SACW | April 20, 2007 | Pakistanis Against Fundamentalism / Sri Lanka: Muzzling the media; India: Kashmir, Self Determination and the Left ; Liars of the Hindu right; Communal threat to Goa; The Namesake; Nehru's speeches

Harsh Kapoor aiindex at mnet.fr
Thu Apr 19 22:13:33 CDT 2007


South Asia Citizens Wire  | April 20, 2007 | Dispatch No. 2391 - Year 9

[1]  Pakistan: Citizens mobilise against religious extremism
[2]  Sri Lanka: Undemocratic Government Pressure 
on Media is Unacceptable (National Peace Council)
[3]  Revisiting the Kashmir issue (Nirmalangshu Mukherji)
[4]  India: [BJP's UP election CD] Family Lies (Mukul Dube)
[5]  India: Emerging Threats to Goa's Communal Harmony (Vidyadhar Gadgil)
[6]  Film Review: Pleasant, But Seriously Flawed 
- 'The Namesake' - Reviewed by Partha Banerjee
[7]  Book Review: 'Nehru's India -- Select 
Speeches. (ed.) Mushirul Hasan' Reviewed by 
Suranjan Das

____


[1]


Daily Times
20 April 2007

CIVIL SOCIETY RALLIES AGAINST EXTREMISM

* Thousands march in blistering heat in Lahore
* Protests also in Islamabad, Karachi and Peshawar

Staff Report

LAHORE/ISLAMABAD/ KARACHI/PESHAWAR: Thousands of 
Pakistanis staged rallies in major cities on 
Thursday to condemn extremism and exploitation in 
the name of Islam.

Rights activists organised simultaneous protests 
in Lahore, Islamabad, Karachi and Peshawar to 
denounce extremist actions by students of the 
Jamia Hafsa and Jamia Fareedia madrassas, 
affiliated to Lal Masjid, in the capital.

Several thousand Lahoris marched in blistering 
heat on The Mall - the first time a large crowd 
has rallied against religious extremism in the 
city - in a rally organised by the Women's Action 
Forum (WAF) in collaboration with other 
non-governmental organisations.

The protestors - including civil society and 
human rights activists, minority groups, 
political workers, lawyers, trade unions, 
journalists and students - gathered at the Lahore 
High Court building and began marching towards 
the Punjab Assembly building at 2:00pm.

"Mullahism murdabad. Lay kay rahen gay azadi," 
they shouted. One youth wrote "No to Taliban" 
with spray paint on the road.

Hall Road traders hailed the rally as it passed 
by, putting up banners reading: "Stop 
blackmailing and exploiting traders in the name 
of Islam," and "We condemn mullahs' operation 
against CD shops."

The City District Government of Lahore had 
relaxed Section 144 to allow the rally amidst a 
large police presence. One side of The Mall was 
temporarily closed for traffic.

Asma Jehangir, chairwoman of the Human Rights 
Commission of Pakistan, said the military was 
using mullahs to exploit people in the name of 
Islam. "We, the people of Pakistan, are not 
oblivious to this mullah-military alliance," she 
said. "There can be no democracy in Pakistan 
unless GHQ-backed mullahs stop issuing decrees to 
exploit people in the name of Islam."

"This mullah is defaming the most beautiful and 
peaceful religion in the world and wants to 
hamper the prosperity and progress of Pakistan," 
said a WAF activist addressing the rally. "But 
the people of this city will continue to confront 
this mullahism and religious extremism."

PPP Punjab President Shah Mahmood Qureshi also 
suggested that the government had engineered the 
standoff in the capital to present Gen Pervez 
Musharraf as a bulwark against extremism and 
divert attention from the judicial crisis.

Hundreds staged a peaceful protest in Islamabad 
against extremists trying to force their version 
of Islam on others. Most of the protestors were 
women.

Shirin Mazari, a strategic analyst, led the 
protestors, who gathered a kilometre away from 
Constitution Avenue and walked up to the 
roundabout in front of Parliament House.

"Where's the writ of the state?" asked a big 
placard at the protest. "No to religious 
extremism; yes to life and music", and "Free the 
children's library", said other placards.

"Concerned citizens have been watching with anger 
and frustration the terrorism being inflicted on 
them by an extremist fringe within the society," 
said one speaker as the protestors gathered at 
Parade Square.

She was appalled at the state's "inability or 
reluctance" to deal with violations of the law 
committed by Jamia Hafsa and Jamia Fareedia 
students. "Their attempt to challenge the writ of 
the state by establishing what in effect is an 
alternate governing system in the area under 
their control poses a threat to all law-abiding 
citizens," she said.

Hundreds of Christian women from Qayyumabad, 
filmmakers, social workers and university 
students rallied against religious extremism 
outside Quaid-e-Azam's mazaar in Karachi. "It 
would be difficult to find a single woman who has 
not at some point in time faced religious 
extremism," said Karachi's Naib Nazim Nasreen 
Jalil, who also took part in the protest. 
Gang-rape survivor Kainat Soomro was also at the 
rally.

In Peshawar, hundreds of women's rights 
campaigners - including some 60 burqa-clad women 
from the tribal areas - staged a rally near the 
press club, denouncing threats of suicide 
bombings by Lal Masjid clerics and baton-wielding 
madrassa students.

"No religion in the world allows their faithful 
to use sticks in places of worship," Tribal Women 
Welfare Association Chairwoman Dr Begum Jan said.

o o o

The News
20 April 2007

  HUNDREDS RALLY AGAINST RELIGIOUS EXTREMISM
Civil society opposes 'state' within state; urges 
govt to take action against Lal Masjid, Jamia 
Hafsa administration

ISLAMABAD: Hundreds of rights activists rallied 
in big cities on Thursday against Lal Masjid and 
Jamia Hafsa, which are trying to impose a 
Taliban-style justice system.

More than 300 demonstrators, around half of them 
women, rallied in the federal capital, chanting 
slogans including "No to terrorism and extremism" 
and urged the government to take action.

"We want to mobilise public opinion against 
violations of the law by religious students and 
the inability and reluctance of the state to deal 
with these violations," rally organiser Shireen 
Mazari told AFP.

"The government should take very stern action 
against the rowdyism being demonstrated by the 
mosque's administration," leading rights activist 
AH Nayyar told AFP.

Liberals and rights activists rallied in Lahore 
on Thursday to press the government to act 
against Lal Masjid and Jamia Hafsa.

"Mullahs have ruined our society. They have 
distorted the image of Islam. We'll not accept 
extremism anymore," Jugnu Mohsin, a rights 
activist, told a rally after around 700 people 
had marched, shouting slogans outside the Lahore 
High Court.

"It is government's failure. They have been 
blackmailed by the Mullahs of Lal Masjid who are 
pushing the country towards Talibanisation," 
Human Rights Commission of Pakistan Chairman Asma 
Jehangir said. -Agencies

Syed Bukhar Shah adds from Peshawar: Activists of 
various civil society organisations and political 
parties staged a protest demonstration in front 
of the press club and later took out a procession 
here on Thursday to condemn what they termed 
religious extremism propagated by the Jamia Hafsa 
and Lal Masjid in Islamabad.

