SACW | May 1-2, 2008 / Nepal - From Conflict to the Republic / War-torn Sri Lanka / Taking on the Mullah's in Pakistan / Solidarity For Binayak Sen
Harsh Kapoor
aiindex at gmail.com
Thu May 1 21:49:15 CDT 2008
South Asia Citizens Wire | May 1-2, 2008 | Dispatch No. 2510 - Year 10 running
[ Nirmala Deshpande, the noted Gandhian and a
member the upper house of the Indian Parliament,
died on May 1, 2008. She will be remembered by
many for having spoken up for peace between India
and Pakistan during the Kargil conflict and for
her intervention after the anti communal
slaughter in gujarat (unlike other official
Gandhians who sat around as silent spectators).
She had been on the SACW list since the 1990's]
[1] Nepal:
(i) Nepal - From Conflict to the Republic (Kamal Mitra Chenoy)
(ii) The Maobaadi triumph - Seeking explanations (Kanak Mani Dixit)
(iii) A constitution of convenience (Yubaraj Ghimire)
[2] War-torn Sri Lanka is the last sick man of the region (Jonathan Steele)
[3] Pakistan: How to succeed and fail in FATA (Ahmed Rashid)
[4] India: Judgment on OBC Reservation (Rajindar Sachar)
[5] International Day of Solidarity Action For Binayak Sen on May 13, 2008
[6] India: People's Parliament Slams UPA
government: Demands Non Displacing Development
Paradigm
[7] Pakistan: A Press Release by Student Action Committee, Lahore
______
[1] NEPAL:
NEPAL: FROM CONFLICT TO THE REPUBLIC
by Kamal Mitra Chenoy
(Published in: Sahara Time, 22 April 2008)
The results of the Constituent Assembly elections
in Nepal have come as a shock to Indian policy
makers, the media including prominent Nepali
commentators, and the policy elite in the US,
European Union and others. The run up to these
elections, and even a short visit to Nepal would
have to the unbiased observer revealed the wave
of support to the CPN(Maoist), and the
concomitant disillusionment with the Nepali
Congress and the CPN(UML) in particular. Speaking
to Nepalese in Kathmandu on April 7 and 8, days
before the elections, it was clear that there was
a groundswell of support not only among the poor
but also among the middle class. Taxi drivers,
small and large shopkeepers, hotel and restaurant
staff were almost unanimous in their support for
the Maoists. We were observers for Gorkha, the
ancestral home of the Nepalese monarchy. Of the
3 Gorkha constituencies we observed on April 10,
constituency 2 had a high profile candidate in
Dr. Baburam Bhattarai, chief theoretician of the
Maoists and one of the most senior leaders.
In Kathmandu and Gorkha, the Maoist's propaganda
and election work was staggering. There were
arches calling for Prachanda as President,
hoardings with photographs of Maoist martyrs from
the area and a flood of Maoist flags. There were
very few flags of the Nepali Congress, and even
less of the UML. The election became a festive
occasion. Queues of women voters formed as early
as 6 a.m. though voting was to commence only at
7a.m. Most of them were dressed in red, the
colour of festivity. Due to the fact that two
separate ballots had to be cast, one first past
the post, and the second for proportional
representation, voters had to wait two hours to
vote. There were no toilet facilities, no water,
no first aid. Yet some 60 per cent voted. Women
voters in almost all polling booths outvoted men.
Well before 5p.m., the end of polling, large
crowds gathered to ensure the safety of the
ballot boxes. Here too women were present in
large numbers. Observing 16 polling booths over
all three Gorkha constituencies, it became clear
from the spontaneous assertions by voters
especially women, that the Maoists would win.
Most of the other election observers from other
parts of Nepal had the same assessment.
Baburam Bhattarai was supremely confident of the
Maoists emerging as the single largest party by a
big margin. He also had no doubts that the
framing of the new constitution would be a
challenging task, but was confident that the
Maoists, working together with the Nepali
Congress and UML, along with the smaller parties,
would be able to keep their election promises. He
looked forward to a more equal relationship with
India, and hoped that the Indian establishment
recognized the transformation in the Maoists from
a guerrilla force to a peace loving one committed
to the constitutional process. Despite Indian
support to the Nepali Congress and its clear lack
of sympathy for the Maoists, he was willing to
let bygones be bygones, in the process of
building an independent, secular, democratic and
federal republic. The Maoist leader was
expressing widespread sentiments that are
supported across the political spectrum. Almost
all election observers reported no intimidation.
The vote for the Maoists appears to be a positive
one, not one caused by coercion and threat. In
fact, the Maoists appeared to make major gains
because of their electoral promises for the
abolition of monarchy, the establishment of a
secular republic, the framing of a constitution,
and their performance in their brief tenure in
government. Unlike the Nepali Congress and UML
which were unable to make major policy changes
during their much longer tenure, with the former
talking of constitutional monarchy, the Maoists
were consistently republican and not tarred by
their brief tenure in government. This is why
even in affluent Kathmandu, the Maoists won, and
Nepali Congress and UML stalwarts lost. In a deep
sense the vote for the Maoists was a vote for
change, even by a significant section that
opposed their armed struggle or found their
manifesto too radical. The changes in Nepal
appear irreversible. They are also historic.
Unlike its neighbours in South Asia, this
constituent assembly election was based on
universal adult franchise. The elections were
preceded by a national debate in almost all
various sections of society. Within in a few
years period the Nepalese will move from monarchy
to a republic. But they need international
support. Nepal is a poor country with its wealth
earlier appropriated by the feudal elite and
monarchy, and later by the rising capitalist
class. It is in India's interest to accept the
profound changes in Nepal and pragmatically agree
to support the constitutional process and the
building of a pro-poor, pro-Dalit and janjatis,
federal republic, and help this tiny state to
keep its tryst with destiny. This is no minor
task. The Maoists also want to renegotiate
Indo-Nepal treaties which they consider unequal.
Here also India must be flexible. It agreed to
renegotiate the treaty with Bhutan. There is no
reason it should not with Nepal. For years the
Indian foreign policy establishment backed the
wrong horse. This is a time for course
correction, and for India to engage with the
Maoists.
The rest of South Asia, not to speak of other
countries of the South, might come to learn from
the Nepali experience. If the Maoists and their
allies have their way, the new constitution may
turn out to be profoundly federal, with
substantial autonomy for the Madhesis. It would
be socially radical with special measures for the
Dalits, janjatis and women. Its proposed
economic structure would permit globalization but
would have provisions to protect and promote
national industry and protect the rights of the
workers and the poor. Drafting such a
constitution for which there was an earlier
preliminary draft constitution, will be a
daunting task, since a minimum two-thirds
majority is required. But if it is done, and the
constitution is implemented, history will be made.
[The author is professor in the School of
International studies, JNU and was an
international election observer in Nepal.]
o o o
Himal South Asian
May 2008
THE MAOBAADI TRIUMPH
SEEKING EXPLANATIONS
How did the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) win
so many seats in the Constituent Assembly? More
importantly, can they now prove to the Nepali
people and the world that they can be the
vanguard of pluralism and progress?
by Kanak Mani Dixit
For thirty years, modern Nepal was ruled by a
royal autocracy. Then, starting in 1990, the
people began to experience inefficient, perhaps,
but real democracy, through the medium of
political parties. In 1996, one of these went
underground, to engage in Maoist revolution,
picking up the gun against the multiparty system
of the day. Though gaining momentum and spread
over the first seven-odd years, by 2005 the
insurgency had achieved a stalemate with the
state security. The rebels then decided to
relinquish the 'people's war' and, along with the
other parties, helped generate the People's
Movement of April 2006 against the king,
Gyanendra - who had in the meantime taken over.
Two years later, on 10 April 2008, the Communist
Party of Nepal (Maoist) made a leap into the
government, winning an astounding 50 percent of
elected seats in the Constituent Assembly, and
nearly 30 percent of the
proportional-representation votes. In so doing,
they trounced the two main forces of yesteryear,
the Nepali Congress and the Communist Party of
Nepal (Unified Marxist-Leninist), and gained a
definitive mandate from the people.
