[sacw] SACW #1 (11 June 01)

[aiindex@mnet.fr]

South Asia Citizens Wire / Dispatch # 1.
11 June 2001
http://www.mnet.fr/aiindex

----------
[ INDIA / PAKISTAN / KASHMIR ]

#1. Give peace a chance
#2. A passage to Delhi
#3. Public Meeting for an independent and secular Kashmir (London 25 June)
#4. Press Release: "Pakistan must let the people of Kashmir to participate=
=20
in democratic process"

--------------------------

#1.

Frontline
Volume 18 - Issue 12, Jun. 09 - 22, 2001
COMMENT

GIVE PEACE A CHANCE

One can only welcome the prospect of an India-Pakistan dialogue at the=20
highest level with a peculiar combination of exhilaration and foreboding.=20
One would have had far greater confidence in this remarkable initiative if=
=20
it had been prepared more carefully.

AIJAZ AHMAD

PRIME MINISTER Atal Behari Vajpayee's belated invitation to General Pervez=
=20
Musharraf, Pakistan's Chief Executive, for a dialogue is a welcome sign=20
that he is prepared to rise above the intransigence of his more hawkish=20
colleagues and to respond more positively to those voices of reason which=20
have been urging him for some months to open such a dialogue. Nor does a=20
direct dialogue with the highest authority in Pakistan preclude other,=20
parallel dialogues within the nation and beyond. Indeed, as we argued in=20
the previous issue of Frontline, some progress on Track One is imperative=20
for any further momentum on other tracks.

<Image>Indian soldiers near the Line of Control in Nowgam Sector in=20
northern Kashmir recently.

Gen. Musharraf is likewise to be commended for having written back in a=20
spirit of reciprocity without trying to score points. India has made clear=
=20
its commitment to a composite dialogue on all issues of mutual concern,=20
including Kashmir. Pakistan has reiterated its longstanding position that=20
Kashmir is the "core issue" but has combined that insistence with a healthy=
=20
willingness to engage in a wider discussion. This combination of warmth and=
=20
restraint on both sides should be enough for now and augurs well for the=20
future. The issue of the All Parties Hurriyat Conference (APHC) is likely=20
to provide some anxious moments as the preparations get under way, and to=20
this we shall return presently.

Everyone across the political spectrum should welcome this initiative, and=
=20
it is in a spirit of expectation and optimism that one should try to think=
=20
of all the attending difficulties so that ways may be found for overcoming=
=20
them. We have to assess frankly the very mess of the past many months out=20
of which this surprising initiative has arisen and which is bound to be=20
reflected in the perceptions of the respective parties in the dialogue.=20
Second, there is the legacy of the Lahore euphoria and the Kargil disaster=
=20
which must be faced squarely, so that miscalculations and overbids of the=20
past are not repeated. Third, thanks to events of the past two years or=20
more, the situation on the ground within Jammu and Kashmir as well as the=20
nature of the insurgency has changed, for the worse. Fourth, both India and=
=20
Pakistan must address the nuclear issue which has served to=20
institutionalise brinksmanship and irresponsibility in mutual relations.=20
Fifth, a proper understanding of the domestic situation that the respective=
=20
parties face in their own countries is necessary if we are to appreciate=20
the constraints within which they shall meet and which they should help=20
each other in facing.

Sixth, the failure to have a dialogue with the APHC while excluding=20
Pakistan should not now translate itself into yet another failure by=20
speaking to Pakistan while sidelining Kashmiri voices. Reasonable people=20
might disagree as to how far the Hurriyat represents Kashmiris (and the=20
people of Jammu and Kashmir generally), or who else might be included in=20
the overall dialogue, but there is no escaping the fact that the quest of=20
the people, all the people, of Jammu and Kashmir for both peace and dignity=
=20
means that they have to be, in one way or another, active party to the=20
dialogue. Seventh, it would be imprudent to start with a search for a final=
=20
solution all at once, but both sides will obviously have to start moving=20
away from their maximalist positions with a willingness to entertain=20
imaginative alternatives. Even as the respective leaders begin a dialogue,=
=20
it is best to recognise that the territorial claims of the two=20
nation-states as presently understood by each are irreconcilable, and that=
=20
peace with dignity is possible only if the interests of all the people in=20
the conflict zones are given primacy over these claims. This is=20
particularly the case because we are fast approaching a point where the=20
situation on the ground may not allow the respective parties to resolve the=
=20
problem through a mutual accommodation in which there is neither victor nor=
=20
vanquished.

