SACW | Feb. 16 - April 9, 2008 /
Harsh Kapoor
aiindex at gmail.com
Tue Apr 8 19:01:25 CDT 2008
South Asia Citizens Wire | February 16- April 9,
2008 | Dispatch No. 2501 - Year 10 running
[1] Pakistan:
(i) The boycott revisited (S. Akbar Zaidi and Afiya S. Zia)
(ii) They Only Know How To Kill (Pervez Hoodbhoy)
[2] India and Nepal's Constituent Assembly (Kanak Mani Dixit)
[3] Bangladesh:
(i) Try telling Bangladeshis that elections are
bad for the poor (Polly Toynbee)
(ii) Moeen as Bangladesh's Musharraf (J. Sri Raman)
[4] International People's Tribunal On Human
Rights And Justice In Indian-Administered Kashmir
[5] India: On the Recent Attack on Historians by Hindutva Fundamentalists
- Response to Sangh objections on AK Ramanujan's History text
- An email account of violence and intimidation
by Hindutva activists against Delhi's historians
- Sahmat's statement re ABVP's assault on the
Department of History, Delhi University
- How many Ramayanas? I am for many Ramayanas (DP Satish)
[6] Book Review: Witness to folly - An account of
the mess created by India and Pakistan in Siachen
(AG Noorani)
[7] Publication Announcement: Essays on Federalism in Sri Lanka
______
[1]
Dawn
April 01, 2008
THE BOYCOTT REVISITED
by S. Akbar Zaidi and Afiya S. Zia
MANY of us, who come from very different
backgrounds - academics, analysts, activists,
citizens - argued over the course of October and
November last year that civil society actors and
political parties ought to boycott the elections
which were announced by Gen Pervez Musharraf, and
which were eventually held on Feb 18.
It was clear that once the term of the Shaukat
Aziz government came to an end, elections would
be held to elect a new parliament.
In the closing months of last year, political
groupings like the All Parties Democratic
Movement and the Pakistan Muslim League-N
announced that they would not contest the polls,
primarily because they felt that the elections
would be neither free nor fair, and nor were
these parties willing to accept any rules of the
game announced by the uniformed general-president.
The efficacy of the decision depended much on
whether the Pakistan People's Party would also
come on board and hence give some credence to the
boycott call. Many were sceptical that if either
of the two largest parties chose to participate
in the elections, they would gain legitimacy and
those who boycotted would be left out of the
political process.
Eventually, both the two largest parties agreed
to contest an election which resulted in a
resounding victory for the anti-Musharraf
political forces and put Pakistan on the way to a
military-free democratic future. Today, we can
all celebrate the democratic process and look
back and say that the decision to contest was the
best decision that political parties could have
taken.
Two weeks into the swearing-in of the new
parliament, it seems that almost all the fears
and concerns that the boycotters were allaying
have been proven to be wrong. The judges are
free, and are likely to be reinstated, and
President Musharraf just might be pressurised
into make some sort of hurried exit. The script
could not have been written any better and
democracy seems to have triumphed over all other
forms of politics.
Having said this, it would be naïve to think that
the parties are taking these steps in a vacuum.
There is no ignoring the momentum and
uncompromised push for these demands coming
consistently from the lawyers' movement, civil
society and perhaps within the parties too. In
fact, rather than waiting detachedly for some
unproven exercise of sovereignty from parliament,
the people chose to actively vote out the
government and then exerted continued political
pressure for their demands to be met.
It is only a small section of those we call the
'apologists' within and outside the political
parties who seek to dilute principles and
encourage leaders to backtrack on promises for
their personal gain, and who call democratic
pressure a 'confrontation'.
Those of us who were in favour of the election
boycott were under no illusions that we were
anywhere near a revolutionary situation similar
to France in 1789, or even 1968, but felt that a
boycott by the main political actors would put
enough pressure on the Musharraf government where
it would have to back down and make major
concessions. The lawyers' movement was still
vibrant, and the Nov 3 martial law and the
playing with the constitution under the PCO
energised and united diverse sections of civil
society and political actors as well.
We were confident that had the PPP joined the
lawyers' struggle and been more active in its
anti-Musharraf politics rather than indulging in
deals, perhaps the general may have been forced
out earlier. The boycott decision was based on a
reading of the limited strength of the street,
and had the two largest parties participated we
could have been near an Indonesia- or
Philippines-like situation where political power
overthrew authoritarianism.
We will never know what would have happened if
both the PPP and the PML-N had agreed in November
2007 to work together to boycott the polls. If
agreements and a workable coalition can be formed
after the election, a more uncertain and unstable
agreement could have been possible in agreeing to
boycott. However, we will never know.
While the boycott decision may have become far
less important as the numbers who supported the
move dwindled, and more and more political actors
and civil society representatives decided to
contest or support the elections, if nothing else
the boycott issue did raise the level of debate
and exchange in the political public arena.
While there was a complete consensus in
condemning the martial law imposed on Nov 3, and
there was continued support for the lawyers'
movement with the reinstatement of the judges a
real demand, the divisions amongst those who were
in favour of boycotting the elections and those
who supported participation raised the level of
discourse in the Urdu and English press manifold.
There was a lively debate not seen since the time
of the 1999 coup - and even that was rather
one-sided, in favour of the coup. The op-ed pages
of all major newspapers had raised the level of
debate and argumentation to a lively level not
seen in many years. The otherwise dry and staid
political public sphere had come alive.
This taste for political debate acquired by the
media has also been simultaneously attributed to
Gen Musharraf's personal largesse and equally
dismissed as cacophonic laundry washing by the
elite. The point of democratic choices and
transparency, as articulated by the fourth
estate, needs to be dealt with carefully now on.
There should be no calls for going soft on the
new parliament simply because it is nebulous in
its formation. The democratic role of the media
must by definition be challenging and expository
rather than conciliatory and uncritical.
Many of us who supported the boycott decision are
now happy to have been proven wrong, and support
the larger democratic process to further
strengthen and deepen both democracy and civil
society. We recognise, however, the role of the
movements which helped bring about this new
democratisation in Pakistan beyond electoral
politics. We hope that the processes under way
and the promises made will move towards a further
fruition of democracy with the reinstatement of
the pre-Nov 3 judiciary and with the removal of
the former general-president who was resoundingly
defeated in the Feb 18 elections.
