[sacw] SACW #3 (12 June 01) / Northeast India - Special

[aiindex@mnet.fr]

South Asia Citizens Wire / Dispatch # 3.
12 June 2001
http://www.mnet.fr/aiindex

_______________________________________

#1. Generals As Governors: The parallel political systems of Northeast Indi=
a
#2. Naga National Council Flays GOI for ' Double Standard' Policy

_______________________________________

#1.

Himal South Asian (Kathmandu)
Volume 14, No. 6 June 2001

GENERALS AS GOVERNORS
THE PARALLEL POLITICAL SYSTEMS OF NORTHEAST INDIA

In the militancy-affected Indian Northeast, New Delhi's containment policy=
=20
of the last four decades has produced a peculiar equilibrium, one in which=
=20
democracy and authoritarian governance coexist with disturbing ease. The=20
paternalistic carrot-and-stick approach routine use of military force with=
=20
development money spread about in the backward region assumes an imperious=
=20
"foreknowledge of the destiny" of the Northeast. Indian policy must respond=
=20
with constitutional reforms that respond to the region's history which=20
animates the insurgencies. It must conduct a democratic dialogue involving=
=20
the peoples of the Northeast and not rely on secret negotiations between=20
bureaucrats and insurgents. But then will that be allowed by a system that=
=20
appoints generals as governors?

by Sanjib Baruah

"Isn't there a brigadier in Shillong?" This was how Sardar Vallabbhai=20
Patel, India's deputy prime
minister responded in 1949 to reports that the "native state" of Manipur=20
might be reluctant to merge fully with the Indian Union. In September of=20
that year, the governor of Assam, Sri Prakasa, accompanied by his adviser=20
for Tribal Areas, Nari Rustomji, flew to Bombay to apprise Patel of the=20
situation. The fate of Manipur and other indirectly ruled "native states"=20
presented a significant constitutional problem when British rule of India=20
ended in 1947. Indeed, the decision of the Kashmiri Maharaja to accede to=20
India was the beginning of the Kashmir conflict between India and Pakistan.=
=20
Patel and other senior Indian officials might perhaps have pondered more on=
=20
the potential diffi-culties that could arise from decisions by major=20
`native states like Kashmir and Hyderabad on the postcolonial dispensation=
=20
in the Subcontinent. But the thought that tiny and remote Manipur on=20
India's border with Burma, might hesitate about fully joining India had=20
probably never crossed their minds. The meeting of Sri Prakasa, Rustomji=20
and Patel was brief. As Rustomji recalls in his memoir, Enchanted Frontier,=
=20
apart from asking whether there was a brigadier stationed in the region,=20
Patel said little else. It was clear from his voice what he meant, wrote=20
Rustomji, and the conversation did not go any further.

Within days the Maharaja of Manipur, on a visit to Shillong, found himself=
=20
virtually imprisoned in his residence. The house was surrounded by soldiers=
=20
and under the pressure of considerable misinformation and intimidation, the=
=20
Maharaja isolated from his advisers, council of ministers and Manipuri=20
public opinion was made to sign an agreement fully merging his state with=20
India. When the ceremony to mark the transfer of power and the end of this=
=20
ancient kingdom took place in Imphal on 15 October 1949, a battalion of the=
=20
Indian army was in place to guard against possible trouble.

The circumstances attending Manipur's merger with India haunts the politics=
=20
of the state to this day. A number of insurgent groups regard the merger as=
=20
illegal and unconstitutional, and many among the Manipuri intelligentsia=20
are bitter about the way it was effected. While Manipur today has an=20
elected chief minister and an elected state legislature like other states=20
in the Indian Union there is also a de facto parallel structure of=20
governance directly controlled from Delhi that manages counter-insurgency=20
operations. Visitors to Manipur cannot but notice the strong military=20
presence. Even historic monuments such as the Kangla Fort of the old=20
Manipuri kings, and parts of the complex in Moirang that commemorates the=20
rebel Indian National Army, are occupied by Indian security forces.

It is not hard to see why there is such a massive security presence in the=
=20
state. Manipur, today, has numerous insurgent groups with ethnically-based=
=20
support among Meities, Nagas and Kukis. In recent years, smaller ethnic=20
groups such as Paites, Vaipheis and Hmars too have formed their own armed=20
organi-sations. The official count of lives annually lost in=20
insurgency-related incidents in Manipur in recent years is in the hundreds.=
=20
And somewhat independent of the activities of these insurgent organisations=
=20
is the ethnic conflict between Nagas and Kukis and, more recently, between=
=20
Kukis and Paites. Many of these conflicts appear intractable and some of=20
them are attributable to the profound social transformation that these=20
societies are undergoing. Yet unless one believes that a coercive state is=
=20
a necessary instrument to manage change, it is hard to avoid the question:=
=20
were the symbols and practices of the traditional Manipuri state despite=20
the significant erosion of its authority and power under British colonial=20
rule better-equipped to achieve social cohesion? Was Patels readiness to=20
use forcejust as the rest of India was setting off on a path of democratic=
=20
rights and liberties an early acknowledgement that Indian democracy in the=
=20
Northeast would necessarily have an authoritarian accent?

