SACW | Feb 8, 2007

[Harsh Kapoor]

South Asia Citizens Wire  | February 8, 2007 | Dispatch No. 2359 - Year 8

[Interruption Notice: Please note there will be no SACW dispatches 
between 9 - 13 February 2007]

[1]  Assessing Sri Lanka's presidential commission of inquiry 
(Kishali Pinto Jayawardena)
[2]  Pakistan: Why Musharraf Succeeds (S Akbar Zaidi)
[3]  North American Network for Democratic Republic of Nepal  - A Press Release
[4]  India - Higher education in a multicultural society (K.N. Panikkar)
[5]  India: My right not to be censored (Neera Chandhoke)
[6]  India - Gujarat: The non screening of "Parzania" - A Press 
Release by Prashant
[7]  Clemency for Mohd. Afzal Guru - A petition submitted to the 
President of India - on 7 February 2007
[8]  Call for Entries :  The International Festival & Forum on Gender 
and Sexuality 2007 (New Delhi, March 2007)

____


[1]  [Reproduced below is full text of a three part article by 
Kishali Pinto Jayawardena]

o o o

The Sunday Times Online
14 January 2007

ASSESSING SRI LANKA'S PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION OF INQUIRY [Part 1]

by Kishali Pinto Jayawardena

In a three part series commencing this week, this column will examine 
in detail the mandate and nature of the eight member Presidential 
Commission of Inquiry, (the Commission), established by the 
Government of Sri Lanka in 2006 in order to probe into fifteen 
selected incidents of assassinations, extra judicial killings and 
disappearances.

These cases include the assassinations of Minister Lakshman 
Kadirgamar, MP Joseph Pararajasingham, Kethesh Loganathan, the 
execution style shooting of 17 aid workers in Mutur and killings in 
Mutur, Trincomalee, Sancholai, Pesalai Beach, Kayts Police area, 
Pottuvil, Kebithagollawa, Welikanda, Digapathana and the 
disappearance of Rev Jim Brown, all of which occurred at varying 
points of time during 2005 and 2006.

The Commission (due to commence its formal sittings early next month) 
will be 'observed' by eleven 'eminent persons' whose functioning is 
also governed by a mandate issued by the Presidential Secretariat. 
While some nominations have invoked controversy, there is no doubt 
that Sri Lanka is fortunate to have had the inclusion of the highly 
respected former United Nations Special Rapporteur on Torture and 
current member of the United Nations Human Rights Committee, Nigel 
Rodley. Former Chief Justice of India, P.N. Bhagwati functions as the 
Chairman of this panel of observers.

The Government has been strident in its assertions that this 
Commission will constitute an effective mechanism in re-establishing 
accountability for rights violations in Sri Lanka. Consequently, the 
mandates of both the Commission and the international observers will 
be analysed in detail to see whether this is indeed, the case. In so 
doing, I will underline the fact that we have had enough of 
Commission Reports and Sessional Papers that have merely languished 
in the desks of bureaucrats.
On the contrary and insofar as killings allegedly by government 
forces are concerned, given the pervasive climate of impunity that 
has prevailed for decades, (aided by extraordinary emergency laws 
allowing abuses), an effective pattern of prosecutions will be the 
only actual deterrent. Yet, is the Commission satisfactorily 
structured to realise this objective?  Where petitions involve issues 
of service responsibility as factually and immensely complicated as 
those relating to prosecutions for extra judicial killings, can they 
be satisfactorily resolved by fact finding Commissions of Inquiry as 
well as the law and procedures applicable to command responsibility 
and burden of proof as are currently in force? These are the 
questions that will be investigated.
Act No 17 of 1948 (the law under which the Commission is 
established), was enacted primarily to provide for small local 
inquiries concerning the administration of any department of 
Government or the conduct of any member of the public service among 
other things. It is very clear that while this law may have been 
suitable for that purpose, it was not meant to be used for complex 
inquiries such as investigations into extra judicial killings.

Page 2 of the mandate of the Commission affirms its fact finding 
nature in that its investigations are stated to facilitate and enable 
the President "to present the relevant material to the appropriate 
competent authorities of the Government of Sri Lanka including the 
Attorney General" towards efficacious prosecutions. Thus, it does not 
automatically follow that immediate prosecutions will ensue from the 
recommendations of the Commission.

Rather, in a context where the Commission has itself, no separate 
investigative powers or investigative staff, it will function purely 
as a body before which aggrieved persons may present their versions 
(often differing) of the violations in issue. This will obviously 
accomplish little. Past practice of the work of similar Commissions 
has indicated this very well. One immediate comparative instance 
concerns the four 1994 Presidential Commissions of Inquiry to 
investigate the Involuntary Removal or Disappearances of Persons 
which was appointed under the very same law in terms of which the 
current Commission has been constituted.

Out of these four Commissions, the Commission investigating the 
Disappearances of Persons in the Western, Southern and Sabaragamuwa 
Provinces (hereafter the Western Province Disappearances Commission) 
remain the best example of the futility of processes of this nature, 
even if the Commission itself functions satisfactorily.

Some 10,000 witnesses gave evidence before the Western Province 
Disappearances Commission, which found the security forces 
responsible for a large part of the disappearances. However, the 
prosecutions that followed from these findings were negligible. 
Despite the fact that tens of thousands of such cases are thought to 
have occurred in the past, we have had only nine cases of convictions 
since 1998.