Let me now elaborate some of these points.

One would have had far greater confidence in this remarkable initiative if=
=20
it had been prepared more carefully and if the Indian government had=20
undertaken it without floundering around among other dead ends for well=20
over a year. That General Musharraf had come to stay had become clear soon=
=20
after his takeover, and it brings Indian leaders and diplomats no credit=20
that it took them so long to acknowledge this reality. The bizarre=20
experience of the non-ceasefire with the Hizbul Mujahideen a year ago=20
should have made it altogether clear that if the strongest fighting force=20
among the militants could not sustain that initiative without Pakistan's=20
backing, lesser groupings would be all the more incapable of doing so.=20
Then, the November ceasefire was obviously ill-prepared, subject to=20
dissensions within the government, and had the cumulative effect of=20
shifting the centre of gravity within the militancy towards the most=20
extremist jehadi groups, notably the Lashkar-e-Toiba and also the Jaish=20
Muhammadi and others, greatly strengthening Syed Ali Shah Geelani against=20
men like Abdul Ghani Lone and Abdul Ghani Bhat. Then came the negotiator,=20
the affable K.C. Pant, who was appointed belatedly and undermined promptly,=
=20
and it took all the ingenuity on the part of the television mandarins to=20
portray Shabir Shah as someone who mattered. The holding up of the South=20
Asian Association of Regional Cooperation (SAARC) process so as to avoid a=
=20
face-to-face encounter with Musharraf became unbearably absurd, while=20
pressures to open up a direct dialogue kept mounting from all quarters,=20
becoming virtually an international chorus which Musharraf himself happily=
=20
joined. Uma Bharati's tantrum over the Sharjah cricket tournament only=20
illustrated the more bizarre depths of all this bungling.

Had the invitation come even six months ago, it would have had the=20
appearance of an act of liberal generosity on the part of the more=20
powerful, politically more mature state and Vajpayee would have undoubtedly=
=20
occupied the moral high ground. Now, after a chain of policy disasters the=
=20
initiative has the appearance of an act of last resort for a government=20
that has run out of choices it would have preferred, and Vajpayee is made=20
to look like a hapless giant lurching from one policy failure to another.=20
Instead of appearing generous, he appears to be desperate. That,=20
alarmingly, is the reading much too readily accepted in far too many=20
circles within Pakistan and is likely to undermine the talks when they come=
.

Worse still, we seem to have learned nothing from the debacle of the bus=20
diplomacy. What could have been a historic beginning of sustained dialogue=
=20
and negotiated peace between our two countries collapsed into viscious=20
chaos because no preparation had gone into it and something as spectacular=
=20
as the Indian Prime Minister arriving at the Wagah border in a bus was=20
staged merely to placate an international opinion that had been greatly=20
alarmed by our nuclear explosions. The spectacle was made all the more=20
grand because there was at the heart of it, on both sides, sheer policy=20
vacuum. Any responsible political leader would have recalled President=20
Anwar Sadat's historic visit to Jerusalem, to make the peace between Egypt=
=20
and Israel, which had been prepared over several years, in all possible=20
detail. The more recent Oslo process, which did not even yield any modicum=
=20
of peace or justice for the victims, had taken nine years. Instead of the=20
patience required for preparing a breakthrough, we put all-out trust in=20
that vacuous thing which pop journalism as well as pop diplomacy calls=20
"chemistry", a mysterious thing that happens - or fails to happen - between=
=20
leaders while nations wait in the wings.

The present initiative seems to have been scarcely better prepared. There=20
is reason to believe that something of this kind was on Vajpayee's mind for=
=20
a couple of weeks. Even so, on May 22, the day before the ceasefire was=20
withdrawn and the surprise of the invitation was sprung, sobre national=20
dailies like The Hindu were carrying front-page stories saying that an=20
extension of the ceasefire was imminent. Indeed, only a few hours before=20
the final decision was made, Pakistan's offer of talks 'anywhere, any time,=
=20
at whatever level' had been dismissed as "hollow" in a press conference=20
addressed jointly by Home Minister L.K. Advani, External Affairs Minister=20
Jaswant Singh and Finance Minister Yashwant Sinha. The announcement of the=
=20
new decisions thus had the air of a deal between petulant partners:=20
withdrawal of ceasefire for the Home Minister, a bit of bonhomie with=20
Musharraf for the Prime Minister.

