SACW | June 19-20, 2008 / South Asian Solidarity / NATO and Pakistan / Kashmir's Water / India's Far right / West betrays Burma
Harsh Kapoor
aiindex at gmail.com
Thu Jun 19 21:14:12 CDT 2008
South Asia Citizens Wire | June 19-20 , 2008 |
Dispatch No. 2527 - Year 10 running
[1] On Southasian Solidarity and Questions of
State and Land (Ahilan Kadirgamar)
[2] Pakistan: No return to the 1980s (I.A. Rehman)
[3] NATO, Kosovo, Afghanistan and Pakistan (Faheem Hussain)
[4] Blood in Kashmir's Water (Sankar Ray)
[5] India - Bangladesh: Trouble on the Friendship Express? (Antara Datta)
[6] India: The Far Right - fiercer and more fragmented (J Sri Raman)
[7] India: Rather than seek a reward Gujjars
should reform their backward social practices
(Dipankar Gupta)
[8] India: Terror's new face (Editorial, Herald)
[9] The West betrays Burma (John Pilger)
[10] Announcements:
i) India: upcoming protest demo in New Delhi on
Lalit Mehta murder case (New Delhi, 20 June 2008)
ii) an evening of readings and conversation
featuring Mohammed Hanif (Karachi, 22 June 2008)
iii) Anti-Emergency Day (New Delhi, 26 June 2008)
______
[1]
Kafila.org
16 June 2008
ON SOUTHASIAN SOLIDARITY AND QUESTIONS OF STATE AND LAND
by Ahilan Kadirgamar
I have been travelling between cities, from
Kathmandu to Delhi to Calcutta and down south to
Madras. Visiting friends, but also trying to
understand peoples' perceptions of Sri Lanka in a
time of war. I give talks here and there, but
many more meetings over tea and dinner. There is
an older tradition of solidarity, but now I am
thinking again of the meaning of Southasian
solidarity.
In Calcutta, on an activist's book shelf, I find
a book signed and gifted to her in the
mid-eighties by Para, my friend from Berlin who
passed away last year. Kumaraswamy
Pararajasingham, a Marxist and human rights
activist in Lanka in his early years, was a
pillar of Tamil dissent over the last two decades
of exile in Germany. An old Marxist in Calcutta,
asks me about Hector Abhayawardhana, the
theoretician of the Lanka Sama Samaja Party (LSSP
- the major Trotskyite Party), who taught me so
much about Lankan politics, still continuing in
his late eighties in Colombo. Hector was exiled
in India, and was part of that 1942 movement of
Trotskyites finding refuge in India, fleeing
imprisonment in colonial Ceylon. He stayed in
India through the early sixties engaging in
Marxist debates across the spectrum. In Delhi, a
journalist talks to me about Kethesh Loganathan,
the brilliant mind that could consolidate complex
ideas into a few sentences and who mentored me
during the last many years before he was
assassinated two years ago by the LTTE. Kethesh
was the spokesperson of the Eelam Peoples
Revolutionary Liberation Front (EPRLF - a left
leaning Tamil militant group) and spent the
better part of the eighties in India. It was a
different world, that pre-1989 world of
anti-colonial and post-colonial solidarity of
Third World internationalism. As I travel now, I
am attempting to share my concerns about
developments in Lanka, but I end up learning far
more than I can share, I am overly pessimistic,
but draw optimism in the emergent Republican
Nepal and am engaged by the political vibrancy in
post-Nandigram Bengal.
State and land, two concepts that trouble Lanka,
are also two concepts that trouble solidarity. It
is to break the boundaries of the political and
territorial borders of nation-states that present
a formidable challenge for Southasian solidarity.
The weakening of solidarity means that Lankans
can only consider Indian engagement in terms of
the Indian state. Even the economic engagement by
Indian business is mediated by state-to-state
relationships; in the Free Trade Agreement, the
upcoming Comprehensive Economic Partnership
Agreement (CEPA - the free flow of services and
investment), in infrastructure investment
facilitated and carried out by the Indian state.
Consider the figures on trade; Sri Lanka imports
the most from India (an estimated US$ 2.7
billion), it is the third largest destination of
exports (an estimated US$ 0.8 billion), in a
country with a US$ 32 billion GDP in 2007. And of
land, one can only despair at the destruction
caused in the name of (home)land, drawing
territorial boundaries of nations and using it as
the rallying cry of nationalisms. In Sri Lanka
today, in the age of "terrorism", "security" and
"development", the ruling regime avoids
discussion of state reform and land reform. State
and land are reified into the concepts of
sovereignty and territorial integrity, which
constrict the space for possibilities of
solidarity for struggles and reforms.
Even as I think of state and land during my
travels, I want to explain about Sampur, the land
south of Trincomalee, the site of war in 2006 and
2007, and then designated a High Security Zone in
May 2007. With close to sixteen thousand of its
people still displaced, it will now become the
site of coal power plants and coal landing
facilities, and perhaps a Special Economic Zone.
35 square miles (20,000 acres) of agricultural
and fisher-folks' land has been chosen as the
site where, the National Thermal Power
Corporation (NTPC) of India will invest a large
part of the US$ 500 million project to generate
500 Mega Watts of electric power. Indeed power is
important. Sri Lanka is heavily dependent on oil
for electric power, further pushing inflation in
a time of global oil price increases. And indeed
Indian power continues to compete with Chinese
power (there is the Norochcholai electric power
plant being built by the Chinese), where
political hegemony in the region is increasingly
determined through economic engagement.
Sampur however, is very much a part of the
broader history of the multi-ethnic Eastern
Province. The uses of land and the ruling
regime's intentions, at a time when the Muslim
community also fears Sinhalization of the East,
raises questions about the history of land
reform. Repression, though much less than
struggles, also raises questions. The Paddy Lands
Act of 1958, that populist act by the Trotskyite
leader Philip Gunawardena, significantly
transformed share-cropping and land alienation,
specifically in its impact on small farmers, even
if it was driven by the bureaucracy in the form
of the Agrarian Services Department. The land
reform laws of the early and mid 1970s led to the
nationalization of estate lands. The curse of
plantation economy, the mainstay of British
colonial interest, and for long the largest
provider of wealth for Ceylon and its social
welfare policies, was at the cost of the severely
exploited Up-Country Tamil labour (Indian
indentured labour brought over the century prior
to de-colonization to work in the plantations).
The estates went through changes for the state
centred interest of the United Front government
of 1970 - 1977 (a coalition including the Left
parties), as much for appeasing the Sinhala
nationalist fears that the Sinhala political
formations mobilized on. Nationalization of the
estates threw thousands of plantation workers on
the streets, and eventually in settlements in the
North and East, becoming cannon fodder for
subsequent decades of the war. There were the
changes that the bureaucracy brought about
through the Agrarian Services Act of 1979, which
began setting back any gains and protections
granted to paddy land tenants, where
significantly silent was the opposition to
rolling back land reform. How quickly the
question of land reform disappeared from the
public scene, providing only room to speak of
(home)land. And indeed, then came 1977 and the
opening of the economy and the early beginning of
a neoliberal onslaught that was paralleled by the
changes to the political geography through
attacks on minorities and the cycles of war.
Thinking of Sampur reminds one of the
multi-billion dollar Mahaweli power and
irrigation scheme, the largest development
project in Lanka's history, funded by the World
Bank and other donors, accelerated for
implementation in a time of conflict in the
1980s, facilitating Sinhala colonization and
further polarizing the communities through its
ideological claims. Colonization and
gerrymandering of the East by Sinhala nationalist
politicians in the mid-eighties, who also put the
Sinhala poor in the border villages to face the
wrath of the war as a buffer for the security
forces. And when one thinks of the question of
land, of alienation, of colonization, of
displacement, one can not forget the cleansing;
the ethnic cleansing of seventy to eighty
thousand Northern Muslims, the entire population
of Muslims in the Northern Province that were
evicted by the LTTE in less than forty eight
hours in 1990. In Lanka, reform can not be seen
independent of the war, both attempts at state
reform and land reform are reframed and
attenuated by militarization and war. And in
thinking of land, caste was so central to any
conception of society. However, in Jaffna and the
North, the question of caste has been shut out by
the narrow cry of the Tamil nation after 1976. In
attempting to talk about land, or about the state
or for that matter Southasian solidarity, in
attempting to even raise questions, I find I have
to return to the particular histories. I think of
peoples' struggles, each different, yet raising
broader questions about land and about state. In
Lanka, and particularly the North and East, the
militarization of society, the decimation of
social movements, and repression of decades of
war, have crippled the potential for peoples'
struggles, troubling also the possibilities of
solidarity.