A major reason as to why findings of Commissions of Inquiry are not 
used in the actual prosecutions relevant to those cases is primarily 
because the standards of proof used in both contexts differ in 
substantial respects. The commission inquiry will hear evidence of 
those affected, which may at times be ex parte. In addition, the 
provisions of Act No 17 of 1948 stipulate that hearsay evidence 
(statements by third parties) may also be heard, which evidence would 
however be inadmissible in an actual prosecution.
However, the High Court before which prosecutions may be brought will 
consider the specific question as to whether particular service 
officers specified in the indictment were responsible beyond all 
reasonable doubt for their complicity in that particular crime. 
Hearsay evidence will obviously not be admissible for that purpose.

Next week's column will examine past examples where despite 
Commission findings in respect of the culpability of senior army 
officers, these officers were acquitted in prosecutions precisely as 
a result of what has been highlighted above. It will stress the 
necessity for rigorous changes in the law incorporating 
internationally accepted norms of command responsibility among other 
factors, in order that an effective prosecutorial strategy may be 
enabled. Undeniably, rather than the continued enthusiastic endorsing 
of fact finding procedures, this is what is currently imperative.


The Sunday Times Online
28 January 2007

ASSESSING SRI LANKA'S PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION OF INQUIRY [Part 2]

by Kishali Pinto Jayawardena

In the last column, the constitution of the eight member Presidential 
Commission of Inquiry, (the Commission), established by the 
Government of Sri Lanka last year in order to probe into fifteen 
selected incidents of extra judicial killings and other grave human 
rights violations, was examined. The Commission will begin sittings 
in early February.

The point made was very simple; precious little can be achieved by 
fact finding Commissions of this nature. Instead, what is required 
are substantive legal changes that relate to the determination of 
questions of service responsibility as factually and immensely 
complicated as those relating to prosecutions for extra judicial 
killings. This week's column takes this discussion somewhat further.

However, rather than limiting the debate to the fifteen cases 
mandated for inquiry by this Commission, let me put these matters in 
their historical context. During the past three decades, we have 
undergone civil and ethnic conflict as a result of which, more than 
sixty thousand people have died.  These killings have occurred both 
in the North due to the conflict between the separatist Liberation 
Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) as well as during the late eighties when 
there were attempts by the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP) to capture 
the government through armed force.

The abuses that occurred during these periods of conflict were 
manifold.  While the LTTE and the JVP were responsible for countless 
acts of terror, the counter response on the part of the various 
Governments was equally ruthless. Many people were simply 
'disappeared' by state agents using emergency laws that gave them 
extraordinary powers or by paramilitaries acting with the knowledge 
and concurrence of sections of government.

There is no question that these deprivations of life were due to a 
system that allowed and even encouraged such abuses. A familiar 
argument of successive governments has limited responsibility to 
rogue elements within its ranks. One primary factor however gives the 
lie to this spurious defense.

This is that despite the many thousands of disappearances and extra 
judicial killings, the Sri Lankan State has been demonstrably 
unwilling to put into place, specific mechanisms of legal 
accountability that counter impunity for these perpetrators. Most 
particularly, we have seen only two successful prosecutions in recent 
times. Ironically, one case concerned brutal acts of rape and murder 
of a Tamil schoolgirl and members of her family by soldiers in the 
North (the Krishanthi Kumaraswamy Case) while the other concerned the 
no less brutal enforced disappearance of fifty three Sinhalese 
schoolboys in a remote village in the South (the Embilipitiya Case).
The reason why prosecutions in respect of disappearances and extra 
judicial killings fall by the wayside is very clear. Present Sri 
Lankan legal structures, based on old notions of British criminal 
justice, are wholly unable to deal with questions of service 
responsibility as factually and immensely complicated as they are in 
these cases. Let me now illustrate this point in one simple but 
nevertheless extremely powerful example.

Prior to the Embilipitiya prosecutions, the Western, Southern and 
Sabaragamuwa Disappearances Commission of Inquiry (the Western 
Province Disappearances Commission) submitted a Special Report on the 
Embilipitiya incidents to President Chandrika Kumaratunga on 
29.11.'95 which found not only a group of junior officers but the 
district coordinating military secretary (who was in effective charge 
of the military for that area) responsible for the enforced 
disappearances.
However, when the case went to the Ratnapura High Court for 
prosecution, even though that senior army officer, Brigadier 'Parry' 
Liyanage was indicted along with the other junior officers, he was 
acquitted due to the Court holding that no evidence could be found 
directly linking him to the charges of abduction with intent to kill. 
(See Application No; 121/94, Judgement of the Ratnapura High Court on 
23/02/1999. Some of the junior officers were convicted). What is 
striking is that the findings of the Western Province Disappearances 
Commission were not relevant for this prosecution and, in fact, did 
not appear to have even been cited before the High Court.
As remarked previously in this column, the precise reason for this 
non-relevance is not difficult to discover; commissions of this 
nature are purely fact finding and function very differently from 
courts of law.  Standards of proof used in findings of the Commission 
and in judicial prosecutions differ. Hearsay evidence (unlike in the 
case of Commission proceedings) will not be admissible for that 
purpose in judicial proceedings.

