SACW | Dec 10-12, 2009 / Violence, Silence and Impunity: Graves, Schools, Media . . .

[Harsh Kapoor]

South Asia Citizens Wire | December 10-12, 2009 | Dispatch No. 2675 -  
Year 12 running
From: www.sacw.net

[ SACW Dispatches for 2009-2010 are dedicated to the memory of Dr.  
Sudarshan Punhani (1933-2009), husband of Professor Tamara Zakon and  
a comrade and friend of Daya Varma ]

____

[1]  Sri Lanka: power and accountability (Martin Shaw)
        + Sri Lanka’s war on journalists (Bob Dietz)
[2]  Bangladesh: 'Frozen in Time?' (Bina D'costa)
[3]  Pakistan:
      + A military coup in Pakistan? (Tarek Fatah)
      + Lahore lives at night (Murtaza Razvi)
      + The Darkest December (Ahmad Faruqui)
[4] India Administered Kashmir:
      + A grave South Asian tragedy (Jawed Naqvi)
      + Shopian cover-up - Investigating agencies stand exposed  
(Editorial, Kashmir Times)
[5] India: Attacks on Schools by Maoists and Occupation of  
Educational Facilities by Government Security Forces
      + A fight for rights that isn’t right (Meenakshi Ganguly)
      + Sabotaged Schooling - Naxalite Attacks and Police Occupation  
of Schools in India’s Bihar and Jharkhand States (HRW)
      + End Hostilities, Dialogue (Statement by Citizens Initiative  
For Peace)
[6] India: Resources For Secular Activists
        (i) Clear and commendable (Editorial, The Hindu)
        (ii) Sinners In Disguise (Jyotirmaya Sharma)
[9] Miscellanea:
- Damaged Life as Exuberant Vitality in America: Adorno, Alienation,  
and the Psychic Economy (Shannon Mariotti)
- The Lost Radical: Edward Carpenter’s democracy of the soul (Vivian  
Gornick)
- Remembering across the border: Postsocialist nostalgia among  
Turkish immigrants from Bulgaria (Ayse Parla)
- Mapping Human Genetic Diversity in Asia
[10]  Announcements:
(i) Talk by Praful Bidwai 'Looming Ecological Crisis, Copenhagen  
Climate Conference and India' (Bombay, 15 December 2009)
(ii) 8th Hamza Alavi Distnguished Lecture (Karachi, 16 December 2009)

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[1] SRI LANKA: POWER AND ACCOUNTABILITY

by Martin Shaw, 9 December 2009

The degrading aftermath of Sri Lanka’s civil war demands  
international action to ensure protection of its civilians from their  
overweening rulers, says Martin Shaw.
http://www.opendemocracy.net/martin-shaw/sri-lanka-power-and- 
accountability

o o o

Committee To Protect Journalists, New York

Sri Lanka’s war on journalists
by Bob Dietz/Asia Program Coordinator

Today marks the 100th day of J.S. Tissainayagam’s 20-year prison  
term. Tissainayagam, known as Tissa, was convicted of “terrorism”  
charges for articles documenting human rights abuses by the Sri  
Lankan military, as well as the difficult conditions faced by Sri  
Lankans displaced in the nation’s long war. His sentence was a dire  
warning to other journalists who would dare be critical of the  
government. They are right to be concerned.

In the years since Mahinda Rajapaksa has held high office in Sri  
Lanka—as prime minister in 2004 and then as president since 2005— 
nine journalists have been murdered with impunity. According to CPJ  
data, Sri Lanka has the fourth worst impunity record in the world,  
behind only Iraq, Sierra Leone, and Somalia. And over the years CPJ  
and other journalist support groups have been handling a steady flow  
of requests for assistance while threatened reporters seek either  
temporary refuge or permanent exile.

Hopes that the government’s anti-media behavior would change once it  
had successfully ended the bitter war with the separatist Liberation  
Tigers of Tamil Eelam have yet to be fulfilled. Assaults on  
journalists who dare to take on the government, not just on the war  
with the Tamils and its aftermath, but on domestic political and  
economic issues, have hardly eased as abductions, phone and text  
threats, and denouncements on official government Web sites continue  
seven months after the war officially came to an end.

Not many international journalists are singled out by a U.S.  
president. But this year, on World Press Freedom Day in May,  
President Barack Obama cited the prosecution of J.S. Tissainayagam  
as “emblamatic” of press freedom abuses worldwide.
The European Union has continued to bring targeted pressure on the  
Sri Lankan government: If the government wants to retain preferential  
trade tariffs, the EU said, it will have to ensure media freedom and  
release the 300,000 people, almost all of them Tamils, it is holding  
in camps. The issue is still in the air, but the government has  
started to shift some of the hundreds of thousands of Tamil war  
refugees to slightly better conditions. On Wednesday, Robert Blake,  
U.S. assistant secretary of state for South Asia—and the previous  
ambassador to Colombo—told reporters that he saw evidence of  
progress when he visited the site where about 100,000 displaced  
civilians still live.

International advocacy pressing for Tissainayagam’s release is an  
important issue, an “emblematic” one as Obama put it. It  
highlights the broader need for unfettered journalism in one of  
Asia’s oldest democracies. Sri Lanka’s war against Tamil  
separatists has ended, but it is too soon for United States and the  
international community to assume that the government’s war against  
the media has ended. Victory will only come when Tissa is released  
and journalists in Sri Lanka know that they are free to write and the  
country resumes its march toward democracy and out of the tortured  
ranks of countries like Iraq, Sierra Leone, or Somalia.

December 10, 2009

_____


[2] Bangladesh:

Forum, December 2009

'FROZEN IN TIME?'

Bina D'costa delves into the feasibility of holding war crimes trials  
in Bangladesh

"Justice must not only be done, but must be seen to be done".

The Pakistani newspaper Dawn reported, on May 14, 2009 that the  
Foreign Ministry (of Pakistan) "rejected Bangladesh's demand for an  
apology over the alleged (emphasis added) 1971 atrocities." The  
official response was that Bangladesh should not be "frozen in time"  
but rather move ahead. Pakistan advised that Bangladesh should "let  
bygones be bygones" and hoped that the relations between the two  
countries would not become hostage to the past. Pakistani mainstream  
scholars in their analyses usually describe the traumatic narrative  
of 1971 as a "debacle" and the media as an "incident" or a  
"disaster." However, genocide scholars across the world widely accept  
that in its intent to destroy an ethnic group, in the systematic and  
strategic use of rape and through the selected and targeted killings  
of a religious minority (Hindus) and intellectuals, the 1971 war is  
indeed a case of genocide.

The most recent tension arose from the Bangladesh Parliament's  
adoption of a resolution in early 2009 to try the war criminals under  
the International Crimes (Tribunals) Act 1973 (adopted on December  
3). While the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights has  
not offered any formal support, the UNDP local office (United Nations  
Development Program) has announced that it would assist Bangladesh in  
designing and setting up a war crimes tribunal. Renata Lok  
Dessallien, the head of UNDP in Bangladesh stated, "we have suggested  
the names of some top international experts who have experience in  
how war crimes tribunals operate across the globe."

The genesis of Bangladesh as a sovereign entity in December 1971 is  
celebrated as a victory of a secular identity that went beyond any  
religion. In this write-up, I will focus specifically on the most  
recent justice-seeking movement in Bangladesh that brought the issue  
of redressing war crimes to the forefront of the political and  
security agenda.

History
Bangladesh's experience with colonial rule began in 1757. As an  
outcome of political decisions when the British finally decided to  
depart from the Indian subcontinent, the eastern part of Bengal  
became East Pakistan in 1947. The traumatic upheaval of India's  
Partition forced the migration of ordinary Hindus, Muslims and Sikhs  
due to the fact that the two-nation theory (Pakistan for Muslims and  
India for Hindus) resulted in the splitting up of centuries of  
bonding and kinship. However, religion alone wasn't sufficient to tie  
the East and West Pakistan as a nation, since their relationship  
replicated a colony's asymmetrical association with the coloniser.  
The language movement of 1952 that defended Bengali as the national/ 
official language of East Pakistan (as opposed to Urdu which was  
imposed by the West Pakistani rulers) culminated in a national  
movement for an autonomous identity in the late sixties. Further, the  
prejudices of the West Pakistani regime that were reflected in the  
economic and political disparities between the two parts of Pakistan  
provided an impetus for a full blown national movement in late  
sixties. The military regime of Yahya had no sympathy for the  
"peoples' power." It attempted to brutally crush the dissent on March  
24, 1971 (codenamed "Operation Searchlight") thus sparking off the  
Bangladesh Liberation War that became a full-blown India-Pakistan war  
in December .