Those who argued for the elections boycott now
need to organise themselves democratically to
fulfil the unfinished agenda of democratisation
in Pakistan and to ensure that these tasks are
accomplished. Clearly, democracy has to be taken
far further than before and needs to be
strengthened. If parliament is to be sovereign -
the new mantra of the elected representatives -
the role of those outside the assembly has to be
one which ensures that parliamentarians
accomplish their democratic mandate.
And if they don't state or tackle the peoples'
issues due to fear of being de-tracked, then it
is our work to set the agenda for them - on
behalf of the electorate, not the elected. While
happy to have been proven wrong over the boycott
decision, we would hate to turn around a hundred
days later to say, 'we told you so'.
o o o
Times of India
12 March 2008
THEY ONLY KNOW HOW TO KILL
by Pervez Hoodbhoy
ISLAMABAD: A drone is a semi-autonomous,
self-propelled system controlled by an external
intelligence. Suitably equipped handlers guide it
towards an assigned target. The MQ-1B General
Dynamics Predator, connected to high-flying US
military surveillance satellites, differs from
the low-tech mullah-trained human drone produced
in Pakistani madrassas. But they share a common
characteristic. Neither asks why they must kill.
Drones, machine and human, have drenched Pakistan
with the blood of innocents. In 2006, a bevy of
MQ-1Bs hovering over Damadola launched a barrage
of 10 Hellfire missiles, costing $60,000 apiece,
at the village below. They blew up 18 local
people, including five women and five children.
The blame was put on faulty local intelligence.
The same year, a Hellfire missile hit a madrassa
in Bajaur killing between 80 and 85 people,
mostly students. Pervez Musharraf's credibility
stood so low that few believed his claim that
those killed were training to become Al-Qaida
militants. Indeed, while these space-age weapons
have occasionally eliminated a few Al-Qaida men,
such as Abu Laith al-Libi in January 2008, the
more usual outcome has been flattened houses,
dead and maimed children, and a growing tribal
population that seeks revenge against Pakistan
and the US.
The indigenous human drone, equipped with an
explosive vest surrounded with ball bearings and
nails, has left a far bloodier trail. Six suicide
attacks in 2006 turned into 62 in 2007. According
to the South Asia Terrorism Portal, at least
1,523 civilians were killed in terror-related
violence last year. Those praying in mosques or
at funerals have been no safer than others at
political rallies. Beards, and prayer marks on
foreheads, are no protection either.
This drone does not need to know why and who he
must kill. Only how. A spine-chilling suicide
bomber training video illustrates this. It is one
of the several videos that freely circulate in
Pakistan's tribal areas, watched by a population
hostile to Pakistan's armed forces. About 30
masked fighters are filmed in this video,
training in some barren, mountainous area. One
fighter, randomly selected by their leader,
proceeds to climb a huge rock, perhaps 100 feet
high. He reaches the highest point, and then
stands motionless. His arms are outstretched as
though on a diving board, awaiting the signal
from below. Subsequently, without hesitation, and
without closing his eyes, he launches himself
onto the ground below.
The camera cuts to the still body lying on the
blood-soaked ground. It then slowly pans over the
faces of the other masked fighters. Their eyes
betray no emotion. A second signal from the
leader, and they trot military-style to the body,
dig a shallow grave, toss their dead comrade into
it, and cover it up. They then march over the
grave several times, chanting Quranic verses. Why
sacrifice a human life for a few minutes of
footage? English subtitles make obvious that this
is for propaganda. The message: this group's
fighters have overcome the fear of death, and
have willingly surrendered to the group leader
their individual powers to reason and decide.
While the murder of innocents by the MQ-1B has
led to much condemnation in Pakistan, the far
greater carnage left by suicide bombers has
provoked only mild criticism. A few editorials,
mostly in English language newspapers, have been
forthright but there have been no street protests.
On the other hand, implicit justifications
abound. In January 2008, 30 leading Deobandi
religious scholars, while declaring suicide
attacks "haram", rationalised these as a mere
reaction to the government's wrong policies in
the tribal areas. They concluded: "A peaceful
demand for implementing Shariah was not only
rejected but the government was also not willing
to give ear to any reasoning based on Qur'an and
Sunna in support of the sharia demand.
Apparently, these circumstances led some minds to
the frustration that manifested itself in suicide
attacks".
What message are these ulema sending?
That Pakistanis should surrender to Islamic
extremists and adopt the sharia to avoid being
attacked? This amounts to encouragement and
incitement. Why do Pakistanis suddenly lose their
voice when it comes to suicide bombings? First,
the bomber - even if he kills pious Muslims or
even those in the act of prayer - kills in the
name of Islam. Therefore, people mute their
criticism lest they be regarded as irreligious or
even blasphemous.
Second, many believe that suicide attacks will
disappear if Pakistan withdraws from a war
against terror that is not Pakistan's but
America's. But most of the dead and wounded are
perfectly ordinary people. They had nothing to do
with American or Pakistani forces. Even if
America retreats - which is unlikely - Pakistan
is now unable to escape the terrible consequences
of a weapon developed to bleed India and to
secure Afghanistan for "strategic depth".
Unfortunately, few Pakistanis accept that more
and more crazed mullahs have created cults around
themselves and seized control over the minds of
worshippers. An enabling environment of poverty,
deprivation, lack of justice and extreme
differences of wealth is perfect for demagogues.
As the mullah's indoctrination gains strength,
the power to reason weakens. The world of the
follower becomes increasingly divided into
absolute good and absolute evil. Doubt is
replaced by certainty, moral sensibilities are
blunted, the sensation of pain to oneself and
others disappears, and the metamorphosis from
human to drone becomes complete. The writer
teaches at Quaid-e-Azam University.
______
[2]
The Hindu
March 7, 2008
INDIA AND NEPAL'S CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY
by Kanak Mani Dixit
The Indian government is duty-bound to prevent
the criminal-militant nexus from using Bihar and
Uttar Pradesh as a base from which to threaten
the Constituent Assembly process in Nepal.
