SACW Jan 16, 2011 / Pakistan: Class and Religion / Nepal: Identity Politics and Federalism / India: Army in Kashmir ; Denial on Hindutva Terror ; Statehood debate ; Artists speak for Binayak Sen

[Harsh Kapoor]

South Asia Citizens Wire -  Dispatch No. 2698 - January 16, 2011
From: sacw.net

[1] Rejecting defeatist arguments (Ashraf Jehangir Qazi)
[2] Nepal: Identity Politics and Federalism (international Crisis Group)
[3] India / Kashmir: When Generals Subvert Democratic Process (Anuradha Bhasin Jamwal)
[4] India's Remains in Denial on the Hindutva Terrorism
    (i) Swami And Friends? (Saba Naqvi)
    (ii) Bad Apples From The Family Orchard (Prarthna Gahilote)
   (iii) The Confessor In Saffron (Smruti Koppikar)
[5] India: New States and Decentralisation - The debate for Telangana
   (i) Beyond Telangana - The Indian republic is young enough to try out more states (Ramachandra Guha)
   (ii) The cynical state of Telangana (Shiv Visvanathan)
   (iii) Autonomy & Statehood - Telangana Report Renews the Debate (Ajay K Mehra)
[6] India: Artistes protest Binayak Sen's conviction

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[1] Pakistan:

The News International
16 January 2011

REJECTING DEFEATIST ARGUMENTS
 
by Ashraf Jehangir Qazi

Mushkilain mujh par pareen itni ke aasaan ho gaieen.

In a verse, Ghalib observes that beyond a certain degree, what is painful and difficult becomes easy to endure. In itself, though, this second line of the fine, soulful couplet, one of the most quoted lines in Urdu poetry, leaves the following question open: Easy in what sense – to surrender, or to overcome? Today, Pakistan is faced with the need for finding an answer to this.

Some say we have already given our answer and thereby “easily” sealed our fate as a nation. We are either too helpless and scared to resist our fate, or we personally feel “all right, mate,” and do not see our own fate tied to that of our nation. Others say it has now become “easy” to decide that we have no option, despite all the difficulties and dangers, but to take on all the obscurantist and violent forces that threaten the survival of Pakistan.

So how do we interpret this line – indeed, Ghalib?

Can we make the transition from a soft and failing state to a viable and sailing state through policies of surrender to neo-con militarism that terrorises us from abroad and domestic religious extremism that terrorises us at home? We have become a battleground between the two. Our fate, accordingly, will be that of the grass under the feet of two rutting elephants fighting each other. We surrender to them in the hope that the elephants will eliminate each other and the grass will grow again. We are unable to see that they are in effect both aligned against our future as a country.

Class exploitation generates class hatred, and the violence we see today in the garb of religion. This is especially the case in times of economic crises when the poor, and even the middle, classes are driven to the wall, while the rich flaunt their power, corruption and callousness. Religion provides solace to the poor. But it can also be exploited by religious and other zealots who despise the corrupt, liberal and Westernised elite. They are able to play on the anger, frustration, faith and ignorance of the exploited classes.

In such circumstances, far from being merely an opiate, as Marx considered it, religion can become a violent stimulant for the masses and a power play by the religious classes in accordance with their political agendas. They are able to inflame the more conservative and religiously-minded sections of the urban middle-class and power classes because these classes are being increasingly impoverished and dispossessed. The intimidation of the hated liberal elite, who are seen as largely responsible for their economic and emotional plight, provides them a measure of consolatory satisfaction, as well as a false sense of empowerment. This attitude affects even the educated among the exploited classes.

Unless we address ourselves to this class exploitation, hatred and violence will progressively consume our civil society, and thereby undermine the foundation for the future of our nation? Salmaan Taseer’s murder has highlighted this most perilous situation. The argument about the blasphemy law, furious and inflammatory though it has been, is just a symptom of a much deeper malaise. Unless that malaise is earnestly tackled, the question of obscurantist forces being taken on does not arise. The problem is that our exploitative power elite sees their survival interests in accommodating aggressively religious, obscurantist forces, as well as their murderous violence, as long as it is not directed at them. Accordingly, the underlying problem of a deeply dysfunctional and unjust political and socio-economic order is simply ignored.

But wasn’t Taseer part of that elite? Yes and no. He was part of the civilian, moderate, liberal and English-educated political elite – the junior partner. He was one of those whom my late friend Sikander Jamali perceptively described as the political “Anglo-Indians” who are rapidly becoming an endangered species with the reversion of our society to “tribalism.” This phenomenon includes new “tribal” institutions such as the military, the intelligence, and the nexus of Saudi- and Gulf-assisted seminaries and mosques. The “Anglo-Indians” of today may still wield influence. They do not wield power.

The non-liberal power elite – the senior partner – do not feel threatened by Taseer’s murder. Only the relatively moderate, liberal and educated segments of civil society do: If one of their number is targeted, it is deeply regretted. But for the power elite it is not seen as a threatening game-changer. So will the power elite forbid decrees and other public calls for the killing of targeted individuals in the name of protecting the honour of the Holy Prophet (PBUH)? The general impression is that they cannot, even if they wished to.

This has America and other “friends and allies” of Pakistan worried. They are aware of the internal strain to which they have already subjected the Pakistani army, by continuously asking it to “do more” in FATA; at the expense of alienating, among others, the religious establishment and withdrawing its troops from the border with India, from where it sees its main threat emanating. The recent assertion of power by the religious establishment – which has influence in military circles and is profoundly anti-America and anti-India – will raise further concerns in Washington and other NATO capitals about the “reliability” of the Pakistani army, as America steps up its counterinsurgency ground operations and drone attacks in Afghanistan and Pakistan with inevitable civilian casualties. These operations are also vehemently opposed by the religious establishment in Pakistan because of its ties to the tribals and strong empathy for the insurgents. Similarly, the perceived growing political influence of extremist forces will further deepen Western concerns regarding the longer-term vulnerability of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons and materials.