The Women Action Forum, Peshawar chapter, had 
given the call and activists of various NGOs, 
including Aurat Foundation, Action Aid, Noor 
Education Trust (NET), Human Resource Management 
and Development Centre (HRMDC), Strengthening 
Participatory Organisation (SPO), Tribal Women 
Welfare Association (TWWA), Awami National Party 
(ANP) and Pakhtunkhwa Milli Awami Party (PMAP), 
gathered in front of the press club to register 
their protest against the ongoing activities of 
the Jamia Hafsa and Lal Masjid administration. 
Tribal women from Khyber, Mohmand, Bajaur and 
Orakzai agencies were prominent among the 
participants.

Carrying banners and placards inscribed with 
slogans against religious extremism, the 
participants chanted full-throated slogans 
against "bigotry in the name of enforcement of 
Shariah".

Speaking on the occasion, representatives of NGOs 
and political parties deplored that a moderate 
majority in the motherland had always been held 
hostage by a small conservative minority for the 
sake of vested interest. They said the clerics of 
Jamia Hafsa and Lal Masjid were trying to set up 
a state within the state by forcing the people to 
conform to their own brand of religion.

Criticising the administration of Lal Masjid and 
Jamia Hafsa, the speakers said that illegal 
occupation of the state land in the federal 
capital by fanatics in the name of religion was 
totally unacceptable. The protesters reminded the 
religious extremists that Islam did not permit 
coercion of any type and instead put stress on 
tolerance and humility.

"Asking women to give up driving cars and 
threatening owners of shops to stop selling 
audiocassettes and video CDs and switch over to 
other businesses is nothing but an encroachment 
on the rights of the citizens," they said.

The civil society members asked all the freedom 
loving people to rise in unison and join hands 
against the religious intolerance and extremism. 
"It is a must as the actions taken by the 
intolerant religious elements of Jamia Hafsa and 
Lal Masjid are tarnishing the image of the 
country in the comity of nations," they said, 
telling the baton-wielding students of the 
seminaries that the people of Pakistan were 
well-conversant with religious teachings and 
there was no need to force on them any ideology.

The protesters said they have decided to organise 
various functions and seminars to educate the 
people regarding the on going activities of the 
seminary students in Islamabad. They said it 
would lead the country to civil war if the 
government did not stop the religious students 
from imposing their own brand of Islamic ideology 
on people.

o o o

Daily Times
20 April 2007

'IT'S OUR PAKISTAN TOO!'

* Hundreds of women and their supporters say 'No' to religious extremism
* Women narrate their personal experiences with 
orthodox and intolerant elements
* 'There is no compulsion in religion'

Staff Report

KARACHI: Christian women from Qayyumabad, 
filmmakers, social workers and university 
students gathered at a protest rally against 
religious extremism Thursday outside 
Quaid-e-Azam's mazaar. 'Hum dekhain gay!' they 
sang out in a mood that would have made Faiz 
proud.

The rally was called by the Joint Action 
Committee, a group of NGOs, with Aurat 
Foundation, Women's Action Forum, Action Aid, 
PAWLA, Helpline Trust, and others in attendance. 
Naib Nazim Nasreen Jalil also took part.

It would be difficult to find a single woman who 
has not at some point in time faced religious 
extremism, said Jalil when asked about her 
personal experience with religious extremism. 
"Some years ago I reached Karachi from Islamabad. 
At the airport there was an entire group of 
religious extremists from the Jamaat-e-Islami. 
They surrounded me as savages do when they 
capture their prey. Someone pushed me to one 
side, while another pulled me in another," she 
said. "If the people who came to receive me 
hadn't saved me, I'm not sure what would have 
happened."

Albeit small in number, the rally's participants 
represented a small but significant portion of 
secular society. Many of the women taking part, 
such as Anis Haroon, have long battled anti-women 
forces. "We are here thanks to Lal Masjid and 
Jamia Hafsa," joked Dr Aqila of the Aurat 
Foundation while speaking to a colleague as 
Justice (retd) Majida Rizvi embraced Prof 
Shahista Zaidi. "At least that's one good thing 
that they've done," she said while referring to 
the joy many women expressed upon meeting old 
colleagues and friends. "In Karachi, things are 
still much better if we compare it with the rest 
of the country," she said. "One day, when I was 
working at the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission, 
my colleagues and I decided in Ramazan to have a 
cup of tea. We made the tea in our room and sat 
down to drink it. Then some mullah-type people 
found out about it and cursed us. They went to 
the extent of printing a pamphlet against us."

Professor Shaista Zaidi said that she had battled 
religious extremism for thirty years at the 
University of Karachi. "I faced it each day from 
[the student wing of a particular religious 
party]," she said.

What was apparent was that almost all the women 
present had had some brush with extremism. For 
example, Justice Rizvi said that once in a legal 
case she faced extremism. "I was threatened 
against taking a decision against the accused," 
she said. This was the same thing that happened 
to a famous activist who took part in the rally 
and often comes in the media to talk about 
women's issues. She told Daily Times that in her 
personal experience she often received threats on 
her cell phone after she had been particularly 
vocal on some issue. "They call me up and say 
'Hum dekh lain ge tumhe'," she said.

When asked about her personal experiences 
documentary filmmaker Nazli Haque laughed and 
said that mostly young women faced a tough time. 
"No one really bothers you when you're 
menopausal," she said. "Although, now that [I'm 
older] I wish they did."

Citizen Naeem, who was taking photographs of the 
rally for his own records, said that religious 
extremism was evident everywhere. "Even if you go 
for a walk in a park you'll see four people 
spring up to say their prayers there," he said. 
"Then it becomes very problematic for any woman 
to proceed with her walk near them. They taunt 
her and berate her for not wearing a dupatta."

Zaib Advocate said that her personal observation 
had been that if you are in a public place the 
person who looks like a maulvi is more likely to 
stare at you than anyone else. "From the cases 
that come to me I feel that maulvis are usually 
behind sexual harassment cases and not young men. 
In fact, people call maulvis to their house to 
teach their children less and less."

Gang-rape survivor Kainat Soomro was also at the 
rally. "It was after my personal experience that 
I began to understand how women are really 
treated. Even after the case, I still have to 
listen to people taunt me and say terrible 
things. But I will remain firm until the accused 
are brought to justice."

Journalist Zubeida Mustafa recalled that in 1985 
or 1986 her daughter, who was then about 13 years 
old, wanted to go out onto the street to welcome 
Benazir Bhutto upon her return. They went out but 
some men shouted at her for not wearing a dupatta 
and scared the young girl. "Eventually she took 
my dupatta and took off," Mustafa said. "And I 
was left with none."


_____


[2]

National Peace Council
of Sri Lanka
12/14 Purana Vihara Road
Colombo 6
Tel:  2818344, 2854127, 2819064
Tel/Fax:2819064
E Mail: npc at sltnet.lk
Internet:  www.peace-srilanka.org


19.04.07

Media Release

UNDEMOCRATIC GOVERNMENT PRESSURE ON MEDIA IS UNACCEPTABLE

Sri Lanka is a country that has been fortunate to 
have had a vibrant media except within the 
conflict zones of the north and east and in 
LTTE-controlled areas. However, recently there 
has been a noticeable decline in the freedom of 
media and in the accuracy and responsibility of 
media expression in the country as a whole. The 
National Peace Council appreciates courageous and 
balanced reporting in the context of the 
pressures faced by the media at present.