There is a very strong possibility that this same pattern will repeat 
itself in the fifteen cases that would be inquired into by the 
current Commission of Inquiry. In other words, (and confounding 
current cynicism) even if the inquiry/investigative process of the 
Commission proceeds successfully, its findings may well prove to be 
useless when the matter goes to actual prosecutions in terms of the 
existing criminal law.

Within this rigid framework of the law, it is no surprise that the 
most that can happen is the successful prosecution of junior 
officers. However, senior officers escape unscathed and the system 
itself (which condones and encourages such actions) remains in place. 
So we have the paradoxical result that while state appointed 
Commissions of Inquiry find culpability on the part of state 
officers, the laxity of the law allows them escape.  Practically, in 
both the Embilipitiya Case and the Krishanthi Kumaraswamy Case, only 
the junior level officers were successfully prosecuted with their 
convictions being upheld on appeal.

Even more disturbingly, the law has developed in such a manner that 
even though the doctrine of command responsibility has not been held 
applicable to state agents in times of war in the relevant 
prosecutions, such principles have nonetheless been affirmed in a 
different judicial context of fundamental rights violations in 
situations of ordinary law and order.  The inconsistency in this 
differential application of judicial principles has been marked.

The concluding part of this column next week will examine these cases 
and will urge a different approach to securing accountability in 
regard to human rights violations as contrasted to a fact finding 
Commission of Inquiry from which improbable miracles continue to be 
promised by this Government.


The Sunday Times Online
4 February 2007

ASSESSING SRI LANKA'S PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION OF INQUIRY [Part 3]

by Kishali Pinto Jayawardena

This is the concluding segment of a three part series of articles 
critically examining the recently established eight member 
Presidential Commission of Inquiry, (the Commission), to probe into 
fifteen selected incidents of grave human rights violations that had 
occurred in the country during 2005 and 2006. A team of international 
"eminent persons" will observe the Commission's work and the 
functioning of both bodies will be in accordance with their 
particular Mandates.

Some eminently commonsensical points may be disposed of first. The 
fifteen incidents selected for the scrutiny of this fact-finding body 
are only a minute fraction of similar abuses that continue to take 
place even as this column is being written. Is it not discriminatory, 
if not wholly irrational that some incidents have been selected for 
inquiry by this special process while others have been exempted? On 
what basis has this selection been done and the spatio-temporal 
limits of the Commission's mandate defined?
In addition, problematic conditionalities govern the release of the 
findings of the Commission in regard to which, the President can 
withhold the publication of any material which is in his opinion, 
"prejudicial to or absolutely necessary for the protection of 
national security, public safety or wellbeing." Curiously, different 
grounds seem to govern the release of the reports of the Commission 
and the International Observers.  It seems that though at an early 
stage, both mandates used the same vague term of 'public safety and 
well being', the Mandate of the Observers (see the supposedly final 
version of the Mandate of the International Observers dated November 
24, 2006 and signed by the Secretary to the President) was changed 
later to the more rigorous wording of 'national security' and 'public 
order' while the Mandate of the Commission remained the same.

Meanwhile, ambiguities in the relevant last paragraph of the Mandate 
of the Commission leaves the publication of its Report dependant upon 
yet another contingent factor; namely that the publication should be 
immediately after the Attorney General decides to prosecute and files 
indictment for that purpose. The question then arises; what would be 
the situation if the Attorney General decides that there is not 
enough prima facie evidence to prosecute? Or, for that matter, in a 
country where the indictments take up to two years even in the case 
of ordinary crimes, what if there is interminable delay in the 
issuance of the indictments? Would the Report then not be made public 
till all these conditions are complied with?

 From the question of publication we should proceed to the issue of 
prosecution. The Mandate of the International Observers contains a 
clause that permits objections to be made public when the Attorney 
General unlawfully or unreasonably refrains from instituting 
prosecutions on the findings of the Commission. It is however 
relevant that the Commissioners are directed to come to a finding on 
the 'identities, descriptions and backgrounds of persons and groups 
of persons who are responsible under the applicable laws and legal 
principles of Sri Lanka' for the commission of deaths, injury or 
physical harm in respect of the fifteen selected incidents.

By itself, this stipulation seems innocuous. After all, the relevant 
standard should indeed, be "the applicable laws and legal principles 
of Sri Lanka." But then, what would be the case if such laws and 
standards are manifestly inadequate to deal with the complexity of 
war crimes that the Commission will undoubtedly be called upon to 
deal with? For example, if the question of culpability involves 
indirect rather than direct responsibility, could the Commission 
recommend prosecution and would the Attorney General be justified in 
issuing indictment? If not, would the Observers be justified in 
regarding this as an unreasonable or unlawful decision of the 
Attorney General to refrain from prosecution?

Last week's column looked at a singular instance of the Embilipitiya 
Case concerning the abduction of twenty four Sinhalese schoolchildren 
with intent to kill by officers of the army during the height of the 
Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna insurrection in the late eighties. In this 
instance, the Attorney General did, in fact, prosecute Brigadier 
'Parry' Liyanage, the district coordinating military secretary and 
hence in effective charge of the military for that area. 
Notwithstanding the fact that a fact-finding Commission of Inquiry 
into Disappearances had found a measure of responsibility on the part 
of this senior army officer, he was acquitted in the High Court due 
to the finding that no evidence could be found directly linking him 
to the abductions.

