SACW | 23-24 June 2006 | Pakistan Culture; Jihadi's in Bangladesh; Nepal's Maoists, India: Modi's Antics / Ethnic Strife

[Harsh Kapoor]

South Asia Citizens Wire | 23-24 June, 2006 | Dispatch No. 2263

[1]  Pakistan: Of culture and confusion (Abbas Rashid)
[2]  Bangladesh: Banned Harkatul Jihad still active (Editorial)
[3]  Nepal: the Maoist transformation's fuzzy logic (Kanak Mani Dixit)
[4]  Pakistan: Sexual Harassment reaches Sindh 
Assembly (Network for Women's Rights)
[5]  India: Press Release (Association for Protection of Democratic Rights)
[6]  India: Modi's mantra: Gujarat first (Aditi Phadnis)
[7]  Book Review: Dionne Bunsha reviews 'Tremors 
of Violence : Muslim Survivors of Ethnic Strife 
in Western India' by Rowena Robinson

___


[1]

Daily Times
June 24, 2006

OF CULTURE AND CONFUSION
by Abbas Rashid

The kind of difficulty many of us continue to 
have in locating ourselves in a cultural context 
is evident yet again in some of the reactions in 
the Press to the observations made by the federal 
minister of education, General (r) Javed Ashraf 
Qazi, at a recent conference on Pakistani 
culture. The essential point that the general 
sought to make was presumably that Pakistani 
culture, indebted as it remains to Islamic mores 
and values, also draws from the civilisational 
legacy of the Indus Valley stretching as far back 
as Mohenjodaro and Harrapa - not to mention the 
even older Mehrgarh (Balochistan). Of course, the 
general's concern with matters civilisational may 
well have to do with the regime's felt imperative 
of boosting "Pakistan's image in the world as a 
moderate country". How Pakistan's image abroad or 
within can be changed without radically altering 
the reality on the ground is a question that only 
the regime's spokesmen or media consultants can 
answer. But, the point Mr Qazi was making remains 
a valid one. The idea that our identity as 
Muslims or Pakistanis is somehow threatened by 
laying claim to the rich and diverse past of this 
region and its people is an untenable argument. 
Does the celebration of Nauroz become a matter of 
concern in Iran? According to one source the term 
Norouz first appeared in Persian records in the 
second century AD but it was also an important 
day during the Achaemenid times when kings from 
different nations within the Persian empire used 
to bring gifts to the Shahanshah on Norouz. In a 
way, like Basant in this part of the world, 
Nauroz signifies the advent of spring. That it 
also has a religious significance for many does 
not change the fact of its antecedents in the 
distant past.

The question we may also want to consider is that 
if our Indian neighbours have no problems in 
laying claim to India's Muslim heritage, treating 
it as a part of the continuum, why should we 
continue to deny our pre-Muslim past? After all 
the great majority of Muslims in this part of the 
world are the descendents of those who lived on 
this land - among its mountains and rivers, 
deserts and forests - for thousands of years. At 
a point in time they chose, often as a 
consequence of the humanist, spiritual and 
universalist message of the Sufis, to embrace 
Islam as a faith. While this has obvious 
implications for culture, it certainly does not 
entail a wholesale denial of language, culture, 
music and the process of history that worked 
itself out in a specific geographical context.

Consider also a country such as India where the 
Muslims are not in a majority. How much poorer 
would India be if it were to decide to do away 
with its Muslim heritage in an essentialist drive 
towards 'purity'. On the contrary, it is content 
to claim this legacy spanning hundreds of years. 
Whereas, on our side we find it difficult to 
honour even someone like Bhagat Singh who fought 
and died so that this land and its people could 
be free and was defended by a man no less than 
Jinnah in his speech in the Central Assembly in 
1929.

The issue of how we define ourselves culturally 
is relevant not only in relation to the external 
world but even more so in the internal context. 
Not only do we have an ahistorical orientation we 
have also found it difficult to come to terms 
with the fact that we have a rich, composite 
culture. The obsession of our ruling elites, more 
driven by opportunism than conviction, with a 
narrow one-dimensional cultural identity 
contributed in no small measure to alienating our 
once-fellow citizens in what is now Bangladesh. 
But, even after all these years we still seem to 
be wary of regional languages and cultures. One 
indication of that is the virtual absence in our 
educational discourse of serious discussion on 
the issue of the place of the mother tongue in 
early childhood education. Not only do we need to 
reclaim our ancient civilisational heritage, we 
need as a corollary to make room for the diverse 
cultural streams that have fed this region and 
that can add so much to our cultural persona.