The win by the former rebels is explained most
significantly by demographic shifts in Nepali
society. These delivered a wave of support
straight into the Maoist hands from the Dalit,
ethnic/indigenous janajati, youth and
economically marginalised strata. They also had a
fine-tuned campaign machine that used populist
rhetoric to woo the masses, and did not shy away
from countrywide threats and intimidation. The
demographic surge and populist campaign gave the
Maoists the bulk of their votes, but they were
nervous enough about this first-time outcome to
feel the need for coercion. In retrospect, they
might themselves agree that they need not have.
The decisive evolution in the public's
self-awareness began with the 1990 People's
Movement, which did away with the royal Panchayat
regime, and provided space for ethnic assertion
and grassroots activism. The radical
transformations that, over the last decade,
overtook Nepal's diverse population, are also
explained by: exposure to the wider world through
media and first-time road transport, political
awareness through non-governmental activism, the
experience of local governance, the arousal
linked to the 'people's war', and the democratic
fight against the autocratic royal, Gyanendra. A
huge spike in the youth population, coupled with
higher literacy, delivered a voting category that
was quite different from the one which had
exercised the ballot the last time, in 1999. All
of this was carefully utilised by astute
strategists within the Maoist party, who had
stayed in continuous touch and engaged with the
villages when the other political parties had
been scared off by the insurgency.
While these and other societal shifts were
obvious, they had not been studied adequately by
many analysts in terms of electoral impact. Those
with lack of foresight and insight included this
writer, who had suggested a third-place showing
for the Maoists, after the UML and Nepali
Congress. Based on the experience in other
countries, the reading was that the Maoist
violence was too recent in the public memory for
the party to exel in its first electoral
exercise, but that staying the course would
deliver the support of the underclass and
marginalised to the Maoists in the long run.
Indeed, this writer had thought the public would
not give unqualified support to the Maoists in
the absence of some kind of apology down the line
for the excess that was the 'people's war'. As it
turned out, the populace had no time for any kind
of further evolution: that the Maoists had called
off their insurgency and come into the peace
process and elections was deemed enough to give
them a resounding mandate.
Moreover, unencumbered by the hold of upper-caste
politicos, and without sitting legislators and
party bosses to cater to, the CPN (Maoist) went
all out in selecting candidates from marginalised
groups. They then proceeded to successfully get
them elected in a manner that the other political
parties could not expect to achieve over
successive elections. Besides the Maoists' good
showing in garnering 120 of the 240 seats in the
direct-candidate elections, and ensuring
diversity therein, the representation of the many
communities of Nepal was also guaranteed by the
innovation of 335 seats available under the
'proportional representation' ballot. Under this
system, parties were allotted seats in proportion
to the votes they polled, and parties in turn
selected their Assembly members in proportion to
the defined national communities, such as women,
Janajati and Dalit. The presence of the Maoists
in this election and the use of proportional
representation have delivered the most
significant success of the elections of 10 April,
one that turns Nepali politics on its head and
guarantees representation and inclusion like
never before. Along the way, the decades-long
control of the Bahuns (hill Brahmins) over the
political process seems to have been has been
significantly deconstructed.
kiran panday
Start of a new day: ballot boxes head out on election day
Baidhanik kyapcher
In a country made up of many marginalised groups
- by ethnicity, caste, faith and region - the
poor and disfranchised overwhelmingly responded
as a vote bank for the Maoists. Age, too, played
a significant part in the recent polls, with
voters between 18 and 25, making up 30 percent of
the national roll, casting the ballot for the
first time. Many new issues cropped up that were
not present in past general elections, including
positions and planks raised by the ethnic
consciousness across the hills, the Madhes
agitations in the plains of the last two years,
and the 'people's war'. This turbulence threw up
the new agenda of secularism, federalism and
republicanism, and the bulk of young voters, it
turned out, saw the Maoists as the vanguard on
all fronts.
The CPN (Maoist) war chest was full, and money
was spent liberally. The campaign strategy was to
make use of smart slogans, aggressive speeches
and a reliance on unrestrained populism. The key
slogan, "We've seen the others, now let us try
the Maobaadi" caught the public's imagination,
and the Maoists had no compunction about
utilising ethnic populism for votes - for
example, by mooting ethnic-based federal
provinces in a country of widely mixed habitation.
At the beginning, the Maoists were not confident
about their showing, and so the matter of 'seat
adjustments' was raised with the competing
parties. For long, the Maoists also insisted on a
full-proportional system of voting rather than
the mixed system that was ultimately adopted. In
those initial calculations, the Maoists felt that
a proportional vote would secure them a base
level of seats from the underclass and
marginalised communities, expecting that they
would not get enough votes for their individual
candidates to succeed. Having agreed to the mixed
electoral system, the Maoist leadership
experienced a panic attack in September 2007, and
walked out of the interim government so as to
scuttle the (second scheduled) polls, slated for
November. As it turned out, it was the well-worn
faces of the Nepali Congress and the UML that the
voters rejected, while the CPN (Maoist) made off
with exactly half of the 240 seats in the
direct-candidate elections. The proportional
elections, which were supposed to be the Maoist
lifeline, in fact turned out to be one for the
other parties.
Over the winter, the Maoists were hoping to make
a strong third place while aiming for second. A
poll conducted in December found that around 43
percent of respondents were still undecided, with
the first two places still reserved for the UML
and Congress. In retrospect, the undecided seem
to have gone for the Maoists in toto. According
to Maoist leaders, they knew that they had turned
the corner by January, and in a samikshya baithak
(evaluation meeting) two weeks before 10 April,
the conclusion was that there was a lahar (wave)
in their favour. The party suddenly looked headed
for first place, and the leaders said as much
publicly but few others were believing.
Indeed, such was the leadership's confidence
level that it downplayed the killing of six cadre
in western Dang District in a skirmish with
police two days before the elections. Those who
believed that the Maoists were, yet again,
itching for an exit from the polls worried that
the party would use this incident as an excuse;
they were surprised when Maoist chairman Pushpa
Kamal Dahal ('Prachanda') urged his followers to
remain calm and stay the course. In retrospect,
the controlled response was also an effort not to
jeopardise the sure win.
The fact that pressure tactics were used
countrywide in the immediate lead-up to the polls
simply extended the Maoist range of victory -
sometimes to unbelievable proportions, as in the
district of Gorkha. The real brilliance of the
Maoist electoral malfeasance, what some of their
activists called 'baidhanik kyapcher' (legal
capture), was that it was geared to be invisible
to the international poll observers, while the
local poll officials, observers and volunteers of
other parties could be intimidated as required.
(It should also be noted that, booth-per-booth,
election-time malpractice was even more
pronounced in the Tarai plains, by elements other
than the Maoists.)
Threat of violence included the spreading of
rumours about secret techniques to monitor the
voting, threats of dire consequences and fines
for those voting for others, marches by Young
Communist League and cantonment combatants, and
so on. Individual candidates were selectively
thrashed to send a message to the activists and
voters of other parties: a state which could not
protect candidates of the prime minister's and
home minister's own party could hardly shield
others.
Compared to the expectations of outright
election-day violence - from the Tarai militants,
from the royalist right and from Maoist cadre -
polling day itself was bright, largely peaceful,
and indeed, celebratory. It was like a nationwide
festival, and everyone rushed to pronounce the
elections free and fair. As the results started
coming in the next morning, it was clear the
Maoists were on a roll. While there seems little
doubt that the level of malpractice was not at
such a level as to negate the Maoist landslide,
the craftiness of the exercise of intimidation
and 'booth capture' certainly needs scrutiny.
Hopefully, one or more of the many
election-observer groups in Nepal will compile
reports and study the trends so that future
elections can be more free and fair.
Vote for peace
The transformed nature of the voting populace and
clever campaigning explain, in large part, the
Maoist win. But the results of 10 April also
indicated, in a roundabout way, a 'vote for
peace'. Over the two years since the People's
Movement of April 2006, and the peace process
under which the CPN (Maoist) was gingerly brought
into the interim government, Nepal has been
largely without government administration and law
and order. A large part of the population felt
insecure, particularly with the Maoists having
deployed their youth wing, the Young Communist
League.
