SACW #2 | Nov. 27-28, 2006 | Bangladesh: Sharia State or Secular State?

[Harsh Kapoor]

South Asia Citizens Wire - Pack 2 | November 
27-28, 2006 | Dispatch No. 2327 - Year 8

[1]  The Road To A Sharia State?: Cultural 
Radicalization in Bangladesh (Maneeza Hossain)

____


[1] 

Hudson Institute
White Paper
November 2006

THE ROAD TO A SHARIA STATE?
Cultural Radicalization in Bangladesh

by Maneeza Hossain

Located in a hidden corner of South Asia, poised 
to become either a thriving democracy or a failed 
state, Bangladesh has the potential of becoming a 
major front in the global confrontation with 
radical Islamism. If democracy is preserved and 
enhanced, Bangladesh can serve as a model of how 
to counter radical incursions into Muslim 
democratic environments; if democracy is 
defeated, this will be the first such victory for 
radical Islamism and will likely unleash a global 
wave of radical Islamist activism, similar to 
that following the Islamist victory over the 
Soviet-backed Communist regime in Afghanistan. 
The fact that Islamists in Bangladesh have been 
striving to lay the foundation of a Sharia state 
is no secret. Their efforts present a complex set 
of difficulties for democratic life in the 
country, similar to those faced by democratic 
systems that had allowed the activities of 
Communist parties prior to the fall of the Soviet 
empire. In the case of both Communism and 
Islamism, we are faced with ideologies that 
tactically accept the democratic rules of the 
game in order to promote and eventually establish 
a system that negates democracy. The issue in 
Bangladesh is two-fold: (1) There might not be a 
sufficient appreciation of the nature of the 
Islamist threat. Some doubt that the program of 
the Islamists includes the establishment of a 
Sharia state, or they are skeptical of the 
Islamists' ability to reach their goal. (2) There 
is no counter program in effect to address the 
comprehensive character of the Islamists' agenda, 
notably in the area of cultural radicalization.
To date, attempts by those aware of the risks of 
cultural radicalization have only deepened the 
effects of the Islamist program.

Defining Cultural Radicalization

Radicalization is the attempt to "restore" a 
society's cultural purity by reconnecting it °© 
in practices and in rights °© with an idealized 
Golden Age distant in space and time. This 
so-called restoration often comes at the expense 
of the society's actual historical and cultural 
legacies. In the case of Bangladesh, the cultural 
radicalization sought by Islamists posits a 
fictionalized "society of the Prophet" that 
overshadows the lived and shared experiences and 
traditions of the millennia-old Bengali culture. 
Bengali culture at its apogee was a synthesis of 
Islamic values and local traditions and 
practices. Islam has always been an integral part 
of Bengali culture, while Bengali culture has
been the backbone of the moral, intellectual, 
literary, and societal life of the Muslims of 
Bengal.

As part of their program of cultural 
radicalization in Bangladesh, Islamists have 
created a dichotomy
between a fictionalized monolithic Islam and a 
local culture redefined and rebranded as Hindu, 
but this is an artificial dichotomy that is 
better understood as a top-down expression of 
power and control than as a reflection of a 
genuine native conflict. This expression of power 
does in deed have antecedents, notably in the 
attempt by the former West Pakistani leadership 
to subjugate and regiment their East Pakistani 
subjects. Even prior to the rise of independent 
Pakistan, a similar expression of power was 
manifested in Mughal times in the promotion of 
Persian and Urdu as languages of the elite at the 
expense of the local culture. The process of 
cultural radicalization in Bangladesh today is 
propelled by this history of top-down control as 
well as by the current global experience of 
Islamism across the Muslim world. The cultural 
radicalization currently faced by Bangladesh has 
the potential of instituting longer-term cultural 
conflicts. Addressing it is necessary in order to 
maintain local stability and to face down the 
threat of political radicalization that it feeds.
The issue of cultural radicalization, both cause 
and effect of the political radicalism that has 
surfaced, has been underreported and little 
investigated. Slowly but surely, proponents of a 
monolithic understanding of Islam have been 
implementing elements of their program of 
cultural "purification." Their means range from 
the peaceful to the violent. Bangladesh, 
tradition-
ally a tolerant and pluralistic society, is 
therefore experiencing the possibility of an 
irreversible transformation. While members of 
civil society who support a more open conception 
of society, culture, and politics fail to react 
to the emergent threat with any coherent program, 
we must ask ourselves whether this impetus for 
transformation and the lack of response to it 
reflect
a changing cultural mood in Bangladesh, or 
whether they are due to extrinsic political 
factors. More importantly, can Bangladesh survive 
as a pluralistic and tolerant society, or is it 
indeed witnessing a fateful evolution towards 
religious regimentation?

