SACW | July 7-8, 2008 / S. Asian Past / Toba Tek Singh / Messiah Syndrome / US India Nuclear Kiss
Harsh Kapoor
aiindex at gmail.com
Mon Jul 7 21:18:08 CDT 2008
South Asia Citizens Wire | July 7-8 , 2008 |
Dispatch No. 2536 - Year 10 running
[1] Pakistan:
(i) Real threat to Pakistan (M B Naqvi)
(ii) Pakistan Turns into Toba Tek Singh (Q. Isa Daudpota)
[2] Bangladesh: Messiah Syndrome & Graveyard of
Hope (Shameran Abed and Faruq Wasif)
[3] Sri Lanka: The culture of impunity rides on (Shanie)
[4] The pursuit of the Southasian past (Romila Thapar)
[5] India - J & K: Communal Protest in Jammu is
part of Hindutva Agenda to Divide
[6] India : Cycle of violence and counter-violence in Assam (Sanjib Baruah)
[7] US-India Nuclear Agreement - Still a Bad
Deal: Press Release by A Global Network of NGOs
[8] Book Review: Thrice Divided (Sohail Hashmi)
______
(i)
Deccan Herald
7 July 2008
REAL THREAT TO PAKISTAN
by M B Naqvi
For 60 long years, Pakistan has flourished on a
hollow and often dishonest rhetoric of Islam.
Pakistan has more or less reversed in practice
all that the new government was talking about the
way of tackling Islamic militancy: at election
time they were emphasising that a purely military
approach to fighting Taliban and extremists, such
as the Americans insist upon, is unwise. The
problem must be addressed by political means,
though use of force has to be kept in reserve for
sparing use.
The Army chief was entrusted with the task of
fighting Islamic extremism as best as he can the
other day. That apparently has gladdened the
hearts of the Americans who, according to Samuel
Hersh of the New Yorker, have three top US secret
agencies, along with the US Special Forces and
Pakistani intelligence agencies targeting the
Taliban leadership inside Waziristan.
Richard Boucher arrived once again in Pakistan
for three days on June 30. He will go round
meeting all the bigwigs of the state and party
leaders. This is apparently the start of what the
Americans have wanted: a coordinated military
effort by Americans, NATO and Pakistanis. In
NWFP's tribal areas the US National Security
Agency, the CIA and Defence Intelligence Agency
along with Special Forces and Pakistani
intelligence are said to be already active.
The second was the demonstrative military action
in Khyber Agency, just outside Peshawar by
paramilitary forces.
There was talk of possibly losing even Peshawar
because the warlord Haji Mangal Bagh of Khyber
Agency had started extorting money and throwing
his weight about in Peshawar.
There are now two categories of Pakistani
observers: Those who think that Talibanisation of
Pakistan is underway and is irreversible and the
others say the state has to be firm and act as
the Americans advise to contain the Taliban.
The fact is that much of Frontier's tribal areas
are already slipping out of Pakistani control.
Prime Minister Gilani frequently asserts that the
government will re-establish the writ of the
state. Please mark this will.
Names of each warlord-cum-Taliban commanders of
an agency are known; it is also known that they
are the real governments that are realising taxes
through extortion, administering rough justice
and providing what security there is.
Look at the typical Taliban commander or warlord.
All he has to do is to find a rich patron,
probably a narcotics producer with money to help
raise a Lashkar even of 70-80 armed people.
He proclaims himself a Taliban commander and, hay
presto, he rules. All he has to do is to be
ruthless in imposing taxes, administering simple,
inexpensive and quick justice to follow the
example of Arabian Peninsula's Middle Ages'
customs. This elicits admiration from simple,
gullible Frontier Muslims - indeed the Sunni
Muslims of all the subcontinent.
This is now a cottage industry. Once a commander
raises a Lashkar, he can extort more money and he
becomes the locality's ruler. What is not
prohibited by Taliban Islam is murdering
opponents or kidnapping them for ransom.
Recently, Pakistan's ambassador to Afghanistan
was abducted from near Torkhum. He was recovered
after several months on payment of a (huge)
ransom. Money otherwise is floating around in the
Frontier largely because of the flourishing
heroin and cannabis trade.
The beneficiaries are probably no more than 500
or so rich individuals. The spread of such Islam
is paradoxical for a place where civilisation
goes back 6,000 years. Pakistan areas were the
first where vedic culture flourished, followed by
Buddhist era and later by Islam.
The real vulnerability of Pakistan lies in the
proneness of gullible Muslims to admire
everything associated with medieval mores of
Arabian Peninsula, particularly of Mecca and
Medina. What Prophet Muhammad and his companions
said and did in accordance with their local
traditions elicits now unlimited admiration. The
notion is that everyone received just treatment
then.
Taliban too impart supposedly honest and ruthless
justice quickly and inexpensively. These
qualities are greatly admired by the
subcontinent's Muslims who yearn for establishing
such an Islamic state, though scholars differ
what can it possibly be.
There are local reasons in Pakistan too. For 60
long years Pakistan state has flourished on a
hollow and often dishonest rhetoric of Islam.
Pakistanis have to pay the wages of 60 years of
shallow and deceptive Islamic rhetoric and
manipulations by Pakistan's intelligence outfits:
for over 21 years Pakistan has organised a Jihad
in which hundreds of thousands of Pushtoon and
Frontier people have participated: first in
Afghanistan, then in Indian-controlled Kashmir
and later again in Afghanistan's civil war that
erupted 1993 onwards.
Taliban conquered Afghanistan for Islam - maybe
for Pakistan also. Taliban established an Islamic
state that all Deobandi Muslims regarded as
authentic Islamic State that must be supported by
all. Today in Pakistan's tribal areas any number
of warlords or Taliban commanders are
establishing just such Islamic statelets. These
are the wages of the 60-year long bogus rhetoric.
Pakistan's real vulnerability is its people's
admiration for ruthless medieval mores adopted by
charlatans today seeking power and pelf. Their
game has to be exposed as a first real step to
contain them. Otherwise Talibanisation will
continue and the more the armies of Pakistan and
others kill the ordinary Pushtoons the more
militants and radicals will be produced.
o o o
(ii)
PAKISTAN TURNS INTO TOBA TEK SINGH
by Q. Isa Daudpota
Pakistan is like an airplane lost in a dark
ominous cloud, running on autopilot. Its
coordinates and destination were set by previous
crew members, who have been made to disappear or
have parachuted out.
Passengers with gurgling stomachs and sweaty
brows having long realized the trouble and appear
paralyzed. They have seen a stream of crew
members pushed off the plane or bail out with
parachute -- shady hunks in khakis, but some rare
trustworthy ones too.
The Captain, Asif Zardari, took over when his
wife was shoved off the plane. The First
Officer, Nawaz Sharif, is there propped up by his
benefactor General Zia ul Haq. CIA operatives
onboard, passengers learned, had forced Zia to
jump off with a crate of mangoes tied to him.
