[sacw] SACW #1 (22 Sept. 01)

[Harsh Kapoor]

South Asia Citizens Wire / Dispatch #1
22 September 2001
http://www.mnet.fr/aiindex

----------------------------------------

1. Pakistan, the Taliban and the US ( Ahmed Rashid)
2. The Women's Solidarity Front demands answers from the Democratic Sociali=
st
Republic of Sri Lanka
3. Book Announcement : Sri Lanka:The Arrogance of Power: Myths,=20
Decadence & Murder
4. Book Review: India, Sri Lanka - On Nationalism and Ethnicity
5. India: Fatwas on Dress Codes by Kashmiri fundos & by Revolutionary=20
People's Front , Manipur
6. When religion is used to justify crime and spread hate -- as it=20
has been in Afghanistan and Kashmir, Ayodhya and Bombay -- religion=20
itself is perverted. (Dilip D'Souza)

_______________________

1.

The Nation (USA)
October 8, 2001

Pakistan, the Taliban and the US

by Ahmed Rashid=20
Lahore

Pakistan's military ruler, Pervez Musharraf, has pledged full=20
cooperation with the United States against terrorism, but Pakistan=20
will need to carry out a U-turn in its policy of support for the=20
Taliban if it is to regain the West's confidence and end its present=20
diplomatic isolation. The stark policy choices the military faces may=20
also require a complete turnaround from twenty years of clandestine=20
support to jihadi parties and the growth of a jihadi culture, which=20
has sustained its policies in Kashmir and Central Asia.

After having spent the past seven years providing every conceivable=20
form of military, political and financial support to the Taliban,=20
Pakistan is now essentially being asked by Washington to help the US=20
bomb the Taliban leadership, along with their guest Osama bin Laden,=20
and topple the Taliban regime.

In an immediate follow-up to Musharraf's rhetorical pledge to assist=20
the United States in countering international terrorism, President=20
George W. Bush and Secretary of State Colin Powell asked Pakistan to=20
take concrete measures to prove its sincerity. "We thought as we=20
gathered information and as we look at possible sources of the attack=20
it would be useful to point out to the Pakistani leadership at every=20
level that we are looking for and expecting their fullest=20
cooperation,'' Powell said at a news conference on September 12. A=20
day later, after mentioning Musharraf's message of support, Bush=20
said, "Now we'll just find out what that means, won't we? We will=20
give the Pakistani government a chance to cooperate and to=20
participate as we hunt down those people.''

The United States has given the military regime a list of demands in=20
order to facilitate Washington's expected attack on bin Laden. They=20
are believed to include permission for the use of Pakistani airspace=20
for the bombing of bin Laden's camps, an immediate end to Pakistan's=20
supply of fuel and other goods to the Taliban, closure of Pakistan's=20
borders with Afghanistan in order to prevent the escape of Arab=20
militants to Pakistan and the sharing of intelligence with the United=20
States about bin Laden and the Taliban.

The list is clearly only the first step in testing Pakistan's=20
resolve. More demands are almost certain to follow, among them US use=20
of military bases, airports and harbors for the expected military=20
offensive. Washington has asked for a comprehensive report from=20
Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) about every detail it=20
has on bin Laden, including his contacts with Pakistani extremists,=20
his use of Pakistani militants to carry messages around the world and=20
his hiding places in Afghanistan.

At the same time, Washington has given the ISI a little time--"no=20
more than a week or so," according to Western diplomats--to see if it=20
can persuade the Taliban to hand over bin Laden and dismantle the=20
multinational network of extremists belonging to his Al Qaeda (the=20
Base) organization. Within days of the World Trade Center/Pentagon=20
attacks, senior ISI officers were in Kandahar holding intensive talks=20
with Taliban leader Mullah Mohammed Omar in a bid to convince him=20
that if he does not hand over bin Laden, US strikes will also target=20
the Taliban leadership. The chances of success are bleak, because of=20
the close relationship between Omar and bin Laden. The Taliban have=20
sounded alternately defiant and conciliatory, but on September 15,=20
Omar issued a bellicose statement against the United States, saying=20
the Taliban were ready to defend bin Laden and die. There does appear=20
to be panic in the movement; several ministers in Kabul and=20
commanders in the field have sent their families to Peshawar and=20
Quetta in Pakistan--indicating that they themselves are ready to flee.

