SACW | Sept. 28-29, 2006 | Balochistan; Sri Lanka on the edge; India: Malegaon, Bhopal
Harsh Kapoor
aiindex at mnet.fr
Thu Sep 28 21:06:43 CDT 2006
South Asia Citizens Wire | September 28-29, 2006 | Dispatch No. 2294
[1] Pakistan: Balochistan geopolitics and Akbar Bugti - Parts I and
II (Nafisa Shah)
[2] Sri Lanka: Change Ground Situation to Correspond to Peaceful
Intentions (NPC)
[3] India: Malegaon blasts investigation - A Litmus Test of
Impartiality (Praful Bidwai)
[4] India: Fumigating Bhopal (Harsh Mander)
[5] Book announcement: Forms of Collective Violence: Riots, Pogroms,
and Genocide in Modern India by Paul R. Brass
[6] Upcoming Events:
(i) Protest against burning of the works of Dr. B R Ambedkar at
AIIMS, (New Delhi, 29 September)
(ii) Gallerie launch at frankfurt book fair (October 6, 2006)
(iii) Programme Details - National Youth Convention (New Delhi, 5-8
October, 2006)
____
[1]
The News International
September 26, 2006
BALOCHISTAN GEOPOLITICS AND AKBAR BUGTI - Part I
by Nafisa Shah
The killing of Nawab Bugti by Pakistan's 'commando regime' has sent
shockwaves across the country and has reinforced Baloch nationalism
like never before. However, nationalism, insurgencies, militancy and
guerrilla warfare, which has acquired a chronic historic persistence
in this region, is inextricably linked with the geopolitical history
of this antique land. Perhaps more than anything else, Bugti
certainly was not the first victim of the geopolitics that is driven
by cut-throat capitalist competitions and the world powers'
alternating interests.
Balochistan, the province, comprises forty-three per cent of
Pakistan's land mass, and a 770 km coastline, but only makes up five
per cent of the country's population. These five per cent people are
perhaps also sitting on the wealthiest land mass in the country.
However, these people are no ordinary people. They are the Baloch.
The mythological and much romanticised narrative of this region
reinforces the power of the tribesmen and their legendary armour,
their horses and their fighting prowess. The Baloch, whose origins
are considered Semitic, came in a caravan from Aleppo in Syria --
pushed out perhaps by invasions and conflicts, or geographic
necessities. Then a mythico-historical war between two brothers
Gwaram and Mir Chakar went on for a hundred years, leading to a vast
diaspora of the Balochi nation across the lands of Sindh, Punjab, and
north in the Pushtoon belt. Thus the narratives of their very making,
their diasporas, their tribal structures, their turbans, beards and
swords sustains and feeds into their everlasting war.
However, Baloch nationalism, more than anything else, is a by-product
of imperial and neo-imperial capitalist struggles in the context of a
weak and ineffective state. In the 56 years of Pakistan, four
insurgencies have been suppressed leading to many executions,
arrests, disappearances and massacres. A history of the area also
shows a contested space in the 19th century imperial designs resisted
frantically by the tribesmen.
The Great Game was a phrase coined by Rudyard Kipling in the empire
building competition between Tsarist Russia, Victorian England and
the Ottoman Empire for the control of trade routes in northern India
in the nineteenth century. To counteract Persian and Russian designs
the British empire-makers constructed this area as a frontier of
tribes and landscapes through which they would contain the designs of
their rivals.
Sovereignty and concentration of power in Balochistan can be traced
to the seventeenth century Khanate of Kalat, a Brahui speaking
region. Even though the Kalat chiefs, and the Ahmedzais, maintained
their dynastic hold for nearly three centuries, very frequently the
region would break out in rebellion. The contests of power between
the three empires were often tested on the Khanate of Kalat who
always depended on external powers to hold them together. The Khanate
was never a complete state unto its own and its sovereignty was
always subject to protection either from the kingdoms in Delhi or the
rulers in Afghanistan or Persia.
The British, in the 19th century, were intensely impressed by what
they called, the 'freebooter' tribes, who maintained their
independence, with their incessant skills to attack, raid and
plunder. The Marri and the Bugti tribes were constructed in the
British imagination as the fiercest of them all. The perception of
the exaggerated danger of the Balochi 'freebooter' led the British to
organise campaigns for decades to suppress their rebellions by
carrying out physical massacres; breaking their spatial structures by
capturing their chiefs; shifting the tribes into different
territories; and replacing their material culture of mares and
matchlocks with ploughs and hoes.
The Bugtis, for instance, were decreed as enemies of the British, but
also as offenders and outlaws, and a proclamation was announced in
1846 where a reward of Rs10 was given to anyone who captured a Bugti.