Background

With a population of over 145 million, Bangladesh 
is home to the third-largest Muslim community in 
the world. The former East Pakistan (previously 
East Bengal) has had a tumultuous political 
history since gaining its independence in 1971. 
Of par tic ular note are the assassinations of 
two presidents who were also the founders of the 
major political par-ties that dominate 
Bangladeshi politics to this day.  Sheikh Mujibur 
Rahman, the charismatic leader of the Awami 
League (AL), whose daughter Sheikh Hasina is the 
current opposition leader, was killed in 1975; 
and Ziaur Rahman, the founder of the Bangladesh 
Nation al Party (BNP), the main part ner in the 
ruling coalition (now led by Rah man's widow, 
Khaleda Zia), was killed in 1981.

After almost a decade of military dictatorship, 
the restoration of the democratic process in 1991 
brought a new era of political vigor to 
Bangladesh. However, the political system was 
prone to corruption. Successive elections relied 
heavily on patronage and cronyism, leading to a 
growing disenchantment with the democratic 
process and the two main political movements. 
This gave Jamaate-Islam, the prominent Islamist 
party that is now part of a coalition with the 
BNP, an oppor-tunity to promote a platform 
seeking the fundamental transformation of 
Bangladeshi society through the eventual creation 
of a Sharia-based state.  It is not surprising 
that Islam should play a role in Bengali politics 
given how deeply rooted Islam is in Bengali 
identity and history. The important function of 
Islam in Bengali life prompted even secularist 
ideo-logues, such as Mujibur Rahman, to seek to 
accommodate it. It is the exploitation of Is 
lam's central role in Bengali identity and the 
refusal to acknowledge any other components of 
this iden tity that become the hall-mark of 
Islamist activism.

That the Jamaate has a long-term plan for 
Bangladesh is not a secret. Born of Islamist 
revivalist thought in the first half of the 
twentieth century, the Jamaate has moved with 
other Islamist groups throughout the world to 
embrace some precepts of Salafism, a rigid 
understanding of the Sharia-based state. In so 
doing, it has paved the way in Bangladesh for the 
emergence of Salafi groups. These have made their 
entry into the cultural and political scene 
through conservative ulemas (religious scholars) 
inhabiting mosques in many districts of the 
country, and through the militant jihadist group 
Jamatual Mujahideen Bangladesh (JMB). The Jamaate 
advocates the establishment of a Sharia state 
through the violent overthrow of the established 
order.  In accordance with a pattern of 
penetration adopted by a multitude of sister 
Islamist organizations world wide, the Jamaate is 
also seeking a presence in student, worker, and 
professional sectors. Its gains have been 
considerable, although they are still checked by 
an established tradition in Bangladesh of 
religion-free activism in all three sectors.

The Current Evolution of Cultural Radicalization

Those seeking cultural radicalization in 
Bangladesh have sought both to promote ideas and 
to act. The ideas have sought to suppress other 
ideas in the cultural marketplace, and the 
actions undertaken have often been violent and 
coercive. Some of the promoters of cultural 
radicalization have systematically targeted key 
communities. Journalists have been singled out 
for harassment and not-so-occasional 
assassinations; authors have been muted or 
ostracized; NGO workers have been threatened. The 
overall result of these actions is the creation 
of an atmosphere of fear that has affected the 
traditional tolerance that Bangladesh has 
historically enjoyed. A brief survey of the 
changing face of Bangladesh through a sampling 
and categorization of incidents and attacks 
illustrates the gravity of the situation.

The actions taken in the service of cultural 
radicalization can be labeled either 
retrospective (those targeting the history and 
traditions of Bangladesh) or prospective (those 
seeking to influence the country's future through 
its youth). Retrospective actions include the 
systematic attack on free thought and expression 
and the invasive transformation which targets the 
creative and artistic communities. Prospective 
actions include the rise of the madrasas in order 
to prepare the next generation of culturally 
"pure" youth. These two approaches have 
compounding cumulative effects on culture in 
Bangladesh and are altering its current face and 
reshaping it along Islamist ideological lines. 
It is possible to identify at least six different 
groups targeted by the promoters of cultural 
radicalization as they seek to implement their 
program of purification:
(1) "Hindu," (2) "Christian," (3) heretics or 
apostates, (4) minorities, (5) those considered 
socially deviant, and (6) critical voices.