That the ceasefire was an idea whose time had never come was clear enough,=
=20
while a direct dialogue with Pakistan at appropriate levels is something=20
that the whole world has been urging. But the two things should have been=20
kept separate. The ceasefire had in any case become a mere dead letter some=
=20
time ago and a decent interval could have been found quite easily between=20
the invitation to dialogue and the official withdrawal of the ceasefire,=20
for the dignity of Pant if nothing else. As it is, Pakistan Foreign=20
Minister Abdus Sattar gets the chance to say, and to sound plausible when=20
he says, that invitation to Musharraf in one breath and withdrawal of even=
=20
the symbolism of a ceasefire amounts to 'one step forward, two steps back.'

One therefore welcomes the prospect of an Indo-Pak dialogue at the highest=
=20
level with a peculiar combination of exhilaration and foreboding.=20
Exhiliration because it seems conceivable that the forces for peace have=20
now become strong enough, in the two countries and internationally to turn=
=20
this visit into the beginning of an irreversible peace process. But the=20
government is internally so divided that it seems unable to sustain any=20
decision whatever, be it the issue of the Hurriyat delegation going to=20
Pakistan or Pant's mission, and it seems ill-equipped, therefore, to=20
undertake so complex a process as search for peace within Jammu and Kashmir=
=20
as well as between our two countries. All moves seem to be short-term and=20
merely tactical. This propensity is inherent in the instability of the NDA=
=20
government as well as personal rivalries within the Bharatiya Janata Party.=
=20
Furthermore, even so recent a development as India's sudden turnabout on=20
the issue of the United States' National Missile Defence (NMD) proposals=20
seems to suggest that major initiatives are undertaken without due=20
deliberation or sense of long-term consequences for India itself. Would=20
such a government have the nerve and the competence to break fresh ground=20
on matters more complicated and emotionally charged? One doubts it.

On the face of it, a meeting between Vajpayee and Musharraf would appear to=
=20
have been prepared, as some marriages are said to be, in heaven. We have,=20
on the one hand, a legendary swayamsevak of 60 years' standing, whom the=20
Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) dare not entirely undercut since he is=20
uniquely responsible for delivering so much of the pseudo-liberal urban=20
middle class to it and without whose helmsmanship the BJP would have never=
=20
been able to form the government in the first place. The degree of his=20
leverage rivals that of Jawaharlal Nehru and Indira Gandhi. Even the fact=20
that his long innings is drawing to a close would have us believe that he=20
just might play the last couple of balls beyond the boundary. Musharraf, on=
=20
the other hand, is Chief Executive and the Army chief all at once. Nor is=20
he a chance soldier. Rather, he made a successful coup against a man who=20
had wrecked the judiciary, then harrassed one Army chief so much that he=20
died on the job and despatched the next into the twilight on a whim. Nawaz=
=20
Sharif had tried to do the same to Musharraf but Musharraf was prepared.

Today, his grip on the Army seems stronger than ever, having made some of=20
the key top appointments very much to his own satisfaction. He is also=20
poised to appoint himself President of the country in a new dispensation,=20
having neutralised Nawaz Sharif as well as Benazir Bhutto so that their=20
respective parties are rushing around like headless chicken. Sharif's=20
erstwhile party has actually been carved into two while Musharraf has=20
obliged the Saudi royal family by allowing Sharif, their errand boy, to=20
leave the country and settle in its domains. Benazir is so much at bay that=
=20
despite the reprieve she recently received from the Supreme Court, she is=20
still afraid of getting prosecuted for other misdeeds and dare not leave=20
her sanctuary in Dubai and return to Pakistan. Musharraf is, in short, the=
=20
right man to talk to.

Many Pakistanis I have met seem to believe that Vajpayee is their best bet,=
=20
precisely because of his RSS affiliation and his unique personal place in=20
the BJP. Nixon was the one who made peace with China, they keep reminding=20
me. For our part, our best chance would seem to be with a Pakistani leader=
=20
who is secular and liberal by temperament, a military man to the core, on=20
excellent terms with the intelligence establishment, and who has devised=20
for himself a brand new political system designed for absolute power=20
exercised from the top. India itself has done much to give him the=20
reputation, important in the Islamicist circles in Pakistan, as the man who=
=20
had reservations about Lahore and therefore gave us Kargil. Some might even=
=20
surmise that real peace shall come only when the RSS negotiates it with the=
=20
Pakistan Army.

