[sacw] SACW Dispatch #1 | 12 Sept. 00

Harsh Kapoor aiindex@mnet.fr
Wed, 11 Oct 2000 02:10:51 -0700


South Asia Citizens Web Dispatch #1
12 September 2000
http://www.mnet.fr/aiindex

#1. India: Christian forum plans protest rally in Washington 
#2. Current Issues in South Asia - Internet Chat with Stephen P. Cohen 
--------------------------------------------

#1.

The Hindu
11 Sept.2000

CHRISTIAN FORUM PLANS PROTEST RALLY 

By Sridhar Krishnaswami 

NEW YORK, SEPT. 10. The Indian American Christian Coalition of North America
will hold a prayer rally in Washington on September 14 to protest against
attacks on
Christian Missions in India. The rally will take place on the Capitol Hill
lawns during the
Prime Minister, Mr. A.B. Vajpayee's address to Congress. 

A press release issued by the organisation said the demonstration was to
oppose the
persecution and murder of Christians in India and that many lawmakers from
the House
of Representatives and the Senate would speak at the rally. 

Mr. Vajpayee would address a joint sitting of Congress on September 14 in the
morning. Later, he is scheduled to meet members of the House International
Relations
Committee and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. He would also have
lunch
with the India Caucus. 

The Christian coalition called for an immediate end to ``persecution and
violence''
against religious minorities. ``Mr.Vajpayee is a member of the Hindu
supremacist group,
the Rashtriya Swayam Sevak Sangh (RSS). According to a State Department
report
and international human rights observers, the RSS, described as an
extremist, neo-Nazi
group, which is the force behind the violence and bloodshed, that targets
Christians and
Christian Missions in India,'' it said. 

``The Prime Minister has repeatedly denied his party's involvement and
holds that
unidentified groups are responsible for such acts of religious terrorism.
He has denied
his party's role in the violence while maintaining close ties to this
Hindu extremist
religious terrorist groups,'' the coalition said. 

``The demonstrations will denounce not only the religious extremism and
neo-Nazi
policies of the RSS, but of its allies, the Vishwa Hindu Parishad, Bajrang
Dal and the
Bharatiya Janata Party, for their role in the destruction of the fabric of
the Indian
society,'' the statement said. 

______

#2.

CURRENT ISSUES IN SOUTH ASIA 
LIVE INTERNET CHAT WITH STEPHEN P. COHEN 
September 7, 2000 

As Indian Prime Minister Atal Behari
Vajpayee approaches his visit to Washington
starting on September 14, we again consider
policy issues in India, Pakistan, and
throughout South Asia. 

While South Asia grapples with the existence of nuclear weapons, ethnic
conflict, terrorism, and other threats, it also affords new opportunities
for market reform, growth of democratic institutions, and closer ties with
the United States.

Stephen Cohen, who visited the region in the Spring, takes your questions
about the state of affairs in South Asia and U.S. policy toward nations in
that part of the world.

We're out of time now. Thanks very much for your excellent questions, and
thanks to Stephen Cohen for taking the time to respond.

#21 Dear Professor Cohen

1. We have witnessed a sustained upswing in Indo-US relations since
President Clinton's visit. My reading is that there has been considerable
activity since then to implement many components of the Institutional
Dialogue between the two countries contained in the Vision Statement, and
PM Vajpayee's visit should see further progress in those directions.

2. Despite this progress, the Clinton administration has ordered the waiver
on only a limited range of sanctions against India, even though the
President has been vested with the powers to lift them all.

3. I would like your views as to why the President has held back on
ordering a full waiver and whether the CTBT issue remains the one and only
sticking point. If so, it seems at odds with progress in elevating the
relationship in virtually every other area in the bilateral relation. There
is clearly a much greater understanding about India's position after two
years of intensive dialogue, and the US clearly appreciates that the
Vajpayee government needs to build a consensus in India for the signing.
Also there are clearly expanding areas of agreement on issues of security
and non-proliferation including support for the CTBT and commencing
negotiations to end production of fissile material for weapons and
enhancing export controls. I would have thought that, in the spirit of the
progress made in this security dialogue, the Clinton administration could
make the gesture of lifting all sanctions. Further, I would have thought
that the failure of the Senate to ratify the Treaty would have undercut the
President's capacity to pressure India to sign.