In Bengal, I find that Nandigram has raised the
question of land and rejuvenated the sense of
solidarity. In Nepal, I meet a second generation
Indian Maoist from London. He does not seem
interested in state reform or land reform, even
though both are stated priorities of Nepal's
Maoist party. He wants to see his revolution at
any cost. Diasporas and distance, and forms of
solidarity can also be irresponsible and
destructive. The dominant sections of the Tamil
Diaspora are also not interested in state reform
or land reform, they are only interested in
securing (home)land and the emergence of a
(nation-)state at any cost. Kethesh and Para
spent the last two decades trying to change that.
In returning to thinking about solidarity, the
world has changed much. It is not the decade of
the forties, when Hector and others would form
the Bolshevik Leninist Party of India (BLPI). And
it has even moved on from the eighties, when
Kethesh and other Tamil militants would relate to
a broad spectrum of political parties and social
movements in India. Solidarity then may have to
begin with intellectual questions, but with
commitment and responsibility. Questions that are
in many ways Southasian (to borrow Himal's
definition), not in the sense of the
relationships between South Asian states, but
questions about the Southasian peoples. Questions
about our particular states, their relationship
to our particular lands and peoples, which
despite the severest repression and erasure, will
nevertheless emerge and challenge us. The sharing
and exploring of such questions are also
beginnings for solidarity.
______
[2] PAKISTAN:
Dawn
19 June, 2008
NO RETURN TO THE 1980S
by I.A. Rehman
ON the whole, the lawyers-sponsored long march on
Islamabad was a wholesome experience, as all
activities that can reassure the people of their
potential to effect a change always are.
Regardless of the motivation, the suspension of
the bureaucratic canon that all non-religious
political gatherings in Islamabad must be
forcibly prevented should be welcomed. In a
capital where even small groups of protesters
have often been hounded and beaten up by
truncheon- wielding goons in uniform,
authorities' wooing of a large congregation was
an unintended benefit of the long march. One
should like to hope that this break from an ugly
practice marks the beginning of a new tradition
of tolerance of dissent.
The debate on what was actually achieved by the
lawyers and what they could not achieve is
unlikely to end soon. But there is little room
for controversy on some harsh messages the event
has sent to the federal authority, specifically
to the People's Party high command.
First, it has become abundantly clear that no
diversionary manoeuvre or subterfuge can help the
government in bypassing the issue of the judges'
restoration. Any further delay in resolving this
matter will not only affect the authorities'
ability to address issues on the people's list of
priorities, it will also accelerate the
politicisation of the judges' role and thus do
serious harm to the cause of the judiciary's
independence.
Secondly, the protest rallies provided ample
proof, if any were needed, that the People's
Party is losing its standing with the people
because of a growing perception that it is
dragging its feet on the judges issue not only
because of its own reservations on the
independence of the judiciary but also because of
its subjective appreciation of the post-election
power structure. Unless the party can arrest the
alienation of the common citizens with something
better than the game of bluff and bluster started
by some of its trouble-shooters, it will become
dangerously vulnerable. The party has already
created problems for itself by pandering to
cronyism and it should know better than taking
all its supporters for granted.
Thirdly, and more important than anything else,
the rush among fortune-seekers of many different
hues to play godfather to the lawyers' movement
has exposed a game plan to revive the pattern of
governance devised by Gen Ziaul Haq. In that
design the scope for democratic politics will be
minimal.
While the mainstay of Gen Zia's rule was his
command over the armed forces, he did craft
civilian support columns. He strengthened the
conservative religious lobby with economic
incentives, employment opportunities, and by
helping it to fill its coffers and build up
arsenals of modern weapons. He also allowed the
business a free rein and pacified landlords by
ensuring deletion of land reforms from political
discourse. After initial jolts, he allowed the
civilian bureaucracy the illusion of partnership
with their more privileged counterparts from the
military. Through purges under the Provisional
Constitution Order (PCO) of 1981 he created a
docile judiciary that became a willing tool for
creating a theocracy. Finally, he laid claims to
immortality by acquiring nuclear weapons. It was
this formidable coalition of vested interests
that sustained Gen Zia's anti-democratic rule.
This state model easily survived some infirm
tinkering by two PPP governments and the second
PML-N government deemed it prudent to make it
even stronger. Gen Musharraf stumbled into a
manner of governance that led to the collapse of
the edifice Gen Zia had so laboriously raised.
While following Gen Zia's example in demonising
and demolishing the predecessors in power (PML-N
in Gen Musharraf's case and PPP in Gen Zia's
case) he alienated the big business and then
squeezed the civil bureaucracy out of
decision-making.
He had no problem with the conservative clerics
to begin with but after 9/11 it became impossible
for him to pamper them. His ham-handed drive
against terrorism did not allow the public to
realise that this war was being fought in
Pakistan's interest and an overwhelming majority,
especially in areas bordering Afghanistan, came
to believe that Islamabad was fighting America's
war. By ostracising the architect of the bomb he
alienated the nuclear hawks. Thus by the end of
2006 the general had knocked down all the props
of his power except for the judiciary.
His 2007 decision to break with the judiciary is
likely to be written down as one of the most
intriguing acts of hara-kiri in the annals of
totalitarian rule. Finding himself isolated and
under a multi-dimensional pressure to hold a
general election, and to allow some fairplay, Gen
Musharraf had no option but to fish for support
in political parties other than the one he had
dethroned in 1999. His failure in keeping the
latter out was inevitable in the crude manoeuvre.
The lawyers' movement and the apparent lack of
intra-coalition cohesion seem to have reactivated
the lovers of the Zia model. Quite obviously they
believe the present coalition, disliked by the
religious parties, big businesses and even by the
permanent establishment, should give way to an
IJI-like alliance backed by the interest groups
mentioned above. The sudden emergence of some of
the veteran coup-makers as champions of democracy
can only be explained in this context.
It is no secret that quite a few powerful
elements have already started suggesting a fresh
election within a few months and the traditional
power-brokers, who should never be considered as
having retired, are busy painting scenarios that
can tempt any politician.
No elaborate argument is needed to prove that
Pakistan cannot afford a return to the 1980s. The
Zia model envisages an anti-democratic and
obscurantist regime that can never appreciate the
demands of a federal state, nor can it do justice
to the teeming millions - women, peasants,
workers and the minority communities. All those
working for a revival of the Zia legacy are thus,
consciously or unwittingly, paving the way to an
ultimate disaster.
This increases the responsibility of the
coalition leaders for completing the transition
to democracy. A total break with the
authoritarian tradition, everybody knows what
that means, will only be the first step towards
the establishment of democratic government. The
need for speed is manifest. Nobody should
entertain the illusion that the window of
opportunity opened to the politicians bearing
civilian badges will remain open for ever.
This should be taken not as a call for blind
support to the wobbly coalition because it must
learn to earn people's goodwill but it is
necessary to urge the coalition partners to look
beyond their narrow party interests (easier said
than done) at least over the period required to
put a democratic apparatus in place.
All coalitions are temporary arrangements and
must sooner or later break down. In Pakistan's
present situation, any effort aimed at hastening
the inevitable will impose on the people costs
they cannot bear. Thus, the tendency visible in
each major coalition partner's camp that the
other side is under some unavoidable compulsion
to stay in tandem needs to be resisted.