Coming back to the general's observations, it is 
unfortunate that in most such matters the 
regime's rhetoric has far exceeded any real 
change on the ground. Vociferous calls for 
enlightened moderation have left intact 
repressive and unjust laws brought on to the 
statute books by General Zia ul Haq, a man who 
usurped power in the name of religion and 
ideology. It was not the first time that the two 
were put to blatantly self-serving political ends 
but even with our record it marked a low point. 
The education minister was quite right in 
regretting that the majority of Pakistani 
students were ignorant of the real history of the 
country. But, we know how historians have been 
treated, not to mention the institutions in which 
they could have worked and contributed. Whether 
it is Prof KK Aziz who was ignored and left to 
his own devices or Dr Mubarik Ali and his current 
travails, some things never seem to change. It 
may not be out of place here to remind ourselves 
of the resolution moved by MP Bhandara in the 
National Assembly to the effect that Jinnah's 
inaugural address of August 11, 1947, to the 
Constituent Assembly be included in its entirety 
in the curricula. It has been almost a year and a 
half since the resolution was adopted. So far 
there does not seem to have been much movement on 
the issue. And then we talk of our students being 
ignorant of the real history of Pakistan.

_____


[2]


The Daily star
June 24, 2006
  	 
Editorial

BANNED HARKATUL JIHAD STILL ACTIVE
INDIFFERENCE OF ADMINISTRATION RAISES QUESTIONS

The detailed report of the activities of Harkatul 
Jihad, a religious extremist organisation, 
published in the local print media the other day, 
is not only alarming but also raises serious 
questions. Apparently an organisation that had 
been operating in the country for as long as 17 
years was banned by the administration about four 
months back, and yet it continues to carry on 
with its activities freely. That many of the 
local religious schol-ars have openly declared 
their affiliation with this or-ganisation makes 
us feel more concerned. Whereas the present 
administration is high with its claims of raging 
a war against the extremists, it is not 
understandable why it seems indifferent towards 
Harkatul Jihad. Such attitude raises suspicion.

One might ask with regard to the relative 
successes of the government in catching the JMB 
top rankers and its proud declaration, whether or 
not it was diverting pub-lic attention at gaining 
the much needed support for itself at this 
juncture of politics.

The government simply must realise certain facts: 
that the kind of religious ter-rorism we are 
facing is part of the worldwide phenome-non; that 
the battle against this scourge is a continuous 
one; that it is an issue if left unattended may 
turn to the regime itself whenever there is an 
opportunity. People who run such organisations 
have a distinct agenda of their own backed by 
their highest level of commitment and absolute 
dedication. They are no ordinary crimi-nals in 
the traditional sense of the term. Mere rhetoric 
on honest intentions and so-called successes 
achieved here and there will not either scare or 
drive them away. In that we fail to understand 
how a banned organisa-tion is allowed to continue 
its recruitment, training and despatch of 
personnel to places abroad.

It is our impression that two things are 
evidently missing in the administration's efforts 
with regard to dealing with the religious 
terrorists; first it has not dealt the matter at 
organisational level and secondly it has not 
probed the source and free flow of their funding. 
The administration must be mindful of such 
serious flaws so that it does not fail to stem 
the rot.

_____


[3] 

opendemocracy.net
22 - 6 - 2006

NEPAL: THE MAOIST TRANSFORMATION'S FUZZY LOGIC
by Kanak Mani Dixit

Two astounding months have crushed a king and put 
Maoists into office. Nepal's political world has 
turned upside down. But the people are still 
ahead of those seeking to govern them, says Kanak 
Mani Dixit.

A delicate experiment is underway in Nepal in the 
wake of the success of the "people's movement" 
and the collapse of the Gyanendra autocracy in 
late April 2006. An attempt is being made to draw 
a violent insurgency into open politics. 
Far-reaching changes have been initiated over the 
past two months to put the country on the track 
of full democracy and peace, and the process of 
integrating the Maoists into the political 
mainstream has begun with their emergence on the 
stage of open politics. To what extent will they 
change the terrain of Nepal's polity, and how 
much will they themselves will be transformed in 
the engagement with open society?
A jittery international community, India among 
it, feels that a fast-talking rebel leadership of 
the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) [CPN (M)] 
is extracting excessive concessions from the 
political parties without submitting to an 
immediate process of "management of arms", a 
route towards the demobilisation of Maoist 
fighters. While a section of civil society could 
not be more pleased with the inroads made by the 
Maoists into the national sphere, the political 
party rank-and-file wants disarmament to proceed 
immediately so that they can return and revive 
politics in the districts. They also fear a chasm 
between what the Maoists leaders say from the 
national pulpit and their ability to deliver a 
transformed cadre at the ground level.
The assumption is that the Maoist leadership is 
indeed committed to multiparty politics, which 
ipso facto carries with it the need for its 
forces to begin the process of laying down arms. 
To what extent can the rebel supremo Pushpa Kamal 
Dahal push the agenda, given that the political 
leaders have acted with sagacity in meeting him 
halfway?
As things stand, all over the country, the rebel 
combatants retain control of their weapons even 
as their people's war has been abandoned. And 
therein lies the most critical challenge facing 
the Maoist leadership - of keeping the flock 
together so that when the time comes, the guns 
are laid out for inspection by United Nations 
decommissioning experts in a process leading to 
ultimate demobilisation. This is a hiatus, 
dangerous but also full of possibilities.