Under Colonel Mereweather, in October 1847, about five hundred and
sixty Bugtis were killed by the British troops, and in this fight
with the 'dangerous, turbulent hill tribes' only one British soldier
lost his life. In the aftermath of this campaign, Mereweather is
praised extensively, his action described as an act of gallantry and
skill, the "most perfectly successful affair ever witnessed or heard
of", echoing today's congratulatory posture of the Pakistani army
after killing Nawab Bugti and his men.
However, parallel to the aggressive military posture was a
'civilising' one. Other 'plundering and raiding' tribes, such as the
Jakhranis and Domkis were moved out from the area and settled in
Sindh and therefore subdued. Sporadically under Robert Sandamen's
frontier policy the Marri and the Bugti tribesmen were temporarily
contained by the 'humane' indirect rule, which allowed the Marris and
Bugtis their independence in lieu of certain concessions or
cooperation with the British. Hence, for one and a half centuries,
the British had to constantly use diplomacy and force, but never
entirely succeeded in containing tribal incursions.
Balochistan is yet a border country and a frontier region for the
Pakistani metropolis. Frontiers have more often than not porous
borders and economic and social ties with their alien neighbours.
It's vast land area, which borders with Iran and Afghanistan, has
made it a politically and socially scattered area where people are
among the poorest and the most backward in Pakistan. The sparse and
often nomadic and pastoral populations traverse borders and have
defied boundaries earlier in the movement of large herds, and now
weapons, drugs, and goods.
Frontier tribes are still suspicious of foreigners, and while these
frontiers are often primary suppliers of raw materials to the rest of
the country, they still lag behind in services.
The Baloch are intrinsically a herding people. Therefore it is a
contradiction that the Baloch should be concerned with nationalism or
identity. However, pastoral people are considered 'natural' fighters.
Their mobility contributes to their resilience and their contest for
scarce resources, for protection of their herds, and in fragile lands
makes them always ready for a competition for turf.
Ironically the state of Pakistan has reinforced the tribal identity
and structure of Balochistan by refusing to integrate it into the
metropolis on the terms of the Balochis. The Bugti and Marri tribes,
like 200 years ago, hold their own. But they are also projected as
fearsome, war-like, defiant, and dangerous by the military
establishment rather like their colonial predecessors.
Pakistani Balochistan however is not an ordinary borderland. It is
simply not marginalised on the basis of its geographical remoteness.
It is also marginalised because of its wealth. It is estimated that
the Balochis are sitting on 24 trillion cubic feet of natural gas,
and 6 billion barrels of oil, besides vast reserves of copper, zinc,
antimony, and chromites in the Chaghai district at Saindak. It is
ironical that an area subject to seasonal droughts and extreme water
shortages should be hiding not only treasures in its midst but also
become a geographic passage for global capitalist interests. The
competition and control of energy resources and energy routes, will,
more than any other factor, reshape perhaps both the map of the
region and its socio-political landscape.
The first claimant to Baloch resources is the state of Pakistan,
which considers this area, its hinterland for development of the
metropolitan Pakistan. A predatory centre has been cannibalising
Balochistan's resources with little or no return in an
institutionalized way, to the people of the area. Second, it has over
the years become a centre of free market competitions between China,
and the US, on the one hand, and to a lesser extent, Iran and India.
The new dimension to the geopolitics is now complicated by the
Balochi borderlands seated between the new oil and gas wealthy
central Asian states and the new markets in Asia Pacific with its
brand new deep seaport, Gwadar. Politically its geographical location
neighbouring Iran, has enhanced its importance for the US. Its vast
border with Afghanistan makes Balochistan a key player in terror and
war-against-terror politics. India extends itself through Afghanistan
which has strategically come together for their individual interests.
(To be continued)
The writer is a former journalist and district nazim of Khairpur.
o o o
The News International
September 27, 2006
BALOCHISTAN GEOPOLITICS - Part II
by Nafisa Shah
Much of the nineties was spent by global oil companies trying to
design how to provide accessible markets to the newly exposed Central
Asian Republics. Gas resources in Azerbaijan, Uzbekistan,
Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan are estimated to equal 236 trillion cubic
feet, and oil resources comprise more than 60 billion barrels of oil.
This oil must reach the markets. The shortest route to the markets in
the Asia Pacific region, as you would have guessed by now, is first
through Iran and then Afghanistan and Balochistan.
Several proposals of oil and gas routes are afloat. One of the
proposed pipelines is to begin from Gharzhou, in northern
Turkmenistan, and extend southeastern through Afghanistan, to an
export terminal that would be constructed on the Pakistan coast along
the Arabian Sea. Another gas pipeline linking Turkmenistan's vast
natural gas reserves in Daulatabad Field with markets in Pakistan and
later India. Similar routes are drawn across Iran, China, and
Afghanistan. Historical imaginations of the nineteenth century are
being re-invoked by these companies. The drooling oil companies are
terming all of these networks of pipelines the new Silk roads while
the politics of accessing oil and gas routes from Central Asia to the
markets is the New Great Game. The 'spheres of influence' terminology
in vogue then in the Great Game is being re-invoked as well by these
neo-imperial projects.