Successful management of a coalition is an art
that can only be acquired through diligent
striving towards agreed goals. It is time the
learning process was earnestly begun.
______
[3]
NATO, KOSOVO, AFGHANISTAN AND PAKISTAN
by Faheem Hussain
Znet | 6 June 2008
What is NATO doing in Afghanistan? What are the
true aims of NATO intervention in the region?
These are the questions that I mean to address in
this article. To understand what is happening in
Afghanistan one has to go back to the attack on
Yugoslavia by NATO forces in February 1999.
After the collapse of the Soviet Union and the
Warsaw Pact, NATO lost its raison d'être given
that Western Europe and the United States were no
longer threatened by an invasion from Eastern
Europe. NATO thus had the choice between
disbanding itself or developing a new reason for
its existence. This gave the opportunity to the
United States to reshape NATO in ways that would
serve its imperial interests. It is very
important to remember that its founding documents
clearly say that NATO was a defensive
organisation, which would go into action only
when one of its member states was attacked.
The first step in the US strategy of changing the
nature of NATO was the attack on Yugoslavia on
the pretext of preventing ethnic cleansing.
Clearly Yugoslavia had not attacked a NATO member
state thus excluding a response from NATO.
Whatever one can say about Kosovo, it was
internationally recognised as an integral part of
Yugoslavia (and is still internationally
recognised as part of Serbia) and Yugoslavia did
not attack or even threaten a NATO member state.
[. . .]
Although the present government has taken some
timid steps in distancing itself from the
so-called "war on terror" and has rightly started
to talk to the people of Waziristan, it has not
gone far enough. It has to clearly tell the USA
that its policies in Afghanistan and in
Pakistan's frontier are a failure. They have only
led to death, destruction and the spread of
terrorism. The only way out is for all foreign
forces to get out of Afghanistan and for the US
to stop interference in Pakistan. Once these
forces are out of the region then and only then
will one be able to come to a political solution,
as there is no purely military solution neither
to the problems of Afghanistan nor to the rising
phenomena of Islamic militancy in Pakistan.
Pushtuns have clearly voted against the mullahs
and the militants but at the same time the
rejection of Musharraf is also a sign that the
people of Pakistan reject Pakistan's forced
marriage with the disastrous US policies in the
region. It is time for a clean divorce.
FULL TEXT AT:
http://www.zcommunications.org/znet/viewArticle/17845
_______
[4]
Asia Sentinel
18 June 2008
BLOOD IN KASHMIR'S WATER
by Sankar Ray
A decades-old competition for water complicates
the already-bitter relationship between India and
her neighbors
Water is destined to be a determining factor in
the regional conflicts of South Asia in the years
to come, particularly between India and Pakistan.
Unquestionably one of the most crucial of
environmental resources, this essential
ingredient for human life is growing so scarce in
some areas globally that if current trends
continue, two-thirds of humanity will suffer
"moderate to severe water stress" within 30
years, according to a comprehensive assessment of
freshwater resources by the United Nations.
Nowhere is this truer, however, than in the
parched regions of India, Pakistan and
Bangladesh, where overpopulation, poverty and
scarce resources make the competition more acute.
In a remarkably even-handed paper published in a
recent issue of the Journal of International
Affairs, Saleem H. Ali, associate professor of
Environmental Policy and Planning, at the
Rubenstein School of Environment and Natural
Resources of the University of Vermont in the US,
identifies the lack of environmental cooperation
in bilateral and multilateral relations as the
root cause of a potential conflict "between two
nuclear neighbours, India and Pakistan,
predicated in a history of religious rivalries
and post-colonial demarcation."
The Pakistani scholar urges India and Pakistan to
put aside their mutual distrust to reconfigure
the riparian issues for lasting piece in the
region, their inveterate, decades-old antagonism
notwithstanding, and concentrate on a matter of
equal importance to their survival of each
country. Ali praises the World Bank's
"instrumental role in its negotiation during the
height of the Cold War to bring the two countries
to the negotiating table with the Indus Water
Treaty after bilateral negotiations failed. The
outcome of this historic treaty was the
unrestricted use by India of the three eastern
rivers, the Ravi, Sutlej and Beas and complete
control of the three western rivers, the Jhelum,
Chenab and Indus by Pakistan.
The rivers all have their origin in the bitterly
disputed region of Kashmir. And thus,
theoretically whoever controls Kashmir controls
the rivers, a fact conveniently forgotten for
years as Pakistan and India tested each other's
mettle in a series of wars. The Pakistani Prime
Minister, Hussain Suhrwardy, in 1958 pointed to
the geographical importance of Kashmir when he
emphasized the importance of the six rivers of
the Indus Basin.
"Most of them rise in Kashmir. One of the reasons
why, therefore, that Kashmir is so important for
us is this water, these waters which irrigate our
lands," Suhrwardy said at the time. He proved
himself a prophet. The only other international
statesman who thought along the same lines was
the British Premier, Anthony Eden, who believed
that the resolution of the water dispute would
reduce the tension over Kashmir, hence the Indus
Water Treaty.
India denied the link between Kashmir and the
water issue, however, a denial that has
contributed to the growing resentment between the
two countries, and an amazing one given reality.
The head of the Indus flows through the valley
corridor that connects Indian and Pakistani-held
Kashmir.
Further south India has been engaged in a running
dispute with Bangladesh over the Farakka Barrage
over the River Ganges since 1973. This project
involved a dam built on the Ganges in West
Bengal, about 10 kilometers from the Bangladesh
border. Bangladeshi objections that the project
would seriously affect the country's water supply
have proved correct. Falling water levels below
the dam have raised salinity levels, affecting
fisheries and hindering navigation. Falling soil
moisture levels have also also led to
desertification.
Ali firmly believes that "environmental factors
can play a pivotal role since they help link
various issues such as economic development and
security." He points out that, "states that are
ecologically vulnerable to extreme climatic
events, such as Bangladesh, are recognizing that
poor environmental planning in coastal areas can
have devastating economic impacts".
"I have long been criticizing the brazenly
reactionary promotion of water disputes among
Indian states by the political parties in power,"
said Surajit Guha, the former deputy-director
general of the Geological Survey of India and one
of India's top hydrologists "It may not be
confined within the Indian territory. The Farakka
impasse is a clear evidence of this. Have you
seen European countries through which the mighty
River Danube flows engaging themselves in dispute
over sharing of water during the last one hundred
years? I do not know why water is increasingly
politicized when most of the peoples of SAARC
region are deprived of access to safe and potable
water."
While the west is busy concentrating its efforts
on securing a ready supply of oil, in South Asia
the governments are slowly but surely waking up
to the fact that in the not too distant future
water is going to be equally, if not more
important to the survival of their people.
______
[5]
Economic and Political Weekly
May 24, 2008
TROUBLE ON THE FRIENDSHIP EXPRESS?
by Antara Datta
The Maitreyi (Friendship) Express, the rail
service between India and Bangladesh that was
restarted recently evoked nostalgia and hopes for
stronger ties between the two nations. However,
it will take more than a rail link to deal with
fears of infiltration by Bangladeshi Muslims that
is being used in aggressive political rhetoric.
On April 14, this year the Bengali new year was
ushered in with the reopening of a train link
between India and Bangladesh after a gap of
nearly four decades. As the Maitreyi (Friendship)
Express chugged out of the Kolkata railway
station in Chitpur bound for the Dhaka
Cantonment, there were those who argued that it
would strengthen bilateral relations between the
two neighbours. The biweekly train that has the
capacity to carry over 350 passengers and takes
about 12 hours (including the time taken at the
border), parallels the Samjhauta Express that
runs between Lahore and Delhi.1 The train link
between Dhaka and Kolkata is not the first train
between the two regions. Prior to 1965 there were
three trains the East Bengal Mail, East Bengal
Express, and the Barishal Express that serviced
the two halves of the region. These were stopped
following the 1965 war. Freight services were
resumed in 1972 but were later discontinued. A
bus service between Kolkata and Dhaka began in
1999 and there are daily flights between New
Delhi and Kolkata and Dhaka and Chittagong. But
it was the opening of this train link that had
many waxing nostalgic about a time when the two
Bengals were not separated by manmade borders2. A
refugee from East Pakistan, Janatosh Pal spoke of
how he was six when he left for India but that
Kalindi, the village he was born in Bangladesh,
"remained my motherland".3 Such sentiment though
was not echoed by all. A group calling itself the
Nikhil Banga Nagarik Sangha (All Bengal Citizens'
Committee) opposed the opening up of a train link
with a country they accuse of persecuting Hindus.
