[sacw] SACW #1 (16 Nov. 01)

[Harsh Kapoor]

South Asia Citizens Wire | Dispatch #1.
16 November 2001
http://www.mnet.fr/aiindex

[ This issue of the dispatch is dedicated to the memory of Dr. Sudesh=20
Vaid, the well known Indian feminist and human rights activist who=20
died in Delhi on 15 November 2001.

------------------------------------------

#1. India: Feminist & human rights activist, Prof Sudesh Vaid is dead
#2. Afghan Women Warn Against the Northern Alliance
#3. A Future Veiled in False Hopes (Nafisa Hoodbhoy)
#4. After the Taliban debacle (Imtiaz Alam)
#5. Afghanistan and our future (Shafqat Mahmood)

________________________

#1.

The Hindustan Times
16 November 2001

Sudesh Vaid is dead
HTC
(New Delhi)
Teacher, feminist, writer and human rights activist, Prof Sudesh=20
Vaid, died in Delhi on Thursday after a protracted struggle with=20
cancer. She was 61.

Reader in English Literature at IP College, Delhi [University], she=20
was truly a "public intellectual", synthesising research, activism=20
and deep human values in her quest for a better and more sensitive=20
world.

A memorial meeting will be held at the Constitution Club on Sunday,=20
November 18, at 2 pm. [New Delhi]

______

#2.

Institute for Public Accuracy
915 National Press Building, Washington, D.C. 20045
(202) 347-0020 * http://www.accuracy.org * ipa@a...
___________________________________________________

Thursday, November 15, 2001

Interviews Available:

Afghan Women Warn Against the Northern Alliance

FAHIMA VORGETTS, ariana@t...
Vorgetts headed a women's literacy program in Kabul and fled
Afghanistan after the Soviet invasion in 1979. (Her sister, operating
an underground school for girls in Kabul, fled the country in 1999
when the Taliban learned of her activities.) Vorgetts said today:
"For years we have been trying to raise awareness about the situation
of women in Afghanistan and for years we were being ignored. We had
to beg people to arrange an event. Now people are listening to what
we say about the Taliban, but they must listen to what we say about
the Northern Alliance to not repeat the same type of tragedy for the
country as a whole and especially for the women of Afghanistan. The
Taliban are horrible and Afghanistan will be much better off without
them, but we must not forget that the Northern Alliance committed so
many atrocities, so many crimes during their rule between 1992 and
1996 that they made it easy for the Taliban to come to power.
Afghanistan has suffered for 23 years -- there is no school,
employment, streets, factories or bridges left. The bombing is making
it worse, it's causing more damage. If you want to stop terrorism you
must help the country by providing infrastructure, investment,
education and aid. The war must be against poverty and ignorance,
that's the only way to bring real peace to Afghanistan and
consequently to the United States. The outside world spent billions
of dollars to build up the mujahadeen. Now it should spend money to
help bring some real peace."

TAHMEENA FARYAL, [via Alicia Lucksted, aluckste@p...],
http://www.rawa.org
Spokesperson for the Revolutionary Association of the Women of
Afghanistan, the oldest women's humanitarian and political
organization in Afghanistan, Faryal said today: "Despite the claim of
the U.S. that only military and terrorist bases of the Taliban and Al
Qaeda would be struck and that its actions would be accurately
targeted and proportionate, what we have witnessed for the past many
days leaves no doubt that this invasion will shed the blood of
numerous women, men, children, young and old of our country.... The
U.S. and its allies were supporting the policies that helped foster
Osama bin Ladin and the Taliban. Today they are sharpening the dagger
of the 'Northern Alliance.' So many of those now involved in what has
come to be called the Northern Alliance have the blood of our beloved
people on their hands, as of course do the Taliban. Their sustained
atrocities have been well documented by independent international
human rights organizations such as Amnesty International and Human
Rights Watch, and others. From 1992 to 1996 in particular, these
forces waged a brutal war against women, using rape, torture,
abduction and forced marriage as their weapons. Many women committed
suicide during this period as their only escape. Any initiative to
establish a broad-based government must exclude all Taliban and other
criminal Jehadi factions, unless and until a specific faction or
person has been absolved of war crimes and crimes against humanity.
Otherwise, the people will again be plunged into the living hell that
engulfed our country from 1992 to 1996 -- under elements now involved
in the Northern Alliance -- and continues to the present under the
Taliban. The continuation of U.S. attacks and the increase in the
number of innocent civilian victims not only gives an excuse to the
Taliban, but also will cause the empowering of the fundamentalist
forces in the region and even elsewhere in the world."

