themselves from=20
the British rulers. For this they attacked upper class lifestyles and=20
cultural practices such as frivolous behaviour, expensive lifestyles,=20
Nawabi habits of indulgence and addiction to wine and women and=20
instead celebrated thrift, industry, education, reason and=20
enlightment. But the middle class was not a social or cultural=20
monolith - Joshi describes it as full of significant ambiguities. On=20
the one hand imitation of the ruling class created divisions, as=20
leaders of the caste associations were critical of western ideas even=20
though they demanded social reform. But on the other hand, unity was=20
also a characteristic of the middle class and there were areas where=20
the two overlapped. Thus, there were multiple projects of=20
respectability that brought reformers and revivalists together in=20
their search to gain a degree of respect in the public sphere. This=20
contradictory modernity was a central characteristic of middle class=20
politics.

To illustrate the construction of this modernity, Joshi examines the=20
activities of the middle class in three spheres, which were critical=20
issues in the politics of the colonial period: gender, nationalism=20
and religion. A major project of 'respectability' was the attempt to=20
recast the values and morals of women and the freedom they hitherto=20
enjoyed, in keeping with the new dictates of middle class morality.=20
Underlying this was belief in a mythical golden age when Indian women=20
enjoyed a better position and their subsequent decline, which was=20
used to justify two projects of 'improvement' in their public and=20
domestic lives. The first, was the campaign to remove the Lucknow=20
courtesan or 'twaif' as it was no longer considered proper, within=20
the new norms of respectability for middle class men unlike their=20
predecessors, to consort with and keep courtesans. The second, was=20
the attempt to create an ideal middle class housewife to fit the=20
needs of the new, nuclear urban family. Women's magazines,=20
particularly Hindi ones, such as Strisubodhini and Sudha, offered=20
advice on efficient household management on a middle class income,=20
time management, and provided a picture of the ideal, urban middle=20
class housewife - both Hindu and Muslim - as educated, well dressed=20
but not ostentatious, thrifty, who can run a clean house, teach the=20
children, be a good companion to her husband and look after his=20
comfort. Yet at the same time, those who copied the free manners and=20
modern clothes of their western counterparts were sharply criticised.=20
Thus, middle class constructions of womanhood drawing upon both=20
western and indigenous models, stood for neither oppressive=20
patriarchy or liberatory freedom. This duality displays the=20
contradictions in modernity, which allowed men to create new forms of=20
control over women, to their own gain.

Joshi also examines how middle class interventions in the public=20
sphere in Lucknow introduced new religious identities, different from=20
the period when the Nawabs were in power. Middle class activists=20
created a modern Hindu identity by incorporating the various sects=20
and beliefs of Hinduism into a more or less monolithic Hindu=20
religiosity to suit their public sphere projects, particularly that=20
of empowerment, in which religion, power and politics were=20
inextricably connected. Consequently, relations with the Muslim=20
community underwent a change. Prior to British rule numerous examples=20
can be given of the close ties between Hindus and Muslims: sharing of=20
festivals, literature and ideas under the Nawabs together with=20
differences and even animosities and prejudices. However, now we have=20
the development of clear-cut and separate communities in the=20
development of which colonial policy played a role. The British by=20
nominating Hindus and the Muslims to various boards and committees=20
created consciousness of difference. Hence, Hindu assertiveness and=20
solidarity, Joshi argues, needs to be located not in earlier memories=20
of Muslim oppression, but in the developments of the 19th century and=20
the role both played in it. Hindus began to rediscover their=20
identity, use Hindi in place of Urdu, and voice concern about social=20
reform within their community. Yet, at the same time Joshi emphasises=20
that numerous limitations such as caste divisions, stood in the way=20
of creating a single, united Hindu community.

These religious identities when carried over into the sphere of=20
nationalism, Joshi argues, were responsible for creating=20
contradictions in middle class nationalism, leading to fluctuating=20
and impermanent political identities. As a result, in the 1920s we=20
find the middle class simultaneously imagining the 'nation' as above=20
religious divisions and yet at the same time also as constituted by=20
them, which made them constantly shift between support for secular=20
nationalism and anti-Muslim, Hindu nationalism. This is reflected in=20
Congress activities of the period, when it began to consistently=20
describe the nation as an entity that stood above less important=20
divisions of community, caste, class or gender, while describing=20
other competing visions as parochial or even anti-national. Joshi=20
points to two actions of the colonial government, which helped=20
polarise the Hindus and the Muslims: the introduction of the=20
Devanagiri script in 1900, and special representation for Muslims in=20
the legislative councils in 1909 and weighted reservation of seats in=20
municipalities in 1916. By 1917 the impact of these policies is=20
visible in a number of developments: establishment of Hindu=20
organisations in Lucknow such as the UP Dharma Rakshana Samiti and=20
Oudh Sewa Samiti; the riots of 1924; Hindi journals which reflected=20
these divisions by not only reporting riots, but calling for Hindu=20
unity. Thus, a 20th century Hindu homogenous community and=20
nationalism, assertive and distinct from that of the 19th century was=20
created which is reflected in the politics, journalism, literature=20
and life of the city. Yet, Joshi points to a parallel history of=20
cooperation between Hindu and Muslim leaders in Lucknow: a majority=20
of the delegates to the INC were Muslims; there were individual=20
efforts to settle differences by convening common meetings; and there=20
was plenty of Muslim participation in the Home Rule movement. In=20
brief, there was both cooperation and conflict. There was a constant=20
shift by Hindus between an exclusively Hindu sabha-ite and pluralist=20
Swarajist Congress vision of the nation. Arguing against positions=20
which hold that secular nationalism was merely a liberal facade that=20
covered an essentially Hindu nationalist agenda, or that ideology=20
played no role and it was simply a game of power, Joshi points to the=20
'reasonability and limits' of Hindu nationalism.