Deep Insecurities
What then does this new train symbolise? Does it
mark a metaphorical coming together of people
separated by borders they did not create, or is
the reality far more complicated? A closer look
at the negotiations and controversies
demonstrates that bilateral relations between
Bangladesh and India will take more than just a
train link to heal. Given the sensitive nature of
discourse regarding any movement of human beings
across this fractured border, it is unlikely that
the train will heal deeper prejudices and
insecurities.
When negotiations about the train first opened
there was friction between the two countries when
Bangladesh refused to accept India's proposal for
a 800-metre fence from the border on either side.
India wanted a box like fence from the border
crossing point to Gede in the Nadia district.
Bangladesh objected to both the construction of
the fence as well as the terming of any such
"fortification" as a "fence".4 India's demand for
a fence was a reflection of the fear that the
train could be used by illegal infiltrators
including terrorists.5 The entire discourse about
illegal infiltration from Bangladesh has several
connotations. On the one hand, the Bharatiya
Janata Party (BJP) has protested in the past that
vast numbers of Bangladeshis are "flooding" the
Indian mainland particularly along the eastern
border and changing India's demographic structure.
In April 1992 the BJP national executive passed a
resolution blaming the Congress Party for not
taking action against illegal infiltration. There
was a call for a rally in Calcutta in April 1993
and the BJP issued a direct threat that they were
willing to target and expel Bangladeshi workers.
This rhetoric became particularly strident and
violent in Mumbai with the Shiv Sena picking on a
non-Marathi, non-Hindu "other", in this case
Muslim Bengalis whom they accused of being
"infiltrators" from Bangladesh. In April 1995
they threatened a large-scale deportation of such
illegals and carried out another attempt to do so
in April 1998 which provoked international
tension between Bangladesh and India.6
'Infiltrators' and 'Refugees'
This is not to say that there has not been
illegal migration from across the border,
particularly of a labour force that does not
accept the sanctity of the international
boundary. India has in the past repeatedly
expressed concern about the presence of illegal
immigrants and the porous border between the two
countries.7 However what is striking about this
political discourse is that only Muslims who
cross the border illegally are "infiltrators" and
deserve to be sent back, whereas Hindus, who
cross the border, more often than not, illegally,
are "refugees" who deserve the sympathy and
protection of the Indian nation. Such a belief
mirrors the two nation theory that saw east and
west Pakistan as a homeland for the Muslims, and
assumes that India then would be a similar
homeland for Hindus.
Indian law does not recognise "refugees" as a
distinct legal category. All who cross a border
into India are either citizens and thereby have a
valid right to do so, or "aliens" who fall under
the 1946 Foreigner's Act. Any non-citizen who
enters the country without a visa is technically
an "illegal infiltrator".8 But in both popular
and political discourse the term "infiltrator"
has come to signify Muslims from Bangladesh who
cross the border into Bengal and Assam, usually
in search of employment. This then has two
implications. First, it assumes, that all Hindus
across the world (and particularly those from
Bangladesh) deserve refuge in India as legal
residents whether or not they cross the border
legally. Second, it marks out the Muslim who
crosses illegally both as an illegal migrant and
as a Muslim infiltrator he is marked both by his
legal and communal status. It implies that the
influx of Muslims infiltrates and infects the
body politic that would otherwise be "pure" and
free of such contamination.
The fear that the Maitreyi Express would become a
conduit for terror and illegal workers meant that
there had to be extensive checks at the border
areas leading to significant delays. Almost five
of the 12 hours of the journey is spent by
passengers at the border waiting for immigration
checks to be completed. These delays are perhaps
a result of bureaucratic incompetence but they
also reflect a certain official and popular
unease about a border that can be seen as a
"central space where the relationships between
state and citizenship, between nation and
territory, were and are being constantly tested
and negotiated".9 Post-Partition the eastern
frontier was not a closed defined space. The
government of India in 1947, as in 2008,
remained uneasy about the people who were
crossing this frontier. Jawaharlal Nehru and the
Congress high command did not think that
conditions in east Bengal were particularly grave
and that the flight of the Hindu refugees was a
product of baseless and imaginary fears, which
meant that the human flow could be halted,
perhaps even reversed.10 The Nehru-Liaqat Pact
of April 8, 1950 provided for the return of
migrants on both sides to their original
homelands.11
The first part of the pact was concerned with
ensuring equal citizenship rights for minorities
in both countries while the second part attempted
to ensure that such migrants had freedom of
movement along with protection in transit and if
they decided to return to their homes by December
31, 1950, they would be entitled to the
restoration of their immovable property, house or
land.12 Those refugees who came from East
Pakistan/Bengal between October 1946 and March
1958 were termed "old migrants" (a total of 41.17
lakhs) and were eligible for aid but those
crossing the border between April 1958 and
December 1963 were not eligible for assistance.
In 1952 a passport system was introduced and the
fear that the border would be permanently closed
pushed up migration. In 1956 the Indian
authorities tried to install a barrier of permits
and migration certificates and finally they tried
to deter people by not recognising them as
refugees and refusing them rehabilitation.13
Following riots in 1964, refugees who crossed the
border between January 1964 and March 1971 were
termed "new migrants" (a total of 11.14 lakhs)
and relief was to be given only to those who
agreed to settle outside West Bengal. The 6.1
lakhs in West Bengal were not eligible for relief
and rehabilitation benefits.14 The
bureaucratisation of the border area and the
classification of refugees however masked the
reality that the border was an interstitial space
that many navigated by evading officialdom
without needing passports and visas.
Much has been written about how the treatment of
refugees on the eastern frontier was markedly
different from those in the east how refugees in
the east were not seen as "true refugees", as
opposed to the "deserving poor", the hardworking
Punjabis, and how the state functioned as a
benevolent despot deciding what was best for the
refugee.15 Haimanti Roy has argued that these
refugees were forced to claim and proclaim their
victimhood before they could claim their
nationality.16 What this particular line of
argument demonstrates is that in the
post-Partition period, the concern about the
movement of people was not a communal question
since the bulk of the refugees were Hindu. By
the time of the refugee crisis of 1971 though,
the public and official tone had changed
somewhat. The government of India keen to
emphasise that those who crossed in 1971 were not
going to be considered for rehabilitation, that
they were "foreigners" and would be treated as
such.17 A series of semantic strategies in naming
and labelling the refugees ensured that this was
emphasised. However, in popular discourse as the
number of refugees multiplied, there were
increasing concerns about the communal nature of
the problem. The concern was no longer about the
relief and rehabilitation that had not been
provided for East Bengali refugees but about the
changing communal configurations.