China too is interested in having its share in the new Silk roads.
Shanghai Five has brought together China, and the Central Asian
republics, primarily to counter the US influence in Central Asia.
China has not only initiated the longest gas pipeline in the world to
take central Asian oil to Xingzian and then Shanghai, it has also
succeeded in accessing Balochistan's Gwadar.
The first phase of the much coveted billion dollar strategically
located Port of Gwadar has been completed, with the Chinese
contributing 200 billion dollars. The gas pipeline from Central Asia
will pass from here, and this will be the outlet to the land corridor
between South Asia and Central Asia. The Chinese have been subject to
attacks by the Baloch insurgents who see their interest in the port
as a threat to their survival. In May 2003, four Chinese engineers
were killed in Gwadar area.
Once completed, the Gwadar port will rank among the world's largest
deep-seaports. To connect western China with Central Asia by land
routes, Pakistan is working on a network of road links to Afghanistan
from its border town of Chaman in Balochistan to Qandahar. In the
northwest, it is building similar road links like the recently
completed road to Torkham, to Jalalabad, and eventually the Gwadar
port will be accessible for Chinese imports and exports through
overland links that will stretch to and from the Karakoram Highway in
Pakistan's Northern Areas that border China's Muslim-majority
Autonomous Region of Xingjian. In addition, the port will have a
modern air defence unit, a garrison, and a first-rate international
airport capable of handling airbus service.
India's objectives are to impede Pakistan's strategic depth in
Balochistan, and to impede China from projecting its power in the
Arabian Sea, which India wants to have as its exclusive domain, and
also at the same time, to prevent Pakistan from offering safe transit
routes to the Central Asian Republics, so that they opt for the
alternative Afghanistan-Iran route in which India is a major
investor. Afghanistan and India are the only two countries that
condemned the killing of the Baloch chief. Pakistan sees the hand of
India in instigating local insurgency through Afghanistan.
It is interesting to note a tit for tat response on each of these
ventures. When the Chinese began the Gwadar port, the Indians began
to help Iranians construct the Chabahar port next door. The Chabahar
port ironically also located in the Baloch part of Iran, will be
accessible for Indian imports and exports, with road links to
Afghanistan and Central Asia. India is helping build a 200-kilometre
road that will connect Chabahar with Afghanistan. And in response to
the Chinese presence in Pakistan, the Indians are now trying to
accomplish an air base in Tajikistan making India the fourth power
after Russia, the US and Germany to have a base in Central Asia.
Moreover, the Indians have secured diplomatic missions in the South
of Afghanistan in Kandahar, which is dangerously close to the Baloch
border.
Meanwhile, the US is the grand surveyor. While it keeps speaking of a
unified and strong Pakistan it would definitely like to limit Chinese
activity. It would also like to peep into Iran as a regular exercise.
Pakistan offered the US exclusive access to two of its critical
airbases in Jacobabad (Sindh) and Pasni (Balochistan) during the US
invasion of Afghanistan.
So while the US is making this 'the sphere of influence', India is
encircling Pakistan, and Pakistan is trying to get its circle back,
while China is making its own arcs, exploiting the Central Asian and
Pakistani resources and encircling India, while the Indians are
responding by counter circling China. All are attempting to make new
Silk routes and playing new games.
For Pakistan offering Balochistan as the corridor means vast transit
earnings, besides enormous geopolitical levers to its advantage. More
than forty thousand ground troops; major intelligence operations; air
bases in Pasni, Quetta, Ormara and Gwadar; a naval base in Ormara and
Gwadar; and cantonments all over the place with new ones coming up in
Sui, Kohlu and Gwadar are just a few examples. This militocracy
protects and enables the intense colonisation which is a
multinational project, involving the US and the Chinese whose
interests are both establishment of economic and military bases vis a
vis India and Iran respectively, but also to expand their corporate
empires. Pakistan is courting all and everyone, and is equally
foreign and alien to the Baloch.
It is in this context that the colonisation and militarisation of
Balochistan must be seen; and in response to that, a people
struggling to give meaning to their very histories, their future and
their survival. The Baloch are swiftly becoming irrelevant in these
back to back competitions between world powers, the new race for
bases, for gas and oil routes, for oil and gas explorations, for
copper mining and gold mining, and are being crushed in Pakistan's
presentation of Balochistan as a territory up for grabs for
commercial exploitation.
The military reasserts its political power by giving the US all the
space to establish its bases, while at the same time, offering the
land of the Baloch to China to establish their first warm-water
foothold in the Indian Ocean. The military then must always clear the
debris of nationalisms and insurgencies through their short-term
brute force. It is then, no wonder that the targets of the Baloch are
the intrusive ugly pipelines, the grid stations, the roads, the port,
the army men, all seen as serving other people and other places. And
perhaps, the centre can expect everlasting fighting as a mode of the
area, because of the geographic access to vanishing, consolidating
and remerging, that this vast hilly territory with labyrinths of
mountain passes and obstructions allows.