Every so often the passengers are flashed the
grinning faces of the two pilots to assure them
that the plane is in safe hands. A sharp
journalist on flight notes the lack of sparkle
and empathy in their eyes and wonders if their
bright smiles are a sham.
Air traffic control is in the hands of General
Pervez Musharraf supported by American engineers.
They built the autopilot and are the only people
who now have flight plan that was entered in the
plane. Suddenly, a violent thumping on the door
disturbs the peace inside the locked control
room. Outside, deposed Chief Justice Chaudhry
Iftikhar and his attorney Barrister Aitzaz Ahsan
having caught wind of the plot are trying to
force their way in.
Meanwhile pandemonium reigns in the cabin. A
lunatic Mullah from NWFP with a huge beard
announces that he is Muhammad Ali Jinnah. While
the agitated passengers look at him, from the
back of the cabin a man in cricketing whites who
had earlier been talking to the Mullah, declares
himself Master Tara Singh. Jinnah and Singh
launch into a bhangra dance in the two aisles but
fail to attract the attention of the agitated
passengers who are sweating in their seats.
Fearing more trouble the two mad entertainers are
locked up in the same toilet by on-flight
security men. [This bit was left out by Dawn.]
To avoid further ruckus in the cabin the
cool-headed Purser Saadat Hasan Manto puts on the
film "Toba Tek Singh", a classic drama about the
confusion at the time of partition when Hindu
lunatics in a city in Punjab were repatriated to
India. Suddenly calm reigns as passengers get
glued to the monitor in front of them. This is
like the reassurance of seeing oneself in the
mirror on waking every morning. That's me you
tell yourself, that face is mine, I have survived
the night! The few who don't get the plot
finally realize its parallel with their condition
when they read the film notes in the flight
magazine (http://tinyurl.com/45wje2).
The rest of the world retains an interest in the
future of this unstable flight - an unfolding
drama viewed from ground level seemingly as
surreal as that experienced by those onboard.
Some characters in the drama are highlighted by
the international press.
The New York Times in its Sunday magazine
elaborates the past and present of Aitzaz Ahsan.
He makes it to the Prospect magazine's top 100
global intellectual's list. In the NYT piece,
Ahsan talks about himself being the virtual
deputy prime minister in Benazir Bhutto's cabinet
after Zia ul Haq was killed in 1988.
Inexperience and other flaws of Bhutto mixed with
serious interference by the army prevented much
headway. The president fired the government in
1990. Nawaz Sharif stepped in and got the courts
to try the Bhutto and her hubby, Zardari. They
were defended in court by Ahsan, who now
expresses disdain for Benazir viewing herself as
the life chairperson of the People's Party and
has little doubt about the corruption of the
couple, which he said was evident in their
expenses. He nonetheless remains a member of
the party, which is clearly non-democratic within
its ranks. No one knows how he balances his
alliances.
Justice Iftikhar who originally approved of Gen
Musharraf's takeover in 1999 has redeemed himself
through his activist role in highlighting the
fact of countless Pakistanis having disappeared
due to the 'war on terror'. This exposure has
earned him the ire of the Yanks. He also exposed
and thus stopped the deal to sell off the
national steel mill to a crony of the
Citibanker-turned-Prime Minister Shaukat Aziz,
who is now safely back in America after his
5-year overseas duty. The Chief Justice also
helped to stop the New Murree project which would
have replaced a pristine pine forest in the hills
with luxury hotels and villas for the filthy rich.
Meanwhile as the airborne drama of Pakistan
unfolds the common citizen is burdened by
sky-rocketing prices of food and other
commodities, as well as a serious shortage of
power coupled with serious eco-disasters. This
writer, who needs to walk the darkened bazaars
near his home daily from 2-3 am during blackout
to avoid mosquitoes and heat, can find many who
live a far more deprived existence. Take the
Afghan refugee along his nightly route, a
scavenger, who gathers discarded plastic bottles
from the shopping area for recycling. He earns
Rs 60-100 daily, a sum below subsistence level.
The plane can be flown safely if Pakistanis wake
up to the reality of their situation and begin to
change things for the better. Good sense and
political will are levers needed to disengage the
autopilot and take control of the country.
The author is an Islamabad-based physicist.
An edited version of this appeared in Dawn on
Sunday 6 July 2008:
http://www.dawn.com/2008/07/06/op.htm#3
and as a commentary in Himal:
http://www.himalmag.com/2008/july/commentary_pakistan.php
______
[2] Bangladesh:
a. In the Graveyard of Hope - Faruq Wasif
b. Messiah Syndrome - Shameran Abed
(Two recent op-eds at
http://www.drishtipat.org/blog/2008/07/01/graveyard-of-hope)
IN THE GRAVEYARD OF HOPE
by Faruq Wasif
[Prothom Alo, June 28, 2008]
[Translated for Drishtipat by Shabnam Nadiya]
Bangladesh is the name of hope's graveyard.
Bangladesh is another name for waiting. Here,
everything almost arrives, but nothing actually,
finally comes. But even within the darkness, the
possibility of the arrival shines like the
morning star. Even though in exchange for our
nose, a blade we received, we still hope that
some day our noses will heal. We are waiting,
hope, sister to waiting, will one day return. The
train of history will stop at our platform. We
wait. This is our life's force in this
unspeakable reality. We water the grave of hope
and bring forth the grass of sorrow. Waiting,
brother of hope, keeps us awake. We traverse
decades. We come through death, war, pestilence
and famine.
A new decade arrives, and we spy hope in the
dregs of frustration and are moved. Hope arose in
1990, after the fall of the despot. Hope arose in
2000, at the arrival of the new millennium. We
were almost becoming self-sufficient in food
production, xx was rising, our confidence was
growing as the young men and women labouring here
and abroad were earning dollars. But the lines of
that poem turn true somehow: I built this house
for happiness/It burnt up in fire/I bathe in an
ocean of ambrosia/It turned poison.
The poem is more than a hundred years old. Today
some non-poet would perhaps write, new bottle
same wine. So it's with that in hand that we have
to sit down today to take measure of our
humiliation on a national scale.
Transparency International has conducted a survey
and provided a record of the corruption during
the rule of this government. It states that
corruption hasn't decreased in comparison to the
past two governments, it has increased. TIB
themselves has prepared a comparative picture
based on data from the survey of 5,000 households
across 62 districts. An examination of the six
months prior to and six months after 1/11 shows
that ministry-wise corruption levels, meaning
education, health, land administration, local
government, the NGO sector, corruption and
bribery are rampant everywhere. And that too is
at higher levels than before. In the education
sector, it used to be 12.5 percent, now it's 44.5
percent. In the health sector, 32 percent has
grown to 36.9 percent; in land administration
39.4 percent has increased to 45.1 percent and in
the NGO sector, 33.3 percent is now 35.7 percent.
