SACW | August 15-16, 2008 / Pakistan: 61 years Musharraf's exit / Bangladesh Deals? / NSG Reject India deal / Ban SIMI and its Hindutva equivalents

[Harsh Kapoor]

South Asia Citizens Wire | August 15-16, 2008 | 
Dispatch No. 2552 - Year 10 running

[1] Pakistan:
   (i) Back to 1947 (I.A. Rehman)
   (ii) Changing concept of independence (Mubarak Ali)
  (iii)  Musharraf will be gone in days (Tariq Ali)
   (iv) Where Do Musharraf and Pakistan Go Now? (J. Sri Raman)
[2] Bangladesh: Time to Do Deals? (Farid Bakht)
[3] India: The Amarnath Shrine Board Crisis in Jammu and Kashmir
(i) Citizens appeal to defuse the crisis in Jammu and Kashmir
(ii) Gun Salutes for August 15, 2008 (Shuddhabrata Sengupta)
(iii) In Lasjan, some lessons in hate (Praveen Swami)
[4] India: SIMI and similar Hindutva equivalents 
need to be banned (Javed Anand)
[5] India: U.S. NSG proposal on India should be flatly rejected (ACA)
   + India Nuclear Deal: Letter to govts represented on the NSG
[6] Let Them Dance in Bangalore (Editorial, Times of India)
[7] Announcements:
Centre for Policy Alternatives Publications Launch (Colombo, 19 August 2008)

______

[1]

Dawn
August 14, 2008

BACK TO 1947

by I.A. Rehman

FROM a day of pure joy for Pakistan's citizens, 
Aug 14 has gradually become an occasion for 
reflection. Over the past many years, reflection 
has assumed the form of a somewhat worrisome 
reappraisal, and the room for celebration has 
been shrinking.

The principal reason for this is the common 
citizen's perception that today's Pakistan is not 
what its founders had set out to establish. Apart 
from the fact that the country's map is not what 
it originally was and that it has not become one 
of the greatest nations of the world the 
Quaid-i-Azam had said on Aug 11, 1947 it could 
become, the majority has still not received the 
promised fruits of freedom.

The main features of the Pakistan dream were that 
the country would be the homeland of a Pakistani 
nation whose members were equal regardless of 
their caste or creed; that it was to be a 
federation whose constituent units were 
autonomous and sovereign; that its constitution 
would be what the people decided; that its form 
of government would be a people's democracy and 
in any case it was not going to be a theocracy; 
that the people would be free to shape their 
lives in accordance with their culture and 
traditions. The realisation that this dream has 
remained largely, if not wholly, unrealised is of 
no consequence if the causes of this predicament 
are not thoroughly analysed.

Conventional wisdom identifies several occasions 
when the state of Pakistan got derailed but it 
may be more appropriate to admit that 
state-building efforts left much to be desired. 
What happened on Aug 14, 1947 was no more than 
the laying of the foundation stone of a new 
state. The task of constructing the state was not 
begun for many years, and later on, the political 
engineers proved insincere or lost their way.

The Pakistan dream was shattered during the nine 
years the country was governed in accordance with 
the Government of India Act of 1935, wrongfully 
christened as the new state's provisional 
constitution. The damage done to the 
state-in-the-making under the then scheme of 
things has yet to be fully assessed. The unitary 
form of government envisaged by the Act was, over 
time, adopted by the ruling elite as the only 
possible norm and the need to raise a federal 
structure was ignored. This strained the fragile 
bonds of unity the struggle for Pakistan had 
forged.

The failure to appreciate the elementary rights 
of the provinces led to the abandonment of 
democratic imperatives. By the middle of the 
1950s, Pakistan had become a vulgarised copy of 
the colonial state headed by an absolute ruler 
who relied wholly on chicanery and was 
incompetent to boot. That this system could 
easily be pushed over by another brand of 
absolute ruler, one who derived sanction from 
armed might and could claim slightly better 
service delivery, was soon confirmed.

Perhaps the greatest disservices done to Pakistan 
in those years were, firstly, the transformation 
of a fledgling democracy into a quasi-theocratic 
garrison state. The Objectives Resolution and the 
belief-related provisions of the 1956 
Constitution were thought of as essential props 
for a state locked in a colonial mould. Further, 
state security was installed as the ruling deity 
in the national pantheon. The state could become 
impregnably strong, it was asserted, if it had 
guns in abundance even if its people went hungry, 
remained illiterate and became sick in body and 
mind. Eventually the people's plight came to be 
rationalised as an unavoidable (even if 
unbearable) cost of freedom.

Secondly, the period 1947-56 saw the 
consolidation of an authoritarian mindset. The 
governor-general repudiated the basics of 
Pakistan by functioning like a viceroy of 
pre-Partition India. The system of one-man rule 
became fairly well entrenched by 1956 and it was 
further streamlined by military rulers, from Ayub 
Khan to Pervez Musharraf. So deep has the system 
of one-man rule struck root in Pakistan that 
civilian rulers, who have been inducted as 
watchmen or clerks appointed to fill leave 
vacancies, have also tended to function as 
authoritarian despots who are subject neither to 
the constitution nor the wishes of the people. 
They have been responsible for convincing most 
people that an elected leader and a military 
ruler are one and the same thing.

Thus, after four constitutional initiatives and 
four spells of extra-democratic rule Pakistan has 
barely survived. It has been reduced to an 
anaemic polity. A federation it never became and 
now its status as a state has become debatable 
since it does not exercise a monopoly of power 
throughout the land - an essential attribute of a 
state. Yet Pakistan has the basic ingredients of 
a natural state. A large majority of the 
population apparently wishes to revive the state. 
The question is where does one begin?

The state cannot be constructed or reconstructed 
along the models tested over the past 50 years. 
The assumptions underlying the state created by 
the 1956 Constitution were knocked out by the 
emergence of Bangladesh. The state envisaged by 
the Ayubian scheme of 1962 was an illegitimate 
entity as it lacked the people's sanction. The 
state established by the 1973 Constitution was no 
doubt based on a national consensus but it had a 
very brief life and the 1973 document, even if 
can be revived in its original form, no longer 
enjoys the nationwide support it did 35 years ago.

Gen Ziaul Haq remodelled the state during 1977-85 
and in the process repudiated Pakistan's 
foundational principles - democracy, 
parliamentary government and federalism. Gen 
Musharraf too has remodelled the state and shared 
Zia's guilt. (One hopes there is no difficulty in 
appreciating the fact that each time a new 
constitution is imposed, or an existing basic law 
is radically changed, a state different from the 
previous one is created.)

Thus, the only viable option is to begin the 
exercise that should have been started in 1947 - 
to establish a democratic, parliamentary 
federation. This is the meaning of the demand for 
a new social contract that has lately gained 
considerable ground. However, besides drawing 
upon the Pakistan dream of 1947 it will also be 
necessary now to make a special effort to rule 
out two models - that of a garrison state and a 
theocracy. For this reason Gen Musharraf's exit 
and an end to the insurgency in the north are 
essential prerequisites to the building of a 
state the people may be proud to own, happy to 
nourish and willing to die for.

o o o

Dawn, August 14, 2008

CHANGING CONCEPT OF INDEPENDENCE

by Mubarak Ali

FOR 61 years, Pakistan has been celebrating its 
independence. However, with the passage of time 
the concept of independence has changed for us.

It is no more the same as it was before. For 
example, under the British Raj, when the people 
of the Indian subcontinent were fighting against 
foreign rule, the colonial documents referred to 
the resistance movements challenging the rulers 
as "rebellions against the legitimate government".

The uprising of 1857 was termed by the British as 
a mutiny and not a war of independence against 
their rule. By denying the legitimacy of 
resistance movements, the colonial government 
sought to justify its harsh and oppressive 
policies against them. However, after 1857, the 
emergence of nationalism and the struggle of 
political parties to win their basic rights 
changed the political perception of the people. 
These movements became a national struggle 
against colonial hegemony.