Recently two independent newspapers, the Weekend 
Standard and the Maubima, had to cease their 
operations when their bank accounts were sealed 
by the government on the grounds that they had 
been acting in violation of laws and national 
security. The National Peace Council is gravely 
concerned about reports that high ranking members 
of the government have been personally 
pressurised editors of national media 
institutions who have been critical of government 
policies and actions.

We particularly deplore the threats leveled 
against the editor of the Daily Mirror, Ms 
Champika Liyanarachchi, and her staff regarding 
their reportage of the human tragedy that has 
been unfolding in the east of the country. The 
team of young women journalists who head the 
Daily Mirror are a credit to the media 
profession. We are shocked at the threats against 
them, and regret the subsequent government 
attempts to downplay the incident.

Freedom of expression is one of the basic pillars 
of a democratic society. A free media is 
necessary to inform both decision makers and the 
people about prevailing realities in the country. 
We call on the government to inquire into this 
incident and to insist that its members follow a 
code of conduct that accepts the fundamental 
principles of democratic governance including 
respect for the freedom of the media.


Executive Director
On behalf of the Governing Council

_____


[3]


Znet
April 13, 2007

REVISITING THE KASHMIR ISSUE
by Nirmalangshu Mukherji

In a just world order, rights of 
self-determination of people, including the right 
of independence, ought to be viewed as a basic 
and absolute value. As with most moral 
principles, however, the actual implementation of 
such demands raises difficult issues since they 
always arise in a historical context of unjust 
distribution of rights. In other words, the 
demand for self-determination arises precisely 
because it has not been met so far, rendering the 
context in which the demand arises an unjust one. 
We will briefly examine the right of 
self-determination of people in Kashmir from this 
perspective.

  In that unjust context, dimensions of external 
control intervene with people's rights for 
decades-sometimes, over centuries. These controls 
not only generate vested interests for the 
agencies of control, typically they curb people's 
ability to voice their demand to the point that 
sections of people internalize the features of 
control and begin to demobilise on the issue of 
self-determination. As a result, people 
themselves get divided. Agencies of control are 
then able to use this fact to perpetuate their 
control in the name of people. The historical 
passage of time is a crucial aspect of the 
scenario just sketched. We will look briefly at 
Iraq to get a sense of the isue before we turn to 
Kashmir.

  In Iraq, the imposition of (current) external 
control is recent, brutal, and clearly linked to 
the vested interests of US foreign policy around 
control over oil. The imperialist aggression 
stands fully exposed; thus, the people subjected 
to massive violence stand united in their 
opposition to US occupation. Reliable polls 
suggest that 1% of Iraqi population welcome US 
presence in Iraq while over 80% demand immediate 
end to US occupation; the rest varying on when 
they want the occupying forces to withdraw. Even 
with the tiny minority who demand a phased 
withdrawal of US forces, it stands to reason that 
their apprehensions about the fallout of 
immediate withdrawal is directly linked to the 
chaotic state of Iraqi society caused by US 
aggression itself.

  For the sake of argument, imagine a grim (and 
hopefully false) scenario in which the US, 
assisted by the client Iraqi regime, is able to 
perpetuate its crimes in Iraq for several more 
years. During this period, suppose some semblance 
of order and stability returns in the natural 
course: some oil money is used to restore the 
food and the health systems; water and 
electricity return to normal flow; people are 
able to engage in some trade inside and outside 
Iraq; tourists return; some institutions, 
including education institutions, begin to 
function; violence in the streets is reduced; the 
resistance is partly broken; US forces mostly 
stay in barracks close to oil installations; 
increasing number of people begin to queue up in 
US-sponsored elections.

In this scenario, it is quite likely that the 
minority of currently wavering population will 
increase several folds. Citing favourable polls, 
the US will then be in a position to claim that 
US presence is needed to bolster stability and 
(democratic) order in Iraq. Nevertheless, it is 
clear that nothing changes in so far as the 
absolute value of people's right to 
self-determination is concerned. Violent 
enforcement of external control for long periods 
of time to drive people to exasperation and 
apparent conformity is a tested strategy of 
occupying forces with superior gun power. For the 
same reason, it is of utmost importance that the 
current resistance in Iraq continues to grow 
under the common command of people; this is also 
a tested method of rendering unsustainable the 
tested strategy of occupying forces.

Two other features of current Iraq are relevant 
here. First, there is no doubt that Iraq is a 
divided society with at least three contending 
parties: the sunnis, the shias, and the Kurds. 
But the division between the people of Iraq 
cannot be an argument against self-determination. 
We may have opinions on further dismemberment of 
Iraq or on unsustainable alliances between the 
parties. But it is for the people of Iraq to 
choose which course they wish to adopt. Second, 
when the right of self-determination is viewed as 
an absolute value, the character of resistance to 
imperialism is also of no concern. Once again it 
is for the Iraqi people to choose what they feel 
is the right form of resistance. Historically, 
the choice could well turn out to be a mistaken 
one; but then it is again upto the Iraqi people 
to correct the course.

To sum up, the right of self-determination cannot 
be withheld even if (a) some sections of the 
population do not desire it anymore, typically 
out of duress, (b) the people in the relevant 
region are divided, and (c) the character of 
resistance to external rule is questionable. We 
recall that the British used each of these to 
postpone independence until the circumstances 
arising out of the second war and liberation of 
people around the globe forced the British to 
leave India.

In a recent article posted in Znet ('Is 
independence a viable option for Jammu and 
Kashmir?', 24 January), Badri Raina, as the title 
suggests, has raised the issues the British 
raised for decades before they were compelled to 
withdraw from India. The interest of this piece 
is that the author belongs to the left, and Znet 
is a well-known platform for left-wing opinion. 
The arguments therefore are more refined than a 
mere imperial assertion of the following kind: 
Kashmir belongs to us because some raja signed 
some piece of paper. The net effect, however, 
remains the same.

Raina raises versions of each of (a) to (b) above 
as an opposition to 'the formulation that 
militancy and violence could not justly be 
expected to be shut down till the right to 
'self-determination' was granted' (note that the 
expression 'self-determination' is used with 
quotes by Raina). He also raises versions of (c): 
'how long can the valley then resist the push to 
theocratise both state and polity in that 
'independent' situation. Surely, both Kashmiris 
and the Indian state have big stakes in all 
this.' But since Raina produced no facts to 
support this view, I will ignore this part of his 
essay.

The Polls

Raina's first argument, a version of (a), 
concerns a poll conducted by the MORI 
International organization that 'covered all 
regions, urban and rural, of the three provinces 
of the Jammu & Kashmir State.' Although Raina 
thinks of the MORI Foundation as 'a reputed 
agency by all accounts', he does not mention that 
the foundation is US-based. Raina also cites 
another poll subsequently conducted by Synovate 
India which covered just the valley.

  In what follows, I will focus on the MORI poll 
since, as Raina observed, it covered 'all 
regions.' Further, the focus on MORI is justified 
because Raina begins this part of his essay with 
the condition that 'whatever resolutions are 
debated or found  must pertain to the entire 
state of Jammu & Kashmir rather than  merely any 
discrete part.' I return to the implications of 
imposing this condition on any 'debate' later. 
For now, obeying Raina's condition, it is obvious 
that the findings of the MORI poll are directly 
relevant. Also, I will take the validity of the 
findings for granted.

