SACW | Mar. 15-25, 2009 / Colombo's war / BDR / UNHCHR / Smitu Kothari / Hindutva / Darwin / Sudan / Pope vs condoms
Harsh Kapoor
aiindex at gmail.com
Tue Mar 24 21:10:22 CDT 2009
South Asia Citizens Wire | March 15-25, 2009 | Dispatch No. 2613 -
Year 11 running
From: www.sacw.net
[This issue of the dispatch is dedicated to remembering Smitu
Kothari, the noted activist and engaged scholar who stood by people's
movements. Smitu died in New Delhi on the 23rd of March 2009, Smitu
will be sorely missed by independent progressives and widely
remembered across the wide array of social movements for
environmental justice, peace, human rights and democratisation in
India and in South Asian circles. We just lost a very dear friend --HK ]
[1] Dire times in Sri Lanka's war zone (Conor Foley)
+ Human Rights and Humanitarian Issues in Northern Sri Lanka
(Centre for Policy Alternatives)
[2] Afghanistan: Talking To The Taliban - Did anyone ask Afghan
women? (Patricia Lalonde)
[3] The BDR rebellion in Bangladesh: prevailing uncertainties
(Rahnuma Ahmed)
[4] Nepal: Pillay's job (Kanak Mani Dixit)
[5] Pakistan: Judges’ restoration a good first step: HRCP
+ Touting Religion, Grabbing Land (Patrick French)
[6] India: NBA salutes the life-long contribution of Smitu Kothari to
people’s movements
[7] India: Ways of Hindutva (K.N. Panikkar)
- From Kandhamal to Karavali: The Ugly Face of Sangh Parivar (A
report by 9 human rights organisations)
- Hindutvas ideological testing ground in South (Parvathi Menon)
- A stench that is all too familiar (Siddharth Varadarajan)
- Why ‘Hate Speech’? (Ram Puniyani)
- Act firmly, swiftly to bar hate speech (Editorial, The Asian Age)
- Venomous communalism (Editorial, The Hindu)
- Generals of Saffron (Vijay Prashad)
- Hindu extremists wreck plans for statue of "Christian" Charlie
Chaplin (Rhys Blakely)
[8] Book Review: In Other Rooms, Other Wonders (Review by William
Dalrymple)
[9] Miscellanea:
(i) Beware Human Rights Fundamentalism! (Mahmood Mamdani)
(ii) Darwin In Turkey: An interview with Cigdem Atakuman (Spiegel
Online)
(iii) Radio Interview: Rebbeca Holders, spokesperson for the NGO
Treatment Action Campaign (Anustup Roy)
+ Online Petition by Avaaz: The Pope vs condoms
[10] Announcements:
(i) Traumatised Tribals of Orissa Cant Vote: Will meet the Press
(25 March 2009, New Delhi)
(ii) The Nationalist Hindu Militias - Talk by Christophe
Jaffrelot (New York, 25 March 2009)
_____
[1] Sri Lanka:
DIRE TIMES IN SRI LANKA'S WAR ZONE
by Conor Foley
http://tinyurl.com/cku2n3
HUMAN RIGHTS AND HUMANITARIAN ISSUES IN NORTHERN SRI LANKA
by The Centre for Policy Alternatives (CPA), 21 March 2009
http://www.sacw.net/article759.html
_____
[2] Afghanistan:
International Herald Tribune
March 18, 2009
TALKING TO THE TALIBAN
Did anyone ask Afghan women?
by Patricia Lalonde
I have just returned from Afghanistan and I am struck by the news:
There’s talk about negotiations with the moderate Taliban. President
Barack Obama announced it this week, and the message has been relayed
by European leaders.
Let us first be clear: Either we’re talking about those Taliban whose
moderation means 10 lashes instead of 100 for women who show their
ankles, and maybe we can negotiate them down to five, or we’re
talking about rebels who are victims of current misery in their
country and find themselves loosely affiliated with the Taliban. If
the latter is the case, let’s not call them Taliban.
The Afghan women I know cannot conceive of a ‘‘moderate’’ Taliban,
not to mention negotiations with them. The Taliban are the Taliban,
Islamists who advocate a fundamentalist and extremist ideology in
which the role of the woman is to be muzzled and illiterate.
Many of these women already fought a battle against that role when
the Taliban were in power. They won that battle.
Democracy is working for them. Girls go to school. Women comprise 25
percent of the Afghan Parliament and they are doing a remarkable job.
They are learning “politics’’: a recent budget vote on funds
earmarked for women in various ministries met with opposition from
the male deputies, whereby the women rose and left the chamber. The
women got the budget they wanted.
The will of the Afghan people is to move toward modernity, even at
the risk of their lives. Consider the girls in Kandahar who were
attacked with acid. They continue to go to school, encouraged by
their principal. Girls’ schools have been burned down...and rebuilt.
Women from the south who are prey to Taliban terror are not looking
to negotiate with the Taliban. They know what will happen to their
rights if they do.
For women in Kabul and the Afghan north, where I traveled, this idea
of negotiating with the Taliban would be unbearable. They are looking
for more schools, better teachers, books, pens and paper, computers.
Private universities are multiplying, welcoming ever more students
avid for learning and professional training so that they can find
jobs and work for their country.
Shella Ata, a woman deputy from Kabul, has recently decided to run
for president. Others will follow. She leads the fight for child drug
victims, a phenomenon spreading in Kabul and elsewhere in Afghanistan
for which she says nothing is being done.
Fauzia Koofi, vice president of the Parliament, lives alone with her
two children. Her husband was killed by the Taliban. Every day, she
risks her life to go to work. You can’t talk to her about negotiating
with the Taliban.
We are sending the wrong message to Afghan women. To claim that
negotiating with moderate Taliban is about making their country more
secure for them is something they cannot grasp.
Security will return to Afghanistan when the Afghan people believe
they can choose their own leaders, when corruption ceases, when
Afghan police have a decent salary, when a constitutional change
permits local representatives to be elected locally and not imposed
by Kabul, when they see an improvement in their daily lives.
This is how Afghan women see security. And this is the only way that
insurgents who are not Taliban, but who have taken up arms in protest
against the current government and the unfilled promises of foreign
forces, can resume playing a normal role in their own country.
Negotiating with the Taliban would be the biggest defeat for the
goals for which we went to war in Afghanistan in the first place.
Patricia Lalonde is the chairwoman of Mobilization for Elected Women
in Afghanistan (MEWA). Translated from the French by Constance Borde.
_____
[3] Bangladesh:
New Internationalist
March 17, 2009
THE BDR REBELLION IN BANGLADESH: PREVAILING UNCERTAINTIES
Rahnuma Ahmed reports on the fallout from February's rebellion by
Bangladeshi soldiers, and explains why the present remains so perilous.
A subaltern uprising
That is how private TV channels had reported it, and how it had
generally been perceived on 25 February when BDR (Bangladesh Rifles)
soldiers – border security forces, additionally entrusted with anti-
smuggling operations – rebelled at the Pilkhana headquarters in Dhaka
city.
Discontentment had been the issue. Over food rations (three months,
as compared with twelve for the army), denial of UN peacekeeping
mission services, low pay (the average BDR guard earns about 70
dollars a month), non-payment of promised daily allowances for extra
duties rendered, corruption in the officer ranks. What appeared to
have rankled most was army control, since the BDR administration and
nearly all its officers are from the army. In the words of one
mutineer, ‘we are not against the nation, or the Government. We want
that the BDR should belong to the BDR.’