ZIEBA SHORISH-SHAMLEY, zieba@a..., http://www.wapha.org
Shorish-Shamley is the founder and director of the Women's Alliance
for Peace and Human Rights in Afghanistan.

For more information, contact at the Institute for Public Accuracy:
Sam Husseini, (202) 347-0020; David Zupan, (541) 484-9167

______

#3.

The Washington Post
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A7580-2001Nov10.html

A Future Veiled in False Hopes

By Nafisa Hoodbhoy
Sunday, November 11, 2001; Page B01

Twelve years ago, I was astonished by what I found on a trip from my=20
native Pakistan to Afghanistan. I couldn't have imagined a=20
neighboring Muslim country with so many women in public places. Each=20
morning, the Afghan capital was abuzz with young professionals on=20
their way to work, most dressed in Western clothes and some even in=20
miniskirts and high heels as they vied with their fashion-conscious=20
counterparts in Paris. Kabul University, where I saw more female than=20
male students, was another surprise. But even then, the occasional=20
gunfire and bomb blasts in the city -- ruled by Soviet-supported=20
President Najibullah -- were a reminder that these freedoms could=20
prove elusive. Young women on campus, clutching their notepads in the=20
streaming February sunlight, told me apprehensively, "If the=20
mujaheddin take over, they will force us to veil."

The encumbering full-lengthburqasthat women now have to wear have=20
become a symbol for Westerners of the ruling Taliban government's=20
oppressive policies. Even President Bush acknowledged as much last=20
week when he condemned the current regime under which "women are=20
imprisoned in their homes, and are denied access to basic health care=20
and education." But it would be an oversimplification to imagine that=20
simply ousting the Taliban will restore basic human rights to women=20
there. Indeed, in its determination to use whatever means necessary=20
to destroy Osama bin Laden and his al Qaeda network, the=20
administration is in danger of exacerbating the rivalries among=20
Afghanistan's tribes, whose practices are shrouded in traditions few=20
Americans comprehend.

Even though there has been much talk in the West about how to=20
establish a broad-based post-Taliban government that would guarantee=20
the rights of women and ethnic minorities, the United Nations has not=20
seriously begun addressing the role of women in any future form of=20
government. If history is any guide, neither a government led by the=20
exiled former king, Mohammed Zahir Shah, nor one dominated by the=20
Northern Alliance would readily grant women freedom. Instead, the=20
dramatic changes in women's fortunes over the past century are=20
testimony to their fragile position in Afghanistan's oft-rent social=20
fabric.

I got a clear sense of that during my 1989 visit. Although many=20
Afghan women I spoke with expressed trepidation about a takeover by=20
Islamic fundamentalists, they could not have predicted how oppressive=20
their lot would soon become. After all, they grew up in a relatively=20
liberal Muslim society; many in Kabul and Kandahar had working=20
mothers -- nurses and doctors, engineers, journalists, factory=20
workers and, of course, teachers. Soviet forces had withdrawn from=20
the country just two weeks before my arrival, and the question=20
foremost on everyone's mind was whether the Soviet-backed Najibullah=20
government would survive the onslaught by the Islamist radicals.

As if anticipating his eventual death at the hands of Taliban=20
fundamentalists, the embattled Najibullah was clearly taking no=20
chances -- and he was even recruiting women to help him. At a=20
training school in Kabul, I came across a female trainee reserve=20
force engaged in combat exercises. They told me that their job was to=20
arrest and hand over mujaheddin suspects to authorities. They knew=20
full well what a formidable force the mujaheddin had become. With=20
their most radical factions in Northern Pakistan, they were receiving=20
millions of dollars' worth of arms from the United States, funneled=20
through Pakistan's military ruler, all directed at the goal they=20
would accomplish a few years later -- removing Najibullah from power.