Manipur is not unique. Except for Arunachal Pradesh and Mizoram, five of=20
the seven states of Northeast India today Assam, Manipur, Meghalaya,=20
Nagaland and Tripurahave insurgent movements of varying levels of activity=
=20
and intensity. Some of them, such as the United Liberation Front of Assam=20
(ULFA), Nagalands National Socialist Council of Nagalim (NSCN), now divided=
=20
into two factions, and the Manipur People's Liberation Front (MPLF), which=
=20
consists of the United National Liberation Front (UNLF), the People's=20
Liberation Army (PLA) and the People's Revolutionary Party of Kanglaipak=20
(PREPAK), have separatist agendas. Other ethnically based groups are=20
typically dressed up as national fronts defending this or that minority=20
ethnic group.

As a response to those insurgencies and to Pakis-tan's Inter Services=20
Intelligence's (ISI) inclination to fish in these troubled waters, there=20
are many more brigadiers in Northeast India today than Patel could have=20
imagined. Military formations much larger than brigades corps headed by=20
lieutenant generals and divisions headed by major generals are now=20
stationed in this part of the country. In Vairengte, a Mizoram village,=20
there is even a Counter-Insurgency and Jungle Warfare School for training=20
officers to fight the militants. And the Indian Army is only one of the=20
security forces deployed in the region. Other paramilitary units controlled=
=20
by the central government, such as the Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF),=
=20
the Border Security Force (BSF) the Assam Rifles, various intelligence=20
bureaus and the police forces of each state, are also involved in=20
counter-insurgency operations. And overseeing these operations is a=20
parallel political structure that works outside the rules and norms that=20
govern India's democratic political institutions.

Political violence murders, bombings, kidnap-pings, extortion by militants,=
=20
and killing of militants by security forces in actual or staged encounters=
=20
has become a routine part of news from the Northeast. True, there is also=20
news of elections, cease-fires and talks or prospects of talks with=20
insurgents. But the two kinds of news and images co-exist with disturbing=20
ease. No one finds the image of democratic elections being conducted under=
=20
massive military presence ano-malous. Nor does anyone expect talks with=20
insurgents to bring about sustained peace. Indeed in some ways,=20
insurgencies themselves have become incorporated into the democratic=20
political process. Good political reporters of the Northeast know the=20
precise role that insurgent factions play in elections or the ties that=20
these factions have with particular mainstream politicians.

For politicians, the use of the army to fight insur-gencies has now become=
=20
something of a habit. For instance, in the spring of 2000, after attacks on=
=20
Bengalis by tribal militants in Tripura, political parties belonging to the=
=20
states Left Front government observed a 12-hour bandh to pressurise the=20
central government to send in the army to deal with the situation. Chief=20
Minister Manik Sarkar complained that even though 27 police station areas=20
in the state had been declared disturbed, the Indian army had not yet=20
arrived. One would hardly guess from such statements that the law that=20
these democratic politicians were relying on the law that permits army=20
deployment in disturbed areas is a law that contravenes all conceivable=20
human rights standards.

According to the Armed Forces Special Powers Act (AFSPA), in an area that=20
is proclaimed as disturbed, an officer of the armed forces has powers to:=20
(a) fire upon or use other kinds of force even if it causes death; (b) to=20
arrest without a warrant and with the use of necessary force anyone who has=
=20
committed certain offences or is suspected of having done so; and (c) to=20
enter and search any premise in order to make such arrests. Army officers=20
have legal immunity for their actions. There can be no prosecution, suit or=
=20
any other legal proceeding against anyone acting under that law. Nor is the=
=20
governments judgment on why an area is found to be disturbed subject to=20
judicial review.

As Ravi Nair of the South Asia Human Rights Documentation Centre in New=20
Delhi has pointed out, the AFSPA violates the Indian Constitutions right to=
=20
life, the right against arbitrary arrest and detention, the rules of the=20
Indian Criminal Procedure Code relating to arrests, searches and seizures,=
=20
and almost all relevant international human rights principles. There was a=
=20
time when reports of human rights violations in the Northeast were taken=20
seriously. But most Indians
now regard human rights organisations as being at best na=EFve, or at worst=
,=20
sympathisers of insurgents masquerading under the flag of human rights. The=
=20
violation of human rights in the Northeast is seen as the necessary cost of=
=20
keeping the nation safe from its enemies inside and outside.

Thus in 1991, when the United Nations Human Rights Committee asked the=20
Attorney General of India to explain the constitutionality of the AFSPA in=
=20
terms of Indian law and to justify it in terms of international human=20
rights law, he defended it on the sole ground that it was necessary in=20
order to prevent the secession of the northeastern states. The Indian=20
government, he argued, had a duty to protect the states from internal=20
disturbances and that there was no duty under international law to allow=20
secession.

State within a state

In the insurgency-hardened Northeast, democratic India has developed a de=20
facto political system, somewhat autonomous of the formal=20
demo-cratically-elected governmental structure. This parallel system is an=
=20
intricate, multi-tiered reticulate, with crucial decision-making,=20
facilitating and operational nodes that span the region and connects New=20
Delhi with the theatre of action.

The apex decision-making node is the Home Ministry in New Delhi housed in=20
North Block on Raisina Hill. The operational node which implements the=20
decisions consists of the Indian Army, and other military, police and=20
intelligence units controlled by the central and state govern-ments, and=20
involves complex coordination. This apparatus also involves the limited=20
participation of the political functionaries of insurgency-affected states.=
=20
Elected state governments, under India's weak federal structure, can always=
=20
be constitutionally dismissed in certain situations of instability. But New=
=20
Delhi has generally preferred to have them in place while conducting=20
counter-insurgency operations. Since the insurgencies have some popular=20
sympathy albeit not stable or stubborn the perception that the operations=20
have the tacit support of elected state governments is useful for their=20
legitimacy.