1.	The "Hindu" Target:
The quotation marks around "Hindu" indicate its 
use by the radicalizers as a euphemism for 
various traditional components of the Bengali 
cultural legacy not sanctioned by the Islamist 
utopia. This target includes many aspects of 
culture in Bangladesh, from the music that dots 
every-day life, to cultural celebrations, to 
matters of dress and other visual display, to the 
political process itself.  The millennia-old 
Bengali New Year celebration, until recently a 
cultural staple in Bangladesh, is now ignored, 
contested, questioned, and occasionally even the 
scene of violent attacks. In a spontaneous 
popular reaction to these attacks, many Bengalis 
now embrace this celebration even more 
energetically. The fact re - mains, however, that 
the initiative is in the hands of those who 
challenge it.

2.	The "Christian" Target:
"Christian" serves as the radicalizers' euphemism 
for any and all components of public life that 
stem from the pool of cultural, political, 
educational, and social facets of Western 
civilization. The use of English as a language of 
communication, the reliance on democratic 
institutions (such as the Constitution), the 
wearing of Western-style dress, are all viewed as 
markers of a Christian contamination of 
Bangladesh and are met with the call for 
purification.

3.	The "Heretic" Target:
"Heretics," according to the radicalizers, are 
those Muslims who choose a path of belief in 
contradiction with the monolithic faith promoted 
by radical Islamists. The Ahmadiyyaa South Asian 
Islamic religious movement, which the 
radicalizers refuse to acknowledge as Is lam ic, 
has been a favorite target. Ahmadiyya mosques 
have been attacked, and Ahmadiyya families have 
been ostracized and occasionally subjected to 
violence. Promoters of cultural radicalization 
have introduced intolerance and calls to violent 
actions into the normal public discourse in 
Bangladesh, while the government reacts with 
apathy, or, in some cases, seems to assist the 
radicalizers: even English-language dailies will 
publish the dates and locations of the intended 
attacks on Ahmadiyya mosques, and the Religious 
Affairs Ministry bans publications, sales, and 
distribution of literature by the Ahmadiyya 
community.

4.	The "Minorities" Target:
With the term "Hindu" now being affixed to 
Bengali culture in general, the actual Hindus are 
further relegated to a more marginal status, that 
of the physically undesirable/un - acceptable. 
Hindus and other religious minorities live under 
constant threat, their lives dominated by the 
feeling of being systematically targeted. Public 
statements by radical politicians, as well as the 
brutal targeting of symbols of Bangladeshi open 
culture, have reinforced this atmosphere of fear. 
An effective ethnic cleansing program was 
implemented in Bangladesh even before the rise of 
organized cultural radicalization. Hindus, at one 
point a sizeable minority within the Bangladeshi 
population, are today a vanishing relic of times 
by gone. The promoters of cultural radicalization 
view this loss suffered by Bangladesh as a 
victory in their cultural jihad.

5.	The "Socially Deviant" Target:
"Deviant" social behavior, according to the 
stated and unstated positions of the promoters of 
cultural radicalization, is often associated with 
women, and in particular women activists. The 
status, physical appearance, and behavior of 
women that fail to conform to the radicalizers' 
view of what is acceptable is labeled deviant. 
Across the Muslim world, Islamist movements have 
measured their success by their ability to alter 
and control women and to box them into predefined 
support roles. The place of women in traditional 
Bengali society was not restricted to the private 
realm. Promoters of cultural radicalization in 
Bangladesh have therefore been rather shy in 
their attempts to force women into conformity 
with the segregation standard. How ever, from 
separate seating at Jamaate events to the absence 
of women at public events, it is apparent that an 
implicit project of segregation and 
marginalization is in effect.  While mainstream 
Islamist movements in Bangladesh have been 
careful in handling the women issue, NGOs and 
women activists have been regular targets of 
under-ground movements connected to the cultural 
radicalization project.