I asked Afghan officials then whether such threats of future=20
instability might put women's freedom on the line. The president of=20
the Afghan Women's Council at the time, Massuma Esmaty Wardak, argued=20
that, on the contrary, women's emancipation was deeply rooted in=20
Afghan history. She pointed out that the country's most famous=20
reformer, King Amanullah, who was inspired by Turkey's secular nation=20
builder Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, encouraged sweeping changes for women=20
in the early 20th century. He introduced Western dress, she pointed=20
out, sent girls to study abroad, banned the sale of women, raised the=20
marriage age and abolished the tribal custom known as levirate (where=20
a widow is obliged to marry her brother-in-law).

What Wardak and others I talked to failed to mention was that King=20
Amanullah was ousted in 1929, after a brief reign, when conservative=20
tribesmen revolted against his liberal policies. Thereafter, King=20
Zahir Shah, Afghanistan's longest-reigning monarch (1933-1973) --=20
whom the U.N. has now selected to head the post-Taliban government --=20
slowed down the changes for women. Yes, women came to enjoy greater=20
liberation than in some other Muslim countries, but encouraging=20
freedom also risked provoking a backlash from the conservatives.

Ever since, the role of women has continued to reflect the volatile=20
nature of Afghan society -- and of the dangers of trying to alter=20
traditions by imposing outside standards on the people. The Soviet=20
occupation that followed the bloody communist Saur Revolution in 1978=20
attempted to force top-down changes in Afghanistan. Peoples=20
Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) workers fanned out into the=20
villages to stop Afghans from selling their daughters and coerced the=20
girls instead to go to school. Conservative tribesmen retaliated by=20
murdering PDPA workers. These changes also triggered a vast exodus of=20
Afghan tribes. Some 3 million Afghans fled the country. Many of those=20
who grew up as orphans of war in Pakistan's refugee camps have become=20
today's Taliban; others are that regime's fiercest critics.

The most militant Islamist groups who resisted the Soviet influence=20
banded together under mujaheddin leader Gulbuddin Hekmatyar in=20
Peshawar, northern Pakistan. They objected fiercely to Muslim women=20
not wearing the veil and to their working outside the home. Some of=20
his supporters threw acid on women wearing Western dress in Kabul.=20
When I interviewed Hekmatyar in Karachi in 1986, I was surprised to=20
find a soft-spoken man who was fluent in English. But his supporters=20
included Pakistan's Jamaat-e-Islami, the radical Islamist party that=20
enforced gender segregation at Karachi University with acid attacks=20
on female students. (This group has now given an ultimatum to the=20
Pakistani government to stop supporting the U.S.-led anti-terrorist=20
coalition or be overthrown.)

Hekmatyar has refused to join the Northern Alliance now backed by the=20
United States in its battle with the Taliban. But many other=20
mujaheddin leaders are members of that alliance, and even less=20
radical ones than Hekmatyar punish women who refuse to wear a burqa.=20
The tribal beliefs in the submission of women go far beyond the=20
Taliban.

The stability that the Taliban offered when it snatched power from=20
the warring mujaheddin in 1996 came at a further cost to women. Made=20
up of ethnic Pashtuns, the Taliban enforced the strict Pashtunwali=20
code of honor that requires women to be treated as the property of=20
their men. The militia barredwomen from working in the professions.=20
Without female teachers, schools soon closed. The Taliban issued a=20
decree that forbade all girls from going to school. Women who=20
organized the early protests against the ragtag militia were beaten=20
back. Only two ways of earning a living were left open to them --=20
beggary and prostitution.

Last week I spoke with two Afghan women who have been helping=20
refugees as U.N. staff. They told of women's isolation, cowering in=20
their houses behind darkened windows so that they cannot be seen from=20
the street. Few can read. Many are depressed. Nafisa Nezam, who was=20
in Northern Afghanistan until last month, said that the Taliban have=20
"brought about a new interpretation of 'jihad' to mean fighting women=20
who wear lipstick, nail polish and jewelry." Some have reputedly had=20
their fingers cut off for painting their nails.

There have been some brave voices of dissent. Afghan women in=20
Pakistan have banded together as the Revolutionary Association of the=20
Women of Afghanistan (RAWA). The group's members told me in Islamabad=20
in 1999 that they lived in mortal fear of being discovered. They know=20
how the extremists treat women who dissent. RAWA's founding=20
president, Meena, was murdered in 1987 -- allegedly by the mujaheddin=20
-- for speaking out against the fundamentalists.