The citizens of Nepal go in for Constituent
Assembly elections on April 10, to put in place a
601-member House that has the dual responsibility
of drafting a new constitution and serving as
Parliament during the interim. The Constituent
Assembly is a necessary condition for the country
to achieve political stability, sustainable peace
and a return to pluralism, nine years after the
last general elections. In between, the
population has suffered the Maoist "people 217;s
war," a dirty reaction by the state, the
autocracy of Gyanendra, an unprecedented people's
movement that rejected royal autocracy and Maoist
violence, and heightened identity-based
assertions that continue to this day. The hope is
that the Constituent Assembly will define a
democratic constitution that will simultaneously
address the many conflicting and complementary
demands of marginalised minorities and, at long
last, provide stable politics as a platform for
economic progress.
India too seeks stability in this country that
runs along the northern frontier of Uttar Pradesh
and Bihar, and it has done its bit as an
interlocutor in the recent past. Having
facilitated the discussions in New Delhi in the
autumn of 2005 that brought the Maoists to an
understanding with the parliamentary parties, New
Delhi is now asked, specifically, to rein in
militants who have been engaged in bombings and
targeted killings in Nepal's Tarai plains while
taking refuge across the open border. These
militants - most importantly the one known as the
Janatantrik Mukti Morcha-Jwala Singh - hold the
ability to destabilise the country as it goes in
for elections.
Meanwhile, the Indian intelligentsia should be
alert to attempts by Hindutva forces, especially
political elements along the borderland, to force
their agenda on the Nepali people. This January,
L.K. Advani of the Bharatiya Janata Party
launched a blistering attack on the UPA's Nepal
policy and advocated a Hindu monarchy, while
exaggerating links between Nepal's Maoists and
Indian naxalites.
To be sure, there are more than enough extremist
threats to the polls from within Nepal. Having
come to open politics barely two years ago, the
Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) is capable of
widespread intimidation during its first
electoral exercise, to try to stave off
humiliation at the ballot box. The polls could
also be destabilised by a welter of violent
newborn groups. Many of these are receiving
encouragement, if not support, from the
royalists, who believe (correctly) that the
political parties will use the Constituent
Assembly to do away with the monarchy once and
for all.
While the Maoists, militants and
arch-conservatives within Nepal are to be tackled
domestically, it is the responsibility of the
Indian authorities to halt the ongoing activities
of the JTMM-JS, which over the past two years
have operated with impunity from Indian towns
such as Sitamarhi, Raxaul, Darbhanga and
Gorakhpur. The State governments in Patna and
Lucknow must not allow local politics to wreck
Nepal's return to normalcy. It must also insist
that the Madhesi militants lay down arms and talk
to Kathmandu, or at the very least submit to a
ceasefire. New Delhi has the clout, and should
put it to good use when so much is at stake.
Madhes rises
The mass upsurge of the People's Movement of
April 2006 sought peace and pluralism, and
mandated the writing of a new constitution to
redraw state-society relations. What is known as
the Madhes Movement of last winter was a
spontaneous uprising by the people of
Tarai-plains origin who have long felt excluded
amidst the highlander identification of the
nation-state. 'Madhesi' is an amorphous term
referring to caste categories of the eastern
Tarai in particular, but the movement represented
a historic demand of plains people for inclusion
in the national mainstream. And indeed, the mass
mobilisation of the Madhes Movement has changed
the face of Nepali society, and new political
forces have emerged to take advantage of the
space that has opened up.
Prime Minister Girija Prasad Koirala was unable
to countenance the identity-led nature of the
agitation in the Tarai, heretofore a docile vote
bank for his Nepali Congress party. He was
therefore slow in addressing the Madhesi demands,
which referred to recognition and compensation of
those killed during the previous year's
agitation, proportional representation in state
organs (including the army), changes in electoral
laws to enhance Madhesi participation, and so on.
As the government procrastinated, the demands
became more strident and even unrealistic,
including self-determination and the declaration
of the 500-by-20 mile Tarai plains as a single
province - "Ek Madhes, ek Pradesh."
Though riding a wave of anti-Kathmandu sentiment
across the Tarai, the most critical weakness of
the Madhesi leadership was perhaps that it tended
to represent the eastern-Tarai caste categories.
It would be difficult to maintain the pan-Tarai
momentum for long, because, like the country
taken as a whole, the plains too are divided by
language, faith, caste, class, religion,
indigenity and point of origin.
As time went on, it became clear that quite a few
among the Madhesi leadership were seeking
consortium with the royalists of Kathmandu, as
well as the Hindutva forces across the border.
Hindu-right organisations in Nepal have a limited
base, and for long drew their influence and power
by proximity to the royal palace. But combine the
Indian fundamentalists, sections of Madhesi
militants, royalist politicians and the criminal
gangs of Bihar and Uttar Pradesh acting in loose
concert, and you suddenly have quite a vicious
brew to upset the election cart.
At the Narayanhiti royal palace, Gyanendra seemed
energised by the turn of events, which included
strikes across the plains over the month of
February and what amounted to an economic
blockade of Kathmandu Valley by the Madhesi
activists. He sent emissaries to meet with
Hindutva and BJP stalwarts in India in a bid to
revive the flagging fortunes of the monarchy. For
a while, a couple of weeks ago, it suddenly
looked as if the Constituent Assembly would be
held hostage by the BJP-Congress rivalry within
India, with the former all set to loudly proclaim
the restoration of the Hindu monarchy in Nepal as
a political plank.
Fortunately, while the role of other Indian
entities and organisations cannot be vouched for,
at this stage the Foreign Ministry in South Block
played its card in favour of a pluralistic,
representative evolution in Nepal. By extending
the tenure of Indian Ambassador Shiv Shankar
Mukherjee until after the April elections, the
Manmohan Singh government also sent a message
committing its own agenda and standing to the
holding of elections on schedule in Nepal.
The polls having already been rescheduled twice
before, the polity would have been unable to
sustain another postponement, which would in all
likelihood have led to a right-wing, militarist
shift in government. With the Koirala government
becoming suddenly flexible in negotiations, the
Madhesi leadership known to favour a poll
postponement had no option but to call off the
agitations in the Tarai. By the end of February,
all the credible political forces had been
dragged and cajoled into election mode, and the
people of hill and plain alike were finally
certain of being able to exercise their franchise.