In addition, the party's leadership regularly
provided ominous warnings, carried by Nepal's
efficient radio, print and television media, that
they would return to the jungle and restart the
people's war if the party lost the Constituent
Assembly elections. They added that
'revolutionary parties' can never lose elections.
As such, with the state establishment and civil
society having neglected the task of
demobilisation and integration of Maoist
combatants, the country went to elections with
two armies, the national force and the Maoist
force. A rational choice was thus made by the
public: to vote the Maoist into power, as the
most effective means of keeping safe. Many voters
would have hoped that all the strong-arming and
extortions would end with this one stroke,
coupled with the responsibility that comes with
overwhelming power.
The aging and ailing Prime Minister Girija Prasad
Koirala had in April 2006 been anointed the
unquestioned head of state and government, with
the task of easing the Maoists into the
mainstream. Unfortunately, emphysema had taken a
toll on the prime minister's health, which showed
up in his weakened organisational abilities and
political leadership. For a man whose strength
had always been a voracious ability to meet
people and ingest diverse ideas, Koirala was now
mostly confined to his bedroom and antechamber at
the prime ministerial residence. He hardly
visited Singha Durbar, the central secretariat,
and did not maintain a prime minister's office
worth the name, working variously through
confidantes and relations.
It was Koirala's choice of Krishna Prasad Sitaula
as home minister that became an important factor
in the state's inability to give the people a
sense of security. A peacemaker who had been the
key interlocutor in negotiations with the rebels
in 2005-06, Sitaula seemed out of touch with the
requirements of his cabinet post: he was lenient
regarding Maoist misdemeanours to the point of
appeasement. It could be that Sitaula was fearful
of a Maoist return to the jungle (which was not
about to happen) and consequent collapse of the
peace process. With the Home Ministry unable to
galvanise the Nepal Police and the district
administrations, the impunity that had been the
leitmotif of national polity for a decade and
more remained firmly in place, even during the
transitional phase. The populace understood that
the government was in no position to protect
them, not the peasant, the teacher, the party
activist, trader nor administrator. All of this
was a boon to the Maoists as election time came
around.
Incumbency factor
The legitimisation of the Maoists through the
electoral process was long sought by the Congress
and UML, and whether by design or by default they
conducted a low-key election campaign compared to
the aggressiveness of the former rebels. All the
same, the two parties were hardly expecting the
kind of triumph that the Maoists went on to
achieve. No doubt, both parties were seen as
Bahun-dominated establishmentarian forces that
would be slow in delivering change, at a time
when the people had waited too long in despair.
The weaknesses of the political parties -
including influence peddling, nepotism,
infighting, corruption and lack of an energising
worldview - were all too evident, and the CPN
(Maoist) promised something new and exciting even
if untested.
The question remains, however, as to whether the
Congress and UML deserved to be penalised the way
they were at the ballot. They were being made to
answer for the lack of economic progress and the
halt to development over the decade of conflict,
ironically a situation that was largely created
by the Maoist 'people's war'. Likewise, over the
last two years the coalition government was so
engaged in the peace process, with the Maoists
having one foot in and one foot out of
government, that both governance and the economy
were inevitably impacted. The situation was
further complicated by the Madhes Movement of the
winter of 2006-07, and the continuing agitations
throughout the following year.
It is important to remember that the Maoists did
not begin their 'people's war' against the
monarchy. Rather, the gun was picked up, in 1996,
against the parliamentary set-up and democratic
government in Kathmandu. The conditions in Nepal
at that time certainly required a social
revolution, and the 'people's war' was the action
of a smallish political party seeking the path of
violence to power. The party utilised effective
war strategy in its fight against the state,
gaining strength in its central-west stronghold.
The CPN (Maoist) was eventually awarded a string
of rewards with which to expand, including the
suspension of Parliament, the cancellation of
local government, and the progressive moves by
the pompous Gyanendra to rule absolutely after
2002. This last allowed the Maoist propaganda
machine to claim that all along the fight had
been against the feudocratic royal regime.
Six years after the advent of democracy in 1990,
the political parties had barely begun to learn
how to govern when the Maoists went underground
and shook the foundations of the state
establishment. The mid-1990s were a time when,
after initial hiccups, the Parliament had finally
started to function as a place of civil
discourse, and the economy had begun to grow at
six percent annually. Nepal's political parties
tackled the insurgents as best they could, given
their individual competitive inclinations, the
subterfuges of the royal palace, and the fact
that an under-equipped and dispirited civilian
police was being put up against the highly
motivated guerrilla army.
min ratna bajracharya
Mark of participation
It was only when the Maoists had achieved a
stalemate with the state that they became
agreeable to peace. But first, they needed a
face-saving way out of the 'people's war'. As
such, Koirala and the UML's Madhav Kumar Nepal
agreed to the Maoist demand for the Constituent
Assembly, provided that the Maoists give up the
gun. With the Maoists entering the
peace-and-democracy process, the marginalised
communities of Nepal took up the Constituent
Assembly agenda with alacrity, and the process
took on a life of its own.
The fact is that elections had not happened for
nine years, and the economy was in shambles for
many reasons, but mostly due to the insurgency.
When the Maoists came up with their effective
slogans against the 'incumbents', they were
exploiting the frustrations the populace had with
the ten years of conflict followed by two years
of tenuous transition. The Maoists were
successful in painting the slow-moving UML and
Congress as failed parties, which represented the
corruption, poor development, maladministration
and chaos of both the immediate and long-term
past. In fact, it was the political parties who
had worked to bring the Maoists into government,
making notably magnanimous agreements, including
giving the rebel force equal berths in the
interim parliament and interim government.
Whatever the reasons, the UML and Congress' great
contribution in bringing the Maoists to the table
did not seem adequate to the voters.
Maoist capitalism
The Constituent Assembly has long been seen as
the departure point for the making of a 'new
Nepal' after decades of underdevelopment and a
dozen years of violent instability. The Maoists
have now been 'cleansed' by the elections. The
expectation is that they will indeed rise to the
responsibilities of high office, shedding
completely their ferocious streak and publicly
renouncing violence. One must hope that, having
won where the Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path) of
Peru and so many other 'revolutions' were crushed
or compromised, the well-honed politico-military
machinery of the Maoists will have the
understanding and capability to transform into a
democratic institution that will tolerate and
encourage pluralism, representative government
and the fundamental freedoms.
Rather than begrudge the former rebels their
success, the other political parties and broader
civil society must help the Maoists to run a
government (in whatever configuration) that is
accountable, promotes service delivery, rule of
law and the writing of a democratic constitution
over the course of the next two years. It could
even be that the political party that has, in the
past, been the most violent can itself most
effectively crush the culture of physical harm
that has invaded Nepali society in the last
decade. The people crave to live peacefully and
without fear, holding different values and
opinions, and to have political stability that
will automatically energise economic growth. On
the other hand, it is unlikely that they would
want the Chinese model of economic growth without
personal freedom, which surely would not work
with the democracy that Nepali society has
experienced.
The Maoists have promised peace and stability
through a multi-party democratic polity, but
civil society will have to keep alert because the
rebels are also past masters at tailoring words
to the audience, be it national or international.
In his first victory speech, on 12 April,
bedecked with layers of marigold garlands,
Chairman Dahal concentrated on addressing the
fears of the bureaucracy, international
community, the security agencies and the private
sector. One disconnect between what the Maoists
have promised and what they can deliver is the
fact that they cannot escape Nepal's particular
geopolitical and developmental straitjacket.
'Prachanda Path' - the local answer to 'Mao Tse
Tung Thought' - will have to be rapidly adjusted
when confronted with these realities. The Maoists
will realise double-quick the need to drop their
tried and tested ultra-nationalistic rhetoric;
and for managing the country's finances and
carrying out development, they will have to
cohabitate with the international financial
institutions and the omnipresent 'donors',
bilateral and multilateral.