Consequently, the command structure may include some state-level=20
politicians and senior civil servants. This is perceived to be the weakest=
=20
link in the chain because of the fear that the presence of these locals=20
might potentially subvert the counter-insurgency operations. Consider the=20
following news reports:

1. In December 2000, the central government asked the Manipur government=
=20
to investigate links between at least five ministers and insurgent groups.=
=20
The Home Ministry forwarded a report to the state authorities that included=
=20
evidence of such a nexus between the ministers and insurgents. Manipur's=20
caretaker chief minister Radhabinod Koijam, just before the fall of his=20
government last month, dropped six ministers from his cabinet. Koijam was=20
in the middle of a political battle for survival, and there were other=20
reasons for their removal. But he defended his action saying that their=20
names appeared in the Home Ministry's list of tainted politicians.

2. In January 2001, the Union Home Ministry proposed the setting up of a=
=20
judicial enquiry commission to probe into the allegations and=20
counter-allegations of the insurgent-politician nexus in the northeastern=20
states.

3. In the May 2001 elections just concluded, former chief minister=20
Prafulla Kumar Mahanta repeatedly accused the Congress party of having a=20
nexus with ULFA. The Congress party dismissed the charge as election=20
propaganda and claimed that its victory proved that the electorate did not=
=20
believe the accusation. In the elections of 1996, the roles were reversed:=
=20
the Congress had made similar charges against Mahantas party, the Asom Gana=
=20
Parishad (AGP).

There are, of course, many reasons why demo-cratically-elected politicians=
=20
of a region, where insurgent groups and mainstream political parties may=20
share the same social, political, and cultural space, would sometimes know=
=20
and have ties with each other. Pervasive corruption also leads politicians=
=20
to cultivate ties with insurgent groups. They, like others with a=20
reputation for making illegal money, consider it prudent to try to keep the=
=20
insurgent groups happy by sharing parts of their illicit income with them.=
=20
Rather than a hard boundary separating insurgents and mainstream=20
politicians, in these circumstances, a nexus between some of them becomes=20
inevitable, despite the fact that such ties may cost these politicians in=20
terms of their credibility as far as New Delhi is concerned.

A former home minister of Nagaland, Dalle Namo, who had been part of the=20
Naga underground, once movingly acknowledged his debt to the pioneers of=20
the movement for Naga independence. He told journalist Nirmal Nibedon that=
=20
he is conscious of the fact that he lives in this big bungalow because men=
=20
like Phizo and Imkongmeren and many others once lived in caves. All these=20
chandeliers and lights [are there] because for them the stars were their=20
only light; [I have ] these expensive wall-to-wall carpets because they=20
walked on moss and grass. Nibedon recalls this conversation in a foreword=20
to Namos autobiography, The Prisoner from Nagaland.

Of course, such sentiments connecting insurgents with mainstream=20
politicians are far from universal. It is unlikely, for instance, that=20
Prafulla Kumar Mahanta of Assam or Nagalands pre-sent Chief Minister, S.C.=
=20
Jamir, whom militants have tried to kill more than once, would share=20
similar ideali-sed views about leaders of the Assamese or the Naga=20
underground. However, even these leaders have not always been free of ties=
=20
with militants. The Khaplang-led faction of the National Socia-list Council=
=20
of Nagalim, for instance, is reputed to enjoy the patronage of Jamir.

This is the paradox of counter-insurgency. On the one hand, it must draw on=
=20
the legitimacy of the elected establishment. On the other, it must protect=
=20
itself from this establishments suscepti-bilities. Namos account and the=20
repeated charges of a link between north-eastern politicians and insurgents=
=20
underscore why India's security establishment would want a parallel=20
structure of governance that is as autonomous as possible from the=20
democratic politics of the state in question. For instance, in the case of=
=20
the Indian government's allegation of a nexus between the five Manipuri=20
politicians and insurgents, if the Home Ministry had provided evidence of=20
such a nexus to the authorities in Manipur, it is unlikely, that this=20
report would go to the elected members of the state govern-ment some of=20
whom were themselves the object of suspicion. The most likely person to=20
have received that report from New Delhi, one can reasonably speculate, was=
=20
the Governor of Manipur.

Bending the rules of constitutional democracy, and building and maintaining=
=20
a parallel structure however, is not always easy. Not all elected state=20
governments have been willing to give up their constitutional prerogatives.=
=20
For instance, in Assam, thanks to the consent of former chief minister=20
Mahanta, counter-insurgency operations since 1997 has been conducted by a=20
Unified Command under which all forces including the state police come=20
under the operational command of the Army. Tarun Gogoi, in one of his first=
=20
statements as Assam's chief minister, following the Congress election=20
victory this May, said that he would like to see the Assam police play more=
=20
of a role in the Unified Command because of its superior knowledge of local=
=20
conditions. It is unlikely that Gogoi will seek to end the use of Uniform=20
Command structure in Assam. On the other hand, elected politicians in=20
Manipur have so far resisted pressures from the Indian Home Ministry and=20
the Indian Army to have a Unified Command structure. Former chief minister=
=20
of Manipur, W. Nipamacha, for instance, had maintained that since legally=20
speaking, the army was deployed in the state only to assist the civil=20
administration, it should remain under the command of the state government.