This was a good illustration of the absence of the doctrine of 
command responsibility in our criminal law. Principles of the Rome 
Statute on the International Criminal Court imposing responsibility 
where a commander either knew or should have known that such crimes 
were being committed by forces effectively under his or her command, 
and failed to take all necessary and reasonable measures to prevent 
the commission of the crimes or to have them investigated, (Article 
28), are important in that regard.

But apart from the criminal law, it is disturbing is that even in a 
different judicial context of exercising its jurisdiction pertaining 
to fundamental rights violations, Sri Lankan judges have been wary of 
emphasizing the doctrine of command responsibility in situations of 
conflict. For example, following Brigadier Liyanage's acquittal 
referred to above, he subsequently won a fundamental rights case 
against his non-promotion to the rank of Major General. The Supreme 
Court took the contested position that in the absence of direct 
involvement in the disappearances, Brigadier Liyanage merely occupied 
'a place of authority in the chain of command.' (see SC Application 
No;506/99, SCM dated 25.11.99). To give the proverbial devil her just 
due, it must be said however that despite the direction of the Court, 
then President Chandrika Kumaratunge refused to make the promotion.

In puzzling contradistinction, the Supreme Court has been far more 
receptive to applying the doctrine of command responsbility in 
situations of ordinary law and order. For example, in Silva vs 
Iddamalgoda, ( 2003 [2] SriLR, 63) and in the Wewelage Rani Fernando 
Case SC(FR) No 700/2002, SCM 26/07/2004,) the officer-in-charge of a 
police station and senior prison officials were respectively held 
liable, not on direct involvements in the acts of torture but rather, 
on their non-action.
These paradoxes are understandably bewildering to human rights 
activists who tend to shy away from rarefied battles over obscure 
points of legal theory in the courtrooms. Yet there is no doubt that 
the reform of the legal/justice system and the law itself is key to 
ensuring rule of law norms in times of conflict. Ideally, the 
Commission process and the involvement of an independent objective 
element through the international observers could be used to urge 
such a process, including the establishing of an effective witness 
protection programme.

In the alternative, we will be reluctant observers of yet another 
dilatory, obfuscatory 'fact-finding' process with no perceptible 
impact on a prevalent culture of impunity and a manifest lack of 
prosecutorial/judicial will.

______


[2]

Economic and Political Weekly
January 27, 2007

Letter from South Asia

WHY MUSHARRAF SUCCEEDS

Military rule in Pakistan has had long spells because the army has 
learnt how to be repressive and yet accommodative, target only the 
marginalised and minority groups, buy off support from political 
groups and, in Musharraf's case, make use of the US fear of "Islamic" 
power.

by S Akbar Zaidi

Why does military rule persist in Pakistan for as long as it does, at 
times up to a decade, often without much resistance? Why is military 
rule acceptable to a large number of people, perhaps even the 
majority at certain times, and even preferred to Pakistan's own form 
of electoral politics or democracy? Two possible, partial, 
explanations have been suggested by commentators in these columns. 
One relates to the nature of Pakistan's civil society and questions 
whether it has a democratic gene in it, or whether its agenda is more 
of "enlightened moderation" rather than of participatory politics, 
and is hence willing to support anyone who fulfils that agenda 
through any means. Similarly, as a corollary, the second strand of 
this argument assertsthat the political class, which should be 
involved in the democratic process of politicking, is more interested 
in coming to power at any cost, even if that means coming to some 
'samjhota' with military rule than having to take the military 
head-on.

Clearly, what both these strands suggest is that Pakistanis are 
opportun- ists andare concerned, like most rational beings, in 
specific outcomes and results, and not in the process through which 
they are achieved. It also suggests that these groups in society are 
more willing to compromise than oppose or contradict the state 
institutions. While this is perhaps a partial and tenuous argument, 
it ignores the role - at times brutal, at others accommodative - that 
the military plays in this equation. In order to under- stand the 
longevity of military rule in Pakistan, let us first examine how 
general Zia stayed in power for 11 years and how general Musharraf 
can easily do likewise.

Zia and Bhutto
General Zia came in to power in July 1977 through a coup, which was 
backed by a large number of politicians who were against Z A Bhutto. 
Clearly the supporters of the Pakistan People's Party, Bhutto's 
party, were against the coup and against Zia, especially when he 
hanged Bhutto in 1979. Zia's regime was oppressive and brutal by any 
definition of the term. He had hundreds of Bhutto supporters ar- 
rested, jailed and flogged. Some were even hanged. The greatest 
opposition Zia faced was from the People's Party, and not from the 
collective constituency of political actors - women's groups were a 
notice- able and commendable exception. Many of those who had 
suffered Bhutto's wrath, if they did not openly support Zia, sat on 
the sidelines hoping that they too would get their turn in power.
Using Islamic laws and symbols as props for legitimacy, Zia managed 
to put the fear of god in all Pakistanis and became an active social 
engineer "Islamising" Pakistani institutions and society. He claimed 
to derive his legitimacy from fulfilling Pakistan's destiny to become 
an Islamic country and thereby drew support from a large section of 
Pakistan's urban middle classes, many of whom endorsed his 
Islamisation programme. Essentially, he was able to get social 
support from key sections in Pakistan's society as well as political 
support from Islamic parties by bringing them into the political 
arena as members of his parliament, the Majlis-e Shoora. However, a 
section of Pakistan's enlightened and moderate women played a key 
role in opposing his government.  And of course, and most 
importantly, there was Afghanistan, and the country became the US' 
front line state receiving large amounts of military and economic 
aid. The Musharraf story has many par- allels with Zia.