Washington is thus for the moment adopting a two-track policy,=20
pressuring Pakistan but at the same time giving it space to absolve=20
itself of its past support for the Taliban and deliver bin Laden,=20
something the ISI has refused to do over the past five years. Since=20
September 11, Musharraf has been huddled with his top generals,=20
giving no public statement of his intentions; in his two brief=20
television appearances he has looked exhausted. After meeting with=20
all his generals, his Cabinet and his National Security Council, the=20
government has only said, without giving details, that it will stand=20
by the United States.

Clearly, Musharraf has every reason to be worried. Pakistan has a=20
1,560-mile-long border with Afghanistan, and the United States would=20
need Islamabad's full military and intelligence cooperation if it=20
were to launch an attack. But for the past seven years Pakistan has=20
been the main provider of military supplies, fuel and food to the=20
Taliban army, and Pakistani officers have advised the Taliban on=20
their military campaigns. Over the same period, up to 60,000=20
Pakistani Islamic students, three-quarters of whom were educated in=20
Pakistani madrassahs, or religious schools, have fought in=20
Afghanistan for the Taliban. One year ago, when the Taliban captured=20
Taloqan in northeastern Afghanistan, then headquarters of the=20
anti-Taliban United Front, more than sixty Pakistani military=20
officers and a small unit of the Special Services Group--Pakistani=20
commandos--were supporting and advising the Taliban force of 12,000=20
troops, which included some 4,000 non-Afghan militants.

At present, 3,000-4,000 Pakistani Islamic militants are fighting with=20
the Taliban in their offensive against the anti-Taliban alliance.=20
Thousands of Pakistani and Kashmiri militants also train in=20
Afghanistan for the war in Kashmir. Pakistan's knowledge of the=20
Taliban's military machine, storage facilities, supply lines and=20
leadership hierarchy is total. Pakistan also has the most=20
comprehensive information about the role of foreign militants, their=20
bases and their numbers. The United States is now asking the ISI to=20
turn over all this information to the CIA.

If the army decides to commit fully to Washington, Musharraf will=20
have to do even more. He will have to evacuate Pakistani military=20
advisers from Afghanistan, withdraw Pakistan's recognition of the=20
Taliban regime as the legitimate government of Afghanistan, condemn=20
the Taliban and force them to expel thousands of Pakistani fighters,=20
in addition to a cutoff of fuel and other supplies, at the very=20
moment when they will be preparing to resist a US invasion.

Musharraf will also have to crack down hard on Pakistan's Islamic=20
extremists, who provide bin Laden's Al Qaeda with logistics,=20
communications and other support. He may also be obliged to ban those=20
Pakistani groups, like Harakat ul-Ansar (Volunteers Movement) and=20
Jaish-e-Mohammed (Army of Mohammed), that are listed by Washington as=20
terrorist organizations and could pose a threat to US forces. The=20
largest Pakistani party fighting in Kashmir, Lashkar-e-Taiba (Army of=20
the Pure), is on the US terrorist watch list. All these groups have=20
received tacit state support in the past; stopping their activities=20
will be a major problem for Musharraf.

If Musharraf decides to fall in line with US policy, he will receive=20
widespread support from the majority of Pakistanis--especially the=20
urban, educated middle class--who are tired of the country's dire=20
economic crisis and the chronic lawlessness largely caused by Islamic=20
extremists, and who are concerned about the rapid "Talibanization" of=20
Pakistani society. In early September neo-Taliban Pakistani groups in=20
the Northwest FrontierProvince prevented UNICEF from carrying out a=20
polio immunization campaign for children because they considered it=20
un-Islamic. The same groups have smashed TV sets and forced women to=20
stay at home, as the Taliban have done in Afghanistan.

At the same time, Pakistan could negotiate major concessions from the=20
United States for its support--the lifting of US sanctions against=20
Pakistan imposed in response to Islamabad's 1998 nuclear tests, a=20
partial write-off of the country's $38 billion international debt,=20
more loans from the IMF and the World Bank, greater US pressure on=20
India to settle the Kashmir dispute on terms acceptable to Pakistan,=20
and the re-establishment of a close military and intelligence=20
relationship with the United States to counter Washington's growing=20
military and economic links with New Delhi. However, many Pakistanis=20
fear that the United States may just use Pakistan, as it did in the=20
1980s against the Soviet Union, and then walk away once the US=20
mission is over, establishing a closer military alliance with India=20
and leaving Pakistan in chaos. That fear is not only expressed by=20
Islamic groups but also by Pakistani liberals.