The problem is that both Vajpayee and Musharraf have to tread carefully=20
within their respective institutions. On the issue of a meeting with=20
Musharraf, Vajpayee can gain Advani's consent by letting him call off the=20
ceasefire but it is unlikely that he could deliver on more substantive=20
matters, even if he were so inclined, especially now that his health is=20
failing so badly and the coalition he put together is tottering more or=20
less irretrievably. Would Vajpayee have the vision to recognise that a=20
point is fast approaching, thanks to the political intransigence and level=
=20
of state terror over the past decade, when they may not find many takers=20
within Kashmir even for the sort of autonomy promised even in Article 370,=
=20
which is at any rate anathema to the RSS and its progeny? Even if he were=20
to arrive at such a recognition, would he be able to bring his colleagues=20
along? That would seem improbable. Vajpayee may well have succeeded in=20
delivering a cross-section of the liberals to the RSS but he can hardly=20
deliver the RSS to the peace lobby. Indeed, RSS or no RSS, there are few=20
enough outside the active peace lobby who dare entertain such a thought.

Ditto Musharraf. The tragedy of the current situation in the Pakistan Army=
=20
is that its Islamicist wing shall give us no peace at all, on any terms=20
whatever, short of a jehadi victory, but the liberal wing, which Musharraf=
=20
represents, dare not do so for fear of being set aside. This liberal wing=20
has a peculiar, and probably fatal, relationship with the Islamicist wing=20
within the Army and the broad Islamicist and jehadi forces in Pakistani=20
society at large. This wing sees itself becoming increasingly a minority=20
within the Army itself, as the jehadi current envelopes more and more of=20
its lower ranks and rises through the higher ranks right up to the highest=
=20
echelons. That accounts for the caution, even cowardice, of this liberal=20
wing. But then, the distinction is not quite so sharp. Islamism now=20
permeates so much of the lived culture within the armed forces that there=20
is much traffic between the two poles. Finally there is also an even more=20
fundamental constraint, namely that the jehadis, in all their variety, have=
=20
now become so much the instrument of Pakistan's policies in relation to its=
=20
neighbours that even if secular officers within the Army feel threatened by=
=20
them they dare not take any decisive step against the jehadis. That, then,=
=20
is Musharraf's dilemma: he is a secular officer who functions within a=20
policy frame which relies crucially on the jehadis. That saving the Valley=
=20
from the jehadis is itself necessary for restoring peace, civility and=20
dignity to the people of Jammu and Kashmir is not something he has given=20
any indication of comprehending. Or, maybe, he lacks the courage - which,=20
in practical terms, comes to the same thing.

Such, then, are a couple of the more intractable problems far beyond the=20
question of supporting or not supporting the initiative. Conditions must of=
=20
course be obtained for the dialogue to go on, whatever the constraints. In=
=20
the longer run, however, there are two preliminary preconditions without=20
which peace shall not be even a flicker on the horizon. There has to be=20
constituted in Pakistan a political authority which dares to stare down and=
=20
disarm the jehadis on its own territory, shuns using such elements as=20
instruments of policy in relation to its neighbours, and, to the extent=20
that its intervention in the Valley is a fact of life, actively=20
participates in creating there a civic, secular order free of irredescent=20
religious zealotry; I will believe General Musharraf the day he publicly=20
dissociates himself from the activities of the Lashkar-e-Toiba in the=20
Valley. Conversely, there has to arise in India a corresponding political=20
authority which is willing to tone down the legalistic niceties of the=20
Instrument of Accession, addresses the aspirations that underlie the=20
slogans of 'azaadi', and rethinks the contours of 'Autonomy' as it has been=
=20
on offer in the past, the many violations of it in the past, and the=20
modifications in the very conception of it that might be necessary to=20
address the current situation in Jammu and Kashmir as a whole.

If Prime Minister Vajpayee and General Musharraf are serious about laying=20
the foundations for a long-term process that would eventually give us=20
lasting peace, they should seek each other's help in this matter. That=20
there is a massive indigenous insurgency is a fact; that Pakistan=20
mercilessly abets it and seeks to transform it in its own favour is also a=
=20
fact; that the lines between the two are now entirely blurred is a further=
=20
fact. This whole tangle cannot be undone without cooperation. In the world=
=20
of realpolitik Pakistan shall not give up the jehadis as an instrument of=20
policy unless it is assured that India is genuinely interested in a=20
visionary settlement for the people of Jammu and Kashmir that goes far=20
beyond the existing territorial dispensations. Conversely, India cannot be=
=20
realistically expected to let up what amounts to a military occupation of=20
the Valley unless Pakistan withdraws much of the terror it sponsors. This=20
vicious circle can only be broken through measured withdrawals that are=20
calibrated reciprocally.