Munir Uz Zaman/Driknews

Violence during the conflict
There were 80,000 Pakistani soldiers deployed under the Eastern  
Command. These forces were augmented by an additional para-militia  
force of 25,000, a civil armed force of 25,000 and another auxiliary  
para-military force of ethnic Bengalis (Razakars, al-Badr and al- 
Shams) of 50,000 . For most of the conflict, these forces fought  
guerrilla style warfare against the East Pakistanis whose strength is  
estimated to be 175,000, including a large number of personnel who  
deserted the East Pakistan Rifles, East Bengal Regiment and the  
Bengali Police force. The East Pakistani pro-liberation forces were  
jointly called the Muktibahini (Freedom Force), which formed the  
Bangladesh Forces Command and was led by Gen. M. A. G. Osmani. This  
was divided into 11 sectors, and Bengali officers who had defected  
from the Pakistani armed force served as the commanders of each  
sector. Finally, in December there was an additional 250,000 Indian  
Allied Forces (Mitrobahini) that led the offensive against Pakistan.  
The Eastern Command of Pakistan under Lieutenant General A.A.K. Niazi  
surrendered to the India-Bangladesh joint command led by Lt. Gen.  
Jagjit Singh Aurora (the Commander of the Indian Allied Forces) on 16  
December, 1971.

The Pakistani forces were perceived by the overwhelming majority of  
Bangladeshis who supported liberation as "occupation forces," and  
India's intervention to end the conflict was welcomed. Pakistan also  
attracted global condemnation because of its brutal army crackdown in  
1971 that resulted in mass atrocities and genocide. Estimates vary  
but the widely accepted figure in Bangladesh is that between 1 to 3  
million people perished during the nine months of conflict, and a  
further 8 to 10 million were forced to leave their homeland. Also,  
200,000 women were reportedly victims of rape and sexual violence,  
with 25,000 rapes resulting in forced impregnation. A white paper  
issued by the Pakistani government also noted that at least 30,000  
Biharis and West Pakistanis were killed as a result of the national  
movement and the conflict. While none of these are independent  
sources, the established fact is horrific violence accompanied the  
1971 war.

War crimes movement--why now?
India and Pakistan signed the Simla Pact in 1972 and India, following  
a series of meetings with both Pakistan and Bangladesh, agreed to  
return the 93,000 PoWs to Pakistan. In the aftermath of the conflict,  
the new state of Bangladesh was pre-occupied in gaining both global  
recognition and foreign aid especially from the Middle East, US and  
China, which paved the way for recognition from Pakistan. In exchange  
for recognition from Pakistan and more importantly perhaps for return  
of assets Bangladesh's new leaders agreed not to prosecute the PoWs,  
except for 195 prisoners who were accused of war crimes, crimes  
against humanity and genocide.

Bangladesh's chaotic history following 1971, rife with political  
assassinations, authoritarian military regimes, structural violence  
and problems of governance (especially corruption, nepotism, police  
and political violence, and religious extremism) pushed the justice  
agenda under the rug. Following some hope of democratisation in 1990,  
the demand for the trial of war criminals has increased.

Justice advocacy groups such as the Nirmul Committee and Muktijuddo  
Jadughor were critical as both have played major roles, the former in  
setting up the Peoples' Tribunal in 1992 and the latter in sustaining  
public interest in the issue. The Peoples' Tribunal, which had no  
real authority in law, staged some mock public trials. While it was  
not overtly successful, especially in terms of gender justice, it  
managed to construct a strong symbolic meaning to the justice agenda.  
This justice-seeking movement (the continuing activism and advocacy)  
framed by various civil society groups also generated sustained (if  
not always thriving) demand for the prosecution of the war criminals.  
This movement draws upon the networking and knowledge from both human  
rights and women's movements.

Three important factors contributed to the intensification of the  
current justice-seeking movement. Firstly, following the declaration  
of the state of emergency by the president and the military  
"takeover" behind the scenes in 2007, civil society groups have  
intensified their demands for the trial of war criminals. They had a  
lot of space to operate in a period when partisan political  
activities were formally prohibited, and also gained a lot of airtime  
from a sympathetic media. It was perceived that the interim military- 
backed government would be more sympathetic to the justice-seeking  
movement, especially, as the then Army Chief himself called for war  
crimes trials. This strategic framing gained momentum when the Sector  
Commanders Forum (SCF, a platform of the war veterans of 1971, led by  
the Commanders, all military personnel) publicly pressed the interim  
regime for prosecution of the war criminals.

Secondly, the normative values attached to the voter awareness  
campaigns by various agencies and civil society in 2008 heavily  
focused on democratisation and justice mechanisms and approach,  
contributing to the Awami League's pledge to address the war crimes  
issue if they returned to power. Some noteworthy steps were the voter  
education program funded by the UNDP; media activism highlighting the  
justice movement; advocacy by international human rights watchdogs  
such as the Amnesty International; and a strong interest in a just  
and fair election shown by Bangladeshis generated both outside and  
inside the country.

Finally, important factions of the armed forces led by the then Chief  
of Staff General Moeen U. Ahmed supported the move to advance with  
the war crimes trial. It was reported in the media that he approached  
US and Pakistan to provide crucial documents to support the trial.

Recent war crimes demands in Bangladesh have been somewhat blinkered  
and inward-looking. The interest groups are primarily interested in  
prosecuting the most infamous collaborators of the Pakistani army,  
who are Bangladeshi nationals or Bangalis. In addition, there is the  
age-old tension between religious and secular nationalist politics of  
the 1971 war, which has not been sufficiently addressed. While the  
justice-seeking movement attracts a more moderate religious populace,  
if not always secular, in many instances it also directly confronts  
the Islamic factions of domestic political space. For example,  
Jama'at-e-Islami, a key party in the BNP-led (Bangladesh Nationalist  
Party) four-party alliance that was in office till 2006, has been  
publicly nervous about the recent movement as some of its central  
members would be likely to face war crimes charges.

Pakistan-Bangladesh relationship
Pakistan is watching this recent move in Bangladesh cautiously.  
Bangladesh has raised the question of individual and collective  
accountability of the Pakistani state in both formal and informal  
meetings. It has stated that it is imperative for Pakistan to  
apologise for the genocide/mass atrocities in 1971, share assets and  
also repatriate the Biharis ("stranded Pakistanis") who remain in  
various camps in Bangladesh. Abdul Basit, the spokesperson of the  
Foreign Affairs Ministry stated at a weekly media briefing that "as  
far as Pakistan is concerned, this matter stands resolved under the  
April 9, 1974, tripartite agreement." Under the 1974 agreement,  
Pakistan had stated "regrets", but did not offer any formal apology.  
The former president Pervez Musharraf had also expressed "regrets"  
over the 1971 "excesses" during his visit to Bangladesh in 2002. Some  
civil society groups in Pakistan, especially the human rights and  
women's rights activists on various occasions have offered public  
apologies.


AMDADUL HUQ/DRIKNEWS

The Pakistani state refuses to offer a formal apology, even as a  
symbolic gesture. For Pakistan this is a distraction creeping up from  
its past, during the present period when it is facing insurmountable  
internal problems and is on the verge of a state "failure." It could  
however be argued that the Pakistani political and military elite's  
continued denials of grave injustices committed against its own  
citizens in the "recent past" entrenched deep injustice as a legacy  
that is now intrinsic in its political culture of inequality and  
inequity. This is reflected in Balochistan and Sind; in widespread  
militarisation of the society; and in gradual extremism that  
generated a devastating impact on the everyday lives of ordinary  
people of Pakistan.

While the trauma of 1971 evokes profound emotions, Bangladesh must  
also strategically respond to these internal turmoils, especially of  
the traumatic experiences of ordinary citizens and displaced  
population in Pakistan. Pakistan's official position must be  
considered separately from public opinion. Establishing a civil  
society network that reaches across the bitter historical divide and  
promoting strategic dialogues about how to meaningfully deal with the  
past, would be a good step forward.

The future
There are of course some serious challenges ahead. Some of these are  
briefly noted here, along with opportunities for future  
reconciliation. Firstly, the Bangladesh government and the civil  
society must respond to the domestic opposition arguing that the  
justice-seeking movement and official actions are counter-productive,  
especially claims that these are political stunts to shift attention  
from important issues such as the economic slump, price hike and  
other issues. Secondly, the time gap between when the war crimes took  
place and the proposed establishment of a civil and temporary  
tribunal may have given the defendants time to destroy crucial  
evidence. Thirdly, relating to the second point, some of the most  
daunting challenges are logistical. If the war crimes trial is to  
succeed, an Enquiry Commission must be formed first. This commission  
must investigate, gather evidence, and identify and recommend the  
arrest of some of the most senior and infamous war criminals first.  
The proposed commission must consider the possibilities of a truth  
and reconciliation commission (TRC) that could allow not only  
Bangladeshi citizens (within and outside Bangladesh), but also both  
Indian and Pakistani citizens (and others) who have direct  
experiences of the 1971 war to provide testimonies and crucial  
evidence. The experiences of other states dealing with war crimes  
have demonstrated that without a simultaneous reconciliation  
mechanism, a war crimes trial in Bangladesh in itself would not be  
effective.