It was the second day of the annual BDR week. Three thousand BDR
soldiers, along with their commanding officers, had come to Pilkhana
for the occasion, joining the three thousand plus stationed there.
The 33-hour-long mutiny broke out at a meeting in the Darbar Hall of
the BDR compound, which stretches over 3 square kilometres, and is
located in the city centre. How many actively took part is anybody’s
guess. The police have since filed charges of rebellion, killings,
arson and looting of armories against more than a thousand BDR
soldiers. The army, police and RAB (élite force) have launched
Operation Rebel Hunt to capture rebel soldiers, missing firearms and
ammunition. Two hundred and thirty six BDR soldiers have been
arrested so far, including the suspected ringleader, deputy assistant
director Syed Tawhidul Alam.
The horror and brutality
As bodies of army officers dumped in sewage canals far away surfaced;
as mass graves in the HQ compound were unearthed; as the decomposed
bodies of the director general, and others – mostly senior army
officers – were discovered; as mutilated bodies were found,
bayoneted, eyes gouged out, some burned: the subaltern uprising story
receded into the background. Wives of two army officers and a
domestic maid had also been killed. Allegations of rape surfaced. As
horror at the brutality encompassed the nation (more than 74 were
killed, including three civilians killed by random bullets, and seven
soldiers; according to the latest updates, 2-3 officers are still
missing, while 4 bodies remain unidentified), army officers publicly
contested Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina’s decision to resolve the
rebellion through political rather than military means. She should
not have sat for negotiations with the mutineers, nor sent Government
ministers and her party leaders to talk to the rebels, nor declared a
general amnesty (later clarified to exclude the killers). Instead,
the army should have been allowed to ‘crush’ the rebellion. It would
have been over in a matter of minutes. Lives of precious army
officers would have been saved.
As horror at the brutality encompassed the nation, army officers
publicly contested Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina’s decision to resolve
the rebellion through political rather than military means.
Calmer, more reasoned voices argued, mainly in the blogosphere, since
the national media (print, TV) was also under attack for having
highlighted the BDR soldiers’ grievances, that a military operation
would probably have resulted in more deaths, of hostage officers and
their family members, and also of civilians, living in adjacent
densely-populated neighbourhoods. That anti-aircraft guns could
hardly have been used to flush out rebels hiding among innocent
people living in residential quarters and office buildings. That
terrorists and hostage-takers could have been attacked, but only
after all other means had failed. That news of an army operation
could have led to a nationwide escalation since the rebellion had
spread to other parts of the country. That it was undoubtedly a
massive intelligence failure. That even though the army had borne the
brunt of the BDR carnage, parliamentary discussions and public debate
on corruption in the army should go ahead.
Contesting authority
Rumours of an army take-over circulated wildly (not surprisingly,
given that it has occurred three times in the nation’s 38 year old
history). Grief-stricken and enraged members of the army were
repeatedly urged to show restraint, even after the army chief General
Moeen U Ahmed had declared that the army would be ‘loyal to
democracy’, and would remain ‘subservient to the (elected)
government’. Civilian authority was contested, at times outrageously,
via widely-circulating e-mails purportedly from officers of the army,
and leaked audio recordings of the Prime Minister’s closed-door
meeting with aggrieved army officers in Dhaka cantonment. The US
ambassador extended support to the newly-elected democratic
government, adding later that the US Government would also assist
Bangladesh in combating terrorism. As the immediate crisis was
overcome, Sheikh Hasina’s display of leadership in having resolved it
peacefully was lauded by other foreign dignitaries and leaders. And
within the nation, the army was repeatedly congratulated for having
exercised restraint. Even though, as a Bangladeshi blogger pointed
out, this was precisely what the military should be doing, i.e.,
supporting the civilian government, and working under its leadership.
The Government has instituted a high-powered probe into the mutiny,
assisted by FBI and Scotland Yard investigators. The army has
launched an independent probe. However, there is nationwide
apprehension that the truth may not be revealed
The Government has instituted a high-powered probe into the mutiny,
assisted by FBI and Scotland Yard investigators. The army has
launched an independent probe. However, there is nationwide
apprehension that the truth may not be revealed, that the reports may
not be made public, and that judicial processes may falter. Calls for
the formation of an all-party parliamentary inquiry committee have
not been heeded by the Government. Mud-slinging has erupted between
the political party leaders, by the Prime Minister herself, and her
ministers, equally matched by the ex-Prime Minister and the current
leader of the opposition Khaleda Zia, and other BNP (Bangladesh
Nationalist Party) leaders. Meanwhile, the Government has done away
with disparities in food subsidies that had existed between the
officers and the lower ranks of the police force. Concerns are being
voiced in human rights and political activist circles over a
demonization of the BDR as a whole, even though individual soldiers
had risked their own lives to save several army officers during the
hostage crisis.
Tensions and turbulence
Several feminist activists think that questions need to be raised
about military training per se, that rape, looting and utter
disregard for human values seem to accompany the actions of armed
forces the world over. Others feel this is not the time to raise
these questions, or bring up the decades-long allegations of
indigenous peoples in the militarily-occupied Chittagong Hill Tracts.
The present, they say, is too perilous. That the worst may not be
over is signalled by the Government's recent decision to cancel the
Independence Day parade, on 26 March.
That the rebellion was pre-planned and could well have de-stabilized
the Government and the nation by igniting a series of cascading
‘tensions and turbulence’ is no longer doubted
The subaltern uprising story has paled away as threats to the
nation’s territorial sovereignty have become clearer. Were foreign
forces involved? Did they capitalize on long-standing and simmering
grievances among BDR subalterns, those who are regarded as ‘the
nation’s first line of defence’? The Indian media has pointed its
fingers at the ISI (Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence), at
Pakistan’s reluctance for 1971 war criminals to be tried by Sheikh
Hasina's Government. Counter-theories have emerged, arguing that RAW
(Research and Intelligence Wing, India’s foreign intelligence
agency), and thereby the Indian Government, stand to gain most from
turning Bangladesh into a vassal state.
That the rebellion was pre-planned and could well have de-stabilized
the Government and the nation by igniting a series of cascading
‘tensions and turbulence’ is no longer doubted. But it is also true
that recent revelations by a government minister about JMB (Jamaatul
Mujahideen Bangladesh, a banned Islamist organization) links are not
only pre-mature but also unwise.
Earlier, Sheikh Hasina had expressed her support for the US war on
terror, and pledged to work for the formation of a joint anti-
terrorism taskforce by SAARC (South Asian Association for Regional
Cooperation) countries. Whether the rebellion will facilitate
Bangladesh in joining the US-led ‘war on terror club’ remains to be
seen. If it does, it will not help to build a strong national army
free of political aspirations. Nor will it aid the people in their
ongoing struggles for greater democratization of state and society.
Clearly, it will not be in Bangladesh’s national interest.
_____
[4] Nepal:
Nepali Times, 18 March 2009
PILLAY'S JOB
The United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights Navi Pillay has
large shoes to fill, that of her predecessor Louise Arbour who played
a crucial role in supporting human rights in Nepal.
by Kanak Mani Dixit
18 MARCH 2009
Pillay's job is actually tougher, because there is no black-and-
white, good-vs-evil situation in Nepal today, where the Maoists are
trying to find their feet in above-ground politics.
