SACW | Oct. 13-15, 2007

[Harsh Kapoor]

South Asia Citizens Wire | October 13-15, 2007 | 
Dispatch No. 2460 - Year 10 running


[1] Pakistan:
   (i) Reconciling with the Ordinance (I A Rehman)
   (ii) Threat of radicalisation (Editorial, Dawn)
  (iii) God, cricket and pulled hamstrings (Nadeem F. Paracha)
  (iv) [A Documentary Film] Dinner With The 
President: A Nation's Journey (Robert Koehler)
[2] 'Secular' Nepal forgets Muslims on Eid (IANS report)
[3] India's Burma Policy: 
   (i) Failing the foreign policy test (Praful Bidwai)
   (ii) East With Bits Left Out - A more 
imaginative Myanmar policy would do India good 
(Sanjib Baruah)
   (iii) A conflict of interests (Mira Kamdar)
[4] India: Bureaucrazy -Why . . . the Official 
Secrets Act must be abolished (M Veerappa Moily)
[5] Announcements
(i) Sanjoy Ghose Media Fellowship -2007-08 for Women Journalists
(ii) Upcoming Telecast: In Search of Gandhi by 
Lalit Vachani (BBC World, 01:10 (GMT) 
(iii) Lecture: Sexual Politics: the limits of 
secularism, the time of coalition (London, 30 
October 2007)
(iv) Identities in a South Asian Context Workshop (Sheffield 16 November 2007)

______


[1]  Pakistan:

(i)

The News on Sunday
October 14, 2007

review
RECONCILING WITH THE ORDINANCE

The NRO is likely to offer reprieve to quite a 
few who do not merit this favour, and offers too 
little too late in several areas where the need 
for reform is clamant

by I A Rehman

All sections of society will readily agree that 
the accountability process in Pakistan has 
generally been exploited to persecute political 
opponents and that there is need not only to undo 
the wrongs caused to many political figures but 
also to devise a genuine, fair and effective 
accountability mechanism. There is also unanimity 
on the need for a national reconciliation that 
will enable all shades of opinion to join the 
crucial struggle for the nation's redemption.

Most people have a fair idea of what 
accountability and reconciliation mean. A glaring 
exception is the country's establishment that has 
once again betrayed its capacity for mischief by 
issuing the National Reconciliation Ordinance. 
Chaudhry Shujaat Husain is absolutely right in 
asserting that the ordinance is not what is 
claimed in its title and that it was conceived 
only as a device to divide the opposition. Once 
that objective had been secured the matter could 
be forgotten as diversion for a single night. 
Deception or cunning of a low variety is manifest 
on record.

Public attention has largely been concentrated on 
the last section of the ordinance (section 7), 
that adds a new provision to section 33 of the 
National Accountability Bureau Ordinance of 1999 
and which can be assailed on several grounds. It 
extends relief to a small number of  holders of 
public office against whom proceedings had begun 
before 12 October 1999, and whose cases have not 
yet concluded. Victims of political vendetta 
outside the category of holders of public office 
or those whose case have finally concluded and 
those who failed to challenge the decisions 
against them can expect no relief. One also 
notices a cynically perverse insinuation that 
political victimisation took place only prior to 
12 October, 1999, and that no such charge can be 
levelled against the regime that foisted itself 
on Pakistan on that date. This ordinance alone is 
sufficient to prove that selective victimisation 
of political opponents continues -- that is, if 
nobody can remember what happened at Islamabad 
airport barely a month ago. The regime that had 
made tall claims in 1999 about its resolve to 
give no quarter to plunderers of national wealth 
certainly has no face to show, but the biggest 
losers are the people of Pakistan.

An even more sinister provision of the ordinance 
is the amendment to sec 494 of the Code of 
Criminal Procedure. Under this amendment an 
undisclosed number of people (about 25,000 of 
them by some accounts) against whom criminal 
proceedings had begun during January 1,1986 to 
October 12, 1999 -- a period only a little less 
than 14 years, and who include some celebrated 
absconders and fugitives from justice, have been 
given tidings of discharge provided they can be 
owned up by their foster fathers in political 
organisations.

That withdrawal of cases against them will depend 
on recommendations by federal and provincial 
review boards is an eyewash. A retired judge who 
will head a review board could easily be outvoted 
by the other two members, both representatives of 
the executive. On the one hand, the beneficiaries 
will be surrogates of political groups, and the 
dubious credentials of quite a few of them have 
been more than once exposed, and on the other 
hand, they will be beholden to unscrupulous 
administrations for favours they may not have 
deserved. The effect of this replacement of 
judicial trial by non-judicial adjudication 
regardless of the serious offences attributed to 
the accused will not be miscarriage of justice 
alone, a number of dangerous and freshly 
emboldened men will be let loose on a population 
that has not enjoyed security of life and liberty 
for many a long year.

The outrageous implications of the amendments to 
the CrPC and the NAB law more than offset a 
couple of benign-looking provisions of the 
ordinance. The members of federal and provincial 
legislatures are promised protection against 
sudden arrest under NAB orders. They will still 
be liable to loss of liberty but only after the 
recommendations of committees of their peers have 
been taken into consideration.

The amendment to the Representation of the People 
Act, to the effect that the election result from 
a constituency will be announced by the Returning 
Officer as soon as the statements of poll count 
from the Presiding Officers are added up 
together, is welcome as far as it goes, which is 
not far enough. It amounts to a casual tinkering 
with the huge obstacles to free and fair 
elections in Pakistan. This step alone will not 
'make the election process more transparent,' as 
claimed in the preamble to the ordinance.

The ordinance will, therefore, fail to find 
favour with the conscious segments of the society 
on the ground that it offers reprieve to quite a 
few who do not merit this favour, and offers too 
little too late in several areas where the need 
for reform is clamant. Above all, the ordinance 
will be denounced for betraying its authors' lack 
of comprehension of the remands of national 
reconciliation. Anybody serious and sincere in 
moving towards reconciliation must address the 
alienation of the large populations in 
Balochistan and Sindh, the war on the tribal 
people, and the denial of the right to self-rule 
to the whole nation. Placation of a few who are 
in conflict with law only proves how dangerously 
narrow and brittle the regime's base is. To call 
this national reconciliation is a cruel joke. It 
is also unaffordable.

o o o

(ii)

Dawn
October 12, 2007

Editorial

THREAT OF RADICALISATION

THE setting up of a 'law and order' force is the 
latest from Maulana Fazlullah, the 
self-proclaimed, virtual ruler of Swat. The 
country-mullah has been emboldened to take this 
step because the government has been looking the 
other way all this time when he was busy 
broadcasting threats to the local people to abide 
by Shariah laws or face his wrath. It's been a 
step-by- step advance on the radical cleric's 
part, which amounts to more than just testing the 
waters. Next came the setting up of a summary 
trial court under Islamic law which Fazlullah 
himself heads at his village, Imam Dheri. 
Besides, vigilante volunteers are going around at 
his behest in Swat to enforce religious law. 
Attempts by extremists at blowing up a 
second-century BC Buddha rock carving, too, have 
gone unnoticed. Is it any wonder, then, that the 
mullah's henchmen, whom he calls his commandos, 
are now patrolling the area using a squad of some 
15 vehicles mounted with machineguns, to maintain 
'law and order' and to ensure smooth running of 
traffic? What's next on his agenda? Here's a 
full-throttle attempt at Talibanising society 
which is being allowed to go unchecked for 
unknown reasons.

The withering away of the state is no more a 
Marxian axiom in parts of Pakistan today; but the 
state has been withering for all the wrong 
reasons. There is no hope for a utopia emerging 
in the dangerous bargain. This march backward to 
the dark age brought about by the Taliban in 
Afghanistan just before 9/11 is now engulfing 
large parts of the Frontier province. While North 
and South Waziristan may be the extremists' 
outposts, huge tracts of settled areas such as 
the Peshawar-Kohat-Bannu-Tank belt and now Swat 
falling to home-grown Taliban rule is a serious 
cause for concern.

