[sacw] SACW #1 (14 Dec. 01)

[Harsh Kapoor]

South Asia Citizens Wire - Dispatch #1 | 14 December 2001
http://www.mnet.fr/aiindex

------------------------------------------

#1. Bangladeshi Christian Families Spend Nights in Terror
#2. Bangladesh: Naripakkha, a women's organisation, urges speaker of=20
the Parliament to form a parliamentary inquiry committee Attacks on=20
minorities
#3. Pakistan: A new template for ulema
#4. From Paan daans to Talibans (Mehnaz Akber Aziz)
#5. Writing the obituary of political Islam (Mushirul Hasan)
#6. BOOK REVIEW 'Inventing Subjects: Studies in Hegemony, Patriarchy=20
and Colonialism by Himani Bannerji'
#7. Afghanistan: Danger Ahead for Secularists (Khalid Duran)

________________________

#1.

The Daily Janakantha (Bangladesh)

"Give us money or give us your daughter"
BANGLADESHI CHRISTIAN FAMILIES SPEND NIGHTS IN TERROR

December 7,2001
Natore, Bangladesh: From our news representatives:
In the Boraigram subdistrict of Natore district in Bangladesh=20
Christian families with adoloscent daughters spend each night under=20
the threat of losing their honor. Upon hearing the sound of a=20
motorcycle at night these girls start shivering and look for places=20
where they can hide themselves from the hoodlums. They try to blend=20
in the bamboo stacks that make up their humble dwellings.=20
Chatiangacha village of above mentioned Boraigram is the home to 50=20
Christian families. Their ripened rice crops have been forcibly=20
taken after the October 1st national elections. Now the (Islamic)=20
terrorists' attention has shifted to the juvenile female members of=20
the Christian community. Every night, announcing their arrival with=20
the sounds of their motorcycles, the ruling BNP's activists and=20
terrrorists enter the locality. They call out the name of the father=20
of the girl whom they want to vivtimize that night. When the said=20
girl's father comes in front of these hoodlums, a 'donation' of Taka=20
10,000-20,000 ( $200-$400 U.S.) is demanded. They are given a time=20
limit of 7-10 days and if at that time the money is not paid, the=20
girl would have to stay the night with the fanatics.

Jimmy Koraiya is a resident of Chatiangacha. His original home was=20
in Dhaka. He still speaks in the Dhaka accent. He sadly questions=20
"What kind of country is? If I can't give money, I have to give=20
them my daughter? " The fanatics have come three times on their=20
motorbikes to pick up Jimmy Koraiya's daughter, High School student=20
Suphala Koraiya for a night. The local residents have complained=20
that Boraigram's Jubodol's (rightwing extremist Islamic group)=20
General Secretary, Sanaullah Noorbabu and his assistants Taj,=20
Mojammel, Hakim, Ikbal, Babul Bashar and Belal have created mass=20
terror in the area via extortion and terrorist activities. If=20
someone fails to pay the 'donation' amount within the said time and=20
place, drummed up charges are brought up and a 'summons' notice is=20
sent. In the Bonparha Market area, a section of the BNP=20
(Bangladesh's extremist ruling Islamic colaition) office is walled=20
up and a torture chamber has been built there. When the said=20
'accused' is brought in, he is placed inside the chamber and is=20
forced to make a confession in support of the accusation charges.=20
Then they are forced to pay the extortion amount under the guise of=20
a fine. Joseph Gomes of Harowa village has also received a summons=20
signed by Sanaullah Noorbabu.

Human Rights Congress for Bangladesh Minorities (HRCBM,=20
http://www.hrcbm.org) is an International Forum espousing the cause=20
for the minorities of Bangladesh.

______

#2.

The Daily Star (Bangladesh)
14 December 2001

Attacks on minorities
Speaker urged to form probe body

STAFF CORRESPONDENT
Naripakkha, a women's organisation, appealed to the Speaker of the=20
Jatiya Sangsad to form a parliamentary inquiry committee to=20
investigate the recent incidents of attacks on religious minorities=20
and violence against women across the country.