While the conservatives would smile cynically as
the Maoists begin their ride down the road of
realism, there are already signs that would alarm
the Marxist fellow-traveller. On 16 April, the
party's very first formal meeting, even as the
election results came in, was with the pantheon
of the Federation of Nepali Chamber of Commerce
and Industry. There, Chairman Dahal promised to
maintain capitalism, and not to rock any
commercial boat. In addition, the chief Maoist
ideologue, Baburam Bhattarai, made haste to claim
that the party did not expect to introduce
socialism for another century, and communism for
an additional century. Rather, this was the time,
in the Nepali context, when feudalism was being
jettisoned, and there was nowhere to go but the
route of bourgeois capitalism.
While such pronouncements are striking, they do
beg the larger question: whether the 14,000 dead,
the disappeared, the destruction of the economy
since 1996, the devastation of bridges and
district infrastructure, the traumatising of the
population, and the deployment of the national
army (which conducted its own brutalities) in
response to the insurgency were indeed justified
to arrive at such a point. Will the CPN (Maoist)
become just another party espousing the
social-democratic message of mixed economy and
state benevolence, dropping its plans on the
altar of instantaneous pragmatism, even before
the marker ink has dried on the voter's thumb?
Whatever the answer, one could hope that now,
with power achieved, the former rebels will be
able to provide development and economic advance
amidst a free society, with the same proficiency
with which they conducted guerilla warfare and
the election campaign just ended. For this, the
Maoists will have to turn into democrats, and
there is perhaps no reason why Nepal cannot make
a success of this brand of political
experimentation.
Loktantrik sambidhaan
Things may also not be simple for the Maoists
because, unlike their own rhetoric before the
election results started coming in, they are not
going to be in total command of the polity even
though they are on the driver's seat. There is a
hung parliament - or, rather, a hung assembly -
in Kathmandu, with the Maoists needing to muster
forces and form a coalition government that will
work consensually to run the administration and
write the constitution. For this, they will have
to negotiate with the three main forces, the
Congress, the UML and the Madhesi Janadhikar
Forum (MJF) as the powerful new entrant in the
Nepali polity and representing the sharp edge of
plains activism. (Indeed, the Maoist success in
the hills is mirrored by the win of the MJF in
the Tarai, where it got 30 seats to stand
shoulder-to-shoulder with the Congress and UML as
a national party.)
The hope for now is that the new constitution,
which will be written and promulgated over the
next two years, will protect the values to which
the Nepali people have already become accustomed.
These include the fundamental freedoms of
thought, speech and assembly, as well as
accountability, human rights, free judiciary,
multiparty governance, periodic elections,
pluralism and separation of powers. At the same
time, the Constituent Assembly will be adding
elements to make Nepali democracy more inclusive
and representative, addressing the issues of
secularism, federalism, affirmative action and
republicanism - ideas that have already been
agreed upon by the main political players, but
whose actual fleshing out is bound to prove
problematic. Simply put, Nepal needs to evolve as
a liberal, inclusive, democratic society through
the writing of a democratic constitution, the
loktantrik sambidhaan.
The CPN (Maoist) will now be driving Nepal with
the people's consent, in a position to chaperone
both the government and the writing of the
constitution in collaboration with the other
parties. Having come to power through popular
will, the party should have the wherewithal to
deliver three elements that are so desired in
Nepal at this time: political stability, durable
peace and inclusive democracy. While the
neighbours may prioritise the first, and the
international peacekeepers prioritise the second,
the Nepali people will be forgiven for wanting
all three, and simultaneously. When that happens,
the country's economy will spring to life, as it
has been waiting to do all these years.
Simultaneously, the government will have to
kick-start development, begin the process of
post-conflict rehabilitation of both
infrastructure and the citizenry's psyche, and
launch showcase projects that generate hope and
employment.
The Maoists have arrived at the helm of power
when the people are tired and want change, and
have decided to reject the other parties in their
favour. This is a great opportunity for Chairman
Dahal, who likes to talk of how Nepal's Maoists
are innovators who know the weaknesses of
communist regimes elsewhere, to lead his party
into a democratic evolution that will surprise
the world. Indeed, he can try and fashion a
polity that is economically strong, like the
neighbour of the north, but fit it into a
democratic frame, such as that of the neighbour
of the south. Let it be said that there is a
party that is Maoist in name, which can and will
function as a democratic force to protect
pluralism and promote the economy.
The CPN (Maoist) must prove to the world within a
matter of weeks that it can, in one stroke, put
its violent past behind. No sensible citizen or
political party will think twice about the
Maoists continuing to win in future free-and-fair
elections if they do transform thus, for that
will also be the start of the Nepali economic
transformation. At that point, conditions will
finally be created under which citizens will no
longer have to migrate to seek menial jobs in
foreign lands, as they have done for three
centuries now. With the writing of a people's
democratic constitution and its effective
implementation, let the country put an end to
that chapter, and let Nepalis never again have to
leave their fields and terraces for remote
outposts. They need to experience wealth and
happiness in their own homes and neighbourhoods,
and perhaps the elections of 10 April is
harbinger of the turning of the historical tide.
o o o
Indian Express
May 01, 2008
A CONSTITUTION OF CONVENIENCE
Nepal's interim constitution has been overtaken
by the new political reality after the
constituent assembly polls. The country needs a
more spacious roadmap
by Yubaraj Ghimire
The 'unique' democracy that Nepal's interim
constitution formalised when it came into
existence in January 2007 had some dangerous
provisions. It not only stood for the seven
parties, including the Maoists, controlling the
entire political process, but also saw little
role of the opposition in it. The constitution
also had no provision for the prime minister
being removed from the post except when he died,
or quit voluntarily. A provision to have him
removed with a two-third majority was inserted a
few months later following media criticism. In
the appointment of the new prime minister, it
favoured a 'consensus' among the seven parties,
failing which a two-third majority would do.
During that time, all these parties were united
against the king, and for them sidelining him was
the real essence of the new democracy they sought
to secure in Nepal. All these seven parties which
together fathered the interim constitution also
had no objection to G.P. Koirala acting as the
prime minister as well as the acting head of
state while continuing as president of the Nepali
Congress. And so what if in the process, the
neutrality of position that the head of state
demanded was grossly compromised.
But the political context has changed following
the conclusion of the constituent assembly polls
recently. A new scenario has emerged. The
constituent assembly will have altogether 25
parties, 18 more than the 'monopoly rulers' . Not
only that, yesterday's rulers are today's
political rivals since they contested elections
against each other and are also rival claimants
for power.
The smooth selection of the new prime minister
has become difficult as Koirala hopes to be a
consensus choice, and Prachanda claims that right
by virtue of being the leader of the largest
party in the House with 220 members, still 81
short of the simple majority in a House of 601.
Prachanda, who has not yet been assured of the
support of a two-third majority, asserts that the
mandate is for him to lead the government.
Koirala followers bank on the constitutional
provision that he was appointed by consensus, and
should continue if Prachanda fails to muster at
least a two-third majority in his favour. Some
others in the Koirala camp have come forward with
a suggestion that a constitutional amendment with
the provision that a simple majority in the House
should be able to remove the government be made
before the hand-over of power to Prachanda.
While all these things are yet to be settled,
Koirala has already asked political parties to
move forward in the spirit of consensus and
'enforce' republicanism by the first meeting of
the constituent assembly. He is making this
shrewd move to appease the Maoists, and with the
king's exit on the first day, he also hopes to be
the first 'consensus' acting president if he is
to make way for Prachanda as prime minister. The
Maoists and Koirala have made several deals in
the past, and it will not be a surprise if they
strike one more on power-sharing.
But the composition of the constituent assembly
is very different from the interim parliament
which always acted like a rubber stamp of the
three main parties. Of the constituent assembly's
25 parties, at least one, the Madheshi Janadhikar
Forum (MJF), with a strength of around 50, has
moved swiftly to put its own conditions which
will be the basis of its extending support to the
new government - first, Koirala should quit, and
the new government must implement an earlier
accord that it had signed with the MJF giving the
entire Terai area the status of one single
province with the right to self-determination.