Finally, relating to the third point, the finances of the proposed  
trial must be sorted out. The media has reported that following the  
demand of the Law Ministry, the Bangladesh Cabinet has approved 10  
crore taka (approximately US $1.5 million) for this trial. This  
budget is not going to satisfactorily compensate the costs relating  
even to the domestic judicial process. It is also not clear if this  
budget includes funding for detention facilities/logistics,  
investigations, translations, or defence counsel. The proposed  
Bangladeshi war crimes trial is still a domestic process. The  
government has made it clear that the tribunal would be set up under  
the 1973

MUNIR UZ ZAMAN/DRIKNEWS

Act.

There will probably never be ad hoc tribunals such as the ICTY  
(International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia) and ICTR  
(International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda), which proved to be  
hugely expensive with each having annual budgets of more than US$100  
million. The ICC (International Criminal Court) will take over such  
processes, and similar to the ICTY and ICTR will try individuals, but  
not states.

In recent years, shared international-domestic legal mechanism such  
as a hybrid tribunal has gained some attractiveness. Various models  
have been tried in East Timor, Cambodia and Sierra Leone. The budget  
for East Timor's hybrid process was US $6.3 million, with $6 million  
allotted to the prosecution unit and the remainder almost entirely to  
salaries for international judge. The cost of the Cambodian tribunal  
(the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia, ECCC) was  
originally US$53 million for three years, and it has blown up to $170  
million for five years. The Special Court for Sierra Leone's (SCSL)  
original budget was estimated at US $22 million for its first year of  
operation, compared to the ICTY and ICTR whose annual budgets each  
exceed $90 million. Now, the SCSL's bill for 2008-10 is $68.4m, and  
it has recently turned to the US and countries in the Middle East for  
the $30m not yet secured.

The War Crimes Chamber of the Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina is  
technically a domestic institution, although it has significant  
international donor support. Similar tribunals have also been  
established in Croatia and Serbia. Currently, there are 47 judges who  
are serving on the Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Fifteen of them  
are international judges who are directly funded by the international  
donors who contributed to approximately EUR 20 million in 2006. The  
Bosnian Parliament allocated EUR 2.6 million for the salaries of  
domestic judges, administration cost, courthouse and all other  
related domestic costs. The Iraqi High Tribunal (IHT) is also a  
domestic process and received a significant amount of aid from the US  
which budgeted $75 million in 2004, $128 million in 2005, and $61  
million in 2006. This supported IHT facilities, investigations and  
proceedings. The United States Institute of Peace provided support  
for 10 Iraqi judges to visit the Hague to meet other war crimes  
tribunal veterans.

Considering the financial costs involved, it appears to be a wise  
decision by the Bangladeshi government to proceed with a domestic  
process. Also, the domestic process is crucial for legitimacy and  
wider participation from various communities that have been affected  
by the violence of 1971. However, the domestic justice mechanism of  
Bangladesh is relatively weak and corruption is a serious concern.  
The Iraqi High Tribunal demonstrated that deficiencies in the  
domestic justice process could create a major disadvantage. Legal  
decisions are also inherently political acts that have long-lasting  
political implications. How will the responsibilities of Pakistani  
citizens be resolved? For Bangladesh, networking with various  
international and regional counterparts to share knowledge and  
develop skills for the justice mechanisms would be a useful strategy.

Rushing into a war crimes trial would not be advisable before the  
reports and recommendations of the proposed enquiry commission  
mentioned earlier and a detailed consideration of the finances. The  
current political environment in favour of a trial may not reoccur  
and if the trial does not succeed there will be significant justice  
fatigue. Also further delays mean that yet more of the evidence is  
destroyed and perpetrators disappear from the scene as more die.  
These practical considerations would obstruct any possible future  
processes. It is important to ensure that the ordinary people who  
experienced violence during the war have meaningful access and are  
encouraged to participate in the proposed commissions and the trial.  
Outreach and communication are crucial here. The Sierra Leone process  
has demonstrated that radio, video and public discussion influence  
public opinion about war crimes trials. If these justice processes  
are considered to be elite or middle-class based initiatives, then  
the expected impact of the trial would be seriously undermined, its  
legitimacy challenged and people would feel cut off from the entire  
initiative. The success of the proposed trial of war criminals will  
be measured by its ability to create a legacy for future generations  
not only in Bangladesh but for the global justice agenda.

1 Press Release on Charles Taylor case, The Sierra Leone Court  
Monitoring Programme, Freetown, July 3, 2007.www. slcmp.org/dr  
website/.../ Access_ Denied_to_CT_ Trial_ Final.pdf.
2 Baqir Sajjad Syed, Dawn, May 15, 2009.
3 Dawn, May 14, 2009.
4 For example, see works of Leo Kuper 1981; Samuel Totten, 1997,  
2004; Rudolph Rummel, 1998; Ben Kiernan, 2007; and/or the Journal of  
Genocide Reseah
5 http: //www.amnesty. org/en/ news-and-updates/good-news/un-provides- 
welcome-support-bangladesh-war-crimes-investigations-20090407
6 The Daily Star, April 8, 2009
7 For a detailed account see Willem Van Schendel, A History of  
Bangladesh, Cambridge University Press, 2009
8 The Indira Gandhi regime of India was the most important ally of  
Bangladesh during the conflict. The regime perceived the Bangladeshi  
national movement as a political opportunity in the context of the  
India-Pakistan rivalry. India also provided arms and ammunitions,  
training and logistical support to the Muktibahini. Indian public  
opinion provided strong moral support for the military action of  
India. The West Bengal and Northeast Indian regions were initially  
sympathetic to the refugee in-flow in the country.
9 Jagjit Singh Aurora, 'The Fall of Dacca', The Illustrated Weekly of  
India, 23 December, 1973
10 Hasan-Askari Rizvi, 1987, The Military and Politics in Pakistan,  
1947-86, Lahore: Progressive Publishers.
11 On 3rd December at 1747, the Pakistani Air Force (PAF) attempted  
to disable the Indian Air Force (IAF) with a pre-emptive strike.  
Airfields at Amritsar, Srinagar, Avantipur, Pathankot and Faridkot  
were attacked. For details see http://www.globalsecurity. org/ 
military/library/report/1984/KRG.htm
12 A recent study suggests that 269,000 people died during the war  
leading to the liberation of Bangladesh in 1971. Obermeyer, Ziad,  
Christopher J L Murray, and Emmanuela Gakidou, 'Fifty years of  
violent war deaths from Vietnam to Bosnia: analysis of data from the  
world health survey programme', British Medical Journal, June, 2008,  
issue 336, pp 1482-1486.
13 Kashmir dispute was the other important issue that India and  
Pakistan sought to resolve through the Simla Pact.
14 For details refer to the Tripartite Agreement of Bangladesh,  
Pakistan and India, 9 April, 1974.
15 Also, a High-Level Panel was established by UN Secretary-General  
Ban Ki-Moon for the December 2008 Bangladesh parliamentary election,  
consisting of senior UN officials and election experts.
16 Some blogs have highlighted this, for example, see Drishtipat  
Collective Writers' Blog 'Unheard Voices', Uttorshuri, and South Asia  
Citizens' Web (SACW).
17 General Ahmed mentioned in a recent interview that 'when  
Bangladesh Army's Organogram was made in 1972, (the) total strength  
was about 57,000 with the Chief of Army Staff of the rank of  
Lieutenant General. Now the strength of the Army is approximately  
145,000…' http://deshivoice.blogspot.com/2007/08/general-moeen-u- 
ahmeds-interview.html
18 Dawn, 14 May, 2009.
19 Suzanne Katzenstein, 'Hybrid Tribunals: Searching for Justice in  
East Timor', Harvard Human Rights Journal , Vol. 16, Spring 2003
20 http://bellum. stanford- review.org/?p=537
21 Michael P. Scharf , The Special Court for Sierra Leone, October  
2000, http://www.asil.org/ insigh53.cfm. The UN tribunals for the  
former Yugoslavia and Rwanda have together cost at least US$1.3  
billion over the past decade and more than $1 billion more is likely  
to be spent before proceedings are concluded. For details see, Peter  
Kammerer, South China Morning Post. Hong Kong: Sep 26, 2004
22 The Iraqi Special Tribunal, which was set up to try Saddam Hussein  
and his accomplices, received $128 million from the US. 'The Price of  
Healing', August 4, 2006. ICTJ news report.
23 The Guardian Weekly, 'Civil war crimes tribunal under threat as  
donations dry up', London (UK), Feb 25, 2009. pg. 24.
24 Beth Dougherty, 'Transitional Justice on Trial: Evaluating the  
Iraq High Tribunal', Paper presented at the annual meeting of the  
International Studies Association 48th Annual Convention, Hilton  
Chicago, CHICAGO, IL, USA, Feb 28, 2007

Bina D'Costa is a research fellow at the Center for International  
Governance and Justice and the Convener of the Security Analysis  
program at the Australian National University. She is also the author  
of Nationbuilding, Gender and War Crimes in South Asia. Her research  
interests are in justice advocacy and peacebuilding in Asia; human  
security and refugees; and children in international politics.


_____


[3] Pakistan:

The Globe and Mail, December 08, 2009

A MILITARY COUP IN PAKISTAN?