The valley summit
The pace of events since the April 2006 uprising 
has been quite astounding. The reinstated house 
of representatives stripped the monarchy of all 
power by a proclamation on 18 May, undoing much 
of Gyanendra's autocratic transgressions since 
October 2002. For their part, the Maoists staged 
a massive rally in Kathmandu on 2 June, and 
intensified their demand for the disbanding of a 
parliament that was undercutting their plank with 
its many progressive pronouncements.
An ailing Girija Prasad Koirala went to New 
Delhi, was graciously treated by his hosts, and 
returned to Kathmandu with a package worth 15 
billion Nepalese rupee ($218 million) for 
consolidating the interim government's budget and 
kick-starting development. In a significant 
departure, New Delhi also indicated its 
willingness to allow United Nations experts to 
oversee the demobilisation process. The 
possibility of credible oversight generated 
momentum for the peace dialogue.
While the bilateral ceasefire continued to hold, 
official talks began between three senior Maoist 
leaders and three ministers representing 
different political parties. This culminated in a 
"summit" organised at prime minister Koirala's 
residence on 17 June. Dahal's meeting with the 
prime minister soon expanded to include other 
members of the seven-party alliance (SPA) that 
had fought to bring down the royal autocracy with 
the assistance of the Maoists. After a 
quarter-century underground, Dahal suddenly 
became "public" on the national stage for the 
first time, in a crowded and impromptu night-time 
press conference.
During the meeting, even as the ailing Koirala 
kept retiring to his room to rest his weakened 
lungs, what emerged was a far-reaching 
eight-point understanding: in this, the two sides 
agreed to draft an interim constitution, create 
an interim government that included the Maoists, 
announce the date for elections to a constituent 
assembly, and dissolve the house of 
representatives "after making an alternative 
arrangement". For their part, the Maoists 
promised to dissolve their "people's governments" 
in various parts of the country.
These rapid developments were propelled by the 
Maoist need to arrive at a "safe landing" as 
quickly as possible, before there was a 
dissipation of their forces and energy. Even as 
the rebels appeared satisfied at what they had 
been able to extract at the talks, the political 
party rank-and-file were agitated at the equation 
of the parliament with the Maoist people's 
governments, and the silence regarding the 
decommissioning of rebel arms. "That was supposed 
to be the quid quo pro, not this", said one 
minister, fuming. The leaders of all parties were 
left hoping that Dahal had given secret 
assurances on downing his guns to Koirala in 
their one-on-one session, for he certainly could 
not have said so in the larger group. Koirala, 
meanwhile, was not telling, and soon flew to 
Bangkok for medical treatment.
There were misgivings within the larger SPA that 
a coterie group within the Nepali Congress had 
essentially presented them with a fait accompli, 
and that the populist pressures based on the 
overwhelming desire for peace meant everyone kept 
his own counsel on the crucial day. The 
grumblings began the day after, with party 
workers castigating their leaders for giving in, 
stating that the Maoists had held on to their 
main card, which was the gun in their hands.
At the same time, the rebels had the terrorist 
tag removed, received an agreement to enter the 
interim government, had their jailed cadre 
released, and, most importantly, got the 
announcement on the disbanding of parliament. The 
naysayers maintain that Maoist sincerity has not 
been tested on the ground, even while the rebel 
bluster tries to push their position as the 
"mainstream" position.
But it is also a fact that it is impossible to 
negotiate by committee, and the delicate 
situation of the Maoist leadership vis-à-vis 
their cadre required a level of secrecy and a 
need to maintain momentum. And while so many 
bemoan the lack of quid pro quo from the Maoist 
side, the very fact that the insurgents have 
abandoned their agenda of violent war can be 
considered their major concession, which was 
provided last autumn and which contributed to the 
momentum of the people's movement. But while it 
is important not to lose momentum, the 
negotiators on the two sides must realise that a 
situation must not be created where a dangerous 
rejectionism overtakes the parties.
What is left hanging in the air in the third week 
of June is how the Maoists are to join the 
interim government without the arms issue being 
settled. At the time of this writing, no letter 
has been sent to the United Nations on arms 
management. Meanwhile, amidst all this, UN 