The murder of Salmaan Taseer, therefore, has significance much beyond its perpetration. Our response to it will portray the quality of our response to the challenges that beset our country. As of now, it appears that our response will be determined by the interplay of short-term domestic political interests, which is likely to result in an elaborate-looking matti pao (bury the matter) solution.

Several justifications will be proffered: This is not the right time to take on additional challenges; we should not further divide our society; we need to make compromises for domestic stability; we have to focus on more urgent issues; Taseer may have been innocent, but he was needlessly provocative; freedom of speech in safety is our goal, but it cannot be realised immediately; we must be realistic; we are not yet sufficiently educated; if justice is not done in this case, or in other cases, it does not mean that we are not pursuing a more just society; have patience. Etc., etc.

If these arguments collectively carry the day, as they seem most likely to, it will signal to the world that Pakistan is fast approaching the status of a failed and dangerous state. The first priority of Western strategy will be to contain the “fallout” of Pakistan’s implosion which will be seen by the US and other regional countries as a far more serious development than the evolving situation in Afghanistan. A fundamental review of our domestic and external strategies and policy measures has become an urgent necessity.

Taseer’s murder has confronted us as a nation with the question raised in Ghalib’s line. Will we find it easier to surrender to forces that are considered too powerful to overcome even though they threaten our existence? Or will we find it easy to see why we have no option but to overcome challenges that threaten to destroy us as a society and as a nation? If in practice we continue to give the wrong answer, we will tackle none of the political, security, social, economic and external challenges facing us today.

Class hatred will deepen. Religion will be used as a political explosive. Violence will spread. No one will be secure. In such a situation, progress will be impossible. We will serve neither faith nor country. The direction we will have chosen for Pakistan will be set in stone. Time will not be on our side. External military intervention will become certain. All our difficulties, indeed our fate as a nation, will be made “easy.” Our choice of answer, accordingly, should be easy to make. That is how I read Ghalib’s line.

The writer is Pakistan’s former ambassador to the United States and India. Email: ashrafjqazi at yahoo. com


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[2] 

NEPAL: IDENTITY POLITICS AND FEDERALISM

Asia Report N°199 13 Jan 2011 [International Crisis Group]

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Federal restructuring of the state has emerged as a major demand of ethnic and regional activists in Nepal. The debate about it is extremely politicised. Federalism is not simply the decentralisation of political power; it has become a powerful symbol for a wider agenda of inclusion, which encompasses other institutional reforms to guarantee ethnic proportional representation and a redefinition of Nepali nationalism to recognise the country’s ethnic and cultural diversity.

Activists demand the introduction of reservations to guarantee proportional representation of marginalised groups in government and administration. They want provinces to be named after the most numerous ethnic and regional groups and boundaries drawn to make them dominant minorities. Some claim to be indigenous to these regions and demand preferential rights to natural resources and agradhikar – priority entitlement to political leadership positions in the future provinces.

Ethnic and regional demands were important parts of the Maoist agenda during the civil war; in eastern Nepal, much of their support depended on it. State restructuring became a central component of the 2006 peace deal. After violent protests in the Tarai in 2007, federalism was included in the interim constitution as a binding principle for the Constituent Assembly.

But of the three major parties, the Maoists are the only one to give full-throated support to federalism and the establishment of ethnic provinces. Identity politics may sit uneasily with their class-based ideological framework but federalism is of great importance for them. Now that the former Hindu kingdom is a secular republic, it is the most important point left on their short-term transformative agenda. Much grassroots support, the loyalty of ethnic and regionalist activists within the party and their wider credibility as a force for change depend on them following through.

Both the Nepali Congress (NC) and the Communist Party of Nepal (Unified Marxist-Leninist), UML, have accepted federal restructuring. They have actively participated in drafting a federal model in the Constituent Assembly. There is agreement on most institutional arrangements including the division of powers between provinces and centre. But this process has been driven by longstanding proponents of federalism within both parties, none of them very influential. It is unclear whether there is a wider consensus. Both parties have agreed to federalism in the spirit of bargaining; neither of them owns the agenda. Behind the official positions there is significant resistance to it.

Backtracking on federalism is politically impossible. Both the NC and UML are already struggling to retain cadres and leaders from minority backgrounds. But deferring crucial decisions, or stalling the constitutional process altogether, could be tempting for those opposed to change. The assumption that the Maoists have both the most to gain and the most to lose from the constitutional process could lend wider appeal to the idea.

The risks are hard to calculate. Ethnic and regionalist groups, already suspicious of the major parties’ commitment to federalism, threaten protests and ultimately violent resistance should it not come. Their eyes are on the 28 May 2011 deadline for the promulgation of the new constitution. Popular support is most widespread among Madhesis in the central and eastern Tarai and members of ethnic groups in the eastern hills. Many Madhesis are disillusioned with their leadership, but feel reforms are incomplete. The organisational landscape of ethnic activists in the eastern hills may be fragmented for now, but underneath lie strong personal and political networks. Activists are getting frustrated and the mood is becoming more militant. With an issue to rally around they are likely to coalesce; a politicised population would easily be mobilised for protest movements, should federalism not come.

Not all want federalism. Popular opposition to ethnic federalism in particular is substantial, by virtue of its association with identity politics. Many Brahmins and Chhetris, the dominant caste groups, fear they will lose out from the introduction of ethnic quotas and federal restructuring. But organised resistance is limited and fragmented. Open opposition only comes from a fringe of the political left which fears Nepal’s unity. Several Chhetri organisations are not against federalism itself but want to defend their group’s interests in the restructuring process. Pro-monarchy groups and the Hindu right are less concerned with federalism than with the republic and secularism. But given the common uneasiness with the redefinition of Nepali nationalism, a broader conservative alliance is a distinct possibility.

The structure emerging from the Constituent Assembly, federal but with a strong centre, offers a feasible compromise. If the NC overcomes its aversion to provinces named after ethnic and regional groups, the new constitution will offer important symbolic recognition of Nepal’s cultural diversity. In combination with the language rights and proportional representation in administration and government envisaged, this would go a long way towards meeting popular aspirations among ethnic and regional groups. The fact that the draft offers little scope for preferential rights beyond proportional representation as well as strong individual rights provisions should allay Brahmin and Chhetri fears of future discrimination. Not promulgating the constitution in time or deferring a decision on federalism, however, could spark serious unrest.