Towards April 10
The sovereign, elected Constituent Assembly is as
close to a magic wand as the Nepali people can
hope for. It is certainly one that they deserve,
to deliver them from the extreme instability,
political violence and the democracy deficit of
the last decade. The economy is currently at a
standstill, even while the northern and southern
neighbours grow at near double-digit rates. The
people of Nepal have not had a whiff of the
so-called peace dividend, nor any post-conflict
rehabilitation to speak of, almost two years
after the "people's war" ended.
For the 601-member House, the challenges of
constitution-writing, as well as government
formation, will be enormous. To begin with, the
legislators must rise above the extreme populism
that has gripped Nepali politics like a
malignancy over the last two years, and the lists
of party candidates are not inspiring. Besides,
the modalities of the Constituent Assembly's
functioning have not been discussed and there is
the possibility of great confusion and anarchy
immediately after the elections. That is clearly
an urgent matter to be discussed in the days
ahead, but for the moment the job is to protect
the elections from two quarters: those parties
inclined to participate but influence the polls
through fear and intimidation, and those forces
within and without who will try to disrupt the
elections through killings, kidnappings and
bombings.
Fortunately, we know the potential spoilers. The
Nepali intelligentsia and civil society must keep
an eye on the domestic forces - royalist
politicians, militants, criminals as well as the
unruly ranks of the CPN (Maoist) - to prevent an
election derailment. India's opinion-makers can
help Nepal in its return to normalcy by
watchdogging the Hindutva-inclined monarchists so
that they have no scope to interfere in the
affairs of a neighbour. The Indian government,
meanwhile, is duty-bound to prevent the
criminal-militant nexus from using Bihar and
Uttar Pradesh as a base from which to threaten
the Constituent Assembly process. A peaceful,
prosperous Nepal will reverberate in the Ganga
plains as well.
(Kanak Mani Dixit is a journalist and civil
rights activist in Kathmandu and editor of the
Himal Southasian monthly magazine.)
______
[3] Bangladesh:
(i)
The Guardian
February 12 2008
TRY TELLING BANGLADESHIS THAT ELECTIONS ARE BAD FOR THE POOR
by Polly Toynbee
The march of democracy - so impressive in the
past 50 years - must not stumble over
indifference and fears of violence
It was a moving sight: hundreds of people on rows
of long benches under canopies, enthusiastically
waiting to register to vote. Kaliakor is a
district of Bangladesh preparing for elections,
elections no one is entirely certain the military
government will call. Many fear a return to
democracy will bring political violence. Look
what elections did to Kenya - democracy is
dangerous. Many query whether imposing late
western systems on dirt-poor developing nations
is a good idea.
David Miliband, the foreign secretary, was
visiting Bangladesh and urging a safe return to
democracy. "Clean and effective government," he
called for here - as he had in Afghanistan two
days earlier - and in Pakistan, whose imminent
elections threaten yet more bloodshed.
Voting alone doesn't guarantee democracy.
Political violence, feudal patronage and
corruption may break out the day after hotly
contested elections. Leaders of both main
Bangladeshi parties - "the two ladies" - are
locked up on widely believed corruption charges.
Frankly, it needs the pen of an Evelyn Waugh to
do justice to the personal grudge war between
these two 67-year-olds, one a daughter and the
other a widow of founding heroes of the war of
independence, who refuse to speak or compromise
despite barely a sari's thickness of policy
difference between them.
Today, back in Oxford, Miliband gives a lecture
with a strong message on democracy in honour of
Aung San Suu Kyi, Burma's imprisoned leader. He
reaffirms the need to back democrats wherever
they are in a post-Iraq and China-influenced
world growing dangerously blase about democratic
values. Despite all the turmoil he has observed,
he declares that a universal democratic "civilian
surge" means "there are no regional or
continental values that are inhospitable to
democracy".
The march of democracy in the past 30 years makes
an impressive list: Europeans liberated in
Portugal, Spain and Greece; all of Latin America
(save Cuba) now democratic; the collapse of the
Soviet empire and authoritarian regimes in Asia,
from Indonesia and the Philippines to South Korea
and Taiwan, while Mandela's election seemed to
mark new hope in Africa. Now 60% of the world's
people elect their leaders. Put like that,
democracy looks unstoppable - only a matter of
time before the Middle East, the Gulf states and
China succumb.
Yet democracy has many enemies. China's and
Singapore's leaders claim rapid economic progress
needs nothing of the kind, pointing to less
successful poor countries struggling with
elections. Meanwhile the left is increasingly
suspicious of the word "freedom", hijacked by
neocons. Democracy at the point of a gun can look
like a fig-leaf excuse for enforcing neocolonial
western interests. If democracy is such a good
thing, why does the west prop up and arm
autocracies such as Saudi Arabia? Why kowtow so
abjectly to Chinese wealth? It was Ken
Livingstone who in 1987 - back in his red-hot
days - wrote a book called If Voting Changed
Anything, They'd Abolish It. (He's rightly rather
keen on Londoners getting out to vote now). On
the right there is always a business phalanx that
finds stable despotism good to do business with -
no problem trading with China or the Gulf.
Democracy struggles to take root in countries so
poor that the rice needed to keep a family alive
is willingly traded for a vote: patronage and
clans promising corrupt favours will trump
political ideals every time. Political scientists
observe that democratic governments rarely
survive in countries with per capita incomes of
less than $1,500 a year: Kenyans and Pakistanis
live on under $1,000. The same research finds
democracy rarely fails once per capita incomes
rise to $6,000 a year.
But no rules about human life are absolute: in
Bangladesh political passions run high, though
pockets may be empty; and people impressed on
Miliband time and again the importance of
elections. Look at India, whose per capita income
is still under $1,000, yet its democracy thrives
with a free press and independent judiciary.
Meanwhile Russia backslides on $8,000 a head.
There is another endemic problem with democracy -
the chasm between rhetoric and reality, between
promise and performance. Nothing again is ever as
exhilarating as the moment the Berlin Wall fell
or Mandela walked free. Afterwards disillusion
with the drudgery of everyday governance turns
things sour. The longer established a democracy,
the more secure and better run it is, then the
more cynical citizens become - less likely to
vote, more heartily despising their relatively
uncorrupt and efficient politicians. But telling
jaded Europeans to value their vote is no more
use than telling well-fed western children to eat
crusts that would be the envy of starving
Zimbabweans.