The shadow of the Lal Masjid operation in the 
heart of Islamabad, too, still lingers. It is far 
from over as far as the cousin-cleric of the 
slain firebrand Abdur Rashid Ghazi is concerned, 
who has been made the custodian of the mosque 
under Supreme Court directives. The rhetoric 
coming out of the place is as lethal and laced 
with threats as to remind one of Ghazi's 
intolerant ways of imposing Shariah. With 
parliamentary elections round the corner, the 
constitutional crisis over Gen Musharraf's 
eligibility for another term in office and the 
challenging in court of the national 
reconciliation ordinance hanging in the balance, 
there's a need to do more than just fire-fighting 
the threats posed to society by extremists. 
Ignoring the emerging radical threat will bring 
no bliss, much less order to the chaos spreading 
all around.


o o o

(iii)

Dawn
October 07, 2007

GOD, CRICKET AND PULLED HAMSTRINGS

by Nadeem F. Paracha


SO far Shaoib Malik's captaincy of the Pakistan 
cricket team has whiffed in like a breath of 
fresh air. Especially when compared with the 
ironically cramped and conservative style of his 
predecessor, Inzimamul Haq. I say ironic because 
as a batsman Inzi was fluent and liberally 
bordering on the flamboyant. So, was it the fear 
of losing that turned Inzi into a stuffy and 
lethargically conservative skipper?

Conventional wisdom would suggest, yes, fear was 
the overriding reason. But during and after the 
procedures that initiated Inzi's complete ouster 
from the team, insiders within the Pakistan 
Cricket Board (PCB) were also whispering about 
the effects of 'tableegh-isation' on the former 
skipper's personality. In the course of two years 
before the 2007 World Cup debacle, the PCB had 
already asked Inzimam to cool it a bit with his 
Islam thing, while some cricketers discreetly 
complained that they were being forced by Inzi to 
follow dictates according to the Tableeghi Jamaat.

A PCB official suggests that the PCB in this 
respect had been caught between the devil and the 
deep blue sea. Because (according to this 
official), like Inzimam, the PCB too saw the 
Islamisation of the cricket team as an effective 
way to mould the culture of the dressing room. 
The culture that was to be moulded was one built 
during the captaincies of Imran Khan, Javed 
Miandad and Wasim Akram. It was a culture of 
flamboyance and combativeness, but which, by the 
late '90s, had spiraled out of control, getting 
tainted by greed (match-fixing), political 
intrigue (captaincy battles involving Javed 
Miandad, Wasim Akran, Waqar Yunus and Aamir 
Sohail), and groupings.

A former PCB media adviser agrees with the theory 
that Inzimam actually used religion to control 
the volatile tendencies of the culture prevailing 
in the team. Apparently, the late coach Bob 
Woolmer had little problem with the team's 
re-born-Muslim status and his reasons were 
attached to what Inzimam was gaining from his 
Tableeghi regime, i.e. discipline and submission 
from the cricketers.

However, this discipline was not exactly based on 
a willful belief in the importance of 
professional order, but rather a grudgingly 
submitted fear gained from the players by playing 
the ever-useful Islamic card and a strict code of 
conduct and ethics based squarely on the 
Tableeghi Jammat ideals of Islam. Early this 
year, during a talk show hosted by former 
Pakistani cricket captain Rameez Raja, Inzimamul 
Haq, when asked what his message would be for the 
youth, he suggested that along with worldly 
knowledge, they should also get religious 
education.

This says two things. First of all, it suggests 
that ever since Inzimam's stint as captain, more 
and more Pakistani cricketers had started using 
the formulaic language used by Tableeghi Jamaat 
members. Secondly, and as some PCB officials and 
cricketers have already claimed, most Pakistani 
cricketers, if they had to be in the good books 
of the captain, had to tamely submit to his 
Tableegh regime in the dressing room.

Like Mushtaq Ahmed and Saeed Anwar before him, 
(and celebrities like Junaid Jamshed), Inzimam 
had willingly let himself be turned into a 
poster-boy for the large evangelist group who in 
the last many years has been accused by some 
quarters of preying on the insecurities of known 
personalities in the showbiz and cricketing 
circles. Last year, during the ICC Champions 
Trophy in India, Inzimam was taken to task by the 
Pakistan Cricket Board chairman for insisting on 
holding joint prayers with his team on the ground 
where they were taking a training session.

Can anyone imagine the Indian team praying to 
Ganesh or Hanuman on a Pakistani ground or an 
English team holding a mass at the Gaddafi 
Stadium? But then those teams know better because 
they come steeped in secular, professional 
backgrounds.

It is no secret that players like Shoaib Akhtar 
were an awkward anomaly in Inzimam's team. The 
reason behind Shoaib's falling out with both 
Inzimam and Bob Woolmer had certainly to do with 
things more than just pulled hamstrings and 
tantrums. Shoaib was said to be disgusted with 
the nature of Inzimam's manipulative, 
religion-driven ways of gaining loyalty from his 
players, and it is only natural that a 
personality like Shoaib was bound to feel 
isolated and persecuted in the morally 
self-righteous and judgmental make-up and psyche 
of the Inzimam-led Pakistani cricket team.

So when did it all begin? A veteran sports 
journalist suggests that the onus lies with the 
former Pakistani cricketer, Saeed Ahmed, whom 
Ahmed's former county cricket mate, Tony Graig, 
described as a "party animal" in the '70s. 
However, Ahmed suddenly saw the light in the 
early '90s, grew a beard and joined the Tableeghi 
Jammat.

He then started visiting the Pakistan team's 
dressing rooms during the matches in Sharjah in 
the late '90s, delivering impromptu lectures to 
various team members. The team management 
surprisingly tolerated him and he managed to hand 
over a few cassettes to a couple of cricketers. 
These tapes were of lectures given by the 
Tableeghi Jammat's most famous speakers.

The cricketers most impressed by these lectures 
were the bubbly leg-spinner, Mushtaq Ahmed, the 
innovative off-spinner, Saqlain Mushtaq, and 
stylish opening batsman, Saeed Anwar. By the 
start of 2003 World Cup, all three had become 
active members of the Jamaat. Waqar Yunas, who 
replaced Wasim Akram as captain, became a sort of 
a de-fecto member of the preaching squad (minus 
the beard) and is said to have actually 
encouraged the practice of cricketers being 
lectured by evangelists.

However, these lectures, sudden appearance of 
beards and cassettes did not help much as Waqar's 
team crashed out of the 2003 World Cup. The 
Tableeghi Jammat's recruiting agents made greater 
inroads into the team when after the 2003 World 
Cup debacle, the team saw a string of firings and 
Rashid Latif was named the new captain. Though a 
man of liberal outlook, he could not stop men 
like Saeed Anwar, Mushtaq Ahmed and Junaid 
Jamshed from looking to exercise greater 
influence on the team. Eventually, once Rashid 
was removed from captaincy, and replaced by 
Inzimam, the recruiters got their biggest fish in 
this respect: the burly skipper himself!

There is a very interesting photograph that 
appeared in the newspapers at the time. It showed 
Saeed Anwar, Mushtaq Ahmed and Junaid Jamshed 
leading Imran Khan, Inzimam and a couple of other 
cricketers at the famous annual gathering of the 
Tableeghi Jammat members in Raiwind. Even though 
they failed to get Imran Khan in their circle, 
Inzimamul Haq became an enthusiastic participant 
and a member.