Restive generals represent the backers of the Taliban and al-Qaeda –  
bad news for the war next door

by Tarek Fatah

A military coup is unfolding in Pakistan, but, this time, there is no  
rumbling of tanks on the streets of Islamabad. Instead, it seems the  
military is using a new strategy for regime change in Pakistan, one  
that will have adverse consequences for Western troops deployed in  
Afghanistan.

A year after rogue elements of Pakistan's intelligence services  
disrupted Indian-Pakistani peace talks by staging the Mumbai  
massacre, the democratically elected government of President Asif  
Zardari is facing a putsch from within its ranks, engineered by the  
men who run Pakistan's infamous military-industrial complex.

The men who wish to replace Mr. Zardari represent the religious right- 
wing backers of the Taliban and al-Qaeda, adding a new obstacle in  
Barack Obama's war effort in Afghanistan. A change of guard in  
Pakistan will also place Canadian troops at a higher risk of attack  
from a Taliban that will get unimpeded access to safe havens across  
the international border.

In the West's war against terrorism, Mr. Zardari is probably the only  
politician in Pakistan who has the guts to identify the cancer of  
jihadi extremism and order the Pakistani army to root it out. With  
reluctance, the army has complied, but only half-heartedly. With him  
gone, it's almost a certainty that Canada and the United States, as  
well as Afghanistan and India, will once more face the deception and  
fraud that became the hallmark of Pervez Musharraf's military regime.

For years, the Pakistani army received billions of dollars in direct  
American aid while it backed the Taliban and staged faked armed  
encounters to deceive the Pentagon.

The army views the government's efforts at peace with both  
Afghanistan and India not only with suspicion but also with alarm.  
Peace with India would undermine the very raison d'être of Pakistan's  
massive military.

The army's patience with Mr. Zardari ran out in October, when the  
U.S. Congress passed the Kerry-Lugar bill that promised billions in  
aid to Pakistan, but with a crucial caveat: The money would go  
through the channels of the civilian administration and if the  
military interfered with the democratic process or bullied the  
politicians and the judiciary, the Americans would halt all aid to  
the military.

The generals were in an uproar. Having lived their entire lives with  
a sense of entitlement that rivalled medieval caliphs and emperors,  
the men in uniform started a campaign to dislodge Mr. Zardari and his  
ambassador in Washington, Husain Haqqani – the authors, they said,  
of their misfortune.

Addicted to the billions in U.S. aid that have made them among the  
wealthiest in their impoverished country, Pakistan's generals are in  
a Catch-22. If they overthrow the government, they risk losing the  
manna from America. If they do nothing, they lose their veto over  
government policymaking, domestic as well as foreign.

Stung by this loss of power, the generals have asked the pro-Taliban  
media to whip up an anti-U.S. and anti-India frenzy in the country,  
claiming that Mr. Zardari has sold out to the Americans and the Indians.

Mr. Zardari also is being depicted as the epitome of corruption and  
thus unworthy of governing Pakistan. Working from within the  
government, military intelligence was able to coax a junior minister  
to release a list of thousands of supposedly corrupt politicians and  
public officials in the country. Leading them was Mr. Zardari  
himself – notwithstanding the fact that before he was elected  
president, he had been imprisoned for more than a decade by the  
military without a single conviction.

What irks the generals is not just that they are now answerable to a  
civilian but that Mr. Zardari belongs to an ethnic group that is  
shunned by the country's ruling Punjabi elite. Mr. Zardari is a Sindhi.

The hysteria among Pakistan's upper-class elites demanding a military  
dictatorship is best reflected in an article written by a retired  
military officer in the right-wing newspaper The News: “Military  
rule should … return. … The problem with democratic governments is  
that they remain under pressure to go with what the majority of the  
citizens want, not what is best for them. … People of several South  
American countries that have returned to civilian rule after a long  
time are now beginning to feel they were better off under  
dictatorships.”

If Mr. Obama wishes to succeed in bringing the Afghan war to an end,  
he had better make sure Mr. Zardari's elected civilian administration  
is allowed to govern until the end of its term. A coup in Islamabad  
will mean failure in Kabul.

Tarek Fatah is a former activist in Pakistan and founder of the  
Muslim Canadian Congress. He is author of Chasing a Mirage: The  
Tragic Illusion of an Islamic State.

o o o

Indian Express, 9 December 2009

LAHORE LIVES AT NIGHT

by Murtaza Razvi

Lahore, Bapsi Sidhwa’s “City of Sin and Splendour” carried on  
undeterred in its ways; then, on Monday evening, the twin bombings at  
a throbbing shopping centre in a middle-class neighbourhood took  
dozens of lives. The same day, Peshawar and Quetta, two other  
provincial capitals, were also hit by terrorists.

Lahoris may be flabbergasted at what they consider the lack of proper  
security around the city in these critical times, but in their own  
way, they were back Tuesday morning in large numbers at the scene of  
Monday night’s carnage, laying flowers and lighting candles in  
remembrance of those lost — mostly women and children — to this  
latest spate of terrorism. This impromptu response suggests that  
secular sections of Pakistani society will not be cowed by the  
followers of militant Islam.

Lahore has had more than its fair share of terror attacks, but it  
continues to defy the Taliban. And it will even now, insist ordinary  
citizens walking in the streets. The youth music festival planned for  
later this month will be held undeterred by acts of terror, say the  
organisers.

“Terrorists cannot be allowed to change our way of life,” says one  
music enthusiast. “Music must now be played and heard louder still.  
Only a cultural onslaught by performing artists, with common citizens  
in attendance, can send a message to those indulging in terrorism  
that we will live and we will live well. You cannot bog down our  
spirit.” This sentiment is shared widely.

However, Islamabad, not exactly known for a fun-filled environment,  
has succumbed badly, as has Peshawar. There are barricades and snap  
checks literally every few yards down any road worth the name. Going  
by the recent number of terrorist assaults on the twin cities of  
Islamabad and Rawalpindi, it seems every other building is a high- 
value target. There are embassies, UN offices and a myriad of NGOs  
all over, and all are equally despised by the Taliban for spreading  
what they see as anti-Islamic culture and values, such as women  
walking or driving or music being played out loud.

In Islamabad going to the Marriot Hotel, hit twice in two years, is  
chilling. You are stopped at some nine snap-checking points and  
grilled, and your car checked. At the sixth such barrier, I could not  
keep myself from asking the security officer if I looked like a  
terrorist. “No, sir,” came the confident answer. “But it’s  
people like you we feel comfortable checking thoroughly because we  
know you are not going to blow yourself up, and us with you. I  
wouldn’t know what to do if I really suspected someone of being a  
bomber. I too have little kids at home.” His honesty was laced with  
an uneasy sense of a tragedy foretold, as it were.

Once you reach the Marriot, you see a thick, high wall, like the one  
the Israelis have built. A bunker-like reception area that leads to  
what used to be the driveway of the hotel.

Entering the building you suddenly realise how empty it all looks.  
“Am I the only person silly enough to have come here?” you wonder.  
It’ll be a long time before the Marriot can bounce back to business  
as usual, you are told by a nervous receptionist. An unspecified  
number of snipers guard the hotel property.

Islamabad after dark seems like it’s under curfew. Jackals and wild  
boars seem to be the only presence in the thick foliage that can hide  
so much from surveillance. Mere mortals dare not step out.

I was nursing similar depressing thoughts while landing in Lahore the  
week after my trip to Islamabad. But the contrast between Islamabad  
and Lahore was pleasant. The roads and the bazaars buzzed with night- 
time traffic and shopping, the restaurants were just as crowded,  
though Lahoris said they avoided going out during the day. The  
reason: all recent bombings took place in daytime; none at night! You  
were told. Well, that was true until last Monday.

But then Lahore defies logic. A reason has to be found, even if  
obviously dumb, to keep the good times rolling despite the adversity.  
The Punjab government keeps shutting down privately-owned schools for  
lack of adequate security — but schooling again is a daytime  
activity; nights, they said, were safer. The motorists start rolling  
out their vehicles after 9 pm, and then it’s business as usual,  
including all-night restaurants serving gourmet meals to their  
obsessive-compulsive patrons.

The only places that were barricaded were police stations and  
government offices and residences, for these had been the targets,  
until Monday night. Now it seems public places too are in the bull’s  
eye. But still there are hardly any snap checks on the roads, one is  
told. Hotels and malls have long had their metal detectors installed,  
and they feel threatened no more than the average citizen.

Life must go on, insist the Lahoris — and it does.

The writer is an editor with ‘Dawn’, Karachi

o o o

Dawn, 7 December 2009

THE DARKEST DECEMBER

by Ahmad Faruqui

In his landmark poem, The Wasteland, T. S. Eliot calls April the  
cruellest month. But to most people, December is the cruellest month,  
with its short days and long nights. To Pakistanis and Bangladeshis,  
the darkest December is the one that came in 1971. What happened then  
is well known. Why it happened is less well known.