In addition, 96.6 individuals out of every 100
have been victims of the corruption in the law
enforcement agencies. So who's been left out? We
hear that the politicians are no longer in power,
many of them are immobile, in jail. So who are
the phantoms who have been doing all this? It was
to curb corruption that so much effort was
expended, so many upper floor chumps were sent
downstairs, and chumps from lower floors promoted
to the upper.
In the past the political leaders would call the
TIB report a conspiracy, propaganda to tarnish
their image. Will the same thing be said this
time as well? I don't know. If corruption has
decreased even slightly, then is the new TIB
survey lying? Those who have nothing else, have
experience. Its from that experience that we
know, whatever the intent of the survey, the data
that has emerged from it are close to the truth.
If that is the case, then what was this game of
hopscotch that we had been witnessing all this
while?
We don't know whether in the future, after
another 1/11, we will have to read another epic
of corruption in an anti-corruption drive. Still,
sorrow sulks within our hearts, Why did we build
this house!
Our train never arrives; our night never dawns.
The ringing of sword on shield never ends. If our
train does come, it never runs on the right
track. Still we wait. Like a condemned man waits
with the noose around his neck, so we wait too,
for some more breath, light, cherished faces,
tastes of the mortal. We who inhabit the
footpaths wait, one day we will have a house.
Slum-dwelling rickshawpullers in Dhaka and
Chittagong nurtures the yearning to one day
return to the village and farming. The poor wait,
something will happen some day. They will no
longer want for rice, their children will laugh.
The prostitute waits, even if she can't, her
daughter will escape this life of the fallen.
When her life is over, she thinks her
granddaughter or her great granddaughter will
surely find a different life. Then she goes to
her grave and waits, when will the gates of
heaven open. And she will ask the Creator of this
world, did my children find happiness? Those
fathers and mothers will wait even beneath the
grass and earth of the grave, those that they had
left behind, have they found happiness? Perhaps
they won't know, but we do, over a million women
have been smuggled to brothels in various
countries. That's about the number of people who
live in a smallish district of this land! Over
400,000 among them are India, and 40 thousand
boys are living the lives of sex slaves in
Pakistan. Still we wait, they will return, they
will be brought back. People cannot do without
waiting and hoping. If we didn't have the hope of
the times changing, we would move around like the
living dead. If there was no wait for the
establishment of our golden Bengal and the trial
of the war criminals, the Liberation War would
become a meaningless. If there was no hope that
one day this lawlessness will end, we would turn
to stone from sorrow.
It is through these eyes of stone that we witness
the kings, queens and princes of corruption have
either been released or are about to be. Of
course we want to see freedom in politics, we
want the re-establishment of the political rights
of the people. But since when have these corrupt
politicians become so similar that we have to
witness the freeing of the corrupt in the guise
of freeing politics?
We see that although corrupt individuals are
being placed under pressure, institution
corruption is not being addressed. Citizen's
participation in administration and rule has not
been increased. The people are like puppets in
the reform and anti-corruption drives. Are we
only supposed to go and vote when we're called
upon? We've lost our rights in the regimes of
both political and non-political governments. All
we've retained is our right to vote. What can be
done with that, if the same people stand for
election? If the pond of politics is overrun with
weeds, you cannot clean it with bamboo sticks,
the entire pond has to be uprooted. Only the
people can do that. It's the people of East
Bengal that wiped out the last trace and name of
Muslim League. It's the people of Bangladesh that
forced out the Pakistani occupation forces. In
Kansat, Shonir Akhra, Fulbari, the people rose up
again and again. That was the muscle power of
democracy. And this government, this is the
muscle power of the ruling elite. The two not
bring the same results.
A scream for a mass movement burnt deep inside
the heart of society. But no response to that
came from politics, and so a vacuum was created.
The people could find no one any more to reflect
their hopes on to. "People Power" hung in space
with no heir, no one to claim the mantle. But
power is such a thing, it does not, cannot just
travel hand to hand without a final address.
Since the people could not, the people's
representatives would not, take it on, power
landed in the laps of today's navigators, and
said take me, use me, drive me. The next history
every one knows. We needed a flush to get rid of
all the waste, they pressed the flush button. But
now all the blood, all the spoils, all the
pollution is coming back. is that dirt now going
to overflow the toilet and drown us all?
No one can deny that corruption is like a sea
flowing over Bangladesh. Everyone knows that a
sea cannot be cleaned like this. The only way is
to allow rivers and streams to keep flowing into
the sea until it cleans itself. And those rivers,
those streams, are the people. So the only path
is to remove the barriers in the way of the
people. There is no other solution. There can be
no ordering the river to flow from the heights of
the Qutub Minar of power. Stuck between the
scylla and charybdis, we also see a glimmer of
hope. Will a bridge be built between the masses
and government power, can state power finally
pass out of the hands of the elite into the
people? On that rests the future of hope and fear.
So we wait and wait. We wait as the hyphen
between past and future. But no nation, no
people, can spend decades suspended, waiting as
hypens. We want to wipe away our poisoned
inheritance and start a new day, but we cannot
also erase our proud history.
The last 37 years have rained so many blows on
our feelings, deep calluses have formed. It has
become like a hard tortoise shell. Does a hopeful
heart still beat under that shell? We fear that
if hope is dead, opportunism will be born and
will stretch its neck out of its shell like a
tortoise. And Bangladesh will be transformed into
a grave for hope. In that graveyard will walk a
group of tortoise people, who have a strong shell
as shields and whose necks are always stretched
out in greed.
We do not want the dead weight of those
tortoise-like opportunists to turn everything to
poison forever.
o o o
THE MESSIAH SYNDROME
by Shameran Abed
Our current army chief is not the first general
to have unsuccessfully tried to bring about a
qualitative change in a nation's politics by
giving it, in characteristic military style,
short-term shock therapy. But strengthening
democracy requires more than a messiah, it
requires collective, long-term efforts to
establish the rule of law, to ensure individual
freedom and to allow democratic institutions to
grow and flourish.
IT IS surprising that a major story on Bangladesh
in the latest issue of Time magazine (June
30-July 7), which is based on an exclusive
interview with the army chief, General Moeen U
Ahmed, has gone almost unnoticed. Could it be
that those who have seen and read the story
prefer not to discuss or highlight it, given its
unflattering portrayal of the general and his
attempts at being the nation's redeemer? Or are
we ashamed at our collective folly at having
initially been hopeful about the general and his
band of deluded followers who still believe that
they can put this country on a democratic path by
stifling democracy itself?
General Moeen, like his purported boss,
Fakhruddin Ahmed, appears to have a preference
for the foreign media. One will not come across
too many exclusive interviews of the army chief
in local publications (he did, however, give an
exclusive to one of the private television
channels that has seemingly gone out of its way
to pander to this military-controlled regime).