After "converting" most of the regular players of 
the team, the only ones deciding not to toe the 
line in this respect were Shoaib Akhtar, Shahid 
Afridi and, of course, Danish Kaneria (who is 
Hindu). Even Yusuf Yuhanna, Christian, converted 
to Islam (and became Mohammad Yusuf). Even though 
he insisted that there was no pressure from 
Inzimam for him to change his faith, insiders and 
press reports suggested that much of Yusuf's own 
family members thought otherwise. By early 2006, 
Shahid Afridi too had become a member of 
Inzimam's religious clique, leaving only Shoaib 
Akhtar to face the music.

Inzimam's Raiwind regime may have turned the 
Pakistan cricket team into a (seemingly) 
well-knit unit, but its many critics accused the 
captain of operating at the expense of 
ostracising talent that refused to bend to the 
religious dictates of his regime. Many also 
believe that Inzi's religious zeal actually 
softened the team's innovative and competitive 
nature, a nature that was rigorously nourished 
and encouraged by the likes of former captains 
like Imran Khan, Javed Miandad and Wasim Akram.

The new attitude had left them looking and 
behaving more like cricketing ambassadors of the 
Tableeghi Jammat, with an on-field outlook that 
smacked of a lacklustre approach to competitive 
cricket. But what now? The PCB official I was 
talking to said that silently but surely, the 
culture of the team is being moulded again, 
making it more competitive and secular. He said 
the board had absolutely no problem in how any 
player wanted to conduct his religious business, 
but the sort of religious fanfare exhibited 
during Inzimam's reign as captain is being 
discouraged.

One can understand that it will take some time 
for the board to rectify the Tableeghi culture 
that was so systematically invested in the psyche 
of the team. This became apparent when after 
losing the Twenty20 World Cup final to India last 
month, Shoaib Malik apologised to "all Muslims of 
the world". Some observers considered it to be a 
somewhat racist comment, since there are 
Christians and Hindu Pakistanis as well who were 
supporting the team, and, of course, most Indian 
Muslims were rather happy that Pakistan lost!

"It will take time," says the PCB official. "The 
cricketers were encouraged to wear their 
religious beliefs on there sleeves, and they got 
used to it. But this will change, once the 
cricketers realise that one doesn't have to 
exhibit one's religious commitment to prove one's 
patriotism," he said.



o o o

(iv)

www.variety.com/
September 20, 2007

Toronto
DINNER WITH THE PRESIDENT: A NATION'S JOURNEY
  (Documentary -- Pakistan)

by Robert Koehler

A Vidhi Films presentation in association with 
ITVS Intl./ZDF/Arte. (International sales: Steps 
Intl., Copenhagen.) Produced by Sachithanandam 
Sathananthan. Executive producer, Sally Jo Fifer. 
Directed by Sabiha Sumar, Sachithanandam 
Sathananthan.

With: Sabiha Sumar, Pervez Musharraf.
Narrator: Sabiha Sumar.

As timely as the slap of the morning paper on the 
porch, Sabiha Sumar and Sachithanandam 
Sathananthan's "Dinner with the President: A 
Nation's Journey" only partly explores the 
pressing questions regarding Pakistan's future 
and the prospect of current unelected President 
Pervez Musharraf. Flawed but most telling for 
Western viewers as a specifically Pakistani view 
of Musharraf's political dilemmas and the nature 
of his support and opposition, hourlong doc 
should be rapidly snatched by North American and 
Euro news cablers, while Musharraf is in a 
potential power-sharing deal with former prez 
Benazir Bhutto.

Pic was made prior to Bhutto's touted 
re-emergence, but is told from narrator Sumar's 
personal and feminist p.o.v., which gives equal 
or more weight to women's rights than to matters 
of quelling Islamist terrorists in the nation's 
western frontier. Including a pleasant though 
unrevealing dinner session with Musharraf, Sumar 
mixes with young hipsters and old fundamentalists 
to draw picture of a country riven by huge 
ideological, cultural and gender divisions. Many 
agree, though, that Musharraf's brand of 
"democracy" is better than that of previous 
regimes, including Nawaz Sharif's, toppled in 
Musharraf's 1999 coup.

Camera (color, widescreen, DV), Claire Pijman, 
Peter Brugman; editors, Albert Elings, Eugenie 
Jansen, Calle Overweg. Reviewed at Toronto Film 
Festival (Real to Reel), Sept. 13, 2007. English, 
Urdu dialogue. Running time: 58 MIN.

[Contact Information]

http://www.itvs.org/international/filmmakers/dinnerwithpresident.html

http://vidhifilms.net/


______



[2]

Hindustan Times
14 October 2007

'SECULAR' NEPAL FORGETS MUSLIMS ON EID

Indo-Asian News Service
Kathmandu, October 14, 2007


More than a year after it abolished Hinduism as 
the state religion and declared itself secular, 
Nepal, once the world's only Hindu kingdom, still 
remains Hindu in its psyche, with the government 
on Sunday failing to extend greetings to Muslims 
on the occasion of Eid-ul-Fitr, one of the Muslim 
festivals.

As Muslims in the parts of sub-continent 
celebrated Eid on Sunday after a month's fasting, 
the Nepal Muslim Ittehad Sangh's petition to 
Prime Minister Girija Prasad Koirala to declare 
Eid a national holiday fell on deaf ears.

The secular government however had observed a 
public holiday on Friday to celebrate 
Ghatasthapana, worshipping a holy pitcher and 
kicking off the biggest Hindu festival in Nepal 
that lasts for nearly a fortnight.

Strangely, the prime minister's office had not 
issued any public message, extending greetings to 
the Muslim community.

It was the communists and royalists who rose to the occasion.

The second largest party in the ruling coalition, 
the Communist Party of Nepal-Unified Marxist 
Leninist (UML), greeted Muslims, wishing for 
peace and progress.

Madhav Kumar Nepal, chief of the party, hoped the 
country would soon be able to hold the stalled 
election and progress to a peaceful and 
prosperous federal republic.

Earlier this month, Maoist chief Prachanda had 
issued a statement, extending best wishes for Eid.

A former prime minister, Surya Bahadur Thapa, who 
was appointed by King Gyanendra in 2003, also 
extended his best wishes as chief of the Rastriya 
Janashakti Party, hoping for peace, happiness and 
prosperity.

However, there was no message from the office of 
the prime minister, who is now also the head of 
state.

Since this year, Koirala has been observing all 
the Hindu festivals, including recently offering 
worship to Nepal's living goddess, the Kumari, an 
incident that created a standoff between him and 
the embattled king with the crowds hailing the 
monarch and shouting slogans against the premier.

Last month, Nepal experienced one of the worst 
sectarian violence in its history when the murder 
of a powerful Muslim landlord in apilavastu 
triggered killings, arson and looting.

Hundreds of Muslims are said to have fled their 
homes following the incident, with many of them 
fleeing to India.

[. . .]

______


[3]  India - Burma:


(i)

FAILING THE FOREIGN POLICY TEST

by Praful Bidwai
6 October 2007

India's approach to the Myanmar problem speaks of 
the deep cynicism that passes for foreign policy 
'realism' in New Delhi.

IF the real test of the short-term success of a 
nation's foreign policy lies in its 
neighbourhood, rather than in distant lands or 
remote or rarefied international fora, then 
India's policy has been something of a failure in 
recent years - just when the country's global 
profile has undergone a sea change.

Nothing illustrates this better than New Delhi's 
policy somersaults over Nepal until it recognised 
the inevitability of the absolute monarchy's end. 
Only slightly less serious has been its failure 
to anticipate or influence major developments in 
Bangladesh and Sri Lanka and, more recently, to 
stand in solidarity with the movement for full 
democratisation in Pakistan.

However, these lapses pale into the shade when 
compared with India's reprehensively passive and 
callous posture towards the pro-democracy 
movement in Myanmar - the greatest such 
mobilisation since 1990 - which holds the 
potential to overthrow one of the most repressive 
and barbaric military regimes anywhere in the 
world.