As with the human rights community of Nepal, therefore, the role of
OHCHR is to calibrate its challenge to state establishment that is
now run by the Maoists in a way that the ex-rebels are assisted in
their transformation without giving an inch when it comes to
accountability and an end to impunity.
The challenge in Nepal is the fact that there is a country-wide
lawlessness amidst a multitude of demands that come up from
historically marginalised communities, even while a constitution has
to be written where the many demands of developing a inclusive
society have to be incorporated. But just as the fundamental
principles of democracy shouldn't be neglected in the writing of the
statute, so must the globally recognised standards of human rights be
held sacrosanct.
The natural tendency for Nepal's Maoists has been to suggest that
human rights standards are relative, and that all is fair in the
fight for rights. Another method is to try to cloud the issue by
suggesting that those who fight for political and civil rights are
elitists who seek to divert attention from the real issues, which
have to do with economic and social rights.
There should be no need emphasise that the enjoyment of economic and
social rights itself requires complete adherence to universal
fundamental freedoms. There can be no right to food and good health
and social security without the right to life, freedom of press, rule
of law and an end to impunity. Today, the job of the rights defender
is more challenging than before because this is a transitional period
where we seek to bring those who respect human rights the least, are
sought to be converted to believers in the law.
The job of OHCHR in Nepal is made complex by the fact the National
Human Rights Commission itself is trying to find its feet, hampered
as it is by the lack of human rights orientation of some of its
commissioners, which includes a Maoist activist. There has also been
a distressing lack of coordination thus far between the High
Commissioner's office and the NHRC. At the same time, the Nepal
office of OHCHR has its term expiring in September 2009, and we fear
that perhaps the office will be too timid with the powers that be for
fear of being not renewed.
That attitude would be unfortunate, for OHCHR is the kind of
institution which should remain in Nepal to defend the citizens of
Nepal at a time of need, by right, and not because of the goodwill
shown by the Maoists in government. Now, more than ever, we need
international oversight over an elected government that still thinks
it needs to intimidate people with the threat of violence to rule.
_____
[5] Pakistan:
Human Rights Commission of Pakistan
JUDGES’ RESTORATION A GOOD FIRST STEP: HRCP
Press Release, March 16, 2009
Lahore: The Human Rights Commission of Pakistan (HRCP) has welcomed
the restoration of judiciary as a first step towards strengthening
democracy and rule of law and said the people of Pakistan have sent a
clear message that they will not settle for a sham democratic process.
A statement issued by the Commission on Monday said: “The HRCP
welcomes the restoration of superior court judges and congratulates
lawyers, the civil society, political parties – including the
Pakistan People’s Party – and above all the people of Pakistan, who
again demonstrated their ability for a worthy cause whenever they
found one. We wish Monday morning’s decision had been taken earlier.
Still the announcement revealed the difference of approach between a
military regime and a civilian democracy. This is a clear message
from the people to leaders of all political parties that they will
not settle for a sham democracy.
However, this is merely the first step. Real challenges now begin and
the people expect that they will get not only an independent
judiciary but also justice. This will not come about automatically
but will require some doing. The people also expect that the
restoration of judges will ensure the rule of law and independence of
judiciary and also that the parliament will make earnest efforts to
save the judiciary from the harmful effects of politicization.
The HRCP has all along been concerned about the lack of independence
of the Election Commission and of a satisfactory mechanism for the
appointment, tenure and terms of service of members of the superior
judiciary. An independent Election Commission is crucial for the
democratic system to go forward in a smooth and non-contentious
manner. Similarly, mechanisms for appointments and accountability of
judges must enjoy the confidence of the legal fraternity and the
people. The people expect speedy progress on federation-making,
guarantees of provincial autonomy and priority to economic concerns
of the people, specially their need for relief from unemployment and
poverty. In addition, just as people from all schools of thought had
come together for the cause of the judiciary and democracy, the
people expect all political parties to get together to promote
democratic governance and improve the level of social justice in the
country.”
Asma Jahangir Chairperson
o o o
The New York Times
March 16, 2009
TOUTING RELIGION, GRABBING LAND
by Patrick French
THE demonstrations across Pakistan last week that forced President
Asif Ali Zardari to reinstate the nation’s former chief justice,
following the attack by militants on the Sri Lankan cricket team in
Lahore, were simply the latest phase in the broad destabilization of
the country.
This was hardly to have been anticipated 18 months ago, when I flew
to Islamabad with Nawaz Sharif, the former prime minister. At that
time, the prospects were good: Mr. Sharif had made an agreement with
his main rival, Benazir Bhutto, to return the country to democracy.
“I am not afraid,” Mr. Sharif told me. “I am going home after seven
years. My primary concern is to put an end to the curse of
dictatorship and give some relief to the people of Pakistan.”
After we landed in Islamabad, I had dinner with the family of my
brother-in-law, Sana Ullah. Sana’s family comes from the Swat Valley,
a religiously conservative and beautiful region in the north known as
the Switzerland of Pakistan. It is, or was, a prosperous holiday
destination, attracting tourists from places like Japan because of
its ancient Buddhist heritage, and it was where Pakistani film makers
would go to shoot movies in a romantic mountain setting.
But the stories I heard that evening were full of foreboding. The
Swat Barbers’ Federation had just forbidden “English-style haircuts”
and the shaving of beards. Strange visitors — possibly Uzbeks — were
engaged in military training in the forests. A teenage boy told me,
almost in passing, that his female cousin’s school had been blown up.
Today the political situation is very different: Ms. Bhutto was
killed in a suicide attack in December 2007, Mr. Sharif has been
banned from public office, and Swat has become a killing field.
The region has been handed over to the Pakistani Taliban in a foolish
bargain made on behalf of Mr. Zardari’s government. Like most violent
revolutionary movements, the Taliban use social injustice and a half-
understood philosophy as an excuse to grab land and power. Houses and
property have been taken over, and the Taliban have announced that
people should pay 40 percent of their rent to their landlords and 60
percent to “jihad.”
In the district capital, Mingora, decapitated corpses were dangled
from lampposts with notices pinned to them stating the “un-Islamic”
action that merited death. At least 185 schools, most for girls, have
been closed. Government officials, journalists and security troops
have had their throats slit. Little wonder that most of my brother-in-
law’s family has fled, along with 400,000 others.
What many Westerners fail to understand is that the Swat Valley is
not one of Pakistan’s wild border areas. It is only 100 miles from
Islamabad. In the words of Shaheen Sardar Ali, a cousin of Sana’s who
is a law professor at Warwick University in England and was the first
female cabinet minister in the government of North-West Frontier
Province, “Swat is not somewhere you could ever see as being a
breeding ground for extremism.” She remembers going to school
unveiled as a child in the 1960s and studying alongside boys. But
today, any girl who goes to school is risking her life.
Shariah law has been imposed, allowing elderly clerics to dictate the
daily lives of the Swati people. President Zardari’s foreign
minister, Shah Mehmood Qureshi, describes this as “a local solution
to a local problem,” but the deal with the Taliban represents the
most serious blow to the country’s territorial integrity since the
civil war of 1971, when the land that became Bangladesh was given up.
When territory is surrendered in this way, it is very difficult for
the state to recover it. The central premise behind the war on
terrorism was that extremist groups should not be allowed sanctuaries
from which to threaten the rest of the world. In that context, the
loss of Swat offers the Taliban and other extremist groups a template
for the future.