Kathmandu/Brussels, 13 January 2011 


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[3]  India / Kashmir:

Kashmir Times
16 January 2011

WHEN GENERALS SUBVERT DEMOCRATIC PROCESS

by Anuradha Bhasin Jamwal

If union home secretary, G.K. Pillai renewed some optimism with his remarks about probability of troops reduction in Jammu and Kashmir, the army burst the bubble with its emphatic 'no' to any such eventuality. The army's abject denial signifies two grave wrongs that are detrimental to interests of a constitutional democracy. First that it seeks to hold the presence of troops as some kind of a sacred ritual that cannot be questioned. Second, and more importantly, that the army deems it has the right to turn down decisions being taken at the political and civil administration level. Earlier this summer, the army had similarly opposed the move for revocation of Armed Forces Special Powers Act when the union home ministry was toying with the idea.

Misconceptions endorsed by a militaristic mindset need to be cleared. The armed forces of the country are no holy cow and cannot be treated above the board. There is nothing sacrosanct about the army or para-militaries occupying civilian spaces. Rather their presence is against the very basic essence of democracy since it tends to put restrictions on the civil liberties of the people living in highly militarized zones. If such a high presence of troops is legitimised on the basis of high levels of violence, militancy or any other law and order problem, the same logic can be used to reverse the trend. However, in the Kashmir case, the number of troops operating has remained much the same whether it was the case of dealing with thousands of armed insurgents or whether it is just a couple of hundreds, reduced to few pockets. Infact, more numbers have been added, not to forget the doubling up of the local police, a segment of which is involved in counter insurgency and extremely notorious for its repressive tactics and gross violation of human rights. The troops build-up has never been seriously reviewed in view of the declining graph of militancy related violence as if there is something sacred about the usurpation of space by the military or the extra-judicial powers it enjoys.

Few months ago, an army general even had the audacity to equate the AFSPA to a holy book. On Friday, when the union home secretary talked about scaling down troops, the army chief did not only turn down such a proposal, he also justified the continuance of AFSPA and the policy of opposing any judicial trial for army personnel tainted on account of human rights abuse. His logic was that the legal system in Jammu and Kashmir is not reliable enough. He quoted instance of Kashmir Bar president Mian Abdul Qayoom in prison for several months. While one person's incarceration does not become an indication of the entire legal system, which not only includes lawyers but also judges, the same question can easily be thrown back to the army chief. Why indeed is Mian Qayoom in prison? Apparently, there are no charges against him. He is simply detained under public safety act, an extra-constitutional tool in the hands of the powers that be for political vendetta or suit their whims. By that logic, there indeed is something wrong with the legal system of this state where anybody can be detained purely on basis of some suspicion, even none at all. The continuum of extra legal powers to the men in uniform only perpetuates a flawed legal system since it seeks to patronise some persons despite their endless crimes of murders, tortures and rapes.

Such practices do not behove of any democracy, where people ought to be put above the army or any other uniformed force. It is only in a military dictatorship that the army is above all and above the board. India happens to be a constitutional democracy. The AFSPA was incorporated into the constitution by an act of the parliament. Only the parliament can strike it down. How can a democratic country allow its army to dictate terms and make political statements on AFSPA revocation or troops withdrawal? The army at best can have a recommendatory role, not one beyond that. India is a democracy, guided by its constitution where much emphasis is laid on the rights of individuals and civil liberties. Indian official position is that Kashmir is an integral part of India. Why can't rights which rest of the nation enjoys be applicable to the people in this state? It would be a great paradox to call Jammu and Kashmir an integral part of the country if instead of pursuing democracy here, what is being accomplished is a coup, atleast in the psychological sense, by those with military might.

[SEE RELATED MATERIAL:

Plan to cut security forces in J&K
by Vinay Kumar (The Hindu - ‎January 14, 2011‎)
http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/article1092591.ece?homepage=true

Army not to cut down forces in J&K: Gen VK Singh
(Economic Times - ‎Jan 14, 2011‎)
http://tinyurl.com/4zhkrll   ]

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[4]  India Remains in a State of Denial on Hindutva Terrorism:

Outlook Magazine
January 24, 2011			
	
hindu terror: the bias

SWAMI AND FRIENDS?
Did we get the terror prism all wrong, did majoritarian bias blind us?

by Saba Naqvi

In our mind’s eye, the shadowy terrorist was almost always a Muslim. At times he had a flowing beard and angry eyes, the stereotype beamed at us by the popular media. At other times, he was clean-shaven, if only to deceive us. But after Swami Aseemanand’s confessional statement, the discourse on terror is changing. The big question is: have we been looking at the terror prism all wrong?

True, there is a genuine problem of radical Islam in our neighbourhood and we have a festering insurgency in Kashmir. But if we examine the role of Indian Muslims in terrorism, it is sporadic and with no clear pattern. There were the serial blasts in 2008 carried out by the so-called Indian Mujahideen but half the cases they were blamed for are now being attributed to individuals and groups influenced by extremist Hindutva ideology. In the south, the Al Umma is believed to have carried out the Coimbatore blasts (1998) but there’s been no big strike subsequently. Which is why security expert B. Raman says that “today the threat from Indian Muslim terror groups and from Hindus who have taken to terror would be equal in scale. These Hindu terror groups cannot be dismissed after the Aseemanand confession, whatever the motives of the leak.”

 
But as a nation, we are loath to break out of ancient prejudices and stereotypes. Given the historical backdrop of Partition and the recent developments in Af-Pak, it is just so much simpler to see the Muslim (Pakistani or Indian) as the perpetrator. The sadhu, sadhvi or swami just doesn’t come to the mind’s eye, though the picture may now be changing. Historian Mahesh Rangarajan says, “Let us never forget that independent India’s first terrorist act was when an assassin shot dead a defenceless 77-year-old man we know as Gandhi. It is this act that led to a ban on several Hindu organisations by the Iron man, Sardar Patel, who called them a terroristic, fascistic creed that spreads the communal poison.”