6.	The Critical Voices Target:
It has been suggested that Bangladesh is enduring 
a project for theocracy and a project for 
autocracy. Both projects negate the traditional 
Bangladeshi practices of open communication, 
tolerance, freedom of expression, and diversity 
of opinions. This suggestion may be subject to 
debate.

What is not is that many journalists and opinion 
makers have been dismissed, harassed, battered, 
and imprisoned by the government and Islamist 
groups. Even voices that are constructively 
critical are rebuked as damaging the country's 
image. This official, or quasi official, 
atmosphere of intolerance feeds upon the cultural 
radicalization project and, in turn, nourishes 
it.  The end result is the potential slide of 
Bangladesh away from its hard-earned status as a 
free and open society.

Current Responses To Cultural Radicalization

As noted, the cultural radicalization project in 
Bangladesh is a top-down effort with an 
ideological impetus. It has generated diverse 
reactions, some spontaneous and some deliberate. 
All these reactions can be seen, depending on 
their origin, either as social responses or 
political counteractions.  Social responses have 
been numerous. From the use of the teep (bindi) 
on the forehead, to the revival of Bengali-style 
fashion at the various socio economic levels, 
Bangladeshi society has displayed its desire to 
preserve its diverse cultural legacy and not to 
succumb to the uniform vision espoused by the 
promoters of cultural radicalization. Resistance 
to the radicalization effort has also taken the 
form of art that documents, continues, and 
develops the cultural legacy of Bengal.  New 
artists, vocal as well visual, are offering works 
rooted in Bengali traditions to an appreciative 
wider public. Although not explicitly conceived 
as or offered as a comprehensive rejection of 
cultural radicalization, this art, retaining its 
individual and unorganized character, constitutes 
an organic resistance movement that is virtually 
impossible to defeat.
As to the political counteractions, these have 
been as varied as the forces that inhabit the 
Bangladeshi political spectrum. The configuration 
of political currents in Bangladesh can be 
schematically rendered, from the extreme "left" 
to the extreme "right," into five divisions, each 
of which has reacted to cultural radicalization 
in its own way:

1.
Socialist and Communist movements at the extreme 
left have preserved a nationalistic tone in their 
discourse and have therefore been consistently 
critical of cultural radicalization, often by 
linking it to the antirevolutionary forces that 
fought against the independence of Bangladesh in 
1971. For these movements, cultural 
radicalization echoes the era of East Pakistan 
and their rejection of it on political as well as 
social grounds. These leftist movements view the 
cur-rent rise of Islamism in Bangladesh as a 
continuation of an attempt by Pakistan to 
reinsert itself in Bangladesh and gain back its 
1971 losses. It should be pointed out that while 
some Pakistani agencies and political players 
have played a role in the rise of Islamism in 
Bangladesh, reducing the phenomenon of cultural 
radicalization to a mainly Pakistani 
intervention, as these movements do, ignores the 
latent native factors that are contributing to it.

2. The left-of-center mainline political 
movement, the Awami League, heir to the Founder 
of the Nation, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, posits 
itself as the secular (if not secularist) 
response to the project of cultural 
radicalization. The AL has displayed an awareness 
of the spread of the phenomenon and repeatedly 
announced a deliberate program of cultural 
reinvigoration to address it. Some components of 
this program are at the grassroots level and 
therefore not readily measurable in their effect 
and impact. However, a clearer comprehensive plan 
for the AL remains to be articulated. 

3. The right-of-center Bangladesh National Party 
maintains that the two main components of 
Bangladeshi culture, namely the Bengali heritage 
and the Islamic contribution, exist in a stable 
equilibrium. BNP officials have often noted the 
resistance of Bangladeshi culture to any induced 
change and therefore have characterized warnings 
against cultural radicalization as politically 
motivated and/or alarmist. How ever, this BNP 
assessment ignores the reality of an incremental 
but steady alteration of the cultural landscape 
of Bangladesh. Further more, it inadvertently 
masks some of the more radical change taking 
place through the ruling coalition it formed with 
the Jamaate-Islam.

4. To the right of the BNP, the Jamaate favors 
the cultural radicalization that the country is 
witnessing °©without applying the label 
"radicalization" to it.  Jamaate officials might 
stress the peaceful character of their 
Islamization. However, their actions and words 
tell another story. The extremity of the 
Jamaate's true beliefs is evident in the 
statement of a Jamaate official who characterized 
the induced flight of Hindu Bang - ladeshis from 
the country as similar to the human body getting 
rid of excrement.