The US has indicated that it now gives India a higher priority in its
foreign policy through the Vision Statement. In what ways do you think this
will be manifest? Will the US support India's membership on the Security
Council? Will the US support India's membership of APEC despite the 10 year
moratorium on new members? Inclusion in the economic groupings?

Kind regards
Ric Shand Australia South Asia Research Centre The Australian National
University Canberra, Australia

Prof. Shand:

First, this is a very lame duck administration, and many key policymakers
are in the market for jobs elsewhere. There will be a wholesale
housecleaning of people if the Republicans win, even if Gore should win
(and that looks increasingly possible), there will be changes at the top.
So, I see them as just holding on, making no significant policy changes or
initiatives (very much the way they deferred the missile defense decision
to the next administration).

The sanctions policy is the result of a tug-of-war in the administration
itself, and there are those who would argue that they should be lifted, or
eased further; yet there are those who resist this, and wanted even a
tougher position; further, Congress does need to be consulted, as the
waiver is only a year-to-year thing. Washington wants to use the lifting of
sanctions as a bargaining lever with India--they seem to be pressing most
for a CTBT decision, which I personally regard a misguided. (I'd rather get
firmer Indian commitment to other regimes, and see India do more in terms
of containing missile and nuclear technology spread--and also take some
measures to stabilize the delicate trilateral balance of terror that has
emerged between India, Pakistan, and China.

You certainly are right in noting that the Senate's failure to ratify
weakened the President's negotiating position, and I believe that the
Indians (correctly) calculated that this would happen. However, all sides
most move beyond the debate over treaties, and deal with the more urgent
and frightening aspects of having two new nuclear weapons states emerge in
an area of great political instability. I believe that Indian prestige was
enhanced by the tests--everyone now recognizes India's claim to great power
status as legitimate, even if they are reluctant to carry it to the logical
conclusion, i.e. Security Council membership, but from a technical military
perspective India's security is degraded--presumably there are Chinese as
well as Pakistani nuclear-tipped weapons aimed at Indian targets and
recently Indian nuclear 3experts have claimed that India's second strike
capabilities are not really proven or convincing.

On the question of APEC membership I will have to plead ignorance--or at
least a lack of sound information--but this could be one of the things the
two countries are now bargaining about. In any case, the US will not want
to alienate Japan and other states that have had a long and positive
relationship with Washington over the years. India is not yet in that
class, but at least we are now thinking about India in terms of its
major-power status.

Best, Stephen Cohen

#20 Dear Mr. Cohen,

It is clear that both India and Pakistan are finding it very difficult to
find a peaceful resolution to Kashmir. USA, on the other hand, has changed
its policy to tilt more towards India while claiming to be "impartial" and
un-involved. Isn't such a policy by US an impediment rather than helpful in
resolving this the world's most dangerous dispute?

Regards Siraj, Denver, CO

Dear Ajaz:

In order to be of help to two (or more) contending parties, you have to be
able to talk to each of them; our contacts with India were limited sharply
to the nuclear issue and some trade disputes; their tests, although
regrettable in many ways, did wake up Washington and forced presidential
engagement with New Delhi. We now have a fairly good standing with India,
but they are in no way dependent upon the United States and cannot be
pressured into talks with Pakistan, even if the US thinks this is in their
interest. spc

#19 Dear Mr. Cohen,

President Clinton's visit last March aimed at opening new ground for U. S.
- India relations. In their March 21 Joint Statement, the President and
India's Prime Minister Vajpayee declared that their "partnership of shared
ideals" led both countries "to seek a natural partnership of shared
endeavors". India has been however generally at odds with the United States
on key issues of international security policy. The differences appear
often to be based on matters of principle. Later on this month, India and
China will be holding their first ever joint naval exercise in a theater of
relevance for the security of the Taiwan Strait. India and Russia have also
strengthened their ties since the Kosovo crisis, and India's armed forces
remain very dependent upon supplies of Russian contractors. But there are
some signs of diversification. An American offer to make the F-16 tactical
available to the IAF remains standing and it may be reconsidered by New
Delhi after a Gore administration takes charge in January. How do you see
the prospects for specific defense and security policy cooperation between
Washington and New Delhi, what are the main conditions and scenarios? Thank
you very much.