About half of the 4 million or so people who fled Afghanistan over=20
the past 20 years are women, and many of them would love to return to=20
their home country once the Taliban is overthrown. Among them, Tahira=20
Shairzai, a former schoolteacher in Kabul who now works in the United=20
States, told me she favors the U.N. choice of an interim government=20
headed by King Zahir Shah. The 86-year-old exiled monarch shares=20
Pashtun ethnicity with the Taliban, but he is popular because he=20
treated ethnic groups even-handedly during his 40-year rule of=20
Afghanistan. Tahira also holds out hope that the Northern Alliance,=20
which allows girls' schools to remain open in the area it controls,=20
will take a positive attitude toward working women.

However, the past behavior of the Alliance leaders offers little=20
indication that women's rights will be taken seriously under the next=20
regime. A mishmash of conservative and more moderate tribal leaders,=20
the Alliance is united for the sole purpose of combating the Taliban.=20
A recent meeting ofanti-Taliban leaders in Peshawar demonstrated that=20
women's rights do not figure in their deliberations.

What's more, as U.S. bombs hit civilians, the Pashtuns are becoming=20
even more radicalized. The United States has had little success in=20
wooing moderate Pashtuns away from the Taliban -- a move that the=20
administration recognizes is necessary not only to win the current=20
war but because Afghanistan's future stability depends upon=20
cooperation among tribal factions. As the U.S. bombing continues,=20
thousands of armed Pashtun tribesmen are gathering on the=20
Pakistan-Afghan border to fight alongside the Taliban.Political=20
analysts I have spoken with in Pakistan predict that even if the=20
Taliban is routed, it will likely withdraw into the hills and fight=20
the new government. Moreover, the Northern Alliance could plunge into=20
internecine strife.

So although there is no doubt in my mind that women will fare=20
somewhat better if the Taliban is overthrown, I wonder what comes=20
next. Unless there is a means of ensuring durable peace, women's=20
rights do not have a fighting chance in Afghanistan.

Nafisa Hoodbhoy, a journalist who worked for 16 years for Dawn=20
newspaper in Karachi, Pakistan, taught as a Ford Fellow at Amherst=20
College this year, with a focus on women and politics in Pakistan,=20
Afghanistan and Iran.

=A9 2001 The Washington Post Company

______

#4.

The News International
16 November 2001

After the Taliban debacle

By Imtiaz Alam

All notions about Taliban putting up a protracted struggle have been=20
put to rest and with that pro-Taliban entiments in Pakistan have also=20
been grieved. Benefiting from the walkover, the Taliban provided to=20
ostensibly ignite Pakhtun sentiment, the Northern Alliance has tried=20
to repeat its 1992 maneuver to outflank others, but the UN and=20
international community seems resolved not to become instrumental in=20
reviving the internecine ethnic conflict and has set a course that=20
should alleviate the concerns being expressed by Islamabad.

The Security Council has set the parameters and procedure for a=20
broad-based government that precludes the Rabbani government and=20
engages all ethnic groups and forces that matter, including Northern=20
Alliance and a whole range of Pakhtun elements.

Such an interim government is to be created in consultation with and=20
by all Afghans through and under the umbrella of the UN. It will have=20
the backing of a multi-national force to enforce order, leaving no=20
option for the Northern Alliance but to coalesce in. The takeover of=20
Kabul by the Northern Alliance has in fact upset the international=20
collation that was not prepared to fill a sudden void caused by the=20
surprising run by the Taliban.

The 'tactical retreat' by the Taliban has in fact turned out to be a=20
strategic debacle. By giving a walkover to Northern Alliance to enter=20
Kabul, the Taliban had tried to barter territory for survival and=20
hoped to retain substantial support among the Pakhtuns who resent a=20
non-Pakhtun Kabul falling into the hands of others. But the Taliban's=20
defeat is so dramatic that not only in the Tajik-Uzbek-Hazara regions=20
they have been routed, but also in the Pakhtun areas the warlords and=20
the tribal chieftains are not letting them to maintain a foothold.=20
The Taliban has again surprised, first by sweeping Afghanistan and=20
braving the bombing for almost ten weeks, by now continuing to=20
retreat from almost everywhere with, perhaps, no safe-havens left=20
among the people, except the caves and remote hideouts or some=20
sanctuaries as refugees on this side of the Durand Line.