What the military is most concerned about is a backlash from Islamic=20
parties and conservative Islamicists within the officer corps, who=20
will accuse Musharraf of kowtowing to the Americans. Maulana Samiul=20
Haq, who heads a string of madrassahs that many Taliban leaders=20
attended in the early 1990s and that are now attended by Central=20
Asian Islamic militants, has warned Musharraf that there will be a=20
huge public backlash if Pakistan bends to US demands. "I am sure the=20
Pakistani Army will not allow this to happen, and Musharraf will be=20
mindful of the sentiments of his under-command. There will be a=20
strong public backlash also,'' Haq said on September 14. Haq's=20
provocative comments reflect moves by Islamic fundamentalists to=20
increase pressure on Musharraf from within the army. Several senior=20
generals and former ISI chiefs known for their hard-line Islamic=20
views have been even more provocative, claiming that the attacks in=20
the United States were carried out as part of an Israeli-Jewish=20
conspiracy in league with the CIA in order to give Israel a free hand=20
to crush the Palestinians and defame Muslims.

Musharraf is deeply concerned about US intentions toward the Taliban,=20
and the Pashtun ethnic group in particular, from whom the Taliban are=20
drawn and who straddle the border between Pakistan and Afghanistan,=20
and what the future state of Afghanistan will look like. The United=20
States is likely to target the Taliban leadership and its military=20
formations and encourage an anti-Taliban uprising in the Pashtun belt=20
in the south and east of Afghanistan, which is the Taliban heartland.

There is already growing US and international support for the Loya=20
Jirga (tribal council) peace process in Afghanistan, headed by former=20
King Zahir Shah, now in exile in Rome. The LJ process is almost=20
certain to become the main political alternative for Afghanistan and=20
will probably be backed in coming months by the United States and=20
NATO. Pakistan does not support the LJ and would insist to the United=20
States that Islamabad continue to have a major say in the formation=20
of any future government in Kabul. If Pakistan is fully on board with=20
Washington, Islamabad will be able to influence the outcome of the US=20
attack and may retain influence in determining the future Afghan=20
government. If it balks, Washington is unlikely to listen to=20
Pakistani demands.

Musharraf is between a rock and a hard place, and the way he goes=20
could determine the future viability of the Pakistani state. This is=20
a moment of reckoning for Pakistan. It has to decide whether it wants=20
to be part of the international community or go it alone, at the risk=20
of turning into a pariah nation and possibly even state collapse.

_________

2.

What More Are We Waiting For?

The Women's Solidarity Front demands answers from the Democratic Socialist
Republic of Sri Lanka

With more than 17 years of civil war in Sri Lanka that has caused enormous
loss of lives, destroyed property, devastated our economy and militarised
and dehumanised the entire social fabric, the WSF wishes to ask this
'democratic socialist' government the following:

=B7 Is it the wish of this government to prolong the suffering and agony of
the people further? Has not the 'democratic socialist government' elected b=
y
the people still realised that it has a primary responsibility to protect
its citizens from further burdens and suffering?
=B7 Is the only concern and priority of this government at this moment to f=
ind
strategies to cling on to power?
=B7 Has not the brutality of this war unleashed wave after wave of violence
against women and increased women's vulnerability especially in the war zon=
e
in the name of 'protection' of 'national interests'?
=B7 Why is the 'democratic socialist government' evading and not recognisin=
g
the legitimate rights of minorities and the historical discrimination
suffered by the Tamil speaking people?
=B7 Does not this government realise that in the face of its continuing
inaction, racism /communalism in various forms is on the rise seriously
jeopardising peace initiatives and an end to the ethnic conflict?