As democratic methods such as demonstrations, 
strikes, agitations and picketing were adopted, 
the British stopped calling them rebellions or 
insurgencies and accepted them as a political 
struggle.

The national struggle, which united the people of 
the subcontinent irrespective of their religion 
and caste, was an expression of their sentiments 
to win freedom from colonial bondage. It was a 
symbol of unity. A joint struggle for freedom. 
The national struggle, however, came to be 
divided when the All India Muslim League drifted 
away from national politics and raised the slogan 
of two nations and demanded a separate homeland 
for the Muslims.

After Partition, in Pakistani historiography, the 
role of the national struggle against colonialism 
has been downplayed and the 'Pakistan Movement' 
has received more importance. The major 
achievement of this movement was not only its 
success in ridding India of British rule but also 
liberating Muslims from the domination of the 
Hindu majority. Therefore, the Pakistan Movement 
became more anti-Hindu than anti-British.

How did the concept of independence change after 
Partition? This can be traced from the historical 
developments in Pakistan. The first case was that 
of East Pakistan. Just after 1947, the Bengalis 
complained about the arrogant behaviour of the 
West Pakistani bureaucrats who were posted there 
and treated the locals as their subject. These 
grievances accumulated until 1971 when Bangladesh 
split from Pakistan and declared its 
independence. In Bangladeshi historiography, the 
concept of Pakistani independence of 1947 has no 
place. Instead it contains a historical narration 
about 'the war of liberation' from Pakistan.

On the other hand, the independence of Pakistan 
soon disillusioned the small provinces which were 
forced to forget their regional identity and 
absorb it in a national one. There was strong 
reaction against this policy, which further 
strengthened the provinces' strong resistance to 
a powerful centre and its institutions. The 
establishment of One Unit in 1955 was viewed as a 
step to eliminate regional identity. The result 
was that they lost faith in democracy and G.M. 
Syed even went to the extent of declaring that 
for Sindh it was a useless system because the 
Sindhis could not come to power in the presence 
of the Punjabi majority.

It was the same argument which was presented by 
the Muslim leadership in India - namely, that the 
Muslims of India, as a minority, could not get 
their political rights, therefore, democracy was 
not an appropriate political system. On the basis 
of this argument, they demanded a separate 
homeland. So, in Sindh slogans were raised for 
'Sindhudesh', a separate homeland where the 
Sindhis could have freedom to handle their own 
affairs.

The nationalist elements of Sindh are not happy 
with the present political situation and seek 
autonomy if not separation for their province. 
The case of Balochistan is very critical because 
the Baloch leadership was betrayed again and 
again by the Pakistani ruling classes. Their 
resistance movements were crushed brutally and 
their leaders were imprisoned, tortured and 
assassinated. Finding no solution within 
Pakistan, the Baloch have been raising the 
slogan, 'Liberation of Balochistan'. To them the 
concept of independence is no more relevant.

The situation in the tribal areas of the NWFP is 
also changing rapidly and they are drifting away 
from the national mainstream.

When the question of independence is raised in 
any society, we find institutions and groups of 
people demanding freedom from the clutches of 
coercive institutional authorities. For example, 
there is a strong movement for the independence 
of the judiciary because judges have played a 
role in legitimising all military dictators. The 
ruling classes are not in favour of an 
independent judiciary because it would be a check 
on their misuse of power. However, the movement 
has become popular and gained the support of the 
people. But it appears that there is little hope 
of the judiciary becoming independent in view of 
the betrayal by the politicians.

There are other groups and parties that are 
struggling for their independence. For example, 
haris or peasants who are languishing in the 
private jails of the landlords who have set up 
these jails in blatant violation of the laws. It 
is their basic right to be free. They are 
helpless and are at the mercy of their 
tormentors. The same is the case with women, 
domestic workers and other subordinate classes. 
They all want their independence and freedom.

So, the question is: who benefited from 
independence? The simple answer is that the elite 
and the privileged classes who are free to 
exploit the people and squander the resources of 
the state. To them, the concept of independence 
is the freedom to do what they like. In the 
absence of law and order, industrialists, feudal 
lords, smugglers and the crime mafia are free to 
fleece people, be involved in all sorts of 
illegal business and collect money and take it 
away outside the country.

For them, Pakistan is a paradise. They are happy 
to celebrate Independence Day. But to the common 
man who is suffering in poverty and misery, whose 
children have no access to education, who has no 
security against lawlessness, or medical 
facilities in case of illness, or financial 
support when he loses his job, the question 
remains: should he celebrate independence or 
mourn it?

o o o

(iii)

The Guardian
August 14 2008

MUSHARRAF WILL BE GONE IN DAYS
The Pakistani president is likely quit soon. But 
don't expect democracy to rush in: the military's 
habits die hard

by Tariq Ali

A photo of Pakistani president Pervez Musharraf 
is seen partially torn down at a water plant on 
the outskirts of Islamabad.

A poster showing Pakistani president Pervez 
Musharraf is seen partially torn down at a water 
plant on the outskirts of Islamabad. Photograph: 
Emilio Morenatti/AP

There is never a dull moment in Pakistan. As the 
country moved from a moth-eaten dictatorship to a 
moth-eaten democracy the celebrations were muted. 
Many citizens wondered whether the change 
represented a forward movement.

Five months later, the moral climate has 
deteriorated still further. All the ideals 
embraced by the hopeful youth and the poor of the 
country - political morality, legality, civic 
virtue, food subsidies, freedom and equality of 
opportunity - once again lie at their feet, 
broken and scattered. The widower Bhutto and his 
men are extremely unpopular. The worm-eaten 
tongues of chameleon politicians and resurrected 
civil servants are on daily display. Removing 
Musharraf, who is even more unpopular, might win 
the politicians badly-needed popular support, but 
not for long.

As the country celebrated its 61st birthday 
today, its official president, ex-General Pervez 
Musharraf, was not allowed to take the salute at 
the official parade marking the event, while 
state television discussed plans to impeach him. 
Within a few days at most, Musharraf will resign 
and leave the country. Pakistan's venal 
politicians decided to move against him after the 
army chief, Ashfaq Kayani, let it be known that 
there would be no military action to defend his 
former boss.

Washington followed suit. In Kayani they have a 
professional and loyal military leader, who they 
imagine will do their bidding. Earlier John 
Negroponte had wanted to retain Musharraf as long 
as Bush was in office, but they decided to let 
him go. Anne Patterson, the US ambassador, and a 
few British diplomats working under her, tried to 
negotiate a deal on behalf of Musharraf, but the 
politicians were no longer prepared to play ball. 
They insisted that he must leave the country. 
Sanctuaries in Manhattan, Texas and the Turkish 
island of Büyükada are being actively considered. 
The general would prefer a large estate in 
Pakistan, preferably near a golf course, but 
security considerations alone would make that 
unfeasible. There were three attempts on his life 
when he was in power and protecting him after he 
goes would require an expensive security 
presence. Had Musharraf departed peacefully when 
his constitutional term expired in November 2007 
he would have won some respect. Instead he 
imposed a state of emergency and sacked the chief 
justice of the supreme court who was hearing a 
petition challenging Musharraf's position.

Now he is going in disgrace, abandoned by most of 
his cronies who accumulated land and money during 
his term and are now moving towards the new 
powerbrokers. Amidst the hullabaloo there was one 
hugely diverting moment involving pots and 
kettles. Two days ago, Asif Zardari, the 
caretaker-leader of the People's party who runs 
the government and is the second richest man in 
the country (from funds he accrued when his late 
wife was prime minister) accused Musharraf of 
corruption and siphoning US funds to private bank 
accounts.