Pakistan’s slide toward anarchy is similar to the conditions in
Afghanistan in the 1990s: it was easier then for the Afghan elite to
pretend that the political situation was likely to improve than to
face the truth and do something about it. The bickering factions in
Kabul allowed the Taliban to take control of large areas of southern
Afghanistan, refusing to see that this would only embolden the
Islamists to march on the capital.
Similarly, millenarian Islamists are now seeking to destroy Pakistan
as a nation-state, and realize that they have won a strategic victory
in Swat. President Obama’s hope of weaning “moderate” elements in
Afghanistan and Pakistan away from violence, as happened with Sunni
militants in Iraq, is stymied by the fact the Pakistani Taliban know
they are winning. Making a deal with them now is appeasement.
Worse, the Islamabad government has gained nothing from it. The
Lahore shootings showed how fragile the security situation remains.
Radical Sunni groups are more powerful than ever in the Punjab.
The Pakistani Army has been given billions of dollars by American
taxpayers to defeat the Taliban, and it has failed. Some of the money
even appears to have been diverted to the militants. The army has
limited skill in counterinsurgency tactics or in winning hearts and
minds; its main achievement over the last two decades has been in
training militants to fight Indian troops in Kashmir.
“The people in Swat have no employment, no money, and they are
terrified of the army,” Professor Ali told me. “Force is not an
alternative, it’s too late.” Pakistan’s civilian law enforcement
agencies need to be urgently reformed and strengthened.
The only way forward is for the government and those opposition
politicians, such as Mr. Sharif, who still have popular support to
unite with progressive elements inside the Army, and to recognize the
real and immediate danger of the Islamist threat. If they do not,
their country risks becoming a nuclear-armed Afghanistan.
_____
[6] India: A Tribute to Smitu Kothari
Narmada Bachao Andolan
62 M.G Marg, Badwani, Madhya Pradesh - 451551
Telefax: 07290-222464; E-mail: nba.medha(AT)gmail.com
Maitri Niwas, Tembewadi, Behind Kakawadi, Dhadgav, Dist. Nandurbar,
Maharashtra - 425414 — Telefax: 02595-220620
NBA SALUTES THE LIFE-LONG CONTRIBUTION OF SMITU KOTHARI TO PEOPLE’S
MOVEMENTS
Resolves to carry forward his vision for a just and pro-poor
development Narmada Bachao Andolan joins other people’s movements in
expressing its shock and grief at the most untimely demise of Smitu
Kothari, one of the most active, progressive and consistent voices
against the neo-liberal anti-poor agenda of privatization,
globalization and liberalization in recent times. A widely respected
scholar, visiting academic at the Cornell and Princeton Universities,
author of several publications on contemporary socio-political and
economic discourses and above all an indomitable activist, Smitu
Kothari, 59 passed away today early morning at 6 a.m owing to a
cardiac attack after having undergone a heart surgery yesterday at
AIIMS in Delhi. The cremation will be held at Lodi Road electric
Crematorium in South Delhi at 4pm on the 23rd March. The most
unexpected stroke came when Smitu was at a meeting of the Delhi
Solidarity Group and Himalaya Niti Abhiyan to discuss strategies for
strengthening the people’s struggles in Himachal Pradesh against
displacement, mining and environmental destruction on the 20th
afternoon, from where he was rushed to the AIIMS and was discharged
the same day as his ECG was found to be normal. However he was again
hospitalized a day later due to arterial complications and succumbed
during the post-operative care.
One of the founders of Lokayan ("Dialogue of the People"), and
Intercultural Resources, two centres in Delhi promoting exchange
between non-party political formations and concerned scholars and
other citizens from India and the rest of the world, he was actively
involved in ecological, cultural and human rights issues striving to
collectively forge a national and global alternative that is socially
just and ecologically sane and in this capacity has been vigorously
pursuing multifarious academic and activist initiatives. Development
induced displacement, people’s governance and social-environmental
movements were some of his core concerns. He was also one of the
striving spirits behind the Independent People’s Tribunal on the
World Bank Group in India held in 2007.
Smitu has also been a long time vocal supporter of the struggle of
the thousands of adivasis, farmers, labourers, fishworkers, potters
and all the project-affected people in the Narmada valley and
articulated their concerns at various fora both within India and
across continents.
A truly loving person, Smitu continues to be a source of inspiration
not just for people’s movements and struggles in India, but also to
voices of dissent and alternatives across the globe. NBA expresses
its heartfelt condolences to Smitu’s extended family of activists,
supporters and all peace and justice loving people. We salute his
decades of invaluable contribution to diverse people’s movements and
resolves to take forward his message and commitment to come together
and be united against all odds and strengthen our collective force
for justice.
Medha Patkar, Ashish Mandloi, Kamla Yadav, Kailash Awasya
_____
[7] India: Hindutva Expanding in Society
Frontline, March 28-April 10, 2009
WAYS OF HINDUTVA
by K.N. Panikkar
The violence in Gujarat and Orissa has generated disgust towards the
Sangh Parivar, but Hindu communalism is seeking to refurbish its image.
AP
NO other phenomenon has affected life in the subcontinent so
adversely as communalism. When this “monster” came on the stage as
early as the beginning of the 18th century, as evidenced by a
communal riot in Ahmedabad, no one perhaps had an inkling about the
magnitude and character it might assume in future.
Although it took a long time for it to take centre stage, when it
did, it had a devastating effect on Indian polity and society. Its
inherent ability to divide people on the basis of religion and sow
the seeds of mutual hatred led to the partition of the country. The
people of India and Pakistan can ill afford to forget the human
tragedy that Partition entailed. The pathos of Partition, which the
Urdu writer Sadat Ali Manto so touchingly captured in Toba Tek Sing
and Khol Do, or the masterly account in Bhishm Sahni’s Hindi novel,
Tamas, tell us how devastating and brutal communalism can be.
The heart-rending experience of Partition, however, did not put an
end to communalism. It only exacerbated it, at least in India, as the
memories of inter-communal violence were invoked for political
mobilisation. As a result, during the post-Independence period,
communalism continued to plague social consciousness and colour
political perspectives in the country. By the end of the 20th
century, its influence had assumed such proportions that Hindu
communal forces succeeded in wielding power at the Centre and in some
States. This success heralded a new stage in the development of
communalism and at the same time a tumultuous phase in the political
history of the nation.
The access to power that the communal forces gained by the end of the
20th century was important for a variety of reasons. Among them, the
most significant was the two-fold agenda that the communal forces
pursued in order to perpetuate the newly acquired political power.
They realised that controlling the state institutions in itself was
not sufficient if they were to consolidate power and exercise it for
a long time to their political advantage. It would be necessary to
transform the character of the administration itself.
The secular administrative practices, which the Indian state had
followed since Independence, albeit with limitations, were out of
sync with the new regime. The Sangh Parivar expected from the state
institutions active involvement in the pursuit of its communal
agenda. In other words, it wanted the administration to shed its
secular character and serve as the communal arm of the state. In
pursuit of this objective, the governments led by the Bharatiya
Janata Party (BJP), both at the Centre and in the States, ensured
that communal elements were extensively, if not exclusively,
recruited into various branches of the administration.