Just as Zia had alienated Bhutto's supporters but was able to draw 
support from other political groups and build his own mainstream 
political constituency, Musharraf too has been able to work with most 
political groups and parties who feel that by keeping their options 
open, they will be allowed to share the power the military chooses to 
dispense. The military's game when in power is to quickly identify 
individuals and groups - there are many, too many of them - who are 
willing to work with it and allow them some sem- blance of authority 
and autonomy in a political structure which it dominates. This form 
of praetorian democracy has worked well for both Zia and Musharraf. 
Identical to Zia's Islamisation pro- gramme and his desire to fulfil 
Pakistan's Islamic destiny (even if it is inverse in content) is 
Musharraf's messianic mission of "enlightened moderation", intended 
to realise the general's vision of Pakistan's destiny. In both cases, 
not surprisingly, there are numerous actors, groups and factions who 
are willing - even genuinely eager - to fulfil Pakistan's destiny in 
either of these two opposing directions. Hence, allies have never 
been a problem for any military regime in Pakistan.

Ends and Means
In Musharraf's case, just as the general has himself genuinely 
expressed the view that he (at least personally) wants to see a 
liberal and moderate Pakistan, there are numerous Pakistanis, too who 
want the country to be a modern, liberal, enlightened and peaceful 
society. Just as there were those who supported Zia's Islamic agenda 
out of their strong belief in such a political project for Pakistan, 
there are those who feel the same way about Musharraf's vision. When 
the ends justify the means, why should either vision be spoiled by 
agitational politics or democracy?

It is this accommodative and inclusive, rather than exclusionary, 
political strategy which ensures that military rule in Pakistan 
continues unabated. Moreover, it is the refinement of this strategy 
from military regime to military regime, which allows the Musharraf 
dispensation to be less repressive than either Ayub Khan or Zia. 
Military rule in Pakistan is increasingly relying on the carrot 
rather than the stick.  Also, in all the three episodes, the US 
government and Washington's financial institutions have played a key 
role in supporting the generals' rule in Pakistan.  Without this 
financial, military and dip- lomatic support, none of the military 
governments would have survived as long as they did. This also 
explains why the decades of military rule show higher growth rates in 
the economy than the democratic interregnums. In each of the three 
cases the generals used the financial support from the US and other 
western governments to not only provide patronage and buy-off 
political opposition, but to also invest in economic resources. They 
could not have done this on their own.  Military rule does also make 
enemies and excludes some groups. However, interestingly, in 
Pakistan, in each of three military regimes the exclusion and 
repression - often brutal and military - has been of ethnic/regional 
groups and not of mainstream political parties. But what is critical 
is that the military regimes are able to get away with this brutality 
precisely because they do not face enough opposi- tion. Ayub Khan and 
Yahya Khan were able to rape East Pakistan because there was no 
protest in west Pakistan against the military's actions; the 
democratic movement against Zia came mainly from Sindh and Zia was 
able to suppress the province because most of the political parties 
there were accommodated in his settlement. And now Balochistan under 
Musharraf: the little resistance that his oppressive policies receive 
is isolated and takes place far away in this region, on the sidelines 
of "main- stream" political Pakistan.  Musharraf has also succeeded 
by reading the times astutely. Zia ul Haq, despite all his 
accommodative skills, would have found it difficult to survive in a 
post 9-11 anti-Islam world. In a world of US domination and "western" 
values, Musharraf has pandered to the fear- syndrome lobbies of the 
west, a factor that has resulted in his longevity. He has also 
benefited from the "there is no alternative" factor: he has projected 
himself as a liberal, moderate, enlightened, Muslim general who rules 
a country with nuclear weapons.  If the US withdraws its support 
without finding a strong and reliable alternative to Musharraf, the 
nuclear weapons could end up in the hands of Islamic fundamentals, so 
goes the improbable theory. Better to work with the devil you know 
than the one you do not.

With Musharraf making plans to be re- elected as general-president 
for another five years, there does not seem to be any way to dislodge 
him from power. He will not go voluntarily and the opposition, hoping 
to "share" power with him in the next assembly, is unlikely to make 
much noise. Having made a number of enemies in Waziristan and 
Balochistan, probably the only way he would end up going is the Zia 
way. Until then, general Musharraf is assured a political career 
perhaps far longer than any of his predecessors.

______


[3]


NORTH AMERICAN NETWORK FOR DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF NEPAL (NANDRON)
PRESS RELEASE
February 5, 2007

North American Network for Democratic Republic of Nepal (NANDRON) is 
deeply concerned over the violent situation in Terai and expresses 
its solidarity with the common people of Terai, and renounces the 
violence and infiltration of the regressive forces in peaceful 
agitation launched by Madhesi people demanding their rightful place 
in Nepal's political system. It is obvious that regressive 
monarchical forces are trying to reestablish themselves through 
infiltration in the movement by jeopardizing the upcoming Constituent 
Assembly Elections. We demand immediate isolation of the infiltrators 
and opening up of dialogue with genuine leaders leading the Madhesi 
movement.