Musharraf's departure will highlight the problems 
that confront the country, which is in the grip 
of a food and power crisis that is creating 
severe problems in every city. Inflation is out 
of control. The price of gas (used for cooking in 
many homes) has risen by 30%. Wheat, the staple 
diet of most people, has seen a 20% price hike 
since November 2007 and while the UN's Food and 
Agriculture Organisation admits that the world's 
food stocks are at record lows there is an 
additional problem in Pakistan.

Too much wheat is being smuggled into Afghanistan 
to serve the needs of the Nato armies. The poor 
are the worst hit, but middle-class families are 
also affected and according to a June 2008 
survey, 86% of Pakistanis find it increasingly 
difficult to afford flour on a daily basis, for 
which they blame their own new government.

Other problems persist. The politicians remain 
divided on the restoration of the judges sacked 
by Musharraf. The chief justice, Iftikhar 
Muhammad Chaudhry, is the most respected person 
in the country. Zardari is reluctant to see him 
back at the head of the supreme court. A possible 
compromise might be to offer him the presidency. 
It would certainly unite the country for a short 
time. And there is the army. Last month, the 
country's powerless prime minister, Yousuf 
Gilani, went on a state visit to the US. On July 
29 he was questioned by Richard Haass, president 
of Council on Foreign Relations:

     Haass: Let me ask the question a different 
way, then - (laughter) - beyond President 
Musharraf, which is whether you think now in the 
army there is a broader acceptance of a more 
limited role for the army. Do you think now the 
coming generation of army officers accepts the 
notion that their proper role is in the barracks 
rather than in politics?

     Gilani: Certainly, yes. Because of the 
February 18 election of this year, we have a 
mandate to the moderate forces, to the democratic 
forces in Pakistan. And the moderate forces and 
the democratic forces, they have formed the 
government. And therefore the people have voted 
against dictatorship and for democracy, and 
therefore, in future even the present of - the 
chief of the army staff is highly professional 
and is fully supporting the democracy.

This is pure gibberish and convinces nobody. Over 
the last 50 years the US has worked mainly with 
the Pakistan army. This has been its preferred 
instrument. Nothing has changed. The question 
being asked now is how long it will be before the 
military is back at the helm.

Tariq Ali's latest book, The Duel: Pakistan on 
the Flight Path of American Power will be 
published in September by Simon and Schuster

o o o

(iv)

WHERE DO MUSHARRAF AND PAKISTAN GO NOW?

by J. Sri Raman (truthout.org, 13 August 2008)

photo
Pakistan President General Pervez Musharraf faces 
impeachment proceedings. (Photo: Reuters)

     Just some time ago, South Asia was telling 
the world a tale of two defeated dictatorships. 
We are now witnessing a drama of democracies in 
distress in Pakistan and Nepal. The fate of the 
former country, in particular, hangs precariously 
in the balance, even as Washington frets and 
worries about one of its many favorite generals 
known for their political misadventures.

     The outcome of the power struggle in Pakistan 
appears unpredictable, even as hawks in New Delhi 
hardly conceal their concern over the nemesis 
overtaking President Pervez Musharraf.

     Retired General Musharraf's post-democracy 
fate does reveal parallels with that of Nepal's 
dethroned King Gyanendra. As noted in these 
columns earlier (Dislodging Defeated Dictators, 
June 10, 2008), "those who expected Musharraf to 
seek exile elsewhere after the elections in 
Pakistan - some even talked of a plane waiting 
for him - have proven as wrong as their Nepalese 
counterparts, who were, at one point, sure of the 
former king's flight to India."

     The king, however, had to pack up and leave 
the palace, though not the country, in late May, 
less than two months after the elections to the 
Constituent Assembly that returned the Maoists as 
the single largest party. The event caused even 
some envy in Pakistan, with quite a few querying 
why the country could not emulate Nepal's 
example. Is Pakistan doing so now? Can it?

     The source of Musharraf's post-election 
confidence was no secret. He did not flee as the 
superpower friend stood by him. The besieged 
ex-general nearly regained his bluster and 
bravado after a well-timed and well-publicized 
call from US President George W. Bush, extending 
him solidarity in the "war on terror" that only 
the elected government in Islamabad could wage 
now. A show of sympathy from Washington also 
helped Gyanendra extend his stay in the 
glittering palace, but only up to a point.

     As he faces impeachment proceedings now, 
Musharraf has again occasioned words of sympathy 
from Washington. But the verbal sympathy this 
time falls short of a vow of solidarity. "We are 
not apologetic about our policy on Musharraf. We 
are trying to secure an honorable and peaceful 
exit for him" - that is as far as Anne W. 
Patterson, US ambassador to Pakistan, was 
prepared to go in a recent conversation with the 
media.

     A less-nervous expression of support has come 
from New Delhi. India's bumbling National 
Security Adviser M. K. Narayanan, whose blurted 
comments provide a barometer of the militarist 
opinion goading Prime Minister Manmohan Singh's 
government, has rushed in with his reaction to 
the goings-on in Pakistan.

     In a comment apparently calculated to provoke 
majority opinion in Pakistan, Narayanan has 
voiced concern that the impeachment may leave a 
"big vacuum" that will give freedom to radical 
extremist elements to do "what they like in this 
country."

     The impeachment threat has become more real 
than before, since the leaders of the two major 
ruling coalition partners - Asif Ali Zardari, 
husband of slain Benazir Bhutto, who has 
inherited some of her halo in the Pakistan 
People's Party, and former Prime Minister Nawaz 
Sharif of the Pakistan Muslim Legue (Nawaz) - 
announced their agreement on the move on August 
6. Earlier, Sharif had stressed the priority of 
restoring judges sacked by Musharraf, while there 
was little love lost between the judiciary and 
Zardari. Zardari had spent 11 years in jail on 
corruption charges and obtained an amnesty in 
this respect from a Musharraf ordinance.

     The impeachment proceedings were set in 
motion with the National Assembly meeting on 
August 11 for a session devoted to this purpose 
and the Punjab and North-Western Frontier 
Province Assemblies passing a resolution. The 
resolution asked the president to seek a vote of 
confidence in parliament. At the time of writing, 
the Assemblies in the other two provinces - Sindh 
and Balochistan - are expected to follow suit 
soon. This, however, does not guarantee speedy 
and successful completion of the proceedings.

     Musharraf can be voted out only by a 
two-thirds majority in both Houses of parliament. 
This, in turn, cannot happen without cross-voting 
by a section of the "king's party," the hitherto 
pro-Musharraf Pakistan Muslim League (Qaide 
Azam). Such cross-voting has taken place in the 
Punjab Assembly, but that is no reliable promise 
of its repetition in parliament.

     Cross-voting is not completely ruled out from 
the ruling side. Makhdoom Amin Fahim, a PPP 
leader who lost to Yousaf Raza Gillani in the 
prime-ministerial race, has raised eyebrows with 
his stand that time is "not right" for 
impeachment.

     A 100-page "charge-sheet" is reportedly ready 
against Musharraf. But there are indications that 
a section of the anti-Musharraf alliance is for 
preparing a "more solid" charge-sheet, which it 
may take until the first week of September to 
draft. The charge-sheet will include corruption 
charges, with Zardari alleging that some $700 
million of US aid for the anti-terror war has 
been diverted to the infamous Inter-Services 
Intelligence (ISI) and for other purposes.

     According to the latest reports, Musharraf is 
also preparing his "charge-sheet" against the 
government. The charges will include economic 
mismanagement and lapses in law-and-order 
maintenance. Popular dissatisfaction with the 
regime on these counts is palpable, by many 
accounts, though this may not make Musharraf a 
paragon of virtues in the people's eye.

     Pundits also see a seed in the proceedings 
for dissension in the ruling ranks. They argue 
that the impeachment by itself implies that 
Musharraf was a duly elected president. This, 
according to them, may render difficult the 
restoration of judges, a subject on which the 
coalition partners have already differed 
considerably.