What is the current "Burmese crisis" all about? 
Simply put, underlying it is popular disgust with 
an extraordinarily predatory regime, which has 
brutalised 47 million people with a huge 
490,000-strong army for decades, which has 
bankrupted a country endowed with magnificent 
natural resources, which routinely practises 
arbitrary detention, slave labour and torture, 
and which has had no compunctions about gunning 
down and "disappearing" dissidents.

The people of Myanmar have risen in revolt 
against the junta. It is the duty of the 
international community to support them and 
protect them against a lawless government which 
is accountable to nobody and shows no regard for 
the cares and concerns of the larger world. If 
human rights are inherent to flesh-and-blood 
people, then concern for them must be universal.

Only the most consummate practitioner of 
Machiavellian realpolitik or the diehard cynic 
with deadened sensibilities could remain unmoved 
by the sight of barefoot monks refusing alms 
offered by soldiers in protest against the ruling 
junta, or of the Army opening fire against a 
column of peaceful demonstrators. The scenario 
evocatively reminded the global public of the 
Gandhian legacy of India's great struggle against 
colonial rule - close to the Mahatma's birth 
anniversary.

Yet, just as Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and 
Congress president Sonia Gandhi were extolling 
the virtues of Gandhian non-violence, the new 
Chief of the Army Staff, Deepak Kapoor, spelt out 
his ground-level interpretation of India's 
approach towards Burma in his maiden press 
conference.

He said that the happenings are Myanmar's 
"internal affair" but "we have good relations" 
with its government and "we should maintain 
these". General Kapoor stressed that the support 
of the Myanmarse military is vital to the success 
of India's counter-insurgency operations in the 
northeastern region.

Ergo, as far as Myanmar is concerned, out go 
"romantic" notions such as democracy, human 
rights, and peaceful resolution of disputes, from 
which other things follow - including the 
injunction against violating the impunity of 
non-combatant civilians, and respect for 
international law and covenants on civil and 
political rights. In realpolitik, everything is 
par for the course, and nothing is forbidden, so 
long as it promotes "the national interest" (for 
example, counter-insurgency). It was especially 
deplorable that the Army Chief made this 
pronouncement bearing strong policy implications.

This represented an intrusion into the 
prerogative of the executive and was wholly out 
of order for a military commander. Yet, General 
Kapoor was following in the footsteps of his 
predecessor Gen. Joginder Jaswant Singh, who, 
too, was given to making expansive policy 
declarations, including one that vetoed a 
solution to the Siachen glacier issue with 
Pakistan.

Kapoor's statement may appear to be a crude 
version of the supposedly sophisticated, nuanced 
position of the Ministry of External Affairs. But 
it is not. It accurately reproduces the core of 
the Ministry's stand, minus a few platitudes such 
as "India hopes to see a peaceful, stable and 
prosperous Burma" and "a broad-based process of 
national reconciliation and political reform". 
The bottom line is the same. As an establishment 
journalist put it, in New Delhi's view, "a 
hundred thousand monks are hardly going to be 
able to overthrow the military regime".

Had the Ministry's approach been really different 
from the Army's, it would have summoned the 
Burmese Ambassador to India to the Foreign Office 
or issued a statement deploring the killing of 
innocent people in Myanmar without mincing words. 
It did nothing of the sort.

In fact, India did not even pull the considerable 
leverage it has over the Yangon regime to help 
fix the visit to Myanmar of United Nations 
Special Envoy Ibrahim Gambari, including getting 
him permission to fly to the new capital 
Naypyidaw, where he first met the acting Prime 
Minister, and after days of waiting, the top 
junta commander, Gen. Than Shwe. In fact, China 
pushed for this.

It is only when External Affairs Minister Pranab 
Mukherjee sensed the international mood on 
Myanmar during his October visit to New York that 
he suggested that Myanmar consider conducting an 
inquiry into the unconscionable use of force in 
Yangon and other cities.

In New York, Pranab Mukherjee stressed that 
India's "interests" lie in "a stable and peaceful 
periphery"- which is necessary "if India is to 
grow rapidly and transform itself". He was at 
pains to oppose economic sanctions against 
Myanmar. He said: "I do not subscribe to penal 
sanctions at all times. We should instead try to 
engage the country concerned in negotiationsŠ. 
Sanctions .. should be the last resort Šbecause 
[they are] counter-productive. Instead of 
correcting the errant rulers, they end in the 
suffering of innocent people."

This was a weak, pusillanimous, and conditional 
statement devoid of reference to principle or 
doctrine. It came after more than 40 (and 
according to one estimate, 200) protesters had 
been killed by the junta, and thousands detained. 
It repeated shop-worn cliches about the 
limitations of sanctions - in favour of 
"constructive engagement", a strategy first 
advocated by the West vis-À-vis Apartheid South 
Africa, where it manifestly failed.

What "constructive engagement" with Myanmar might 
mean was revealed by Union Petroleum Minister 
Murli Deora's visit to that country to discuss a 
gas deal, right at the height of the 
state-sponsored violence.

Pranab Mukherjee's "national interest" statement 
derives from the view that democracy or 
protection of the life or limb of Myanmarese 
civilians is not a worthy cause in and of itself. 
The double standards which contrast this with 
India's fervent rhetorical advocacy of democracy 
in the United States -led bodies like the Concert 
of Democracies are both rigorous and astounding.

India's stand on the Myanmarese question is 
neither spontaneous, nor ethically grounded, nor 
even driven by an internal process of policy 
deliberation. It is impelled largely by 
international pressure, spearheaded by the U.S. 
This does not speak of a proactive approach 
worthy of an emerging power with an independent 
foreign policy orientation.

This passivity marks our media too: In contrast 
to the international press, hardly any Indian 
journalist has filed reports from within Myanmar 
or from its borders.

India's position on Myanmar is determined by four 
parochial considerations: Securing Myanmar's help 
in fighting insurgencies in the northeastern 
region; exploiting Myanmar's natural gas 
reserves; containing China's influence in 
Myanmar; and promoting "stability" in India's 
"periphery", itself a derogatory term for our 
neighbourhood.

All four considerations are dubious. Myanmar has 
only extended limited, selective cooperation in 
preventing some northeastern groups from 
establishing camps on its soil. Prominent among 
them is the National Socialist Council of 
Nagaland (Khaplang), with whom Myanmar has a 
ceasefire agreement anyway.

But the Myanmarese military has at best taken 
token and desultory action against the United 
Liberation Front of Asom, the People's Liberation 
Army and the United National Liberation Front 
(UNLF) of Manipur. At any rate, the border region 
has never been fully "sanitised" of insurgents.

The larger point is that Myanmar has shrewdly 
played Chinese interests off against Indian 
interests, while milking both countries for 
military and economic assistance and holding out 
the lure of gas, teak and other natural 
resources. India has walked into this trap.

India's famed "interests" in Myanmar's gas 
warrant critical scrutiny and introspection, not 
celebration. It should embarrass us all that four 
Indian companies figure among the "Dirty 20" 
corporations implicated in the exploitation of 
Myanmar's gas reserves - at the expense of human 
rights violations and environmental destruction. 
Among them are the public sector ONGC Videsh Ltd 
and the Gas Authority of India Ltd.

The human rights and environmental consequences 
of these petroleum and gas companies' activities 
have been detailed at length by EarthRights 
International, the Shwe Gas Movement and the 
Arakan State Human Rights Commission. Put simply, 
they are horrifying.

The argument that India should invest in Myanmar 
and develop close relations with its military 
regime to counter Chinese influence is a non 
sequitur and hence unconvincing. A large country 
like India can and has to live with military 
relationships between some of its neighbours and 
other powers. India has done so successfully 
during periods of Pakistan's close military 
relations with the U. S. and China. This did not, 
and should not, generate a panic response. Such 
relationships are not a zero-sum game.