That should be the medium-term objective, short of a move toward a final=20
solution, and if that objective is adopted any number of interim steps=20
become possible. The two countries can take credible joint measures to=20
address the whole range of issues related to the nuclear dimension and to=20
eliminate the threat of a nuclear stand-off. As the level of infiltration=20
from Pakistan declines and India undertakes a corresponding withdrawal of=20
its security forces first from the field and then from the state, safe=20
routes and check-points can be established for the local people to start=20
travelling across the Line of Control (LoC). Both sides can recognise that=
=20
the historic land of Kashmir, on both sides of the LoC, is internally as=20
diverse in ethnic and religious terms as Pakistan or India and that instead=
=20
of suppressing that diversity or creating permanent divisions among these=20
fraternal peoples, both countries have a stake in helping devise political=
=20
structures that respect that diversity. In India, surely, we never tire of=
=20
talking about 'unity in diversity' and enlightened opinion in Pakistan=20
thinks of that country as a multinational state. There is no reason why the=
=20
same principle should not apply to Jammu and Kashmir and, in deed, to the=20
whole of that historic civilisation on both sides of the LoC. Any number of=
=20
interim steps can be taken for ensuring that kind of civil, secular 'unity=
=20
in diversity' as part of the ultimate solution.

Central to all this is the issue of the people of Jammu and Kashmir being=20
able to represent themselves. This question too needs to be divided into=20
two time-frames. The first is the immediate perspective of the Musharraf=20
visit. The aim here should be merely to make a beginning, not press any of=
=20
the substantive issues too much, lay the foundations of future dialogue and=
=20
minimise those areas of dissension that have the potential for undermining=
=20
the goodwill that both sides are wanting to build. Pakistan's stand on the=
=20
issue of the APHC in this immediate context seems excessive and disruptive.=
=20
At the end of a high-profile interview to India Today (June 4, 2000) Abdus=
=20
Sattar was asked: "So what according to you will be the number one priority=
=20
in the talks?" He replied: " The greatest need is to lend an ear to what=20
the Kashmiri people are saying. That will be our number one priority." It=20
takes no great acumen to see that he is referring to the Hurriyat. Would he=
=20
entertain the idea that the voice of Farooq Abdullah, the democratically=20
elected Chief Minister of Jammu and Kashmir, is also a key component of=20
"what the Kashmiri people are saying"? Would he be willing to invite a=20
delegation of Kashmiri Pundits alongside the Hurriyat? Would he welcome a=20
multi-religious Kashmiri voice? Would he be willing to concede that=20
'Kashmir' is not just the Valley but the whole of a vast historic land on=20
both sides of the LoC? Even the term 'Azad Kashmir' makes no sense without=
=20
that recognition, and the euphemism of 'Northern Areas' does not negate the=
=20
fact that Gilgit is part of this larger entity. The matter of "what the=20
Kashmiri people are saying" is thus very complex and needs to be addressed=
=20
more carefully and comprehensively, without prejudice against any of the=20
claimants.

As for the final settlement, there is of course, at the heart of the=20
matter, a very mortal and also a very conventional kind of territorial=20
dispute that nation-states are prone to. It is an unfortunate fact of this=
=20
era of nation-states that lives of millions can be jeopardised for mere=20
miles of territory. Since this is the most recalcitrant aspect of the=20
problem it is prudent at this stage to address it as little as possible,=20
except to observe that in any conduct of politics which recognises itself=20
as a branch of ethics, it should be the people who are made sacrosanct, not=
=20
territories. Two other long-term issues may be mentioned here, since they=20
have never been a part of the public discourse.