Ambassador Arshad Sami Khan provided his take on the events in his  
memoir, Three Presidents and an aide. A fighter pilot who earned the  
Sitara-i-Jurat during the 1965 war, Sami was ADC to presidents Ayub  
Khan, Yahya Khan and Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. Historians have pinned the  
blame for the secession of East Pakistan on Gen Yahya. Without  
absolving Yahya of his weaknesses, Sami says that a good part of the  
crisis predated the general’s arrival on the political scene.

At partition, Pakistan was split into two wings that were 1,000 miles  
apart. Many, including Lord Mountbatten, had questioned whether the  
glue of religion would be strong enough to hold them together. Since  
the two wings did not share a common language, it made no sense to  
impose a single language on them. Imposing Urdu, a minority language  
spoken in the west, made even less sense. But that was precisely what  
was done in 1952. Deadly language riots ensued in the east.

In the years to come, the west continued to rule the east. The  
Bengalis felt like they had traded one colonial master for another.  
The general elections of Dec 7, 1970 provided an opportunity to  
redress the grievances of East Pakistan and promote national  
integration. But the divided demographics delivered a politically  
explosive result.

The Awami League (AL) emerged with an absolute majority but all its  
seats were located in the east, where 55 per cent of Pakistanis  
resided. Sheikh Mujib, its leader, was called the future prime  
minister by Gen Yahya. Sami says this was just a façade. Yahya had  
never intended to hand over power to the civilians, least of all to  
the Bengalis. He had hoped that a fractured coalition would emerge,  
allowing him to continue as the all-powerful president.

He began to pressure Mujib into accepting a strong presidency with  
several ministries under the direct control of the president. When  
that failed, he tried to hatch a power-sharing arrangement between  
the AL and the PPP headed by Bhutto. That also failed. By now, the AL  
had sensed a trap and began a campaign of public agitation. Yahya  
accused the party of wanting to secede and playing into India’s  
hands. Sensing an opportunity, says Sami, Bhutto gave Yahya a strong  
hint that he would support a military solution. Yahya’s commander in  
the east, Lt-Gen Sahibzada Yaqub Ali Khan, opposed military action.  
His counsel was ignored and he was replaced by a man who would be  
reviled in history as the ‘Butcher of Bengal’.

Gen Tikka Khan launched a ruthless operation to crush the AL on March  
25, dashing all hopes of making a democratic transition. Ironically,  
on that day the National Assembly was to have been convened in Dhaka.  
By June, the regime claimed that the insurgency was over. In reality,  
it had simply gone underground. Millions of refugees fled to Indian  
Bengal to escape the violence.

As autumn approached, Yahya realised that India was not going to sit  
idle. Bhutto was sent as the head of a military mission to Beijing  
with Lt-Gen Gul Hasan and Air Marshal Rahim. According to Sami, when  
these people returned home, they lied to Yahya and told him that if  
hostilities with India broke out, crack Chinese troops would cross  
the Himalayas to relieve pressure on the Pakistani garrison in the East.

Sami’s insightful recounting of history is pregnant with lessons.  
First, even with its two far-flung wings, Pakistan was not destined  
to break apart. No one had forced East Bengalis to join Pakistan. To  
preserve the union, the leaders in the west should have shared power  
with those in the east.

Second, during the 1965 war, East Pakistan felt abandoned with little  
military presence. West Pakistan proceeded to rub salt into the  
wounded psyche of the east by imposing upon it the humiliation of the  
Agartala conspiracy trials. These diverted attention from the post- 
war problems in the west and were designed to project the image of  
India as a perpetual enemy. The mass movement that unseated Ayub Khan  
later was conveniently blamed on India.

Third, even at this point, Pakistan’s unity could have been  
preserved. Mujib was willing to compromise on several of the Six  
Points. Instead, the regime blundered by not honouring the electoral  
outcome. A campaign to malign the winning party was launched. The  
AL’s unprecedented victory was blamed on the Indian intelligence  
agencies as if they could have duped the entire populace of East  
Pakistan into voting against their will.

Fourth, when the AL leadership refused to buckle, another blunder was  
committed by resorting to armed force on the presumption that the  
rebellion was confined to a few ‘miscreants’. The regime seriously  
over-estimated its ability to subdue a province of 75 million with a  
military force of 45,000.

Fifth, when war with India appeared imminent, Yahya knew the game was  
over. He could have sought ways to avoid war with India and let the  
east secede peacefully. The suffering of millions could have been  
avoided.

Instead, the regime conjured up dreams of Chinese and American  
intervention. The Indo-Soviet Treaty had neutralised China’s ability  
to mount any military operation against India. And the Vietnam War  
had sapped the ability of the US to get involved in a second Asian  
war. The salience of both developments was lost on Yahya and his  
advisers. They had naively expected their allies to bail them out.

And sixth, for three decades all governments that came after Yahya  
suppressed the Hamoodur Rehman Commission report into the war. It  
only saw the light of day when an India publisher posted it on the web.

Unless the bitter lessons of what befell Pakistan 38 years ago are  
shared widely with the people, the nation will continue to wallow in  
conspiracy theories. It is much easier to blame others than to blame  
oneself. But, as the Greek historian Polybius put it, ‘There are  
only two sources from which benefit can be derived: our misfortunes  
and those that befell other men.’

_____


[4] Kashmir:

Dawn, 10 Dec, 2009

A GRAVE SOUTH ASIAN TRAGEDY
by Jawed Naqvi

This file photo taken in Bimyar, west of Srinagar, shows unmarked  
graves at a graveyard where at least 235 unidentified dead were  
buried. Human rights workers say that in the past 18 months they have  
identified dozens of burial grounds where they believe Indian  
security forces dumped more than 2,400 corpses. –Photo by AP

There are a few different ways in which South Asians say adieu to  
their dead and each poses a problem worth pondering. Burials require  
land, which is expensive. Some cemeteries in Europe have in fact  
started placing the coffins vertically to save on the spiralling cost  
of disposing the dead!

Cremation, which the Romans gave up centuries ago but that continues  
to be the preferred way to send off the dead in four of the eight  
Saarc countries, needs wood, which is expensive and also a load on  
the ecosystem. Electric crematoriums are being experimented with but  
they too are costly.

The Parsis were perhaps the most eco-friendly. They would place their  
departed ones atop the Tower of Silence, till the vultures, otherwise  
crucial to the circle of life, started dropping bits of the remains  
over posh Mumbai homes. Municipal requirements nudged the community  
to opt for burial instead. True to their spirit of accommodation, the  
Parsis followed the new rules without demure.

In the north-eastern tribal states of India, the dead are sometimes  
entombed with their belongings. There was a picture of his favourite  
Maruti 800 car placed over the grave of a tribal chief.

Bahadur Shah Zafar, the last Mughal emperor, was buried in exile; so  
was Begum Hazrat Mahal, the queen of Awadh. There is an old  
agreement, now perhaps mothballed, between the Indian and Pakistani  
governments to build a proper mausoleum over the Begum’s grave,  
which lies abandoned in a street in Kathmandu.

Remembering the dead is ritually nurtured. Many though not all  
Muslims visit graveyards annually on a given night to pray for their  
ancestors. India has a protocol for official guests to visit the  
shrines of its political leaders like Nehru and his daughter. Paying  
floral respects to Mahatma Gandhi, the slain apostle of peace, is  
mandatory for foreign dignitaries.

Everything is not smooth in this. Gen Musharraf shunned ideological  
aloofness to offer flowers at Gandhi’s Raj Ghat shrine but the king  
of Saudi Arabia cited religious constraints to refrain from honouring  
the world’s best known (though marginalised at home) helmsman.

Not everyone in the culturally resplendent South Asia it seems has  
the time today, much less the inclination, to persist with a  
tradition they otherwise claim as an abiding debt to those that are  
no more. This sadly is a less acknowledged feature of our otherwise  
celebrated but evolving worldview.

A social activist was planning to celebrate her birthday in Delhi  
recently when she found herself heading on a bumpy jeep ride to a  
former bastion of Maoist guerrillas in Warangal, in the southern  
state of Andhra Pradesh. There she met a woman in her 30s who had  
served five years in prison and whose knees had been cracked by  
sustained torture because she was a guerrilla. Now the former  
guerrilla works with a dedicated group whose job it is to track the  
dead bodies of people killed in police encounters.

The group does what the International Committee of the Red Cross is  
globally mandated to do: locate missing persons, track them if they  
are reported killed, find their bodies and hand them over to the  
relatives, who are mostly too poor to perform even the simplest of  
the last rites. So the virtually nameless group raises funds for a  
halfway decent farewell for an erratic stream of victims of police  
encounters. If and when a missing person is tracked and found  
abandoned, that is.

I have always marvelled at the ease with which a hidebound  
ritualistic people, devoted to the dead as they are to the living,  
manage to absolve themselves of responsibility so deeply ingrained in  
their culture when their humanity is most on test.

Last month the International People’s Tribunal on Human Rights and  
Justice in Indian-administered Kashmir (IPTK) published a report on  
Jammu and Kashmir listing a number of unmarked and hitherto unknown  
graves of people buried without any acknowledgment or clue. ‘In the  
2,700 graves we investigated, the body count was 2,943 plus,’ the  
report says. ‘Within 2,700 graves, 154 graves contained two bodies  
each and 23 graves contained more than two cadavers. Within these 23  
graves, the number of bodies ranged from three to 17.’