     Musharraf has also so far disowned any 
intention of exercising his constitutional powers 
to dismiss the National Assembly and pave the way 
for fresh polls. It remains to be seen, however, 
whether he sticks to this resolve.

     King Gyanendra's exit has not helped a 
coalition of political parties in Nepal usher in 
Nepal's democracy. The Maoists have failed to 
form a government full four months after the 
elections, with the military now intervening 
against the electoral mandate being honored. The 
army in Pakistan may not be standing by Musharraf 
for now, but safe democracy is still some 
distance away.

     As for Musharraf's "safe exit," that is also 
becoming a matter of fierce controversy. 
According to Information Minister Sherry Rehman, 
the decision on this has been left to leaders of 
the ruling coalition. PML (N) spokesman Ahsan 
Iqbal, however, has quipped: "If we give safe 
passage to Musharraf, then we should also open 
the gates of jails."

     Meanwhile, Washington will not convince 
anyone by projecting either Musharraf's stay in 
power or his "safe exit" as a mandatory condition 
for winning the "war on terror." Nor can the 
Narayanans of India present the India-Pakistan 
peace process as incompatible with democracy in 
Pakistan.

     Curious observers in South Asia have two 
questions in their mind now: Where does Musharraf 
go now, if he goes? And where does Pakistan?


______


[2]

BANGALDESH : TIME TO DO DEALS?

by Farid bakht

Economic & Political Weekly, August 09 - August 15, 2008

With a weak political opposition and 
Indo-Bangladesh relations closer than they have 
been for a generation, Bangladesh's military 
regime perhaps considers this a good time to 
attempt a deal with New Delhi over transit 
facilities. On the domestic front attempts are 
being made to gain legitimacy by inducing 
political parties to participate in the elections.

Farid Bakht (faridbakht at yahoo.com) is a commentator on South Asian affairs.


The foreign secretaries of India and Bangladesh 
met on July 17 and 18 in New Delhi. Prior to the 
event, the Indian high commissioner Pinaki 
Chakravarty made it clear to reporters in Dhaka 
that the "transit" facilities and the handover of 
United Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA) leaders, 
including Anup Chetia, would be at the top of the 
agenda. He also said that it was difficult to 
understand why Bangladesh could not grant India 
transit facilities and was making it a political 
issue.

Naturally, he would have been fully aware that 
the two previous democratically elected 
governments had failed to sign any agreement, 
fearful of domestic political repercussions. 
Discussions about eastwest highways always 
produce evocative images of "corridors". So why 
is there pressure now to conclude an agreement on 
transit?

New Delhi-Dhaka relations are at present probably 
the closest they have been for a generation. 
Bangladesh has positioned itself as the 
Philippines of South Asia.  (???) With India's 
move towards a strategic partnership with the US, 
both New Delhi and Dhaka have a similar 
geopolitical orientation. Over the last 18 
months, Dhaka has made no attempt to play the 
China card. Observing such docility, South Block 
may feel this is as good a time as any to test 
the strength of the relationship.

General Moeen U Ahmed recently shunted aside 
general Masud Uddin, a supposed hardliner with a 
hawkish position on India. Now as undisputed 
leader, and with a friendly rapport with New 
Delhi and Washington, Moeen's position has 
reached a peak. Another reason may be that with a 
debilitated political opposition, desperately 
wanting to return to power, the next few months 
are the best time to "do deals". Such treaties 
are controversial, but an unelected, brutal 
regime with a record of arresting over 80,000 
people may be seen as an "ideal partner" compared 
to an elected government, vulnerable to street 
politics. The military backed regime, however, 
knows it still has choppy waters to navigate over 
the next six months. It will be more confident if 
it can get through local polls and dictate events 
from a position of strength. It will thus proceed 
more cautiously and provide a smokescreen of 
"demands" to sell back home. Possibly the best 
time to sign contentious agreements will be late 
October.

So, the Bangladeshi delegation favoured a 
comprehensive study, rather than putting pen to 
paper. It also tabled an impressive sounding 
counter list: request to reduce the trade 
deficit, a reciprocal transit access to Nepal, 
and water sharing. The trade deficit with India 
($ 1.9 billion) is a source of disquiet for the 
business sector.

While offering some long overdue concessions, the 
Indian position was that the range of 
Bangladesh's exports is too narrow and that it 
would be better to allow Indian firms to invest 
across the border and then "export" back to India 
- not the most favourable reply.

Border Clashes

To underline the difficulties involved in 
improving ties, just as the foreign secretaries 
were wrapping up the summit, clashes on the 
border led to two members of Bangladesh Rifles 
being shot dead. The Indian high commissioner 
blamed it on a smuggling operation and took a 
shot at the media for sensationalizing the news. 
Meanwhile, the government made what it termed a 
"strong protest", mentioning that the high 
commissioner's press statement did not explain 
how the two paramilitary riflemen were shot on 
Bangladeshi territory. The transit facility is a 
controversial issue and the regime will be 
playing with fire if it provides it to India 
without extracting a heavy price (tariff 
reductions may not cut the mustard).

On the other hand, acceding to requests to hand 
over ULFA members may be easier - while this 
would be reported as "caving in", it is not a 
high priority political issue in the domestic 
arena.

Two high level visits later this year by the 
Indian army chief, followed by external affairs 
secretary, Shiv Shankar Menon, will provide the 
opportunity to see what can be agreed upon this 
year.

Domestic Deals?

The Awami League (AL) leader, Sheikh Hasina, was 
released after 11 months in captivity. What have 
the AL and the army agreed to? Released for 
medical treatment, she is travelling between the 
US and Europe, organising expatriate AL units. 
Unfortunate comparisons are being made to the 
AL's decision to participate in rigged elections 
in 1986, thus allowing general H M Ershad to 
remain in power for four more years until civil 
protests brought him down in 1990. It was not the 
finest hour for a younger Sheikh Hasina. Many of 
her "front bench" colleagues today are relics 
from that era and the concern is that a similar 
arrangement is being put into place. This would 
allow elections and a popular victory for a 
united AL (in contrast to an out-of-sorts 
Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP)). The army's 
position would also be secured constitutionally.

In sharp contrast, in 1986, the BNP refused to 
participate, thus rendering the "elections" 
worthless with very low turnout. This time, BNP, 
or at least a faction, needs to participate to 
lend a façade of legitimacy, and avoid street 
protests in 2009. So, unsurprisingly, moves are 
being made to convince the "other lady", ex-prime 
minister Khaleda Zia. The authorities released 
one of her sons, Arafat, on July 17, for medical 
treatment in Bangkok.

The negotiations continue over the other son, 
Tariq Rahman. To add to the drama, Khaleda Zia's 
younger brother was arrested two days later, 
adding some not so-subtle pressure.

Multiple Elections

The regime is still intent on several elections, 
starting off with mayoral and municipal polls on 
August 4. Of more concern is the army's desire to 
conduct polls at the 'upazilla' level (an 
institution set up by dictator Ershad) to create 
a power base of local supporters. This formula, 
in turn, was copied from Pakistani dictator, Ayub 
Khan. In some ways, some things never change. The 
military continues to strive to invent 
unconvincing democratic platforms. The chief 
election commissioner, A T M Shamsul Huda 
indicated that these upazilla polls would take 
place towards the end of August or early October 
(avoiding the month of Ramadan), possibly in two 
phases. According to the plan, "new" elected 
politicians will then form an alliance (in 
reality, a king's party) to fight the general 
elections, pencilled in for late December. For 
the moment, the AL is pretending to oppose the 
upazilla elections. Within a few weeks, we will 
know if they are determined to make a fight of it 
or whether this is public posturing to deflect 
criticisms of collusion.