  The part of MORI results which has drawn 
world-wide attention, and flagged repeatedly by 
Raina, suggests that 61 per cent feel that they 
would be better off politically and economically 
as Indian citizens, and only 6 per cent feel that 
they would be so as Pakistani citizens. Raina 
comments: 'by no stretch of the imagination then 
can it be argued that the overwhelming sentiment 
in the state of Jammu & Kashmir is for 
"sovereign, secular, independence."  'However 
much as these findings might shock some 
knowledgeable peddlers of the "Kashmir 
Question,"' Raina continues, 'those are the 
facts.'

  Praful Bidwai ('Wanted: policy, not hubris', 
Frontline, July 6, 2002) points out two related 
problems with the results. First, 'the 
overwhelming majority of those who would prefer 
to be Indian citizens belong to Jammu and Ladakh, 
not to the Valley. The "don't know" answers to 
the question are concentrated in Srinagar.' To 
elaborate, whereas 99 per cent of respondents in 
Jammu and 100 per cent in Leh felt they would be 
better off as Indian citizens, 78 per cent of 
those in Srinagar said they did not know while 9 
per cent felt they would be better off as Indian 
citizens and 13 per cent as Pakistani citizens.' 
Bidwai explains: 'the 78 per cent "don't knows" 
clearly include a large number who subscribe to 
azadi or that version of it which equals autonomy 
or independence from India, but who reject merger 
with Pakistan. Given that the core Kashmir 
problem is about the Valley, this is a sobering 
thought.'

  Second, Bidwai observes that 'the critical issue 
within Jammu and Kashmir is not just "free and 
fair" elections, but inclusive and free 
elections.' In other words, 'fairness in 
determining the popular will can mean very little 
unless the electoral process involves the broadly 
representative spectrum of political opinion in 
the State.' As a matter of fact, several currents 
of opinion have just not been allowed to function 
in Jammu and Kashmir for decades. This fact, 
combined with decades of violence resulting in 
nearly a hundred thousand civilian casualties, 
untold economic misery, and the general 
alienation of people from articulated political 
process, explain the staggering figure of 'don't 
knows', which, as Bidwai pointed out, is crucial 
for understanding the situation in Kashmir.

  Raina is entirely silent about this part of the 
MORI findings. As noted, his strategy is to build 
up on the fact that these findings are restricted 
to the valley, hence they are irrelevant in view 
of the 'all regions' condition imposed by him. 
Further, the 'don't knows' don't count since, 
according to him, 'unarticulated private 
predilections of any group of people in any part 
of the state  cannot be authorized agenda as the 
problem is addressed.' In other words, first we 
are advised to overlook the historical conditions 
which have led to 'unarticulated' opinion in vast 
sections of the people; then we are advised to 
ignore the opinion since it is 'unarticulated.'
Raina has another strategy to defray this 
'sobering' aspect of MORI findings: for the 
valley, instead of depending on the MORI poll, he 
shifts to the Synovate poll taken three years 
later in 2005, despite his 'all regions' 
condition, and juxtaposes these results with that 
of the (inconvenient) MORI poll. According to the 
later poll, 36.2% Kashmiris in the Valley and 
Rajouri (equally muslim dominated) prefer the 
India option. This enabled Raina to conclude from 
articulated opinion that 'by no stretch of the 
imagination then can it be argued that the 
overwhelming sentiment in the state of Jammu & 
Kashmir is for  "sovereign, secular, 
independence."' Setting aside the algebraic issue 
of whether the remaining 63.8% represent 
'overwhelming sentiment', recall the historical 
feature of (a) that, as time flows and the 
prospects of attaining basic rights recede, 
people are likely to resign to less desirable 
options in the absence of organized democratic 
struggle.

The period between 2002 and 2005 - the post 9/11 
world - has seen a setback to people's democratic 
struggles in these parts of the world. 
Specifically, the turn around in Pakistan's 
Kashmir policy under US pressure, the continuing 
violence and economic misery, the sectarian 
character of the jehadi groups, and the 
opportunism of Hurriyat and other political 
parties, on the one hand, and the limited 
restoration of the electoral process and opening 
up of some economic activity, on the other, could 
have led to an increase in the resigned opinion. 
In other words, there is no evidence that the 
crucial democratic test of 'fairness in 
determining the popular will', advocated by 
Bidwai, has been met. By adopting the synchronic 
perspective, Raina has failed to appreciate the 
historical condition of people under duress.

Division of people?

Turning to (b) above, let us examine the validity 
of Raina's 'all regions' condition. As noted, 
Raina has a two-pronged argument: (A) people in 
the valley do not have the 'overwhelming 
sentiment' against India; (B) taking all regions 
into consideration, the 'overwhelming sentiment' 
is for India. Combining the effects of (A) and 
(B), Raina's ill-concealed message is that, even 
if (A) is false, (B) takes precedence. In other 
words, even if the people in the valley are 
overwhelmingly against India (and for 
independence), we should ignore their opinion 
since people in the region as a whole want to 
remain in India. Raina puts the message 
rhetorically as follows: 'how is the desire for 
"independence" of half the valley's population to 
be squared with the overwhelming opinion in the 
valley?' The additional argument that (A) could 
well be true just bolsters Raina's strategy. We 
saw that (A) is not likely to be true. This 
leaves the entire burden of Raina's argument on 
(B) alone - the 'all regions' condition.

  Since the 'all regions' condition looks like a 
classic, pre-emptive, statist move to defray any 
demand for secession, the leftist Raina needs to 
find 'democratic' arguments in support of the 
condition. Alongwith much rhetoric, he weaves in 
two facts: (1) "people in all regions are in 
general agreement that 'the unique cultural 
identity of Jammu and Kashmir-Kashmiriyat-should 
be preserved in any long-term solution. Overall, 
81% agree, including 76% in Srinagar'; (2)  'An 
overwhelming 92% oppose the state of Kashmir 
being divided on the basis of religion or 
ethnicity.' So the argument is that, since a vast 
majority of people wish to uphold 'Kashmiriyat' 
and are against the division of Kashmir on 
religious or ethnic grounds, the demand for 
independence by a section of the population ought 
to take the backseat. In fact, those who demand 
independence while upholding (1) and (2) - there 
must be some given the numbers - are plainly 
inconsistent, and hence, they can be ignored.

  Notice first that the charge of inconsistency 
assumes that if the people in the valley wish to 
secede from the Indian state, they would be doing 
so on religious or ethnic grounds. Once we decide 
to look at people's movements only through 
communal or sectarian lenses, we lose sight of 
the basic historical issue that vast sections of 
people may simply wish to secede from a State. It 
is the Indian state the people in the valley are 
against, the state that is seen to have 
confiscated their own statehood first by 
fraudulent means by entering into an undemocratic 
pact with a raja, and then by half a century of 
accelerating repression. If religion were the 
issue, the valley would have preferred the 
Pakistan option which is overwhelmingly rejected 
by the people in the valley, as the MORI findings 
cited by Raina show.