This upsets the Maoists' vision of federalism
which is in favour of creating 11 provinces - two
based on geographical remoteness and the rest on
ethnicity. At the same time, both the Maoists and
Koirala realise that neither the House procedure
nor the process of forming the new government can
move smoothly without MJF support. But the
interim constitution was so short-sighted that it
failed to foresee that any other party except the
ruling seven would be there in the CA.
A deal between Koirala and the Maoists may help
the early formation of government, but it does
not guarantee political stability in Nepal. At
least for now, Nepal's parliament will have to
recognise and accept the role of the opposition
and dissent, a practice that had unfortunately
been completely done away with in the past.
______
[2]
The Guardian,
May 2 2008
WAR-TORN SRI LANKA IS THE LAST SICK MAN OF THE REGION
Last weekend's carnage underlines the idiocy of
pledges to destroy the Tamil Tigers. Peace talks
now seem a distant hope
by Jonathan Steele
Time is running out for the great south Asian
boast. By the end of this year, according to a
new year prediction by Sri Lanka's army chief,
Lieutenant-General Sarath Fonseka, his guerrilla
opponents - the Tamil Tigers - would be
"extinct". They and their demands for a homeland
for the Tamil minority would vanish from the
field, and after 25 years of war the island and
its Sinhalese majority could enjoy peace again.
An end to Sri Lanka's bloodletting is certainly
overdue. The country has become the last sick man
of the region. In Nepal an almost equally long
civil war stopped 18 months ago when intelligent
compromises produced agreement to reform the
constitution. In Pakistan, after nearly a decade
of army rule, elections in the winter produced a
partial return to civilian control; the country's
re-empowered politicians have just struck a peace
deal with militant leaders in the fractious
border provinces.
Comparisons are never exact, and Sri Lanka
differs from Nepal and Pakistan in numerous ways.
Since gaining independence from Britain it has
had an uninterrupted history of parliamentary
rule. Its system of land tenure is not feudal. By
Asian standards economic inequalities are
relatively minor, and the benefits of decent
healthcare have spread to every district, along
with universal education for girls as well as
boys.
But on the pattern of many other democracies, the
country's elected politicians have not responded
well to the legitimate demands of ethnic,
religious, and regional minorities. Tamils turned
to violence and terrorism after years of
frustration. Many went to the extreme of
advocating secession after becoming convinced
that a fair share of power was unreachable in a
unitary state.
The current government is not the first to
believe it could defeat the Liberation Tigers of
Tamil Eelam (LTTE), as the Tigers are properly
known. Earlier administrations had similar
ambitions but eventually realised they were
futile and ruinous. The death toll has already
reached 70,000, a proportion of the population
that would amount to 200,000 in Britain. No
wonder independent observers treated Fonseka's
victory boast with horror. No wonder, too, that
India's embassy and western diplomats were
appalled a few days later when Fonseka's
political master, President Mahinda Rajapaksa,
abrogated the internationally brokered ceasefire.
Its Scandinavian monitors had to leave.
The government based its military hopes on a
serious setback for the LTTE in eastern Sri
Lanka. Colonel Karuna Amman, the guerrillas'
regional commander, defected to the government
side four years ago, and his forces received
logistical and financial support to attack their
old colleagues. The government dumped Karuna
after he fell out with other breakaway
commanders, and he came to Britain on a false
passport, for which he received a nine-month
sentence here in January. His forces continue
under new pro-government leadership, and with
their help the army captured most of the LTTE's
eastern strongholds last year.
But the Tigers' core area is in the north.
Efforts to break into it since January have cost
scores of soldiers' lives and made little
progress. Last weekend the army suffered large
losses at Muhamalai, south of Jaffna, in the
biggest battle for years. Journalists were barred
from local hospitals, but the government admitted
losing 47 men. Both sides inflate the other's
losses and minimise their own, but some Sri
Lankan analysts estimate that casualties on both
sides could exceed a thousand. The government
claims to have gained 500 yards of ground. "I
don't think they really appreciated the tenacity
and fighting spirit of the LTTE. The Tigers have
proved they are no pushover," General Gerry de
Silva, a retired army commander, told local
journalists.
Following the logic of asymmetrical warfare, the
Tigers have responded to the offensives by
reinforcing their old strategy of sending suicide
bombers to kill civilians - more than 20 people
died in an atrocity near Colombo last week. The
Tigers have persistently used force to conscript
children into their ranks, and evidence suggests
this is on the increase again. On the government
side security forces are said to be linked to the
abduction and killing of suspected LTTE
sympathisers. Thiagarajah Maheswaran, a Tamil MP,
was gunned down in a Hindu temple on New Year's
Day a few hours after announcing he would give
parliament details of death squads. Meanwhile,
Sri Lanka's small but vibrant group of
independent human rights watchdogs reports a
tightening of pressures on the media.
Western governments and other traditional
aid-givers have repeatedly warned Sri Lanka that
there can be no military solution. The US
Congress recently cut off military aid, except
for air surveillance. The EU has to decide in a
few months whether to renew Sri Lanka's trade
preferences. President Rajapaksa is ignoring the
barrage of criticism and has turned to a new
range of allies for support, loans and weaponry.
He has made two trips to China, and this week
Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, Iran's president, was in
Colombo with a promise of £1,000m in soft loans
and grants. Although the money is intended to
help Sri Lanka expand its only oil refinery,
develop an irrigation and hydropower project and
buy Iranian oil, it will allow the country to
absorb the pressure from its rising trade deficit.
It is hard to see any chance of a shift in this
bleak picture. Many observers believe the LTTE
leadership has become so battle-hardened that it
feels more comfortable with war than having to
prepare for a reasonable discussion of
constitutional reform. The government, for its
part, shows no readiness to prepare the Sinhalese
electorate for the concessions that will
eventually have to be made. At 28% a year, Sri
Lanka now has Asia's highest inflation. Prices of
basics such as rice and coconut have gone up
particularly sharply. But economic discontent has
not turned into political pressure for an end to
a costly war. The Sinhalese opposition is
divided, and in no mood to press Rajapaksa with a
demand for a return to the aborted ceasefire
agreement and peace talks with the LTTE.
Last weekend's losses have at least forced
Fonseka to dilute his boasts. On Sunday a defence
ministry statement quoted him as saying the
battle will "take a decisive turn before the end
of this year". That is a long way from predicting
the Tigers' extinction in 2008. The bad news is
that it means the government intends to stay on
the warpath into next year, and perhaps beyond.
______
[3]
Daily Times
May 2, 2008
HOW TO SUCCEED AND FAIL IN FATA
by Ahmed Rashid
The present under discussion 'Waziristan Accord'
which is still to be agreed upon is totally
inadequate. It was put together by the army
before the general elections in order to give
troops a breathing space - although that
breathing space would also be used by the
extremists to regroup
The resumption of attacks by the Pakistani
Taliban and the withdrawal of the ceasefire offer
by Baitullah Mehsud point to an early resumption
of severe violence in FATA and suicide bombings
in the rest of the country. This follows several
weeks of relative calm in the aftermath of the
general elections, even though the extremists had
mounted their biggest coup earlier on by
assassinating Benazir Bhutto.
The PPP-led coalition government at the Centre
and the ANP government in the NWFP have both made
it clear that they are keen to adopt a more
comprehensive strategy towards bringing peace to
FATA even though they face multiple pressures -
on the one side from the army for a quick,
localised peace accord with Mehsud to give troops
breathing space and on the other by the US and
NATO forces in Afghanistan, who look suspiciously
at any accord because it will allow Pakistani
militants to also focus on the Afghan Taliban's
summer offensive in Afghanistan.
What is the way out for the government and the people of FATA ?
In the many words expressed about peace plans in
FATA by the PPP and the ANP, one key ingredient
has been missing. Before the elections, both
Benazir Bhutto and Afsandyar Wali spoke
succinctly of the need to carry out political
reform in FATA.
Yet today, now that they are in power the PPP and
ANP are failing to spell out the desperately
needed strategic vision which should provide the
framework for all policies towards the extremists
and the people of FATA.