More important, those who demand that India must 
see itself as a countervailing force to China 
essentially advocate the launching of a new Asian 
Cold War. This can only have disastrous 
consequences for India's long-term security. An 
arms race with China - that too with a strong 
nuclear component - will sharply raise India's 
already bloated military expenditure. The 
economic burden will be massive. Once you are 
sucked into an arms race, you no longer make your 
own strategic decisions autonomously. They are 
made for you by your adversary.

Finally, promoting "stability", defined 
independently of regime legitimacy, is a recipe 
for freezing a situation of iniquity and 
oppression. Surely, India's long-term interests 
do not lie in a neighbourhood which has a series 
of "stable" but tyrannical regimes. We long 
deluded ourselves that Nepal's monarchy would 
guarantee "stability"- only to find the 
pro-democracy movement shattering that dangerous 
myth.

In the ultimate analysis, a foreign policy 
divorced from morality, or counterposed to it, 
cannot serve national, leave alone universal, 
purpose. In the past, although not consistently, 
India tried to marry the two. Jawaharlal Nehru's 
advocacy of non-alignment, decolonisation, peace, 
nuclear disarmament, and redressal of North-South 
inequalities was one such attempt. It gave India 
a much higher global stature than was warranted 
by its military or economic power. It also 
contributed to a better world.

Global Stature of The Past

In the mid- and late 1960s, too, India stood its 
ground in opposing the U.S.-led Vietnam War 
despite its dependence on Washington for 
financial aid, and worse, its "ship-to-mouth" 
existence in regard to wheat supplies. Similarly, 
India continued to support the anti-apartheid 
movement and the African National Congress (ANC) 
in the face of all kinds of economic and 
political arguments about losing its influence 
with the West. Ultimately, the ANC triumphed. 
India was proved right.

Again, India earned the respect of the world by 
awarding the 1993 Nehru Memorial Prize for 
International Understanding to Aung San Suu Kyi, 
three years after she had won 90 per cent of 
Parliament seats in an election and was arrested 
- to be detained ever since.

The pertinent point is, any broad-horizon foreign 
policy calculus must recognise that India has a 
plethora of options in any given situation. 
Indeed, these have multiplied with India's 
growing economic power. To imagine that they have 
shrunk - for example, to a zero-sum game in 
Myanmar vis-À-vis China - is to impose upon 
ourselves an artificial narrowing of our horizons.

This can only demean India and detract from her 
potential to contribute to making the world a 
better place. At the end of the day, just as 
India's domestic achievements will be measured by 
the world on the strength of her success in 
overcoming mass deprivation and building an 
inclusive society, her foreign policy success 
will be judged by her contribution to the larger 
world.


o o o

(ii)

The Telegraph
October 15, 2007

EAST WITH BITS LEFT OUT
- A more imaginative Myanmar policy would do India good
by Sanjib Baruah

Most countries do public diplomacy abroad. In its 
standard use, the term refers to cultural and 
educational programmes, radio and television 
broadcasts, and citizen exchanges to promote 
foreign policy goals. In recent years, it has 
come to include 'soft power' - the goodwill that 
a country has because of the influence of popular 
culture and its positive image among foreigners. 
The target of public diplomacy is usually foreign 
audiences.

India however, chooses to do public diplomacy at 
home. For the second time in less than four 
months, the external affairs minister, Pranab 
Mukherjee, visited the Northeast to explain the 
Look East policy. Both events were sponsored by 
the public diplomacy division of the ministry of 
external affairs. One can only welcome the 
belated discovery by the South Block of the value 
of the public discussions of foreign policy. But 
one wishes that these exercises were more about 
taking input from the ground, rather than about 
explaining policy from the top. From the 
perspective of India's multiple global audiences, 
there may be some risks in calling these 
exercises public diplomacy. Does our external 
affairs ministry treat the Northeast as India's 
'near abroad' or the 'far-east' within?

Mukherjee explained the promises that the Look 
East policy holds for northeastern India and how 
the priority given to its economic development 
fits into our foreign policy goals. The Planning 
Commission deputy chairman, Montek Singh 
Ahluwalia, was around as well. He said that the 
Northeast would see a massive upsurge in economic 
development over the next five years. Audiences 
in the Northeast, however, have grown a bit tired 
of the repetitious nature of what they have been 
hearing about the Look East policy. The reporter 
for The Telegraph pointed out that Mukherjee's 
speech in Guwahati was almost an exact 
reproduction of the speech he gave in Shillong 
four months earlier.

But the missing 800-pound gorilla from the 
Guwahati deliberations was the situation in 
neighbouring Myanmar. What are its implications 
for the future of the Look East policy? As fear 
grips Myanmar following the crackdown by the 
military junta, questions are being asked 
everywhere about the implications of the recent 
developments. What, for instance, does the 
crackdown on the Buddhist monasteries mean with 
reference to whatever residual legitimacy the 
military regime still has?

Since our Burma policy took a U-turn in the early 
Nineties, India has been betting on the military 
regime's durability. Thus, even though the 
decision of the army chief, Deepak Kapoor, to 
publicly articulate foreign policy goals raised 
some eyebrows, his statement calling the 
crackdown in Myanmar an "internal matter" was not 
out of line with official policy. Mukherjee has 
said, "It is up to the Burmese people to struggle 
for democracy, it is their issue." And the most 
scandalous of all was the presence of the 
petroleum minister, Murli Deora, in Myanmar to 
sign a deal for natural gas exploration when the 
crackdown was in full swing.

Our foreign policymakers like to describe our 
Myanmar policy as being premised on realism. The 
concept is subject to much criticism in the 
academic literature on international relations. 
Realism can easily be an excuse for lazy 
thinking: letting some supposedly objective 
national interests get the upper hand in shaping 
foreign policy.

The sudden end of the Cold War in 1989 spelt the 
failure of realism to explain some of the new 
forces that were transforming the world. Among 
these emerging forms of more globalized political 
activism are those that have been further 
energized in recent years by the internet, the 
mobile phone and the proliferation of 24-hour 
news channels.

The impact of some of these forces is apparent in 
the pressures on Myanmar and on many other 
governments - including India - vis-à-vis their 
Myanmar policy. In the past few days, India has 
had to modify its initial stance in response to 
these pressures. It voted for the European 
Union-sponsored resolution at the United Nations 
Human Rights Council condemning the Myanmarese 
government for its violent repression of peaceful 
demonstrations. The council has also approved a 
resolution calling for an independent 
investigation of the human rights situation in 
Myanmar.

Myanmar itself has responded to these pressures 
by clamping down on the internet, the mobile 
phone network and by taking steps to stop the 
flow of news and pictures from the country.

Recently, China's sensitivity to world public 
opinion has been all too apparent. Even on 
Myanmar, unlike India, China did not take a 
strict "internal matter" line, but opted for 
behind-the-scenes diplomacy. With the Beijing 
Olympics on the horizon, China does not want to 
be seen as being closely associated with 
unpopular, repressive regimes.

After initial resistance, it began putting 
pressure on Sudan to accept a UN peacekeeping 
force in Darfur. Activists have warned that 
Beijing risks hosting the "Genocide Olympics". 
While no one expects Beijing to become an 
advocate for democracy in Myanmar, there is 
little doubt that its Myanmar policy reflects 
sensitivity to global public opinion and the 
importance of soft power.

China is not alone in this matter. Unlike the 
early years of the Association of Southeast Asian 
Nations, when there was a reluctance to intervene 
in the internal affairs of member states, 
political liberalization in countries like 
Indonesia and Philippines, and political activism 
in Thailand and Malaysia are leading it towards 
siding with the forces for change in Myanmar. 
Japan's Myanmar policy has also changed 
significantly. Even Singapore has said that it is 
"deeply troubled" by the crisis in Myanmar.