The WSF wishes to remind the government of its responsibility towards its
people and take steps to :
1) Immediately declare a unilateral ceasefire to show its genuine desire fo=
r
a political solution to the conflict.
2) Immediately initiate peace talks with the LTTE with third party mediatio=
n
as also pointed out by the many sections of society who want an end to the
war, and an end to authoritarianism, intimidation and tyranny.
3) As a matter of utmost priority bring about a lasting political solution
to the ethnic conflict, which will meet the just demands of the Tamil
speaking people.
4) Immediately investigate and punish those in the armed forces who have
committed and are continuing to commit war crimes and acts of violence
against women.

WSF is an autonomous group of women drawn from all ethnic communities,
having links with working class women from both the formal and=20
informal sectors.

19th Sept 2001
Colombo
Convenors - F. Zackariya and R. Weerasinghe.

_________

#3.

SRI LANKA:THE ARROGANCE OF POWER: Myths, Decadence & Murder

By Rajan Hoole

Written by a co-author of The Broken Palmyra, the focus of=20
which was inwards - within Tamil
society - the present volume examines primarily the Sri=20
Lankan State. Sri Lanka: The Arrogance
of Power - Myths, Decadence and Murder is the story of how=20
the State, its ideology and inherent
violence spawned the LTTE as its mirror image, a violently=20
obscurantist JVP within Sinhalese
society itself, and continues to suffocate in that legacy.

The book traces the connections between major events in=20
post-independence Sri Lanka. It
elucidates crucial aspects of the 1977 violence that have=20
been papered over. The central
sections deal with the July 1983 holocaust and the Welikade=20
prison massacres that still form an
elusive watershed in this country's political history. Both=20
published and unpublished materials
have been collated in giving an account of the JVP=20
insurgency of 1987-90. A key chapter deals
with the dirty war of the mid-1980s, where the UNP=20
government's attempt at demographic
transformation, with covert Western and Israeli assistance,=20
plunged the crisis to a point of no
return and irrevocably internationalised it. Other chapters=20
deal with demoralisation in the security
forces, political assassinations and the fascist drift=20
among Tamils. A final chapter tackles the
question of peace. Although written for the general reader=20
wanting to probe below official and
partisan obfuscation, the student of contemporary Sri Lanka=20
will find the book compulsory
reading.] 500p.

Published by University Teachers for Human Rights (Jaffna),=20
Sri Lanka.

[The book has been already released! In the near future we=20
shall give more details of how to
purchase the book from abroad.
For local purchases in Sri Lanka:

At Rs. 800/- per copy, the book is priced at the lowest=20
compatible with covering production costs.
Its available for sale at study institutes and booksellers=20
in Colombo. You could purchase from the
following places:

RCCG Book Center, 66, Dutugamunu Street, Kohuwala,=20
Dehiwala, Sri Lanka ( e-mail to
rccg@s...),

Suriya Book Shop, SSA, 425/15, Thimbrigasaya Rd, Colombo 5

Barefoot, Galle Road, Colombo 3

Book Land, 432, Galle Road, Colombo 3

ICES No.8, Kynsey Terrace, Colombo 8

Marga Institute, 91/10,Dutugamunu Street, Kohuwala, Dehiwala

Contact e-mail: <contact@u...>

_________

4.

Economic and Political Weekly (Bombay, India)
September 1, 2001

On Nationalism and Ethnicity

M S S Pandian

Postcolonial Insecurities: India, Sri Lanka, and the Question of=20
Nationhood by Sankaran Krishna; University of Minnesota Press,=20
Minneapolis and London, 1999; pp 296, $ 22.95, paperback.

India's self-serving political and military intervention in the=20
ethnic conflict between the Sinhalese and Tamils in Sri Lanka has, in=20
the course of the past decade, spawned scores of books and hundreds=20
of research papers. Most of this literature is anchored artlessly in=20
the conventional 'international relations' framework which treats the=20
ultimate arrival of the nation and the sovereignty of the nation=20
state as given. The book under review consciously departs from this=20
framework and offers a refreshingly new approach to the problem.=20
Significantly, it comes out with a set of conclusions which makes one=20
rethink a wide range of issues and, in particular, the relationship=20
between ethnicity and nationhood.
The book, first of all, chooses, for most part, not to partake in=20
epistemic realism that demands the researcher to discover the truth=20
of what is being studied. Instead the book adopts a representational=20
view of the reality - with an explicit acknowledgement that=20
representations of events and the inescapable contest over such=20
representations are implicated in power/knowledge nexus. Within this=20
framework, the book analyses how competing representations open up=20
different sets of enunciative possibilities for different players in=20
any situation, i e, 'it allows parties and leaders to portray=20
themselves as nationalists, patriots, self-sacrificing heroes,=20
regional hegemons interested in protecting beleaguered minorities in=20
neighbouring countries, and so on'.