Letters to the Amrita Bazar Patrika in late April
and early May 1971, less than a month after
refugee crisis had assumed serious proportions,
reflected this concern. S A Basu from Nagpur
wrote to express his displeasure at the growing
numbers of Muslim refugees predicting that, "The
hope that these refugees will return to their own
homes as soon as normalcy is restored to East
Bengal is rather a faint hope".18 A month later
an anonymous letter to the editor pointed out
that Hindus in East Bengal had been attacked by
those Muslims who had subsequently become
refugees. "India is now thoughtlessly allowing
those very people to come to West Bengal in their
millions...Surely India is overdoing charity and
imperilling (sic) the interests of her own
people." Suggesting that there was an insidious
plan to plant Muslim teachers in West Bengal
schools in order to subvert and Islamicise the
education system,the anonymous reader predicted
that the "Muslim escapees" would soon turn West
Bengal into a Muslim majority area.19
In official discourse while the communal
composition of the refugees was never publicised,
it is believed that Hindus made up a bulk of the
refugees.20 The government was sensitive to any
attempts to publicise and potentially exploit the
communal composition of the refugees. The journal
Mother India was prevented from publishing an
editorial on the subject of Muslim refugees
titled 'Refugees or Trojan Horses' that would
have suggested that Muslim refugees had been sent
to deliberately destabilise the country. The
government of India declared that this would be
"prejudicial to the maintenance of communal
harmony and were likely to affect public order"
and prohibited the publication of the editorial
under Section 6 of the Criminal and Election Laws
(Amendment) Act of 1969.21
Communalisation of the Border
As a result of this fluid border the fear of the
"infiltrator" has now become an almost accepted
part of the political discourse about relations
between India and Bangladesh. This unease is a
product of actual illegal infiltration,
aggressive political rhetoric and what can be
described as the "communalisation" of the border.
On the day the train set off, a group of
protestors representing the Nikhil Banga Nagarik
Sangha disrupted its passage at Aranghata in the
Nadia district. The police blamed the group for
planting seven crude bombs on the tracks that
were defused a day before the inauguration of the
train. The bombs were found at Bikramtola near
Dhantola by local residents who then informed the
police. The bombs were not powerful enough to
cause any significant damage and were seen as a
political statement by the group (which denied
any association with the bombs).22 The leader of
the group, Subhas Chakrabarti, described the
train as a "cruel joke" and asked "Why should
democratic and secular India seek to develop such
intimate links with Islamic Bangladesh, where
Hindus continue to suffer huge torture,
intimidation and dishonour".23 The group then has
two distinct demands first that Bangladeshi
Hindus who have been tortured be rehabilitated
properly in India. Next, that India take
responsibility for the plight of Hindus in
Bangladesh and ensure that it forms a key part of
bilateral relations. Such demands demonstrate how
the refugee/infiltration/ migrant issue remains a
thorn in the side of both countries. On the one
hand, groups such as the Sangha locate themselves
specifically within the Indian nation state and
demand rehabilitation from it, and yet, they
claim rehabilitation and assistance for those,
who in the eyes of the state ought to be seen as
"forei gners". Just as the discourse about the
Muslim migrant becoming a terrorist infiltrator
while taking away scarce jobs from Indians was a
concern voiced by the Sangha, similarly the Hindu
migrant was seen as a legitimate refugee worthy
of the protection of the Indian state. Thus, in
such a discourse, the Hindu is twice
disadvantaged first, he is being "swamped" by
illegal Muslims from across the border, and
second, he is denied the rights that he deserves
both as a refugee, and as a victim of oppression
by the Indian state.
It is patently illogical to suggest that illegal
migrants attempting to sneak across a national
boundary would use a train that stops for nearly
four hours to check for visas. The less than
stellar record of the train since its inception
however suggests that this fear, however un
founded, will not come to fruition. There have
been very few takers for the Friendship Express
and passengers have cited the difficulty in
booking tickets, the long wait at the border and
lack of publicity about the train as contributing
factors. Despite the yearning for the past of
those like Janatosh Pal who would like to return
to a homeland they left behind nearly six decades
ago, such nostalgia about the movement of people
across the two halves of Bengal is only one part
of the story about the Maitreyi Express. In fact,
the rumblings about the ill-treatment of refugees
and fears about infiltration indicate that it
will take more than a train to mollify the unease
about the flow of humanity that has and continues
to cross the Bengal border. As long as there
remain disgruntled Hindu refugees in West Bengal
and masses in the east seeking a better life
across the border there will be more than a few
hiccups along the way for the train of friendship.
Antara Datta (adatta at fas dot harvard dot edu)
is a PhD candidate at the Harvard University, USA.
Notes
1 'Kolkata-Dhaka Moitree Express Flagged
Off', The Times of India, April 14, 2008.
2 'The Train Next Door', The Telegraph, April 17, 2008.
3 Subir Bhaumik, 'Dhaka-Calcutta Train Link
Resumes', BBC News, April 14, 2008.
4 Nishit Dholabhai, 'Friendship Express
Runs into a Fence', The Telegraph, November 2,
2007.
5 'Train to Bangladesh Caught in Row over
WireMesh', The Deccan Herald, October 3, 2007.
6 Michael Gillan, 'Refugees or Infiltrators? The
Bharatiya Janata Party and 'Illegal' Migration
from Bangladesh', Asian Studies Review, 26/1
(March 2002).
7 Government of India, Ministry of External
Affairs, 'India Bangladesh Political and Economic
Relations' (April 2008).
8 B S Chimni, 'Status of Refugees in India:
Strategic Ambiguity', in Ranabir Sammadar (ed),
Refugees and the State: Practices of Asylum and
Care in India 1947-2000, Sage, New Delhi, 2003.
9 Haimanti Roy, 'Citizenship and National
Identity in Post-Partition Bengal, 1947-65',
University
of Cincinnati, Ohio, 2006, unpublished PhD
dissertation, 17.
10 Joya Chatterji, 'Rights or Charity?
Government and Refugees: The Debate over Relief
and Rehabilitation in West Bengal, 1947-1950' in
Suvir Kaul
(ed), Partition of Memory, Permanent Black,
New Delhi, 2001, pp 74-110.
11 Committee of Review of Rehabilitation
Work in West Bengal, Ministry of Labour and
Rehabilitation, Department of Rehabilitation,
'Report on Conferment of Right and Title to Land
on Displaced Persons from Erstwhile East Pakistan
in West Bengal and Remission of Type Loans, 12th
Report', 1973.
12 Jhuma Sanyal, Making of a New Space, Ratna Prakashan, Kolkata, 2003.
13 Nilanjana Chatterjee, 'Midnight's
Unwanted Children: East Bengali Refugees and the
Politics
of Rehabilitation', Brown University, 1992,
un published PhD dissertation, p 35.
14 Ministry of Supply and Rehabilitation,
Government of India, 'Report of the Working Group
on the Residual Problem of Rehabilitation in West
Bengal' (March 1976).
15 Joya Chatterji, op cit.
16 Haimanti Roy, op cit
17 The exact instructions for the
registration of refugees read like this:
"Refugees from East Bengal should be got
registered under the Foreinger's Act, 1946
according to the instructions of the Ministry of
Home Affairs to all State Governments and they
are required to obtain residence permit for stay
at the place where registered for a period of
three months. After registration if any refugee
desires to leave the present place of residence
unauthorisedly he should be handed over to the
police for violation of the provision of the
Foreigner's Act". Government of India, Minsitry
of Labour and Rehabilitation, Branch Secretariat,
'Administrative Instructions for Transit Releif
Camps for Refugees from East Bengal' (1971) 12.
18 The Amrita Bazar Patrika, April 29, 1971.
19 The Amrita Bazar Patrika, May 21, 1971.
20 United Nations High Commision for Refugees,
The State of the World's Refugees, UNHCR, 2000,
66.
21 Rajya Sabha Debates, Vol LXXVIII, No 4, July 22, 1971, 93.
22 'Bag of Bombs near Maitreyee Tracks', The Telegraph, April 14, 2008.
23 Subir Bhaumik, 'Excitement Mounts over
Train Link', BBC News, April 9, 2008.
______
[6]
Daily Times
June 20, 2008
NOT ARTICLES OF THEIR FAITH
by J Sri Raman
The Far Right, which is at once fiercer and more
fragmented than ever before, bids fair for power
in New Delhi. This is the dire warning for the
anti-communal forces, also in disarray, from the
Ketkar and Nandy episodes
There are two major reasons for which two recent
attacks on the freedom of expression in India
need special notice. The raid on an editor's home
and the legal suit against a social scientist, in
response to newspaper articles by both,
represented more than routine exercises of Far
Right muscle flexing.