One is that the most important settlement in Kashmir has to be an internal=
=20
one, among the Kashmiris themselves, in which the governments of India and=
=20
Pakistan can play a pivotal role and the international community can help=20
but which will emerge out of a comprehensive and civilised dialogue among=20
all the Kashmiris, of all regions and religious beliefs, on both sides of=20
the LoC. But no secular, progressive, democratic and just solution is=20
possible without first putting in place elaborate and careful mechanisms=20
for reconciliation. There has been altogether too much violence and=20
cruelty, too many have suffered at the hands of the militants and the=20
security forces alike, for it all to go away with the magic wand of a legal=
=20
and territorial settlement. The dead cannot return to life but the truth=20
about the manner of their death needs to be recorded, the guilty named and=
=20
punished, and recompense offered to the survivors. The Valley shall never=20
be at peace with its own conscience, nor the great civility of kashmiriyat=
=20
be restored to it, until the Pundits can be brought back to live there with=
=20
their properties, liberties and security restored to them, and the violence=
=20
against them accounted for. Sikhs have suffered, migrant workers have=20
suffered, women of all communities have been dishonoured, and the iron has=
=20
gone much too deep in the soul. We will need, I believe, something=20
resembling the South African Commission for Truth and Reconciliation to=20
heal the wounds. The alternative is permanence of hatred and cruelty,=20
bifurcations, trifurcations, deeper and deeper fissures, and a real=20
settlement infinitely postponed. The initiative shall have to come first=20
from outside the formal structures of government, eventually forcing the=20
state to be accountable, and if such an initiative can in fact be=20
fruitfully pursued that will help the process of reconciliation in Kashmir=
=20
but will also strengthen civil society in both India and Pakistan as well,=
=20
against arbitrary power of the states and freelance crusaders alike.

Finally, the process of settling the territorial dispute and giving the=20
dead a decent burial would have to be combined with the recognition of the=
=20
shared responsibility on part of the two countries to compensate all the=20
populations on the two sides of the LoC for the havoc this dispute has=20
caused in their lives. That would mean a comprehensive programme for=20
economic development, for the construction of requisite political=20
structures, for repairing the social fractures, for rehabilitation of=20
populations that have been evicted from their ancestral homes and=20
properties, and compensation for families that have suffered at the hands=20
of either the militants or the respective government forces - and all this=
=20
as a joint responsibility of the two governments. In taking joint=20
responsibility for the people of the historic land of Kashmir we may learn=
=20
how to cooperatively build our fraternal countries.

Copyrights =A9 2001, Frontline & indiaserver.com, Inc.

--------------------------

#2.

DAWN
10 June 2001
Opinion

A PASSAGE TO DELHI

By M.P. Bhandara

INDO-PAKISTAN relations oscillate between the euphoric and the despondent.=
=20
Both countries inherited a lot of baggage before and after the subcontinent=
=20
split. We live with the burden of this baggage. Each move by either country=
=20
relays to the other a loaded strategem in a malevolent design. Things are=20
as they are and will be as they will be. What then may we expect to be the=
=20
outcome of the talks between the heads of government, next month in Delhi?

Would it be reasonable to expect any progress on the core issues? Certainly=
=20
not. Whatever the protagonists have to say to one another on the=20
fundamentals of the Kashmir dispute has been said before. There are no=20
surprises. Pakistan shall plead, cajole and finally talk blunt. The Indian=
=20
will varnish and dot the i's and cross the t's commencing from Simla in=20
1972 and ending in the Lahore Declaration of 1999. There will not be much=20
mention of Kargil so as not to embarrass the guest. Perhaps, Kargil is best=
=20
left where it is - in its icy, windy, wilderness waste.

What then should be the format of the talks? Addressing core issues head-on=
=20
might provoke sore answers. The talks could fail in less than an hour.=20
Would it be worthwhile jeopardizing the opportunity?

If core problems are not amenable for the time being to a productive=20
dialogue, what is? For Pakistan, trade is a subsidiary issue. We can well=20
afford to buy Indian goods via Dubai. Travel to India is again something=20
that our government is not all that keen about. Our rich and not-so-rich=20
prefer travelling westwards; and a long line of suffering humanity that one=
=20
sees outside the gates of the Indian High Commission in Islamabad is=20
content to patiently wait in rain and hail till they get a visa. The=20
re-opening of visa offices in Karachi and Bombay has its own long history=20
of complexity. We seem to agree to disagree on everything.

The centrepiece in the negotiations is likely to be Pakistan's presumed=20
ability to influence and restrain freedom fighters into entering the=20
Kashmir valley and the price that Pakistan will demand for exercising such=
=20
influence. Herein lie the ingredients of a bargain.