Leopoldo Lovelace, Jr. Mershon Center for Education in International
Security & Public Policy, and International Studies Program, The Ohio State
University.

Dear Leopoldo:

As things stand now, all US military sales to India are prohibited because
of the sanctions introduced after the 1998 tests. A new administration may
lift them, but I don't see F-16s as high priority, it would also take an
act of Congress to change the law. We should be cooperating with the
militaries of both India and Pakistan (which has been even more heavily
sanctioned), but I do know that the Indians in particular are very wary of
dependency on the US--we cut them of several times in the past, as we cut
off the Pakistanis, and India has tried to diversify its arms suppliers.
But there is scope for cooperation on peacekeeping, developing commonality
between services, and so forth. However, If India decides to build an ICBM
that can reach Columbus, O., I suspect that any enthusiasm for defense
cooperation with India that might develop in the next few years would
dissipate. spc

#18 Don't Nixon's memoirs state he seriously considered using Nukes against
India.

Would you have bought a used car from him? Even if they did, don't believe
everything you read.

#17 to the question :

In light of revelations that Nixon wanted to nuke India, do be believe that
India doesn't need a nuclear deterrence?

you said:

"I know of no such revelations concerning Nixon; the Enterprise was not
even in the Bay of Bengal during the 1971 crisis, it was more a gesture to
the Chinese and Pakistanis (who did not appreciate it!), than a serious
threat; incidentally,..."

May I suggest that you pick up the book The Arrogance of Power: The Secret
World of Richard Nixon, written by former journalist and award-winning
biographer Anthony Summers. A newspaper report is here:

http://www.timesofindia.com/310800/31worl2.htm

I will. But I was sitting in the Pentagon when they found out about the
Enterprise, and they were totally astonished. spc

#16 Mr.Cohen,

What is your take on this 'natural ally' business that we often hear about
in official circles from both the U.S and India with respect to Indo-US
relations? The ground reality is that the U.S refuses to do anything about
the Chinese proliferation of nuclear and missile technology to Pakistan.
The U.S not only refuses to sell any military hardware to India but also
persuade others not to sell certain equipments and technology. Does
'natural ally' only mean 'we need your technology graduates and access to
the Indian market' to the U.S.?

Lastly what do you think India's response should be to Pakistan' state
sponsored terrorism, not only in Kashmir but also in other parts of the
country?

Thank you. Mohan Marette

Dear Mohan:

I don't take it as much more than rhetoric. I could point to statements and
policies that India has pursued which have angered American policy-makers,
but which Delhi felt were just and correct. However, it is important that
we do not toss out real common interests because we don't like the
diplomatic rhetoric. The US is finally coming around to a tougher line
against Chinese proliferation activities (if India had more clout in
Washington, we would have done so earlier), the tech graduates coming to
America are having a profound impact on the way in which Americans see
India, all for the good. So, hold your ears (or nose) when you hear
speeches about "natural allies" (what, btw, is an unnatural ally?), and
think of ways in which the two states can exploit together common
interests; this will help us get over the bumpy parts of the road. spc

#15 The American position is quite transparent. First, in order to occupy a
neutral position, Clinton administration reversed 4 decades of US policy,
by no longer accepting Kashmiri accession to India as a valid, legal
document. This had the effect of putting both India and Pakistan on an
equal level - as occupiers of former J&K State. Second, this position also
made redundant, those UN proceedings and resolutions on Kashmir, as those
were based on accepting Kashmiri accession to India, and India's complaint
was based on Pakistani aggression on Indian territory. Once the accession
is questioned and denied, the basis of Indian complaint no longer exists,so
those resolutions are voided.