Examine the history of terrorism and assassinations in India. Gandhi was killed by a Hindu fanatic, Indira by her Sikh bodyguards, Rajiv Gandhi by an LTTE suicide bomber. In the Northeast too, Muslims are not at the root of terror groups. Indeed, the ULFA can be seen as a godchild of the Hindutva ideology. Yet we buy into the global image of Muslims as equal fanatics and equal terrorists. Moreover, stretch the argument further and we can argue that in South Asia as a whole it is majority fundamentalism that takes on frightening dimensions. Besides what is happening in Pakistan, in Bangladesh majority Sunni fundamentalism is gaining ground. Meanwhile, in Sri Lanka it is the Buddhist Sinhala majority that has undermined democracy, using brutal methods to contain all opposition.
 
It’s in this context that we must examine the psychology of Aseemanand and friends. Pratap Bhanu Mehta, president, Centre for Policy Research, explains that “any ideology that is premised on a deep degree of resentment towards another group will at some point have a violent expression”. At the same time, he says, we have to get out of the identity trap and radically reframe the question on terrorism. “These so-called Hindu terrorists also see themselves as victims like the Christian Right in the US. And we have to factor in the fact that investigative agencies and society at large is predisposed to a certain bias.”

Still, there are specificities. Unlike the Maoists, Islamists or regional terrorists, the Hindu fanatic is not striking at the state or citizens (who are seen as collateral damage). There is a more complicated motive: the idea behind the Malegaon, Ajmer and Hyderabad blasts was to trigger panic and fear in Muslim majority areas, blame the minority community and create a communal polarisation.

There are other worrying questions. The Hindu extremist is not against the system; he is often embedded in the system. The Sangh parivar link is undeniable and here one may point to the huge display of weapons during every ayudha puja by the RSS cadre and politicians like Narendra Modi alike. Since there are several photographs of Modi with Aseemanand, one should ask questions about the reach of these extremists. Historian Christophe Jaffrelot says, “These terrorists are part of the establishment as ex-army officers, doctors working at the helm of five-star hospitals, sadhus or sadhvis and ex-MPs. Interestingly, none of the Abhinav Bharat leaders were from the plebians of the lower castes...who are only used against the Muslims at the time of communal riots.”
 
He also points to the attitude of the state. “The police forces (at the state and at the national level) have attributed bomb blasts targeting mosques or dargahs to Islamist groups and nobody objected to this nonsense—except for a few news persons. Second, even after Hemant Karkare exposed the Abhinav Bharat in the Malegaon case, many of the guilty men have not been made accountable for what they said or did. Karkare’s FIR mentions many more armymen and Sangh parivar leaders who have not been arrested.” Jaffrelot says the transcripts of the conversations between Abhinav Bharat leaders, retrieved from Malegaon accused Dayanand Pandey’s laptop in 2008, even mentioned their responsibility in the Mecca Masjid blast. Yet, nobody paid attention, “as if in the rule of law prevailing in India, Muslims had to be guilty of violence, whereas Hindus could get away with it. This is the perfect recipe for communal disaster”.

Which is the motive of the terrorist. Over the next few weeks, communal temperatures may again rise as the POTA court in Gujarat is expected to sentence several Muslims for the Godhra train attack. The prosecution has been hankering for the death sentence. In the backdrop of the great Hindu-Muslim faultline, all confessions leaked to the media by a Congress-led dispensation or justice delivered in a state run by Narendra Modi will all be part of a narrative that is sought to be managed by intelligence operatives and politicians alike.

o o o

Outlook Magazine, 24 January 2011

terror: hindutva angle

BAD APPLES FROM THE FAMILY ORCHARD
The BJP’s denial of any link with Hindutva terror is as loud as its embarrassment is acute

by Prarthna Gahilote

Weeks after Swami Aseemanand confessed to his involvement in 2007 Samjhauta Express blast, the BJP is still in political denial. Party spokesperson Nirmala Sitharaman asks, “Where is the need to own up to anything? Aseemanand was in no way a member of the party. We are neither worried nor embarrassed. We don’t recognise any of the statements made by him.”

Sources confirm that the BJP is clear on its stand on Hindu extremism. The party denounces any form of terror. It doesn’t support terror activities and believes that those found guilty of such acts should be tried under the law of the land. Question Sitharaman about the party’s plan of action and she protests: “Why should we need a special agenda for that? We have far more important issues—like the upa’s corruption—to handle than worry about this. This leaked confession is a clear attempt of the Congress to divert attention from the corruption charges against the UPA government.”

BJP president Nitin Gadkari echoes the view. “The Congress has left no stone unturned to defame the Sangh,” he said. “This recent allegation is part of the same votebank politics that the Congress plays.” With key assembly elections coming up in Assam, Kerala, Tamil Nadu and West Bengal, Gadkari may have a point, given that Assam alone has a 35 per cent minority population. But there is little hiding the fact that the Aseemanand confessions have made a dent.

Which is why RSS chief Mohan Bhagwat also issued a statement. “Elements nurturing extremist views have been asked to leave the organisation. A majority of the people the government has accused had left voluntarily and a few were told that this extremism will not work in the RSS,” he said.

However, within the BJP, senior leaders seem uncomfortable about commenting on the issue. Which is perhaps why senior party leader Arun Jaitley, who was to be present at the release of Ratan Sharda’s book Secrets of RSS at the party headquarters in Delhi last week, decided to skip the event at the last moment.

Gadkari, who was at the book release, said rather sheepishly, “I had given time for this (event) some three months back. It is coincidental that the release of this book should be happening at such time when allegations are being made.” Gadkari also felt it was necessary to attack the charges being leveled at the RSS by investigators. “The allegation that RSS office-bearer Indresh Kumar (who has been questioned in connection with the Ajmer dargah blast) was an ISI agent is laughable,” he said. “Pushing its agenda of votebank politics, the Congress is busy hanging the nationalists in this country and protecting anti-nationals like Afzal Guru.”