Kumar Ketkar, editor of the Marathi daily
Loksatta, invited the raid by writing an
editorial on the Maharashra state government's
plan to raise a statue of Maratha warrior-king
Shivaji on the Arabian Sea. Ashis Nandy, who
prefers to be described as a political
psychologist, provoked the prosecution attempt by
his bid at a brief analysis of the mandate of
Gujarat's middle class for Narendra Modi in
leading national daily Times of India.
What calls for a closer look, first, is the fact
that these are not really obvious, tailor-made
cases for Far Right crusaders to take up. In one
of the cases, the provocation seemed too weak to
trigger off such a Pavlovian response. In the
other, the provocation did not seem to emanate
from a source that the Far Right considered
"pseudo-secular" and, therefore, punishable by
every means.
Ketkar appeared anxious indeed to avoid causing
offence. A long-time critic of the Shiv Sena, he
has only targeted Maharashtra's ruling coalition
of the Congress and the Nationalist Congress
Party (NCP). And his editorial made no mention of
the communalist campaign built around the cult of
Shivaji that distorts history and diminishes the
Maratha legend's stature. Ketkar only scoffed at
the skewed priorities behind the statue project.
Wrote he: "It appears that all the problems of
Maharashtra have been solved. People are not only
happy and contented but are looking forward to a
magnificent future. There are no indebted farmers
in the state now, no suicides, no deaths caused
by malnutrition. All children go to school, there
is no unemployment among the educated as there is
tremendous growth of industry as well as the
knowledge sector and everyone has been employed.
There is no question of the unskilled or the
uneducated being unemployed because there is no
such person...Indeed that is the reason why the
people of the state are immensely delighted that
the duo that rules the state has taken up the
grand project of erecting a magnificent statue of
Chhatrapati Shivaji Maharaj, right in the Arabian
Sea, across Nariman Point, about one kilometre
away. The government has decided that the statue
will be taller and more grand than the Statue of
Liberty in New York Harbour."
The editorial, essentially critical of the
grotesque extravaganza of the project with an
outlay estimated at billions of Indian rupees,
led to a mob attack on Ketkar's home from an
outfit called the Shiv Sangram, linked formally
to the NCP but still part of the larger camp of
the far right.
What has brought trouble for Nandy is an article
published on January 8 under the headline "Blame
the middle class". He, of course, blamed
Gujarat's middle class for the electoral mandate
won by Modi and communal politics in December
2007 and for its "inane versions of communalism",
but did not stop there. He proceeded to make
observations, with which some in the Parivar (the
Far Right "family") would feign partial agreement
at least.
He wrote: "The secularist dogma of many fighting
the...Parivar has not helped matters. Even those
who have benefited from secular lawyers and
activists relate to secular ideologies
instrumentally. They neither understand them nor
respect them...Indeed, shallow ideologies of
secularism have simultaneously broken the back of
Gandhism and discouraged the emergence of figures
like Ali Shariatis, Desmond Tutus and the Dalai
Lama - persons who can give suffering a new voice
audible to the poor and the powerless and make a
creative intervention possible from within
world-views accessible to the people."
Nandy also said: "Recovering Gujarat from its
urban middle class will not be easy. The class
has found in militant religious nationalism a new
self-respect and a new virtual identity as a
martial community, the way Bengali babus,
Maharashtrian Brahmins and Kashmiri Muslims at
different times have sought salvation in
violence. In Gujarat this class has smelt blood,
for it does not have to do the killings but can
plan, finance and coordinate them with impunity.
The actual killers are the lowest of the low,
mostly tribals and Dalits. The middle class
controls the media and education, which have
become hate factories in recent times. And they
receive spirited support from most non-resident
Indians who, at a safe distance from India, can
afford to be more nationalist, bloodthirsty, and
irresponsible."
The quotes should suffice to show that not all
opponents of the Far Right would agree with him
and that some in the Parivar can fallaciously
perceive areas of agreement with his political
philosophy. Nandy himself had argued, at greater
length, against certain ideas of secularism
elsewhere, as in an essay titled "Unclaimed
baggage" in the Little Magazine.
This, however, did not stop the Gujarat police
from registering a criminal case against him on
May 30. The case, ironically based on a complaint
by the president of the Ahmedabad-based National
Council for Civil Liberties, is that the article
was "prejudicial to national integration and
intended to cause friction and promote enmity
between different communities on grounds of
religion, race, language and place of birth."
This brings us to the second reason why this tale
of attacks on two articles merits greater notice
than the familiar machismo of Far Right goons.
These attacks symbolised not just simple and
straight communalism, but one combined and
compounded with regionalism - with a particular
brand of caste character, too, in the bargain.
Regionalism, with an emerging combine of
intermediate castes representing it, had proved a
formidable opponent of the Far Right in the past.
Examples include Bihar, where the redoubtable
Lalu Prasad arrested L K Advani on his Ayodhya
march and the advance of the Far Right, and the
Southern State of Tamilnadu, where "Dravidian"
politics denied a place to "Hindutva" politics
until recently.
A different story is unfolding, however, in
Maharashtra (where the Shiv Sena and its version
of the Shivaji cult represent Maratha power that
seeks to set up "Hindu suicide squads" even while
sending North Indians back home) and in Gujarat
(where the "Hindutva" hordes of non-Patel
nationalists seek to protect the State's "asmita"
or pride by perpetuating Modi's rule).
The Far Right, which is at once fiercer and more
fragmented than ever before, bids fair for power
in New Delhi. This is the dire warning for the
anti-communal forces, also in disarray, from the
Ketkar and Nandy episodes. With the general
election just round the comer, it is a warning
that they must heed in a hurry.
The writer is a journalist based in Chennai,
India. A peace activist, he is also the author of
a sheaf of poems titled 'At Gunpoint'
______
[7]
Mail Today
June 18, 2008
RATHER THAN SEEK A REWARD GUJJARS SHOULD REFORM THEIR BACKWARD SOCIAL PRACTICES
by Dipankar Gupta
EVER wondered why Gujjars did not choose an
easier ploy and opt for Scheduled Caste status
instead? Obviously it is better to be a tribe
than an untouchable. In fact, as a tribe one can
boast of a martial tradition, even a criminal
genealogy to great effect. There are communities
in India that proudly brandish their brigandage
past and the way they struck terror in the hearts
of priests and scribes. To be a Scheduled Caste
is very different. That would entail the stigma
of untouchability, made worse by the fact that
Gujjars routinely heap abuses on Scheduled
Castes. To then join that category of the
despicable under- caste would be a fate worse
than being de- reserved. Atribe, however,
attracts no such obvious opprobrium, and if that
tag entails a criminal past, well, that too is
par for the course. This is why they had no
objection when Vasundhra Raje Scindia dreamt up
this disingenuous plan of categorising the
Gujjars as a de- notified criminal tribe. She
thought that this would enable her to sneak them
in with the Meenas in the same bag.
Unlawful
As that did not last the wash, the Gujjars took
matters in hand and are doing their best to
showcase their tribal status. Interestingly, most
of the practices that they are proclaiming as
their own are actually against the law. Instead
of being shamefaced and taking some urgent home
improvement steps, they actually expect to be
rewarded for their doggedly illegal ways. Look at
the list of blatantly unlawful practices that
Gujjars claim in the self- satanised version of
their tradition and culture. They say their kids
get engaged when they are in the womb, their
women have half a dozen husbands, they purchase
brides like one would cattle at a village fair,
and that they encourage child marriages. Any
other community would be prosecuted for just one
of these offences, but the Gujjars actually want
to be recognised and rewarded for doing them all.
Even if one were to overlook such gross
illegalities, on what grounds can Gujjar leaders
make that all important leap and assert that such
heinous customs characterise tribes in general?
There is no textbook or glossary where a tribe
has been defined in terms of being joined at the
womb, or for practising child marriages or
purchasing women in the village haat .If
anything, these are traditions that one usually
associates with the so- called "upper castes".