Such potential conflicts between the compulsions of the civil dispensation=
=20
and the concerns of the security establishment make the governors of these=
=20
states crucial nodes in the counter-insurgency network. The management of=20
this difficult equation, in fact, confers on the governor's office a role=20
that far exceeds the more ceremonial functions it is constitutionally=20
restricted to elsewhere and in normal circumstances. The career profiles of=
=20
the incumbents in the Northeast provide an index of the importance of the=20
gubernatorial office to the parallel political system. All the seven=20
governors of the northeastern states today have either occupied
high and sensitive positions in India's security establishment or have had=
=20
close ties to it.

Arunachal Pradesh: Arvind Dave, former chief, Research and Analysis Wing (R=
AW)

Assam: Lieutenant General (retired) S.K. Sinha

Manipur: Ved Prakash Marwah, retired Indian Police Service officer

Meghalaya: M.M. Jacob, former central minister and deputy chairman of the=20
Rajya Sabha

Mizoram: A.R. Kohli, former businessman with political ties

Nagaland: O.P. Sharma, retired Indian Police Service Officer

Tripura: Lieutenant General (retired) K.M. Seth

Two are retired military men, two are retired police officers, and one is=20
the former head of India's espionage agency, RAW, engaged in clandestine=20
operations abroad and at home. Of the two without any ostensible ties with=
=20
the security establishment, M. M. Jacob, governor of Meghalaya, was once=20
Minister of State for Home Affairs in New Delhi; and A.R. Kohli, recently=20
appointed governor of relatively peaceful Mizoram, who had a career in=20
business, has strong ties with the RSS, suggesting proximity to Home=20
Minister L.K. Advani. The fact that all the appointees have had fairly=20
intimate connections with the security establishment cannot be mere=20
coincidence. As appointees of the central government and as facilitating=20
agents in the counter-insur-gency regime, such antecedents serve very=20
practical ends, parti-cularly in ensuring that the demands of security=20
override the rules of democracy in the event of a conflict between the two.

Governor as judge

Instances of gubernatorial interventions point to the role they play in=20
insulating counter-insurgency operations from democratic processes and=20
scrutiny. Governors often act in ways that not only stretch constitutional=
=20
propriety but also sacrifice democratic procedures at that altar of=20
security expediencies. A case of what can be called counter-insurgent=20
constitutionalism took place in Assam in 1998 when the Governor, Lt. Gen=20
Sinha, intervened to stop the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) from=20
prosecuting then chief minister Mahanta on a serious corruption charge.=20
Mahanta's acquiescence in the Unified Command structure was clearly=20
important to the security establishment. At the same time, the legal=20
pursuit of a credible corruption charge against an elected chief minister=20
could have significantly raised the legitimacy of India's democratic=20
governmental institutions in the public eye. There was a choice between two=
=20
sets of values: the perceived political requirements of counter-insurgency=
=20
versus an opportunity to raise the public esteem of India's democratic=20
institutions in a region where those institutions lack legitimacy.

The corruption charge against Mahanta went back to what is commonly=20
referred to as the Letters of Credit scam, involving at least INR 200=20
crores between 1986 and 1993. Mahanta was not chief minister at that time.=
=20
Fake letters of credit were issued by the states animal husbandry and=20
veterinary departments to draw money from the treasury, and a number of=20
politicians of both the then ruling Congress and the opposition AGP, were=20
implicated. It was also suspected that a part of the money found its way to=
=20
the ULFA.

The CBI investigated a number of politicians. The case against Mahanta was=
=20
that the kingpin of the scam, Rajendra Prasad Borah, had paid him INR 40=20
lakhs during the 1991 elections, and that Mahanta's air travels during the=
=20
campaign had been financed by Borah. According to the CBI, in that=20
election, Borah had distributed house-building material to purchase votes=20
in Mahanta's electoral constituency. Bank drafts distributed by Mahanta, in=
=20
his electoral district, according to the CBI, were paid for by Borah.

For a governor a former military general to make a legal judgment on=20
whether a chief minister should be prosecuted pushes the limits of=20
constitutional propriety. To be sure, this power of Indian governors is not=
=20
limited to the Northeast and as the Delhi-based magazine India Today=20
pointed out in an editorial, there is something profoundly undemocratic=20
about a mechanism which requires the governors permission to even begin=20
legal proceeding against a chief minister seen as corrupt. In the=20
Northeast, given parallel power structure in place, the potential for abuse=
=20
of that power or, perhaps its use as a means of securing support for the=20
security regime from a corrupt chief minister is enormous.

The governor's reasons for disallowing the CBIs prosecution of Mahanta,=20
involved a number of legal rationalisations. Sinha pointed to the lack of=20
evidence, and questioned the reliability of the witnesses who formed the=20
basis of the CBI's case. The CBI, according to the governor, had not=20
established Mahanta's criminal culpability. The governor rejected the=20
charge that Mahanta had entered into a criminal conspiracy with Borah to=20
defraud the state claiming that no evidence of such conspiracy has been=20
provided.

Obviously, governors enjoy extraordinary powers to influence chief=20
ministers in the interests of the parallel regime. In this particular case,=
=20
it is difficult to avoid speculating on a very obvious connection. In Assam=
=20
since 1997, the Unified Command structure has been possible because of the=
=20
consent given by Mahanta. That was a year before the governor was called=20
upon to make this crucial judgment in the corruption case. Was there a quid=
=20
pro quo in the governor's decision to protect Mahanta from legal=20
prosecution so as to ensure his continued support for the Unified Command=20
structure? Did the perceived needs of counter-insurgency trump the value of=
=20
achieving greater transparency in government? More importantly, what has=20
this entire edifice and its strategies achieved by way of ending insurgency=
=20
and restoring peace?