Primarily, the book deals with three competing representations of the=20
ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka. These are representations calibrated=20
and deployed by the Sri Lankan state, Sri Lankan Tamil ethnic=20
minority and the Indian state. While the book is suffused with=20
instances of how the Sri Lankan state has appropriated and=20
reinterpreted different events so as to legitimise its=20
Sinhala/Buddhist majoritarian agenda against the Tamils, Shankaran=20
Krishna's skilful recounting of the interpretative strategies=20
employed by J R Jeyawardene, the late president of Sri Lanka, to=20
align the nation space of Sri Lanka with Sinhala Buddhist identity is=20
eminently instructive here. He shows how by a judicious mix of the=20
real and mythic, and by the logic of elision and exclusion, the=20
political rhetoric of Jeyawardene constituted the past, present and=20
the future of Sri Lanka as belonging only to the Sinhalese. The=20
Tamils in this story that is founded on a hierarchy of ethnic=20
authenticities, figure as belonging to the 'history' of invaders from=20
the Indian subcontinent, and as ones who have sullied the purity of=20
the Sinhala/Sri Lankan nation.

On the other hand, the Sri Lankan Tamils have narrativised the story=20
of the ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka and their location in it as one=20
of a 'reluctant transition from a politics of desired accommodation=20
to violent secessionism'. The books argues that this narrative of=20
failed attempts seeking inclusion in the nation invests the Tamil=20
separatist movement a moral legitimacy and allows it the space not to=20
do business with the Sri Lankan state.

Repression and Hegemony

While these stories are extremely illuminating and relevant, the most=20
interesting account detailed in the book, in my opinion, is the=20
representational strategies of the Indian state which allowed it=20
simultaneously to advance its desire to be a regional hegemon and to=20
address local concerns of nation-making. The Indian state, which=20
followed a twin track policy of diplomacy, and covert and overt=20
military coercion in Sri Lanka, legitimised its political and=20
military intervention in the Sinhala-Tamil conflict primarily on two=20
interweaving grounds. First, India, as a nation with a claim to have=20
been found on pluralistic principles, has an ethical duty towards the=20
oppressed minorities in the region. Second, if the Indian state, in=20
the particular case of Sri Lankan Tamils, did not intervene it would=20
weaken Indian nation by alienating the Tamils in Tamil Nadu. As=20
Sankaran Krishna shows us in detail, this is an interpretative=20
strategy whose history can be traced to the dismemberment of Pakistan=20
by India in 1971, allowed the Indian state to fuse together two ways=20
of engaging with ethnicity - ethnicity as a danger to the nation as=20
well as ethnicity as an opportunity for making the nation (by=20
presenting itself as a regional hegemon, in this case).

Here, the book's conclusion about India's Sri Lankan policy is worth=20
quoting in extenso, given the fact that a large part of the existing=20
literature on the theme uncritically replays Indian state's rationale=20
as profound truths:

The twin tracks were not so much oriented to a speedy resolution of=20
problems as designated to keep India's neighbours in a continuous=20
state of destabilisation. The gains of the policy were to be found=20
in the process, not in the destination. It kept Jeyawardene's regime=20
off balance and curtailed its efforts to bring hostile forces into=20
India's backyard; it afforded an opportunity for Congress to portray=20
itself as the defender of a kindred ethnic minority, a portrait that=20
could someday be parlayed into votes and may be even power in Tamil=20
Nadu; it served as a constant reminder to all the smaller neighbours=20
that the cost of alienating India was not negligible.

Equally important is the conclusion of the book, based on these=20
competing narratives, that ethnicity is not atavistic or primordial,=20
but is indeed modern - as being integral to the making of modern=20
nations.