The extent to which it succeeded in this endeavour is difficult to
ascertain, but it is fairly apparent that a conscious policy to
induct Sangh Parivar cadre was followed. A good example is the
police. It is widely reported that the police force in States ruled
by the BJP, such as Rajasthan, Madhya Pradesh and Gujarat, has been
“saffronised” by inducting recruits from the Sangh Parivar. The
consequences are by now well known. In the communal conflagration in
Gujarat in 2002, the police not only refused to intervene to save the
victims but actually abetted members of organisations such as the
Vishwa Hindu Parishad (VHP) and the Bajrang Dal in their crimes.
Police partisanship has also been reported from Karnataka, Madhya
Pradesh and other States in which the BJP is or was in power. Almost
all state institutions underwent such a transformation under BJP
rule. When the National Democratic Alliance was defeated in the last
elections, it was hoped that the secular character of the
administration would be retrieved. However, it did not happen. The
lack of political will was not the only reason. The communal elements
were so well entrenched in the administration that they could prevent
the attempts to recover secular practices. This has led to a paradox:
a government pledged to secularism, but an administration
predominantly manned by communal elements. As a result, communal
influence remained unabated in administration. Even the Army, it is
reported, was not free from the communal influence. If so, it is
possible that the example of Lieutenant Colonel S.K. Purohit, who is
accused of being the brain behind the Malegaon bomb blast, may not be
an isolated instance.
What distinguished BJP rule from the previous administrations was the
manner in which the government was used to realise the political
agenda of creating a Hindu state. The Sangh Parivar looked upon the
government not from the perspective of what was immediately possible,
but as an instrument to create a communal future. As such, its main
interest was to construct a social and political consciousness that
would usher in and sustain a Hindu nation. That was the purpose for
which the institutions of the state, particularly the ideological
apparatuses, were used extensively.
Almost every initiative in the fields of education and culture were
undertaken with such an intention. In order to realise it, the
ideological apparatuses of the state were placed under the control of
communal activists, ideologues and fellow travellers. They rewrote
the national agenda in communal terms. Their interventions in the
educational, cultural and intellectual fields sought to privilege
indigenous knowledge over others and thus create a Hindu nationalist
fervour. In the process, they sought to redefine the nation as Hindu.
[. . .]
http://www.frontline.in/stories/20090410260702600.htm
o o o
FROM KANDHAMAL TO KARAVALI: THE UGLY FACE OF SANGH PARIVAR
A report by 9 human rights organisations
http://www.sacw.net/article764.html
HINDUTVAS IDEOLOGICAL TESTING GROUND IN SOUTH
by Parvathi Menon (The Hindu, March 16, 2009)
http://www.hindu.com/2009/03/16/stories/2009031656131000.htm
A STENCH THAT IS ALL TOO FAMILIAR
by Siddharth Varadarajan (The Hindu, March 24, 2009)
Varun Gandhi’s bigotry against Muslims is hardwired into the DNA of
the BJP and the sangh parivar. That is why he is still his party’s
candidate for the elections.
http://www.hindu.com/2009/03/24/stories/2009032458930800.htm
WHY ‘HATE SPEECH’?
by Ram Puniyani
http://communalism.blogspot.com/2009/03/varun-gandhis-hate-speech.html
ACT FIRMLY, SWIFTLY TO BAR HATE SPEECH (Editorial, The Asian Age)
http://communalism.blogspot.com/2009/03/act-firmly-on-hate-speech.html
VENOMOUS COMMUNALISM (Editorial, The Hindu)
Varun Gandhi’s hate speech during an election rally in Pilibhit,
Uttar Pradesh, was couched in language so crude and so violent that
it has made hardened communalists blush.
http://www.hindu.com/2009/03/20/stories/2009032055110800.htm
GENERALS OF SAFFRON
by Vijay Prashad (Economic and Political Weekly, March 14 - March 20,
2009)
Neither are Sonal Shah’s associations with the Hindutva organisations
in the United States as innocuous nor are her critics McCarthyites
http://epw.in/epw//uploads/articles/13284.pdf
HINDU EXTREMISTS WRECK PLANS FOR STATUE OF "CHRISTIAN" CHARLIE CHAPLIN
by Rhys Blakely
http://communalism.blogspot.com/2009/03/karnataka-film-maker-caves-in-
after.html
_____
[8] Book Review
IN OTHER ROOMS, OTHER WONDERS
Review by William Dalrymple
Published: March 7 2009 01:16 | Last updated: March 7 2009 01:16
In Other Rooms, Other Wonders
By Daniyal Mueenuddin
WW Norton & Co $23.95 224 pages
It was an Indian novel, The White Tiger, that won last year’s Booker
Prize, and another piece of Indian fiction, Q&A, that was adapted
into this year’s Oscar winner, Slumdog Millionaire. But 2009
nevertheless looks set to be the year that Pakistan emerges from the
literary shadow of its great neighbour. Just as Pakistan as a nation
state seems to be disintegrating, Pakistan as a force in literature
is gaining ever greater cohesion.
Until two or three years ago, Pakistan seemed to be a literary desert
in both Urdu and English. Now, quite suddenly, it has produced a
cluster of remarkable bright young novelists able to match anything
coming out India: in fiction, Nadeem Aslam, Mohsin Hamid, Mohammed
Hanif and Kamila Shamsie; and in non-fiction, Ahmed Rashid and Ayesha
Siddiqa.
At the literature festival I helped direct in Jaipur this January, it
was the Pakistani contingent that stole the show – despite attempts
by Hindu fundamentalist parties to ban Pakistani books from Indian
shelfspace. The writers spoke eloquently about the difficulty of
writing in such a volatile environment – Aslam talked of “writing
fast with a burning quill”. He and Hanif, author of A Case of
Exploding Mangoes, compared their experiences to what the writers of
Latin America faced in the 1970s: a repressive political environment
that could not be escaped, and which had to be confronted on the page.
If there was one thing the new Pakistani fiction seemed to lack, it
was a Midnight’s Children – a single text to which the word
masterpiece could unquestionably be attached. Now that moment may
have come in the shape of Daniyal Mueenuddin and his outstanding
collection of short stories, In Other Rooms, Other Wonders. It is one
of the most startlingly authentic works of fiction to come out of
south Asia this decade, rooted in a rural landscape like the stories
of RK Narayan, but far bleaker and blacker than anything in Narayan’s
Malgudi tales. The trajectory of each story ends, almost inevitably,
in a shell-burst of loss and tragedy.
Like Rushdie’s Midnight’s Children, Other Rooms is a book that seems
at first to come out of nowhere, owing nothing to the literature
produced by the writer’s contemporaries or compatriots. But while
Midnight’s Children in reality leapfrogged Europe to seek inspiration
in the magic realist writing of Latin America, Other Rooms has made a
stranger leap still. It looks for inspiration not in the writing of
south Asia or indeed anywhere else in the modern world, but instead
draws on the stylistic example of Turgenev and Chekhov, and the soul-
searing bleakness of vision of Dostoevsky or Gogol – but with the
action transposed from the Russian steppe to the Pakistani Punjab.
Like Turgenev in his Sketches from a Hunter’s Album, Mueenuddin
creates a world peopled by wholly believable rural folk who cluster
around the townhouses and estates of the landlord, KK Harooni
(clearly modelled on Mueenuddin’s own father), all sketched with
wonderful economy and lightness. We meet Rezak, who lives in a little
hut on the edge of the estate, and who finds happiness with a young
mute wife, who then mysteriously disappears, presumed abducted; the
ingenious “Nawabdin Electrician” with his “signature ability, a
technique for cheating the electric company by slowing down the
revolutions of electric metres”, who is shot by a robber and nearly
killed; Saleema the kitchen maid who falls in love with Rafik the
butler and bears him a child, but who is abandoned when Harooni dies
and Rafik returns to his wife. She ends her days begging at a road
junction, cradling “the little boy in her arms, holding him up to the
windows of cars ... one of the sparrows of Lahore”.