Eventually, for the Baloch, as I see it, the emergence of nationalism
is trying to put a name to a struggle that is between their sheer
relevance and their becoming nothing. And in this do or die game,
scapegoats like Mehrab Khan, Nauroz Khan, and Nawab Akbar will be
presented by the Baloch, and destroyed by the colonial masters in
this everlasting and solitary battle for survival of the Baloch,
against vast multiple empire making projects.
(Concluded)
The writer is a former journalist and district nazim of Khairpur.
_____
[2]
National Peace Council
of Sri Lanka
12/14 Purana Vihara Road
Colombo 6
[ . . .].
28.09.06
Media Release
CHANGE GROUND SITUATION TO CORRESPOND TO PEACEFUL INTENTIONS
During his visit to New York to take part in the UN General Assembly
meeting earlier this month, President Mahinda Rajapaksa stated that
government was willing to resume peace talks with the LTTE providing
they commit themselves to cease using violence. The President also
said he was prepared to be flexible on political positions and would
continue to seek the facilitation of Norway and the international
community in the conflict resolution process. Now LTTE leader
Velupillai Pirapaharan has given his commitment to negotiations with
the government in a message through the Norwegian facilitators. Taken
together with the UNP-government negotiations on a politically
bipartisan working together on the ethnic conflict and other national
issues, these could constitute propitious signs for the future.
However, the reality on the ground continues to be disturbingly
different. For the past two months there has been a condition of
armed hostilities between the government and LTTE in different parts
of the north east. Indeed the ground situation is so abysmal it has
prompted the head of the international ceasefire monitoring mission
in Sri Lanka, Major General Lars Johan Solvberg to describe the
nature of the present violence as being shocking. The fear of people
in the north east is such that threatening leaflets distributed in
Muttur, purporting to be from the LTTE, have caused many amongst the
largely Muslim population to flee. Now it is reported that those same
people have been compelled to return to Muttur by the security forces
and are also being denied relief rations unless they return to
Muttur. These are actions that are in violation of all norms of
international humanitarian conduct.
It is tragic that large masses of innocent people should become
victims of ruthless military and political strategies. The National
Peace Council calls on the government and LTTE to implement
international human rights and humanitarian standards on the ground
for their respective statements to become more meaningful. There
should be credible mechanisms established with an international
presence to ensure that abuses such as political killings,
abductions, restriction of essential supplies, child recruitment, and
so on, do not continue with impunity. In addition to positive
statements that obtain international recognition, there also needs to
be genuine commitment to negotiate so that the non-implementation of
promises made at the Geneva talks of February 2006 and the withdrawal
from talks even before they began in Oslo in June 2006, do not repeat
themselves.
Executive Director
On behalf of the Governing Council
_____
[3]
Frontline
Sep. 23-Oct. 06, 2006
A LITMUS TEST OF IMPARTIALITY
by Praful Bidwai
Fairness of the investigations into the Malegaon blasts will decide
whether the Indian state can re-establish its secular credentials and
win Muslim hearts.
THE Malegaon bomb attacks have triggered a peculiar contest within
the Indian security establishment, which is centred on how to deny
the obvious. The obvious in this case is the specific and successful
targeting of Muslims in significant-scale violence for the first time
in India, which raises uncomfortable questions about the dominant
official view or paradigm of terrorism and counter-terrorism. This
paradigm holds that terrorism in this country is essentially inspired
by Islamic fundamentalism and usually assisted by Pakistani secret
agencies.
The dominant view cannot countenance the possibility that Hindutva
militants belonging to extremist outfits like the Bajrang Dal or
Vishwa Hindu Parishad might be the culprits in Malegaon. So it
minimises, as it must, vital clues and pointers - including the
timing of the explosions after Friday prayers in a crowded mosque,
during the Shab-e-Barat observances, which draw huge numbers of
pilgrims and beggars into Malegaon; the discovery of bicycles with
Hindu names painted on them, on which the bombs were planted; a local
history of Hindu-Muslim tension and intense communal polarisation;
and, above all, the involvement of Bajrang Dal extremists in bomb
fabrication efforts in the Marathwada region, which is adjacent to
Malegaon and in many ways similar to the North Maharashtra area in
which the town is itself located.
Equally, the dominant paradigm must resort to increasingly convoluted
explanations: Islamists executed the Malegaon attacks to provoke a
violent reaction and widen the communal divide so as to destabilise
India; their general motive is always to spread randomly "mayhem,
confusion and fear"; Islamist terrorists have never had any
compunctions about killing large numbers of other Muslims, however
devout, especially if they do not follow rigid Wahhabi Islam; jehadi
terrorists need have no location-specific motive; they are forever
willing to kill, even commit suicide, to advance their fanatical
cause; they are profoundly irrational, or downright mad, and blinded
by hatred; they commit violence, because, well, they are terrorists...