It also urged the Speaker to hold a general discussion on minority=20
repression in parliament.

The organisation made the appeal to the Speaker in a letter, signed=20
by its convenor Rina Roy, on December 9.

Expressing concern over the attacks on minorities and women, it noted=20
that such incidents have increased alarmingly after the October 1=20
general election.

"Even the home minister told the parliament that 266 people were=20
killed and 213 rape incidents took place across the country in 25=20
days since October 1," the letter said, "But there was no step to=20
stop the attacks and to ensure the security of the people."

Members of the Naripakkha have visited four areas where such=20
incidents took place and organised two meetings to restore communal=20
harmony in those areas.

Naripakkha convenor urged the members of parliament to take steps to=20
bring back normalcy in their constituencies and to rehabilitate the=20
displaced people.

In another letter to the Leader of the Opposition Sheikh Hasina, the=20
Naripakkah urged her to attend parliament session at least once to=20
project the recent attacks on religion minorities and demand trial of=20
those involved in such incidents.

______

#3.

The News International (Pakistan) Thursday December 13, 2001
Editorial
A NEW TEMPLATE FOR ULEMA

The contours of the policy-change vis-a-vis the religio-political=20
parties forced upon the military government by the post-September 11=20
scenario are still in the process of being defined. The top=20
leadership of the mainstream parties remains under detention, and the=20
official quarters are indicating a crackdown on "extremists." There=20
is, however, no definition of the vexatious term and it is difficult=20
to judge where the line will be drawn between moderation and=20
extremism in matters of religion itself and, particularly, in mixing=20
it with politics. A consensus definition being difficult to find, we=20
had suggested previously that the government should concentrate on=20
enforcing the law without specifically targeting any group and,=20
simultaneously, attend to the socio-economic causes that breed=20
extremism.

News reports now suggest that Islamabad is considering the induction=20
of "moderate" ulema in provincial cabinets. Once again, there is the=20
question of definition. Secondly, ulema of various hues have always=20
been a part of provincial and federal governments. It is not,=20
therefore, clear what special purpose will be served by the exercise=20
now under official contemplation. If in the name of patronising=20
moderation any particular sect is given official sanction, the=20
negative fallout in terms of reaction by the other sects is certain=20
to cancel out the potential benefits. Moreover, past experience=20
suggests that association with the government diminishes whatever=20
public standing the chosen ulema had. "Darbari ulema" are an age old=20
phenomenon and have seldom carried any religious prestige or=20
political weight.

Most importantly, the dichotomy of the religious and temporal=20
scholarship has done great damage to progressive thinking in Islam by=20
closing the door to informed and enlightened Ijtehad and Ijma. By=20
excluding much of the worldly knowledge from their domain, the ulema=20
have trapped themselves in a medieval time-warp and modernity has=20
passed them by. On the other hand, scholarship in worldly affairs has=20
generally come to not only exclude religious knowledge from its realm=20
but, quite often, it has also laboured under the misconception of=20
being incompatible with religion. This fallacy is utterly against the=20
Islamic teachings which have no concept of a church or a regimented=20
clergy. Community leaders must also be prayer leaders and, like=20
Allama Iqbal, a scholar of Islam must also be a scholar of selected=20
contemporary knowledge. This combination is the template the=20
government should be reviving and patronising.

If the post-September 11 events have underscored any lesson, it is=20
that the era of obscurantism is over. Modernity has to catch up with=20
Islamic scholarship. While the social dynamics will make their own=20
contribution to this end, the government has to play its part. It can=20
begin by ending the past practice of using religion for political=20
purposes and patronising pliable segments of the clergy to hide its=20
misdeed behind. Just as there are plans to modernise the madrassas,=20
the clerical monopoly over religious interpretation has to be=20
transferred to enlightened scholarship equally adept in religious and=20
worldly knowledge and, thus, capable of satisfying the many questions=20
troubling the modern minds.