The bodies thus buried were ‘routinely delivered at night,’ some  
bearing marks of torture and burns, the 108-page IPTK report,  
including documentary evidence and photographs, says.

How this fares against the pain and tortured inflicted by Pakistani  
troops on their erstwhile Bengali citizens would not lessen the  
enormity of one brutality vis-à-vis another.

What the Sinhalese did with Tamils and the vendetta Tamil extremists  
wreaked on their fellow countrymen could never be exonerated on  
grounds that the gore is any less, for example, than what the  
Afghans, with or without foreign assistance, inflict on each other.

Nor does the plight of the ordinary people caught between the Maoists  
and the Nepalese military lessen the gruesome reality of their  
helplessness.

Today we see the world heading towards truth and reconciliation as  
the way out of intractable conflicts and to make this possible there  
is an attempt to put equal emphasis on truth as a key component of  
any future solution to global strife.

South Asia festers with a plethora of intractable and brutal  
conflicts. It is difficult to believe that we are going to continue  
to live in denial of our innate callousness. The dead pose a grave  
challenge to a possible chance at peace in South Asia. If we have a  
conscience, it is not an insurmountable challenge.

The writer is Dawn’s correspondent in New Delhi.

o o o

Kashmir Times, 12 December 2009

EDITORIAL:  SHOPIAN COVER-UP
Investigating agencies stand exposed

The preliminary report released on Human Rights Day by the  
Independent Women's Initiative for Justice, titled 'Shopian:  
Manufacturing a Suitable Story' has not only blasted the  
investigating agencies for a deliberate cover up, they have rather  
pointed out that this 'hushing up' conspiracy is part of a larger  
political agenda to suit the interests of a so-called peace process  
in which people of Kashmir have largely remained excluded. The report  
argues, on basis of scientific logic, that any accidental death of  
the two women alleged to have been raped and murdered six months ago  
is impossible. It talks about the visible marks of injuries on the  
body of Asiya and initial post mortem reports, all of which cannot be  
dismissed as cases of fudging. The report challenges the 'pre- 
meditated' drowning theory that was being floated from the day one  
and is now being circulated by the CBI selectively through media, on  
the basis of location, level of water and its flow in the nallah in  
which the two women are being made out to have drowned. The report  
also questions the deliberate tampering of evidence by the police men  
and maintains that the failure, rather denial of the CBI, to even  
question and interrogate the guilty police officers, points to the  
CBI's bid to save the skin of the men in uniform. The women's team  
during a press conference while releasing its preliminary report also  
reminded about the remarks of the chief justice of the State High  
Court regarding the accused cops: that either they were themselves  
the culprits or they knew who had committed the crime. The finger of  
suspicion all along has been on the men in uniform. Given the heavy  
concentration of the security forces in the area where the bodies of  
the women were found further lends credence to the theory. The  
deliberate tampering of evidence by police further confirms the  
doubts. Obviously, such an act was aimed to shield men in uniform and  
not common civilians. Every effort to sabotage investigations was  
meticulously planned. This is common knowledge in Kashmir.

The women team's report has only gone a step further and hit the nail  
on the head, stating that all this conspiracy was not only aimed to  
save the skin of some men in uniform but was a part of a larger  
political agenda to protect the image of the security forces amidst a  
peace offensive that was on the anvil when the Shopian incident  
happened. The report has also pointed out that while the Centre felt  
it necessary to ensure that the interests of the security forces and  
their authority was not harmed in any way, all out efforts were made  
to hush up the case also because of the strategic location of Shopian  
which becomes a gateway to Kashmir if the Mughal Road is to be opened  
in another year or so from now. This strategic location of the town  
makes it imperative for the security forces to carve out a greater  
role for themselves in the area which would be objected to by the  
people on the basis of the findings of the Shopian investigations.  
This makes perfect sense, as does the handing over of the case to the  
CBI to bail out the state government which was forced to take up all  
the responsibility of Centre's agenda of hushing up the case. The  
state government was only too eager to hand over the case to the CBI  
to get its neck out of the mess and evade all the blame. It becomes  
more and more lucidly clear why there has been a conspiracy to hush  
up the Shopian rapes and murders, though unsuccessfully for the last  
six months. But such knowledge, however, does not ensure that justice  
would be delivered. That can happen only when the Centre wakes up to  
the situation and realises that everything cannot be achieved by  
might. In the face of democratic and peaceful campaigns for justice,  
it would be in the best of interests of all to simply bow down and do  
the needful of nailing the culprits in this case. This would also  
serve the interests of the peace process as it would ensure inclusion  
of a larger section of society in Kashmir and not simply a handful of  
separatist leaders.


_____


[5] India: Attacks on Schools by Maoists and Occupation of  
Educational Facilities by Government Security Forces

Deccan Chronicle, 9 December 2009

A FIGHT FOR RIGHTS THAT ISN’T RIGHT

by Meenakshi Ganguly

We met 15-year-old Sunil in a classroom at Tankuppa High School in a  
remote part of Bihar’s Gaya district. It was one of 11 classrooms at  
the school, but when we visited only three were open for learning.  
The other eight rooms were occupied by armed men: paramilitary police  
who have taken over most of the school for the past three years,  
since their police station was destroyed in a Naxalite attack. The  
police station has still not been rebuilt, so now it is the  
students’ education that is being wrecked.
Although Tankuppa was supposed to expand to a “plus two” school,  
teaching Classes 11 and 12, with the security forces already using so  
many of the classrooms, there is not enough space for all the current  
students to sit and study, let alone an additional two classes.  
Sunil, who will soon graduate to Class 11 and wants to continue his  
studies, is simply unable to live his dream: his family cannot spare  
the money to send him to even the next-closest school offering higher- 
level classes.
Sunil is one among tens of thousands of students in Bihar and  
Jharkhand whose education is being disrupted as a result of the  
Naxalite conflict. On the one hand, the Maoists are blowing up  
government school buildings. On the other hand, government security  
forces are occupying schools for days, months, and even years, using  
them as bases for their anti-Naxalite campaigns. The students are  
stuck in the middle.
At least 13 schools in Jharkhand have come under Maoist attacks in  
the past month. The Naxalites claim that they attack schools because  
they are occupied by security forces, but recent research by Human  
Rights Watch proves this claim false: at least 25 of the schools they  
attacked in Bihar and Jharkhand were not being used by security  
forces at the time. Post attack the structures still leave behind  
enough solid walls to protect security forces.
Sunil’s classmate Indira, 16, says she has trouble concentrating on  
her lessons. The police bring criminal suspects back to the school  
and beat them in the schoolyard in view of the children. “I feel  
very bad when they beat them”, she said. Indira also does not like  
how the police have taken over the school’s latrines — this means  
that she has to use an open field near the school.
Other students described how offensive it is when the police bathe in  
their underwear in front of the girls.
The government claims that the Maoists cannot be defeated just with  
force and that their threat must also be countered with development.  
If that is so then the government should remember that access to  
quality education for India’s most marginalised children is an  
indispensable ingredient for progress. And if the Naxalites seek to  
justify their bloodshed by saying they are fighting for India’s  
poor, then their destruction of one of the few services that can  
empower these communities is abhorrently perverse.
Both sides of the conflict should reconsider their misguided  
policies: The Naxalites will never win legitimacy if they wage a war  
by picking soft civilian structures, especially when it comes at the  
cost of India’s most disadvantaged children; and the government must  
consider that although they are responsible for ensuring the safety  
and security of the civilian population, their current policies and  
practices are frequently violating children’s right to an education,  
and are thus only providing further fuel to the Maoists.
Sunil told us that his favourite school subject is mathematics. Maybe  
he can become an accountant when he grows up. But that will happen  
only if the government and the Maoists, who both claim to be fighting  
for his future, let him have a safe and secure present.

* Meenakshi Ganguly works on South Asia for the Asia
division of Human Rights Watch

o o o

Human Rights Watch

INDIA: PROTECT EDUCATION IN NAXALITE CONFLICT
Schools Attacked by Maoist Fighters and Occupied by Government  
Security Forces

December 9, 2009


     The Maoists say they are fighting for India’s poor, but their  
attacks on schools deprive these children of the education they  
desperately need. At the same time, long-term police occupation of  
schools puts these children right in the midst of danger and trauma,  
keeps them from their classrooms, and frightens them away.
     Bede Sheppard, Asia researcher in the Children's Rights Division

(Ranchi) - The ongoing conflict between Maoist insurgents and  
government forces is disrupting the education of tens of thousands of  
India's most marginalized children, Human Rights Watch said in a new  
report released today.

The 103-page report, "Sabotaged Schooling: Naxalite Attacks and  
Police Occupation of Schools in India's Bihar and Jharkhand States,"  
details how the Maoists - known as Naxalites - a longstanding, pan- 
Indian armed militant movement, are targeting and blowing up state- 
run schools. At the same time, police and paramilitary forces are  
disrupting education for long periods by occupying schools as part of  
anti-Naxalite operations. The report is based on visits to 22 schools  
in Bihar and Jharkhand, and interviews with over 130 people,  
including 48 children, as well as with parents, educators, police,  
and local officials.