Mueenuddin’s Pakistan is visually beautiful – there are wonderful
sketches of the rhythms of the landscape with its banyan trees and
mango orchards. But it is brutal and savage too. Individuals can be
generous and dutiful, but fate is rarely kind: men are killed, women
are abducted or taken to the Karachi brothels, while the police beat
the innocent and helpless, and the powerful trample on the poor.
Emotions are left unspoken in this conservative society; apparently
flexible barriers of class and wealth prove in the end cruelly
insurmountable. Jaglani, the unscrupulous land agent, takes another
man’s wife: “Please, Chaudrey Sahib, you and I grew up together in
Dunyapur, we played together as children,” says the husband. “I beg
you don’t take what’s mine. You have so much, and I so little.” “I
have so much because I took what I wanted,” replies Jaglani. “Go away.”
If Other Rooms is unlike anything recently published in India, this
is partly because of the very different trajectories the two
countries have taken since 1947. Almost immediately after
Independence, the Congress party broke the power of the Indian
landowners, emasculating them with income tax and land ceiling acts
that instantly shredded their estates. This legislation was never
passed in Pakistan, which continued to be dominated by its old feudal
elite, just as Tsarist Russia once was.
So while most successful Indian writers in English are the product of
urban middle-class backgrounds and now tend to live in London or New
York, there are no Indian Daniyal Mueenuddins who live like Tolstoy
or Turgenev on their estates. Mueenuddin has lived on his own as a
farmer for 20 years, hundreds of miles from the nearest urban centre,
and can describe with real authenticity the rural world he daily
inhabits.
It is true that the quality of a writer’s fiction should never be
judged by his home address – Joyce after all wrote the Dublin of
Ulysses from Trieste. Yet here the difference is striking. Compared
to the thwarted, tragic grandeur of Mueenuddin’s women, Deeti, the
opium farmer’s wife who is the heroine of Amitav Ghosh’s Sea of
Poppies, seems paper-thin: Bihar as imagined from Brooklyn.
The critic Pankaj Mishra has attacked the “slickly exilic version of
India” manufactured by diasporic English-language writers from India,
describing them as a “cosmopolitan third world elite”, their fictions
“suffused with nostalgia”. No one could make this charge of
Mueenuddin. His stories have not just a fluency and perfection of
shape; above all they have an authenticity of observation and
dialogue rooted from long experience living among the people he is
writing about. The result is a unique book, probably the best fiction
ever written in English about Pakistan, and one of the best to come
out of south Asia in a very long time.
William Dalrymple is author of “The Last Mughal’” (Bloomsbury). His
new book, “Nine Lives: Searching for the Sacred in Modern India” is
published by Bloomsbury in October
Copyright The Financial Times Limited 2009
_____
[9] MISCELLANEA:
(i) BEWARE HUMAN RIGHTS FUNDAMENTALISM!
by Mahmood Mamdani
(Mail and Guardian Online, March 20 2009)
When former South African president Thabo Mbeki makes the African
case for a postponement of the International Criminal Court's (ICC)
indictment of President Omar al-Bashir of Sudan, what can he say with
dignity and foresight?
To begin with, he should remind his audience that nowhere in the
world have rights existed outside an enabling political context. No
democracy enforces a fixed standard of rights regardless of the
country's political context. Few can forget how the Bush
administration diluted the Bill of Rights in the interest of pursuing
Homeland Security. In the relation between law and politics, politics
is always paramount. Precisely because the struggle for rights is a
political struggle, enforcers of rights -- and not just its violators
-- need to be held politically accountable lest they turn rights
enforcement into a private vendetta.
Mbeki can then share with his audience the lessons Africans have
learned in the struggle for peace and justice over the past several
decades. Contrary to what many think, this lesson is not that there
needs to be a trade-off between peace and justice. The real trade-off
is between different forms of justice.This became evident with the
settlement to end apartheid. That settlement was possible because the
political leadership of the anti-apartheid struggle prioritised
political justice over criminal justice. The rationale was simple:
where there was no victor, one would need the cooperation of the very
leaders who would otherwise be charged with war crimes to end the
fighting and initiate political reforms. The essence of Kempton Park
can be summed up in a single phrase: forgive but do not forget.
Forgive all past crimes -- in plain words, immunity from prosecution
-- provided both sides agree to change the rules to assure political
justice for the living.
The South African lesson has guided African practice in other
difficult situations. In Mozambique Renamo sits in Parliament instead
of in jail or in the dock. In South Sudan, too, there would have been
neither peace nor a reform of the political system without an
agreement not to pursue criminal justice.Why not in Darfur?
Mbeki would also be well advised to keep in mind that in the court of
public opinion -- unlike in a court of law -- the accused is
considered guilty until proven innocent.
The public needs to be reminded that when the justices of the ICC
granted the prosecutor's application for a warrant to arrest the
president of Sudan, they were not issuing a verdict of guilty. The
justices were not meant to assess the facts put before them by the
prosecutor, but to ask a different question: if those facts were
assumed to be true, would the president of Sudan have a case to
answer? Unlike court, which took the facts for granted at the pre-
trial stage, we need to ask: to what extent are these facts true?
And, to the extent they are true, are they the whole truth?
The prosecutor's case
The prosecutor's application charged President al-Bashir with (a)
polarising Darfuri tribes into two races (Arab and Zurga or Black),
(b) waging a violent conflict (2003-2005) leading to the ethnic
cleansing of Zurga ethnic groups from their traditional tribal lands,
and (c) and planning the malnutrition, rape and torture of internally
displaced persons (IDPs) so as to "slow death" in the camps -- a
process that the prosecutor claimed went on from 2003 to the time the
application was submitted in 2008.
The racialisation of identities in Darfur had its roots in the
British colonial period. As early as the late 1920s, the British
tried to organise two confederations in Darfur: one "Arab", the other
"Zurga" or black. Racialised identities were incorporated in the
census and provided the frame for government policy and
administration. In spite of official policy, Arabs never constituted
a single racial group. Contemporary scholarship has shown that the
Arab tribes of Sudan were not migrants from the Middle East but
indigenous groups that became Arabs starting in the 18th century.
This is why there can be no single history of Arab tribes of Sudan.
Little unites privileged sedentary tribes of riverine Sudan and
impoverished nomads of Western Sudan. Unlike the Arabs of riverine
north, who have tended to identify with power, the Arabs of Darfur
are the most marginalised group in a marginalised province.
The largest of the Arab tribes in Darfur, the cattle nomads of the
south, were never involved in the government-organised
counterinsurgency. Those involved -- the camel nomads of the north
and refugees from Chad -- were from among the poorest of the poor.
The idea that the Arabs of Darfur were part of a single cohesive
"Arab" bloc facing "black Africans" is a recent invention driven
mainly by an external media, and now by the ICC. Its main effect has
been to demonise "Arabs" and to obscure the real causes of the conflict.
CONTINUES BELOW
Who, then, has been fighting whom in Darfur, and why? The short
answer is that this has been a conflict over land, triggered by four
different but related causes: the land system, environmental
degradation, the spillover of the four decade-long civil war in Chad
and the brutal counterinsurgency waged by the al-Bashir government in
2003 and 2004.