______

#4.

The News International (Pakistan) Friday December 14, 2001

FROM PAAN DAANS TO TALIBANS

Mehnaz Akber Aziz

Dadi would have never understood the concept of Talibans.."array bhai=20
yeh bohat na-maqool hain" would have been her comment. We have been=20
so linked with these creatures of another God in the past few months,=20
that it is almost difficult to explain to the International onlookers=20
on what we are. In my mind I am always trying to find the link=20
between my family history and Talibans and what they mean to me=20
versus what they mean to the outside world who get confused on why do=20
I not wear a Burqa or why am I educated.

I grew up in an environment of having grandparents who came to=20
Pakistan at the time of Independence with a varied history, of UP and=20
Pathaans. Dadi wore a white cotton gharara, and kept a paandan on her=20
side. The entire childhood was spent in acquiring manners of Tameez=20
and Adaabs. The family was extremely religious and daily routines=20
included the five times prayers, and "khatums" and "Ramazans". Just=20
the other day when I found our Indian neighbour as the Islamic=20
expert, being interviewed on CNN regarding Ramazan and explaining=20
that, one could not even swallow ones saliva. He had me rolling. Did=20
he mean that we went around spitting the entire day? So, life was not=20
in separate categories but combined the culture, the value system,=20
religion and professionalism, altogether. And there was nothing=20
fundamentalist about it. People entertained, women acquired=20
education... there was no Hijab or beards that stare in our faces as=20
though from alien State.

Imagine in just fifty years it all has become a hotch potch, and we=20
find a lack of connection to what we started from. Pakistan just does=20
not emerge anymore as a shared reality but too many realities that we=20
even within the country cannot understand. It remains dependent on=20
outsiders to pick one thread and convey it all around.

What happened to the transition to globalization and a link to the=20
civilised nations? What happened to Dadis that were well-balanced=20
Muslim women, in times when Islam was a value system and not=20
perceived as a terrorist tool? What went wrong with the decades and=20
the generations that would be lost altogether, and who is to be=20
blamed?

The recent war against terrorism has opened up a Pandora's box of=20
what was within and were harbouring. It is a war that has opened up=20
many issues within our own country between the have and have-nots. It=20
is for the first time that the plight of the have-nots is impacting=20
the elite, through international discrimination. We can no longer go=20
through VIP queues when the poorer lots stand being searched on=20
airports. It is the recession that is hitting the entire country.=20
They will face up to the fact of how we ignored the elements in the=20
nation in the absence of equal resources and also in the absence of a=20
movement that was secular enough and provided leadership to the young=20
who were lost in the face of poverty, and lost in the absence of a=20
shared reality.

On the issue of Islam we have today that has been put on our heads as=20
Armour of sorts when we already were Muslims. The 80's saw this Islam=20
being imported in to Pakistan, it was the time various schools of=20
thought were separated and used against one another. They were few=20
who did not take to it but other who were compelled towards the new=20
meaning of being the Islamic Republic of Pakistan. As a paradox and=20
again as a reaffirmation of the complexities, in the rural parts of=20
Pakistan we still have a strong Sufi following.

The result is that today there are various "varieties" of Islam and=20
schools of thoughts. What is missing from the new face is the fact=20
that we are a part of South Asia and more so the subcontinent and we=20
have a culture that has been taken away from us blatantly. Here one=20
cannot go without addressing our nation state's need to cut the cord=20
from anything that could be labelled Indian. Dance, Music, Dress,=20
Fun. It all had to go. It all resulted in further strengthening of=20
feudalism and tribalism because there was an absence of vision for=20
the entire country as one. The only tool then being Islam though not=20
the one we experienced but one that flew in from "somewhere". Hijabs,=20
beards, women strapped to the four walls of the house, Hadood=20
ordinance are some nightmares to be faced daily since then.