This brings the Simla accord to center stage as the only means of resolving
the dispute. Having now established the groundwork by placing both Pakistan
and India on the same legal level in Kashmir, the American solution is
simple - a de jure partition of the state along the LOC and the position on
the ground where the LOC was never defined (Siachen). The US solution to
Kashmir is very straight forward: division of the state between India and
Pakistan along their present positions, with both countries providing some
level of autonomy to their respective Kashmiri populations. That is about it.

They have made this clear to both sides, imo, and are not interested in
being a part of any further discussions and negotiations between India and
Pakistan. They are totally opposed to Pakistani proxy intervention in
Indian Kashmir, and would be totally opposed to attempts by India to regain
any part of Pakistani Kashmir. This is my reading of the Kasmiri situation
from an Indian American perspective Do you agree?

It may be transparent, but I read the record differently than you. The US
position has always been that of the Brits, that Kashmir was still to be
settled; this is also the UN's position. The rest of your analysis is not
unreasonable, but I wouldn't conclude that the US position on the LOC is as
firm as you say it is. Some Americans have said this, and it is a
reasonable (although not the only) way to deal with the problem. AS I noted
in another response, there is also a significant difference in power
between India and Pakistan, which complicates the likelihood of both
agreeing to any particular settlement. I've written in the past, that any
settlement that brought the Kashmiri Hindus back to the Valley, living in
peace, would be a good one, that would mean that their rights (as Indian
citizens) would be protected, and their Muslim majority neighbors would not
abuse their power. (there have been complaints from the Buddhist Ladakhis
about Srinagar). spc.

#14 I know that the Mr. John Holum and the others in the US
Non-proliferation Dept. still hope to "cap-reduce-rollback" India's nuclear
weapons.

But, without going into irrelevant examples like South Africa, Ukraine,
Brazil, etc., or lame excuses like "adding more nuclear weapons in this
world when others are reducing their stockpile is reprehensible," can you
justify the US/NATO insistence on maintaining nuclear weapons for the P-5
while applying the "Do as I say, but not as I do" double-standard on
India's nuclear weapons programme?

Also, do you think that the US, given its vehement opposition to the
undertaking of P-5 at NPT Review 2000, will ever agree to a global
elimination of nuclear weapons within a specified timeframe?

Thanks. AKS

Dear AKS:

Cynically, can you name a great power (including those we've been talking
about) that does not apply a double standard from time to time?
Realistically, I think the US government has just about given up any hope
of cap/rollback/etc. I've always thought it a foolish thing to say,
especially since it was impossible to achieve. But remember the days when
the US was actively supporting India's nuclear program? Forty years ago
many American saw an Indian n. program as desirable to balance out the
Chinese.

I think that some future American administration might well come to the
view that a specific time frame was possible. If you look at the record,
you'll see that some presidents have endorsed the idea of elimination of
nuclear weapons, and some have not; this is a question that will not be
answered for some time, but let's hope that the world moves in that direction.

I'd also add that the Indian position on the horizontal spread of nuclear
weapons something that remains to be clarified. I'd like to see India
publicly adhere to those portions of the NPT that prohibit the transfer of
n. technology--and be suitably praised for doing so. spc

#13 Was China's transfer of nuclear technology to Pakistan done to offset
the conventional force level of India thereby making them no longer valid
in the equation. Was not China's move a highly calculated neorealist
approach to South Asia?

Daniel

Dear Daniel:

I've never seen an authoritative public account of what exactly the Chinese
might have transferred, but if you are correct then there were several
motives. First, by supporting Pakistan--an old friend--the Chinese balanced
off the former Soviet Union as well as India. Since Pakistan was determined
to get a bomb anyway, the Chinese (if they did do it), may have wanted to
make it easier for a long-time ally (Pakistan is the largest recipient of
Chinese military and economic aid, however they should also transfer their
economic policies to Pakistan, it would do the latter a lot more good).