NANDRON urges Nepal government to fulfill the genuine demands of 
Terai communities and immediately declare Nepal as Democratic 
Republic with Federal Governance System, paving way to the 
Constituent Assembly's election. We also demand the implementation of 
the comprehensive peace agreement and announcement of the CA election 
date immediately.

NANDRON supports inclusive and participatory governance through 
proportional representation with equal participation of all 
ethnicities in the affairs of state. At this historic juncture, when 
it appears possible to build Nepal as a promised land for all, unity, 
understanding and trust among all ethnicity, and linguistic groups, 
are paramount. Let us vouch for the national integrity.
NANDRON demands the Rayamajhi Commission Report be made public and 
fully implemented immediately as recommended by the Commission. We 
would like to draw the attention of all the lawmakers in the interim 
legislature that the Non-resident Nepalese be not deprived of voting 
rights in this historic event of the Constituent Assembly's election 
for the establishment of a New Nepal.
The North American Network for Democratic Republic of Nepal (NANDRON) 
is an advocacy and watchdog organization acting as a common forum for 
all Nepali expatriates and friends of Nepal living in North America 
with one of its primary objectives being advocacy and awareness 
campaigns to help the political parties, civil society, and people of 
Nepal pursuing for the establishment of a popular, inclusive and 
representative democratic republican system in the country.

Dr. Chitra Tiwari
Coordinator
United State of America
Washington DC
cktiwari at verizon.net,
ddpoudel at cox.net


______


[4]

The Hindu
February 08, 2007

HIGHER EDUCATION IN A MULTICULTURAL SOCIETY

by K.N. Panikkar

Value education should be primarily secular without, however, 
discarding the humanist elements in religious traditions.

THE UNESCO International Commission on Education for the Twenty-first 
Century headed by Jacques Delors has identified "learning to be" and 
"learning to live together" as two among the four pillars of 
education. They connote some of the fundamental values education 
tries to impart in any society. "Learning to be" addresses the 
question of development of the inner capacity of the individual, 
which will prepare him or her to meet social and political 
responsibilities. "Learning to live together" would involve the 
creation of a harmonious life, transcending sectarian loyalties and 
differences. There is no education without values, but in all 
societies values are a mixed bag. They are so because of differing 
ideological needs. Yet there are certain universal values all 
societies cherish and disseminate. Education is an effective agency 
of value dissemination, particularly in the context of a globalised 
world. As such, the values in education are a combination of the 
universal and the particular, both subject to changes according to 
the differing patterns of human experience. The values of higher 
education in India as obtained at the time of its liberation from 
colonial rule in 1947 and developed thereafter were shaped by the 
influences of these two dimensions.

The search for the creation of new values in education has a fairly 
long history, reaching back to the period of early colonial rule. The 
Indian intelligentsia during the colonial period had sought to evolve 
a system of education qualitatively different from the colonial and 
the traditional. The alternative did not entirely reject them. It was 
an effort to reconcile tradition with modernity in which tradition 
was identified as the dominant literate culture and its religion and 
modernity as the culture of the capitalist West filtered through 
colonialism. The beginning of the quest for such reconciliation can 
be traced to the intellectual engagements in the early part of the 
19th century. The genesis of modern ideas of education in India is 
generally attributed to the colonial system but in reality they 
emerged in opposition to it. The Indian intelligentsia tried to 
evolve an alternative that was neither colonial nor traditional, 
although it borrowed ideas from both. Given the colonial hegemony, 
however, the alternative was stillborn, remaining mainly at the level 
of ideas without much of an impact on practice. As a result, the 
modern educated intelligentsia was nurtured on the social and 
political values the colonial system tried to disseminate, which 
continued to be an influential factor even after Independence.

The thinking on education as reflected in the recommendations of 
various commissions and policy statements from 1948 to 1992 
underlined an increasing tendency to adopt secular values. 
Unfortunately, this tendency to orient value education on 
secular-democratic lines received a setback thereafter when Hindu 
communal forces controlled the governments at the Centre and in some 
States. During this period, two tendencies acquired prominence. 
First, to promote religion-centred education by defining value 
education mainly in religious terms. Secondly, to discard the 
critical approach to the tradition-modernity relationship and to 
privilege traditional values over all others.

The implication of this historical experience - the incorporation of 
secular values and their attempted reversal - is a useful guide in 
the formulation of value education. These two tendencies represented 
two different conceptions of Indian society. The former implied a 
plural society struggling to become multi-cultural whereas the latter 
implied an attempt to turn a plural society into a mono-cultural one. 
India being a multi-religious society with a variety of cultural 
practices, one of the aims of value education should be to promote 
the former and discourage the latter. If so, value education has to 
be primarily secular without, however, discarding the humanist 
elements in religious traditions. Such an approach would lead to two 
sets of values. The first, universal moral values such as truth, 
honesty, and compassion; and, the second, values such as secularism, 
democracy, and equality. These two sets of values are generally 
considered mutually exclusive, but are not really so, as secularism 
essentially creates a moral universe.