It was also the '80s that saw the mass migration of people who were=20
running from a repressive dictator, with a top down notion of=20
Pakistan. This trend to send children abroad to open environment,=20
which would never return saw a glaring brain drain. It is as though=20
the middle segment of society was sucked out complete making the=20
society tilt to the direction of the unfortunate who did not have the=20
resources and the connections to filter out. The upper crust that=20
could repress the lower level remained. The feudal and tribals that=20
were inadvertently the politicians and the beaurucrats who were the=20
gatekeepers of any reform held fort. The privileges usurped all power=20
and the have-nots were lost with no voice and resources.

The whole notion of CIA training the Talibans initially makes sense=20
but on the other end we did have a whole generation of men who did=20
not have means to be educated and to get to the job markets and hence=20
joined the movement. All of the above has come back to bear with us=20
today. We have set the stage for the western media to come in and=20
pick-up any segment of the society that looks romantically backward.=20
Honestly it is not their fault but ours who have forgotten Dadis and=20
bred elements known as the Talibans, and have no middle ground to=20
fall on, and no connection to where we started from and why.

______

#5.

Indian Express (India) December 12, 2001

Writing the obituary of political Islam
The myth of brotherhood

[by Mushirul Hasan]

This Ramzan is different from the previous ones. Probably the=20
celebration of Id-ul Fitr, a few days from now, will be equally=20
muted. The US attacks on Afghanistan and the consequent loss of so=20
many innocent lives sadden many. Islam's ceaseless demonisation,=20
despite Muslim countries joining the coalition against terrorism,=20
hurts the faithful. And many are, of course, deeply shocked by the US=20
acquiescence in Israel's assault on Palestine. The Shab-i Qadr - the=20
night (23rd day of Ramzan) of the Prophet's ascension to heaven from=20
the great mosque in Jerusalem - is over, but the Zionist state, the=20
heir to fascism, prolongs the agony of the Palestinians. Maybe the=20
martyrdom of Hazrat Ali, the Prophet's cousin, which took place on=20
the 21st day of Ramzan, would bear fruit next year when the=20
Palestinians will achieve freedom from Jewish bondage. Maybe, this=20
year's prayers on Shab-i Qadr will be answered next year. Maybe,=20
rewriting the script for Afghan- istan will augur well for that=20
war-ravaged country. Perhaps, a secular leadership is the panacea of=20
the ills that plague over 50 Muslim countries.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Just as a practising Hindu will not pay heed to the demand for a=20
temple at the disputed site in Ayodhya, a devout Muslim will not know=20
the meaning of jehad
------------------------------------------------------------------------

One thing is for sure. Now nestling in their hideouts, the Taliban=20
leaders are no more than petty, short-sighted politicians who used=20
obscurantist ideas and religious and anti-Western rhetoric to bolster=20
their political designs. In the end, they brought nothing but ruin=20
and misery to their people, tarnished Islam's image and made its=20
followers vulnerable to the attacks of xenophobic elements in the=20
West. This is, sadly, how it has been for sometime - starting with=20
Jamaluddin Afghani, the roving pan-Islamist in the last quarter of=20
the 19th century, continuing with Saddam Husain's ill-fated invasion=20
of Kuwait, and culminating in Osama's silly and messy manoeuvres.=20
Such adventurists, I repeat, serve neither the faith nor the people.=20
If anything, their script is a sure recipe for self-destruction.=20
Given the Iran, Pakistan and Afghan experience, it is time to write=20
the obituary of political Islam.

Islamist ideologues have no business playing around with the lives of=20
innocent people. They must be countered with the aid of liberal and=20
secular ideologies that have been experimented with for centuries in=20
Muslim societies. Religious zealots must not be allowed to stalk our=20
lands. Flowing beards and gowns do not necessarily represent true=20
Islam; the spirit and temper of the faith does. Outward rituals are=20
not good enough; spiritual journey begins from within, reaching=20
commanding heights through individual exertion. One is a good Muslim=20
- and that is Islam's quintessential message - without wielding a gun=20
and striking at 'enemy' targets.