But when foreign media organisations come
calling, the army chief, like the chief adviser,
seems to oblige them far more willingly. Do both
men suffer from the same complex? Do they both
feel that their accountability is to the west
rather than to the people of Bangladesh? After
all, it is the resident representatives of our
western development 'partners' who are believed
to have instigated the January 11, 2007
intervention by the military in the first place,
and it is they who have supported and propped up
this regime ever since.
If the tendency of the principal players of the
current regime to explain themselves to foreign
audiences more willingly than to the people of
this country is worrying, what is more worrying
is their patent lack of appreciation of history.
Our current army chief is not the first general
to have unsuccessfully tried to bring about a
qualitative change in a nation's politics by
giving it, in characteristic military style,
short-term shock therapy. This has never worked
in the past, in this subcontinent or elsewhere,
and it will not work this time around. Addressing
our democratic deficit will require more than a
discredited anti-corruption drive and the
desperate neutralisation of two iconic political
leaders. General Musharraf tried this very tack
in Pakistan and failed miserably. In our country,
the fallout, political and economic, of this
government's ill-conceived agenda, which many
believe is also designed to legitimise a greater
long-term role for the military in national
politics, will only be dire and frightening.
A sustainable democracy will not result in our
country until our leaders work to establish the
rule of law, uphold the fundamental rights of the
citizens and allow democratic institutions to
grow and flourish. Yet our current leadership,
just like the elected and military leaders of the
past, have continually undermined the rule of
law, violated at will the rights of the people
and continue to sidestep or destroy at every
opportunity the institutions that are supposed to
act as the pillars of a genuine democracy - a
functioning legislature, an independent
judiciary, an effective bureaucracy, civil
society organisations that operate as
non-partisan pressure groups and media that works
to put additional checks and balances on
government, not work as the mouth pieces of one
or the other party or of an unelected,
military-controlled regime.
Moreover, there is an inherent arrogance about
our current rulers, who were never given a
popular mandate but seem to believe in their own
right not only to govern but also to determine
who should govern in future. This may seem to
most to be contrary to the basic democratic ideal
of representative government, but it appears not
to bother the chief protagonist of our present
undemocratic dispensation in the least. To Time
magazine, General Moeen stated that 'you can
judge the people of a nation by the type of
leaders they select'. Given that the general
admittedly has an extremely low opinion of the
leaders that we 'selected' in the past; does this
mean that he has an equally low opinion of us,
the people, as well?
That would explain why he apparently feels little
need to explain himself, his actions, or that of
the current regime to the people of this country.
But what are its implications for our democratic
aspirations? If our present rulers, whose primary
duty is to allow the people to freely and fairly
choose their governors, do not feel that the
people are up to it, what reason could we have to
feel optimistic about a return to democratic
rule? General Moeen also told Time magazine that
the people need to be educated 'so that they
don't keep on cutting off their own feet'. Who
will judge when the people have been sufficiently
educated? And what will happen to elections till
that desired level of education has been
attained? If the general feels that the people,
at their present level of awareness, are not
capable of making the right decisions, surely he
is better off not affording the people that
opportunity at all.
Given his apparent take on the matter, the bigger
question is: does the general believe in a
representative democracy at all where every
person has an equal vote? Or does he feel that
the choice of governors should be left up to a
select group of educated and enlightened men such
as himself? Right now, it seems that he feels
compelled to show support for the former while he
secretly believe in the latter.
For those of us who feel that the only way to
strengthen democracy is by allowing people more
freedoms and greater choices, the implications of
General Moeen's statements to Time magazine are
disheartening to say the least. When rulers lose
faith in the ability of the people to decide for
themselves what is best and, more worryingly,
when they feel that they can openly and
unashamedly insult those they govern, the result
is usually the confiscation of the people's
democratic rights. That began with the
declaration of the state of emergency that
automatically suspended the fundamental rights of
the people and the promulgation of the emergency
power rules, which took away additional rights
including the right to bail. When and under what
circumstances those rights will be returned to
the people remains anyone's guess.
Interestingly, General Moeen reportedly feels
that 'no systems of government are bad in their
own right, it's the human beings who make it so'.
That is probably why he feels that he can bring
about a qualitative change in politics by getting
rid of our current crop of political leaders and
installing 'effective leaders' in their place, if
need be by circumventing the democratic process.
But is it not an effective system of checks and
balances that is meant to keep the leaders
honest? And do we not require functioning
democratic institutions to ensure that those
checks and balances exist and work? Our
democracy's many failings will not be addressed
simply by imposing different leaders on the
people. The sooner the army chief realises that
and puts faith in the people's ability to learn
from their mistakes, the sooner will he allow us
to re-embark on our democratic quest.
______
[3]
The Island
5 July 2008
THE CULTURE OF IMPUNITY RIDES ON
by Shanie
Abductions and arbitrary arrests are once again
reaching alarming proportions, together with
extra-judicial killings by all sides involved in
our little dirty war. Often, abductions are
followed by beatings (as in the recent cases of
media persons) or mysterious disappearances.
Pious statements of condemnation and
"explanations" from apologists ring hollow
because there is no redress for the victims and
their families. Nobody is charged with these
offences and the usual excuse is that there was
no evidence or that no eye-witnesses have come
forward. This certainly is not the
professionalism that we expect of the law
enforcement authorities. Our Police have had an
enviable record in cracking complex crimes in the
past. But now a culture of impunity exists when
it comes to crime associated with political
figures. It gives rise to a feeling shared by
many that these crimes are being committed on the
direction of political powerful masters.
Take the case of Joseph Pararajasingham, who was
killed as he attended Christmas Mass at the
Batticaloa Cathedral in 2005. There were several
eye-witnesses who identified the killer but the
Police have chosen to release this suspect. A
Commission of Inquiry headed by High Court Judge
Mahanama Tillakaratne was appointed to
investigate this and similar crimes. We do not
know what conclusions the Commissioner has
arrived at. In any case, the report released in
2007 is presumably gathering dust in the
President's Office. The family has understandably
lost any faith that the killers will ever be
brought to justice.
But this is not an isolated case. Hundreds have
been abducted and have disappeared; many have
been openly killed. All parties - the LTTE, TMVP,
EPDP and the security forces - are widely
believed to be responsible for one or the other.
The killing of the innocent students in
Tricomalee, the aid workers in Mutur (both in the
Trincomalee District), the Tamil and Muslim
civilians in Allaipiddy (Jaffna District), in
Pesalai (Mannar District) and Pottuvil (Ampara
District), in the Farm School in the Vavuniya
District, and the spate of civilians killed in
bus bombings in Kebittigollawa (Anuradhapura
District), Buttala (Moneragala District) and in
several areas of the Colombo District show that
terror from all sides covers all parts of the
island. The cited incidents are only the ones
that are well known. There are daily incidents of
terror that are a part and parcel of the life of
civilians in the North and East. Elsewhere, a
fear psychosis is building up.