Why is peace so elusive?

This counter-insurgency apparatus and its modus operandi are geared=20
fundamentally, and more or less exclusively, to containment. So long as=20
insurgencies are only contained, and no sustainable peace processes are in=
=20
place, democracy in the Northeast is likely to continue to co-exist with=20
the use of authoritarian modes of governance. With the significant=20
exception of the Mizo movement, most insurgencies in the Northeast have=20
been transformed, or are currently transforming, into long-term,=20
low-intensity conflicts. The perceived need for counter-insurgency=20
operations never seems to go away. Even in Mizoram, at least if one goes by=
=20
military presence in that state, the end of the insurgency has not meant=20
that the state within the state has been dismantled.

There are three reasons why most northeastern insurgencies turn into=20
protracted conflicts of attrition: (a) the goal of counter-insurgency is=20
limited to creating conditions under which particular insurgent groups or=20
factions surrender weapons, come to the negotiation table on the=20
governments terms and make compromises in exchange for personal gain; (b)=20
counter-insurgency operations do not dramatically change the conditions on=
=20
the ground that breed and sustain the insurgent political culture and=20
lifestyle; and (c) the political initiative that accompany and supplement=20
counter-insurgency operations try to utilise former militants
in the war against insurgents, thus creating a climate of mistrust and a=20
cycle of violence and counter-violence between anti-government and=20
pro-government insurgents.

The need for a powerful security presence can hardly disappear under these=
=20
conditions. Assam's growing violencewhich includes a large number of secret=
=20
killings by death squadsexemplifies the results of a counter-insurgency=20
strategy which in fact transformed an insurgency into a wider and long=20
drawn-out conflict. The bloody elections of May 2001 in which scores of=20
people lost their lives is at odds with Lt. Gen Sinha's euphoric claim of=20
the ballot having won against the bullet .

The Mizoram exception, of course, is important. In 1986, Laldenga, the=20
leader of the Mizo National Front, signed an accord with prime minister=20
Rajiv Gandhi, and this remains the only instance of an accord successfully=
=20
bringing about an end to insurgency in northeast India. Laldenga became the=
=20
chief minister of Mizoram and when he lost elections two years later, there=
=20
was no call for a return to insurgency. Among the factors that accounted=20
for the successful end of the Mizo insurgency were the following: the=20
undisputed leadership of the insurgency in the hands of a single individual=
=20
who was willing to compromise and who could deliver his part of the deal;=20
the feasibility of offering Laldenga the chief ministership of Mizoram in=20
exchange for ending the insurgency; the existence of large and organised=20
church-related civil society institutions that were actively involved in=20
creating and supporting the consensus for peace; and a political climate in=
=20
New Delhi during the Rajiv Gandhi years that was relatively open to making=
=20
significant political compromises with insurgents.

But to date, the Mizo case has been the only exception, and insurgency=20
refuses to die down despite the sophistication and resources of the=20
counter-insurgency establishment and the leeway given it to use the=20
governor as political administrator. In seeking to understand why peace=20
continues to elude Northeast India, it is important to study how=20
insurgencies are able to sustain themselves in the face of such enormous=20
military action. It is important to keep in mind the fact that while the=20
security establishment runs parallel administrations that circumscribe=20
civil administrations politically, insurgent movements run similar parallel=
=20
fiscal administrations at the ground level through illegal tax collection=20
and extortion.

One perspective on the longevity of armed civil conflicts focuses attention=
=20
not so much on the grievances that are articulated by insurgent groups but=
=20
to the ability of these groups to finance their activities. For example,=20
economist Paul Collier in an article, in a recent volume, Managing Global=20
Chaos, looking at the global patterns of armed civil conflicts, concluded=20
that the most significant factor of civil conflicts is the ability of rebel=
=20
organisations to be financially viable. He also found a strong correlation=
=20
with a specific set of economic conditions such as a regions dependence on=
=20
exports of primary commodity and low national income.

It is not that poverty breeds armed civil conflicts, Collier surmises, but=
=20
that certain economic conditions are conducive to the mobilisation of=20
revenue by armed insurgent groups. Primary commodities are highly lootable,=
=20
primary production centres located in conflict-zones are easily accessible,=
=20
and production cannot be moved elsewhere. Unlike a manufacturing unit,=20
which is not worth much once production ceases, owners and managers of such=
=20
centres continue to be dependent on existing production sites, making them=
=20
vulnerable to extortion. Low national income, Collier argues, is co-related=
=20
with armed civil conflicts not because the objective condition of poverty=20
sustains rebellion, but because in a context of poverty and unemployment,=20
an insurgent group that is able to raise enough money can recruit new=20
members quite inexpensively.

The Collier thesis is useful to explain the resilience of the Northeast=20
insurgencies. It draws attention to the conditions that permit illegal tax=
=20
collection. For instance, in those areas of large countries where the=20
states presence is weak, it is easier for rebel organisations to establish=
=20
illegal taxation structures that resemble official ones. The availability=20
of foreign material support also becomes an important factor in explaining=
=20
the persistence of armed civil conflicts. The civil war in Sierra Leone=20
perhaps most dramatically supports the Collier thesis: the control over=20
diamond mining and international diamond smuggling is clearly what has=20
allowed the armed rebels to continue the fight.