Before we proceed further, let us appreciate an important factor: the=20
street power of the fascist groups in both countries are bound to resist=20
any movement towards peace. On an urban basis the principal groups that can=
=20
organize anti-government demos that shake governments in principal cities=20
are the Jamaat-i-Islami on our side and the RSS and Shiv Sena on the other.=
=20
Extremist groups are opposite sides of the same coin. They don't brook=20
compromises - blind as bats to the perceptions of the other side. Any=20
change in the status quo - no matter what - is a 'sell-out' to the other si=
de.

A joint declaration by both Pakistan and India condemning fundamentalism,=20
sectarianism, terrorism, hatred sermons, fanaticism and the destruction of=
=20
religious sites and symbols will be sending the right message to world=20
opinion and position both countries on the track of sanity. Pakistan could=
=20
take the initiative in this. Such a move should do Musharraf's image a=20
world of good. The West would be inclined to condone his non-democratic=20
credentials, and even consider him an emerging political leader.

What should Pakistan's demands be if the core Kashmir issue is a=20
non-starter in round one of these talks? Our demands should be only those=20
which are fully supported by the All Parties Hurriyat Conference (APHC) and=
=20
be seen to promote the immediate interests and welfare of the Kashmiri=20
people. Foremost in this regard is the inherent right of the Kashmiris to=20
travel and trade across the LoC. To avoid prickly questions, the travel=20
document should not be passports issued by either country. Proactive=20
diplomacy will be required to think of solutions that will take care of=20
mutual sensitivities.

Another matter closely related to Kashmir is the standoff in Siachen. The=20
glacier is likely to be remembered by posterity as a monument in ice and=20
rock to the stupidity of nations.

The agreement that was nearly reached between Rajiv Gandhi and Benazir=20
Bhutto in 1989 should be re-examined as it restores the situation that had=
=20
existed before the Indians occupied the heights of the glacier. One good=20
debating point that Musharraf is entitled to recapitulate if Kargil is=20
discussed: that the Indian occupation of Siachen is as violative of the=20
letter and spirit of the Simla Agreement as was Kargil. The only difference=
=20
is that the Indians got away with it. We did not. It is time for both sides=
=20
to admit to their wrongs.

Is a possible agreement on intra-Kashmir people and trade movement and on=20
the Siachen glacier too high a price to pay for 'persuading' the Mujahideen=
=20
to suspend its activities if not altogether stop its freedom war? Pakistan=
=20
should make it clear that it can influence some, if not all, the Mujahideen=
=20
groups. No great fire can be extinguished at one stroke; the embers keep on=
=20
glowing for some time afterwards.

To sum up: the purpose of the first summit meeting can be to pave the way=20
for a second and a third which could in due course focus on core issues; in=
=20
the meantime, other confidence-building steps are necessary. Kuldip Nayar,=
=20
in one of his recent articles appearing in these columns, has suggested=20
that the change in the Indian mind to meet was highly influenced by=20
Pakistan's decision to stop shelling across the LoC. If this is one=20
reciprocation, others may well follow.

The Indian decision to prevent the APHC members from travelling to Pakistan=
=20
appears to suggest a siege mentality in the South Block. Our neighbours=20
should be helped to overcome these hang-ups.

Yet another suggestion for consideration by this summit would be a proposal=
=20
for nuclear and missile experts of one country to meet their opposite=20
members with an agenda to reduce nuclear risks and accidents. New=20
confidence-building ideas will be generated better by such cross meetings=20
of professionals than is possible at political summits. The nuclear experts=
=20
of either side are in a better position to discuss cold testing of=20
fissionable materials and the pros and cons of joining the CTBT together or=
=20
demanding better terms for entry into it.

The conventional thinking is that India being the larger country should=20
pave the way by showing a big heart. This hope is a bit naive. Agreements=20
have to be sold to public opinion at home, and any country perceived to be=
=20
giving more than receiving is vulnerable to street agitation. So the give=20
and take have to be businesslike showing equal advantage to either.

Pakistan should also remember that the Kashmiris are not the only Muslims=20
in India. Have we ever considered inviting delegations from the All-India=20
Muslim League and such like? We should also invite Buddhist delegations=20
from Ladakh to see for themselves the sanctuary and safety of Buddhist=20
relics in Pakistan.

A slow fox trot, which would endeavour to mortar brick on brick goes=20
against the grain of our official thinking. But cool contemplation will=20
counsel against rushing into the eye of the storm in its full ferocity. The=
=20
institutionalisation of heads of government meetings annually will in=20
itself diminish the power of the extremists and rejectionists everywhere.=20
India and Pakistan sleep in the same pit of poverty - yet we dream a=20
different dream.