The BJP’s legal cell believes that the case against Aseemanand will not stand in a court of law. The BJP and the Sangh, it is learnt, will provide covert legal aid to the swami as well as Indresh Kumar should the need arise.

o o o

Close-knit? Swami Aseemanand at a function in Gujarat with chief minister Narendra Modi and other state BJP leaders. The swami has worked extensively in the Dangs.

terror: hindutva angle
THE CONFESSOR IN SAFFRON
Swami Aseemanand startles, and raises many questions

by Smruti Koppikar

ON a low plateau in the hills of the Dangs district, Gujarat, stands the Shabarimata temple complex. In the temple itself, devotees file in and out, rituals take place at the appointed hours. In the adjoining part, simply called the ashram, life and time have been more or less at a standstill over the last two years, after furious activity in the preceding five-six years. Temple-goers who have heard of the ashram’s ‘swamiji’ do not fail to glance its way as they descend the temple steps. Some are in awe of what it now represents; the local tribals pretend they don’t see it.

This is where Swami Aseemanand lived and worked till he mysteriously disappeared about two years ago. This is the temple he built to Lord Ram’s tribal devotee, Shabari, after he made the Dangs his home in the late 1990s. On December 14, eyewitnesses say, a convoy of some 20 vehicles brought the swami back for a brief hour or so, accompanied by hundreds of policemen. That day, National Investigation Agency (NIA) officials had brought Aseemanand—arrested on November 19 from a hideout in Haridwar—for verification of the place where the “bomb-for-bomb” theory took shape.

In the Kangadiamal-Subir-Jarsod belt that the temple-ashram overlooks, hardly any local wants to talk about the swami. They are aware that his disappearance is significant, but claim not to know of recent developments, including his much-discussed confession statement of December 18, 2010. Made under Section 164 of the Code of Criminal Procedure before a magistrate, it is admissible as evidence. In the statement, the swami mentions the existence of many radical Hindutva outfits, their networking, their involvement in various unresolved or partly-resolved terror attacks carried out from 2006 to 2008 in Muslim-dominated areas, their links to members of the larger Sangh parivar. Besides Malegaon (2006 and 2008), Ajmer (2007), Hyderabad (2007), Aseemanand and comrades he has named in the confession also stand implicated for the blasts on the Samjhauta Express.

Locals say they know nothing about this side of the swami. They’d rather address other issues that affect them. They want to protest against the damming of rivers, and they detest that the area has become a tourist and pilgrimage spot. They want to fight for their land rights. Nevertheless, as Father Xavier, a Jesuit teacher, says, “Tribals here are fed up and confused; tensions between Christian and non-Christian tribals increased after the swami arrived. His ideology is spreading, and the government is helping him by handing over schools to his Vanvasi Kalyan Ashram. The blasts are not an issue here.”

Aseemanand has come a full circle. In November 2008, he had given the slip to the late Hemant Karkare, then chief of Maharashtra’s anti-terrorist squad, who was slain in the 26/11 Mumbai attacks. Karkare closed in on the swami by tracking the cellphone of his driver Sunil Dahod, which was used to communicate with Sadhvi Pragya Singh Thakur, an accused in the 2008 blast in Malegaon. The confession appears to validate Karkare’s leads on the involvement of Hindutva groups in the Malegaon and Samjhauta Express blasts.
 
The confession helps fit together several pieces in the 2006-2008 terror jigsaw. But seasoned cops say it would be an oversimplification to see this as irrefutable evidence of Hindutva terror. The confession is the first direct assertion made by an involved Hindutvawadi in the larger game of targeting Muslims. As Arvind Inamdar, a former director-general of police of Maharashtra, says, “This confession is serious, because it talks of over 100 people killed and also the involvement of army officers. But this isn’t definitely the only evidence in the cases.” And M.N. Singh, a former police commissioner of Mumbai, says, “The NIA still has to gather evidence and put up a credible case before the court”.

Aseemanand’s statement takes the terror ideology right to the RSS when he talks about Indresh Kumar, member of the national executive, having met him in Shabaridham in 2005 with “many top RSS functionaries.” He details how Indresh Kumar had deputed Sunil Joshi for this job (terror attacks) and would extend Joshi “whatever help was required”, especially by providing finance and men. Indresh Kumar has refuted this; his lawyer sent a notice to the NIA for “leaking” the confession.


Hot brick? Indresh Kumar with TV crew. (Photograph by Fotocorp, From Outlook, January 24, 2011)

Without taking away what the confession discloses, there are areas, former police officers say, where Aseemanand appears to have “revealed something but not conclusively enough”. Consider two examples:

    * In the Samjhauta Express case, the swami talks of the June 2006 meeting at textile trader and RSS sympathiser Bharat Riteshwar’s bungalow in Valsad with Riteshwar, the sadhvi and Sunil Joshi of the RSS, who had brought with him three “committed” people, Sandeep Dange, Ramji Kalsangra and Lokesh Sharma. It was at this meeting that the Malegaon 2006 and Samjhauta attacks were planned. Aseemanand talks of handing over Rs 25,000 to Joshi, and Joshi detailing three different and independent teams working on the Samjhauta blasts. Nailing him and the others in these cases will be difficult; Joshi was suspiciously murdered in December 2007.
    * In the 2008 Malegaon case, Aseemanand talks of picking up Dange and Kalsangra at Vyara in his car and dropping them off at the Rajpipla-Baroda junction, and he found them “not coherent.” He learned later that bombs had gone off in Malegaon a day earlier. This is still circumstantial. Presumably, the two were the bombers and were fleeing. As it happens, Dange and Kalsangra—believed to be the lynchpins of Joshi’s core group—are yet to be nabbed.

Then, there’s the complication of the Maharashtra ATS having filed a chargesheet accusing some Muslims for the Malegaon 2006 attacks. Even as the cry to release them and compensate them for incarceration gets stronger after Aseemanand’s confession, ats officers  say they stand by their chargesheet in the case, which is now with the CBI.