* The deep cause was the colonial system, which reorganised
Darfur as a discriminatory patchwork of tribal homeland where settled
peasant tribes were granted large homelands in which they were
considered natives. In contrast, camel nomads with no settled
villages found themselves without a homeland and so were not
acknowledged as natives anywhere. When it came to granting access to
land, participating in local administration and the resolution of
local disputes, homeland administrations favoured so-called native
over non-native tribes.
* The second cause of the conflict was desertification. Studies
from the United Nations Environment Programme show that the Sahara
expanded by 100km in four decades, and that this process reached its
high point in the mid-1980s, pushing all tribes of North Darfur to
more fertile lands further south. The resulting land conflict was not
between races, Arab and Zurga, but between tribes with homelands and
those without. Contemporary observers such as the Darfuri
anthropologist Sharif Harir traced the unprecedented brutality of the
violence in the 1987-1989 war to the fact that sheer survival was at
stake.
* The third was the Cold War, with its two sides -- the
tripartite alliance of Reaganite United States, France and Israel on
the one hand, and Libya backed up by the Soviet Union on the other --
arming different factions in neighbouring Chad. As successive armed
groups took turns ruling Chad, opposition groups took shelter in
Darfur, where they mobilised and armed. The easy availability of arms
rapidly militarised the inter-tribal conflict in Darfur.Regional and
international powers got involved in the Darfur conflict long before
the Khartoum government did, but no one reading the prosecutor's
application would be aware of this fact.
* The final cause that aggravated the land conflict in Darfur
was the brutal counterinsurgency unleashed by the al-Bashir regime in
2003 to 2004 in response to an insurgency led by three major tribes
in the region: the Fur, the Masalit and the Zaghawa.
Four wrong assumptions
The prosecutor's application makes four erroneous assumptions, all of
them so he can pin the full blame of the violence on al-Bashir. This
is how the prosecutor put it to journalists at The Hague: "What
happened in Darfur is a consequence of al-Bashir's will."
The first error is to identify the duration of the conflict in Darfur
with the presidency of al-Bashir. Yet, the conflict in Darfur began
as a civil war in 1987, before al-Bashir and his group came to power,
and long before the cycle of insurgency and counterinsurgency that
began in 2003. The civil war has become entangled with the
counterinsurgency, though they have separate causes. Whereas the
insurgency was a rebel challenge to power in Khartoum, the civil war
was triggered by the effects of drought and desertification, and
intensified by two factors, one internal, the other external, one the
failure to reform the system of tribal homelands and the other an
effect of the ongoing civil war in Chad.
The second error is to assume that excess deaths in Darfur are the
result of a single cause: violence. But the fact is that there have
been two separate if interconnected causes: drought and
desertification on the one hand, and direct violence on the other.
World Health Organisation sources -- considered the most reliable
source of mortality statistics by the US Government Accountability
Office in its 2006 evaluation -- trace these deaths to two major
causes:about 70% to 80% to drought-related diarrhoea and 20% to 30%
to direct violence.
The third error is to assume a single author of violent deaths and
rape. In his eagerness to make the prosecution's case, Moreno-Ocampo
not only obscured the origins of the violence in Darfur, he also went
on to portray life in the internally displaced persons camps in
Darfur as a contemporary version of life in Nazi concentration camps
in Europe, with al-Bashir cast in the role of the Führer. At the
press conference announcing the case against the president of Sudan,
the prosecutor said: "Al-Bashir organised the destitution, insecurity
and harassment of the survivors. He did not need bullets. He used
other weapons: rape, hunger and fear. As efficient, but silent."
To be sure, there were ongoing incidents of rape in Darfur, as there
are indeed in most conflict situations where armed young men confront
unarmed young women. This much was recognised by the US special envoy
to Sudan, Andrew S Natsios, in his testimony before the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee on April 11 2007: "The government has
lost control of large parts of the province now. And some of the
rapes, by the way, that are going on are by rebels raping women in
their own tribes. We know in one of the refugee camps, it's now
controlled by the rebels, formally. There have been terrible
atrocities committed by the rebels against the people in the camps."
Rebels, like government soldiers and the paramilitary Janjaweed, have
authored both rape and the killing of civilians. Take figures newly
released by the United Nations-African Union Mission in Darfur
(UNAMID) in Khartoum. UNAMID, which keeps a count of each individual
death, including its circumstance, calculates the total number of
conflict-related civilian deaths in the year 2008 at 1 520. Of these,
600 are said to be the result of conflicts over grazing lands among
Arab tribes. When it comes to the remaining 920, UNAMID says that
more civilians were killed by rebel movements than by government-
organised counterinsurgency forces.
The fourth erroneous assumption is that the situation has not changed
in Darfur since the onset of the counterinsurgency in 2003. In Moreno-
Ocampo's own words: "In April 2008, the United Nations estimated the
total number of deaths since 2003 at 300 000." This estimate came
from John Holmes, UN under-secretary general for humanitarian
affairs. This is how Holmes put it in the first place: "A study in
2006 suggested that 200 000 had lost their lives from the combined
effect of the conflict. That figure must be much higher now, perhaps
half as much again." There are two qualifications here, and Moreno-
Ocampo glossed over both. The first was that these mortality figures
were said to be the result of "a combined effect", referring to
direct violence and drought. The second qualification was explained
by Reuters: "United Nations cautioned reporters that the number was
not a scientific estimate but a 'reasonable extrapolation'." The
assumption underlying the extrapolation -- that the level of
mortality has not changed in Darfur from 2003 on -- was contradicted
by the UN's own technical staff in Sudan. As Julie Flint explained in
the New York Times of July 6 2007 and the Independent (London) of
July 31 2007, UN sources spoke of a sharp drop in mortality rates in
Darfur from early 2005, so much so that these sources report
mortality estimates had dipped to as low as below 200 per month,
lower than the number that would constitute an emergency.
That the ICC has politicised the issue of justice is no reason to
sidestep the question of accountability. The kernel of truth in the
prosecutor's application concerns 2003-04, when Darfur was the site
of mass deaths. This was mass murder, but not genocide. Its authors
were several, not just the government of Sudan. There is no doubt
that the perpetrators of violence should be held accountable, but
when and how is a political decision that cannot belong to the ICC
prosecutor. More than the innocence or guilt of the president of
Sudan, it is the relationship between law and politics -- including
the politicisation of the ICC -- that poses an issue of greater
concern to Africa.
The debate has hitherto focused on the need to have the same rules
for all war criminals, regardless of national origin or political
orientation. Only then can the rules claim to be just, so that
justice may act as deterrence. If, however, justice masquerades as
selective punishment, only to those who dare transgress American
power, critics have pointed out that the exercise will not be a
deterrent to potential war criminals, but only to those who dare
challenge American power.
I have suggested that the more important question is that of the
larger political consequences of a fundamentalist pursuit of criminal
justice by those determined to enforce criminal justice regardless of
its political context or consequence. Take one example. If the ICC
were to have the political will and courage to try war criminals in
the US War on Terror, we can say with confidence that the American
political system is strong enough to contain its political fallout.
There is little chance of "red states" going to war against "blue
states". But can one say with any confidence that the price of single-
mindedly pursuing criminal justice in Sudan will not be a renewed
civil war? Such a fundamentalist pursuit should be named vengeance,
not justice.This is why we need to subordinate criminal
accountability to a larger pursuit, that for political reform.