#12 What are the terrorist groups in this region, and what are their goals?
Doesn't terrorism tend to increase the resolve of the victimized and, if
so, are terrorist groups ignorant of this?

Leon Czikowsky Harrisburg, Pa.

Dear Leon:

You should check out the Potomac Institute of Rosslyn, VA, which
specializes in studies on terrorism; in S. Asia the real champions are the
Tamil Tigers, who perfected the instrument of the suicide bomber, hitting
political targets;

There are "terrorists" (they would call themselves freedom fighters) in a
number of S. Asian states, and several groups in Kashmir. If you define
terrorist as one who attacks civilian targets for the purpose of inciting
fear and terror, the numbers are not that great, and India, at least, is
prepared to wait them out as it did in dealing with separatist groups in
the Punjab and other states. spc

#11 May I ask another question?

The Washington Post has reported from India that Mr. Vajpayee will try to
avoid discussion with US officials on Kashmir and nuclear relations with
Pakistan and proliferation. This seems hardly possible. My question is:
given that these two items are likely to figure on the political agenda,
what is the best the US can reasonably expect to get from India on these
two subjects? Would there not be an argument for Washington's keeping a
clear eye on both--even if no progress was expected--while doing its utmost
to push the economic and business relationship, both for its own sake (it
will help make money and provide jobs) and because it will help to
strengthen and institutionalise bilateral ties, forming a firm basis upon
which the US could start to broach these issues in a more resolute way down
the road?

Regards and best wishes,
Jeff Phillips, Washington

Jeff:

Right now we have zero leverage on these issues; India has taken the moral
high ground on Kashmir (because of the Pakistani-inspired conflict in
Kashmir), and will not sign the CTBT as a way of keeping open the
possibility of new tests in the future; the first set certainly got
America's attention, I would not expect new Delhi to toss this lever away,
especially since the treaty is going nowhere. They might well announce that
they would sign it under certain circumstances, i.e. after the US does,
which may be never. spc

#10 Dear Mr Cohen,

I hope that you will be able to take my question, and air it on the net.

I have a simple and straight forward question. We all know that the Kashmir
dispute is the one issue that truly hampers development between India &
Pakistan, and some resolution is ultimately needed that will be agreed upon
between the two countries, and Kashmiris.

You've stated before that there is no-way a UN referendum will ever be held
in Kashmir, and your almost certainly right, owing to India's stance of
Shimla/Lahore treaties being the cornerstone of negotiations, and not UN
resolutions.

Also, we all know that there is little vocal support for greater autonomy,
yet alone secession from India in the Jammu & Laddakh regions of the state.
The Kashmir Valley is really the dispute, where people are probably
divided, seeking independence or merger with Pakistan. Militarily, India is
far more superior than Pakistan, and there is little chance of a military
victory for Pakistan, taking the Valley.

My question, Sir is quite simple. What, do you feel, are the only solutions
that New Delhi may be willing to agree to.? - owing to some international
pressure, a need to resolve the 53-year dispute, ward off CTBT pressure,
and ultimately win a permanent seat in the UN security council. Do you see
India ever agreeing to anything other than the LOC becoming an
International border - something that you know will be almost impossible
for any Pakistani govt to agree to. Do you ever see New Delhi agreeing to
solutions such as semi-independence of the Kashmir Valley - a'la Kashmir
Study Group Plan, or the 'Andorra' solution, where the borders between
Pakistani & Indian controlled areas of the state are porous, and Kashmir
would get its own semi-sovereign constitution.

So Sir, the question is, do you see New Delhi agreeing to any other formula
other than the LOC becoming an international border, and if so, what do you
see as realistic options ? I know from previous chats you have not stated
clearly which options you think are realistically possible, but I do hope
you can have a stab at giving us an idea of what the options are for the
Kashmir solution, coming from a well-respected authority and having
travelled to the region yourself.

Hope to hear from you soon, Sir.