A major sticking point will be whether the 
parliamentary elections can be held under a state 
of emergency. The smaller, co-opted parties 
predictably are supportive while the AL is 
adamant that it cannot. This is where the western 
diplomats have waded in. Expectedly, the US 
ambassador has got himself into the spotlight 
with two "dinners" on July 15 and 16. Otherwise 
unwilling to meet or speak together, politicians 
from rival parties had no problem mingling during 
these diplomatic functions. There have been vocal 
protests across the board about "interference". 
What many had not realised is that, only a few 
days before, some of the same prominent leaders 
had attended a three-day closed door conference 
in Wilton House, in southern England, at the 
behest of the UK foreign office and the infamous 
Asia Foundation. The diplomats and other foreign 
agencies are trying to pressure the politicians 
into the end-game, to agree to the rules and 
follow a pre-set agenda.

Politicians from all sides are mainly talking 
about elections and the "health" of their 
leaders. They are disconnected from the serious 
economic trouble faced by the majority of the 
population, barely able to cope with inflation.

The script for another political "emergency", on 
the back of an economic crisis, two years or so 
down the road, is thus being written.

The generals, with external assistance, are 
laying the groundwork for an unwelcome return to 
the helm. The politicians prefer to concentrate 
on their immediate future.

______


[3] India: ON THE AMARNATH SHRINE BOARD CRISIS IN JAMMU AND KASHMIR

(i)

MEDIA RELEASE

The Hon'ble Prime Minister of India
Prime Minister's Office
South Block, Raisina Hills
New Delhi

Sub: An appeal to defuse the crisis in Jammu and Kashmir

August 13, 2008

Dear Dr Manmohan Singh,

The death of 5 people in firing in Baramulla is 
very disturbing to say the least. The recent move 
of the Government to take an all party delegation 
to J&K to restore peace and harmony while a 
welcome step, came a bit too late and the outcome 
of its efforts have been too little. Both the 
regions of state are having severe problems. The 
agitation started by Amarnath Yatra Sangharsh 
Samiti (AYSS) has blockaded the route to Kashmir 
valley and there are severe attacks on Kashmiris 
and Muslims living in Jammu area. The agitation 
had begun in the valley with the transfer of land 
to Shrine board. Now the material suffering of 
valley's people, blocking of their supplies by 
agitation of AYSS is threatening to create severe 
repercussion in the valley the results of which 
may be very adverse.

Amarnath yatra has been one of the major 
religious tourism activities of the state, well 
managed by the local population, mainly Muslims 
of the area, till 2001 when Shri Amranath Shrine 
Board (SASB) was formed and it took over the 
arrangements of the pilgrimage. SASB had Governor 
of the state as the chief and Governor's 
Principal Secretary as the Chief Executive 
Officer (CEO). Gradually the SASB started 
asserting beyond its mandate, e.g. going on to 
construct shelters and structures on Pehalgam 
Golf Course, mainly due to the clout of the 
Governor who headed this body. In 2005 SASB, 
contrary to the laws, was granted the permission 
to use the forest land for the tourists. 
Incidentally, CEO's wife was the forest officer 
who cleared this highly illegal demand of the 
shrine board. This started the process, which 
ultimately went out of hands of the local 
government. Due to some intervention and some 
subtle pressures from the higher ups the matters 
have come to a sorry pass. While Government 
initially opposed the order of the forest 
department, the high court stayed Government's 
decision. Following this the state Govt.'s 
buckling and transferring, and then cancelling 
the land transfer, to SASB started the process 
which today is threatening to destroy the efforts 
towards peace built over the period of decades.

It is interesting to note that Amaranth yatra by 
Hindus is rooted in one of the most mixed support 
structures; the cave where shrine is located was 
discovery of a Muslim Shepherd, Malik, in 1850s, 
since when the pilgrimage picked up. The 
descendents of the Malik family have been part of 
the management of the yatra till 2001. With SASB 
taking over, it started giving a Hindu tilt to 
the organizing process and the promotion of yatra 
went on at a hectic pace. The result was that 
there occurred a great increase in the number of 
pilgrims, from 12000 in 1989 to 400,000 in 2007. 
The period of yatra was extended from 2 weeks to 
10 weeks and this resulted in adverse 
environmental effects, tons of human excreta and 
plastic material converted the nearby beautiful 
Lidder River into a sewer. It was one of the 
major reasons for melting of lingam, revered by 
the devotees, and attempts were made to put it 
into shape by putting dry ice. While BJP is 
calling for restriction of pilgrims to a 
particular number, e.g. 150 per day in Gangotri 
and Gomukh, for environmental reasons, here the 
unrestricted number of pilgrims and the 
aggressive promotion of the same are destroying 
the ecological balance of the hills. Also due to 
the patronage of the Governor the Shrine board 
virtually took over the functioning of Pehlagam 
Development authority.

The order of the Government transferring the land 
to SASB did result in the threat perception in 
already intimidated the Kashmiri residents of the 
valley. The perception that the land is being 
given to change the demographic composition of 
the valley affected the social thinking. One of 
the reasons for this perception was the common 
knowledge there that such a suggestion was given 
by Shimon Peres, the Israeli Foreign minister to 
Lal Krishna Advani, a few years ago. The 
spontaneous  breaking out of protest in valley 
was used by Syed Ali Shah Gilani, belonging to 
the extremist faction of Hurriat Conference, who 
went on to fan the fire during the agitations and 
further aggravated the situation by calling for 
boycott of polls to be held in October,.

As such what a tragic pass we have landed 
ourselves into. Kashmir was the place of highest 
synthesis of diverse streams of our culture. 
Kashmiriyat stood for values of Vedanta, teaching 
of Gautam Buddha and the Sufi saints. Sixty years 
since the treaty of accession has been signed, 
its clauses were violated with impunity and 
military solution has been the main instrument of 
our action. The army which is meant to fight the 
external enemy is the mainstay of our policies 
there. This needs severe introspection.

The people of Jammu also have suffered due to 
their problems being neglected. There is a 
widespread feeling that problems of Valley are 
being addressed by the Center and Jammu region is 
being neglected. Genuine effort for all round 
redressal of grievances is the need of the hour. 
The incitement by sectarian elements and the 
communal elements has to be confronted head on by 
an active process of reconciliation, restoration 
of peace through dialogue with all the grieving 
parties and other components of civil society. 
There is an urgent need to recognize the wrongs 
done in last few years, wrongs which are contrary 
to the forest laws, and the norms about shrines. 
No where in the country any holy place has been 
allotted any part of a forest land, nowhere in 
the country the assertion and dominance of temple 
trusts or Dargah boards has been meekly accepted 
beyond the confines of its own boundaries, as in 
the case of SASB.

* We urge upon you sir, to take the matters with 
utmost seriousness and take further the efforts, 
undertaken by your Government, which are just a 
small beginning.

* Foremost of the measures needed is to lift the 
blockade of the valley by the agitators and to 
restore the supplies to the valley and transport 
of fruits from valley to the markets of the 
country.

* We urge upon you to immediately convene a high 
powered meeting involving SASB, Kashmir's Action 
Committee, representatives of political parties 
and civil society to find a peaceful solution to 
the imbroglio.

* We urge upon you to review the functioning of 
SASB which has assertively acted in direction 
which are contrary to norms.

* The society must prevail upon the communal and 
sectarian elements to postpone any call for 
agitation till normalcy is restored in the 
valley, and the results of dialogue process are 
made public.

We are sure you will consider these proposals to 
ensure peace and amity in the country as a whole.