India may be the laggard in responding to this 
new era of global activism. Indian foreign 
policy- makers had discovered realism rather 
late. It is understandable that countering 
Chinese influence, and hoping that Myanmar (and 
Bangladesh) would extend to our security 
establishment the kind of help that Bhutan 
provided in 2003 to eliminate Northeastern rebel 
groups would be major considerations in India's 
Myanmar policy. But shouldn't we be worried that 
India's national interest defined in that way - 
and often articulated by active or retired 
military generals - requires the presence of 
non-democratic regimes in the entire 
neighbourhood?

Rather than betting on the generals' survival for 
much longer, it is time for India to take a 
long-term view, draw lessons from its isolation 
on Myanmar, and rethink its Myanmar policy. It is 
in a good position to take the leadership in a 
global initiative to bring about a political 
transition in Myanmar. That would enable India to 
side with the forces of Myanmar's future. In 
another era, when Burma was a province of India 
and the separation of Burma from British colonial 
India was debated, the Buddhist monks of Burma 
took a strong pro-India position. Writing from 
Calcutta in 1931, Ottama Bhikkhu of Burma 
supported a federal scheme tying India with Burma 
that had Gandhi's blessings. None of Burma's 
traditions, he said, "hark back to China, all 
hark back to India". He pointed to Burma's 
historical connection with India by sea and land 
dating back to "the earliest times". Madras and 
Bengal, he said, "supplied dynasties of Burmese 
kings, priests and peasants". The Buddha gave 
Burma its religion and "Indian architects their 
style of architecture." Contrasting this with the 
relative absence of cultural influence from 
China, he said, even though China is near Burma, 
its "interest in Burma seems to have been limited 
to these trade-routes, for traces of her 
influence are hard to find".

No other country has more of a reservoir of soft 
power assets in Myanmar than India. Today, the 
democracy movement there is led by a woman who 
once lived in India, and is the author of a book 
called Burma and India: Some Aspects of 
Intellectual Life under Colonialism.

We should not squander these soft power resources 
by letting our obsession with economic growth and 
energy security and our security establishment's 
inclination to put counter-insurgency ahead of 
conflict resolution stand in the way of a more 
imaginative Myanmar policy.

The author is at the Centre for Policy Research, 
New Delhi, and Bard College, New York

o o o

(iii)

The Guardian
October 14, 2007

A CONFLICT OF INTERESTS

If the US and the EU want India to act according 
to its moral values and not its national 
interests in Burma, they had better do the same.

by Mira Kamdar

The world has been horrified by graphic images of 
the latest crackdown by Burma's military junta. 
But the bullets and clubs unleashed on Buddhist 
monks have worked. The monks have retreated, and 
an eerie normalcy has returned to Yangon 
(Rangoon), Burma's principal city and former 
capital.

That crackdown continues under cover of darkness. 
When the sun sets in Burma, fear rises. Everyone 
listens half awake for the dreaded knock on the 
door. Any night, the military's agents can come 
for you, take you away, and make sure you are 
never heard from again.

In recent nights, the junta's henchmen have burst 
into monasteries, lined up sleepy monks, and 
smashed their shaved heads against the walls, 
spattering them with blood. Scores of others, 
perhaps hundreds, have been carted off for 
interrogation, torture, or execution. The 
nighttime assault on a United Nations employee 
and her family made international news, but 
hundreds of less well-connected Burmese have been 
similarly abused.

For 45 years, Burma's people have been subjected 
to the junta's reign of terror. My father was 
born in Rangoon long before the 1962 coup that 
brought the current regime to power. Afterwards, 
many of my relatives, prosperous Indian merchants 
who had been settled in Burma for generations, 
abandoned homes and businesses in order to save 
their skins as chaos enveloped the city, later 
renamed Yangon.

A relative who now lives in Bangkok, but who 
returned part-time to Yangon in response to 
overtures from Burma's cash-starved rulers, 
recalled those days: "We lived through hell. We 
never knew when we woke up each morning what 
would happen. People were being denounced left 
and right. They could just come and take you away 
and take everything away from you." Those who 
couldn't leave Burma, or didn't want to, have 
lived with this fear ever since.

The United States and Europe have issued strong 
statements condemning the crackdown and calling 
upon Burma's neighbours, especially India and 
China, to exert their influence on the regime. 
The response from both has been muted (as it has 
from Thailand, which also has strong economic 
ties with Burma).

China balks at interfering in the "internal 
affairs" of a neighbour from whom it gets 
precious natural gas and potential access to the 
sea. India, which "normalised" bilateral 
relations a few years ago, is reluctant to 
alienate Burma's military, with which it has 
worked closely to counter rebels in India's 
northeast who had been using the common border to 
tactical advantage. To this end, India has 
provided aid, including tanks and training, to 
Burma's military.

But the main reason for India's good relations 
with Burma's ruling thugs is the country's vast 
and still largely unexploited energy reserves, 
which India desperately needs to fuel its 
economic boom. India has invested $150m in a gas 
exploration deal off the Arakan coast of Burma, 
and India's state-owned Oil and Natural Gas 
Corporation and Gas Authority of India Ltd have 
taken a 30% stake in two offshore gas fields in 
direct competition with PetroChina, which has 
also been given a stake.

India and China are simply doing what the US and 
European countries have done for so long: trump 
rhetoric about democracy and human rights with 
policies that serve their strategic and energy 
security interests. US relations with Pakistan 
and Saudi Arabia are two examples, and America's 
Chevron and France's Total, two of the world's 
oil giants, continue to do a brisk business in 
Burma, thanks to loopholes in the sanctions.

But the rise of India and China means that the 
time-tested posture of western democracies toward 
emerging states to "do as we say, not as we do" 
will become less tenable. If the EU and the US 
want democratic India to act according to its 
stated moral values and not its vital national 
interests when these appear to conflict, they had 
better be prepared to do the same.

Feeling the heat, including threats from some US 
senators to link America's nuclear deal with 
India to its actions in Burma, India has 
announced that it is asking for the release of 
Burmese democratic opposition leader and Nobel 
prize winner Aung San Suu Kyi from house arrest. 
But the credibility of all democratic regimes, 
not just India's, is at stake in what unfolds in 
Burma.

In cooperation with Project Syndicate/Asia Society, 2007.

______


[4]


Indian Express
October 09, 2007

BUREAUCRAZY
M Veerappa Moily

Why we recommended that the Official Secrets Act must be abolished


  The recent raids by the Central Bureau of 
Investigation on the house of a retired officer 
of the Research & Analyses Wing (RAW) for alleged 
violations of the Official Secrets Act (OSA) have 
ignited a public debate on the role of this act 
in preventing greater openness and transparency 
in government. The OSA, enacted by the British, 
regulates all matters relating to secrecy and 
confidentiality in government. It mainly provides 
a statutory framework for dealing with threats to 
the unity and integrity of the nation by way of 
espionage, sedition and other covert acts against 
the nation. Despite its colonial lineage, the act 
has been kept operational after Independence on 
grounds of national security.

In its first report, the Second Administrative 
Reforms Commission (ARC) headed by me had 
undertaken a full review of this act in the 
context of the Right to Information Act in a bid 
to reconcile the felt need for transparency in 
government with the imperatives of national 
security. It would be illuminating and opportune 
at this juncture to retrace the basis of our 
eventual recommendation in that report to abolish 
the OSA.

How to deal with so-called 'official secrets' is 
perhaps the most contentious issue in the 
implementation of the RTI Act. In a democracy, 
people are sovereign and the elected government 
and its functionaries are public servants 
accountable to the citizens. Transparency should 
therefore pervade all aspects of governance. At 
the same time, it has to be recognised that 
public interest is best served if certain 
sensitive matters affecting national security are 
kept out of the public domain. The RTA Act treads 
this fine balance - for example, by giving people 
the unhindered right to know the decisions of the 
cabinet and the reasons for these, but not access 
to the actual discussions that may occur in the 
cabinet. The act explicitly recognises these 
confidentiality requirements in matters of state 
and Section 8 of the act exempts all such matters 
from disclosure.