At present there is no over-arching strategic
vision for the future of FATA being articulated
by the ruling parties. Such a vision should be
based on direct consultations with the people of
FATA to bring the region into the fabric of
Pakistan's constitution and laws, offering them
the same political, social and educational rights
and opportunities that are available to all
Pakistanis.
(This would include a massive development
programme for which the US and other Western
states have already expressed a desire to
contribute.)
Such a strategy may take several years to
implement because it has to be done with the
consent of the tribes in FATA - many of whom have
to be won over first - but the building blocks
should be set out now.
Ultimately the people of FATA must decide through
a referendum or any other democratic means the
future political status for FATA. Options could
include becoming a separate province or joining
the NWFP.
In the short term under the framework of future
political reform the government can open a
dialogue with all the tribes, Pashtun civil
society and even the extremists.
In other words the government talks to everyone
under the banner, changing the rules of the game
in FATA.
But instead the PPP-ANP appear to be backsliding
from their original commitments, declining to set
out a strategic vision for FATA and instead
getting bogged down in local negotiations with
militant leaders.
At the moment only the extremists have a clear,
articulated political vision for FATA - they want
a sharia state independent of Pakistan, where Al
Qaeda and a whole host of other foreign groups
can congregate and undermine the region and the
world. No patriotic Pakistani can accept such
terms of abject surrender.
The present under discussion 'Waziristan Accord'
which is still to be agreed upon is totally
inadequate. It was put together by the army
before the general elections in order to give
troops breathing space - although that breathing
space would also be used by the extremists to
regroup.
Moreover the so called Accord is almost the same
as earlier failed accords by the Musharraf
regime. While the militants pledge to cease
attacks on the army and free the several hundred
hostages - soldiers, civilians, government
officials and the Pakistani ambassador to Kabul -
that they are holding, the government would
largely relinquish control of the region to the
militants and free Taliban extremists it is
holding. There would be no guarantees that the
Pakistani Taliban would not join the war in
Afghanistan.
The PPP-ANP attempts at modifying this Accord
have largely rested on a stepped up aid and
development agenda - good in itself, but
insufficient to provide the impetus for political
reform, reduce the grip of the extremists or
provide the security needed to bring back the
tens of thousands of FATA tribesmen now living as
refugees in other parts of Pakistan.
While the government tinkers with an Accord that
is politically insufficient and militarily a
concession, it is also creating major problems
for itself in its relations with the US,
Afghanistan and NATO countries who view any such
short term approach with suspicion.
However before a strategic plan can materialise
there are certain realities that need to be
addressed.
Even though General Ashfaq Kayani has expressed
his willingness and already taken several steps
demonstrating his positive intentions to adhere
to the wishes of the elected government, the army
and the ISI remain the most important formulators
and implementors of policy in FATA. It is
impossible for the PPP-ANP coalition to come up
with a plan that does not have army backing.
General Kayani has also told the political
leadership that they must take "ownership" of the
war on extremism, but the army too has to take
steps to help the civilian government do so. So
far the army has shown little inclination to back
a policy of long term political reform in FATA.
It has tinkered on the edges of reform with
disastrous results.
For example since 2004 the army broke down the
Political Agent system replacing it with military
officers, then relented and has tried to
re-establish the former system. There is talk of
improving upon the draconian FCR - Frontier
Crimes Regulation - which in fact needs to be
done away with altogether.
The army needs to take three strategic decisions
before it can deal with the problems of FATA -
much in the same way the army did after the
Kargil war after which President Musharraf
decided to open talks with India on Kashmir.
The first strategic decision pertains to the need
for the military to wrap up the Afghan Taliban
leadership who continue to enjoy sanctuary,
re-supply, recruits and patronage from elements
within Pakistan. The Afghan Taliban are playing a
leading role in guiding the Pakistani Taliban in
FATA. Since 2004 every one of the accords the
army has struck with the Pakistani Taliban has
been a result of Taliban leader Mullah Mohammed
Omar sending envoys to FATA to negotiate with the
military - side by side with the Pakistani
Taliban leaders.
As long as sections of the establishment believe
that there are good Taliban and bad Taliban,
extremism will flourish in FATA and spread to
other parts of NWFP.
The second strategic necessity is to understand
that there can be no peaceful solution in FATA
unless it is linked to a similar process in the
Afghan provinces across the border. The tribes
have been one and the same for centuries and they
ignore the border.
President Hamid Karzai is also trying,
unsuccessfully, to woo the Afghan Taliban, just
as the PPP-ANP would like to do. But these two
processes have to be one joint effort. Social and
development programmes to FATA have to be linked
to similar programmes on the other side. This
obviously requires a far more improved
relationship between Pakistan and Afghanistan
than has existed since 2001.
The civilian government is clearly determined to
strike a more harmonious relationship with Kabul,
but the army needs to give it public backing and
express a willingness to deal with the Pashtun
tribes of Pakistan and Afghanistan in a common
fashion. The Afghan side must reciprocate by
starting a serious debate about and ultimately
recognising the border and the Durand Line.
The third strategic decision relates to the need
for the army to publicly support major political
reform in FATA and to help the PPP-ANP protect
emerging civil society in FATA thereby allowing a
strong anti-Taliban and anti-extremist ethos to
emerge among the Pashtun tribes.
Since the first military action in 2004, the army
has failed to protect tens of thousands of FATA
residents who have fled to other parts of
Pakistan as refugees rather than accept Taliban
rule. The Pakistani Taliban have killed hundreds
of tribal maliks and members of civil society in
FATA such as journalists, educators, doctors and
businessmen - all charged with allegedly spying
for the US but in reality the victims of Taliban
ethnic cleansing to clear the region of all those
Pashtuns who do not support the Taliban ideology.
The army must help these people return home and
protect them while the government provides the
social and economic backup for them to prosper.
Only then can the state hope to develop a serious
Pashtun lobby in FATA for progressive political
reform.
These substantive issues are what the PPP-ANP
alliance should be discussing and engaging with
the army rather than trying to come up with a
plan that abandons long term political reform in
favour of short term quick fixes which will
collapse within weeks.
Likewise the Bush administration with its
terrible penchant for military solutions needs to
be persuaded to be patient and prepare itself for
a more long term solution that will make its
offer of US $750 million over five years in
development aid for FATA, far more meaningful.
Similarly the madrassa culture in FATA needs to
be countered by a massive educational and
literacy program which the ANP government is best
placed to carry out.
At present the government is caught in the
conundrum of appearing to be soft on terrorism
because it is advocating a dialogue with the
terrorists. What it should be saying is that it
is trying to establish a strategic political
vision for FATA that is comprehensive and far
reaching and will eventually give the people of
FATA the same rights as all Pakistanis.
Ahmed Rashid is the author of Taliban: Militant
Islam, Oil, and Fundamentalism in Central Asia
and Jihad: The Rise of Militant Islam in Central
Asia
______
[4]
15 April 2008
JUDGMENT ON OBC RESERVATION
by Rajindar Sachar
The Constitution Bench Judgment on
upholding reservation in Higher Educational
Institutions has come on expected lines, in the
light of Judgment in Indira Sawhney case (1992).
Though 27% quota for OBC was loosely challenged,
but this plea was an empty one because latest
Govt. of India National Sample Survey data (2004
- 05) shows 41% and 43% constitute OBC amongst
Muslims and Hindus respectively.
Of course everybody knew that the real
issue was " would court accept govt's partisan
approach (no doubt influenced by higher echelons
of OBC political leadership) that the principle
of creamy layer amongst OBC should be dispensed
with - The court has given short shrift by
holding "Thus, any executive or legislative
action refusing to exclude the creamy layer from
the benefits of reservation will be violative of
Articles 14 and 16(1) and also of Article 16(4)".
It is unfortunate that because of partisan
politics some are still unwilling to accept this
equitable decision and thus put in jeopardy the
implementation of this overdue measure for poor
segments of OBC. As it is, the partisan approach
of higher segments of OBC has already done
considerable damage to SC/ST students. This is
shown by the fact of how all the parties indulged
in conspiracy of silence with regard to the
benefit that was to accrue to SC/ST under this
very govt. circular from last year.