Anuradha Bhasin Jamwal
Apoorvanand
Arundhati Dhuru
Dhruv Sangari
Dunu Roy
Ganesh Devy
Ghanshyam Shah
Indu Prakash Singh
Jatin Desai
Jaya Mehta(Dr)
KM Shrimali (Prof)
KN Panikkar
Kumkum Sangari
Lalit Surjan
Mahendra Sangari
Mansi Sharma
Nandita Das
Ram Puniyani (Dr)
Saif Ahmed Khan
Sandeep Pandey
Shabnam Hashmi
Tapan Bose
Uma Chakravorty
Vineet Tiwari
Zafar Agha


o o o

(ii)

kafila.org

GUN SALUTES FOR AUGUST 15, 2008

by Shuddhabrata Sengupta

Anniversaries are good opportunities for 
reflection. I write this the early hours of 15th 
August, 2008, the 61st anniversary of Indian 
independence.

The events of the past few months, and the past 
few days, in the Indian administered state of 
Jammu and Kashmir have demonstrated how well and 
how equally (or not) the police, paramilitaries 
and armed forces of the Indian Republic treat 
different kinds of protesting crowds. The facts 
that I am about to discuss are good measures with 
which to think about the relationship between 
acts of power, different kinds of people, 
sovereignty, life and death in the Indian nation 
state as it has evolved over the past 61 years.

The region of Jammu in the province of Jammu and 
Kashmir has been caught in the grip of a fierce 
agitation against the revocation of the land 
transfer to the Amarnath Shrine Board. We have 
all seen footage of angry SASS (Shri Amarnath 
Sangharsh Samiti) activists brandishing trishuls, 
setting up roadblocks and burning tyres, the 
agitation has spread to different parts of India

As of August 10, the following has taken place (in Jammu)

"Š* 18 cases have been registered in connection 
with communal violence in which 20 persons were 
injured, 72 Kulas (hutments) of Gujjars were 
burnt down, 22 vehicles damaged and several 
trucks carrying supplies looted. "These are only 
reported incidents. Many such incidents have 
taken place, which have not been reported so 
far," the officers told the team.

* 117 police personnel and 78 civilians were 
injured including two policemen who were lynched 
and are "battling for life" in PGI Chandigarh 
while six civilians were killed, including three 
in police and Army action.

* 129 cases were registered against the rioters. 
A total of 1171 arrests were made but most of 
them are now out on bail.

* 10, 513 protest demonstrations and 359 serious 
incidents of violence have taken place across 
Jammu in which 28 government buildings, 15 police 
vehicles and 118 private vehicles have been 
damagedŠ"

The information given above is quoted from - 
"Dangerous divide: Jammu officials put it in 
black and white"by Muzamil Jaleel, Indian 
Express, August 10, 2008. Muzamil Jaleel culled 
this information from a briefing delivered by 
government officials in the Jammu region to a 
visiting 'all party delegation'

As is clear, of the 6 reported deaths in the 
Jammu region, two are of policemen, who were 
attacked by the pro Amarnath Land Transfer 
agitationists. Two of these are suicides, both of 
whom have been hailed as 'martyrs' by the Shree 
Amarnath Sangharsh Samiti activists. Only two out 
of six deaths, in the past twenty or so days of 
relentless and violent agitation, which included 
intimidation of truckers on the Jammu Srinagar 
highway can be attributed to police or 
paramilitary action. Each of these deaths is 
unfortunate and deserves to be condemned.

In two further and separate incidents, the VHP, 
BJP, Shiv Sena  and Sangh Parivar and allied 
organizations 'Chakka Jam' that paralysed roads 
in major cities yesterday, two more people died, 
because they could not reach hospitals on time. 
These two people were the 'collateral damage' of 
the upsurge of patriotic sentiment displayed by 
activists sympathetic to the SASS agitation in 
Jammu.

On the other hand, in the part of the Kashmir 
valley administered and occupied by India, in the 
past few days alone, in several instances of 
firing on unarmed mobs, have led to the deaths of 
30 people. Many of these deaths occured when 
unarmed crowds tried to accompany trucks carrying 
fruit (which had earlier been prevented from 
proceeding towards markets on the Srinagar Jammu 
highway) towards Pakistan Occupied Kashmir. Fruit 
growers in Indian administered Kashmir were at 
the forefront of attempting to salvage precious 
stocks of produce by taking to the 'Muzafarabad 
Road'. Apart from the 30 confirmed dead, several 
more are in hospitals, injured in critical 
conditions, and there lives are endangered by the 
fact that life saving medicines are in short 
supply due to the economic blockade of the 
Kashmir valley.

The difference in treatment of two different 
kinds of crowds is easy to see. In one instance, 
more than twenty days of continuing, violent 
agitation result in two deaths by police firing. 
In another instance, less than a week's agitation 
results in 30 deaths. Clearly, the loss of lives 
in the Kashmir valley does not amount to much in 
the calculus of power. A rough arithmetic of 
sorts would indicate that a comparison of two 
casualties (in Jammu) to thirty casualties (in 
Kashmir) means that agitating Kashmiri lives are 
approximately fiteen times less significant (or 
more expendable) than agitating Jammu lives. The 
agitation in Jammu has harped often on how it is 
discriminated against in comparison to Kashmir. 
In one sense at least there is some truth in this 
charge. In the matter of the expenditure of 
bullets by the Indian state, there is no 
comparison at all between Jammu and Kashmir. When 
it comes to ammunition, way more bullets are 
spent in Kashmir than is the case in Jammu.

It is clear, that the Indian state's armed might 
does not confront rampaging Jammu mobs if they 
hold the tricolour and shout nationalist slogans, 
or slogans in favour of the Amarnath Shrine 
Board's desire for land in the Kashmir Valley, 
even if they sometimes lynch policemen. On the 
other hand, unarmed fruit growers and ordinary 
people on the streets of the Kashmir valley are 
sitting targets for trigger happy police, 
paramilitary and army personnel. Guns can be, and 
are being aimed at their heads.Unlike Jammu, no 
policemen or armed forces personnel have been 
killed, at least until now, in the course of the 
fruit growers agitation in the Kashmir valley.

As, independence day dawns, a clear pattern 
emerges. When push comes to shove, the Indian 
state has no hesitation in expending its bullets 
in some cases, and in showing exemplary restraint 
in others. Mowing down crowds that hold the 
tricolour flag aloft doesn't look good on TV. 
But, obviously, a little bloodletting in the 
streets of Srinagar on the eve of Independence 
day is good for 'national' morale.

Now, if, you were one of those who happens to be 
the kind of person who the state seems to be 
willing to favour with a  shower of bullets at 
any given opportunity, would you be celebrating 
'Independence Day'? What would you be 
celebrating, - your freedom to fall to a 
policeman's gun?

No wonder they play national anthems with gun 
salutes. A hail of bullets makes for the most 
fitting percussive accompaniment to poignant 
displays of national pride in India today.

o o o

(iii)

The Hindu
August 15, 2008

IN LASJAN, SOME LESSONS IN HATE

by Praveen Swami

How the Hindutva campaign in Jammu radicalised one village in Kashmir

Three people died in the first mass violence the village has ever seen

MIM-linked neo-fundamentalists tapped the vein of xenophobic fear

SRINAGAR: Most of the time, Lasjan is shrouded in 
a fog of diesel smoke, punctuated by the demonic 
howling of the high-intensity foghorns beloved of 
truck drivers on mountain highways.

Almost everyone here has something to do with the 
tens of thousands of trucks that run from 
Srinagar to Jammu: owning them, driving them, 
repairing them, loading them and, at the very 
bottom of the economic ladder, cleaning them.

Now, though, Lasjan is silent and clean: a hub 
not for commerce, but for the communally-charged 
anti-India movement that has swept Kashmir this 
week.

Just what happened in Lasjan on Tuesday is 
disputed. Police insist that former State 
Minister, Javed Mustafa Mir's guard opened fire 
at a mob which was attacking the People's 
Democratic Party leader's home. Village 
residents, though, insist that the Jammu and 
Kashmir police fired on a peaceful protest march 
- and followed that up by firing at women who 
tried to retrieve the bodies of two men killed in 
the shootout.