In an unequal and elitist society where public 
officials wield enormous powers, the OSA has 
engendered a climate of secrecy wherein 
confidentiality becomes the norm and disclosure 
the exception. Section 5 of the OSA was intended 
to deal with potential breaches of national 
security but the clumsy wording of the section 
has converted it into an omnibus provision 
reducing practically every official data and 
transaction into a confidential matter. This 
tendency was accentuated by the Civil Service 
Conduct Rules 1964, which prohibit communication 
of an official document to anyone without 
authorisation.

The RTI Act has a clause: "Sec. 8(2): 
Notwithstanding anything in the Official Secrets 
Act, 1923 nor any of the exemptions permissible 
in accordance with sub-section (1), a public 
authority may allow access to information, if 
public interest in disclosure outweighs the harm 
to the protected interests." This provision 
overrides the OSA and allows disclosure of 
information even where there is a clash with the 
exemption provisions of Sec. 8(1) of the RTI Act. 
In other words, the OSA would not come in the way 
of disclosure of information if it is otherwise 
permissible under the RTI Act. Nonetheless, the 
OSA along with other rules and instructions still 
creates a climate of secrecy and paranoia in 
respect of all official matters even where these 
may have nothing to do with national security, 
which is the rationale for the OSA.

Section 5 of the OSA lays down that any person 
having information about a prohibited place, or 
such information which may help an enemy state, 
or which has been entrusted to him in confidence, 
or which he has obtained owing to his official 
position, commits an offence if (s)he 
communicates it to an unauthorised person, uses 
it in a manner prejudicial to the interests of 
the state, retains it when (s)he has no right to 
do so, or fails to take reasonable care of such 
information. Any kind of information is covered 
by this section if it is classified as secret. 
The word 'secret' and the phrase 'official 
secrets' have not been defined in the act. 
Therefore, public servants have the discretion to 
classify anything as secret.

The Supreme Court in Sama Alana Abdulla vs State 
of Gujarat (1996) held: (a) that the word 
'secret' in clause (c) of sub-section (1) of 
Section 3 qualified official code or password and 
not any sketch, plan, model, article or note or 
other document or information and (b) when the 
accused was found in conscious possession of the 
material (map in that case) and no plausible 
explanation has been given for its possession, it 
has to be presumed as required by Section 3(2) of 
the act that the same was obtained or collected 
by the appellant for a purpose prejudicial to the 
safety or interests of the state.

This implies that a sketch, plan, model, article, 
note or document need not necessarily be secret 
in order to be covered by the act, provided it is 
classified as an official secret. Consequently, 
even information which does not have a bearing on 
national security is not to be disclosed if the 
public servant obtained or has access to it by 
virtue of holding office. Such overly harsh and 
sweeping provisions help create a Kafkaesque 
atmosphere of secrecy about even trifling matters 
as shown by the travails of the former RAW 
officer whose criticism of the procurement 
practices in his former organisation have been 
taken to be a breach of the OSA. His revelations 
may be considered as whistle-blowing by some 
while his former colleagues may consider them to 
be more a case of washing dirty linen in public. 
But how such allegations can be considered a 
breach of national security is difficult to 
fathom.

The writer, a former chief minister of Karnataka, 
is chairman of the Second Administrative Reforms 
Commission

______


[5]  ANNOUNCEMENTS:

(i)

SANJOY GHOSE MEDIA FELLOWSHIP -2007-08 FOR WOMEN JOURNALISTS

Charkha Development Communication Network, an NGO 
working to empower rural communities through 
communication, has announced the "Sanjoy Ghose 
Media Fellowship -2007-08 for Women Journalists" 
with the objective of highlighting perspectives 
of women in areas of conflict through the media.

This arises from the basic premise that in an 
area of conflict where development itself stands 
compromised, often the perspectives of women are 
not expressed nor do they form part of public 
opinion. Being key players and playing 
multifarious roles within their homes and in 
society, these reflect alternate viewpoints on a 
host of issues and add  value in dealing with the 
crisis  that people have faced for nearly two 
decades.

Charkha wants to encourage writings by women in 
the region to bring out these insights.  Through 
its Feature Services in Hindi, English and Urdu, 
the writings will be disseminated through 
national and regional media to reach a vast 
readership across the country.

The Fellowship is open to all women writers and 
journalists residing in Jammu & Kashmir between 
the ages of 25-45 years. Applications are invited 
in Hindi, English and Urdu. There will be 3 
Fellowships for six months with a total value of 
Rs.12, 000/-, each and will be selected by a Jury 
of eminent people in the media and academia both 
in J&K and from the national mainstream. Those 
who have already received the Sanjoy Ghose 
Fellowship are not eligible.  The Fellowships 
will be awarded in New Delhi on 7 December 2007 
to mark the birthday of the founder of Charkha, 
social activist, Sanjoy Ghose.

Further details are available on the website:
www.charkha.org.  The applications should be sent by post to:


The President
Charkha Development Communication Network
G-15/11-12 Malviya Nagar, New Delhi 110 017

Telefax:  011-26680816/26680688
E-mail: charkha at bol.net.in 
The last date of receiving applications is 2 Nov 2007.



Sujata Raghavan
Programme Coordinator
Mobile no: +91-9811217054

____

(ii)

"IN SEARCH OF GANDHI" (52 MIN.) IS SCREENING ON BBC WORLD.

US/CANADA SCREENING TIMES

   Monday October 15, 2007
   01:10 (GMT)        In Search of Gandhi   BBC World*

INDIA SCREENING TIMES

Monday October 15, 2007
01:10 (GMT)        In Search of Gandhi   BBC World*

Synopsis:

In the early decades of the twentieth century, 
Mahatma Gandhi's legacy of satyagraha inspired a 
mass movement of millions of Indians to rise up 
against the British colonial state and 
successfully agitate for the establishment of a 
democratic and free India. But what kind of a 
democracy does India have today?

In road-movie style, the film crew travels down 
the famous trail of Gandhi's salt march, the 
remarkable mass campaign that galvanized ordinary 
Indians to join the non-violent struggle for 
democracy and freedom in 1930. Stopping at the 
same villages and cities where Gandhi and his 
followers had raised their call for independence, 
the film documents the stories of ordinary 
citizens in India today. Although inspired by a 
historical event, In Search of Gandhi is not a 
journey back in time. Instead it is a search for 
the present and future of democracy in India.

Main Credits:

Camera: Mrinal Desai
Sound: Anita Kushwaha
Editing: Menno Boerema
Executive Producer: Iikka Vehkalahti
Produced by Don Edkins
Directed by Lalit Vachani

A Wide Eye Film (2007) for Steps International

For information on the Democracy project, see:
http://www.whydemocracy.net


_____


(iii)

  British Journal of Sociology 2007 public lecture

SEXUAL POLITICS: THE LIMITS OF SECULARISM, THE TIME OF COALITION

Date: Tuesday 30 October 2007
Time: 6.30-8pm
Venue: Old Theatre, Old Building [London School of Economics]
Speaker: Professor Judith Butler
Discussant: Professor Chetan Bhatt
Chair: Dr Suki Ali

This lecture considers the conditions for 
coalition that might exist between religious and 
sexual minorities through focusing on 
differential forms of state coercion. Several 
arguments have emerged in Europe and elsewhere, 
claiming that feminism and progressive sexual 
politics are threatened by new religious 
communities and the effects of Islam in 
particular and base their views on libertarian 
principles (feminism and progressive sexual 
politics rely on increasingly robust conceptions 
of personal liberty) and on criticisms of 
multiculturalism (cast as a relativist enterprise 
that is unable to ground strong normative 
claims). Such arguments tend to rely on 
conceptions of sexual or gender freedom which 
presume certain conceptions of secular progress 
and to forget or dismiss conceptions of sexual 
politics that are bound to anti-racist struggle. 
Without denying that clear tensions exist between 
religious traditions that condemn and forbid 
homosexuality and progressive sexual movements 
that tend to promote exclusionary conceptions of 
the secular, the lecture focuses on the 
importance of conceptions of cultural 
translation, antagonism, and the critique of 
state coercion to consider what 'critical 
coalition' might mean for religious and sexual 
minorities

Judith Butler is Maxine Elliot Professor at the 
University of California, Berkeley. Chetan Bhatt 
is a professor in the Department of Sociology at 
Goldsmiths.