It may be noted that though the Supreme
Court had given interim stay regarding OBC
admission, there was no stay regarding SC/ST
quota, which could have been filled up but no one
spoke about it and it has unnecessarily gone
waste for last year. This indifference to SC/ST
quota exposes the hypocrisy of many politicians
that when they are talking of uplifting the poor,
it is the caste angle which has primacy. It
should be noted that the extra seats created for
2007-08 were 12216 of which 9468 were for the
OBCs 1832 for SCs and 916 for the STs. Thus it
was possible for the Govt. to fill up the quota
for SC/ST (a total of 2748 seats). Management of
Institution had no objection because they had
already made arrangement for filling up 12216
seats.
But surprisingly no effort was made to fill
up SC/ST quota last year. This anomaly was felt
very strongly by Peoples Union for Civil
Liberties (PUCL) which by its letter of May 4,
2007 brought this fact to the notice of prime
Minister, Mr. Arjun singh, and others including
Ms. Mayawati, the Chief Minster of U.P.,
expressing its anxiety and surprise that so far
the Government had not taken any steps to fill up
the seats reserved for SCs and STs when there was
no restraint against them. Unfortunately for
reasons not clear no steps were taken - the
result SC/ST lost last year's quota.
Again from the current press reports it
appears that some political groups are trying to
find ways how creamy layer can be included in
the quota (a useless exercise in view of
judgment). Again no attention is being paid in
this process for the enrolment of SC/ST which is
permissible - why has the government not asked
the institutions to go ahead with their
admissions - whatever the angulanties, regarding
OBC can be worked out but why should SC/ST be
denied admissions in higher institution again for
the second year. Why must partisan politics
always override equity and fairness to the most
neglected. Is it because political leadership is
under pressure from the creamy layer of OBC not
to let SC/ST take benefits if the same are not at
the same time available to OBC is this social
justice - is it not pandering to
caste politics and vote
gathering mechanism. But why SC leadership is not
exposing this game - even Mayawati is playing
cool on this.
I feel that nervousness on the question
whether if OBC is graduate, but economically
below the guidelines of 2004 (updated to the
present inflation index) he will not be eligible
for admission in OBC quota is misplaced. Creamy
Layer touchstone is not only at the educational
level but also at economic level. Thus it would
be unacceptable and unjust if a conscientious
hardworking OBC poor was to pass graduation by
studying even under street lights (instances have
actually happened) he should be deprived of the
benefit of reservation even when his family
income is below the limit. As Court has said
about the exclusion of creamy layer "one of the
main criteria for determining the socially and
educationally backward class is poverty", and
that "Creamy Layer has no place in the
reservation system".
I feel prima facie family income level of
2.5 lakh per year fixed in 2004 (updated by
inflation index) can be the upper most limit for
being retained in non creamy layer. To call it
inadequate would be a mockery considering that
statistics show that of OBC Muslims (82%) and
Hindus (80%) are below a per capita consumption
of Rs. 20 per day - as it is even national
average of poor whose per capita consumption per
day is Rs. 20 constitute about 77% of total
population.
The Court has also given direction that '
there must be periodic review as to the
desirability of continuing with the reservation,
and suggesting possibly five or ten years'. With
respect it seems to me that this direction is
hasty, considering that the directive of Article
45 of the Constitution (now made a Fundamental
Right) that the State shall provide free and
compulsory education until the age of 14 years
remains woefully a distant dream, coupled with
the fact that according to Census of 2001,
national literacy (which in reality only means
writing your name) is 65%.
Bhandari J. suggestion that legislators
should be outside the ambit of reservation is
sound both in principle and equity. Legislators
who proclaim their first loyalty to the common
man must show their genuineness by making this
voluntary gesture - as it is they are certainly
for above the limit of social/economic
backwardness.
Another fear expressed is that if creamy
layer is excluded the quota for OBC will remain
unfilled. I would therefore suggest that if after
filling up from non creamy OBC, any seats are
left out, they should be filled up from
economically weak and backward non creamy segment
of non OBC. If still quota remains unfilled,
those vacancies could be filled up by creamy
layer of OBC, but not otherwise.
The Court has rightly not given any
direction regarding Minority Institutions. But
does not equity demand that these institution on
their own provide proportionate quota for non
creamy OBC amongst its own Minority on the same
terms as for non Minority institutions.
New Delhi
15/04/2008
______
[5] AN INTERNATIONAL DAY OF SOLIDARITY ACTION FOR BINAYAK SEN ON MAY 13, 2008
Dear Friends,
Please find below and attached an appeal for
organizations to endorse an international day of
solidarity action for Binayak Sen on May 13,
marking one year of his unjust imprisonment. We
are a broad coalition of organizations and
individuals based in different countries and hope
to put up a massive collective effort aimed at
the embassies as well as the press to exert
pressure for his release. His trial begins on the
30th. There is a lot being planned in India as
well.
As you may know, one of the contacts for Indian
coordination : Satya Sivaraman - satyasagar[AT]gmail.com
APPEAL TO OBSERVE ONE YEAR OF DR. BINAYAK SEN'S UNJUST DETENTION
On May 13th/14th, 2008 Dr. Binayak Sen, an
activist with a lifelong commitment to the issues
of community health and human rights, will
complete his first year of unjust imprisonment at
the Raipur Central jail in Chhattisgarh.
Organizations across the globe will be holding
events on the evening of May 13th, 2008 to mark
one year of his imprisonment. We appeal to your
organization to hold rallies, candlelight vigils
or lectures against his unconstitutional
detention. Please let us know at freebsen at gmail.
com if your organization would endorse this
appeal.
Dr. Sen's life has been focused on providing
healthcare to the most marginalized sections of
the society. By setting up the unique Shaheed
Hospital, the community-driven work of Rupantar
and his broader involvement with Jan Swasthya
Abhiyan - the Indian circle of the People's
Health Movement, Dr. Sen has made healthcare
available to people who have been ignored by
government or private systems.
As the State Secretary of People's Union for
Civil Liberties of Chhattisgarh and the national
Vice President, Dr. Sen has uncovered human
rights violations by the state and other armed
groups. He has highlighted starvation deaths,
dysentery epidemics, poor conditions of under
trial prisoners, custodial deaths and extra
judicial killings. Dr. Sen has also worked on the
issues of right to food, work, health and
education. He has been amongst the most vocal
opponents of Salwa Judum, a private militia
movement armed by the Chhattisgarh Government to
combat Maoist insurgency - that has contributed
to a spiraling increase in violence and
displacement of thousands of tribals. Even the
Supreme Court of India has issued a strong
disapproval of the Salwa Judum, citing concerns
similar to those raised by Dr. Sen.
On May 14th, 2007 Dr. Sen was arrested in Raipur
under the repressive Chhattisgarsh Special Public
Security Act, 2005 (CSPSA) and the Unlawful
Activities (Prevention) Act 2004 (UAPA) on
charges of sedition, conspiracy to wage war
against the state and conspiracy to commit other
offences. The continuing detention of an activist
committed to non-violence and social justice is a
mockery of justice itself. He now remains
imprisoned for a year without trial or bail,
including a cruel spell of solitary confinement.
Dr. Sen is victim to an increasing trend of
arresting human rights activists in India for
challenging state authority. Lachit Bordoloi, a
human rights activist from Assam; Prashant Rahi,
journalist from Uttarakhand; Govindan Kutty,
editor of People's March in Kerala; Praful Jha, a
journalist from Chhattisgarh; Vernon Gonsalves,
an activist from Nasik; Arun Ferreira, Ashok
Reddy, Dhanendra Bhurule, Naresh Bansode,
activists from Vidarbha have all been charged
under the UAPA and kept under prolonged detention
without bail.
We appeal to the international community to speak
out against the stifling of pro-poor and
democratic voices such as Dr. Binayak Sen's. The
international community has already shown its
appreciation by bestowing the Jonathan Mann award
for public health and human rights on him. In
addition, the UAPA and the CSPSA must be
repealed, and the Chhattisgarh government should
stop its support for Salwa Judum.