Democracy does need constant renewal. In Britain
neither of the main parties - not David Miliband
in this speech - are yet willing to reform the
profound dysfunctions of a system that lets the
next election revolve around the super-votes of
just 8,000 swing citizens in key marginals.
Though in a previous job Miliband was
forward-thinking in reviving the power and pride
of Britain's great cities, electoral reform is
still out of bounds for Labour.
China's People's Daily was quick to gloat over
the Kenyan fallout: "Western-style democracy
simply isn't suited to African conditions, but
rather carries the roots of disaster." Miliband's
Oxford lecture will be a resounding refutation of
this, and a restatement of universal values. But
he avoids Blairite hubris and triumphalism.
Although he is "unapologetic about a mission to
help democracy spread", he also stresses the
"need to be cautious about our capacity to change
the world", emphasising the power of
international institutions - the international
criminal court, the World Trade Organisation, the
EU, the UN - to build the culture of democracy.
"Democracy can and will take root in all
societies".
In the end, this argument always falls back on
Churchill: democracy is the least bad system yet
devised, which is hardly a ringing endorsement
with which to confront China or Saudi Arabia, the
left or the right. Waiting with trepidation for
what elections may unleash in Pakistan and
Bangladesh, or next year in Afghanistan, can make
orderly military rule look a better option than
Kenyan-style slaughter. But then ask why were so
many very poor, mostly illiterate, people queuing
under those canopies in Kaliakor. They were
driven by the universal desire to chose their own
rulers, however difficult and dangerous the road
to democracy.
o o o
(ii)
truthout.org
02 March 2008
MOEEN AS BANGLADESH'S MUSHARRAF
by J. Sri Raman
In our preoccupation with Pakistan and its
embattled president, many of us have almost
forgotten another South Asian country and another
general encountering another pro-democracy
movement. General Moeen U Ahmed, chief of the
Bangladesh armed forces, was in New Delhi for a
week since February 24 to remind India and the
region of his role as the other Pervez Musharraf.
Moeen was supposed to be here on a
"military-to-military" mission, and met Indian
counterpart Deepak Kapoor and External Affairs
Minister Pranab Mukherjee, reportedly to discuss
cooperation in defense. Moeen, however, did not
stop there.
It has been made public on his behalf that
that he pleaded with Prime Minister Manmohan
Singh's government to help make Bangladesh safe
for restored democracy by prevailing upon
Bangladesh's two most prominent contenders for
civilian power not to return to electoral
politics. The reported plea warrants the
presumption that the recent events in Pakistan
prompted Moeen's India visit, which was put off
last year on the officially cited ground of
floods in Bangladesh.
The Musharraf syndrome is manifestly obvious
here. As Pakistan's military ruler, its present
president of uncertain powers had for years tried
to prevent the country's two most prominent
aspirants for civilian power from returning home
and joining electoral politics. He was forced,
however, to allow the return of former Prime
Ministers Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif - and
even of the elections. Musharraf continues to be
engaged in a contained confrontation with Sharif
and Asif Ali Zardari - Bhutto's husband who is
playing her political role after her horrible end.
Moeen, of course, is no president, but he is
the power behind the throne in Bangladesh. The
army-backed government in Dhaka, too, tried to
exile former Prime Ministers Sheikh Hasina Wajed
and Begum Khaleda Zia, but failed. Moeen and his
men also tried to prevent the return of Hasina
from a visit abroad, and failed again under
international pressure. The leaders of the Awami
League (AL) and the Bangladesh National Party
(BNP), however, have been kept away from all
political activities through a slew of corruption
cases and long spells of under-trial detention.
Indications have been reported of Moeen's
possible plans to install himself eventually as
the president in the place of Fakruddin Ahmed, in
charge of the current caretaker regime. It is not
known, however, whether something like Pakistan's
National Reconciliation Order, freeing the two
leaders from corruption cases, will precede such
a move. But there is another respect, certainly,
in which Moeen is trying to do a Musharraf.
Musharraf may not really have profited by
splitting Sharif's Pakistan Muslim League (PML)
and forming a party named after the Quaid-e-Azam
(the title of Pakistan's founder Mohammed Ali
Jinnah.) The PML-Q has ended up a distant third,
after Bhutto's Pakistan People's Party (PPP) and
the PML-Nawaz, in the recent general election.
The example, however, has not deterred Moeen from
making a similar effort to give himself political
legitimacy in the Bangladesh general election
that the caretaker regime has promised to hold
before the year end.
Last year, the army-backed government in
Dhaka tried its utmost to push Nobel-winning
economist Mohmmad Yunus into politics and help
him form a party to end both main parties. The
attempt proved abortive, with Yunus seeing
through the cynical game. Efforts followed to
break the both the AL and the BNP. Not much
success has attended these efforts, and the
parties as a whole have remained loyal to the
harassed leaders with halos of their own.
Moeen and his men, however, have not given
up. According to informed observers, he would
like to be sure of a two-thirds majority in a new
parliament to ratify the 37 ordinances, through
which he has ruled the country for the last 13
months. Will two split-away parties give Moeen
what a single one could not provide Musharraf?
Few observers will answer that in the affirmative.
Moeen would appear to have no illusions about
what a real democracy can do for him. Even as far
back as last April, he caused more than a few
political ripples by declaring at a public
meeting that Bangladesh would not return to "an
elective democracy." Days ago, he elaborated on
the same theme. Asserting that the country had
tried "Westminster-type parliamentary democracy
for the last 15 years," but could not make it
work, he called for "a form of democracy that is
suitable for us."
The particular form of democracy he has in
mind may suit neither the major political parties
nor the people used to polls. Nothing, however,
would suit the army more, or the religious
parties and forces, particularly the
Jamaat-e-Islami, which, as a member of Begum
Zia's coalition regime, distinguished itself by
its divisive role in the Bangladesh society. The
poor electoral showing of the clerical parties in
Pakistan has not made their Bangladeshi
counterparts ardent partisans of ballot politics
either.
Moeen and the army-propped regime were able
to delay the democratic process for quite some
time with an anti-corruption campaign that
brought some of the political luminaries of the
past to law. The glamor of the campaign, however,
has worn thin, with its perceived excesses
hitting the country's economy and with graft in
the army and in select political circles
appearing to have been placed outside its
purview. the anti-corruption crusade has lost its
attraction all the more following the recent
steep spiral in the prices of rice, pulses and
other essential commodities.