5. To the extreme right are the radical Islamist 
under - ground movements, which, driving the 
violent implementation of the cultural 
transformation, can be expected not to have any 
complaint about it, except perhaps its slow pace.
What this quick overview indicates is that 
Bangladesh urgently needs a counter-program to 
cultural radicalization that takes into account 
the symptoms of its implementation (indicated by 
its six aforementioned targets), its methods, and 
the deep causes of its success, however limited. 
Such a program cannot be reactive, and it cannot 
let the promoters of cultural radicalization 
define its areas of operation.

The Methods of Cultural Radicalization

Although violence has been the most prominent of 
the methods pushing towards cultural 
radicalization, it is by no means the sole or 
main vehicle for this program. Two other methods 
have been part of the radicalizers' arsenal: 
cultural saturation and a method best 
characterized as bait-and-switch.  The backbone 
of the cultural saturation method is the 
previously mentioned madrasa-alternative 
education system, as well as publications, 
broadcasts, and sermons designed to instill in 
Bangladeshi culture Islamist values. While in a 
free society the Islamists' program would compete 
with other ideas and values, the atmosphere of 
fear in Bangladesh has destroyed the level 
playing field. Any approach to the problem of 
cultural radicalization will have to have as its 
main objective the restoration of an atmosphere 
where competing ideas can be freely exchanged. 
The main reason why cultural radicalization has 
been possible in Bangladesh is not related to 
culture. The spread of corruption, the 
degradation in government services, and the 
ensuing waning of con fidence in the political 
system have created a fertile ground for the 
implementation of a bait-and-switch method: 
promoters of cultural radicalization offer social 
and economic services and imbue them with ideas, 
values, and cultural elements in conformity with 
their ideology. Bangladeshi citizens take 
advantage of these needed services and in the 
process are subject to a program of cultural 
radicalization. This process has created a 
situation akin to a state-within-a-state in Bang 
ladesh, as ex plained below.  Since independence 
in 1971, the Jamaate has developed institutions 
parallel to the government's. Citizens of 
Bangladesh view themselves as immune to the risk 
of religious extremism. And yet, societies have 
engendered alternative egos that posit Sharia as 
the ideal of rule, at the expense of their 
democracy.  Jamaate-Islam of Bangladesh may never 
have had official connections with other national 
Is lamist movements. However, Jamaate's 
grassroots mobilization and political action 
methods resemble those of other movements. The 
model is one that capitalizes on the 
inefficiency, corruption, and lack of political 
vision in the mainstream, providing alternatives 
in practice, morality, and ideology. In the cases 
of Bangladesh, the respective Islamist movements 
have behaved not as conventional political 
parties, which monitor the government's 
performance and point out deficiencies, but 
rather as the kernel of an alternative system 
altogether.

For example, where state schools fail to provide 
lunch for students, the Jamaate sponsored 
madrasas not only furnish lunch, they also offer 
after-school tutorials for students. In so doing, 
the madrasas become competitors to the state 
schools, creating an alternative network that 
incorporates religious education. To the poor and 
pious of Bangladesh, this combination of lunch 
and God is an attractive package that trumps what 
any public school can offer. Needless to say, the 
kind of religious education provided in these 
madrasas is a militant version with its own 
understanding of what is the pure Islam, one that 
clashes with traditional practice prevalent in 
Bangladesh.  In the banking sector, the 
Jamaate-influenced Islamic Bank has been 
outperforming other banking institutions.  This 
has effectively created a parallel economy that 
fosters Islamist businesses while remaining out 
of the mainstream control of the state. In what 
may be an ominous sign of further Islamization of 
the banking system, the largest state bank was 
recently purchased by Saudi interests.  Public 
medical care in Bangladesh is full of gaps, but 
the Jamaate-sponsored Ibn Sina Hospital provides 
state-of-the-art health services that were un 
heard of in the country until recently. In the 
health sector, as well as education and banking, 
Jamaate institutions are viewed as models of 
performance, efficiency, and integrity. In 
addition to providing necessary services for the 
population at large, these Jamaate institutions 
are excellent venues for employment for young 
professionals associated with the Jamaate 
movement.