That such a portrayal of tribes has so far not
been contested by decision makers reveals both
their ignorance and bias. This is what has
allowed such piffle to pass without attracting
the attention of the law. Actually, Colonel
Bainsala's inspirtational model is Mandal, for it
was he who set the trend by scoring with afoul.
In Mandal's scheme precious backwardness points
are given to communities whose children marry
before they are legally allowed to have in- laws
of their own. Arguments of the kind that Mandal,
first, and Colonel Bainsala now, are forwarding
have dangerous social consequences. They are not
very different from saying that those who commit
sati should get aleg up, or those who practise
female foeticide should get abetter shake from
the state. If such political articulations are
logically possible, then it is just a matter of
time before they actually happen. The Gujjar
campaign to be recognised as a Scheduled Tribe is
deeply insulting to those who genuinely belong to
this category. Not only have they demeaned tribes
by linking them to child marriages and the
commodification of women, but Gujjars have gone
further to assert that like all tribals they too
bathe with their cattle, have no access to
drinking water or in- house toilets. Well, in
that case, join the club. To say that these are
tribal features and not marks of poverty is
culturally offensive. It is poverty and not
culture, that forces people to live under such
sub- human conditions, and we have millions in
this country, from all castes and creeds, to
prove this.
Condemnation
The Gujjars may well have strange ways of sharing
abath, but they cannot speak for tribes in
general. There are tribes and tribes. Most of
them are known for their scrupulous cleanliness,
their scrubbed and just bathed look. Any Tagore
enthusiast will attest how charmed the great poet
was at the cleanliness and comeliness of the
Santals, and how carefully they gave their bodies
a decorative look. Scheduled Tribes are generally
too poor and marginalised to even know how
Colonel Bainsala and his votaries are heaping
insults on them. That the Meenas have so far not
objected to Gujjar rationalisations goes to show
how far removed they too are from what it is to
be a genuine tribal. They would probably not want
a close definitional nitpicking on the subject
for that might show up the well- to- do Meenas
for what they are -prosperous agriculturalists
and feared members of the bureaucracy and the
police. The Meenas are not the only tribes in
Rajasthan. In fact, many of them around Jaipur
have probably not been tribals for generations.
Besides the Meenas, the other recognised tribes
are the Bhils, Banjaras, Gerasia, Dhankas and
Saharias to name a few. These tribes, like most
other tribes in central and western India, have
for decades been economically trampled upon, but
this is probably the first time that a certified
cultural assassination of their way of life has
been carried out in the open. These other tribes
may be too poor and marginalised to make common
cause with those who are squatting by uprooted
railway tracks, but the intellectuals in our
country have no such excuse. While they were
justly offended by reports of sati ,child
marriages and dowry among the so called "forward
castes", they seem tongue- tied when it comes to
the Gujjars. Here we have a whole community
showing off their nefarious practices, and not a
drop of ink in condemnation.
Quotas
The Gujjar agitation is a perfect, copybook
example of what can go wrong with the reservation
format that most politicians favour today. Once
again fake histories and false heritages have
been powered by political muscle. Here we have a
community that is guilty of following
reprehensible practices and yet it is just a
short step away from being rewarded for it. It
would be ridiculous, for instance, to give
preferences to South Asians in Britain because
some of them keep their women cloistered, or that
many of them happily punish their girls in the
name of honour killing. Imagine if Rajputs claim
OBC status because they treasure the practice of
burning widows with their dead husbands. Instead
of granting the Gujjar demand for ST status on
account of their self- confessed crimes against
women and children, it would be better to punish
them so that they are forced to reform from
within. If, however, they get their way for doing
the wrong things, it would not only make a
travesty of reservations but would also turn the
clock back in terms of our progress as a
civilised nationstate. When Raja Ram Mohun Roy or
Ishwar Chandra Vidyasagar fought against child
marriage and the degradation of widows, they did
this because they were consumed by shame. They
realised that Hindus had better reform their ways
if they wanted to stand up as a proud community.
In contrast, not only is there no sense of shame
among Colonel Bainsala and other Gujjar activists
for the lifestyle they pursue, but they are also
holding it out as a threat. Either Gujjars get
their ST status or they would go right ahead with
child marriages, buying women and polyandry. And
with that they would also give the true tribals a
false reputation!
The author teaches sociology at Jawaharlal Nehru University
______
[8]
Herald, 19 June 2008
Editorial
TERROR'S NEW FACE
The arrest of sevaks of the Sanatan Sanstha, a
religious group that is behind the Hindu
Janajagruti Samiti for planting bombs in theatres
at Thane and Vashi brings a new dimension to
terrorism.
Seven people were injured when one of the bombs
the sevaks planted exploded in the parking lot of
Thane's Gadkari Rangayatan theatre on 4 June.
Ramesh Hanumant Gadkari, Mangesh Nikam, Santosh
Angre and Vikram Bhave, the four bombers, are all
full-time activists of the Sanatan Sanstha,
living in ashrams run by the organisation. Their
arrest at the end of a 10-day investigation by
the Maharashtra Anti-terrorism Cell exposes what
many have suspected for a few years now; that not
all terrorists are Muslim, and there are Hindu
terrorists too.
Police say that they had planted a bomb outside a
mosque or dargah on the Pen highway last Diwali,
to check its intensity, but it did not explode.
Nikam had earlier set off a bomb in the house of
a family in Ratnagiri that had converted to
Christianity, and was on bail awaiting trial.
Ever since there was an accidental bomb blast at
a flat in Nanded rented by Bajrang Dal activists
a few years ago, there has been suspicion that
extremist Hindu organisations were also carrying
out terrorist attacks. However, police forces in
India never seriously investigated this
phenomenon, blaming the Malegaon blasts, the
Mecca Masjid blast in Hyderabad, the blasts in
the Jaipur dargah, etc, on 'Islamic terrorists'.
Now, they need to have a fresh look, and see who
was really responsible. The Sanstha has said it
had no knowledge of these activities and that the
sevaks did it 'on their own'. But the police say
it is very clear that at least one of the bombs
was assembled in the ashram premises, though no
bomb-making materials were found in Gadkari's
room.
Protestations of innocence cannot be taken at
face value, and the organisation must be
investigated thoroughly. Its literature talks of
'elimination' of 'evildoers', and though no doubt
they will claim that the words are used in a
figurative and not literal sense, the police need
to rigorously look into its voluminous literature
and check out its activities with a fine tooth
comb. This is because the Sanatan Sanstha and
the Bajrang Dal, two Hindu fundamentalist
organisations that are both linked to bomb
blasts, are the main constituents of the broad
joint front called the Hindu Janajagriti Samiti,
which has been holding public meetings all over
Goa claiming Hinduism is in danger, and making
provocative speeches.
Besides, the leader of the Sanstha, Dr Jayant
Athavale, lives mostly in Goa at Mangueshi, and
directs the organisation's activities from this
state.
What is especially troubling is the editorial
written by Shiv Sena chief Bal Thackeray in
yesterday's 'Saamna', his party's newspaper. He
has advocated the creation of 'Hindu suicide
squads', saying that the only way to counter the
threat of Islamic terror is by 'Hindu terror'.
This threat cannot be taken lightly. Terrorists
typically target innocents, and with two
varieties of terror 'taking on' each other with
bombs, it is ordinary people who will be blown to
bits.
_______
[9]
THE WEST BETRAYS BURMA
by John Pilger
14 June 2008
The voices of those who know how to help Burma
are all but extinguished by a virus called the
"war on terror".
When I phoned Burmese pro-democracy leader Aung
San Suu Kyi's home in Rangoon recently, I
imagined the path to her door that looks down on
Inya Lake. Through ragged palms, a trip-wire is
visible, a reminder that this is the prison of a
woman whose party was elected by a landslide in
1990, a democratic act extinguished by men in
ludicrous uniforms.
Her phone rang and rang; I doubt if it is
connected now. Once, in response to my "How are
you?" she laughed about her piano's need of
tuning. She also spoke about lying awake,
breathless, listening to the thumping of her
heart.