With best regards.

Waqas Javed

Dear Javed Waqas:

Let me disagree with you on one important point. Kashmir is both a symptom
and a cause. It is a real grievance in its own right (for both sides, and
also for the Kashmiris), but it remains a problem in part because of the
larger strategic imbalance between India and Pakistan. Pakistan does not
want to be turned into a vassal state, and seek outside help to force India
to compromise on Kashmir. Solving the Kashmir dispute is difficult enough
but the power disparity makes it even more difficult. Its a real problem,
and I don't think that enough thought has been given to it, both sides tend
to fall back on legalistic and moralistic arguments, dismissing the
legitimate concerns of the other. spc

#9 (1) India says it will not talk with Pakistan until a conducive
atmosphere for peace is created by Pakistan, implying that Pakistan stop
supporting militant groups in Kashmir. However, for its own part, India has
raised its defense budget by 28.2%, exploded nuclear bombs within a 100
miles of the border with Pakistan, and turned Kashmir into a garrison state
by deploying close to half a million regular and paramilitary troops there.
Does this not militate against the creation of a peaceful atmosphere? Plus,
if there is peace to begin with, what is there to talk about?

(2) India has turned down the Swiss foreign minister's offer to mediate in
the Kashmir dispute by saying once again that the "two countries talk the
same language" and no mediation is needed. How long will this pattern
continue?

Ahmad

Ahmad: you are double dipping, but here's an answer:

1) I don't understand the last sentence; there's certainly no "peace"
between India and Pakistan, this is a classic "cold war" situation, where
the two battle each other on ideological and political fields, as well as
on real land from time to time.

2) Too long. Both sides have asked for outside assistance from time to
time, and both have rejected outsiders from time to time; its India's turn
to be stubborn, but there were long stretches when Pakistan was also eager
to pursue a military ,rather than a political, solution to Kashmir and
other areas of dispute.

#8 Professor Cohen,

As a student of South Asian Studies, I have read lots of your books,
articles and papers, and was impressed by your knowledge and insightfulness
on South Asia affairs and by your admirable optimism about the prospects of
U.S.-India relations in the post-Cold War era.

It seems to me that in proposing a realistic and incremental approach to
deal with India aimed at co-opting India into the U.S.-dominated world
order, you are based on the assumption that the rise of India "will not
challenge American military and economic strength" because "India is not a
great power in classic sense".

Could you elaborate a bit why India is not a classic power that will not be
a challenge to the U.S. vis-a-vis China, which I presumably lots of
Americans believe so? (I'd love to read your new book. When will be ready?)
How do you envisage the relations between India and China in the context of
their respective relations with the U.S.? It appears to me that while
expressing their frustration or opposition of a unipolar world, Indians
attempts to build a unipolar region, either through "Indira doctrine" or
"Gujral doctrine". How do you comment this ironic mentality of India? Do
you see this an asset or liability for U.S.-India relations? Thank you very
much for your time.

Dear Rong Ying:

Always happy to reply to a faithful reader! If there were a million people
like you, I'd be rich!!

Seriously, in the nuclear era the notion of a classic military alliance has
just about disappeared, as the only time/place when force can be used is
around the edges, or at the periphery. India is one of the the three major
Asian states (one conclusion of my book, probably coming out early next
year), but power cannot be measured only in military terms. There is
cultural power, ideological power, and in our era, informational power
(with Bollywood and the internet, India is a software and information
superpower). I foresee a Bollywood-Hong Kong competition for global
supremacy in making bad movies, probably outdoing even Hollywood! spc

#7 (1) Simply saying that Pakistan and India should hold talks has not been
effective, since no such talks are not being held. Would it make sense for
the US to hold a conference to bring the parties together, without
appearing to mediate in the conflict? How about providing economic
incentives to promote peace and reduce defense spending?

(2) Attempts to hold these three-way talks between the Indians, Pakistanis,
and Kashmiris have floundered. Would it be useful to consider the
techniques used in Northern Ireland where "three bilateral strands" were
used to get the process started.