Community Level Peace Building
These abuses of human rights cannot be left for
self-correction by the very forces engaged in
these abuses. The civil society, the media and
even our religious leaders have been basically
intimidated into near silence. Nobody likes to be
beaten up or incarcerated without charges for
months. Except for a few with discernment, the
public are deprived of access to the stories of
abuse. History has shown that genuine peace
building must grow as a people's movement. In
Marcos' Philippines and in Suharto's Indonesia it
was people's power which overthrew repressive
regimes. In South Africa and Northern Ireland, a
people's movement supported by international
pressure helped to restore peace and democracy.
Such a people's movement is what this country
needs at this stage. We need civil society and
religious leaders who will challenge 'traitor'
labels (as President Rajapakse courageously did
during the 1988 insurgency) to give leadership to
the people undergoing trauma.
Prof. Daya Somasundaram, then Professor of
Psychiatry at the University of Jaffna and
co-author with his colleagues in the University
Teachers for Human Rights (Jaffna) of the Broken
Palmyrah, addressed the 2002 Annual Sessions of
the Jaffna Science Association. What he stated in
the context of Jaffna in 2002 is valid for the
country as a whole today. He said: 'Community
level peace building activities have to be
initiated. The mode of thinking and acting has to
change from a conflict-habituated system of
suspicions, grievances, ethnocentrism, violent
solutions and confrontation to a peace system
with give and take, accommodation, flexibility,
forgiveness, non-violence and a wider world-view.
A fixed belligerent posture should not be
engineered or orchestrated, but a creative
response allowed to grow independently and
spontaneously from below. Only then can genuine
peace be sustained."
Somasundaram is quite right that new initiatives
need to taken at the grassroots. We should think
anew and take a broader view of understanding the
mind and frustrations of the 'other'. The media
should set an example in this, despite the
dangers involved. Too often, our media,
particularly the Sinhala and Tamil media, do not
promote the themes of national harmony and the
respect for the human rights of all communities.
Inconvenient truths are suppressed or worse,
distorted. The media can be an indispensable tool
for promoting public respect for democracy and
human rights. Self censorship as practised now,
for whatever reason, defeats the purpose for
which the media exists - to disseminate knowledge
and awareness. Chauvinism, from whomever it
emanates, needs to be exposed for the harm it
does to the future of our country.
Apologists and Red Herrings
We referred earlier to the case of 17 ACF workers
who were killed in Mutur. This is being
investigated by the Government appointed
Commission of Inquiry (CoI). But it is indeed a
pity that Prof Rajiva Wijesinha in a newspaper
article this week has again returned to the theme
of blaming the ACF for not withdrawing its
workers from Mutur earlier. To borrow a phrase
from Archbishop Desmond Tutu, it is obscene to
draw this red herring. 17 young persons have
brutally shot and killed in cold blood. We should
find and punish the killers of this heinous
crime. The University Teachers for Human Rights
(Jaffna) by meticulous research have been able to
present evidence that identifies the killers. We
should assist the Commission of Inquiry to
investigate independently, including the evidence
presented by the UTHR (J), and make their
findings. It is truly obscene for this liberal
turned apologist to draw a red herring by trying
to shift the blame on the ACF. The ACF may or may
not have exercised good judgment in keeping its
staff in Mutur on that fateful day. The ACF
exists to provide assistance in precisely such
situations but this was an extraordinary
situation, which the local management may not
have realised. But that is not the real issue.
These young persons have been brutally murdered.
The real issue is to identify and bring their
killers to justice.
Whilst on the Mutur massacre, it may be pertinent
to refer to another red herring that has been
drawn in respect of the Presidential Commission
of Inquiry headed by retired Supreme Court
Justice. An eleven member International
Independent Group of Eminent Persons (IIGEP)
headed by retired Indian Supreme Court Chief
Justice P N Bhagwati were present as
international observers and to assist the CoI.
The IIGEP withdrew earlier this year citing
various reasons why they felt that the CoI may
not be able to arrive at the truth. One of the
reasons they gave was that there was a conflict
of interests in the counsel from the Attorney
General's Department being closely involved in
the collection and preparation of evidence and
leading the questioning of witnesses. At least
one of the leading counsel for the CoI had
reportedly advised some of the original police
investigations that are to be examined by the
CoI. Counsel for the security forces whose
conduct is under investigation have predictably
drawn a red herring by accusing one of the
Commissioners of a conflict of interest and
accusing the Chairman Udalagama, a person of
undoubted integrity, of misconduct. Are these 17
young persons and their families entitled to
justice. There have been disturbing reports of
the intimidation of witnesses, some of whom have
had to flee the country. Others have simply
refused to come forward out of fear.
Bishop Lakshman Wickremesinghe
Soon after the 1983 pogrom, and shortly before
his death, Bishop Lakshman Wickremesinghe gave a
stirring and oft-quoted pastoral address to his
flock at Kurunagala. What he said then still
remains valid after twenty five years: "The
urgent demands of our national crisis must
overcome personal, party and petty interests. We
must pray for and support those who are trying to
build convergence in the midst of divergence.
Renewed dialogue between the Sinhala and Tamil
leadership should not be delayed. The possibility
of renewed violence remains in the background
like a dark shadow. A genuine sharing of power
between the majority and minorities has to
emerge. There must be a real determination to
reach a settlement. Otherwise, there will be
increasing disorder along with increasing
dictatorship."
______
[4]
Himal
June 2008
THE PURSUIT OF THE SOUTHASIAN PAST
Moving beyond the colonial-era understanding of
the history of the Subcontinent gives us a whole
new way of looking at the Subcontinent's past.
This now includes not just the usual explorations
of politics and economy, but also of social,
cultural and religious issues - as well as the
writing of history in the first place.
by Romila Thapar
Sixty years ago, at the time of Indian
Independence, we in the region inherited a
history of the Subcontinent shaped by two
substantial views of the past: the colonial and
the nationalist. Both were primarily concerned
with chronology and with sequential narratives.
The focus was on those in power, a focus that has
been basic to much of the writing of history.
There was information on the action of kings and
dynasties, on governors-general and viceroys, and
on various national leaders. On these, there was
broad agreement. What was contested, although
only partially, was the colonial representation
of early Indian society. The colonial view was a
departure from earlier Indian historical
traditions, and drew on European preconceptions
of Indian history. The use of history to
legitimise power had changed from the rule of
dynasties to colonial and nationalist definitions
of power.
Three arguments were foundational to the colonial
view of Indian history. The first was a
'periodisation' (the dividing of history into
periods) that was to have not just consequences
for the writing of history, but also major
political impact during the 20th century. Indian
history was divided into three sections - the
Hindu, the subsequent Muslim civilisation, and
then the British period - as formulated by James
Mill in The History of British India, published
in 1818. In the first two cases, these labels
were taken from the religions of the ruling
dynasties. The divisions were endorsed by the
assumption that the units of Indian society were
monolithic religious communities, primarily the
Hindu and the Muslim, and were mutually hostile.