On a different register, the book reinterrogates the relationship=20
between nation and ethnicity. In the conventional wisdom, ethnicity=20
is viewed as something which is opposed to nation, and only by=20
taming recalcitrant ethnicities, nation could arrive. In other words,=20
this argument, basing itself on a progressivist teleology, visualises=20
the gradual and violent demise of ethnicities and the ultimate=20
conquest of the nation. Contesting this academic common sense, the=20
book argues forcefully and convincingly that 'far from a detour on=20
the way to arrival as the nation state, so-called particularistic=20
identities such as ethnicity, language, religion and region=20
constitute the principle of difference against which national=20
identity is sought to be constructed and reproduced'. Further, the=20
book shows that the dominant narrative of 'transition to nationhood'=20
functions as an important justification for enormous statist=20
violence. To reframe these arguments, it is not the taming of=20
ethnicity, but its very production and reproduction, is essential for=20
the nation to define itself.

On the basis of these conclusions, the book makes an impassioned plea=20
to re-envision the nation not as grounded in a unified sense of=20
identity, but as confederal spaces based on pluralistic ethos.=20
Evocatively, it demands us 'to decouple our histories from the=20
narratives of the nation, to miscegenate the stories of our origins,=20
and=8A to decolonise our vision of the futures by liberating that space=20
from the modulations of ersatz pasts.' In supporting the possibility=20
of such an agenda, the book compares, among other things, the=20
divergent trajectories of the ethno-nationalisms of the Tamils in=20
India and Sri Lanka. It describes how Tamil nationalism in India or=20
Dravidianism veered away from separatism and moved towards a federal=20
spatial imagination. This was made possible by the response of the=20
Indian state to accommodate the Tamil demands. In contrast, the=20
unrelenting majoritarian nationalism in Sri Lanka led to a political=20
trajectory that is the reverse of the Indian Tamil case - Tamils=20
moving away from seeking accommodation in the Sri Lankan nation and=20
opting for separatism. Along the way, the book also effectively=20
demolishes the often-cited argument that Tamil nationalism in Sri=20
Lanka and India are closely related.

It is in constructing this agenda for the future that the book runs=20
into certain critical difficulties. First of all, in upholding=20
Dravidian nationalism as a sort of a model for the future, the book=20
seems to over- emphasise the generosity of the centre in=20
accommodating the Tamil demands. The problem with such a view is that=20
it not only accepts the received hierarchy between the nation and the=20
regions, but also unwittingly grants primacy to the nation state as=20
the centre of the nation. Secondly, the book constructs the history=20
of the Dravidian nationalism as a movement from separatism, to=20
accommodation, to the arrival of the pluralistic nation. Such a=20
linearised trajectory of events comes dangerously close to contradict=20
the book's overall disenchantment with the progressivist teleology. I=20
should hasten to add here that these are problems are not specific to=20
this book, but are faced by the social sciences in general, primarily=20
because we are yet to have a language adequate enough to transcend=20
the deadly embrace of the nation. Given this, these points of=20
difference do not in any way diminish the substantial achievements of=20
this book which is fresh in its approach, valuable in its=20
conclusions, and ethical in its vision of the future.

_______

#5.

The Telegraph
21 September 2001
Editorial

VEILED THREAT=20

Enemies of open society subvert freedom in many ways, one of which=20
may be a perverse attempt at moral policing. An illustration of this=20
was seen recently by a militant outfit's fatwa on Muslim women in=20
Kashmir to wear the burqa or face physical attacks. That the majority=20
of the women had to surrender to the diktat out of fear did not=20
detract from its criminality. The defiance of Manipuri women in the=20
face of a similar threat from an insurgent group in the state=20
therefore looks particularly laudable. The little-known Manipuri=20
militant group may have seen this as a ploy to gain publicity and=20
some mileage vis-a-vis other such outfits operating in the state. Not=20
only have the women thwarted this design but have courageously=20
challenged any organization's right to order a dress code for them.=20
Manipur's women's organizations are known to have played a crucial=20
role in battling several social ills confronting large sections of=20
the state's youth. Their fight against drugs and AIDS has been as=20
exemplary as their positions on human rights issues. They have shown=20
the way again in their righteous indignation with the underground=20
elements who threatened to shoot women unless they stopped wearing=20
trousers, saris or salwar kameezes and returned to "traditional"=20
dresses.