  In fact, the charge of inconsistency - if not 
downright sectarianism - applies to Raina 
himself. Having argued in favor of the view 
expressed in (B), Raina also argues strongly in 
favour of turning the current LOC (line of 
control between India and Pakistan) into a state 
boundary since 'Kashmiris that live in what is 
called the POK are not Kashmiri-speaking, barring 
a sprinkling, and even within the valley there 
never has been much love lost between 
Kashmiri-speaking muslim Kashmiris and those that 
are non-Kashmiri-speaking Mirpuris or Punjabis! 
If anything, it is the Pandits who tend to be 
missed as blood brothers!  Wheels within wheels, 
you might say.' Setting aside the issue of 
truth-content of these remarks, Raina is now 
clearly advocating a division of Kashmir on 
ethnic lines in contradiction to the stated 
position in (B).

  I am not suggesting that there is no tension 
between the desire for unity of all Kashmir on 
the basis of Kashmiriyat and conflicting 
region-wise opinion on the issue of secession 
from India. But the difficult task of resolving 
this and other conflicts bestows on the people of 
Kashmir when they prepare to exercise their right 
of self-determination with freedom and dignity. 
When the conditions for exercising the will of 
the people occur, all parties have the right to 
approach the people with their opinion. But, 
ultimately, the people must give the verdict on 
how they wish the difficult issues to be 
resolved. The right of self-determination, in 
other words, is supreme and absolute.

It is interesting that Raina barely touches the 
fundamental issue of self-determination, and 
restricts his discussion only to what he 
considers to be hurdles in 'granting' 
independence to the people in the valley. Again, 
the message is ill-concealed. If independence is 
not admissible in the first place, people in the 
valley lose the right to exercise this option. 
Once they lose the right to exercise a specific 
option, the general right to exercise any option 
loses meaning. Hence, the people in the valley do 
not (really) have the right of 
self-determination. As a result, Raina holds that 
'the right to secession,' which was 'at one time 
a part of the theoretical repertoire of the 
undivided Left in India' needs to be revised by 
the division of the current left to which Raina 
belongs. In the revised picture, basic rights of 
the people are viewed by Raina as 'nothing but 
another form of Idealism,' 'a thin ground' for 
'granting secession'. So, what was viewed as the 
basic right of people by the 'undivided Left' 
turns out to be dispensable rhetoric for that 
strand of the current left which views the stakes 
for the Indian state as higher than the rights of 
people.

______



[4]

18/19 April 2007

FAMILY LIES

by Mukul Dube


When the Election Commission took the BJP to task 
for the communally charged content of its UP 
election propaganda CD, that party reacted 
immediately by disowning the CD. We see here a 
response which characterises the Sangh Parivar: 
an outright lie.
	The BJP could not continue to hide behind 
that lie after the makers of the CD stated on 
record that they had been told what line was to 
be taken in it and that party high-ups, who were 
kept informed at every stage, had approved it 
when it was completed and had released it with 
some fanfare.
	The BJP then swung out its usual second 
line of defence: different spokesmen saying 
different things, all false. One said that the CD 
was the work of uncontrollable fringe elements in 
the party, quite forgetting the central 
importance of Lalji Tandon in UP. Another said 
that the CD was an aberration in a record 
presumably unblemished otherwise. There was also 
the laughable but unsuccessful distraction of 
party luminaries courting arrest: another 
familiar Hindutva ploy, the Red Herring Defence.
	I have not seen the UP election CD; but I 
have seen or heard some of the other propaganda 
material brought out by the Hindu Right over the 
years, and it has been consistent in its 
hate-mongering and its demonisation of Muslims. I 
therefore believe the TV channel which broadcast 
portions of this CD and said that it was 
deliberately not showing some, and that at places 
it was silencing the audio track, because they 
were altogether too lurid and offensive.
	That various limbs of the Hindutva 
organism have routinely been putting out such 
propaganda without any action being taken against 
them is a reflection of the failure of the law 
and order machinery to live up to the promise of 
religious equality made in our Constitution. That 
machinery has failed to uphold what is clearly 
stated in various laws. As  Achin Vanaik told 
Praful Bidwai (Inter Press Service, 12 April 
2007): "The BJP got away with murder in the past 
because India's establishment failed to apply the 
law of the land and pandered to Hindu 
majoritarianism."
	What is the law of the land? It is 
perhaps stated the most clearly in  Section 153-A 
of the Indian Penal Code, which deals with 
"promoting enmity between different groups ... 
and doing acts prejudicial to maintenance of 
harmony."
	Had the law been enforced, the now silent 
"Sadhvi" Rithambara would years ago have been put 
behind bars. Joining her would have been Narendra 
Modi, who fought the 2002 Gujarat election 
against "Miyan Musharraf", in effect calling not 
just Gujarat's but the whole of India's Muslims 
Pakistanis, and who notoriously described the 
refugee camps for terrorised Muslims in his state 
as "breeding factories".
	In the matter of the UP election CD, 
other branches of the Hindutva "family" have thus 
far been silent. Indeed, the fact that the BJP is 
not in power in New Delhi seems to have kept them 
muzzled since the last general elections. It 
remains to be seen if they will be made to swing 
into action or if the old charioteer Advani will 
begin another "rath yatra". Like those of 
Pavlov's subjects, the Family's responses are 
conditioned.


______


[5]

Navhind Times
April 15, 2007

EMERGING THREATS TO GOA'S COMMUNAL HARMONY

by Vidyadhar Gadgil

We have just passed the first anniversary of one 
of the blackest days in the recent history of 
Goa, on March 3, 2006. This day witnessed the 
first organised communal violence, taking place 
in what has till now been a relatively peaceful 
state. Starting from a dispute over a religious 
structure, the issue snowballed and led to 
unprecedented attacks on the Muslim community in 
the Sanvordem-Curchorem area. Fortunately, no 
lives were lost, but property worth crores of 
rupees was destroyed and looted, and many Muslim 
families had to flee for their lives, returning 
to their homes after many months. Even today, 
there is a noticeable atmosphere of fear within 
the Muslim community in the area.

After this incident, there have been many 
attempts made to come to terms with the reality 
of the situation. There have been many attempts 
made to explain away the communal violence in 
Sanvordem-Curchorem as an aberration rather than 
something that fits in as part of the current 
political reality. 'Goa's syncretic culture' and 
'Goa's tradition of communal harmony' are phrases 
that are commonly heard even now, albeit with a 
somewhat defensive note. A commonly expressed 
feeling is that Goa, with its 'unique history and 
culture', cannot fall prey to organised 
communalism and fascism. This ostrich-like 
attitude is a sure invitation to future disaster.

Goa has the longest history of colonialism in the 
subcontinent. Conquered in 1510 by the 
Portuguese, it was under foreign rule for a long 
period of 450 years. One of the legacies of 
Portuguese rule was a divide between the Hindus 
and Christians, as the Portuguese actively 
discriminated against Hindus. This historical 
fact, like the historical fact of forced 
conversions in the 16th century, is an issue that 
can become poison in mischievous hands.

Further fault-lines emerged over the years. The 
first was at the time of the historic opinion 
poll to decide on the issue of a merger with 
Maharashtra. Political parties had been formed 
with support bases from specific religious 
communities, and the ruling Maharashtrawadi 
Gomantak Party, with strong support among the 
Bahujan Hindu masses, favoured a merger. The 
United Goans' Party, with support largely from 
the Catholics, was strongly against it. The 
opinion of the masses, Hindu as well as Catholic, 
was against merger though, and the proposal was 
defeated. But, it was a narrow thing: 52 per cent 
against and 48 per cent favouring merger.