All this has not been lost on Moeen and his
mandarins in the caretaker regime. They crushed a
rebellion of campus origin months ago, but they
know that popular discontent can find a dangerous
expression again. They have made certain moves to
win over the political opposition. This include
official initiatives to rehabilitate martyred
Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, liberator of Bangladesh
and father of Hasina, as the "Father of the
Nation," and Ziaur Rahman, former president and
husband of Begam Khaleda Zia as a "patriot,"
besides a promise to try the "war criminals of
1971." By most accounts, however, the moves
cannot succeed in stalling the pro-democracy
movement.
It is interesting to recall, in this context,
that Moeen himself was in Pakistan during the
Bangladesh Liberation War and joined and returned
to the country's armed forces as a "repatriated
officer." The past record itself may not go
against his current political ambitions. As in
Musharraf's case, however, a massive democratic
upsurge can do so.
A freelance journalist and a peace activist
in India, J. Sri Raman is the author of
"Flashpoint" (Common Courage Press, USA). He is a
regular contributor to Truthout.
______
[4]
PRESS NOTE: FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
05 APRIL 2008
INTERNATIONAL PEOPLE'S TRIBUNAL ON HUMAN RIGHTS
AND JUSTICE IN INDIAN-ADMINISTERED KASHMIR
www.kashmirprocess.org
Srinagar, 05 April 2008: The Public Commission on
Human Rights, a constituent of the Jammu Kashmir
Coalition of Civil Society, with the support of
other groups and individuals, announces the
INTERNATIONAL PEOPLE'S TRIBUNAL ON HUMAN RIGHTS
AND JUSTICE IN INDIAN-ADMINISTERED
KASHMIR.
Stakeholders in civil society across Indian-administered Kashmir state
that they are engulfed by local, regional, and
international political processes that bypass
them, withholding their right to participation
and decision-making. They note that Kashmir is a
flashpoint in conflicts between India and
Pakistan, while the systemic effects of existing
structures of governance on the lives of the
people of Kashmir are silenced, trivialized, or
rationalized as necessary. They note that the
fabric of militarization in Indian-administered
Kashmir profoundly affects their lives, while
undermining their capacity to intervene in the
regularized violence that results. Segments of
civil society across Kashmir ask to be a part of
the international community, to have the right
and resources to speak to the conditions of their
life. They state that their portrayal in media
and politics simplifies issues that are
intricate, and dehistoricizes them. They ask the
international community to participate in
rigorously and thoughtfully engaging their
experience of protracted isolation and inquire
into the diminishing of cultural and public life.
Timeframe:
The Tribunal will hold its investigations and hearings in 2008-2009.
The Tribunal Conveners are:
Dr. Angana Chatterji, Convener. Dr. Chatterji is
associate professor of anthropology at the
California Institute of Integral Studies.
Advocate Parvez Imroz, Convener. Advocate Imroz is a human rights
lawyer and founder of the Jammu and Kashmir Coalition of Civil Society.
Mr. Gautam Navlakha, Convener. Mr. Navlakha works with the Economic
and Political Weekly and is a human rights
defender. Mr. Zaheer-Ud-Din, Convener. Mr.
Zaheer-Ud-Din is chief editor of Daily Etalat
and vice president of Jammu and Kashmir Coalition
of Civil Society.
The Tribunal Legal Counsel and Liaison are:
Advocate Mihir Desai, Legal Counsel. Advocate Desai is practising in
the Mumbai High Court and the Supreme Court of India, and co-founder
of the Indian People's Tribunal.
Mr. Khurram Parvez, Liaison. Mr. Parvez is programme coordinator for
the Jammu and Kashmir Coalition of Civil Society.
Purpose and Mandate:
The Tribunal will inquire into the architecture
of military presence, militarization, and
governance in Indian-administered Kashmir, and
their subsequent and continued impact on civil
society, political
economy, infrastructure, development, local
government, media, bureaucracy, and the
judiciary. The Tribunal proposes to inquire into
the actions of the Indian state and its
institutions, as widely
established by human rights organizations, to
examine the structure of militaristic violence on
the part of state institutions, and examine
conditions of injustice therein.
Speaking to the need for an International
People's Tribunal in Kashmir, Advocate Parvez
Imroz stated: "This Tribunal goes beyond
condemnation. It initiates an international
process that looks into complex, systematic, and
institutionalized repression in order to engage
global civil society in investigating crimes
against humanity in Indian-administered Kashmir.
This process will inform struggles of Kashmiris
for human rights and justice."
In defining the urgency for an international
tribunal, Dr. Angana Chatterji stated: "Across
India, Kashmir reverberates in the imaginary as
an icon of unification whose continued possession
is a must for the assertion of nationalist
history and purpose. We call upon the
international community to join us in
investigating India's record in Kashmir, as
India, an emergent superpower, argues for a seat
on the United Nations Security Council. We seek
accountability under provisions of the
Constitution of Jammu and Kashmir, Constitution
of India, and International Law and Conventions,
to insist upon reparations, justice, and
self-determination."
Advocate Mihir Desai added: "The use of harsh
laws, lack of transparency, and virtual total
impunity and disregard for international law and
failure of local institutions cry out for an
independent people's tribunal to inquire into
the real situation in Kashmir. The Tribunal seeks
to unravel its impact and issues, so as to bring
out the true picture of Kashmir before the
international community."
Mr. Gautam Navlakha articulated: "As an Indian,
15 years of covering the war in Jammu and
Kashmir has convinced me that justice is not
available to the people who are aggrieved by the
war being perpetrated by the Government of India.
It is, therefore, necessary that one demystifies
the lived realities of the people in order that
the real issues of people's democratic right to
determine their destiny is brought out as sharply
as possible. It is therefore imperative to set
up a people's tribunal."