While northeastern India is no Sierra Leone, it is nevertheless striking=20
that the region is both poor and a primary commodity-producing=20
regionfactors that, according to Collier, make an area conducive to illegal=
=20
tax-collection and to the persistence of armed civil conflicts. Indeed, the=
=20
production and transportation of primary commodities that Northeast India=20
produces and exportstea, timber, coal and so onhave been a major source of=
=20
legal taxation by governments, a source of extortion by officials, and the=
=20
favourite source of illegal taxation by insurgent groups, and increasingly=
=20
by pro-government insurgent groups that collaborate in counter-insurgency=20
operations, like Assam's SULFA (former members of ULFA who have=20
surrendered, and hence the S).

Indian taka, Naga taka

During 1994-95, Sanjoy Ghose, the social activist who was kidnapped and=20
killed by ULFA in 1997, travelled extensively in the Northeast. His travel=
=20
diaries have been published posthumously as Sanjoy's Assam. In his travels=
=20
through Nagaland, Ghose found a formalised system of tax-collection imposed=
=20
by the NSCN. Every-body paid, and in the case of the state government's=20
Public Works Department (PWD)perceived as highly corrupt Ghose found that=20
there was a progressive system of illegal taxation in place. Those of the=20
rank of executive engineers and above paid one-third of their net salary.=20
This percentage may seem high to someone unfamiliar with the culture of=20
corruption in the region, but the fact is that the formal, departmental=20
salary is only a small part of the actual income of an engineer. A senior=20
police officer of Nagaland confided to Ghose that even though he himself=20
was not paying, most of his colleagues did contribute. Such stories about=20
systems of illegal taxation perhaps not equally formalised everywhere are=20
heard all through the Northeast. Indeed it is not merely insurgent=20
organisations, but mainstream political parties, student organisations,=20
corrupt officials, all resort to coercive and illegal modes of tax=20
collection from businesses big and small.

Pervasive corruption and the preponderance of outsiders in the economy of=20
the region make the climate especially illegal taxation-friendly. Indeed,=20
as Sanjoy Ghose found in the case of PWD engineers in Nagaland, unlike=20
government tax collectors who could target only what is officially declared=
=20
as income, insurgents drawing on popular perceptions and credible rumour=20
can impose higher taxes based on more realistic assessments of income. It=20
is in no one's interest to report extortion demands and payments that=20
involve mostly illegal income to law enforcement officials.

Krishnan Saigal, a former Indian civil servant who was Assam's Planning and=
=20
Development Commis-sioner and who is familiar with the process of=20
development finance in the Northeast, has written about the way development=
=20
funds allocated to the region are a bonanza for a group of contractors and=
=20
license holders mostly from outside the region whose main ambition is to=20
make a fast buck and get out of the area as quickly as possible. As the=20
Indian state has increased development expenditures in response to the=20
voices of discontent in the Northeast, he writes, there has been an even=20
quicker siphoning off of funds to the heartland with the few benefits=20
accruing to those in power through the usual corrupt forces. Saigal=20
believes this has led to increasingly corrupt regimes in the northeastern=20
states. And the people of the region, he believes, even see them as=20
representing central power in order to keep their state underdeveloped.

The perception that New Delhi is throwing money away in order to buy peace=
=20
gives an aura of legitimacy to tax collection by insurgents. The manifesto=
=20
of the NSCN is a case in point: "The pouring in of Indian capital in our=20
country for political reasons has shattered the Naga people into a society=
=20
of wild money", creating a parasitic, exploiting class of "reactionary=20
traitors, bureaucrats, a handful of rich men and the Indian vermin". Such a=
=20
view of the politics underlying New Delhi's development expenditures allows=
=20
Naga insurgents to take the moral high ground: it is only fair that such=20
ill-gotten wealth be shared with an organisation that works for the greater=
=20
good of the Nagas. To give another example of the consequence of this=20
perception, in Nagaland it is said that during elections when political=20
parties distribute money to buy votes, acceptance of that money is seen as=
=20
legitimate since it involves only 'Indian taka' (Indian money), not ''Naga=
=20
taka' (Naga money).

In order to discredit militants in the eyes of their supporters, military=20
and intelligence officials have in recent years started speaking about the=
=20
luxurious lifestyles of insurgent leaders or of the insurgents being=20
nothing more than bandits seeking 'easy money'. While all this is not news=
=20
to anyone living in the Northeast, whether such statements from security=20
officials involved in counter-insurgency operations increases the=20
legitimacy of governmental institutions vis-=E0-vis the rebels, is a=20
different matter. Despite some highly publicised successes such as=20
unearthing evidence that one of India's major business houses 'the Tatas'=20
were providing support to Assamese rebels, it is doubtful that the focus on=
=20
the expropriative aspect of insurgencies has so far led to any systematic=20
change affecting the illegal tax-collection capacity of insurgent groups.

Here are two recent newspaper reports that illustrate how routine the=20
taxation systems of insurgent organisations are and how impervious they=20
have been to decades of counterinsurgency operations:

In February 2001, the NSCN (Issac-Muivah) announ-ced, and Indian newspapers=
=20
routinely published the news of, a "tax break" for industries. According to=
=20
The Times of India, the NSCN (I-M) announced an exemption of "loyalty=20
taxes" for two years on certain categories of businessessome of them even=20
state-owned busi-nesses. Quoting the organisation's Information and=20
Publication Secretary, V. Horam, the news report said that the tax break=20
was given in order to boost economic activities in the Naga areas of the=20
Northeast. The "tax exemption", said the notification, applied to=20
enterprises that were less than two years old. However, the taxes on other=
=20
businesses and the income tax on salaried people would continue.