Now her silence is complete. This week, the
Burmese junta renewed her house arrest, beginning
the 13th year. As far as I know, a doctor has not
been allowed to visit her since January, and her
house was badly damaged in the cyclone.
And yet the United Nations secretary-general, Ban
Ki-Moon, could not bring himself to utter her
name on his recent, groveling tour of Burma. It
is as if her fate and that of her courageous
supporters, who last week beckoned torture and
worse merely by unfurling the banners of her
National League for Democracy, have become an
embarrassment for those who claim to represent
the "international community".
Why? Where are the voices of those in governments
and their related institutions who know how to
help Burma? Where are the honest brokers who once
eased the oppressed away from their shadows, the
true and talented peacemakers who see societies
not in terms of their usefulness to "interests",
but as victims of it?
Where are the Dennis Hallidays and Hans von
Sponecks, who rose to assistant secretary-general
of the UN by the sheer moral force of their
international public service?
The answer is simple. They are all but
extinguished by a virus called the "war on
terror". Where once men and women of good heart
and good intellect and good faith stood in
parliaments and world bodies in defense of the
human rights of others, there is now cowardice.
Think of the parliament at Westminster, which
cannot even cajole itself into holding an inquiry
into the criminal invasion of Iraq, let alone to
condemn it and speak up for its victims.
Last year, 100 eminent British doctors pleaded
with the minister for international development,
then Hillary Benn, for emergency medical aid to
be sent to Iraqi children's hospitals. "Babies
are dying for want of a 95 pence oxygen mask",
they wrote. The minister turned them down flat.
I mention that because medical aid for children
is exactly the kind of assistance the British
government now insists the Burmese junta should
accept without delay.
"There are people suffering in Burma", said an
indignant British PM Gordon Brown, "there are
children going without food Š it is utterly
unacceptable that when international aid is
offered, the regime will try to prevent that
getting in." British foreign secretary David
Miliband chimed in with "malign neglect."
Say that to the children of Iraq, Afghanistan and
Gaza, where Britain's role is as neglectful and
malign as any. As scores of children in Shia
areas of Baghdad are blown to bits by US forces
and what the BBC calls Iraq's "democratic
government", Britain is silent, as ever.
"We" say nothing while Israel torments and
starves the children of Gaza, ignoring every
attempt to bring a ceasefire with Hamas, all in
the name of a crusade that dares not say its name.
What might have been a new day for humanity in
the post-Cold War years - even a renewal of the
spirit of the Declaration of Human Rights, of
"never again" from Palestine to Burma - was
cancelled by the ambitions of a sole rapacious
power that has cowed all before it.
The "war on terror" allows Australia and Israel
to train Burma's internal security thugs. It
consumes most humanitarian aid indirectly and the
very internationalism capable of bringing the
"clever" pressure on Burma, about which Aung San
Suu Kyi once spoke.
Dismissing the idiocy of a military intervention
in her country, she asked, "What about all those
who trade with the generals, who give them many
millions of dollars that keep them going?"
She was referring to the huge oil and gas
companies, Total and Chevron, which effectively
hand the regime US$2.7 billion a year, and the
Halliburton company (whose former CEO is US
Vice-President Dick Cheney) that backed the
construction of the Yadana pipeline, and the many
British travel companies that send tourists
across bridges and roads built with forced labour.
The BBC, in contravention of its charter, has
just bought a 75% share of Lonely Planet travel
guides, a truculent defender of "our" right to be
tourists in Burma, regardless of slave labour or
cyclones or the woman beyond the trip wire. Shame.
[First published in the British Guardian on June
4. Reprinted from http://johnpilger.com.]
______
[8] Announcements:
(i)
INDIA: UPCOMING PROTEST DEMO IN NEW DELHI ON LALIT MEHTA MURDER CASE
Dear Friends,
In a meeting held at 7, Jantar Mantar, New Delhi
on 17th June 2008, it has been decided to hold a
dharna (Sit-in protest) in front of Jharkhand
Bhawan
on 20th June, friday at 12 pm.
As you know a NREGA activist Lalit Mehta has
been killed by the vested interests in Palamau
while he was helping Social Audit team led by
Prof.
Jean Dreze. People all across the Jharkhand and
elsewhere are demanding for a CBI probe into the
killing of Lalit Mehta and enquiry into the
irregularities in NREGA implementation in Jharkhand.
Please join in and raise your voice collectively.
Location : New Jharkhand Bhawan
Near PRIYA Cinema, Close to India Airlines Colony
Kusumpur Pahadi
Vasant Vihar [New Delhi]
On Priya Cinema Road turn left after Priya Complex
Phone No of Jharkhand Bhawan : 011-2673 9000
In Solidarity,
Aruna Roy
Swami Agnivesh
Anne Raja
Nikhil Dey
Kiran Shaheen
---
(ii)
JOIN US FOR AN EVENING OF READINGS AND CONVERSATION FEATURING MOHAMMED HANIF
There is an ancient saying that when lovers fall
out, a plane goes down. A Case of Exploding
Mangoes is the story of one such plane. Why did a
Hercules C130, the world's sturdiest plane,
carrying Pakistan's military dictator General Zia
ul Haq, go down on 17 August, 1988?
Teasing, provocative, and very funny, Mohammed
Hanif's debut novel takes one of the
subcontinent's enduring mysteries and out of it,
spins a tale as rich and colourful as a beggar's
dream.
According to Mohsin Hamid, A Case of Exploding
Mangoes, is "one of the most important Pakistani
novels of recent times, unputdownable and darkly
hilarious. Mohammed Hanif is a brave, gifted
writer. He has taken territory in desperate need
of satire - General Zia, the military, Pakistan
at the time of the Soviet-Afghan war - and made
it undeniably his own."
Mohammed Hanif was born in Okara, Pakistan. He
graduated from the Pakistan Air Force Academy as
a Pilot Officer but subsequently left to pursue a
career in journalism. He has worked for Newsline,
India Today and The Washington Post. He has
written plays for the stage and the critically
acclaimed BBC drama, What Now, Now That We Are
Dead? His feature film, The Long Night has been
shown at film festivals around the world. He is a
graduate of University of East Anglia's creative
writing programme. Mohammad Hanif is currently
head of BBC's Urdu Service and lives in London.
Date: Sunday, 22nd June 2008
Time: 6:00 pm
Suggested Minimum Donation: Rs. 100
Venue: The Second Floor (T2F)
6-C, Prime Point Building, Phase 7, Khayaban-e-Ittehad, DHA, Karachi
538-9273 | 0300-823-0276 | info at t2f.biz
Map: http://www.t2f.biz/location
---
(iii)
PEOPLE'S UNION FOR CIVIL LIBERTIES: DELHI
C-105, D.A. Flats, Sindhora Kalan, Delhi-110 052
Dear Friends,
As you are aware PUCL-Delhi organizes
Anti-Emergency Day meeting every year to take
stock of the prevailing human rights and civil
liberties situation in the country. As black laws
continue to exist in various parts of the
country, and misused by various governments,
arresting and putting behind the bars not only
innocent citizens but also human rights activists
whose efforts are the only hope of securing the
human rights of people. Guns continue to be used
in place of talks to resolve the differences
between people and governments. People like Dr.
Binayak Sen and T.G. Ajay, the leaders of human
rights movement, continue to face the ire of
governments for opposing/exposing their
anti-people policies. The situation does not seem
to be qualitatively much different from the black
days of Emergency as life and liberties of people
still continue to be threatened.
You are invited to come and share your views on these issues on
ANTI-EMERGENCY DAY
26th of June, 2008 at 5.00 p.m.
at GANDHI PEACE FOUNDATION
Deen Dayal Upadhaya Marg, ITO, New Delhi.
_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/
Buzz for secularism, on the dangers of fundamentalism(s), on
matters of peace and democratisation in South
Asia. SACW is an independent & non-profit
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