Then came the Konkani agitation. The Catholics 
were united behind Konkani, along with the 
upper-caste Hindus. But, the Hindu Bahujan Samaj 
was in favour of Marathi. Now we have the script 
controversy.

The fact of the matter is that there are deep 
divisions in Goan society along religious lines. 
The peaceful nature of the Goan population 
ensured, however, that there was tolerance, if 
not acceptance, of other communities and faiths. 
Also, four hundred years of mixing had created 
common practices and forms of worship, and this 
syncretism did stand Goa in good stead.

Though all the above-mentioned fault-lines and 
divisions along religious and caste lines 
existed, they had not become a cause of communal 
strife. This was largely because there was no 
organised right-wing force capable of exploiting 
these issues in pursuit of communal politics.

Such a force emerged in the early 1990s. As the 
ideology of Hindutva grew in strength all over 
India, the RSS, which had only a marginal 
presence in Goa until this time, suddenly began 
to grow in a spectacular fashion. Benefiting from 
the communal mobilisation that had taken place in 
India over the Babri Masjid issue, the RSS 
established a firm foothold in Goa. Its political 
front organisation, the BJP, began to inch closer 
to power, and made it there within a decade.

During its years in power, beginning in 1999, the 
BJP took decisions that worked to communalise the 
polity. Changes were brought in with a view to 
bringing the Hindutva agenda into young minds. A 
VCD was produced, which propagated a communal 
viewpoint, while ostensibly dealing with Goa's 
Liberation. Government schools were turned over 
to RSS front organisations on one pretext or 
another. Efforts were made to communalise the 
police force, by ensuring that youth sympathetic 
to the Hindutva agenda were recruited.

There was a furore over these attempts, and the 
BJP had to backtrack to some extent. It lost 
power in early 2005, as another spate of 
defections succeeded in toppling the government. 
The period which followed has been one in which 
the Hindutva forces appear to have rethought 
their strategy.

The realisation has crept in that the Christian 
minority is substantial and powerful enough in 
Goa to prevent overt attacks on it. Though the 
anti-Muslim sentiment has always been present as 
a sub-text in the discourse of the Hindutva lobby 
in Goa, they had not harped on this issue much, 
as the Muslims were in a miniscule minority. In 
the recent past, the percentage of Muslims in Goa 
has risen, largely due to migration, and this 
provided a convenient weapon through which to 
propagate its anti-minority message. Focusing on 
Muslims, and branding them as 'outsiders' helped 
to prevent the Christian community from 
effectively allying with the Muslims in their 
time of trouble.

Whatever Goa's tradition of communal harmony, 
today, it is sitting atop a volcano waiting to 
explode. The Hindutva forces have been 
systematically stoking the fire, and incidents 
like the recent desecration of a temple in 
Sanvordem-Curchorem are bound to recur, as 
mischief-makers engage in acts that will vitiate 
the atmosphere. It is clear that March 2006 was 
not an aberration, but part of a familiar 
pattern, in which the politics of violence and 
hatred will continue to escalate, and search for 
new victims. The global atmosphere, with the 
so-called 'War on Terror', only aggravates 
matters.

The government has failed to respond adequately 
to this menace. Though it constituted an enquiry 
after the March 2006 communal violence, the 
report lacks any teeth. The report accepts that 
the violence was pre-planned in nature, and says 
that systematic rumour mongering led to the 
violence. Despite adequate evidence as to the 
identity of the rumour-mongers, some of whom the 
report even names (like Sharmad Raiturkar, the 
BJP candidate from Margao in the 2005 
by-election), it shies away from indicting those 
responsible, claiming that it is not possible to 
identify the hand/s behind the violence. With no 
meaningful action being taken, the message that 
has gone out is that one can engage in the 
politics of hate and violence with impunity.

What is worrisome in such an atmosphere is the 
response of the secular forces, many of whom have 
been playing a role that can only be described as 
soft communalism. After the Sanvordem communal 
violence, many voices generally considered 
'secular' were actually saying that the Muslims 
should not have 'provoked' violence by exercising 
their constitutional right to hold a peaceful 
protest meeting -- a classic case of blaming the 
victims.

An even more ludicrous response was that evoked 
by the report of the Sanvordem violence-related 
fact-finding committee, headed by internationally 
renowned human rights lawyer Nandita Haksar. This 
report made an honest attempt to examine the 
roots of communalism in Goa. The reaction of the 
BJP was predictable -- it condemned the report. 
But, many secular commentators also reacted 
adversely, saying that the report was bringing 
Goa's culture into disrepute! Echoes of Modi's 
repeated invocation of Gujarati asmita, the only 
difference being that, in Goa, it was the 
purportedly secular voices that were vociferous 
in attacking the Haksar report on such grounds! 
This is the biggest success of Hindutva ideology 
-- it has succeeded in making its hate-filled 
anti-minority perspective part of general 'common 
sense'.

In sum, it is clear that there is no magic potion 
in the Goan soil or culture, which is going to 
protect the state against communalism. Like any 
other part of India, there is plenty of history 
and myth, which can be distorted and manipulated 
by communal forces. Communalism and fascism may 
take somewhat different forms in Goa, but the 
nature of the beast is the same.

Communal ideologies have got firmly established 
in Goa and it is going to be a long, hard haul 
before they are defeated. Almost certainly, 
things will get worse before they get better.

______


[6] 

Siliconeer
April 2007
Volume VIII * Issue 4

Film Review:
PLEASANT, BUT SERIOUSLY FLAWED:
The Namesake - Reviewed by Partha Banerjee
(Rating **1/2 Mediocre)


(Above): Tabu and Irrfan Khan in "The Namesake"

As a first-generation Bengali immigrant from 
Kolkata, I am happy that a long-overdue film to 
tell our story to the mainstream American 
audience is finally done. I am happy that Jhumpa 
Lahiri's best-selling novel and Mira Nair's 
making a film out of it explore and expose our 
many experiences migrating, living and bringing 
up the children in an environment of isolation, 
marginalization, and identity crisis. In a 
country where mass media and Hollywood are 
preoccupied ignoring or undermining the 
new-immigrant experience, The Namesake is a 
welcome breath of fresh air. Undoubtedly, such a 
story would please the open-minded, kind and 
liberal Western viewer, and also the 
educated-affluent, immigrant family, particularly 
South Asians in New York, Boston, Jersey, 
Chicago, Houston or Los Angeles, or the many 
other small and unknown places they live in.

Readers can visit Partha Banerjee's Web site at:
www.geocities.com/chokmoki/
My problem, however, is that both the celebrated 
novel and the Wall Street Journal-honored film do 
just that: please a naïve, apolitical audience 
that fails or refuses to dig deeper into the 
superficial, nice concepts of diversity, 
assimilation (or the lack of it), cultural 
conflicts and personal tragedies in this 
so-called Melting Pot. The story, however well 
meant, successfully keeps the first-observer 
uninformed about the true tale of a new 
immigrant's life and struggle. Just like the 
artificial Bengali pronunciations and sentence 
constructions by its primary characters - the 
Ganguli family, the film, with its often-imposed 
and superfluous sequences, misses a great 
opportunity to transform the story from an 
obvious, broad-brush landscape into a subtle, 
masterful one, grounded in earth. That's a 
disappointment, because only an act of true 
artistry and superior finesse would do justice 
both to Bengal and the Bengali diaspora, from 
both sides of the British-erected borders. After 
all, Nair herself said that the film was "about 
my deep love for Bengali life and the city of 
Calcutta. And it's an homage to Satyajit Ray's 
work."