Whatever the truth, three people - one an ageing 
woman - died in the first mass violence the 
village has ever seen.

Lasjan villagers played no role in the movement 
against the grant of land to the Shrine Board 
that broke out in July. No protests were seen 
against former Governor S.K. Sinha's decision to 
grant land to the Shrine Board - nor celebrations 
when his successor, N.N. Vohra, revoked the 
orders.

But as Hindutva groups led protests demanding the 
land back, attitudes in Lasjan began to change. 
Many here were directly hit by the violence. "We 
had five trucks stranded at Lakhanpur for over a 
week because of the disturbances," recalls local 
transport-business owner Abdul Ahad Mir. "And we 
lost tens of thousands of rupees. I thought: was 
this the future?"

Islamist claims that Kashmir was subjected to an 
economic blockade appear hyped: over 21,000 
loaded trucks made their way out of the State 
between the first week of July and August, 
carrying much of the early fruit harvest. "The 
protests slowed us down by a few days, and made 
the passage dangerous," says Poonch resident 
Mashooq Ahmad, who works the Jammu-Srinagar 
route, "but most of us got through."

But the fact is that, compared to the same weeks 
of 2007, one in three trucks that left Lakhanpur 
were stranded along the highway into Srinagar - 
leading to shortages that weren't life 
threatening, but panic-inducing, nonetheless.

Reports that ethnic Kashmiri truck drivers were 
attacked by Hindutva mobs in Jammu caused even 
more concern concern. Pantha Chowk resident Nazir 
Ahmad Wani and his neighbour Mohammad Latif, both 
of whom were serious injured in a murderous mob 
attack, were well known to villagers.

"It became clear that fundamentalists in Jammu 
were trying to choke our livelihoods and lives," 
says local shopkeeper Mohammad Asad Mir, "so we 
decided to support those who wanted to cross the 
Line of Control, like Syed Ali Shah Geelani."
Mosque-based resistance

Lasjan, though, had no significant presence of 
political Islamists like Mr. Geelani - which 
raises the question of how it ended up joining 
their cause.

Answers lie in the dramatic growth of the 
neo-fundamentalist Jamaat Ahl-e-Hadith - one of 
south Asia's largest movements of the religious 
right. In Lasjan, the Ahl-e-Hadith has invested 
in a new mosque and educational centre. Jammu and 
Kashmir Ahl-e-Hadith president Shaukat Ahmad Shah 
has been a regular visitor, supported by the 
village's new truck-owning elite, who see the 
religious sect as a means of accessing social 
respectability.

In May this year, several hundred clerics led by 
Shah formed the Majlis-e-Ithaad-ul-Millat - or 
the organisation for national unity - to campaign 
against drugs, alcohol use, rape, sexual 
harassment, suicide and what it called "moral 
degradation."

MIM-linked neo-fundamentalists tapped the vein of 
xenophobic fear which had fuelled politics in 
Kashmir ever since 2006, when the uncovering of a 
prostitution scandal in Srinagar was marked by 
Islamists as evidence of the existence of an 
Indian plot to undermine the region's religious 
character.

Following the rape-murder of schoolgirl Tabinda 
Gani in 2007, Islamist leader Syed Ali Shah 
Geelani joined in this campaign, saying "lakhs of 
non-State subjects had been pushed into Kashmir 
under a long-term plan to crush the Kashmiris." 
He claims that "the majority of these non-State 
subjects are professional criminals and should be 
driven out of Kashmir."

Shah's decision to back the Shrine Board 
movement, built around Islamist claims that 
temporary land-use rights granted to pilgrims 
were in fact a façade for a large project to ship 
in outsiders, and thus reduce Muslims in Kashmir 
to a minority, proved decisive to politics in 
Lasjan.

When movement along the lifeline from Jammu to 
Srinagar was disrupted, these claims seemed to 
have vindicated.


______


[4]

http://www.indianexpress.com/story/349496-2.html

Indian Express
August 16, 2008

SUSPECT SIMI? OF COURSE

Indian Muslims must recognise the organisation 
for what it is: against secular democracy

by Javed Anand

Javed Anand: The special tribunal under the 
Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act 2006, headed 
by Justice Geeta Mittal, recently lifted the ban 
on the Students Islamic Movement of India (SIMI). 
The joy with which several mainstream Muslim 
organisations and much of the Urdu press greeted 
SIMI's return to lawful existence proved to be 
short-lived since the very next day the Supreme 
Court stayed the tribunal's verdict. Nonetheless, 
the misguided show of solidarity with SIMI raises 
some very disturbing questions. Are Muslim 
leaders and the Urdu media wilfully blind to the 
malevolence sheltering in their own backyard? Or, 
is it that in the interests of "communal 
balance", anything goes?

The nefarious nature of SIMI has been evident 
from the moment it emerged from the womb of the 
Jamaat-e-Islami (JeI) in 1977. "Character 
building" to fight against the perceived twin 
evils of communism and capitalist consumerism 
with its "degenerate morality" was the declared 
objective. But in less than a decade this 
self-styled moral brigade metamorphosed into "the 
real inheritor" of the legacy of the founder of 
JeI, Maulana Abul Ala Maududi, who argued that 
all Muslims must strive for an Islamic state.

True to its ideological mooring, in the '80s, 
SIMI produced eye-catching stickers proclaiming 
"Secularism, NO; Democracy, NO; Nationalism, NO; 
Polytheism, NO; Only Islam". These stickers 
adorned many Muslim homes and shops throughout 
India. But no one seemed to be unduly perturbed 
by this dangerous drift of a section of Indian 
Muslim youth, spreading wings under the loving 
care of its patron, the JeI. (It was only in the 
late '90s that the JeI officially snipped the 
umbilical cord that organically linked it to 
SIMI.)

There is a filial relationship that unites 
different fundamentalisms and there is a sibling 
relationship between fanaticism, extremism and 
terrorism. Put differently, there is a thin line 
that divides one from the other. By the early 
'90s, it was talking the language of "jihad" and 
an "Islamic caliphate." In SIMI's case, jihad can 
mean nothing other than armed struggle?

Don't trust information doled out by intelligence 
agencies? What about ex-SIMI members, its 
founding president and unit chiefs?

Take, for example, Saeed Ahmed Khan, its former 
Mumbai chief, who confessed last month that he 
visited Pakistan in 1991 after learning that "the 
ISI was training Indian youths to cultivate (sic) 
the culture of jihad". Khan said that the then 
SIMI top-brass C.A. Baseer and Asraf Zafari were 
pushing it in a more militant direction. "It was 
at this juncture that the gun culture took root 
in SIMI - these radical preachers toed the line 
of jihad and brainwashed Indian youths who later 
turned into anti-Indian jihadis."

Don't believe him? What about Dr Ahmadullah 
Siddiqi, its founder president, who left India in 
1981 and has been a professor of journalism and 
public relations at Western Illinois University, 
Macomb, USA the last 16 years? In a September 
2003 interview, he agreed: "Perhaps the group has 
been hijacked by elements in other countries and 
other Muslim societies and not all of them may 
be, but some of them have become misguided and 
radical ."

What about yet another ex-SIMI-man, Kanpur's Haji 
Mohammed Salees, horrified by what he saw and 
heard at SIMI's "Ikhwan Conference" in his city 
in October 1999? Among the things that shocked 
Salees was reportedly the war cry of the 
seven-year-old Gulrez Siddiqui before an audience 
of over 20,000 people: "Islam ka ghazi, 
butshikan/ Mera sher, Osama bin Laden  (The 
warrior of Islam, the destroyer of idols/ My 
lion, Osama bin Laden)". Those who addressed the 
gathering, long-distance telephonically, were 
Hamas founder, Sheikh Yaseen, head of the 
Jamaat-e-Islami, Pakistan, Qazi Hussain Ahmed, 
and the imam of the al Aqsa mosque, 
Israel/Palestine. "It was all a shock for us. We 
realised they are developing international links. 
We distanced ourselves," Salees has said

Two years later, at a gathering of 25,000 Muslim 
youths in Mumbai, SIMI reiterated that the time 
has come for Indian Muslims to launch an armed 
jihad in India with the establishment of an 
Islamic caliphate as the ultimate aim.