Religion was believed to have superseded all
other identities. This periodisation also
projected an obsession with the idea that Indian
society never changed throughout its history,
that it was static.
The second assertion was that, through the
centuries, the pre-colonial political economy
conformed to the model of 'Oriental Despotism',
an idea conducive to assuming society to be
static, characterised by an absence of private
ownership of land, despotic and oppressive rulers
and, therefore, endemic poverty. A static society
meant that it lacked a sense of history, since
history records change, and consequently there
was thought to be no historical writing in
pre-modern India.
The third assertion was the claim that Hindu
society had always been divided into four main
castes - the varnas. These had been rigidly
separated because they were believed to represent
the diverse races of the Subcontinent. The
identification of caste with race resulted from
European ideas of what was called 'race science',
and the labelling of people by racial labels.
This caste organisation of society was rooted in
what was seen as the Aryan foundations of Indian
civilisation. In defining Indian civilisation,
Sanskrit was viewed as its dominant language and
the hegemonic religion was Vedic Brahmanism.
Above all, the attempt was to project India as
alien, the 'Other' of Europe.
Colonial interpretations claimed to be applying
the criteria of Enlightenment rationality in
their reconstruction of the history of the
colony. But in fact, they were imposing a history
that suited the requirements of colonial
dominance. These preconceptions, together with a
focus on chronology and the narrative of
dynasties, governed routine history. Colonial
historians drew on texts reflecting the
upper-caste perspectives of Indian society. Many
Indian historians, coming from the newly emerged
middle class, were of the upper castes and were
familiar with these texts; thus, by and large
they continued this routine.
There was a debate, especially among historians
influenced by nationalist ideas, about some of
these preconceptions. For the most part, however,
the colonial periodisation was generally
accepted. A few historians altered the
nomenclature to ancient, medieval and modern,
terms that were borrowed from Europe and thought
to be more secular - although the markers all the
while remained the same and, in effect, there was
little change. Oriental Despotism, as a system of
political economy, was naturally rejected by the
more nationalist Indian historians. Curiously,
however, there was little interest in providing
alternative hypotheses on the early Indian
economy and society. Such an interest began
relatively late. Social history in standard works
largely reiterated the description of the four
castes as given in the normative texts, the
dharma-shastras. There was little recognition of
how the system actually worked, however, with its
many deviations from the norm.
The predominant form of nationalism, described as
anti-colonial and secular, was beginning to be
imprinted on Indian historical writing from the
early 20th century. Parallel to this, and
initially less apparent in historical writing,
were the two religious nationalisms, Hindu and
Muslim, both emerging at about the same time.
Both had been deeply influenced by the colonial
projection of monolithic and segregated
communities of Hindus and Muslims in the past.
Such nationalisms were not essentially
anti-colonial, and were more interested in using
history to legitimise their political ideology of
religion-based nationalism to endorse the
political mobilisation that they sought. Muslim
religious nationalism came to define the identity
of Pakistan, while Hindu religious nationalism
sought a parallel identity for India. The agenda
of colonial policy is apparent in such views.
[. . .]
Full text at:
http://www.himalmag.com/2008/july/coverfeature_southasian_past.php
______
[5] Continued Communal Protest in Jammu is part of Hindutva Agenda to Divide
(Kashmir Times, July 8, 2008)
Editorial
SERVING NOBODY'S INTEREST
VIOLENT PROTESTS HARMING SOCIAL, ECONOMIC STABILITY
There appears to be no end to the violent
protests in Jammu, which may not augur well for
the social and economic stability of Jammu and
Kashmir, particularly Jammu region. Whether or
not those spearheading the agitation have a
genuine grouse against the government, the
ongoing protests with mobs on the rampage, is not
a good omen. Most importantly, it is affecting
the day to day life of a common man, for whom, at
the end of the day, the question of bread and
butter is more important than who gets to run the
affairs of the Amarnath shrine, or even the
larger regional disparities question. A one
legged government has certainly been unable to do
much in providing even the basic amenities to the
people or in fulfilling their needs of essential
commodities which are either scarce or available
at exorbitant prices. In this scenario, many
people huddled indoors, because of both the
enforced bandh and the curfew, have nothing to
even eat. Barring this, the ailing people are
unable to get adequate medical attention. In
fact, the one week long agitation so far has
caused the entire region loss of several lakhs of
rupees with business receiving a great set back.
The economic blockade targeting business of
Kashmir has adversely affected the business in
Jammu as well. Tourism and Amarnath pilgrimage,
the cause of which the protestors seem to be
espousing, has also been adversely affected as
many pilgrims travel via Jammu for the Valley. It
is not simply a question of economics but also
the social fabric of the state which has been
severely damaged by the protests taking up a
communal form. Even if the protest is sought to
be legitimised on grounds of regional
aspirations, the communal tones are apparently
visible. Interestingly, those supporting the
ongoing agitation, in response to allegations of
creating a regional and communal divide, have
stated that there is no attempt to create
communalism in Jammu region and that some Muslims
have even offered support to the protest. In
fact, they are making strong appeals for
maintaining communal amity and have ensured that
no Muslim of Jammu would be targeted. This indeed
may be a tricky assurance given the fact that
such an assurance is silent about minorities and
Muslims other than Jammu Muslims. And what really
is the definition of a Jammu Muslim? Is it
essentially a person from the city. Though no
specific cases of harassment to the Muslims have
come to the fore in Jammu city, there have been
incidents on the outskirts of the city and on the
Jammu-Srinagar national highway as also the other
routes. The temporary shelters of some nomadic
tribes too have been set on fire at some places.
Such instances are being justified in the name of
enforcing bandh. The BJP and others supporting
the agitation maintain that such attacks were
resorted to as normal part of protestors
enforcing bandh and not selective targets against
any particular community. Going by reports that
all persons moving on the highways are subjected
to some form of harassment or the other, from
questioning to being physically heckled, this may
be true. But is a party that seeks to use this
protest as an election agenda and ensure a larger
representation in the next state legislative
assembly even aware that use of such forceful
means to ensure bandh are violative of the civil
rights of citizens and downright undemocratic?
Without going into the rationality of the
demands, the violent street protests must stop
immediately. So must the prolonged Jammu bandh,
forcefully enforced by mobs on the streets so
that curfew can be lifted from various parts of
the region including the winter capital. Instead,
if those wishing to get some political mileage
out of the protests feel that their demands are
reasonable, there are other democratic forms of
protest that they ought to take recourse to.
Holding the ordinary citizens to ransom and
creating serious regional and communal divides,
adding to the fear psychosis and insecurities of
certain sections of the society will in the
ultimate run not only be detrimental for Jammu
region but also for the agenda they are pursuing.