None of this is very convincing. Indeed, the more convoluted the
explanation, the less plausible it sounds. Evidence from the world
over suggests that jehadi violence as a rule is not "mad" or random.
It follows a certain (perverse) rationality. It aims to send a
"message" about the vulnerability of a powerful adversary (as
happened on 9/11) or register a protest (against the Spanish
government's pro-U.S. Iraq policy, as with the 2004 Madrid bombings)
or avenge an injustice (Abu Ghraib or Guantanamo Bay), etc.
Even suicide bombers do not act mindlessly or randomly. Chicago
University researcher Robert Pape recently looked for analysed
patterns in 462 cases of "successful" suicide attacks in his book
Dying to Win. He found that about 95 per cent of the attacks were
"demand-driven" and not driven by the "supply" of religious fanatics.
Most were aimed at foreign occupation forces. Southern Lebanon
witnessed a spate of suicide attacks during the post-1982 Israeli
occupation, but these stopped after Israel withdrew. Iraq had no
suicide attacks until the U.S. invasion of 2003. Since then, fidayeen
attacks have become routine. There is no organic link between suicide
bombings and Islam. The non-Islamic LTTE is the undisputed global
leader in suicide bombings.
The only piece of evidence that favours the dominant view on Malegaon
is the alleged discovery of RDX high explosive at the site. This too
is a weak piece of evidence and one contested by the Union Home
Secretary, no less. Only one of the three forensic laboratories that
examined the explosives detected in Malegaon says they contain RDX.
But even assuming that RDX was used, it hardly proves that the
blasts' executors were jehadis aided by a Pakistani agency. Going by
several reports quoting Intelligence Bureau sources, RDX is no longer
all that rare or hard to procure domestically.
Hindutva fanaticism
In any case, we should know better than to rely on purely
technology-based evidence, when all the material circumstances and
facts point in the opposite direction. Sound political judgment must
supplement forensic evidence. And that judgment tells us that
Hindutva fanatics can be as capable of causing terrorist violence and
mayhem as jehadis.
Ever since the Ayodhya mobilisation in the mid-1980s, Hindutva
fanaticism has left a trail of blood through numerous States and
cities, Mumbai in 1992 and Gujarat in 2002 being the two ghastliest
episodes. The number of people killed in each of these, roughly 2000,
greatly exceeds the casualties in any terrorist bombing in this
country.
Close to Malegaon, both literally and figuratively, lie Nanded,
Parbhani, Purna and Jalna, all in Marathwada, which have over the
past three-and-a-half years witnessed bomb attacks (or preparations
for attacks) targeted at Muslims and specifically at mosques. The
culprits in each case appear to be Hindutva fanatics. There is
clinching evidence of this in Nanded, where two Bajrang Dal activists
Naresh Rajkondwar and Himanshu Panse were killed on April 6 while
attempting to fabricate a bomb along with fellow-extremists Rahul
Pande, Yogesh Deshpande, Maruti Wagh and Gururaj Tupttewar.
The incident occurred in the house of a known RSS activist and
Bajrang Dal-VHP member. It was investigated by the Secular Citizens'
Forum and People's Union of Civil Liberties, Nagpur. There is
convincing photographic evidence to show that the Bajrang Dal was
indeed running a bomb-fabrication operation. Some of the pictures
also showed that the local police tried to cover up Bajrang Dal-VHP
involvement by planting fire-crackers - to suggest that the blast was
caused by crackers, not bombs - and false beards.
These findings were corroborated by K.P. Raghuvanshi, head of
Maharashtra's Anti-Terrorism Squad. In an interview to Communalism
Combat (June 2006), he described the Nanded bomb-fabrication as a
"terrorist act" by "Hindus": "It is clear that these bombs were not
being manufactured for a puja. They were being manufactured for
unlawful ends to wreak violence through terror."
Besides their targets - and a similar culture and history of communal
polarisation - Nanded has something in common with Malegaon: in both
cases, fake beards and skullcaps of the kind used by Muslims during
prayers had been planted. None of this conclusively proves that
Hindutva fanatics were responsible for Malegaon, but it does make a
powerful case for pursuing that line of investigation. The
Maharashtra government seems to be dragging its feet on this,
probably encouraged by a section of the security establishment whose
Islamophobic prejudices were discussed in this Column (September 8,
2006).
It is of the utmost importance that the police investigate the
Malegaon incident and the events leading up to it with scrupulous
objectivity and impartiality and make full public disclosure of all
relevant facts after completing the investigation. Any slip on their
part will generate suspicion that they are shielding a particular
group out of communal prejudice.
The Malegaon police force is a classic embodiment of
"institutionalised communalism", which has repeatedly clashed with
and punished Muslims. Three days after the bombings, it gratuitously
got into a confrontation with a Muslim gathering and opened fire. It
must be restrained and its criminal investigations must be
supplemented with the very best expertise available in the country
from among officers with proven secular credentials.