Where the state has failed in providing the 
expected services in education, banking, health, 
and social welfare, the Jamaate has stepped in 
with exemplary albeit highly ideological 
institutions. The result is the creation of an 
effective state-within-the-state, one that does 
not rely on conventional measures to assert its 
influence.  The number of seats in parliament is 
of little relevance in understanding the power of 
the Jamaate. The Jamaate's twelve seats are often 
dismissed by those who re fuse to see the growing 
impact of Jamaate institutions all over 
Bangladesh. The criterion used here does not take 
into account the fact that the Jamaate seeks 
power through transforming society, not through 
gaining parliamentary seats. All indicators point 
to the fact that this trans-formation is taking 
place. Most Bangladeshis engage in wishful 
thinking when they convince themselves that this 
change is not real, or, at worst, real but 
contained.  They need only look west to countries 
such as Lebanon to see what a presumably 
containable state-within-a-state can bring to a 
thriving society. 

Conclusion: Suggestions For A Comprehensive Strategy

If cultural radicalization is about inducing 
conflict where none has existed, the response to 
it should not be simply to accept that a conflict 
exists and defend the component of culture that 
is considered under attack. Islamist cultural 
radicalization targets Bengali culture. 
Countering it should not be a mere defense of 
Bengali culture, but instead a rejection of the 
posited dichotomy between Islam and Bengali 
culture. Bangladesh can assert pride in its 
Islamic heritage with out having to pass a test 
of Islamicity artificially imposed by the 
promoters of cultural radicalization.  Further 
more, Bangladesh can declare its embrace of 
global civilization in all its facets, including 
democracy and secularism, without feeling the 
need to justify it in Islamic (or more 
appropriately, Islamist) terms.  Ad dressing the 
growing threat of cultural radicalization re 
quires this spirit of no apology.  The plan to 
counter cultural radicalization has to be based 
on solid premises: (1) Recognition of the 
universality of human rights and values and a 
rejection of their attribution to a Western or 
Christian origin. Malaysia's societal Islam, 
Islam Hadari, can be invoked as a form of Islam 
that accepts traditional cultural practices. (2) 
An insistence on the intrinsic relation between 
Islam not only as a culture and a civilization 
but also as a religion, with Bengal as land, 
society, and history.  In other words, any 
artificially posited dichotomy between Bengali 
identity and Muslim identity must be rejected. 
(3) A positive insistence on the future of 
Bangladesh as a state for all of its citizens, 
with a recognition of the ancient and proven 
Islamic values of tolerance, diversity, and 
acceptance of others Muslim or not  and rejection 
of the new Islamist conception of a monolithic 
Sharia state. (4) An insistence on zero tolerance 
for any movement, ideology, or political group 
that uses violence and intimidation as a way of 
achieving its aims, and the development of a 
national consensus towards that effect.

Proponents of liberal democratic values have 
often claimed the innate compatibility of the 
notions they advocate with Bangladeshi culture. 
The current situation is indeed the test of this 
view, which holds that the country's current 
climate of intolerance is a transformation 
brought about by promoters of radical political 
views. It is against a backdrop of political 
corruption and bureaucratic inefficiency that 
promoters of radical movements present 
themselves, often credibly, as a counter model of 
efficiency and integrity. The cultural dimension 
is therefore not their primary offering.  It 
does, however, follow. Presented as the "true" 
form of the religion to a pious society, the 
transformation progresses, often as a by-product 
of the political dimension. The implications of 
this phenomenon in Bangladesh are also 
considerable in the Bangladeshi diaspora. 
Cultural radicalization paves the way for 
political movements that often espouse violence 
as the means for change. Europe has al ready 
experienced the effects of a radicalization that 
originated overseas.  The future of cultural 
radicalization is conditioned on the success of 
its promoters in positing a clash of cultures in 
Bangladesh. Defusing their program and thereby 
avoiding their program's ensuing political 
adventurism can be achieved through reclaiming 
the cultural space and denying them the 
institutions that they have usurped.


Maneeza Hossain, a specialist on the politics and 
culture of Bangladesh, is a Senior Fellow at 
Hudson Institute.  Ms. Hossain, a U.S.-trained 
lawyer and native of Dhaka who has written 
several monographs on Islamism in Bangladesh, is 
currently producing a study of the political 
evolution of Bangladesh.

--
HUDSON INSTITUTE
015 15th Street, NW, Sixth Floor, Washington, DC 20005
Tel: 202-974-2400 Fax: 202-974-2410
www.hudson.org

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