Pillars of secularism

The three pillars of secularism, to borrow the terminology used in 
the UNESCO report, are religious universalism, humanism, and 
rationality. In a multi-religious society universalism is one of the 
ideological bases of secularism. It would help to create harmony 
among religions by emphasising the commonly shared religious truth, 
which could lead to mutual respect of religions. Without respecting 
the religious rights of different denominations, a multi-religious 
society can hardly have a peaceful existence. One of the travails of 
Indian society since colonial times has been religious strife which, 
among other things, is a result of the absence of mutual respect. 
Faith in religious universalism, which is central to secularism, 
alone can bring about a harmonious relation between religions. 
Therefore, the core belief of universalism that all religions are 
essentially the same and differences are only in their external 
manifestations is a necessary value to cultivate in a multi-religious 
society.

In all considerations of values in education, the multi-cultural and 
multi-religious character of Indian society figures prominently. The 
solution to the tensions arising out of this is sought through the 
dissemination of secularism as a value of education. This naturally 
brings into focus the place of religion in education. The 
overwhelming consensus has been in favour of education about 
religions distinct from religious education. The distinction is 
extremely important as the former would reinforce universalism and 
the latter would strengthen particularism. India is generally 
considered a multi-cultural society. If equality is central to 
multiculturalism, such an appellation is of doubtful validity. India 
is at best a plural society, which tolerates the existence of 
different cultures.

Cultural equality in practice is yet a far cry. It is in this context 
that the inculcation of secular values becomes crucial as it would 
contribute to the transition from the plural to the multicultural. 
The cultural homogenisation the Hindu communal forces try to bring 
about would adversely affect this process. The tendency to privilege 
an invented monoculture of the past tends to undermine the possible 
realisation of multiculturalism. In this context, therefore, imbibing 
secularism as a value in education assumes great importance. In 
recent times, both cultural homogenisation as well as privileging the 
invented monoculture of the past gained ascendancy in the realm of 
higher education.

In all discussions on educational values, there is a tendency to 
differentiate the secular values from the moral and the ethical. The 
assumption is that secular and moral values are distinct and 
unrelated. A strict division between the two is unreal, not only 
because they are interrelated in practice but also because most of 
the moral and ethical values are also embedded in the latter. One of 
the foundations of secularism, for instance, is humanism, which 
incorporates almost all moral and ethical values derived from 
religious teachings. This is not to argue that values derived from 
religious teachings need not be part of education, but to suggest 
that religion is not the only possible source for the incorporation 
of moral values such as compassion, love, mutual respect. It is 
possible to inculcate such values from secular sources also. The 
purpose of education could be variously interpreted, ranging from the 
mundane to the spiritual. That it helps to understand the meaning of 
life, to realise the creative potential of human beings, and to 
locate oneself in society is beyond dispute. Today when Indian 
society is entering a new phase of global participation, a variety of 
tensions are likely to emerge. One among them is related to the place 
of traditional values in a fast changing social, cultural, and 
intellectual climate. That they cannot be discarded is generally 
acknowledged. It is equally true that there is no place for revival. 
The solution is creative integration of the values of both for which 
the inculcation of secular values in higher education, which provides 
a sphere for critical interrogation, could pave the way.

(The writer is a historian who is currently Chairman of the Higher 
Education Commission of Kerala. This article is based on a 
presentation at the Indo-China seminar on Higher Education in New 
Delhi on January 20-21, 2007.)

______


[5] 

Indian Express
February 08, 2007

MY RIGHT NOT TO BE CENSORED

As 'Parzania' is kept out of theatres in Gujarat, the question is: 
Can a ban on a book, play or painting ever serve a larger cause?

by Neera Chandhoke

  The Indian state banned Salman Rushdie's The Satanic Verses in 1988 
and 27 years later film exhibitors ruled out the screening of 
Parzania in Gujarat. In both cases it was feared that an otherwise 
creative work might enrage political passions, cause law and order 
problems, lead to the destruction of private and public property. 
What on earth, defenders of censorship can ask, is wrong with this? 
Individuals, howsoever creative, sometimes need to be curtailed in 
the interests of the public good. Reportedly activists of the Bajrang 
Dal warned owners of cinema houses in Gujarat that any decision on 
whether the film on the human consequences of post-Godhra riots 
should be screened, should keep in mind the interests of the state. 
That the theatre owners' decision is prompted by commerce more, and 
by considerations of ethics less, is not as important as the basic 
question: why is censorship of a book, a film, a play, or a painting 
wrong, if the ban serves a larger cause?

We can only answer this question when we ask the reverse question: 
Why is censorship wrong? What does censorship do to the authors of a 
text? At an obvious level, censorship denies the author the basic 
right to freedom of expression. Human beings have the right to 
articulate their opinions, and give form to their creativity, their 
notions of how things are and how they should be. This is what being 
human means - to reflect on what it means to belong to society, to 
critique social practices, to dream of a desired society and to give 
expression to these yearnings. I may not agree with the precise way 
in which you frame your opinion or your creativity. But as the 
philosopher Voltaire put it, 'I disapprove of what you say, but I 
will defend to the death your right to say it'. Censorship denies 
basic rights to the creator of the text, and thereby the right to be 
human.