A part of the incontrovertible evidence about the involvement of Aseemanand and others in the Malegaon, Hyderabad, Ajmer and Samjhauta blasts apparently lies in his own papers. Those who knew him say he was in the habit of writing meticulous diaries. Within days of his arrest in November last year, locals claim, something was burnt in the ashram kitchen. The NIA found little material evidence in Shabaridham. Now, the focus is on Joshi’s dairies and notings. If found to be valid, they will add to the tapes and laptops seized from self-styled guru Dayanand Pandey, the sadhvi’s motorcycle used in the Malegaon 2008 blast, Lt Col Shrikant Purohit and Rakesh Dhawde’s money trails to bring together the multiple strands and paint a complete picture of Hindutva terror.


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[4] India - Federalism and Decentralisation - The debate on Telangana: 

(i)

The Telegraph
15 January 2011

BEYOND TELANGANA - The Indian republic is young enough to try out more states
by  Ramachandra Guha

The United States of America has less than half as many citizens as the republic of India, yet almost twice as many states. The map of that country has been drawn and redrawn very many times in the course of its history. On January 1, 1800, for example, the US had only 16 states; fifty years later, the number had jumped to 30. When the 19th century ended there were 45 states in the union. Oklahoma was added in 1907, while Arizona and New Mexico were incorporated in 1912. Hawaii and Alaska came on board as late as 1959.

To be sure, while some of these states were carved out of existing ones, most were added on as the American colonists expanded their reach and influence to the west and south of the continent. On the other hand, the republic of India is constituted out of territory left behind by the British. After the integration of the princely states was completed in 1948, no new land has been acquired by the Indian Union. Still, the American example is not entirely irrelevant, for it shows that large nations take shape over long periods of time. It may only be after a century or more after a nation’s founding that its political geography settles into a stable equilibrium, with its internal divisions and subdivisions finally and firmly established.

When India became independent in 1947, it inherited the provincial divisions of the raj, these a product of accident rather than of historical or social logic. At once, a clamour began to create states based on linguistic communities. The Telugu speakers of the Madras Presidency wanted an Andhra Pradesh. The Marathi speakers of the Bombay Presidency demanded a Maharashtra. The Punjabi, Malayalam and Kannada speakers likewise mounted campaigns for states incorporating their particular interests.

The Congress leadership, represented by Jawaharlal Nehru and Vallabhbhai Patel, was initially opposed to linguistic states. Having just witnessed the division of India on the basis of religion, it now feared a further balkanization on the basis of language. However, the demands grew so insistent that the government finally constituted a states reorganization commission. The commission had three members: a jurist, S. Fazal Ali (who also served as chairman), a historian, K.M. Panikkar, and a social worker, H.N. Kunzru.

The report of the SRC, made public in 1955, recommended that the four major linguistic communities of southern India get states of their own. A consolidated state of Marathi speakers was not granted, principally because the Parsi and Gujarati capitalists of Mumbai were fearful of its consequences. However, this led to a resurgence of the samyukta (united) Maharashtra demand, which acquired such widespread popular support that in 1960 two separate states of Gujarat and Maharashtra were constituted, with Bombay being awarded to the latter.

The SRC did not concede the demand of Punjabi speakers either, because it was led by the Sikhs, and the Congress leadership feared that it might be the precursor of an independent Sikh homeland. But when the Sikhs fought so valiantly for India in the 1965 war with Pakistan, the longstanding demand for a ‘Punjabi suba’ was finally conceded, with the areas dominated by non-Sikhs being separated to constitute the new states of Haryana and Himachal Pradesh.

Viewed retrospectively, the fears of Nehru and Patel appear to have been misplaced. With the partial exception of Punjab in a particular decade (the 1980s), the new states based on language have not been a threat to national unity. To the contrary, they have consolidated this unity. Whereas Pakistan split into two because the Punjabi and Urdu speakers of the west oppressed the Bengali speakers of the east, and Sri Lanka underwent a 30-year civil war because the Sinhala majority sought to make the minority Tamils second-class citizens, the republic of India has, by creating clearly demarcated territories and autonomous provincial governments, allowed its major linguistic communities the space and place to nourish and renew themselves.

In the context of the challenges of the 1950s and 1960s, the creation of linguistic states was an effective solution. But must it be a permanent one? Do not now the new challenges of inclusive development and good governance call for a further redrawing of the map of the republic? That is the question raised by the movement for a Telangana state, a Vidarbha state, a Gorkhaland state, a Bundelkhand state (and some others). Those who articulate these demands do so on the grounds that they represent populations whose livelihood needs and cultural aspirations are denied dignified expression in the excessively large states in which they now find themselves.

Before the general elections of 2004, the Congress, then out of power, forged an alliance with the Telangana Rashtra Samithi. It made one particular promise and one general promise; support for the creation of a Telangana state, and the formation of a new states reorganization commission. After it unexpectedly came to power, the Congress reneged on both promises: the first because it was opposed by the powerful Andhra chief minister, Y.S. Rajasekhara Reddy; the second because it was opposed by the communist parties, whose support was crucial to the new government’s survival, and who vetoed a new SRC because the Bengali comrades did not want to give encouragement to the movement for a state of Gorkhaland.

The constraints of realpolitik compelled the Congress to abandon promises made in 2004. Five years later, it came to power without requiring the support of the Left. Surely it was now time to constitute a new SRC with three or more credible members? That it failed to do so was the product of apathy, inertia, indolence, complacency, in a word, status quoism. The consequence was a resurgence of the Telangana movement. The Central government, buying time, set up a commission under B.N. Srikrishna. The report, recently tabled, basically favours the retention of a united Andhra, and is sure to lead to a fresh and costly wave of strikes, bandhs, fasts, and hartals.

The experience of the past few decades suggests that smaller states are, on the whole, conducive to good (or at least less dreadful) governance. After a unified state of Punjab split into three parts, Haryana, Himachal Pradesh, and the now truncated, Sikh dominated Punjab have all witnessed steady economic growth. The hill states of Uttarakhand and Meghalaya are better off for having left the low-lying large states of which they were previously part, namely Uttar Pradesh and Assam. I do not believe that, for all their difficulties, the residents of Chhattisgarh are nostalgic for the days when it was part of Madhya Pradesh. True, Jharkhand does not appear to have significantly benefited from separation from Bihar, but its major problems — Maoism, the mining mafia, political corruption and so on — predate its creation as a state of the Union.