Notions of Empowerment
The Hindu middle class activists used this variety of nationalism for=20
their own empowerment in the late colonial period. On the one hand=20
mobilisation around the secular nation associated with the INC=20
enabled them to challenge imperialism and emerge as the leaders of an=20
independent nation, and label the demands of different groups as=20
anti-national while ignoring the latent Hinduisation of the secular=20
national culture. On the other hand, upholding the rights of a=20
community defined as the majority and encouraging it to defend itself=20
against attacks by Muslims provided another source of empowerment.=20
These contrary pulls meant that they could adopt neither position=20
consistently and therefore we find a constant shift between the two=20
visions of the nation, unable to commit itself to either.

Joshi feels that the exercise of nation building under a colonial=20
set-up has left a significant legacy for the post-colonial period.=20
The fractured discourse on nationalism was visible in the immediate=20
post-colonial period when Nehru keen to separate religion and=20
politics, and leaders who advocated Hindu nationalism both drew upon=20
the discourse of the colonial period to justify their positions. It=20
also underlies the contradictory beliefs and actions of the middle=20
class in the contemporary period, as evident in the political=20
agitation around both the mosque in Ayodhya and the Mandal report in=20
north India. In the case of the former, the anti-Muslim rhetoric by=20
the Hindu Right was accompanied by protests that their campaign was=20
not anti-Muslim but aimed at justice for the majority community. In=20
the latter case, upper caste, educated urban youth, projected their=20
agitation as against 'casteist' politics despite the fact that their=20
existing privileges were due to their upper caste status. Middle=20
class activities show the continuing presence of contradictions, i e,=20
simultaneous articulations of contradictory positions on issues=20
relating to politics, society and culture.

A few problems in this otherwise interesting and comprehensive work=20
maybe pointed out. The first, which is minor, is the use of involved=20
language and repetition which makes the text difficult to read. The=20
second, more substantial is that the use of the concept of 'public=20
sphere' does not add materially to the framework used by the author.=20
If the idea is to drop the notion of an 'ideal modernity' then it is=20
also best left in 18th century Europe. The project of the=20
construction of modernity in colonial Lucknow stands without it. The=20
book provides enough rich empirical materials for it. Finally, the=20
author describes the Hindu nationalism of the colonial period as=20
'reasonable' and 'benign' as compared to that of the 1990s, but no=20
explanation is provided. The book will be of interest to those=20
interested in understanding the process of nation building in India,=20
which remains incomplete.

______

#6.

The Hindustan Times (India) | Thursday, December 13, 2001

Trust and hope are Malegaon's biggest casualties
by Shashank Mhasawade
(Malegaon, December 12)
More than a month after the October 26 communal riots, the rift=20
between Hindu and Muslim communities has been split so wide open that=20
no political footwork is likely to bridge the gap.
Trust, the basic ingredient for harmony between the two communities,=20
has been the biggest casualty and people on both sides of the divide=20
are squarely blaming the police, the government and the=20
administration. All three fell far short of expectations in their=20
moment of crisis, they say.
A walk along the narrow lanes in this congested textile town of=20
Maharashtra evokes suspicion. Residents cast wary eyes and it is=20
difficult to pick up a conversation with anyone. People are hesitant=20
to speak but once they open up, it is apparent that, whether Hindu or=20
Muslim, they are still bleeding from the wounds.
"Hindus from Muslim-dominated areas are migrating to other parts,=20
preferably to Hindu dominated areas. The same is happening with=20
Muslims residing in Hindu pockets, as they feel insecure," said=20
Dashrath Mahajan, who runs a grocery shop in a Muslim-dominated area.

While about 50 families have already migrated to other parts of the=20
town, about 20 more are in the process of moving out.
Ahmed Sheikh said he and his uncle shifted their families to a secure locat=
ion.

"Now there is no fear of unwarranted attacks, nasty comments=20
everyday. But the lack of trust in each other is growing with each=20
passing day. The situation wont improve irrespective of who visits=20
the town," he says.
Roads have now become the border crossing between the two=20
communities. Kusumba Road and Abdul Hamid Road are classic examples.=20
Each community has a strong presence on either side and a deep=20
feeling of insecurity rules the roost.
There are no takers for vacant plots, empty houses and shops on these=20
roads despite the fact that their prices have crashed by over 50 per=20
cent in past month.
But even more disturbing than this ghettoisation of Malegaon is the=20
fact that the two communities are banning trade and interaction with=20
each other. Muslims have unofficially banned the Aroma theatre, run=20
by Hindus. Hindus hardly buy goods from Muslim-owned shops and vice=20
versa.

Both communities feel the police are useless and have failed to=20
control riots. Zahid Younous, brother of Bilkis Bano, a 55-year-old=20
lady who was killed in police firing asks: "Were the police not aware=20
of the growing tension before October 26? After the riots, the Army's=20
presence helped normalise the situation. Isn't this a failure of the=20
police?"

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