This, of course, is not the first time that militants in Manipur have=20
sought to impose their code of social behaviour on the people. There=20
have been issues such as bans on drinking and pornographic films that=20
received some degree of public approval. But even this moral policing=20
raises fundamental questions about individual rights and freedom of=20
choice. Any attempt at forcing public morality, even if apparently=20
well-intentioned, militates against this freedom. If this attempt is=20
accompanied by threats of violence, it is clearly criminal by nature.=20
Interestingly, even better-known insurgent groups like the=20
Revolutionary People's Front have not only condemned the threat but=20
also vowed to punish those who issued it. While the women in Imphal=20
have shown their courage, the state administration cannot shirk its=20
responsibility of tracking down the culprits. It is necessary to=20
tackle the problems of even the lunatic fringes of society.=20
Unchecked, such madness may infringe on basic freedoms, as=20
forcibly-veiled Kashmiri women must have realized to their deep=20
anguish.

_______

7.

Rediff.com
September 20, 2001

Dilip D'Souza

Silent About Many Things

At precisely 10:30 on the morning of September 18, my family and I=20
stood for a moment of silence. It had been announced some days=20
before, and a full page ad in that morning's newspaper told us to do=20
so. In case we had missed it altogether, there was even a soft=20
recording on the phone, in place of a dial tone, to remind us. On a=20
Solidarity Day against Terrorism, this was a moment of prayer, a time=20
to remember all those who have lost their lives to terrorists.

Moment done, I looked at the full page again. There's a picture of=20
our prime minister, and a quote from him that says 'Every Indian has=20
to be a part of this global war on terrorism ... We must, and we=20
will, stamp out this evil from our land and from the world.' Below,=20
there are four more pictures, of major terrorist incidents: the=20
Bombay bomb blasts of March 1993, the Indian Airlines hijacking of=20
December 1999, the Anantnag massacre of March 2001 and the WTC=20
attacks of September 11.

Horrors all. 'Ugly face of Terrorism,' says the collective caption=20
below the four photographs.

And yet, and yet... why do I feel a certain unease?

When I look at this ad, when I read all the columns about terrorism=20
that have appeared in our papers since September 11, when I stand=20
quiet and think of the victims of these outrages -- I also say a few=20
silent words for Raju. Because I knew his father, and through his=20
terrible despair I understood: this 14-year-old boy, his only son,=20
was also a victim of terror.

Raju died on January 11, 1993. In the heart of Bombay, during some of=20
the worst rioting our country has ever known, he was butchered by=20
some of his fellow Indians. He was one of somewhere around a thousand=20
Indians who were murdered by other Indians in the two months of=20
December 1992 and January 1993. I ask you: as he watched the men who=20
surrounded him that night raise their long knives and slash at him,=20
as he understood he had arrived at the last few moments of his life,=20
do you think Raju did not feel terror?

Go ahead, pick any of those thousand Indians who died like Raju died=20
-- as they saw death coming for them, did those men and women not=20
feel terror?

Forget the deaths if you like. Did the man in the famous photograph=20
from that time, a scrawny man in rags and a moustache, running for=20
his life with blood streaming from his face, not feel terror? Did the=20
man in that other famous photograph from that time, the sturdy jawan=20
home from serving his country at the border, looking around at his=20
smashed and looted house, not feel terror?

Did anyone who lived through those weeks not feel terror? What about=20
those crazed few minutes near the Bandra railway station, when some=20
men suddenly stabbed some other men and people ran screaming and a=20
few alert photographers caught their headlong fright on film? What=20
about the people who were panicked for a whole night by a rumour that=20
an armed horde was about to come ashore on the Dadar beach? What=20
about the one hundred or so residents of Pedder and Carmichael Roads=20
who gathered one afternoon to meet then defence minister Sharad=20
Pawar, pleaded with him to use the army to quell the riots?

What were all these people feeling?

And what was it that I felt as I realised that I would be nuts to try=20
to make my way from my office to my suburban home? When several surly=20
yahoos advanced menacingly on me as I asked questions about a burned=20
and looted shop in Girgaum for a report on the riots that I was=20
working on? When I finally did take the train home and it crawled=20
past an enormous crowd near Mahalaxmi railway station, the men=20
carrying swords that glinted in the evening sun, glinting forever in=20
my mind?

I know it and I feel not the slightest shame admitting it: I was in=20
terror. As was all of Bombay.