Certainly, freedom of expression, like other rights, is not absolute; 
it can be limited by the principle of serious harm. If an 
inflammatory speech leads to communal or caste riots in which other 
persons are seriously harmed, the speech giver is culpable under law. 
What else counts for serious harm? Consider incidents in which either 
'this' group or 'that' has demanded that a book be withdrawn, or a 
film not be screened. In India, increasingly groups who tend to 
belong to one particular ideology get agitated over representations 
of Saraswati by M.F. Husain on the grounds that this representation 
'hurts' their sentiments. Deepa Mehta was not allowed by the same 
kind of group to film Water on the same pretext. Irate mutterings 
accompanied her earlier film Fire; the film, it was said, was against 
Indian culture. Historians cannot criticise Shivaji because he is an 
icon of Maharashtra. The film Fanaa could not be shown in Gujarat 
because the hero commented adversely on the Narmada issue. Now 
Parzania cannot be shown in the same state, because it might 
perchance harm the interests of the state.

But what is the notion of harm that is being employed here? Husain's 
sketch of Saraswati followed a well-known and historical genre of 
representation in India. The film Water documents the plight of 
widows, not unknown to the newspaper-reading public. The film Fire 
deals with a phenomenon which is again not unknown - alternative 
sexualities. Fanaa was banned because the hero said something that 
had been documented in hundreds of government and non-government 
reports: That lakhs of people in the Narmada valley have been 
displaced without proper compensation. And hundreds of published and 
unpublished reports about what happened in Gujarat are in the public 
domain.

In all these cases, the basic freedom of the author of the work has 
been violated, even though the exercise of his or her right has not 
resulted in serious harm. But our rights as readers, as watchers of 
films, as art lovers, and as citizens have also been violated. To 
watch a film is to engage in a dialogue with the filmmaker, to 
respond to the issues raised and the manner in which they have been 
raised, to criticise them and to mull over them. A good filmmaker 
shakes society out of its complacency, forces people to think.

Censorship deprives us of this 'waking up'. It violates two rights - 
your right to tell me a story, howsoever wracking that story might 
be. It also violates my right to learn from that story. Either way, 
censorship prevents communication. This defeats the purpose of 
democracy; the rights of authors not to be prevented by the actions 
of other agents from communicating their ideas to others who might 
wish to hear them.

-The writer is a professor of political science, University of Delhi


______


[6]

   Prashant  
. The Province Office for Integral Social Development of the Gujarat Jesuits
. A  Centre  for  Human  Rights, Justice  and  Peace
Post   Box   No.   4050,    Navrangpura,   Ahmedabad  380 009, 
Gujarat,    India
Tel. :    +91 (079)  66522333,   2745 5913         .         Fax : 
+91 (079)  2748 9018, 2630 1362
Mobile :   9824034536 .  e-mail : sjprashant at gmail.com   . 
  www.humanrightsindia.in

PRESS   NOTE


The news that "Parzania", a film by Rahul Dholakia will not be 
screened by the multiplex owners of Ahmedabad is simply shocking.

The cold fact that an individual or a small group can terrorize 
ordinary citizens in this State,  speaks  volumes of the break-down 
of the law and order mechanism.  It is also a clear indication that 
the ordinary citizens are denied their rights and freedoms.  For 
them, the so called "Vibrancy" of this State, is a sheer sham...a 
total falsehood.

Citizens of Gujarat should now boldly come out to protest  the 
violation of their fundamental rights and make every possible effort 
 to ensure that  "Parzania" is screened  everywhere and that as many 
as possible are able to see it.

A new "Satyagraha" has to take place !

Fr. Cedric Prakash sj
for and on behalf of several concerned citizens
and human rights activists


7th February 2007

______


[7]

www.sacw.net |  8 February 2007

CLEMENCY FOR MOHD. AFZAL GURU - A PETITION SUBMITTED TO THE PRESIDENT 
OF INDIA - ON 7 FEBRUARY 2007
http://www.sacw.net/hrights/Afzalpet7feb07.pdf

______


[8]

Call for Productions from African, Asian, Pacific, Latin American,
European and Caribbean countries

The Public Service Broadcasting Trust is pleased to invite audiovisual
productions for

THE INTERNATIONAL FESTIVAL & FORUM ON GENDER AND SEXUALITY

New Delhi, India, March 2007

The Festival will bring together a rich collection of films from India
and across the world delving into the deep intricacies of our everyday
experiences of gender and sexuality and those that raise some of the
larger issues associated with these identities and constructions.

If you have recently directed a documentary, a short fiction film, a
feature or a television programme that is innovative (in form or
content), creative, challenging and goes beyond conventional forms of
television/ film language, we are interested in screening your work.

For details on entering films visit www.psbt.org

Public Service Broadcasting Trust is a not for profit trust that
represents the confluence of energies in an attempt to foster a shared
public culture of broadcasting that is as exciting and cutting edge, as
it is socially responsive and representative of democratic values. In
seeking to do this, PSBT seeks to situate a new vocabulary and activism
at the very heart of broadcasting in India.

_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/

Buzz for secularism, on the dangers of fundamentalism(s), on
matters of peace and democratisation in South
Asia. SACW is an independent & non-profit
citizens wire service run since 1998 by South
Asia Citizens Web: www.sacw.net/
SACW archive is available at: bridget.jatol.com/pipermail/sacw_insaf.net/

DISCLAIMER: Opinions expressed in materials carried in the posts do not
necessarily reflect the views of SACW compilers.