"The Maoists say they are fighting for India's poor, but their  
attacks on schools deprive these children of the education they  
desperately need," said Bede Sheppard, researcher in the Children's  
Rights Division of Human Rights Watch and author of the report. "At  
the same time, long-term police occupation of schools puts these  
children right in the midst of danger and trauma, keeps them from  
their classrooms, and frightens them away."

The Maoists attack schools because they are often the only government  
buildings in the remote rural areas where the militants operate.  
Undefended schools are a high-visibility, "soft" target.

In the past month, through December 8, at least 14 schools in  
Jharkhand and 2 schools in Bihar have been bombed.

Attacking them garners media attention and increases fear and  
intimidation among local communities, Human Rights Watch found. The  
government's failure to repair the bombed schools promptly prolongs  
the negative impact of these attacks on children's education.

The government security forces - both police and paramilitary police  
- occupy school buildings as bases for anti-Naxalite operations,  
sometimes only for a few days but often for periods lasting several  
months, and even years. Sometimes the security forces occupy school  
buildings completely, while in other places they occupy parts of  
school buildings, with students trying to carry on their studies in  
the remaining space.

Naxalite attacks and school occupations by security forces place  
students unnecessarily at risk of harm, and lead many to drop out or  
cause interruptions to their studies. Girls appear especially likely  
to drop out following a partial occupation of a school due to  
perceived or experienced harassment by the security forces. Students  
also reported being upset by witnessing security forces beating  
suspects on school grounds. Often, schools are closed altogether and  
students may not be able to attend at all or are forced to move into  
inferior sites, to study outdoors or, for those able to reach them,  
to travel to schools further away.

"The Naxalite leadership should instruct their fighters to end all  
attacks on schools immediately," said Sheppard. "The government  
should also reconsider its practice of using schools for military  
operations, which frequently comes at the expense of children's  
education, creating further grievances for the Naxalites to exploit."

The right to education is guaranteed under India's constitution and  
laws, and in international human rights treaties to which India is  
party.

"Access to education for India's most marginalized children is an  
indispensable ingredient for India's development," said Sheppard.  
"Children in these areas are being deprived of this right for years  
as this conflict plays out."

Children and parents tell their stories:

"This school has been badly damaged ... the whole building has been  
ruined, the windows are smashed and blown, and the floor is cracked,  
as are the walls and the ceiling. Even the door is broken. The wall  
outside that connects to the veranda is also destroyed, everything is  
in ruins."

- A 16-year-old student whose school in Jharkhand was bombed by  
Naxalites on April 9, 2009.

"Sometimes [the security forces] bring culprits back to the school  
and beat them.... I feel very bad when they beat them."

- A 16-year-old student whose school in Bihar was partially occupied  
by State Auxilliary Police, as of June 12, 2009.

"There was no fear before the police camp came, and we were free to  
have all kinds of fun in the school."

- A 15-year-old student whose school in Jharkhand was partially  
occupied by the Indian Central Reserve Police Force, as of May 30, 2009.

"The [Naxalites] have blown up the school.... Since the buildings are  
damaged there are no classes. So my children are not going to school.  
I am not able to send my children to study outside of the village. We  
are poor people. We live in the forest. We till the land to earn our  
livelihood. There were 250 students studying at the school and all of  
them are getting spoiled because of no class in the school.... [Now,  
my children] do not do anything. They play around the village ...  
grazing cattle and doing like that ... those who are able to send  
their children out of the village have sent their children to study  
in other villages. But poor people like us cannot send our children  
to study out of the village."

- A father of five children-three of whom were studying at a school  
in Jharkhand that was bombed by Naxalites on November 29, 2008.

--
SABOTAGED SCHOOLING
Naxalite Attacks and Police Occupation of Schools in India’s Bihar  
and Jharkhand States
December 9, 2009
http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/india1209web_0.pdf


o o o

[SEE ALSO]

http://www.sacw.net/article1279.html

END HOSTILITIES, START DIALOGUE

The following is a statement issued on behalf of the Citizens  
Initiative for Peace.

While there were indications from the government as well as the  
Maoists some time back that they were prepared to consider the idea  
of a dialogue as proposed by the Citizens Initiative for Peace and  
other groups, the CIP notes with deep concern that operations by the  
security forces of the Central and State governments have already  
been launched in several States causing untold miseries to the tribal  
people in the affected regions.

Meanwhile, the CIP also observes with grave anxiety that work on mega  
projects continues unabated despite the local people’s persisting  
resistance while the demand for making the MoUs public has fallen on  
deaf ears.

In this context the CIP firmly believes that unless the concrete  
problems of poverty, deprivation and displacement are addressed  
urgently by the authorities the present cycle of violence cannot be  
reversed.

Therefore the CIP

(a) calls upon the governments to implement forthwith the Samatha  
Judgement of the Supreme Court that recognises the tribal  
communities’ right and control over land, forests and natural  
resources, including underground minerals, within their domain;

(b) feels that to create a conducive atmosphere for dialogue work on  
the mega projects should be suspended;

(c ) urges the government as well as the Maoists to cease hostilities  
without any condition so that free and frank dialogue can take place  
on the issues involved and for exploring the possibilities of finding  
solutions to the tribal people’s basic problems which have remained  
neglected for long years leading to the current crisis;

(d) appeals to both sides to create peaceful conditions for fruitful  
talks.

Surendra Mohan, D. Bandyopadhyay, Manoranjan Mohanty, Ravi Hemadri,  
Sumit Chakravartty



_____


[6] India: Resources For Secular Activists


(i) The Hindu, Dec 10, 2009

EDITORIAL: CLEAR AND COMMENDABLE

The Bharatiya Janata Party’s raucous slogan-shouting in the Lok  
Sabha could not drown out the clear message from Home Minister P.  
Chidambaram’s reply to the debate on the Liberhan Commission’s  
report on the December 6, 1992 demolition of the Babri Masjid. His  
oration was in the best traditions of truth-telling — a cool  
lawyerly marshalling of facts punctuated by sharp punches but also by  
honest self-criticism that is rare in Indian political discourse.  
True to form, the BJP leaders defended the indefensible — defiant in  
their insistence that the “disputed structure” met its brutal end  
because kar sevaks were at the end of their patience. Mr.  
Chidambaram, on the other hand, must be commended for showing the  
mirror to the BJP and also turning it inward, admitting on the floor  
of the House that the P.V. Narasimha Rao government — which made a  
“wrong political judgment” — was partly to blame for the  
demolition. Assembling his facts with care and targeting the  
protagonists with precision, the Home Minister made out an  
unassailable case against the sangh parivar and the BJP, accusing the  
latter of breaking “every single promise” made to the Supreme  
Court, the Central government, and the National Integration Council.  
The assault on the disputed structure was “pre-planned, calculated,  
and cold-blooded.” The evidence lay in the variety of tools and  
ropes ready at hand for destroying the structure, the inflammatory  
slogans that encouraged the rampaging kar sevaks, and the passivity  
of the BJP leaders as well as the police and district administration,  
which “remained a mute spectator to the demolition.”

Even as Mr. Chidambaram laid bare the details of the Babri  
conspiracy, which could not have possibly succeeded had the Congress  
central government done its job, the party’s rising star, Rahul  
Gandhi, was away in Lucknow, refusing even to acknowledge that he had  
read the Liberhan report. Had he gone through the 1,000-plus pages,  
he might have learnt that there were other omissions in the report,  
besides Prime Minister Rao’s tragic culpability. History will record  
that the Congress in power made two earlier key contributions to the  
process that led to demolition. It was Rajiv Gandhi’s government  
that, under pressure from a VHP-led mobilisation, facilitated the  
opening of the locks of the makeshift temple in February 1986, and  
enabled the performance of shilanyas in November 1989. One provided  
fresh impetus to the Ayodhya movement, the other legitimised the Ram  
mandir project. It was not part of Mr. Chidambaram’s remit to go  
into this pre-history of the demolition. But the Congress would do  
well to follow his lead and complete the much-delayed exercise in  
truth-telling on Ayodhya — so that full closure can be applied to a  
benighted chapter in independent India’s socio-political history.

o o o

Mail Today, 10 December 2009

SINNERS IN DISGUISE

by Jyotirmaya Sharma

There are hidden facets to the sorry episode of the Babri Masjid that  
also implicate others

THE LIBERHAN Report can be excused for its longwinded vacuity as also  
the time it took to see the light of day. But the more hilarious  
aspect of the aftermath of the tabling of the report is the manner in  
which politicians of various persuasions have reacted to it. All of  
them have come up with their own version of the truth. In Indian  
politics, truth never prevails, but all that prevails is true.

In a mature democracy, it would have been the norm for the BJP to  
accept that they participated in a criminal act that vitiated public  
life and divided people.