Don't believe any of them? What about SIMI's own 
posters plastered in the by-lanes of Muslim 
mohallas across the country following the 
demolition of the Babri mosque, with an 
invocation: "Ya Ilahi, bhej de Mahmood koi  (Oh 
Allah, send us a Mahmud)". Who does not know that 
the reference was to Mahmud Ghaznavi whom 
fanatics revere as a "But Shikan (Destroyer of 
Idols)"

Which editor of an Urdu paper can disclaim 
knowledge of these inflammatory posters? Could it 
be that Urdu papers never received press releases 
from SIMI on their official letterhead with a 
logo depicting a Quran and an AK-47 perched on 
top of a globe? And who has not heard of SIMI's 
open adulation of the Taliban and Osama bin 
Laden, for both of whom India is Enemy No 3 after 
the United States and Israel?

Let's now turn to the provisions of the Unlawful 
Activities (Prevention) Act. It provides for a 
ban on any organisation that is inimical to the 
sovereignty and integrity of India, or is 
involved in terror acts.

Are the blasts after blasts, in city after city 
of India in recent years, part of the "jihad" 
espoused by SIMI? The investigating agencies 
obviously believe this to be the case. Why else 
would SIMI activists be routinely detained, 
arrested, interrogated, charge-sheeted and put on 
trial? Admittedly, they have yet to establish the 
terrorism charge against SIMI activists before 
any court of law in any of the blast cases.

A continuation of the ban on SIMI would need it 
to be established as guilty of one or more of the 
charges - secessionist activity, terrorism, 
spreading communal discord, hostility to Indian 
constitution - since 2006, the last time the ban 
was re-imposed. Otherwise a ban cannot legally be 
re-imposed.

But is it merely a question of law? Should SIMI 
not also be judged from a socio-political 
perspective, in terms of its implications for 
India's secular-democratic polity? Should any 
sensible citizen be embracing the Bajrang Dal 
merely because it has not been convicted under 
the law of the land? If that is not acceptable, 
by what logic can Muslim bodies rush to the 
rescue of SIMI?  

  Before the first ban was slapped on SIMI in 
2001, the chief ministers of Maharashtra, MP and 
Rajasthan made a strong case before the NDA for a 
simultaneous ban on SIMI and the Bajrang Dal. And 
rightly so. But the Vajpayee-led government chose 
to act against one and not the other. The UPA has 
done no better.

Why are Hindu extremist organisations also not 
placed under the scanner of the Unlawful 
Activities (Prevention) Act? To ask this question 
is to rightfully demand an end to discriminatory 
justice and even-handed application of the law of 
the land against all. Mulayam Singh and Lalu 
Prasad's welcoming of the lifting of the ban on 
SIMI can be explained away in terms of vote-bank 
politics. But for Indian Muslims to be seen as 
standing by a self-declared enemy of 
secular-democratic India is nothing short of 
suicidal.

The writer is co-editor, "Communalism Combat", 
and general secretary, Muslims for Secular 
Democracy

______


[5]  India Nuclear Deal: NSG should Flatly reject this disastrous arrangement


(i)

ARMS CONTROL ASSOCIATION MEDIA ADVISORY

 U.S. Proposal for India-Specific Exemption from 
Nuclear Suppliers Group Guidelines Circulated 
August 2008


Note for Reporters by Daryl G. Kimball (202-463-8270 x107)

August 13, 2008

Full Text here: http://tinyurl.com/5653le

o o o

(ii)

Avert a Nonproliferation Disaster: oppose NSG waiver to India

Letter sent to foreign ministers of governments represented on the NSG

Decision Time on the Indian Nuclear Deal: Help 
Avert a Nonproliferation Disaster

full text at: http://tinyurl.com/5jmtoj

______


[6]

Times of India
16 August 2008
Editorial

LET THEM DANCE

One of India's most cosmopolitan cities, 
Bangalore, stands in danger of losing that tag.

The Bangalore police have decided to follow the 
letter of the law in strictly enforcing a ban on 
dancing in bars and clubs and ensuring that all 
restaurants shut shop at 11.30 p.m. The laws 
they're acting on are the Licensing and 
Controlling of Places of Public Entertainment 
(Bangalore City) Order, 2005 and the Karnataka 
Excise Act of 1965.

While the 2005 order makes it mandatory for all 
places offering live entertainment to be licensed 
by the police after meeting strict standards, the 
latter prevents women from dancing in places 
serving alcohol, which must shut down by 11.30 
p.m.

The police are well within their rights to shut 
down places that are operating without valid 
licences - as, indeed, they are to enforce the 
Excise Act. The problem is with the legislation 
itself.

Formulated in 1965, it is clearly an archaic law 
that is incapable of responding to current 
situations and needs to be updated. It is 
ridiculous that, in the 21st century, there 
exists a law that dictates where women can dance.

That such laws persist in this country, 
particularly in a city considered to be India's 
window to the world, betrays the antiquated 
mentality of our legislators. It also displays 
the tensions in a male-dominated society where 
women are increasingly beginning to assert their 
independence.

With more women entering the workforce and 
establishing independent means of income, there 
is bound to be resistance from a patriarchal 
society that is unable to come to terms with 
change. Now that more women inhabit public 
spaces, authorities have responded by attempting 
to impose male moral codes on women to dictate 
their behaviour.

At a time when India is opening up to the world 
is this the image - of intolerance and 
illiberality - that we want to put out of a 
premier Indian city? As India plugs into the 
global economy, our country is going to undergo 
profound changes.

Globalisation is not just bringing in foreign 
capital, it's also about a global sensibility and 
ethos. Our lawmakers have to learn to deal with 
the changes that greater openness will bring. 
This includes letting women decide where they can 
dance.

The government's job is not to sit in moral 
judgment over what citizens do in their free time.


______


[7]  Announcements: South Asia Citizens Wire | 
August 15-16, 2008 | Dispatch No. 2552

Invitation

Centre for Policy Alternatives, supported by the 
Berghof Foundation for Conflict Studies,
is pleased to announce the launch of the Sinhala 
and Tamil Language publications:

"Power Sharing, The Federal Idea and Sri Lanka"
and
"Local Governance in Sri Lanka: Past and Present"

"Power Sharing, The Federal Idea and Sri Lanka" 
will be introduced by Professor Jayantha 
Seneviratne, Senior Lecturer, Department of 
Philosophy, University of Kelaniya

"Local Governance in Sri Lanka: Past and Present" 
will be introduced by Professor Navaratna 
Bandara, Head of the Political Science 
Department, University of Peradeniya

We cordially invite you to participate in this ceremony, to be held on

Tuesday the 19th of August, from 2.00 p.m to 5.00 p.m
at the National Library Auditorium

Please download the Invitation Flyer from 
http://www.cpalanka.org/Federal_Invitation.pdf

For more information and to confirm attendance 
please contact Manjula on 0778043228


_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/

Buzz for secularism, on the dangers of fundamentalism(s), on
matters of peace and democratisation in South
Asia. SACW is an independent & non-profit
citizens wire service run since 1998 by South
Asia Citizens Web: www.sacw.net/
SACW archive is available at: http://sacw.net/pipermail/sacw_insaf.net/

DISCLAIMER: Opinions expressed in materials carried in the posts do not
necessarily reflect the views of SACW compilers.