Realities in Kashmir, through neglect,
indifference, or complicity, continue to
reproduce cycles of violence that are gendered
and classed, religious and ethnic in their
effects, with ever increasing
social, political, economic, environmental, and
psychological consequences that affect private,
public, and everyday life. The Tribunal seeks to
examine charges of, and expand awareness and
understanding regarding, institutionalized
violence, social trauma, and human rights abuses,
and develop recommendations for justice,
reparations, and healing, in alliance with
ethical, peaceable grassroots processes and civil
society groups and individuals that dissent such
conditions. Mr. Zaheer-Ud-Din explained that:
"The Tribunal proposes to inquire into instances
of intense and regularized violence, such as
torture, gendered and sexualized violence
including rape, disablement, killings,
executions, enforced disappearances,
interrogations, detentions, and devastations by
landmines." Further, the Tribunal proposes to
inquire into if and how this endangers the
survival of the living, such as among Kashmir's
majority Muslim population, among women,
'half-widows', children, and other
disenfranchised groups, including the aged and
people with disabilities, and religious minority
groups, and the effects on culture and society at
large in Kashmir, and related spheres in Jammu
and Ladakh.
The Tribunal will investigate the ongoing and
systemic nature of violence, and the spiral of
brutality. The Tribunal will inquire into forms
of disempowered, reactive, and violent
resistances on the part of groups engaged in
militancy, and instances of outside intervention.
The Tribunal will inquire into the probable
intersections between the injustices perpetrated
by Indian military and paramilitary forces and
those enacted by militants, deepening and
continuing cycles of repression in the process.
Further, the Tribunal will inquire into the
activities of Hindu nationalist organizations.
The Tribunal will also inquire into forms of
resistance mounted by civil society, and the
corresponding demands for justice from various
segments in Indian-administered Kashmir,
including people's demand for the right to
self-determination, and its meanings.
Advocate Imroz stated: "The Tribunal will address
growing concerns with, and allegations of,
breakdowns in social, political, cultural,
religious, gendered, and economic life in
Indian-administered Kashmir, that affect history
and memory, spirit and future. In doing so, the
Tribunal seeks to increase concern, and ethical,
constructive, and creative participation of the
local and international community toward justice,
peace, and security." Mr. Navlakha clarified
that: "Power politics recommends 'Truth and
Reconciliation Commissions' that seek forgiveness
without justice. The Tribunal maintains that
there cannot be any reconciliation without
justice."
Advocate Desai clarified that: "The Tribunal will
make distinctions between the 'judicial' and
'extra-judicial' as drawn by the Indian military
and paramilitary forces and ask if and how the
structure of militarization furthers impunity,
and impacts legal and moral accountability on
part of the state."
Dr. Chatterji stated: "The Tribunal will
investigate the legal, political, and
militaristic apparatus through which 'states of
exception' have been established and are
continued in Indian-administered Kashmir. The
repression of self-determination struggles and
genocidal violence has left 70,000+ dead and
8,000+ disappeared since 1989. Building on its
mandate from the submissions of civil society,
this Tribunal calls on the international
community to recognize the juncture at which
functions and failures of governance intersect
with the culture of grief in Indian-administered
Kashmir."
Why Indian-administered Kashmir?
The Tribunal will limit its primary
investigations to Indian-administered Kashmir,
and selectively to Jammu and Ladakh, even as
issues in Pakistan-administered Kashmir and those
of outside groups that engage in militancy are
of political, social, and ethical significance.
Also, access to areas that have experienced
heightened military presence and violations in
Indian-administered Kashmir remain limited, and,
given the politics of borders, it is only
conceivable for organizations and individuals
working in Indian Kashmir to access areas
restricted to its current borders as defined by
the Line of Control.
Parameters:
The Tribunal will confine its investigation to
the period between November 2003, when the
Indo-Pak cease-fire began, and 2009, with
supporting investigations related to the period
between 1989-2003.
The Tribunal is constituted as a people's
collective, to undertake an inquiry into the
history of the present in Indian-administered
Kashmir through the participation of civil
society, to reflect on the past toward energizing
public space in the present, and for
determinations of the future. Based on the
conviction that people's voices must not be
silenced, this Tribunal will investigate existing
evidence, and hear statements and testimonials
through public processes that maintain
transparency. The Tribunal will solicit the
participation of survivors, those seeking
justice, local communities and groups, and
internal experts from Indian-administered
Kashmir, and from India and other places in South
Asia, and the international community. The
Tribunal will rely on the willingness of those
affected and others to testify about experiences,
events, and circumstances, and on the
participation of credible and competent persons,
and those not enacting political agendas. On
completing its work, the Tribunal will invite a
group of renowned public figures to constitute a
Council of Justice to deliberate on the
Tribunal's findings, and craft their statements
in response. The Tribunal's findings and
recommendations, and statements of the Council of
Justice will be presented at a public hearing in
Indian-administered Kashmir, and subsequently to
the international community.
Note:
The Tribunal is a non-funded and voluntary initiative.
Press Contacts:
Mr. Khurram Parvez, Tribunal Liaison
Mobile: 91.9419013553 (Srinagar); Office: 91.194.2482820 (Srinagar)
E-mail: khurramparvez at yahoo.com; kparvez at kashmirprocess.org
Dr. Angana Chatterji, Tribunal Convener
Mobile: 91.9906667238 (Srinagar)
Mobile: 001.415.640.4013 (United States); Office: 001.415.575.6119
(United States)
E-mail: achatterji at ciis.edu; Angana at aol.com; achatterji at kashmirprocess.org
Advocate Parvez Imroz, Tribunal Convener
Mobile: 91.9797221612 (Srinagar); Office: 91.194.2482820 (Srinagar)
E-mail: p_imroz at yahoo.co.in; pimroz at kashmirprocess.org
______
[5]
INDIA: ON THE RECENT ATTACK ON HISTORIANS BY HINDUTVA FUNDAMENTALISTS
RESPONSE TO SANGH OBJECTIONS ON AK RAMANUJAN'S HISTORY TEXT
Note prepared by the departmental council of the
department of history, University of Delhi,
in its meeting of 4 February 2008
[. . .]
http://communalism.blogspot.com/2008/02/response-to-sangh-objections-on-ak.html
o o o
AN EMAIL ACCOUNT OF VIOLENCE AND INTIMIDATION BY
HINDUTVA ACTIVISTS AGAINST DELHI'S HISTORIANS
Date: Mon, Feb 25, 2008 at 6:25 PM
Subject: Violence in the Department of History by ABVP activists
http://www.sacw.net/India_History/25Feb2008.html
o o o
SAHMAT'S STATEMENT RE ABVP'S ASSAULT ON THE
DEPARTMENT OF HISTORY, DELHI UNIVERSITY
[ . . .]
http://communalism.blogspot.com/2008/02/sahmat-statement-re-abvps-assault-on.html
o o o
HOW MANY RAMAYANAS? I AM FOR MANY RAMAYANAS
by DP Satish (February 27, 2008)
The late A K Ramanujan is arguably one of the
best internationally known Indian writers. The
Mysore born and educated Ramanujan taught at the
University of Chicago for decades. He introduced
India's oral folktales to the West through his
scholarly writings and translations. His writings
are so fascinating and you will be hooked to them.