The fact is that militant fanatics, nurtured to bolster US=20
machinations in the region, did not carry much conviction outside=20
their limited spheres of influence. Where are the militant Muslim=20
armies overrunning the territories of their neighbours? Where is the=20
great 'Islamic bomb'? Perhaps, stored in the cold storage at London's=20
Harrod's! Where are the jehadis who were expected to burst forth from=20
mosques/madarsas to wage war against the West? The bubble of=20
Talibanisation has burst sooner than later.

Bamiyan's Buddha has seen it all. He, a victim to its brutal=20
manifestation, knows that the Western media exaggerated the Taliban=20
influence in the region. The decapitated Buddha is smiling. The=20
anguish over civilian deaths apart, neither the governments nor the=20
Muslim communities were energised to back the Taliban cause. Domestic=20
unrest rather than Muslim solidarity caused the initial furore in=20
Indonesia; Pakistan chickened out, hoping to make a few extra bucks;=20
Bangladesh remained largely quiescent. And, thank goodness, the 120=20
million Indian Muslims offered no excuse to the sangh parivar to=20
raise the spectre of a green menace.

Historically, tribal and ethnic identities have shaped the contours=20
of Muslim societies. After the French Revolution (1789), the ideology=20
of nation-states and nationalism have had greater appeal than the=20
romantic notion of umma. Hence the historic contest between competing=20
Arab, Persian and Turkish identities. After World War I, Arab=20
nationalism cut across the religious divide, despite rumblings in=20
certain quarters, to develop on broadly secular lines. Similarly,=20
Palestinian nationalism, pitted against Zionism, has welded the=20
Muslim and Christian communities in its struggle against Israel's=20
occupation.

Although Islam binds people through its essential tenets, the ebb and=20
flow of Muslim societies has not rested on divine commandments. The=20
Muslim nations are split vertically and horizontally. So that=20
pan-Islamism has been a vague idea, a grievance, a mere sentiment=20
that is not translatable into a unified world-wide movement. Despite=20
the essentialised image, lack of unity and coherence have been the=20
hallmarks of Muslim societies; hence, the multiple ideological stands=20
and the diverse social and cultural practices.

Please, therefore, do not be swayed by Islamic symbolism. On close=20
reflection, you will find your Muslim neighbour thinking and acting=20
like you. Just as you, a practising Hindu, will not pay heed to the=20
demand for building a temple at the disputed site in Ayodhya, he, a=20
devout Muslim, will not know the meaning of jehad. If, on the other=20
hand, you ask him to wage jehad against your common oppressor, he may=20
follow your lead.

In Islam's early days, jehad was the war cry in a tribal-ridden=20
society. Later, rulers employed this emotive slogan to justify=20
military expansion. Today, jehad is the weapon of the strong -=20
military dictators and monarchs - and bears no resonance in the minds=20
of the poor and the weak. That is precisely why its meaning must=20
reflect contemporary realities. If the Muslim communities insist on=20
their adherence to jehad as a spiritual asset, they may consider=20
incorporating some of the values embodied in Asoka's dhamma, in Sufi=20
thought, or in Akbar's Din-i Ilahi.

If they wish to nurture mujahids in the true ecumenical spirit of=20
Islam, they will need to draw on democratic and socialist theories=20
that have made this world a better place to live in. Indeed, many=20
Urdu writers and publicists have argued that socialism means an=20
organised and harmonious co-operation of individuals with a view to=20
securing universal well-being. Urdu poet Hasrat Mohani commended the=20
crusade against exploitation and oppression by the socialists. Do you=20
know that the same Hasrat, an otherwise devout Muslim, visited=20
Mathura each year to take part in the Janmashtami festival? He=20
followed the well-established eclectic Sufi tradition, pioneered by=20
Amir Khusro and creatively expressed in the poetry of Jaisi, Rahim=20
and Raskhan, of revering Hindu gods and participating in Diwali=20
celebrations. This is, for you, another version of Islam observed in=20
the subcontinent.

______

#6.