In March 2001, militant groups demanded INR 40 lakhs from eight Christian=20
missionary schools in Manipurs capital city, Imphal. When the schools=20
expressed their inability to pay, the militants imposed a fine of INR 2=20
crores and ordered them to close down. The matter was raised in the Manipur=
=20
State Assembly. The press reported that security in and around the=20
missionary schools was increased. The chief minister of Manipur told the=20
state legislature that cases were registered with the police in connection=
=20
with the extortion demands and were being investigated. But no one expected=
=20
such investigations to go very far. Last month, three Christian=20
missionaries were murdered by militants apparently because of non-payment=20
of those levies.

There seems to be little evidence that in these two states, years of=20
counter-insurgency has had any significant impact on the conditions that=20
have bred and sustained insurgency, i.e. the relative incapacity of civil=20
administration to provide protection (despite its strong military presence)=
=20
and the continued ability of insurgent organisations to collect illegal=20
taxes. It appears that insurgent groups can guarantee security and collect=
=20
tax better than the state can. It is hardly surprising then that many=20
people politicians, traders, government officials and even major=20
corporations make their uneasy peace with insurgent groups, just as they=20
learn to live with counter-insurgency operations without high expectations=
=20
of an end to the fighting.

What then accounts for this fundamental failure? It must be that New=20
Delhi's Northeast policy has yet to come to grips with the dense social=20
networks of northeastern societies and the ideas and values that animate=20
the insurgencies.

Passionate about history

How can the Northeast ever hope to get out of this quagmire, in which a=20
larger democracy lives comfor-tably with the most arbitrary of powers in=20
disturbed areas? There might be occasional doubts in India about what=20
counter-insurgency itself can achieve. But one idea that enjoys widespread=
=20
acceptance is that once the problem of the region's economic backwardness=20
is taken care of, the main source of political turmoil will go away. Indeed=
=20
it would probably be hard to find a more diehard group of economic=20
determinists than Indian bureaucrats and politicians engaged with the=20
Northeast.

This faith in economic development contrasts sharply with the vision of=20
insurgent groups in the Northeast. While those who try to solve the=20
insurgency problem mainly talk about economic development and=20
modernisation, the insurgents hark back to history. Thus ULFA speaks of=20
Assams lost independence when the Yandabo Treaty was signed between the=20
British and the Burmese kings in 1826, Manipuri rebels raise questions=20
about the constitutionality of the merger agreement of 1949, and Naga=20
rebels query how these long stretches of frontiers which were neither=20
Burmese nor Indian territories could simply disappear into India and Burma=
=20
after 1947? (Kaka D. Iralu, Nagaland and India: The Blood and the Tears,=20
2000).

True, militant groups, political parties and public opinion in northeastern=
=20
states do complain about the regions economic underdevelopment but their=20
primary grouse appears to be perceived injustices grounded in the history=20
of how the Indian postcolonial consti-tutional order came into being. But=20
what is striking is that the bureaucrats, politicians and military officers=
=20
who make Northeast policy are either oblivious of the historical issues=20
that insurgencies raise, or consider them too trivial to merit substantive=
=20
engagement. Thus, exploring different ways of granting greater=20
consti-tutional autonomy as a response to these historical claims, is not=20
at all part of the Indian policy-maker's basket of solutions.

In the history of ideas there are numerous examples of the authoritarian=20
consequences of dealing with places and people only in terms of their=20
supposed futureframed in terms of ideas about backwardness and=20
progresswithout taking into account their past. After all, that is how an=20
entire generation of liberal and progressive English thinkerse.g. Jeremy=20
Bentham, James Mill, John Stuart Mill and Thomas B. Macaulay managed to=20
endorse empire as a legitimate form of government, and even justify its=20
undemocratic and unrepresentative structure. The key to understanding this=
=20
paradox of the liberal defence of empire, writes Uday Singh Mehta in his=20
book Liberalism and Empire, lies in the reforms proposed by the liberals.=20
Developmenta-lism, according to Mehta, had been an integral feature of=20
liberalism. Liberal thought identified India's backwardness, so imperial=20
rule could be justified by the initiation of endless projects for economic=
=20
develop-ment, social reforms, etc.

By contrast, the conservative Edmund Burke had a harder time accepting=20
British rule of India. Of course Burke did not oppose empire; he argued for=
=20
good government, not Indian self-government. Yet his was a sharper critique=
=20
of empire because he saw India in terms of its existing established=20
communities, and he did not want to see them threatened. And unlike=20
liberals who worried about whether India was to be regarded as a nation or=
=20
just a conglomeration of innumerable castes and tribes, Burke assumed that=
=20
peoples living in one place for generations had to be regarded as political=
=20
communities. Most importantly, unlike liberals, Burke, in Mehta's words,=20
never presumed a 'foreknowledge of other people's destiny'. Indian=20
bureaucrats would do well to take more seriously the histories of the=20
peoples of the Northeast, and give up the assumption of foreknowledge of=20
their destinies that is implied in the talk about bringing development and=
=20
modernisation to remote tribal societies.