Ahmad: there has been an active private US diplomacy, (track two, etc.),
but I don't think that India would accept "a conference" any time soon. I'm
in favor of a more active US role, and you correctly note that it should
not appear to mediate, but oddly enough our diplomacy is limited because
while we have good relations with India these days, we have shunned the
Pakistani leadership. Economic incentives in the form of more liberal trade
arrangements would be useful, but we're all members of WTO; reductions in
defense spending alone will not reduce tensions between India and Pakistan.

Yes. There have been informal talks between and among different Kashmiri
factions, and behind the scenes, between Indian officials and Kashmiris of
various opinions. The US should encourage this situation, but we can't
force people to talk, even if we think it is in their interest. (and who is
to say what is in their interest?) spc

#6 Two questions:

1. In retrospect, what difference did President Clinton's visit to India in
March make on a) bilateral relations and b) relations between India and
Pakistan;

2. Reports from India say that Mr. Vajpayee will do his best to keep the
question of nuclear rivalry with Pakistan off the agenda in Washington. Is
this a realistic posture; and what are the main issues thast the PM does
want to raise in Washington?

Best regards, Jeff Phillips

Jeff: Although it was a trip that should have been taken six years earlier
(we neglected India and Pakistan very badly), it did have a remarkable
impact on bilateral US-Indian ties, party because of Clinton's brilliant
performance there (and I'm no fan of his), but also because Indians see the
US in a far more positive light than they did ten years earlier. It might
have had some marginal positive impact on India-Pakistan relations, both
want to have good ties with the US, but we'll have to see how things stand
after the UN summit and PM Vajpayee's forthcoming visit to DC.

AS for the nuclear issue, the Americans are bound to raise it--this is one
of our obsessions--but I don't foresee the visit changing anyone's mind,
especially since there will be a new US administration in a few months. spc

#5 Dr Cohen,

What sort of game is China playing in South Asia? It seems to me that it
ostensibly disapproved of Pakistan's recklessness in Kargil and Drass last
year while secretly continuing to provide it with missile technology and
weaponry. China must fear India's great power ambitions more than it fears
Islamic extremism; hence, they need to bog India down in a regional arms
race. Do you agree? If so, what can, and should, Washington do?

Arun Motianey New York

Dear Arun:

China is playing the same game it has been engaged in since the mid-1950s,
i.e. to support Pakistan against the bigger India; (and also against the
Soviet Union at one time). However, Chinese arms for Pakistan are no
secret: there was a recent announcement of conventional weapons sales a few
weeks ago, and China has provided considerable help to Pakistan's defense
technology sector (although the quality of PRC weapons is not
outstanding--yet).

You do raise the new issue of Islamic extremism, and this has, I believe,
led some Chinese to think through their South Asia policy. They do not want
to see missionary-jehadists flowing from Afghanistan and Pakistan into
Central Asia, and in several Chinese provinces where there are millions of
Muslims. spc

#4 How much is General Musharraf dependent on (or independent of) Jehadi
groups on his policies on Kashmir?

Romesh Chander Columbus, OH

Romesh:

He made his way to the top of the Pakistan army without their support, so I
don't think he is "dependent" on them in the sense that he needs their help
to stay in power; however, there are elements in the army, and also in
Pakistan (and Afghanistan and the Islamic world), who regard the Jehadi
groups as freedom fighters; I would personally make a distinction between
those Kashmiris who have real grievances against India (and in some cases,
against Pakistan, and their own leadership), and the "terrorist-tourists"
who seem to be embarked upon a holy war.

Musharraf is regarded as a fairly liberal Muslim, but even such Pakistanis
feel that injustices have occurred in Kashmir. The real question is whether
and when Pakistan will be able to restrain these groups, and what
inducements India can provide for it to do so.

spc

#3 Dear Mr.Cohen,

As issue of kashmir is widely viewed as potential nuclear threat to the
region if not resolved. And it also projected that India is the only
obstacle in resolution, which is partly correct. but I think ,military
intervention into political affairs and failure of Democracy in Pakistan is
one of the main obstacles in the resolution of conflict.