Endorsed by:
* Association of India's Development (www.aidindia.org)
* Alliance for a Secular and Democratic South
Asia, MIT (www.alliancesouthasia.org)
* Friends of South Asia: FOSA (www.friendsofsouthasia.org)
* International South Asia Forum: INSAF, NYC (www.insaf.net)
* Peoples Health Movement, USA (http://www.phmovement.org/cms)
* Campaign to Stop Funding Hate: CSFH (www.stopfundinghate.org)
* Sanhati (http://sanhati.com)
For more information, please see:
- A petition to free Dr. Sen:
http://www.petitiononline.com/Binayak/petition.html
- Statement of solidarity with Dr. Sen from
internationally renowned intellectuals:
http://monthlyreview.org/0607sen. htm
- Announcement of the Jonathan Mann Award for Dr. Sen:
http://www.globalhealth.org/ news/article/ 9833
- Statement by Human Rights Watch
http://hrw.org/english/docs/2008/04/29/
india18681. htm
- Resources on Dr. Sen and the status of the trial:
o http://www.freebinayaksen.org/
o http://www.savebinayak.ukaid.org.uk/index. html
- An article on Dr. Sen's imprisonment in the
context of the political economy of Chhattisgarh:
http://mrzine.monthlyreview.org/amr140607.html
- Medico Friend Circle Brochure on Dr. Binayak Sen:
http://www.mail-archive.com/ greenyouth at googlegroups.com/msg03256. html
- An analysis of Dr. Sen's case from the PUCL
website: http://www.pucl.org/Topics/
Human-rights/2007/sen- case-analysis. html
- Background information on the Chhattisgarh
Special Public Security Act, 2006
http://oldcontent.newswatch.
in/newsanalyses/attacksonscribes/3893.html
- Background information on the Unlawful
Activities (Prevention) Act, 2004 from Human
Rights Features: http://www.hrdc. net/sahrdc/
hrfeatures/HRF106.htm
- Information on other activists under the UAPA,
2004:
o Amnesty International on journalists
Prashant Rahi, Govindan Kutty and Praful Jha:
http://www.amnestyusa.org/document.
php?lang=e&id=ENGASA200032008o Frontline
Defenders on Lachit Bordoloi of MASS:
http://www.frontlinedefenders. org/node/ 1360
o Background on the arrest of Vernon
Gonsalves, Shridhar Shrinivasan and Adv KD Rao:
http://www.lawyerscollective. org/content/ letters-0
o Background on Arun Ferreira
http://in.news.yahoo.com/hindustantimes/20080411/r_t_ht_nl_general/tnl-naxalprisoners-protest-torture-
in-n-7244580. htmlInformation about Salwa Judum:
When the State Makes War on its Own People-A
report from human rights organizations in India,
2006 http://www.pucl.org/Topics/
Human-rights/2006/slawajudum. htm
______
[6]
Press Release
29th April 2008
PEOPLE'S PARLIAMENT SLAMS UPA GOVERNMENT: DEMANDS
NON DISPLACING DEVELOPMENT PARADIGM
More than a thousand people from people's
movements from across the country have come
together under the banner of Sangharsh. A three
day agitation and dharna in front of the Indian
Parliament in New Delhi's Jantar Mantar was
started on 28th April 2008.
A Jan Sansad (People's Parliament) was organised
today on issues of Displacement, Land Acquisition
and R&R. People's voices on these issues have so
far remained on the margins of electoral
politics. A much needed platform for dialogue and
engagement between people and their elected
representatives was presented today.
More than 45 organisations and movement groups
who have either faced displacement or are
resisting it, gave testimonies on their
struggles, state repression and their vision and
perspectives of development without displacement.
While people affected by dams built as many as
100 years ago are still without rehabilitation,
thousands more are being displaced in the name of
SEZs, mining, water and power projects, forest
reserves and so on. Presentations from Jharkhand,
Chhattisgarh and Orissa presented cases of
unprecedented loot through diversion of Adivasi
land and minerals. The stories from slums and the
so called unauthorised colonies in Delhi, Mumbai
and other cities makes it clear that for the
urban poor, labourers, hawkers and small
retailers it is not 'urban renewal' but 'urban
removal'.
The Central Government has brought forth two
Bills-The Land Acquisition (Amendment) Bill, 2007
and the Resettlement and Rehabilitation Bill,
2007, purportedly to strike a balance between the
need for land for development and protecting the
interests of the persons from whom land is
statutorily acquired. Both the Bills will have
far reaching impact if enacted. In effect, these
Bills sanction displacement and plunder of land
and other natural resources from the people for
the profit of corporations and private investors.
The Land Acquisition Bill allows land to be
forcefully acquired in favour of private
companies sneaking private purpose into the
definition of "public purpose". It is more
regressive and anti-people than even the original
colonial Act! The government pays mere lip
service to protecting the rights of those whose
lands are acquired. The R&R Bill does not even
guarantee basics like land for land and
alternative livelihood based rehabilitation. The
issue of urban displacement has been completely
sidestepped yet again.
People unequivocally opposed development policies
which take displacement as an inevitable
eventuality. One demand has emerged from the
people's struggles across the country - a
decentralised development planning process which
ensures 'development' that is truly people
centric and bases itself firmly on the principles
of democracy, social justice and equity. Concerns
regarding development planning, land acquisition
and resettlement and rehabilitation are
intrinsically linked with one another and cannot
be addressed in isolation. In fact a draft of a
'Comprehensive Legislation on Development
Planning, No Forced Displacement, and Just
Rehabilitation' has been prepared based on
Article 243, and the 73rd and 74th Constitutional
Amendments. In the true spirit of democracy, gram
sabhas and municipalities are proposed to be
empowered with the right to formulate district
and metropolitan level development plans.
Raising their voices against the Special Economic
Zone Act 2005, the people's movements demanded
that governments and different political parties
should stop behaving like brokers of corporations
and big companies. The groups and activists also
demanded withdrawal of the proposed Coastal Zone
Management (CZM) plan and Special Tourism Zone
(STZ) projects.
"In an election year Congress and UPA will do
well if they side with the people and not the
corporate land grabbers. The Indian masses will
not tolerate a government that has sold India to
private companies and corporates in the form of
SEZs, urban renewal and industrialisation", said
Gautam Bandhopadhyay of Nadi Ghati Morcha. "The
government is selling off water, forests and
other natural resources. People have been treated
as oustees and displaced. We will not tolerate
the denial of our rights anymore; we will not
allow another inch of land to be snatched from
us", said Vimal Bhai of Matu Jan Sangathan.
On Behalf of Sangharsh
Rajendra Ravi Madhuresh
Kumar Mukta Srivastava
______
[7]
Press Release: [May 1, 2008, Lahore ]
Student Action Committee
In light of the fact that the issue of the
restoration of the judiciary once again lies in
peril, and with the 30 day countdown finally
coming to an end. The students organized a rally
that proceeded from Fast University to the PPP
Secretariat. The protest brought together the
students once more to send the message that the
youth of the country are still active and will
not sit idly by. The slogans chanted were
pro-judiciary and anti-musharraf. A new variety
of slogans from pre-election days were directed
at zardari saying be loyal to us [the people]
zardari, do not betray us (ker hum se wafadari,
zardari zardai; na ker tu hum se ghuddary,
zardari zardari) and musharraf-zardari alliance
is not acceptable (musharraf zardari ittehad, na
manzoor na manzoor).
The message was loud and clear, as
repeated over and over by the various speakers.
"You the politicians are the representatives of
the people, you are answerable to us. We have
elected you. You have come on our mandate, and
you must stick to the task entrusted on you. We,
the people, elected you to restore our judiciary.
A restoration that comes with no strings
attached. A minus one formula or the reduction of
judicial tenures; no such side policies will be
appreciated and will be tantamount to a betrayal
of the public's trust."
The students made a human chain
around the intersection along the rally's way,
followed by a picket line around the PPP
secretariat. The rally lasted for about an hour
and a half, with the students peacefully
dispersing as has become the tradition of these
student-led protests.
_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/
Buzz for secularism, on the dangers of fundamentalism(s), on
matters of peace and democratisation in South
Asia. SACW is an independent & non-profit
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