Recognising the Northeast as a region where the people have histories, of=20
course, does not mean that the region's history will have ready answers to=
=20
its contemporary problems. But taking history seriously can have important=
=20
implications. There is the example of the recent negotiations between Naga=
=20
leaders and the Government of India where both sides have failed to arrive=
=20
at a common ground the Naga idea of a Nagalim or greater Nagaland, is a=20
source of anxiety to a number of neighbouring northeastern states,=20
especially Manipur.

It is tempting to think of the issue entirely in terms of ethnic anxieties.=
=20
But the history of the political formations of the region, suggests=20
otherwise. The political history of the region has more interconnections=20
and continuities than the idea of bounded and demarcated ethnic homelands=20
might suggest. In the 19th century, Sir James Johnstone, a colonial=20
official, described political rituals of the Manipuri kings which were=20
remarkably inclusive. The investiture ceremony of the Manipuri kings=20
required the queen to appear in Naga costume; the royal palace always had a=
=20
house built in Naga style; and when the king travelled he was attended on=20
by two or three Manipuris with Naga arms, dress and ornaments.

The interconnections between Nagas and Mani-puris suggested by the=20
practices and rituals of the Manipuri court may not provide ready answers=20
to resolve the Nagalim issue today. But one thing is clear: rather than=20
secretive deals between Indian bureaucrats and leaders of one or the other=
=20
insurgent organisations, these questions are best addressed by debates that=
=20
take seriously the passionate interest in history that animates the=20
northeastern insurgencies, and by taking into confidence the people of the=
=20
region.

Rather than trying to contain insurgencies, India needs to raise its=20
expectations of what is possible. Even the most protracted of armed civil=20
conflicts in the world 'Northern Ireland' is today closer to resolution=20
than ever before. Establishing a blue-ribbon committee to examine the=20
accomplishments and failures of the last five decades of India's strategy=20
and tactics of counter-insurgency in the Northeast, may be a good place to=
=20
start from. The Armed Forces Special Powers Act is almost as old as the=20
Indian Constitution. It was introduced to deal with the Naga insurgency.=20
Four and a half decades later, not only has peace remained elusive in=20
Nagaland, insurgencies have enveloped formerly peaceful parts of the=20
Northeast. The extension of this law to the entire region has compromised=20
Indian democracy in the Northeast in unacceptable ways.

Surely half a century is a long enough period for honest stock-taking and=20
reassessment of goals and achievements. Until such rethinking takes place,=
=20
withdrawing the AFSPA, appointing as governors those whose accomplishments=
=20
are in fields other than national security, and removing the military=20
presence from historical monuments such as the Kangla Fort and the INA=20
memorial, will be powerful symbols to indicate the desire for a new=20
beginning that would shape a fully democratic Northeast in the 21st century=
.

But these are civil measures substantially at variance with the=20
'military-economic' solution that currently finds favour. The question that=
=20
remains is whether an honest review of options is at all possible given the=
=20
extraordinary influence of the security establishment and the interests it=
=20
has acquired in the "disturbed"Northeast. The appointment of 'military=20
governors' to oversee the dilution of civil political authority seems to=20
suggest that democratic alternatives will not merit even passing=20
consideration. After all, if a lasting peace is restored in the region,=20
generals will no longer be governors. And there will be no need for so many=
=20
brigadiers.

__________

#2.

Mon, 11 Jun 2001 11:20:22 +0530

NAGA NATIONAL COUNCIL FLAYS GOI FOR 'DOUBLE STANDARD' POLICY

The Naga National Council would like to make our stand clear at this=20
critical juncture of political crises
and confusion by making the following statements:

1 The NNC appreciates and acknowledges the NSCN for upholding the=20
national stand of Naga sovereignty.

2 The NNC also appreciates the NSCN for the achievement of political=
=20
talks at the highest level,
that is, the talks at the Prime Minister level without any conditions and=20
in a third country.

3 We the NNC also appreciate the NSCN under the leadership of Messers=
=20
Isak Chishi Swu and Th. Muivah
for internationalizing the Naga political problem at the international aren=
a.

4 Again the Government of India has declared a cease-fire with NSCN=20
(K) also but on terms and
conditions different from those of NSCN (I-M), which has created more=20
confusion. And the very motive behind
is to further factionalise the political issue to create deeper division=20
amongst the Nagas. It is crystal clear that the government of India has a=20
policy of "divide and rule" to divide and destroy the Naga people. Though=20
the largest democracy, India has clearly exposed herself to the world of=20
her wickedness and hypocrisy. We the NNC condemn this double standard and=20
wicked policy of the government of India in Toto.We oppose any peace-meal=20
solution of Naga political problem. And we sincerely appeal to the=20
government of India to be sincere and serious in their dealing regarding=20
the Indo-Naga conflict of 53 years and solve the political problem once and=
=20
for all without further delay before the situation goes out of control.

5 The stand of the Naga National Council under the leadership of Rev.=
=20
M. Kent is for the Naga National
solidarity, territorial integrity of all the Naga inhabited areas and for=20
national sovereignty. We oppose any organization or group who compromise=20
the sovereignty of the Naga nation and we treat them as traitors and betray=
als.

6 We appeal to the Naga people at home and abroad to stand behind the=
=20
inalienable rights of the Nagas for
sovereignty.

7 We also appeal to the community of nations and the non-governmental=
=20
organizations of the world to support
and intervene for the Naga people for sovereignty.

On behalf of the Naga National Council
Vizosielhou Nagi,
General Secretary
Naga National Council
Nagaland

_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/

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