Because as we look back to the history of both countries, two out of three
wars between India and Pakistan, have been fought when Military regime was
in power In Pakistan. And whenever any elected government came in power,
bi-lateral relations of both countries somehow improved. but military
regime has always thwarted every effort made by any elected government in
Pakistan and toppled those governments rather dubbed them as anti-Pakistan.
While current ongoing religious militancy (which is mainly based in
Pakistan and vowed to join Pakistan) has further deepened the communal
hatred, existed both sides of minds since the period of partitioned. And
due to this existing communal hatred, ongoing religious pro-Pakistan
militancy, our issue is viewed by majority of Indians as an attempt to
create another Pakistan. And absence of non-Muslim Kashmiris from current
uprising questions about the claims of Kashmiris.

I believe for any lasting solution, first both countries level interaction
or relations be improved and it only can happen when a sustained democratic
process be in Pakistan and both countries focus first on Areas of
non-conflicting like trade, culture, media. And if relations improve
between both countries it will be helpful for Kashmiris to get their
message across. But question is that what US can play role in the
resolution of conflict being global leader?

M.Mumtaz Khan spokesman United Kashmir Peoples National Party

Mr. Khan: You have correctly pointed out some of the important factors that
lead countries to deal with each other in a peaceful way: democracies have
a record of not fighting each other (but are ferocious against
non-democracies), and trade and cultural exchanges are also important even
in cases where political systems differ. Sometimes, an outside power or
entity can be helpful. But in the last analysis ALL sides have to be able
to deal with their own extremists--those who want absolute solutions and
who will not compromise--and any outcome has to be, on balance, positive
for all parties that might block an agreement. We've seen this process
underway in other parts of the world, sometimes successfully, but sometimes
the conditions are not right.

Best, Stephen Cohen

#2 The strategy of Pakistan seems to be - we will do anything to hurt you a
little even if it hurts us a lot. They are safe in the knowledge that India
will take a lot before it strikes back.We can probably call it nuclear pain
in back. My question to you is:

1) Can India or any other country safe behind a nuclear shield pursue the
same strategy against UK/US (revenge for colonization or any other
grievance) or China?

2) In light of revelations that Nixon wanted to nuke India, do be believe
that India doesn't need a nuclear deterrence?

VJ

1) Your characterization of the India-Pakistan relationship is not
incorrect, both sides have been willing to accept pain in order to inflict
it on the other side. When we come to nuclear weapons, the question is
whether either side (or both) wants to commit national suicide in order to
hurt the other side, i.e. nuclear weapons are not very helpful in dealing
with ordinary grievances, including "civilizational" differences. I don't
think India wants to seek revenge against the West, although it has its
legitimate grievances, and in the case of China "revenge" is inappropriate
for what is, after all, a border and territorial dispute whose origins are
still much in doubt.

2) I know of no such revelations concerning Nixon; the Enterprise was not
even in the Bay of Bengal during the 1971 crisis, it was more a gesture to
the Chinese and Pakistanis (who did not appreciate it!), than a serious
threat; incidentally, the US Navy was furious with his order that the
Enterprise steam in the vague direction of Dhaka; it actually never got
closer than south of Sri Lanka.

#1 Dr. Cohen--

India has made recent overtures to the military government in Burma,
ostensibly to counter the influence of the PRC in that country, but also to
gain a foothold in a potentially lucrative market. How does New Delhi view
Burma in terms of its overall foreign policy, and does the China factor
essentially signal an end to Indian support for Aung San Suu Kyi and her
NLD opposition?

The Indian government began reconsidering its Burma policy a few years ago,
as it came to realize that Burma (Myanmar) had become quite dependent on
the PRC. This led to a lessening of verbal support for the opposition,
etc., there is also concern over Burmese support for insurgencies operating
in India, and New Delhi needed Rangoon's cooperation.

_____________________________________________
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