Perhaps, the new-generation, Westernized Indian 
authors and filmmakers with strong preference to 
produce in the English language come from a class 
so different (and removed?) that the stories they 
tell lack that grounding that could come only 
from a down-to-earth, grassroots experience to 
live and struggle in the place they claim to 
know. Mira Nair, Deepa Mehta and Aparna Sen - all 
have deep understanding of the film medium; all 
of them have created a major canvas or two that 
boast about their cinematographic qualities 
easily surpassing the run-of-the-mill Bollywood 
kitsch. Aparna Sen's 36 Chowringhee Lane or Mr. 
and Mrs. Iyer, Deepa Mehta's Fire or Water, and 
Mira Nair's Monsoon Wedding or Kamasutra all bear 
testimony to that superior mastery over their 
tools of the craft. In The Namesake, combine it 
with smart and enthusiastic performances by Kal 
Penn, Jacinda Barrett or Zuleikha Robinson (and 
ignore the against-the-grain-of-the-film, imposed 
sex scenes), and you could find an exotic masala 
to churn the unfamiliar recipe of the novel into 
a rich, visual delight. Even Irfan Habib and 
Tabu's purposefully subdued acting went well with 
the slowly-unfolding thread of the story 
encompassing three generations of a family spread 
over two sides of the globe.

But the film simply misses too many points, and 
fails to answer too many questions, and follows 
the novel too religiously. A Bengali-American 
immigrant in U.S., with real experience in the 
life, culture and language the story talks about, 
and perhaps one with the required acumen to 
explore beyond the glossing-over, would thus come 
home with a sense of frustration to see that a 
multi-million-dollar effort was not used well; 
instead, the production company's energies were 
spent on pleasing a crowd that has the power to 
officially adore, and elevate the stature of the 
film in elite circles, who knows, maybe even for 
an Oscar nomination as the Best Foreign Film. 
After all, it's been the Hollywood trend for the 
past number of years.

So, what's missing? For one, in a story of a 
Bengali family, the principal characters do not 
speak the language. Ashoke and Ashima Ganguli's 
Bengali is awkward, to say the least, and the way 
they speak it, however sporadically, is anything 
but Kolkata-like; in fact, it's bizarre. Gogol or 
his sister's grasp (read: no grasp) of the 
language could be forgiven as many Bengali 
immigrants choose, for reasons unknown to me, not 
to inculcate it in their children. But in a 
typical, educated Bengali immigrant household 
where the apartment wall is adorned with 
portraits of poet Tagore and nationalist leader 
Subhas Bose (note: no Gandhi - a true Bengali 
fact of life, indeed), isn't it only expected 
that other essential lifestyle elements would 
feature in? But they did not. The Ganguli couple 
never cooks a Bengali meal on the stove, listens 
to a Bengali song on the stereo, plays a Bengali 
movie on TV, or teaches their children the 
language via textbooks or stories, even though 
these are precious belongings a Bengali immigrant 
clings on to, almost as survival gears. Is it 
because Ashima comes from a family where reciting 
"The Daffodils" is more of a norm than singing 
Tagore songs from Geetabitan? But the extended 
family in Kolkata, the surroundings, and the more 
natural West-Bengali conversations, complete with 
grandmothers and all, show otherwise. Gogol, on 
his first Kolkata trip, decides to go out 
jogging, and before he's stopped by a family 
servant from going far (a rather Johnny 
Walker-type Bollywoodish spoof from the 60's), 
the neighborhood suddenly changes from an upper 
middle-class North Kolkata to a dingy and 
super-crowded West Kolkata labyrinth. In fact, 
other than an obligatory, ten-second sequence at 
the Victoria Memorial, Kolkata, a city Mira Nair 
said she loves (and I believe her), is mostly 
shot at locations reminiscent of The City of Joy 
- to overstate its contrasts with the nice and 
quiet American suburbs. Even a crowded Queensboro 
Bridge looks serene compared to the 
Hollywood-forsaken "Armpit in the Third World." 
Not that Kolkata is the most picturesque place on 
earth; however, the selection of shots is rather 
strange. To be fair, though, Nair does show, 
rather well, a left-leaning Kolkata through 
visuals of protest marches, but even there, she 
focuses her camera way too much on the sickle and 
hammer.

There are other cinematic flaws. I'd, however, 
put more emphasis on the immigrant experience 
illustrated in the novel, which is devotionally 
transcribed into the movie - it didn't have to be 
that way. Gogol's identity crisis is real, but 
portrayed imposed. He's torn inside with his 
Russian nickname that only his father associates 
with, and gets angrier when his American 
classmates make fun of the name. However, it 
takes his father, who otherwise never spares a 
moment to talk about his admiration for Nikolai 
Gogol and his writings, literally a generation to 
explain to his son what circumstances bonded him 
with the name. He finally does it, again in a 
Bollywood kind of way, just before his departure 
from the family and death soon after. Gogol also 
never knew the meaning of Ashima (the one with no 
borders), until his wife Moushumi, who's more 
fluent in French, told him about it. Moushumi 
comes to Gogol's life during an introspection 
after his father's death, as if Gogol has matured 
now; however she abruptly breaks up within a 
year. In an otherwise placid and quiet family, 
Gogol dances wildly in his room to the tune of 
ear-splitting rock n roll. And after being in 
U.S. for so many years, Ashima, a librarian by 
now, still finds it uncomfortable to be kissed on 
the cheek by his grown-up son's girlfriend. The 
educated and apparently modern family's friend 
Mira uses a hocus-pocus ritual with a bunch of 
red chili peppers (was it meant to be funny? If 
so, I didn't get it) on Gogol, to chill him out. 
The family comes back from an India trip (when 
they left the house safely locked up and 
unattended for weeks), and discovers their 
mailbox smeared with slurs, but the neighborhood 
looks too cul-de-sac'y for such an outburst of 
vandalism, if not racism. Other than a handyman 
(and Gogol's girlfriend Maxine), the family does 
not have any white American guests that would 
come and visit the parents or their children - an 
unheard-of fact in an educated immigrant family 
from Kolkata - and the Gangulis never encounter 
African Americans or other persons of color, even 
in New York City. In fact, the only underclass 
the film shows is a group of poor folks in a 
laundromat who take their clothes off in Ashima's 
presence, in a manner that one may find 
deprecating, especially when that's the only time 
you decide to include the less affluent, merely 
as a cinematographic detail, a "B-roll."

In fact, the best time the film (i.e., the novel) 
makes a strong point about an immigrant's 
de-humanization is when Ashima gets the news of 
her husband's death through the voice of a 
dispassionate telephone operator in a distant 
hospital, where Ashoke suddenly dies of a heart 
attack. But knowingly or not, the story-teller 
decides not to spend any more time on it, and 
even though it could have been a major, poignant 
moment in the film, it was not meant to be. 
Because of the broad-brush, multiple strokes the 
film used to paint over this moment, it missed 
its chance to highlight in this relevant tale an 
extremely mechanized system that's often so 
completely detached from humanity that it 
traumatizes and tears apart even a so-called 
successful, "mainstream" immigrant family.