The mood among Maharashtra's Muslims is one of sullenness,
despondency and resentment at their harassment by the police. Their
pervasive alienation is evident through numerous reports (for
instance, Seema Chishti's series in The Indian Express, September
3-7). The Pope's offensive remarks about Islam have further inflamed
passions and increased this alienation. The rolling judgment on the
Mumbai 1993 bombings, now in progress, has also served as a cruel
reminder that the perpetrators of incidents that formed their
immediate backdrop - the pogrom of Muslims in December 1992-January
1993 in Mumbai - are yet to be prosecuted.
The People's Tribunal on the Bombay Violence, headed by Justices Daud
and Suresh, estimated that 2,000 were killed during the pogrom. The
Srikrishna Commission inquired into the violence and recommended the
prosecution of numerous individuals. This has not happened.
This default, and many other injustices and iniquities reflected in
the exclusion of Muslims and the discrimination against them, will
have terrible consequences. Today, Malegaon has become an
all-important litmus test. The Indian state must begin to
decommunalise its counter-terrorism strategy and reaffirm secularism
and pluralism. It must win back the confidence of the Muslim
community by proving its secular credentials. Malegaon is the place
to do it.
_____
[4]
Hindustan Times
September 28, 2006
FUMIGATING BHOPAL
by Harsh Mander
Late one evening, a young man of 34 was found hanging from the
ceiling of his home in Bhopal. His name was Sunil Verma, the date,
July 26, 2006. More than 21 years earlier, he had lost his parents
and five siblings in the gas massacre on December 2, 1984.
That December night, from the adjacent Union Carbide Corporation
pesticide factory in Bhopal, a lethal combination of methyl
isocyanate, hydrogen cyanide, mono methylamine and carbon monoxide
was unleashed on this sleeping city of a million unsuspecting
residents. One of the first localities into which the gas spewed was
JP Nagar, where Sunil and his family were sleeping. Roused, they
found themselves gasping for breath, their eyes burning as if they
were on fire. Coughing and screaming, they ran out of their homes,
and were swept away by a surging human torrent.
Sunil, then 12 years old, tightly held the hand of his younger
sister, Mamata, as he ran desperately. Lost in the dense clouds of
gas, he got separated from the rest of his family. Suddenly, even
Mamata's hand was wrenched out of his. Screaming people surged from
all sides, some fell and were crushed, others tore off their clothes,
yet others were vomiting uncontrollably.
Sunil ran, gasping for his life, his eyes afire, until he could make
out the phantom form of a matador van. He pushed his way inside, and
survived. His relatives told him later that his mother had died
holding her eight-month-old infant son, Sanjay, who miraculously
survived. Their father had returned to their hut the next morning. On
the night of the gas leak, he had locked the hut before they ran.
When he opened the door on his return the next morning, he found the
dead body of one of his sons, Santosh, who had accidentally been left
behind in the panic. Shortly after, their father died, perhaps of the
gas, or may be of a broken heart.
Of his seven brothers and sisters, only the baby, Sanjay, and Mamata,
whose hand had been wrenched from Sunil's, were saved. Sunil suddenly
found himself almost completely alone in the world, responsible for
looking after his eight-month-old brother and his younger sister. The
boy decided not to go back to school, and instead devote himself
entirely to his brother and sister, whom he got admitted into an SOS
village.
In the early years, the survivors lived on relief. The efforts of the
government to rebuild their livelihoods ended as sad and expensive
failures. The Madhya Pradesh government spent Rs 700 million for this
purpose, which succeeded in creating long-term livelihoods for little
more than 80 women.
Meanwhile, unknown to Sunil and other residents of JP Nagar, as they
struggled for livelihoods and ways to stem their failing health, a
curious legal battle was being fought on their behalf in the courts
of India and the US. The Indian government, through the Bhopal Gas
Leak Disaster (Processing of Claims) Act of March 1985, arrogated to
itself exclusive powers to represent the victims in the civil
litigation against Union Carbide. On behalf of the victims, the
Indian government filed a suit for compensation of more than $ 3
billion in the federal court of the southern district of New York.
In the search for a star witness in New York courts, government
officials settled for Sunil, because he was a child who had lost much
of his family in the tragedy. He was flown to the US with the Indian
team. In court, Sunil recounted his story in fluent Hindi, and his
testimony was translated for the judge.
He learnt later that the case was returned in May 1986 to the Indian
courts on grounds of 'forum non-convenience', under the condition
that Union Carbide would submit to their jurisdiction. During the
proceedings of the Bhopal district court, Union Carbide was directed
to pay an interim relief of Rs 3,500 million so that the delay in the
adjudication of the case would not adversely affect the claimants.