They had first committed the strategic blunder of not listening to=20
Pakistan, their only ally and preferring their brotherhood with the=20
'most wanted terrorist', Osama and his Al-Qaeda, over Afghan national=20
interests. Then, in their stupid tribal chivalry, they took the=20
self-suicidal road of fighting entrenched warfare on the frontlines=20
and, thus, became an easy prey to one of the most ferocious bombings=20
in history. And now they have beaten such a disorganized retreat that=20
all those forces in the Pakhtun-dominated province, especially the=20
tribes fed up with warlords, who had once submitted to their writ,=20
are encouraged to revive their fiefdoms, as has already happened in=20
many provinces. Their last ditch effort to regroup will cast them=20
decisively and may not leave them in a position to even resort to hit=20
and run guerilla operations and maintain a clandestine network for a=20
protracted struggle. It is now matter of weeks, if not days, that=20
their fated will be sealed. Such a swift deafeat of an adversary=20
will, however, encourage the US to interfere elsewhere in the Muslim=20
world.

The Taliban were presiding over such a repressed and devastated=20
populace that they might not find a popular base, most crucial to=20
guerilla warfare. The spontaneous jubilations being expressed by the=20
Afghan people, rebellion in many provinces and surrender in some=20
areas only reveal the deep alienation and hatred the Afghan people=20
were nursing against them. They will be increasingly seen by the=20
Afghans as a source of inviting international wrath and an=20
inescapable precise-bombing. Many among Afghans may even prefer to=20
earn some badly needed dividends over providing them a sanctuary,=20
rather than become a victim of Afghan chivalry. They cannot last long=20
by hiding in caves and tunnels or hills, divorced from people and cut=20
off from essential supplies.

Before the US military strategy could prolong, they simply withered=20
away; paving the way for achieving the objectives set by US,=20
eradication of Osama and his associates. Unlike the Soviets, the US=20
was facing an adversary it created that was also abandoned by its=20
only patron, Pakistan, who refused to take a self-suicidal course the=20
clergy was insisting. In the post-cold war world, it is impossible=20
for any movement or country to survive that defies the necessary=20
conditions of its own existence and challenges the international=20
community in such a stupid manner as did the Taliban. The Taliban did=20
emerge as a stabilizing force, but with their extremism and=20
repression they not only brought a bad name to Islam, but also=20
infinite miseries to the Afghan people. With the defeat of first=20
Sunni-state of amateurish seminary, a dangerous process of=20
Talibanization of Pakistan has met a serious setback. If Pakistan=20
vigorously pursues a de-Talibanization course in all its=20
ramifications, then it will be saving its future from falling into=20
the hands of medievalist reactionaries.

On the other hand, the Northern Alliance cannot extend its writ to=20
the Pakthun regions, nor can it defy the international community. No=20
doubt, with the rout of Taliban and vast divisions among the=20
Pakhtuns, it has emerged as a relatively stronger force, but it=20
cannot sustain an expansion in it area of influence beyond its ethnic=20
roots. Nor can it maintain inter-ethnic, inter and intra-group=20
solidarity within its own ranks. Not only Pakhtuns, due to their=20
divisions and allegiance to once Durrani-Ghilzai monarchist coalition=20
that historically ruled Afghanistan, but also various groups among=20
the Northern Alliance, for their internal rivalry, will look towards=20
the former king Zahir Shah. The irony of bloody Afghan history since=20
the royal coup by Sardar Dawood is that it is back to square one,=20
i.e., a quasi-monarchist dispensation that mediates between the=20
conflicting tribal interests. But, after so much upheavals and=20
turnings, the monarchy has lost its role. Yet a tribal Afghanistan=20
needs a symbolic unifier. Most dangerous fallout of the fall of=20
Taliban is that Afghanistan can again degenerate into a prolonged=20
anarchy and internecine conflict the people are deeply fed up with.=20
But without a force to backup a loose coalition or federation of=20
regions and provinces, it is not possible to keep Afghanistan at=20
peace with itself and with adjoining ethnic regions across its=20
borders. The UN is on the right path of building a consensus around a=20
broad-based, multi-ethnic and pluralist interim government that will=20
be backed by an international 'coalition of will' or a multi-national=20
force, including Muslim nations.