The Telegraph (India) 14 December 2001
BOOK REVIEW / WOMEN AS OBJECTS OF POWER
BY VISHNUPRIYA SENGUPTA

INVENTING SUBJECTS: STUDIES IN HEGEMONY, PATRIARCHY AND COLONIALISM
By Himani Bannerji,
Tulika, Rs 395

The Tarakeshwar scandal of 1873, featured on the cover of Himani=20
Bannerji's latest offering, Inventing Subjects, is a scene from this=20
narrative series, several of which were painted in the same year. The=20
episode marks a watershed in the genre of Kalighat paintings that=20
flourished in Calcutta between 1830 and 1938. Given the=20
Marxist-feminist perspective of this collection of six essays, each=20
of which attempts to throw light on the different ways in which=20
social subjects and their agencies have been constructed and=20
represented in the context of the development of colonial hegemony=20
and socio-cultural formations in India, the cover illustration is=20
befitting.

The Tarakeshwar incident revolved around Madhab Chandra Giri, the=20
mahant or head priest of a Shivaite shrine at Tarakeshwar, a place of=20
pilgrimage. The mahant was involved in an illicit relationship with=20
Elokeshi, wife of Nabinchandra Banerji, who worked in a printing=20
press in Calcutta.

On one of his periodic visits to Tarakeshwar, Nabin heard about his=20
wife's involvement with the mahant and confronted Elokeshi, who=20
confessed and pleaded to be pardoned. The couple were reconciled and=20
decided to leave Tarakeshwar but were prevented from doing so by the=20
mahant's henchmen. On May 27, 1873, a frustrated Nabin killed=20
Elokeshi by severing her head with a fish knife. In the ensuing=20
trial, Nabin was sentenced to life imprisonment while the mahant was=20
fined and sentenced to three years of rigorous imprisonment.

These essays act as a curtain-raiser to clich=E9d subjects like power=20
equations, sexual morality of the bhadramahila, and class struggle in=20
a patriarchal hegemonic 19th century setup in Bengal. In the process,=20
the Bengali middle class consciousness comes to the fore.

Bannerji shows how social subjectivity constructed within an=20
epistemological framework is both "inventing" and "invented". She=20
points out, and rightly so, that as a result, "social subjects can be=20
considered as cultural and ideological objects of others' invention=20
while pointing to the possibility of inventing themselves as subjects=20
within a given socio-historical context."

Ranging from the middle class Bengali women's attempts at=20
self-fashioning to the colonial ideological reflexes within which=20
their projects are articulated, the essays capture the complexity of=20
subject formation. Patriarchy and gender organization are treated in=20
these essays as more than "women's problems". They transcend gender=20
differences, and are looked upon as constitutive dimensions of=20
hegemony.

Bannerji's oeuvre constitutes issues of identity, subjectivity and=20
representation. She proposes that identity must be understood as a=20
reflexive, dialectical concept which incorporates both structures of=20
historical and social organization, as well as a personal=20
self-interaction with the world.

Inventing Subjects contains this ardent belief. The essays, complete=20
in themselves yet sharing a commonality, are well-researched.=20
Excerpts of articles from old Bengali magazines and numerous=20
intertextual references substantiate the author's contention.

Bannerji does not deviate from her primary focus - the subjective=20
aspects of class formation and consciousness of the Bengali middle=20
class with a special emphasis on women as both objects and subjects=20
of projects of self-making of classes and their political=20
implications. But at the onset there surfaces a glitch in the form of=20
a casual oblique between "Bengal/India" and "Bengali/Indian women."=20
Homogenizing India, a country known for its heterogeneity and diverse=20
cultural paradigms, by equating Bengal with India or the bhadramahila=20
with the Indian woman nearly tends to subvert the purpose of this=20
otherwise commendable work.

_____

#7.