However, Union Carbide refused to pay this sum and its appeal against
this decision reached the Indian Supreme Court. On February 14, 1989,
in a sudden departure from the matter of interim relief, the Supreme
Court passed an order approving the settlement that had been reached
between the Government of India and Union Carbide, without the
knowledge of the claimants of Bhopal. According to the terms of the
settlement, in exchange for payment of $ 470 million, the corporation
was to be absolved of all liabilities. All criminal cases against it
and its officials were to be dropped, and the Indian government was
to defend the corporation in the event of future suits.
The settlement sum, nearly one-seventh of the damages initially
claimed by the government, was not only far below international
standards but was even lower than the modest standards set by the
Indian Railways for railway accidents. The Supreme Court revised its
judgment on October 3, 1991, upholding the settlement amount paid by
Union Carbide but directing the Indian government to make good any
shortfall.
Over time, it became increasingly difficult for Sunil to return to
his empty house. It was too full of memories. His brother and sister
were growing up in the SOS village. In 1991, he moved in with leading
activist and long-term friend Sathyanath Sarangi.
A year later, in 1992, the state government built a 'widows' colony'.
Houses were allotted by lottery to widows and orphans who had
survived the gas tragedy, and Sunil qualified. He then moved into
this colony, where he lived until his death.
In 1994, his sister turned 18, beyond the protection offered by the
SOS village in Bhopal. Sunil decided to get both his sister and
brother discharged from the SOS village and bring them over to live
with him. Their presence filled a little bit the accumulated
loneliness that had festered inside his soul all these years. But
perhaps they returned too late.
As time passed, Sunil became more and more withdrawn and
uncommunicative. Slowly, almost imperceptibly, he found something
slowly cracking up within him. He was frequently depressed, and
became obsessed with thoughts of suicide. He heard voices call out to
him. He would not stir out of his home, would not wash himself or
talk to people. There were times when he ran out of the house without
clothes, feverishly roaming the streets night and day, running miles
along the railway track, deep into the forest.
For a decade prior to his passing away, Sunil has been on medication
for his mental illness. He refused to consider marriage for himself,
firm in his resolve to first ensure a good future for those he had
taken under his care almost 22 years earlier. In time, he got his
sister Mamata married to an electrician, and his brother educated in
an English-medium school. Today he is a graduate. Before Sunil died,
he was in search of a suitable bride for his brother.
He died wearing a T-shirt declaring 'No More Bhopals'. At the time he
took his life, no one had been punished for the crimes of the Bhopal
massacre. With him died, perhaps, even the hope for justice.
Harsh Mander is the convenor of Aman Biradari, a people's campaign
for secularism, peace and justice.
_____
[5]
New title from Three Essays Collective:
(available from September 21)
FORMS OF COLLECTIVE VIOLENCE:
Riots, Pogroms, and Genocide in Modern India
by *Paul R. Brass*
Contents:
1: On the Study of Riots, Pogroms, and Genocide
2: The Partition of India and Retributive Genocide in the Punjab,
1946-47: Means, Methods, and Purposes
3: The Development of an Institutionalized Riot System in Meerut
City, 1961 to 1982
4: Collective Violence, Human Rights, and the Politics of Curfew
5: Indian Secularism in Practice
About the book:
These essays focus on the various forms of collective violence that
have occurred in India during the past six decades, which include
riots, pogroms, and genocide. It is argued that these various forms
of violence must be understood not as spontaneous outbreaks of
passion, but as productions by organized groups. Moreover, it is also
evident that government and its agents do not always act to control
violence, but often engage in or permit gratuitous acts of violence
against particular groups under the cover of the imperative of
restoring order, peace, and tranquility. This has certainly been the
case in numerous incidents of collective violence in India where
curfew restrictions have been used for just such purposes. In this
context, secularism constitutes a countervailing practice, and a set
of values that are essential to maintain balance in a plural society
where the organization of intergroup violence is endemic, persistent,
and deadly.
About the author:
Paul R. Brass is Professor (Emeritus) of Political Science and
International Studies at the University of Washington, Seattle. He
has published fifteen books and numerous articles on comparative and
South Asian politics, ethnic politics, and collective violence. His
work has been based on extensive field research in India during many
visits since 1961. His most recent books are "The Production of
Hindu-Muslim Violence in Contemporary India" (2003), "Theft of an
Idol: Text and Context in the Representation of Collective Violence"
(1997); "Riots and Pogroms" (1996); and "The Politics of India Since
Independence", 2nd ed. (1994).
xx, 188 pages, includes bibliography, Demy 8vo
2006
ISBN 81-88789-39-9 hb Rs500 (India); elsewhere $16
ISBN 81-88789-41-0 pb Rs250 (India); elsewhere $10
(Postage free)
Three Essays Collective
P.O. Box 6
B-957 Palam Vihar
GURGAON (Haryana) 122 017
India
www.threeessays.com
_____
[6] Upcoming Events
(i)
Protest against burning of the works of Dr. B R Ambedkar at AIIMS on
29 September 2006
To protest against the burning of Dr Bhim Rao Ambedkar's literature by
doctors of the AIIMS, 15 Dalit organisations plan to hold a
demonstration outside the main gate of AIIMS (opposite the Safdarjang
Hospital gate) at 12 noon on Friday September 29, 2006. The act of
burning demonstrates the fact that even educated doctors can be so
much insolent towards the constituional ideals of social inclusion,
social cohesion and protection of human rights through affirmative
action.