No less important is the fallout of Taliban's reversals on Pakistan's=20
Pakthun-belt, where many among Taliban would try to seek sanctuaries=20
not only in the tribal belt, but also among their Deobandi-Pakthun=20
support-pockets. By taking a firm stand against the takeover of Kabul=20
by the Northern Alliance and strongly supporting the Pakhtun=20
participation in the broad-based government, General Pervez Musarraf=20
has assuaged the Pakhtun sentiments. And by taking some preventive=20
security measures, that must be further reinforced, Islamabad has=20
tried to preempt the Taliban's infiltration that has some potential=20
to destabilize some areas of our Pakthun-belt.

Islamabad must also realize its repeated follies of propping up its=20
proxies in Afghanistan. It brought one set of peoples in place of=20
others from so-called Afghan Mujahideen, Messrs Hikmatyar and Masood,=20
to the Taliban, but no one served its purpose. They, rather,=20
continued to switch their loyalties and same is happening now. By=20
picking one group, it annoyed others. Once it put all its eggs in=20
Masood's basket, then in Taliban's favor. Consequently, it was left=20
with no favorites. It is better Pakistan keeps off from getting=20
involved in the factional feuds and start mending its fences with=20
everybody, including all factions in the Northern Alliance, while=20
keeping out of the Afghan quagmire.

______

#5.

The News International
Friday November 16, 2001

Afghanistan and our future
[by Shafqat Mahmood]

The writer is a former Senator and a former federal and provincial minister

The Taliban are crumbling faster than cardboard shanties in the path=20
of astorm. Promises of fierce ground battles, that churned the blood=20
of many a chest thumper in Pakistan, are now drifting helplessly in=20
the dust laden Afghan wind. It is not over yet, not by a long shot,=20
but what remains is amopping up operation. Scattered over rural=20
Afghanistan, the Taliban residue and their foreign volunteers will be=20
picked off slowly but surely.

It is sad in a way although I have no love for the Taliban or what=20
they stood for. Much of this could have been avoided if they were=20
less cocky or more rational or more ready to be a part of the world.=20
If they were all these things, though, they would not be Taliban.=20
People who are ready to blow up ancient Buddhist statutes because=20
they are idols or whip women because their ankles are showing or=20
force every man to keep a six-inch long beard, do not live in the=20
same world as you and I.

A particularly poignant moment for me as Kabul fell, was the playing=20
of music from a truck mounted loudspeaker. If the ordinary and=20
trivial becomes special and significant, there is something terribly=20
wrong with the world. And there was a lot wrong with the Taliban's=20
world. The image of young Afghans queuing up to get their beards=20
trimmed makes this point more eloquently than a thousand or a million=20
words.

The liberators of Kabul are not the Dad's Army either. Within their=20
ranks are some of the most blood thirsty tyrants ever encountered in=20
the tragic Afghan history. Yet it is a sign of the times that many=20
ordinary Afghans let out a collective sigh of relief when the Taliban=20
departed. So let no one mourn the Taliban. They are not synonymous=20
with the Afghans. They were freaks of history and will hopefully be=20
consigned to that special place where other such oddities are kept.

Some of our armchair warriors are not finished though. Retired=20
Generals Hamid Gul and Aslam 'strategic' Beg are calling the Taliban=20
disappearing act a brilliant tactical manoeuvre. Earlier they=20
predicted fierce land battles and now, without an apology, they see=20
the spectre of a long drawn out guerrilla war. Do not forget that one=20
of these gentlemen declared Saddam's 'mother of all battles' as=20
another Vietnam. Having had such a comeuppance, he should have taken=20
an eternal vow of silence. No such luck. The sad part is that some=20
newspapers still bother to give space to his never ending bombast.

Others like Qazi Hussain Ahmed also need to pause and do a rethink.=20
If the Taliban were representative of all the Afghans or even of the=20
Pashtuns they would not have crumbled so quickly. The fact is that=20
they were a small slice of Afghani society and had gathered momentum=20
only because of unending conflict and depravity of the warlords. When=20
their true face was revealed most of the Afghans grew to hate them.

It must also be remembered that if Afghans hate foreigners on their=20
soil, they must have also grown to hate the Arabs, the Chechens, the=20
Pakistanis and others who had flocked to Osama and the Taliban. It=20
did not require a major calculation for the Afghans to see that at=20
least some of their difficulties were because of the foreigners. It=20
is instructive therefore that the Northern Alliance soldiers make it=20
a point of executing the outsiders, who surrender, but spare the=20
Afghans even if they are Taliban.