This event is free and open to all with no ticket 
required. Entry is on a first come, first served 
basis. For more information, email 
events at lse.ac.uk or call 020 7955 6043.

---

(iv)

IDENTITIES IN A SOUTH ASIAN CONTEXT WORKSHOP

Location:

ICOSS - 219 Portobello, Sheffield, S1 4DP

Date:

Friday 16th November 2007
Workshop theme

The currency of the word `identity´ has never 
been more important in South Asia. In an era of 
uneven cosmopolitan hypermobility and neo-liberal 
globalisation, the tensions between the 
particular and the global, the religious and the 
secular, and the state and the nation are acutely 
felt within disparate South Asian societies. This 
one day workshop brings together international 
scholars working on South Asia and its diaspora 
at all career levels. Its aim is to push at 
understandings of how and why `identity´, and its 
continuing production across different registers 
and through different historical, aesthetic and 
political formations, remains such a potent 
signifier in South Asia, feeding social, 
political and cultural conflict in both domestic 
and international spheres. The workshop seeks to 
interrogate some of the different axes through 
which identities, including gender, caste, 
community and religion, continue to coagulate in 
a South Asian context and shape public and 
private spheres. The workshop also looks beyond 
the reification of `identity´ in South Asia by 
pushing at how apparently essential and material 
senses of self, other, sameness and difference 
are in fact historical, relational, heterogeneous 
and dynamic productions. In particular the 
workshop aims to combine the insights of 
different disciplines in the Arts and Humanities 
and Social Sciences, in explorations of South 
Asian `identities´.

The event is part of the South Asian Studies in 
the North (SASIN) network which seeks to create a 
high quality research network of scholars working 
on South Asia in the north of England. The 
universities of Sheffield, Lancaster, UNCLAN, 
Manchester, Leeds and York are involved with this 
network. Previous events have been held in Leeds 
and Manchester.

SASIN Leeds Workshop February 2007

This workshop is being co-organised by Dr 
Katharine Adeney from the Department of Politics, 
Dr Tariq Jazeel from the Department of Geography, 
Dr Alistair McMillan from the Department of 
Politics, Dr Glyn Williams from the Department of 
Town and Regional Planning and Dr Ben Zachariah 
from the Department of History. As well as 
forming part of the CIPR´s identity research 
strand, this workshop is supported by the 
University of Sheffield´s Social Science Research 
Division and Humanities Research Division, and 
will form part of the WUN Seminar Series on South 
Asia.
Keynote speaker

Professor Shail Mayaram

Shail Mayaram is Professor and Senior Fellow at 
the Centre for the Study of Developing Societies, 
Delhi. Her writing has been on state formation, 
subalternity and marginality, philosophy of 
history, multiculturalism and Muslim identities, 
religious conversion and transnational religious 
civil society, spirit possession and shamanism, 
oral epic and narrative traditions and gender and 
governance. Her most recent writing is on the 
categories of caste and tribe, the nature of 
caste formation and the question of backwardness.

She has been coordinating a project on 
cosmopolitanism and the city. The studies it has 
undertaken by several eminent scholars are now 
part of a volume titled, The Other Global City: 
Living Together in Asia which investigates 
inter-ethnic relations in the urban contexts of 
Bukhara, Beirut, Cairo, Istanbul, Dacca, Delhi, 
Lahore, Lhasa, Singapore, Kuala Lumpur and Tokyo. 
She is currently working on a book project 
titled, Nationalism in the time of Imperial 
Terror: From Pax Britannica to Pax Americana.

Publications include Against history, against 
state: Counterperspectives from the margins 
(Columbia University Press, 2003); Resisting 
Regimes: Myth, memory and the shaping of a Muslim 
identity (Oxford University Press, 1997); 
coauthored with Ashis Nandy, Shikha Trivedi, 
Achyut Yagnik, Creating a nationality: The 
Ramjanmabhumi Movement and the fear of self 
(Oxford University Press, 1995); coedited with 
Ajay Skaria and MSS Pandian, Subaltern Studies 
vol 12 (Permanent Black, 2005).
Workshop Schedule

9.30-9.50 Registration and coffee

9.50-10.00 Welcome

10.00-11.00 Plenary Session

Chair: Dr Katharine Adeney, Department of Politics, University of Sheffield

Professor Shail Mayaram, CSDS, Title to be confirmed.

11.00-11.20 Coffee

11.20-12.50 Gender and Identities.

Chair: Dr Alistair McMillan, Department of Politics, University of Sheffield

Professor Shirin Rai, Department of Politics, 
University of Warwick. `Gender and Political 
Representation: Narratives of Service among 
Indian women MPs.´

Dr Kanchana Ruwanpura, School of Geography, 
University of Southampton. `Gender Awareness & 
Action: The Ethno-Gender Dynamics of Sri Lankan 
NGOs.´

Dr Sumi Madhok, Department of Politics, SOAS. 
'Five Notions of Haq: Rights, Gender and 
Citizenship in North West India'. `

12.50-13.50 Lunch

13.50-15.20 Colonialism, Postcolonialism and Identity

Chair: Dr Ben Zachariah, Department of History, University of Sheffield

Dr Steve Legg, Department of Geography, 
University of Nottingham. `Racial intimacy and 
imperial feminism: Meliscent Shephard's 
anti-brothel quest in colonial India.´

Mr William Avis, Department of History, 
University of Sheffield. 'Sixty Years of 
Post-Coloniality: the Particularity of the 
Assamese Experience.'

Dr Tariq Jazeel, Department of Geography, 
University of Sheffield. 'Environmental 
literacies after Eurocentrism: reading the 
politics of space in southern Sri Lanka.'

15.20-15.40 Coffee

15.40-16.40 Diasporic identities

Chair: Dr Tariq Jazeel, Department of Geography, University of Sheffield

Dr Rob Aitken, Department of Politics, University 
of York. `Identity Politics and the confusion and 
conflation of networks, communities and 
identities in the South Asian diaspora.´

Dr John Zavos, School of Arts, Histories and 
Cultures, University of Manchester. `Situating 
Hindu Nationalism in the UK: Vishwa Hindu 
Parishad and the development of British Hindu 
consciousness´

16.40-17.00 Coffee

17.00-18.00 Caste and Community *

Chair: Dr Glyn Williams, Department of Town and 
Regional Planning, University of Sheffield

Dr Andrew Wyatt, Department of Politics, 
University of Bristol. `The re-positioning of 
Tamil identity in the new political economy.´

Professor Craig Jeffrey, Department of Geography 
and Jackson School of International Studies, 
University of Washington. `Caste, class and 
improvised politics on a north Indian university 
campus.´

* This will also be a seminar for the World 
Universities Network (WUN) series on South Asia 
with video link to the University of Washington 
and other partner institutions

18.00-19.00 WUN Reception.

Papers

Kanchana Ruwanpura's paper is now available by 
emailing Margaret Holder (contact details below)
Registration information

Registration is free, but because places are 
limited (and to allow us to organise catering), 
please call or email Margaret Holder to confirm 
your attendance. 0114 222 1645


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