Los Angeles Times December 13, 2001
COMMENTARY
Danger Ahead for Secularists
By KHALID DURAN

While many people are optimistic about the outcome of the=20
U.N.-sponsored meeting on Afghanistan in Bonn, Germany, there could=20
be trouble ahead.
The "winners" in Bonn have a history of repression almost equaling=20
the Taliban's. And the Afghans most likely to embrace democracy were=20
excluded from active participation, meaning the losers are likely to=20
be, yet again, the Afghan people.
The important Afghans excluded from the Bonn negotiations do not side=20
with any of the feuding parties, although, for security reasons, they=20
may belong to one or the other political group. Many of these=20
"dissidents" are among the elite, which is largely based abroad, but=20
others are found throughout Afghanistan. They refer to one another as=20
"democrats," "nationalists" or "independent patriots." They are from=20
all the ethnic groups as well as Sunni, Shiite and Ismaili Muslims.=20
While he has not publicly proclaimed himself as part of this group,=20
the newly appointed head of Afghanistan's temporary administration,=20
Hamid Karzai, is not on a very different wavelength. The fact that=20
these secularists resemble a secret society more than a political=20
party goes back to the war against the Soviets. In prewar=20
Afghanistan, there were few doctrinaire Islamists, or fundamentalist=20
Muslims. The fundamentalist parties were created on orders of=20
Pakistan's military intelligence in the hopes of creating an Afghan=20
government subservient to Pakistan. The masses of Afghan refugees had=20
to register with one or the other of those Islamist parties to get=20
food rations.
Those willing to fight the Soviets could get weapons only as members=20
of an Islamist party. These procedures did not win many Afghans over=20
to the new ideology of Islamism, which is by no means the same as old=20
Islam. Many only paid lip service to Islamism to survive.
Then after the Soviets withdrew, the Pakistanis failed to install=20
their proteges as the new rulers in Kabul, which brought another=20
horse into play: the Taliban. Its core consisted mainly of orphans=20
from refugee camps who had been indoctrinated with the most extreme=20
version of Islam, which most Muslims consider absurd. They pushed=20
some Islamists aside and co-opted others. Secular-minded Afghan=20
nationalists were forced to lie low.
All the same, the independent nationalists established themselves in=20
a few corners of the country such as the sparsely inhabited=20
southwest, where they shook off the Taliban and created their own=20
administration even before the U.S. intervention. Curiously, I saw=20
only one minor press reference to this. On the many maps of=20
Afghanistan published every day, the area was shown as being under=20
the Taliban and then under the Northern Alliance. This did not change=20
even when the independent nationalists took Shindand, Afghanistan's=20
most important air base.
Should there be fair elections, Afghanistan's political scene is=20
going to change profoundly. Ethnicity will play a less dominant role,=20
and the ideological parties will lose. At present, the strongest=20
among those is the Jamaat-i-Islami of Northern Alliance leader=20
Burhanuddin Rabbani, a fundamentalist mullah who scorns democracy. As=20
one women's rights activist put it, the only difference between=20
Rabbani and the Taliban's Mullah Mohammed Omar is the length of their=20
beards.
Rabbani's followers are the strongest component of the Northern=20
Alliance. Allowing them to enter Kabul was a mistake that threatens=20
to undo the success of the United States' Afghan campaign. Although=20
Rabbani's Islamists got the lion's share in the interim government=20
approved in Bonn (the ministries of defense, interior and foreign=20
affairs), they are not likely to share power; they already have set=20
up their own government in Kabul.
The independent nationalists have formed an Islamic National Council=20
of the Afghan Peoples. Their representative was invited to Bonn but=20
was relegated to observer. Given protection by U.N. peacekeepers, the=20
secularists would be a major force for democracy, especially if=20
Afghanistan's elite--100,000 educated Afghans live abroad--feels safe=20
to return. But if there is no protection by U.N. peacekeepers,=20
Rabbani's Islamists will seek to exterminate the secularists, just as=20
they tried to do in the past.
*
Khalid Duran is the author of "The Taliban and the Future of=20
Afghanistan," just released by Ullstein, Berlin. E-mail: MECouncil=20
@aol.com.

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--=20