Neither the election card, nor the larger
Hindutva agenda of the Sangh Parivar can in the
long run work successfully here. A culture of
hatred cannot sustain for long in a society that
is plural, tolerant and has a history of not
succumbing to provocations. The ongoing
agitation, at least in its present form, is in
nobody's interest. There has to be an immediate
end to it.
______
[6]
The Telegraph
July 8, 2008
A CRISIS OF POLICY AND THE SOVEREIGNTY QUESTION
A unilateral ceasefire and a new governor may not
be enough to end the cycle of violence and
counter-violence in Assam, unless there is a
radical renegotiation in the social contract
between India and this state, writes Sanjib
Baruah The author is at the Centre for Policy
Studies, New Delhi
Tired of platitudes
Some in Assam like to see the unilateral
ceasefire by the so-called Alpha and Charlie
companies of United Liberation Front of Asom's
28th battalion as good news. However, there is
nothing in the history of the past two decades of
the state's politics to suggest that the state's
multi-faceted political crisis, of which Ulfa is
a symptom, might end with new defections from
Ulfa or, even a mutiny.
A far more promising development may be the
appointment of former chief minister of
Rajasthan, Shiv Charan Mathur, as governor. For
the first time in nearly two decades, Assam will
have a politician as governor.
Two other gubernatorial appointments in the
region are significant. Sikkim's new governor,
the retired IAS officer, Balmiki Prasad Singh, is
an old 'Northeast hand.' Unlike these two men,
the new governor of Meghalaya, Ranjit Shekhar
Mooshahary, has had a career in a uniformed
all-India security service. But his Bodo roots
makes it an interesting appointment.
Governors of the northeastern states have more
inputs in policymaking than in the less-troubled
states. It is no coincidence that the primary
thrust of our policy towards Ulfa during the
tenure of the last two governors - both military
men - has been military. The half-hearted steps
toward negotiations were not the result of
conviction on either side. They were gestures to
satisfy Assamese public opinion that strongly
favours a negotiated and honorable settlement
with Ulfa.
The outgoing governor, Ajay Singh, leaves behind
a remarkably unsuccessful record of locking horns
with Ulfa for nearly two decades. In the early
Nineties, long before he became the governor, he
commandeered two counter-insurgency operations
against Ulfa as head of the Indian Army's 4
Corps. As governor, he came to be associated with
a hardline position of opposing talks with Ulfa.
Singh claims in his resumé that as the commander
of those counter-insurgency operations, he "was
given the responsibility of wiping out [the] Ulfa
insurgency" and that he "smashed the Ulfa
insurgency in less than three months". But that
was more than fifteen years ago.
While Ulfa is at a crossroads today, it is not
because of its military reversals alone. Popular
outrage at the killings of civilians, and a sense
of hopelessness that there is no end in sight to
the cycle of violence and counter-violence, are
more important factors.
There is no evidence that anyone knows how to use
the shift in the public mood as a political
opening. One hopes that the new gubernatorial
appointments would mark a shift in the balance
between military and political thinking. Even
though Ulfa as an idea has always been more
powerful than the reality, this has not made
engaging with it any less challenging.
The oft-repeated clichés about unemployment and
underdevelopment creating conditions for
recruitment by insurgent groups, and platitudes
about solving the crisis of immigration through
border-fencing do not give confidence that our
decision-makers understand the sources of Ulfa's
political influence.
The two most recent governors have both been
highly vocal on the dangers of illegal
immigration from Bangladesh. But to expect
political dividends out of such speech-making on
this extraordinarily difficult issue without
addressing it in any substantial sense is to
grossly misunderstand the nature of the
immigration crisis and its relationship with the
rise of Ulfa.
Ulfa was a radical fringe of the Assam Movement
of 1979-85. From the very beginning, it tried to
distance itself from some of the Assam Movement's
extreme rhetoric on "foreigners" and
"Bangladeshis." At the same time it tried to get
propaganda value out of the evident indifference
of our governmental institutions to this key
Assamese concern.
But the immigration crisis, for Ulfa, has never
been more than a piece of evidence of what it
sees as a raw deal that the Assamese got in the
postcolonial pan-Indian dispensation.
India's political and bureaucratic elites inherit
a memory of Partition vastly different from that
of their counterparts in Assam. Few people seem
to know that the migration from eastern Bengal
was a politically explosive issue in Assam even
as far back as the 1930s. Indeed, it shaped
Assamese attitudes towards Partition.
The flow of people from one of the subcontinent's
most densely populated areas to a sparsely
populated region - legally open to new
settlements in colonial times - did not stop with
Partition. The erection of an international
border did not change that reality. Indeed, from
the Assamese point of view, the effect of
Partition was to intensify the migration pressure
from eastern Bengal, with waves of Hindu refugees
joining in.
In retrospect, Assam appears to have adapted to
this demographic transformation rather well.
Official predictions of the 1930s that
immigration would permanently alter the future of
Assam and destroy "the whole structure of
Assamese culture and civilization" did not
materialize. But it is not because the predicted
demographic changes did not take place: they did,
with profound consequences. But contrary to the
fears of the colonial era, most East Bengali
migrant Muslims adopted Assamese as their mother
tongue. No one familiar with the relationship
between demographic dynamics and civil disorder
in other parts of the world would read this as a
sign that everyone would live happily ever after.
Japanese scholar Hiroshi Sato talks about the
faultline between the normative definition of
citizenship in Indian law, and the actual
exercise of franchise by people "based on the
legitimacy of rudimentary documents rather than
on the registration of citizenship." The
"foreigners" question in Assam is the product of
this faultline. Understood in this way, it is not
surprising that the issue became the epicentre of
a veritable political explosion in Assam in 1979.
There is no evidence that the ripples of this
explosion have subsided.
The power of Ulfa as an idea reflects a policy
impasse of subcontinental proportions, showing up
the failures of Partition borders and of the
foundational ideologies of the post-Partition
states. Assam's numerous tribal rebellions, and
evidence of candidates of mainstream political
parties turning to Ulfa's tacit support during
elections, and of even the government relying on
such support in certain situations - relations
facilitated by the massive corruption that the
state has become known for - outline the
multi-faceted nature of the crisis. If political
movements relate to reality, either to the bare
facts, or to strivings that grow out of a
reality, Ulfa provides an example of the latter.
In Ulfa's narrative of history, Assam lost its
sovereignty in 1826. It sees itself as being
engaged in a battle to recover that sovereignty.
This reading of history has its elements of myth
and fantasy. But as the veteran journalist, M.S.
Prabhakara, points out, "a certain wistfulness
and nostalgia over a past when Assam was a
sovereign and independent political entity," have
been part of Assamese "folk memories, literature
and cultural and political polemics," for a long
time.