The heat of the battle may be over but the political headaches have=20
already begun. Putting together a broad based government, which by=20
definition should be majority Pashtun, is not going to be easy. While=20
there are definite problems ahead, some of us are becoming overly=20
anxious about the Afghan government of the future. Yes, it was a=20
mistake of our intelligence not to have a link to non-Taliban forces=20
and I hope we have learnt a lesson. But, it is not the end of the=20
world either.

We must have faith in our intrinsic importance for any Afghan=20
government. Most of Southern and Western Afghanistan has already=20
become a common economic market with us. Pakistani goods such as=20
wheat, edible oil, toiletries, POL products, cloth and a host of=20
others are a staple in Afghan markets. Our currency is a legal tender=20
there. This integration of markets is a necessary bond between us and=20
Afghanistan.

Geography still dictates that we provide the nearest port to Afghan=20
goods. In fact Afghan transit trade has become a headache for us and=20
a bonanza for Afghan governments. We are also a host to millions of=20
Afghans, whether we like it or not. No future Afghan government can=20
afford to be an enemy of ours. It may not be a bosom buddy but then=20
no Afghan government has ever been one. A businesslike relationship=20
is the best we can hope for and this will happen.

We must also have faith in the strength of our armed forces.=20
Internally we may have mixed feelings about them because of their=20
political role but externally we must understand that they can deter=20
any aggression. No Afghan government will risk a conflict with us=20
because they know our strength. So, while there may be a rocky road=20
ahead in the near term, the long-term prospect of coexistence with=20
future Afghan governments is not bad.

There is also an apprehension among some people that our love affair=20
with the Americans is about to end. The logic is that after the=20
collapse of the Taliban, we are no longer required. Some even think=20
that we are going to be the next target of American aggression. This=20
is all nonsense. I have no brief for the Americans, and certainly no=20
information, yet is not difficult to see what lies ahead. States come=20
together because of shared interests. I do not see American interest=20
in this region diminishing. Therefore, their interest in us and ours=20
in them will remain.

The simple fact is that the American are here to stay. They have not=20
gone to all this trouble just to defeat the ragtag Taliban or even to=20
root out Osama. These are valid targets but there is also a long-term=20
strategic/economic objective. Central Asia has the largest untapped=20
reservoir of oil and gas in the world. The best way to transport this=20
to European and American markets is through Afghanistan and Pakistan.=20
To do this, American companies have been trying to build a pipeline=20
for many years now. After Afghanistan has been pacified, this will=20
become a major priority.

I do not believe that Americans would have bases either in Pakistan=20
or Afghanistan but they will have some presence in Central Asia. More=20
importantly because of economic and strategic reasons, they will stay=20
engaged with this part of the world. This engagement dictates that=20
they will continue to want a friendly Pakistan. They will also want=20
Pakistan to remain stable and this can only happen if we are=20
economically viable. Therefore, American assistance, and help with=20
the international financial institutions, will remain.

When President Bush and Colin Powell and even Tony Blair say that we=20
are here for the long haul, they mean it. They will remain with us=20
not because they love us, but because their economic and strategic=20
interest demands it. Of course, this engagement would have other=20
repercussions; some good, some bad. If the balance has to be towards=20
the good, we will have to play our cards right.

No outside power can take us out of our difficulties, if we are not=20
determined to help ourselves. This government has done well to keep=20
the focus on the economy but a fundamental social problem would also=20
have to be addressed. We cannot have three systems of education,=20
deeni madaris, Urdu medium schools and the elite English medium. This=20
will keep dividing our society. We need to have one system of=20
education for everyone. Rich, poor, liberal, orthodox, Shia, Sunni,=20
Wahabi, Punjabi, Sindhi, Baluchi and Pushtun, would all have to be=20
weaved into a common thread of education. Only this will heal the=20
fissures in our society.

We also need to sort out the extremists, the sectarian terrorist, the=20
fascists hiding behind religion, and others of such ilk, who=20
destabilise our society. One way to counter them is to rid them and=20
the country of weapons. If we begin to do some of this, we would on=20
the right road. If we are doing right, the help of our friends from=20
abroad will make a difference. Otherwise no amount of aid can do any=20
good. I stick my neck out to say that I am optimistic about the=20
future. I really think that Pakistan came to an important crossroad=20
and took the right decision. If we follow this up with correct=20
policies only good lies ahead.

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