Also, the film didn't even bother to, and one 
might argue, that it didn't necessarily have to, 
tell the stories of the millions of other 
immigrants whose jeopardy is exacerbated by their 
desperate economic and immigration status in an 
apathetic and exploitative system, one that 
champions diversity and assimilation, but treats 
its newcomers with discrimination and misery (the 
post-9/11, nightmarish climate is a living 
chronicle of that).

Did I like The Namesake? How'd I grade it? Now, 
that's the hardest question of all. On one hand, 
I know deep in my heart that the storyteller and 
the film production company did not do justice to 
the intelligent and inquisitive liberal mind - 
Western or not - who wanted to know more; they 
sort of glossed over a serious and complex 
phenomenon that's become a hot-button issue for 
politicians, left or right, worldwide. 
Unintentionally, I believe, such a mass-market 
production would actually help the people in 
power to sweep the well-kept secrets about the 
real immigrant experience in America deeper under 
the rug. And that's a shame.

However, at the same time, I must not also forget 
to show gratitude to Mira Nair and her crew that 
they, for the first time, managed to put such a 
story - our story of hope, pain, sacrifice, 
suffering and joy, however partial and fragmented 
- up on the big screen, for the consumption and 
examination of a larger, mainstream, Western 
audience. In that sense, if pleasing that crowd 
helps it start examining more about the lives 
we're living in alienation, on the many islands - 
Bengali, Hindi, Spanish, Mandarin, Punjabi or 
Creole - that would be a gain, however little or 
late. Until and unless some of us, the more 
politically educated activist type, get to make 
our own mass form of expression, we'd very 
reluctantly accept an effort such as The 
Namesake, just because we have little other 
choice.

And that's the real predicament.


______


[7]

Book Review / The Hindu
April 03, 2007 

NEHRU ON NATION BUILDING

by Suranjan Das

Nehru had central concern for secularism, 
cultural pluralism, communal harmony and 
toleration


NEHRU'S INDIA -- Select Speeches: Mushirul Hasan 
-- Editor; Oxford University Press, YMCA Library 
Building, Jai Singh Road, New Delhi-110001. Rs. 
425.

This is yet another notable contribution from 
Mushirul Hasan for the enrichment of our 
understanding of modern India. Bringing together 
judiciously selected `engaging and moving 
speeches' of Jawaharlal Nehru, the volume unfolds 
the thoughts of the country's first Prime 
Minister on nation building. Hasan rightly 
considers them as "a voice that we shall gain 
much from by returning to more often." This is 
especially true when sectarian and fundamentalist 
forces constantly threaten the secular and 
democratic pillars of our federal polity, when 
the steady erosion of the presence of the state 
in the realm public welfare is undermining the 
structure of mixed economy, and when subservience 
to American unipolarism is endangering India's 
independence in world affairs.

Vision

The first section on `Sovereignty and the making 
of the Indian Republic' presents three of Nehru's 
speeches in the Constituent Assembly and his 
address from the Red Fort on the second 
anniversary of Independence. They outline his 
vision of an Indian polity based on 
politico-economic democracy, social justice, 
secularism and federalism. His reflections 
indicate how much he was influenced by the 
French, American and Russian revolutions.

Nehru envisaged India's `leadership role' in 
world affairs through the pursuit of 
non-alignment and Asian solidarity. He, however, 
urged his countrymen to be prepared for any 
contingency, remaining "firm and not bow down to 
evil". But he realised the advantage of 
maintaining the British link, of course, without 
compromising national sovereignty. That was the 
context of his advocacy for India's membership of 
the Commonwealth. All these thoughts on India's 
foreign policy are recounted in the second 
section.

Hasan returns in the third part to Nehru's 
central concern for secularism, cultural 
pluralism, communal harmony and toleration. The 
trauma of the Partition could never be erased 
from Nehru's mind. He emphasised the `vanguard' 
role of the minorities in building a secular 
India. But he opposed `communal representation', 
although he supported the policy of reservation 
for the Scheduled Castes since the issue was 
neither caste- nor religion-centric, but required 
to be considered "from the point of view that a 
backward group ought to be helped". Nehru placed 
a high premium on the role of universities, 
viewing them as symbols of `humanism', 
`tolerance', `reason', `progress', `adventure of 
ideas' and `search for truth'.

Transformation

The fourth section on `The Nation's Vision' 
captures Nerhu's thoughts on other crucibles in 
India's transformation process. He dreamt of "a 
classless society, based on cooperative effort, 
where there is opportunity for all". But he 
distanced himself from communists, preferring a 
`democratic and peaceful transition'. He 
propounded the concept of a `socialistic pattern 
of society', realisable through planned economy, 
land reforms, cooperative farming and 
industrialisation - but without eroding the base 
of agriculture and cottage industries - and by 
`sinking of differences' between labour and 
capital. He dubbed the demand for a linguistic 
reorganisation of States as `parochial', saying, 
"What is infinitely more important is what 
happens on either side of the boundary, and what 
happens within the state". He also stood for 
"unfettered growth" of all Indian languages. A 
passionate advocate of scientific spirit, he 
hardly missed any inaugural session of the Indian 
Science Congress.

I find the last part of the book particularly 
rewarding because it incorporates some of Nehru's 
less cited speeches. They, as Hasan aptly 
remarks, "illumine Nehru, the man behind the 
politician and administrator, an intellectual and 
philosopher, much in the mode of Plato's 
philosopher-King, whom he was so fond of citing."

Nehru's stress on extricating Indian 
historiography from `unabashed eurocentricism' - 
so brilliantly reflected in his Letters from a 
Father to His Daughter and The Discovery of India 
- is sharply driven home in his statement to the 
Indian Historical Records Commission on December 
23, 1948. Nehru underlined the importance of a 
museum, which was not merely to be `a symbol of 
... unconnected past', but "was meant to interest 
and educate ... which connects its objects with 
the things the visitors are used to seeing in 
their lives and in their environments."

Tributes

This section also contains Nehru's moving 
tributes to some of his illustrious 
contemporaries. He saw Sarojini Naidu as the 
representative of the composite culture of the 
East and the West; he compared Maulana Azad with 
the `great men of Renaissance'; he revered 
Rabindranath Tagore as one of India's sages and 
rishis. Many commentators refer to differential 
perceptions of Nehru and Gandhiji.

Nehru had the highest respect for the Mahatma 
whom he described as "a rock of purpose and a 
lighthouse of truth". Referring to the 
universality of Gandhian message, he emphasised 
"Whatever truth there was in it was a truth 
applicable to all countries and to humanity as a 
whole".

Nehru was a visionary par excellence, as has been 
amply testified to by the speeches presented in 
this volume with an appropriate introduction by 
Hasan. But much of his vision remained 
unfulfilled. We need to explain why there 
remained a gap between what Nehru visualised for 
a new India and what actually transpired. We look 
to scholars like Professor Hasan for an answer.



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Buzz for secularism, on the dangers of fundamentalism(s), on
matters of peace and democratisation in South
Asia. SACW is an independent & non-profit
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