Equally so, the Congress ought to have apologised to the country for  
P. V. Narasimha Rao’s inept handling of the entire situation.

Mulayam Singh ought to have kept silent in Parliament, if only  
because he was, until recently, extolling the virtues of a certain  
Kalyan Singh. The Left too ought to have toned down its self-  
righteous bluster, especially after their cosy understanding with the  
BJP recently in trying to bring down the UPA government over the  
issue of the nuclear deal. “ In the congregation of the  
righteous”, said a poet, “ the sinners are well- disguised: do not  
seek to count them”.

Opportunity

For the BJP and certain of its leaders, the Liberhan report seems  
like a godgiven opportunity to revive its ever- dwindling fortunes.  
Just as their conception of Hindutva is stuck in an imaginary past,  
so are their political calculations. They hope to revive the  
irrational mobilisation of the rath yatra and karseva movements, if  
only to rectify their rockbottom status in the arena of Uttar Pradesh  
politics.

Even if their hope of a revival on the lines of the Ayodhya movement  
clashes with pictures of Narendra Modi in denims, they would love to  
live under the fatal illusion that they have the moral and  
intellectual wherewithal to merge and resolve all such contradictions.

The spectacle of Rajnath Singh thundering about the existence of a  
Ram Temple in the past and the assurance of a temple in the future  
weeks before he is to be given the marching orders by the RSS in  
favour of a man whose sole claim to fame is building flyovers is all  
too delicious for the ordinary spectator. After all, flyovers for the  
BJP are the new temples of their conception of modern India.

In all this, the RSS presents a picture that is a strange mixture of  
bravado, innocence and lack of contrition. They have been consistent  
in stating that they have no regrets about the demolition of the  
Babri Mosque.

But they are equally consistent in saying that a spontaneous surge of  
karsevaks resulted in the felling of what has been known as the  
disputed structure. This theory of spontaneity and popular sentiment  
has served the RSS and the Sangh Parivar well over the years in their  
systematic attempts at subverting democracy, the rule of law and the  
Indian Constitution.

One just has to remember the rhetoric at all levels within the Sangh  
Parivar in justifying the post- Godhra riots and the systematic  
killing of Muslims to know that this is a familiar tool in their kit  
of medieval barbarity. The only consolation that the Sangh Parivar  
has is that even the Congress borrowed the same set of rhetorical  
devices in order to justify the massacre of innocent Sikhs in 1984  
and continues to condone similar acts by not acting on the findings  
of the Srikrishna Report concerning the 1992- 93 riots in Bombay.

Is there, then, a difference between the Sangh Parivar and the  
Congress? The difference is a small, but significant one. The  
Congress condones similar acts of violence for political expediency  
and does so with cynical impunity. The Sangh Parivar indulges in acts  
of organised violence in the name of God, Hinduism, cultural pride  
and with the express purpose of destroying a plurality of the ideas  
of India.

In keeping the mandirmasjid issue alive, the RSS also has a different  
agenda. It hopes to alienate Muslims to an extent by which it becomes  
untenable for them to exist as first- class citizens in India, and,  
thereby, foist its limited, shortsighted and dangerous idea of a  
Hindu nation.

Logic

A few examples would suffice. The former RSS sarsanghchalak , K. P  
Sudarshan, wrote a pamphlet published in 2000 called ‘ Sangh ki  
saphalta ka rahasya’ ( The Secret of the Sangh’s Success). He  
writes that when Indira Gandhi visited Afghanistan and wanted to lay  
a wreath at the tombstone of Babur, the Afghans had to clean the  
place overnight. The tombstone was in a state of acute disrepair.  
Sudarshan cites an official in the Prime Minister’s party asking the  
caretaker of the cemetery about Babur’s tomb and its sorry state.

The caretaker is supposed to have replied that they did not care  
because Babur was no Afghan.

Sudarshan goes on to say that it is unfortunate that many Indian  
Muslims still connect themselves to Babur. He goes on to explain how  
the structure that was demolished was on purpose designated as Babri  
Mosque, and they created futile anger in the country upon its  
demolition.

Sudarshan’s amnesia makes him forget that if his story of the Afghan  
caretaker of the cemetery is a desirable one, then the Sangh ought  
not to have screamed and shouted as much as it did when the Bamiyan  
Buddhas were blown away by dynamite sticks. After all, the Buddha was  
no Afghan either! But Sudarshan’s perverse creativity in rewriting  
history reaches hitherto unscaled heights when he dismisses the  
historical veracity of a structure that is a few hundred years old,  
but argues that the existence of a Ram Temple at the very spot was  
historically true and incontrovertible.

Irony

But there is one other gem in Sudarshan’s pamphlet.

He quotes a fax sent to Narasimha Rao on 10 December 1992 by a senior  
leader from Maharashtra.

Sudarshan says that this leader advised Rao not to ban the RSS in the  
aftermath of the demolition of the Babri mosque because Balasaheb  
Deoras was a friend of the Congress government.

Deoras wanted the government to survive for five years and was not in  
favour of frequently bringing governments down.

This unnamed Maharashtra leader warns Rao that if the Sangh was  
banned, a section of the Sangh sympathetic to Rao’s government would  
turn hostile.

Despite this advice, the Sangh was banned. It would do us all a lot  
of good if Sudarshan could release the copy of that fax to the Indian  
people now and expose this senior Maharashtra leader.

But nothing of this sort is likely to happen. The irony is that all  
those associated with this act of mob violence and vandalism will go  
scot- free. In the case of L. K. Advani, like the proverbial cat with  
nine lives, he will probably see a revival in his political fortunes  
and his political ambitions. In the meantime, the RSS will go on with  
its business of sullying Indian public life in a manner only it can  
and has perfected over the years. History, perhaps, will forgive  
those karsevaks , but it will scarcely condone the likes of Advani  
for being complicit in the RSS’s agenda of the diminution of what  
India is all about.

The writer teaches politics in University of Hyderabad

_____


[8] Miscellanea:

Damaged Life as Exuberant Vitality in America: Adorno, Alienation,  
and the Psychic Economy
by Shannon Mariotti
(Telos, 2009;2009 169-190)
http://www.telospressonline.com/cgi/content/abstract/2009/149/169

The Lost Radical: Edward Carpenter’s democracy of the soul
by Vivian Gornick
(Boston Review)
http://bostonreview.net/BR34.6/gornick.php

Remembering across the border: Postsocialist nostalgia among Turkish  
immigrants from Bulgaria
by Ayse Parla
(American Ethnologist, 6 November 2009 16:45)
http://www3.interscience.wiley.com/journal/122679680/abstract

Mapping Human Genetic Diversity in Asia
by The HUGO Pan-Asian SNP Consortium*
(Science, 11 December 2009)
http://www.sciencemag.org/cgi/content/abstract/326/5959/1541
(subscription required for full paper):
Link to open access Supplemental Materials (87 pages, PDF):
http://www.sciencemag.org/cgi/data/326/5959/1541/DC1/1

_____


[9] Announcements:

(i)  The Citizens Initiative for Peace

Invites You

to

a Talk by Praful Bidwai on the Looming Ecological Crisis, Copenhagen  
Climate Conference and India

on the Occasion of

the Release of His Latest Book: An India That Can Say Yes / A Climate  
Responsible Development Agenda for Copenhagen and Beyond.
The Book is Published by the Heinrich Boell Foundation, New Delhi

Ms. Kalpana Sharma, a veteran journalist, writer and former Bureau  
Chief of the Hindu has kindly consented to formally release the book.  
She will
also conduct the talk-cum-discussion session.

The book deals with and demystifies the complex issue of climate  
change and the grave problem it for poses for the world, in general,  
and the poor
in particular. It analyses the unequal global climate regime,  
critiques market-driven solutions and proposes an ethical  
alternative. It dissects India's National Action Plan on Climate  
Change from that perspective.
Finally, it strives to relocate the climate debate in the context of  
people-friendly development and human emancipation.

Venue: The Press Club, next to Azad Maidan near the CST Rly. Stn.  
[Bombay]
Date: December 15 2009 Time: 5 PM

RSVP: Asad Bin Saif - Mob. 9224643446

(ii)

Irtiqa Inst. of Social Sciences

8th Hamza Alavi Distnguished Lecture

Wed. 16 Dec. 2009 5 PM at Jinnah Medical College, Shaheed Millat Road  
Karachi

Topic: Pakistan and the nature of the state: Revisionism, Jihad and  
Governance

Speaker: Mr. Khalid Ahmed. Director South Asia Free Media  
Association, Lahore

Consultant Editor, the Friday Times.

Admission: Free. All are welcome. Please convey this email to others.  
It is annual event of Irtiqa. Please

come on time with friends and family members to listen and learn.

Iqbal alavi Hon. General Secretary
Ph: 03009276504/35831807


_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/

South Asia Citizens Wire
Buzz for secularism, on the dangers of fundamentalism(s), on
matters of peace and democratisation in South
Asia. An offshoot of South Asia Citizens Web: www.sacw.net/

DISCLAIMER: Opinions expressed in materials carried in the posts do not
necessarily reflect the views of SACW compilers.