To the military mindset, Ulfa's insistence on
discussing sovereignty might seem audacious,
especially given the organization's weak
position. At the same time, it is hard to imagine
how the strivings that animate Ulfa can be
accommodated within the model of an ethnic peace
accord - so popular among our politicians and
bureaucrats.
The chief minister of Assam, Tarun Gogoi, has
held out the Bodo Liberation Tigers as an
example. The BLT, he says, is similar to Ulfa,
but "we sat down with BLT and they
surrendered.... Now we have BLT members as part
of our government."
But historically, the 'Assamese' has not been
purely an ethnic and exclusive category. If the
category includes minorities of all stripes - as
it does in Ulfa's vision - how can the
aspirations of a territorially defined political
community be accommodated within the model of an
ethnic peace accord?
The reason for Ulfa's apparent intransigence on
the sovereignty question may be because the
concept provides a way of getting around this
difficulty. It brings to the policy agenda the
notion of renegotiating the social contract
between India and Assam.
Sovereignty talk does not have to take the form
of the familiar talk about independence. However,
compromises within this paradigm are possible
only if constitutional reforms are part of the
agenda. It might also require a willingness to
relate foreign policy issues, vis-à-vis relations
with Bangladesh, to domestic policy concerns, but
in ways other than those that our security
establishment has long preferred.
A bold new political initiative to resolve
Assam's complex crisis must consider such options.
The author is at the Centre for Policy Studies, New Delhi
______
[7]
Media Release
July 8, 2008
US-INDIA NUCLEAR AGREEMENT - STILL A BAD DEAL:
Global Network of NGOs Urge International Community to Oppose
The US-India Deal Working Group of Abolition
2000, a global network of over 2000 organizations
in more than 90 countries working for a global
treaty to eliminate nuclear weapons, says that
pressure to rush a decision on the US-India
Nuclear Agreement must be resisted.
The organizations are calling upon key
governments "to play an active role in supporting
measures that would ensure this controversial
proposal does not: further undermine the nuclear
safeguards system and efforts to prevent the
proliferation of technologies that may be used to
produce nuclear bomb material," or "in any way
contribute to the expansion of India's nuclear
arsenal."
This week, in defiance of opposition from Left
Parties on whose support it depends, the Indian
government is expected to circulate a draft
nuclear Safeguards Agreement to the Board of
Governors of the International Atomic Energy
Agency (IAEA). In doing so, it set in motion the
remaining steps required to operationalize the
US-India bilateral nuclear agreement (known as
the "123 Agreement" after the relevant clause in
the US Atomic Energy Act). Besides the Safeguards
Agreement, the 45-nation Nuclear Suppliers Group
(NSG) must grant India a special exemption from
its nuclear trade guidelines and finally the US
Congress must accept the terms of the "123
Agreement".
It took two years from the July 2005 Joint
Statement by Prime Minister Singh and President
Bush until the text of the "123 Agreement" was
finalized and nearly a year has elapsed since
then. After delaying for so long, the decision at
this time by the Indian government to send the
draft Safeguards Agreement to the IAEA Board of
Governors has more to do with the personal pride
of Prime Minister Singh than with any changes in
national or international circumstances. It
appears that Mr Singh is more concerned about
keeping faith with President Bush than the
chances that the deal might actually be
concluded. Most political commentators, including
proponents of the deal within the US government
and Congress, believe that the required steps
cannot be completed during the life of the Bush
Administration. Furthermore, there is no
guarantee that the next President will wish to
proceed with the deal in its current form.
The US-India Nuclear Agreement was a bad deal
when it was originally conceived and nothing has
changed to redeem it since then. All the problems
identified in a letter sent to the NSG and the
IAEA by 130 NGOs and experts in January this year
still remain. See the following link for the text
of and list of signatories of the international
letter:
http://cnic.jp/english/topics/plutonium/proliferation/usindiafiles/nsgiaea7jan08.html
The deal effectively grants India the privileges
of nuclear weapons states (NWS), despite the fact
that India developed nuclear weapons outside the
NPT regime. It doesn't even require India to
accept the same responsibilities as other states:
full-scope IAEA safeguards for non-NWS and a
commitment from NWS to negotiate in good faith
for the elimination of nuclear weapons.
The IAEA and NSG must not to be stampeded into
making decisions to fit in with an unrealistic
political time-table. The 35 countries
represented on the IAEA Board of Governors must
consider the possibility that special conditions
demanded by India could undermine the credibility
of the IAEA safeguards system itself. They must
also consider whether undertakings made by a
government at the fag end of its tenure and
facing strong domestic opposition would actually
be honored. The NSG must consider the
implications for the international
non-proliferation regime of granting India a
special exemption. These are weighty matters
which should not be judged precipitously.
The IAEA Board of Governors and the Nuclear
Suppliers Group of countries should, as a minimum
condition, hold firm to the longstanding
international effort to end all production of
highly enriched uranium and plutonium to make
nuclear weapons. They should insist that the
U.S.-India deal be conditioned on an end to
further production of fissile materials for
weapons purposes in South Asia.
Contacts
JAPAN (English and Japanese)
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[8]
Outlook Magazine
July 14, 2008
Review
THRICE DIVIDED
It is a book to buy, read, keep and most importantly to gift to your children
by Sohail Hashmi
FIREFLIES IN THE MIST
by Qurratulain Hyder
Women Unlimited
Pages: 404; Rs. 350
Non-Urdu readers have just begun to
realise that Qurratulain Hyder is without doubt
one of the finest writers anywhere of fiction,
especially reportage fiction. Trying to review
Qurratulain Hyder's translation of her novel
Akhir-e-Shab Ke Humsafar is like trying to review
two books together. She has made several
significant changes in the translation. The first
two chapters-Caledonia and The Golden Album-have
been written only for the English version. Many
chapters have been shuffled around and new
details added.
The changes, however, do not diminish the epochal
tale that Fireflies is. In fact, they make it
richer and easier for someone unfamiliar with the
multi-layered complexity of a land and its
diversities. Through short crisp chapters, the
tale carries you on a journey of discovery and
realisation. The rather detailed scene
descriptions are not there just for atmosphere
but are crucial to the tale. They are also a
testimony to how deeply Qurratulain Hyder, whose
own milieu was Urdu and East UP, knew and
understood Bengal and its pain.
Fireflies is about three generations of Bengalis,
one born around the time of the Bengal partition,
the next growing into youth when India is
partitioned and the last growing up with the
emergence of Bangladesh. It is also about the
shared heritage of the subcontinent and the
artificial cleavages that politics created.
Hyder's finest, undoubtedly, is Aag ka Darya and
Akhir-e-Shab is in many ways a sequel to that
magnum opus. It is a book to buy, read, keep and
most importantly to gift to your children.
_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/
Buzz for secularism, on the dangers of fundamentalism(s), on
matters of peace and democratisation in South
Asia. SACW is an independent & non-profit
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