The commission that I am calling for — and which both reason and emotion mandate —would consider each case for a new state — Telangana, Vidarbha, Gorkhaland, et al — on its merits. Regions that have a cultural, ecological or historical coherence, and are adversely affected by their current status as part of a larger unit, could be granted statehood; for the examples of successful smaller states alluded to above suggest that they may more meaningfully respond to the social and economic needs of the people.

As a political experiment the Indian republic is young, and still finding its equilibrium. A bold government, a government that both understands the nature of the Indian experiment and cares for the future of India, would now constitute a new states reorganization commission. That government is not, alas, this government, which is damaged by a spate of corruption scandals, and headed by a prime minister who is cautious at the best of times. The unrest and discontent will therefore continue in Telangana, and beyond.

o o o

(ii)

The Deccan Chronicle
January 14th, 2011

THE CYNICAL STATE OF TELANGANA
by Shiv Visvanathan

I am one of those dreamy political scientists who always makes wishlists and scenarios of “What if”. I am always waiting for new conversations of intersecting categories. I believe Hyderabad can be the centre for one major encounter. The Srikrishna Commission report on the possibility of Telangana has been released.

It is a 500-page report and needs detailed study. While the report is being pursued, a smaller, quieter event will take place in Hyderabad between January 10 and 14. It is the meeting of the International Association for the Study of the Commons. What one hopes is a conversation between the debate for small states and the dream of the new commons.

The debate on small states usually operates in terms of the language of decentralisation, of governance, of the rhetoric of small is beautiful. It usually follows three grids — the economic, the political and the cultural.

The plea for the small state usually stems from a negative sentiment. There is a sense of internal colonialism of economic discrimination. Telangana feels that the benefits of development are going to coastal Andhra Pradesh.

To the sense of economic hegemony and distorted development is added the logic of culture. Culture with the help of media creates imagined communities which organise around language, a past, a collective sense of history. The two together combine to provide the grammar for a particular kind of politics.

The logic of small states operates then through a particular kind of populism and electoralism. The idea of Telangana was seen as a political Camelot. What electoral politics also exposes is the horse-trading, the promissory notes, the negotiations and the betrayals. Political power becomes the only way of creating the envisioned community.

The majority, in the meanwhile, attempts to create or subvert the imagination. Sociologies confront each other, statistics acquires a political colour and every protest becomes a law and order problem.

Watching as an outsider one witnesses a frozen script on both sides. The categories of small confront the categories of larger unified states and what one witnesses are standard scripts on both sides reduced to a report card of grievances.

The question one asks is, is there a way to evade such frozen scripts because the battle of small states versus big states has become a sterile battle. It, no doubt, captures the populist imagination but barely questions the categories of development, progress and globalisation or add any new sense of welfare or justice. The battle is reduced to competition, between grievance and indifference or unity versus disintegration.

The idea of the commons provides a different imagination for such a debate. An idea of the commons goes beyond the common sense of federalism. A commons is a space beyond the formal rules of market and current politics. A commons is a space of refugee, a place where ordinary people can access nature as food, as timber or as medicine. A commons is a community of sharing and sustainability. A commons is a place where each man operates according to his needs. A commons conveys a community of reciprocity and responsibility which goes beyond the logic of individualism. Development and market deny the idea of commons by emphasising restrictive access to production and distribution.

I want to argue that the idea of commons provides a different measure of evaluation. A commons deals with livelihood issues by connecting economics to livelihood, to ways of life of a community. A commons creates an embedded ecology which relates communities to livelihood. The idea of the commons creates an ethics of scale rather than size. It tries to communicate a multiplicity of problem-solving techniques. Plurality rather than power is the new option.

The idea of Telangana and the idea of Andhra Pradesh are not different currently. Both failed to question the current idea of politics, economics and administration. To apply current models, to ignore the problem of farmer suicides does not really regionalise development. A region has to be more than geography as space; it has to be an alternative idea of democracy.

The Srikrishna report, for all its diligence, adds little to the democratic imagination. Sadly, the movement for Telangana while showing the flaws of electoral democracy has added little in terms of the creativity of locality or the power of diversity. I am not saying that we should not grant Telangana. All I am contending is that Telangana as an imagination should have a sense of the commons linked to the globe in a way that locality is not a parochial idea. It has to have a sense of scale not size. It has to embody new notions of problem solving. Ask yourself what new notions of ecology, agriculture, education and power sharing does either side add to the new democratic imagination. Each side by insisting on Hyderabad is showing a common commitment to the standard policies of economics and politics. I want to ask where are the new theories of the informal economy? Where are the new ideas of social audit? Can we name one theory for better livelihoods on one side?

The challenge of Telangana has to challenge more than the current idea of statehood. Merely creating a new power elite for Telangana is not enough. The question we have to ask is what is the social imagination of both movements? The answer now is none.

It is a mirroring of politics and economics where one hoped for a richer imagination of statehood.

The real challenge is can Andhra Pradesh and Telangana offer a new or alternative theories of agriculture, new ways of watershed management, alternative ways to combat forced migrations to the city. Is there a new theory of governance? What is the new theory of the city? Can we link formal and informal economies through a new idea of the commons? Can Hyderabad become a new commons for both the states? To think this way one has to go beyond the current ideas of Union Territories as sanitary corridors of administrative convenience.

I always honour moves to decentralisation but such efforts have to add to real empowerment. The Telangana movement is a student-led movement and as students are a part of the intelligence I hope they make such issues a part of their agenda. Only then will its politics not go the way of Jharkhand and add to a cynical view of life.

* Shiv Visvanathan is a social scientist

o o o

(iii)

The Statesman, 
11 January 2011

AUTONOMY & STATEHOOD
Telangana Report Renews the Debate
by Ajay K Mehra

THE five-member Srikrishna Commission’s six-point report on Telangana has not offered a clear solution to this 50-year-old imbroglio. In the commission’s reckoning, the first three available options ~ status quo, bifurcation with Hyderabad as UT, and bifurcation into Rayal-Telangana with Hyderabad and coastal Andhra ~ are unworkable. The three workable options are: bifurcation into Seemandhra and Telangana with enlarged Hyderabad as a UT; bifurcation into Telangana and Seemandhra as per existing boundaries with Hyderabad as capital of Telangana; and unified Andhra with constitutional/statutory measures for empowerment of the Telangana region. The committee deems the last option as the most workable. But the Telanganites are rooting for the last but one. Politics over the fate of Andhra Pradesh has intensified after the report.