-------------------------

#3.

PUBLIC MEETING FOR AN INDEPENDENT AND SECULAR KASHMIR

Yasin Malik
Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front

Tariq Ali
writer and political commentator

Monday 25 May 2001
7.00pm
London School of Pharmacy
Maplethorpe Theatre
29-39 Brunswick Square
London WC1N 1AX
(Tube: Russell Square)

Kashmir has a centuries long history as an independent nation in which=20
people of different religions have lived in harmony. But when South Asia=20
was partitioned in 1947, Kashmir was divided between India and Pakistan.=20
Since then the Kashmiri people have been struggling for an independent=20
Kashmir. The brutal repression unleashed against this struggle by the=20
Indian government has claimed the lives of more than 70,000 Kashmiri men,=20
women and children.
Yasin Malik is probably the most popular Kashmiri leader from=20
Indian-occupied Kashmir. He is the leader of the Jammu and Kashmir=20
Liberation Front (JKLF) which has consistently fought for an independent=20
and secular Kashmir, earlier through armed struggle and more recently=20
through mass mobilizations. He is also one of very few politicians who have=
=20
been courageous enough to take a stand against forces of fundamentalism,=20
both Muslim and Hindu. Yasin has been imprisoned by the Indian authorities=
=20
for long periods. He is currently touring the U.S. and Britain.

Organised by South Asia Solidarity Group, c/o Londec, 299 Kentish Town=20
Road, London NW5 2TJ
phone 0207 267 0923

--------------------------

#4.

Date: Sat, 9 Jun 2001 16:31:24 -0700 (PDT)
From: Hamid Bashani <bashani2000@y...>
Subject: HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS IN KASHMIR

COUNCIL OF ADVOCATES INTERNATIONAL
Toronto. (Press release)

Council of Advocates international seeks protection of democratic rights=20
in Jammu and Kashmir. Pakistan must eliminate discriminatory laws and let=
=20
the people of Kashmir to participate in democratic process according to=20
their political views and concience. This was stated by Hamid bashani,=20
secretary general of the council of advocates, in his appeal to the US=20
lawmakers, members of the EU parliament, UN Human rights Commission and=20
international civil liberties and human rights groups. Mr Hamid Bashani=20
said =93I am writing this to draw your kind attention toward the gross=20
violations of human rights in Pakistani occupied Jammu and=20
Kashmir regarding the election for the AJK legislative assembly to be held=
=20
in July, 2001.In this election,the government of Pakistan is imposing=20
draconian and barbaric laws by making it mandatory for every candidate to=20
solemnly declare that he stands for accession of Jammu and Kashmir to=20
Pakistan.It is also mandatory to declare that the candidate believes in two=
=20
nation theory of religious fundamentalism and ideology of theocratic=20
Pakistan.By imposing this laws Pakistan has made impossible for secular and=
=20
democratic candidates to participate in that election,and deprive a large=20
segment of populace from their right to vote. The nomination papers of the=
=20
candidates for all forty seats of the AJK legislative assembly,who refused=
=20
to comply with those discriminatory laws, were rejected on june 8th2001.The=
=20
candidates were arrested and tortured in different local police stations.=
=20
By imposing those laws pakistan is not only violating the fundamental and=
=20
democratic rights,but also denying the right to the self-determination=20
of the people of Jammu and Kashmir. As you already know that under the=20
pretext of the moral support to the right to the self determination of the=
=20
people of Kashmir, Pakistan has been Training and arming the=20
fundamentalist militants in Kashmir leading toward the senseless killing,=20
worst violence of human rights,brutal torture,and custodial deaths by=20
Indian security forces during last ten years.Pakistan=92s policy and practi=
ce=20
toward the right of self determination of the people of Kashmir is=20
inconsistent with its stand on international forums, and universally=20
accepted principal of democratic process and election. On behalf of the=20
people of Kashmir we appeal to you to pursue the government of Pakistan to=
=20
respect the principle of fundamental justice and stop the practice of=20
discrimination on the basis of religion and political opinion,and eliminate=
=20
discriminatory laws and allow the people to participate in the election=20
according to their political views and conscience. .

My best regards,

Hamid Bashani

Tele.416-929-1029.E-mail.bashani2000@y...
E-mail.advocacycouncil@y...
99-1515-howard street,Toronto.Ontario.Canada.
P.O.Bunjosa,distrct Rawalakote.Kashmir.

__________________________________________
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