And if terrorism means the spreading of terror, which is the only=20
thing it seems to me it can mean, then all of us in Bombay=20
experienced terrorism in those weeks. Yes indeed, Raju and the rest=20
of the thousand dead died at the hands of terrorism.

Which is why I wondered as I stood for my moment of silence on=20
September 18: in this full page ad that tells me about the 'Ugly face=20
of Terrorism,' that urges Indians to fight terrorism, why is there no=20
picture, nor even mention, of the riots in Bombay? I don't for a=20
moment mean to overlook the horror of the four events that do appear=20
in the ad. Each of them was a crime against humanity itself, whose=20
perpetrators must pay fully for it.

But were the riots not just such a crime as well?

After all, they happened, didn't they? They weren't a collective=20
figment of our collective imaginations. So why is it that the riots=20
are rarely mentioned in the columns, entirely absent from the full=20
page ad?

Were they somehow less deadly than the four crimes in the ad? Well,=20
the blasts killed about 250 Indians, the Indian Airlines hijack left=20
one Indian dead, the Anantnag massacre 35, the WTC assault count is=20
at thousands and rising. As I mentioned before, the riots killed=20
about a thousand Indians. The way I see it, and I'd like to think=20
that's the only way to see it, one death to terrorism is one death=20
too many. But by the callous numbers alone it cannot be that the=20
riots were a less deadly act of terror than the others.

Then is it that the four events involved a qualitatively greater=20
degree of terror than the riots? Perhaps you think so. But put=20
yourself in the place of Sharad Pawar's afternoon guests, those=20
terrified residents of Bombay's most polished neighbourhood. Put=20
yourself in the place of those panic-stricken Bombayites looking=20
fearfully out to sea at Dadar. Think of what it means to feel the=20
terror of the evil that was loose in Bombay for not just a moment, or=20
a few hours, or a week, but every hour for nearly two months. Put=20
yourself, if you can stand it, in the slippers of Raju as he was=20
reduced to pieces of bloody flesh one January night.

Is there any difference, and is there even any sense in asking about=20
such difference, in the level of terror unleashed by all these events?

Or is it that those responsible for the four crimes are unimaginably=20
evil, shadowy, slippery and powerful men who have escaped justice and=20
live overseas? Well, I don't know how you measure evil. But I do know=20
that those responsible for the Bombay riots live right here among us.=20
For all I know, the young man who strolled past on the street below=20
as I stood in silence at 10:30 could have been one of Raju's=20
murderers. The men who filled him with the hatred that drove him to=20
murder, who urged on Bombay's rioting throngs, live powerful,=20
protected and unpunished lives right here in Bombay.

You tell me: is the knowledge that murderers and their instigators=20
live openly down the road from me any less, or more, terrifying than=20
the knowledge that other such scum live in hideouts in Karachi or=20
Afghanistan?

Something inside me longs for, craves for, answers to the innumerable=20
questions I've asked in this column. Do you have any for me? For=20
yourself?

And even as I write those words, it troubles me no end that I could=20
ask the same questions, write the same several paragraphs, about the=20
murder of 3,000 Indians in Delhi 17 years ago. Yes, why was that=20
massacre of 3,000 turbaned Indians not mentioned in the PM's full=20
page ad? Did they not feel terror?

And as I write *those* words, it troubles me some more that while a=20
murder of just such a turbaned man in Mesa, AZ, has seen the swift=20
arrest of his murderer, in India we have not cared to punish the=20
murderers from 1984. Then or since. Seventeen years since.

'Every Indian has to be a part of this global war on terrorism,' you=20
remember our PM said, and 'we must, and we will, stamp out this evil=20
from our land and from the world.' I could not agree more. But when=20
in India we begin this global war by overlooking the evil in our own=20
land, by explaining it away in our own minds, by pretending it=20
doesn't even exist: yes, I do feel an unease that no moments of=20
silence can erase. For I wonder: just what war are we Indians=20
fighting? If we tolerate terrorism every day, how will we ever stamp=20
it out?

The lesson from the horror of September 11 is hardly that Islamic=20
terrorism threatens the world. It is that when religion is used to=20
justify crime and spread hate -- as it has been in Afghanistan and=20
Kashmir, Ayodhya and Bombay -- religion itself is perverted. Justice=20
and humanity are destroyed.

Now there's something to fight a global war for.

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