Ramanujan died more than a decade ago in the
United States. He is now making news in the
national capital Delhi. Thanks to our ill
informed and self proclaimed custodians of
Hinduism and Hindu mythology : Outfits of the RSS
like ABVP and VHP. His writing ' Three Hundred
Ramayanas ' is embroiled in an ugly controversy
created by the members of the saffron brigade.
[. . .]
http://www.sacw.net/India_History/6march2008.html
______
[6]
Frontline
Volume 25 - Issue 03 :: Feb. 02-15, 2008
Books
WITNESS TO FOLLY
by A.G. Noorani
An account of the mess created by India and Pakistan in Siachen.
MYRA MACDONALD was Reuters correspondent in New
Delhi for four years, during a critical phase in
India's relations with Pakistan. No journalist
has travelled in the Siachen region, from both
sides of the India-Pakistan divide, as
extensively as she has. Her book is
straightforward reportage of what she saw with
her own eyes and of what she was told by
responsible military officials. It is enriched by
her colleague Pawel Kopczynski's stunning
photographs. The om ission of a map is a serious
flaw.
What we have is a good account based on extensive
interviews on how the two countries got into the
mess in 1984, their persistence in folly and how
they are paying for it. At 19,500 feet, Siachen
has the highest helipad in the world. "It cost,
so they told me, at least 30 million rupee
($740,000) a day to run the operation. It was a
war where the majority of casualties were claimed
by the weather and the terrain rather than by
enemy fire. The Indian Army spent 51,000 rupees
($1,260) just to clothe one soldier, not
including his boots, and 95 per cent of the
equipment used on Siachen was imported." On the
basis of the many different estimates she had
heard, "at least two or three thousand men must
have died altogether on both sides in the course
of the war, mostly in the early years. On the
Indian side alone, 12,000 were wounded, injured
or brought out sick, many of them physically or
psychologically scarred for life."
To what gain? India discovered Pakistan's growing
interest in Siachen and decided to forestall any
move by it by dropping men by helicopter to
occupy the passes on the Saltoro range on April
13, 1984. This was "Operation Meghdoot". Pakistan
counter-attacked and the war began. A ceasefire
followed 20 years later. But the diplomatic
impasse remains. Indira Gandhi and Zia-ul-Haq
could well have agreed to let the status quo
remain with neither side having a presence there.
But trust was in short supply, understandably.
India did not intend to have a permanent presence
there. Pakistan's reaction, predictable as it
was, left it with little choice. Lt. Gen. M.L.
Chibber, head of the Northern Command, is a fine
soldier with a balanced approach. Indira Gandhi
told him, "General, do it in a manner that it
does not escalate into an all-out war".
Lt. Gen. Jahan Dad Khan, head of Pakistan's 10
Corps, told the author that it was a question of
who reached the area first. Pakistan decided that
the earliest it could launch an operation was
early May. "By March, when I left, details were
still being worked out," he said. "The
instructions were very clear that the Commander
of the Northern Areas was to move in May. Air
cover would be there. Logistics support would be
there." But the Indian Army moved in the second
week of April. Pakistanis spotted Indian troops
for the first time on April 18.
Each side attributed to the author motives of a
bigger plan and painted the worst case scenario.
In June 1987, India seized control of the Quaid
Post from Pakistan. It was renamed Bana Top after
Bana Singh who led the attack. One Pakistani
Commander wrote in his personal diaries in 1989.
"The Indians have been stupid in coming into this
area; we have been sentimental idiots in trying
to grab the remaining peaks and thereafter throw
them out. Instead of wasting our meagre
resources, and banging our heads against ice
walls, we should fall back to road heads. In a
very short while, the Indians would look very
silly sitting on the inhospitable heights, not
seeing or facing any enemy. Weather and troop
morale will force them to pull back also."
Neither side can throw the other out from the
positions it holds, and holding existing
positions is not a viable option. The only
sensible course is for both to withdraw. In June
1989, they agreed to do just that. A few weeks
later, India insisted on authentication of
existing positions. On this issue the talks have
been deadlocked since.
An interesting report sheds light on the motives
underlying Pakistan's foolish venture into Kargil
in 1999. "According to one former Pakistani
commander, the targets were to be the Indian base
camp at the snout of the glacier, and the main
road leading from Srinagar to Leh as it ran up
the Line of Control between the towns of Dras and
Kargil. Only with such a master plan could the
'agonising slowness' and 'senseless inching
forward' of the Siachen war be halted, the
commander wrote at the time. 'It may not be
necessary to physically occupy both or either. It
would be quite sufficient to render it impossible
for the enemy to hold onto them and use them
freely,' he wrote in a handwritten draft of which
he gave me a copy on condition that I did not use
his name."
One hopes the next edition of this excellent book
will carry a good map to illustrate the areas it
mentions.
______
[7] Announcements:
ESSAYS ON FEDERALISM IN SRI LANKA
Edited by Rohan Edrisinha and Asanga Welikala
February 2008
A collection of essays which can be a useful
resource for those interested in the Federalism
debate in Sri Lanka.
The Centre for Policy Alternatives (CPA)
24/2, 28th Lane
Off Flower Road
Colombo 7
Sri Lanka
_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/
Buzz for secularism, on the dangers of fundamentalism(s), on
matters of peace and democratisation in South
Asia. SACW is an independent & non-profit
citizens wire service run since 1998 by South
Asia Citizens Web: www.sacw.net/
SACW archive is available at: http://insaf.net/pipermail/sacw_insaf.net/
DISCLAIMER: Opinions expressed in materials carried in the posts do not
necessarily reflect the views of SACW compilers.
More information about the SACW
mailing list