Please consider joining the protest and support the cause of inclusion
Rajni Tilak
___
(ii)
Race, war, peace, earth, woman and now a book about books
From Gallerie - India's international journal of ideas
announcing the launch of an issue celebrating books
come and join a lively discussion on October 6 at 3pm
in front of 5.0 D917/919 in Hall 5 Ground Floor
Frankfurt Book Fair
sharing his views on why we love books, will be our special guest,
India's renowned poet and filmmaker, Gulzar.
Also speaking will be esteemed writer and poet Dilip Chitre, and
cultural theorists, Nancy Adajania, Ranjit Hoskote along with editor
of Gallerie, Bina Sarkar Ellias
___
(iii)
National Youth Convention, New Delhi, 5-8 October 2006
5TH OCT- DAY 1
2:00-3:00 (Inaugural Session) KN Panikkar, Nandita Das, Rahul Bose,
Harsh Mander
Performance by: Vidya Shah, Gauhar Raza, School Children
3:00-4.00 Tea Break
4.00-5.00 Introduction of Delegates coordinated by
Youth Facilitators.
5.00-8:00 Secular Politics in India (Four parallel Sessions)
1. Indian Secularism : Theory and Practice - Mihir Desai, Priti Verma
2. Relevance of Gandhi in Contemporary India- Harsh Mander
3. Legacy of the Freedom Struggle- Rizwan Qaiser
4. Scientific Temper & Obscurantism - Gauhar Raza, Amitabh Pandey
8:00-9:00 Dinner
9.00-11.00 Film Screening followed by discussion
6TH OCT- Day 2
9:00-1:00 Assault on Secular Democracy (Four parallal sessions)
1. Ayodhya: What is the dispute? What is the solution? VCD-by KM
Shrimali and S Irfan Habib
2. Kashmir: What is the dispute? What is the solution? - Gautam Navlakha
3. Gujarat: Rebuilding Justice and Hope - Rohit Prajapati , Hiren
Gandhi 4. Redefining Patriotism -Apoorvanand
(with a tea break at 10.30)
1.00-2.00 Lunch
2.00- 3.30 Myths & Realities (combined session)
Dr. Ram Puniyani
3.30-4.00 Tea
4.00- 5.30 Myths & Realities (combined session)
Dr. Ram Puniyani
6.00 onwards Screening of Film
8.00-9.00 Dinner
9.00-11.00 informal interaction/ screening of films/
cultural programme by participants
7th OCT-Day 3
9:00-1.00 Inequalities in Our Society
(Four Parallel sessions)
1. Gender Justice for all communities - Sheba George
2. Understanding Caste, Class and Discrimination -Martin
Macwan, Prasad Chako
3.Globalisation and Poverty - Jaya Mehta/ Vineet Tiwari
4.Security laws & the situation the North East- Colin Gonsalves/ Harsh Dobhal/
(with a tea break at 11.00)
1:00-2:00 Lunch
2:00-5.00 Discussion on National Youth Policy- Gagan
Sethi, Swati Sheshadiri
5.00-5.30 Tea break
7.00-8.30 Unsuni- Performance by Mallika Sarabhai and
Darpana Academy -
( Venue for the performance: Bluebells International School,
Kailash, Opposite Lady Shriram College, New Delhi-110048)
8th OCT- Day 4
9:00-10.45 What does it mean to be an Indian?
Combined Session - Sohail Hashmi
Tea Break
11.00-1.00
War on Terror: Local, National, International -Kamal Mitra
Chenoy/,/ Siddarth Vardarajan, Praful Bidwai
1:00-2:00 Lunch
2:00-4.00 Future Strategies coordinated by Amit Sengupta and youth
facilitators)
4.00-7.00 Free time
7.00pm onwards Peace Concert
Dhruv Sangari/ Cynide and Out of the Blue
( Venue for the peace concert: Bluebells International School,
Kailash, Opposite Lady Shriram College, New Delhi-110048)
_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/
Buzz on the perils of fundamentalist politics, on
matters of peace and democratisation in South
Asia. SACW is an independent & non-profit
citizens wire service run since 1998 by South
Asia Citizens Web: www.sacw.net/
SACW archive is available at: bridget.jatol.com/pipermail/sacw_insaf.net/
DISCLAIMER: Opinions expressed in materials carried in the posts do not
necessarily reflect the views of SACW compilers.
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