One can well imagine the predicament of a government confronted with so many conflicting recommendations. The dilemma inherent in the six proposed options must be seen in the larger perspective of governance. This is what the States Reorganisation Commission did when it visualised the advantages of Vishalandhra in terms of large water and power resources, adequate mineral wealth and valuable raw materials, utilisation of the twin cities of Hyderabad and Secunderabad as the capital, and a unified control for the development of the Krishna and Godavari rivers. The economic affiliation of Telangana with the existing Andhra State would meet its food deficit with the surplus of Andhra State. The lack of coal in Andhra would be fulfilled with supplies from Singareni. Telangana will also be able to save considerable expenditure on general administration in case it is not established as a separate unit.

Obviously, the SRC rested its case for a united Telugu speaking state on economic viability and regional inter-dependence, not a weak case by any standard. Indeed, it goes against the principle of linguistic states discussed since the Motilal Nehru Committee report of 1929, but it ought to sharpen the debate on autonomy. The UPA government is trying to adopt the path of least resistance by insisting on an all-party meeting to discuss the report.
The Republic of India celebrated its diamond jubilee in 2010. Fifty-five years have passed since the Fazal Ali Commission submitted its report on the reorganisation of states, creating 14 states and seven Union Territories. Yet the principle behind the drawing of the country’s internal boundaries and the issue of autonomy within the sovereign republic remains opaque. The rules of engagement have been marked by ad hocism and partisanship.
Post-Partition, the country’s integrity was the major concern. The Constituent Assembly subordinated autonomy to sovereignty. While state autonomy was defined within India’s ‘strong-centre federalism’, local autonomy was lost in Ambedkar’s belief: “What is the village but a sink of localism, a den of ignorance, narrow mindedness, and communalism.” Since the Sixties, scheming state leaders have pursued their agendas.

Jawaharlal Nehru questioned the idea of linguistic states. A committee set up by his father, Motilal, noted: “In a linguistic state what will the smaller communities look forward to to? Can they hope to be elected to the legislature? Can they hope to maintain a place in the state civil service?”  He was opposed to the bifurcation of the Bombay state and the Punjab. His impassioned debate with CD Deshmukh in the Lok Sabha against bifurcation of the state of Bombay ranks as one of the finest parliamentary moment.

In the second layer of federalism, the number of states has been doubled since the reorganisation of states in 1956. The country has witnessed a mini-reorganisation in each of the following decades ~ the Sixties, Seventies, Eighties, Nineties and at the turn of the century. The second decade of the millennium has begun with the demand for a Telangana state. This may buttress similar demands for Gorkhaland, Vidarbha, Bundelkhand, a tri-furcation of Uttar Pradesh, and the creation of yet more states in the North-east. However, autonomy at the local level is a matter that is decided by the states despite the 73rd and 74th constitutional amendments.

The demand for Telangana covers ten districts  of the north-western region of Andhra Pradesh ~ Adilabad, Karimnagar, Warangal, Khammam, Nalgonda, Mahaboobnagar, Medak, Nizamabad, Hyderabad and Rangareddy. Altogether it covers 98,811 sq. km, constituting nearly one-third of the state. Even when the Andhra state was constituted in 1953, the demand for Vishalandhra and Telangana was raised. Nehru visualised a ‘tint of expansionist imperialism’ in merging Telangana with Andhra, but when the SRC recommended the merger despite a bias for a separate Telangana, he described it as a matrimonial alliance with ‘provisions for divorce’ if the partners in the alliance cannot get on well.

However, CH Hanumantha Rao in his book, Regional Disparities, Smaller States and Statehood for Telangana, published by Academic Foundation in 2010, has shown that from the mid-1950s to the late-1960s, the expenditure (38 per cent) on the region was less than receipts (40 per cent). Krishnamurthy Subramanian of Indian School of Business (Economic Times, 3 January 2011) has statistically demolished the claims of the Telangana protagonists.

The Srikrishna Commission has not found statistical support for claims regarding under-development of the Telangana region. Economic and human development in multi-region states has been caught in the web of avoidable partisan politics, strengthening the argument for smaller and more homogenous states.

Social scientists are yet to establish a clear co-relation between autonomy and development. The views differ. Mancur Olson argues that democracy provides the best socio-political environment for economic development. Douglas Lummis maintains that development undermines democratic ideals. Amartya Sen laments that the record of democracy in ensuring development in developing countries is mixed or even negative.  Bruce Bueno De Mesquita argues that the link between economic development and what is generally called liberal democracy is actually quite weak and may even become weaker.

The Indian experience reflects this dilemma. Why did state autonomy not ensure adequate power and resource-sharing among regions? Other instruments of autonomy ensured by the Fifth and Sixth Schedules of the Constitution, such as the panchayati raj under the Balwant Rai Mehta scheme and now under the 73rd and 74th constitutional amendments have not ensured  autonomy either.

In India, autonomy and development are  linked to good governance and optimum distribution of powers and resources. The linkage of  autonomy and development in the era of economic liberalisation is an imperative under which the issues of small governable states, effective sub-state democratic institutions and judicious distribution of power and resources should be addressed. Given the demands for ethno-regional autonomy and new states, it is necessary to set up a second SRC to attend to disputes and evolve a consensus towards a long-term solution.
The writer is Director, Centre for Public Affairs, Noida.

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[6]  India: Voices of Protest for the release of Dr Binayak Sen

ARTISTES PROTEST BINAYAK’S CONVICTION
http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/article1094769.ece

PHOTOS FROM ARTISTS FROM HUMAN RIGHTS PROTEST IN NEW DELHI
http://www.freebinayaksen.org/?p=594

For more information visit: 
 http://binayaksen.net 
 http://freebinakaysen.org

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