Mahmood Mamdani is Herbert Lehman Professor of Government Columbia
University
o o o
(ii) DARWIN IN TURKEY :
'Most Express Sympathy for the Censorship'
(03/17/2009)
The firing of a magazine editor in Turkey over her intention to put a
story about Darwin's evolution theory on the cover has generated a
flood of criticism. SPIEGEL ONLINE spoke with the editor about just
how conservative Turkish society has become.
No issue divides Turks more than the country's alleged creeping
Islamization. Early last week, the Scientific and Technological
Research Council of Turkey (Tubitak) sparked an international
controversy after it prevented the publication of a cover story about
Charles Darwin's evolution theory in Bilim ve Teknik (Science and
Technology), one of the country's leading science journals. The
publication's editor-in-chief, 41-year-old Cigdem Atakuman, claims
she was fired as a result of the incident.
Charles Darwin: a theory too hot for Turkey?
Charles Darwin: a theory too hot for Turkey?
Secular Turks are outraged and the world is watching. Did Tubitak,
which publishes Bilim ve Teknik, censor a feature about the theory of
evolution under pressure from the conservative Islamic-oriented AKP-
led government because it couldn't be reconciled with Muslim
religious beliefs?
A senior Tubitak official has blamed the editor for removing the
story, according to Turkish daily Hürriyet, saying changes were made
at the last minute and rushed. But Atakuman has denied the
allegation, saying the deputy head of the council, Ömer Cebeci, told
her the cover story was too controversial and that he no longer
trusted her to responsibly perform her duties. The paper claims the
incident has been reduced to a case of "one person's word against the
other's."
In an interview with SPIEGEL ONLINE, Atakuman defends her position
and says she is worried about the future of bias-free science in her
country.
SPIEGEL ONLINE: Ms. Atakuman, is it true that you were fired?
Cigdem Atakuman: Yes, it's true. Up until now, there has been no
official statement. But I was made to understand, verbally, that I
have no future as the editor-in-chief of Bilim ve Teknik.
SPIEGEL ONLINE: Who told you that?
Atakuman: Ömer Cebeci, the vice chairman of the council.
SPIEGEL ONLINE: What reasoning did he provide?
Atakuman: The cover story about Darwin was a big mistake, an
unforgivable error. In the current political climate in Turkey,
something like that could be perceived as a provocation.
SPIEGEL ONLINE: In what political climate?
Atakuman: I believe Professor Cebeci was referring to the upcoming
municipal elections in our country. He may also have meant other
political developments that block prejudice-free science. But I think
it was about the elections.
SPIEGEL ONLINE: And why? Is it because the governing party's rank and
file doesn't like the idea of a major cover story about evolution?
Atakuman: I assume so. But I find it extremely difficult to
comprehend. I've been working together with Professor Cebeci since
December 2008. Before that I didn't know him -- I was neither
familiar with his scientific background nor his views. I don't know
what his understanding of science is.
SPIEGEL ONLINE: Could it actually be the case that he is correct? Is
the theory of evolution, in fact, a provocation in Turkey?
Atakuman: Take a look at the Web site of Nature, the world's most
renowned science magazine. They are also reporting about censorship
of the Darwin story and there are many reader commentaries from
Turks. Most of them express their sympathies for the censorship of
the Darwin story and for creationism.
SPIEGEL ONLINE: Darwin isn't especially popular in Turkey. Only one
in four believes in the theory of evolution. How do you explain that?
Atakuman: I see the causes in our system of education. Evolution
isn't the only thing taught badly, if it is taught at all -- most
things are badly taught.
SPIEGEL ONLINE: Do you think that scientific neutrality is in danger
as a result of this incident?
Atakuman: That's not really what I want to believe, but in recent
days, I have had concerns about whether we will still be able to work
free of ideology in the future. Since Professor Cebeci took office,
we have experienced several problems -- the naming of members of the
editorial board, for example.
SPIEGEL ONLINE: Is the issue of Darwin now being hushed up?
Atakuman: No, I believe there will be other publications. This whole
affair has created awareness of Darwin. Many people now want to get
informed. There will also be many events in Turkey commemorating
Darwin's 200th birthday.
SPIEGEL ONLINE: Do you know Harun Yahya, the famous Turkish creationist?
Atakuman: Not personally, but I know from my European colleagues that
they have all received a big, heavy book from him entitled "The Atlas
of Creation." I also have a copy.
SPIEGEL ONLINE: It must be frustrating that Harun Yahya has
distributed millions of copies of his book, whereas your cover story
will not be appearing in Turkey's most famous science magazine.
Atakuman: This creation atlas is an impressive work -- very
colourful, full of pictures. But intellectually, it impresses me less
-- as little as creationism does.
Interview conducted by Daniel Steinvorth.
o o o
RFI INTERVIEW: REBBECA HOLDERS, SPOKESPERSON FOR THE NGO TREATMENT
ACTION CAMPAIGN
by Anustup Roy (18/03/2009)
http://telechargement.rfi.fr.edgesuite.net/rfi/anglais/audio/modules/
actuen/R111/Pope_Condom_For_Internet.mp3
ONLINE PETITION: THE POPE VS CONDOMS
Pope Benedict's statement last week that condoms may aggravate the
AIDS epidemic could put millions of lives at risk. Sign the petition
to the Pope to take care not to undermine proven AIDS prevention work!
http://www.avaaz.org/en/pope_benedict_petition/?cl=205560339&v=3055
______
[8] Announcements:
(i)
Traumatised Tribals of Orissa Cant Vote: Will meet the Press (25
March 2009, New Delhi)
Citizens for Justice and Peace
Delegation of 20 tribals and indigenous peoples from the Kandhmahals
region of Orissa badly traumatised by the communal violence
accompanied by local activists are in the capital since March 23 and
will meet the Election Commission on Wednesday March 25, 2009. The
delegation is appealing to the Election Commission to address
seriously the issue of disenfranchisement of over 22,000 indigenous
peoples from this district and either consider postponement of
elections in these areas or implement special measures to ensure
their franchise for the displaced.
The delegation will meet the press at the Press Club of India on
March 25 at 2 p.m.
Over the three day visit, the delegation has also met the National
Human Rights Commission, the National Minorities Commission and the
office of the United Nations Commmissioner for Human Rights. To
address the critical issues of the state meetings with national
political parties have also been organised.
On March 23 the petition file by victims and activists came up for
hearing before the apex court and Chief Justice Balakrishnan posted
it along with the Archbishops matter for hearing on April 6. The main
prayer in the petition is for restraining the Orissa administration
from forcible closure of relief camps and the stay on the functioning
of the camp courts that in the situation where tribal Christians are
unable to be pesent at the hearings are in effect rendering tribals
landless. The entire visit has been supported by Citizens for Justice
and Peace.
Teesta Setalvad, Secretary
o o o
(ii)
Talk at Institute for Religion, Culture, and Public Life (New York)
The Nationalist Hindu Militias
Wednesday, March 25, 12:30-2pm
International Affairs Building, Room 707
420 West 118th Street
_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/
S o u t h A s i a C i t i z e n s W i r e
Buzz for secularism, on the dangers of fundamentalism(s), on
matters of peace and democratisation in South
Asia. An offshoot of South Asia Citizens Web: www.sacw.net/
DISCLAIMER: Opinions expressed in materials carried in the posts do not
necessarily reflect the views of SACW compilers.
More information about the SACW
mailing list