secretary-general Kofi Annan has inexplicably 
assigned Ian Martin, the high-profile UN 
human-rights official assigned to Nepal and 
expected to play a key role in demobilisation, to 
a six-week fire-fighting mission in East Timor. 
Nepal needed more consideration than that.
The question of arms
Without doubt, the Communist Party of Nepal 
(Maoist) high command has taken an extreme risk 
in the bid to reorient its political strategy, 
both in terms of personal safety and protecting 
the gains of the "revolution". This has stemmed 
from its willingness to submit to geopolitical 
reality, as well as the dawning realisation that 
state power cannot be attained militarily. For 
this reason, and their evident willingness to 
finally abandon arms, the political parties have 
created space for them in the national mainstream.
Yet, there is no need to be placatory beyond a 
point, for the rebels did unleash a violent 
agenda on the people of Nepal. Moreover, their 
claim to speak for the Nepali people will only be 
tested once they contest elections and the people 
get to vote freely, without the looming threat of 
the gun.
The Maoist cadres need to undergo a rapid process 
of "politicisation" so that they learn to 
function in open society, without resorting to 
the threat of the pointed muzzle. The parties 
must be allowed to penetrate the districts beyond 
the headquarters, which they still are unable to 
do due to the recalcitrance of the ground-level 
rebel activists.
In this context, the big question today is how 
credible is the Maoist willingness to submit to 
"arms management", and what is the exact 
procedure? And if commitment is shown to be 
lacking, can the political parties hold off on 
the disbanding of parliament? The Maoists need to 
understand that every Nepali citizen other than 
the Maoists' own fighters, militia and cadre 
(their numbers yet to be ascertained) wants those 
rifles and pistols to be handed in.
The entire disarmament exercise was labelled 
"management of arms" in the twelve-point 
agreement signed between the Maoists and the SPA 
in November 2005, the roundabout language used to 
allow the rebel leadership to "sell" the idea 
gradually to its fighters. In private 
conversation, some Maoist commanders have 
conceded to the political leaders that they could 
not survive within the organisation just yet if 
they went around talking of demobilisation and 
decommissioning.
Over the course of a decade, young fighters have 
been socialised into the culture of violence, and 
for them a decommissioning process would entail 
loss of prestige, power - and even income. 
Mid-level Maoist commanders have assured some 
interlocutors that while they would be willing to 
be confined in barracks, with guns available for 
inspection to the UN, they cannot give up arms 
completely because they do not trust the top 
brass of the Nepal army. The reluctance of 
fighters and militia members to hand over their 
rifles may also be for fear of spontaneous 
reprisals by villagers who have remained sullen 
and subdued for much too long. If this is the 
case, then the Kathmandu government must create 
the conditions where such impromptu vigilantism 
is nipped in the bud.
There is no doubt that disarmament of Maoist 
fighters is key to Nepal's future, even as every 
effort is made to keep the Nepal army under a 
tight leash and made incapable of further 
crushing democracy or fighting a "dirty war". The 
question is whether the leaders who today head an 
armed group should show due humility towards 
political activists who do not hold guns - given 
also the success of the peaceful people's 
movement, which had non-violent Maoist 
participation. Should a party that wants to 
submit to multiparty politics push its agenda in 
the districts through the sheer potential of 
armed intimidation?
Furthermore, it is crucial to understand that 
truly free and fair elections to the constituent 
assembly will not be possible until the voting 
public knows that the rebels will return to the 
villages after the elections only as 
non-combatant sons and daughters.

A representative house?
While to some the eight-point agreement of 17 
June has the flavour of excessive concessions, 
the ambiguities may have been left there 
deliberately to provide "space" for the rebels. 
It could also be that Dahal and his lieutenant, 
Baburam Bhattarai, have been talking in 
confidence not only to Koirala, but also to 
Indian interlocutors and senior UN officials, and 
that they may have provided believable assurances 
about their transformation for peace. While many 
believe that the return for disbanding the house 
should have been a definitive announcement 
regarding the renunciation of violence, it might 
just be impossible for the rebels to do so at 
this stage even if the intention is there.
As far as the parliament is concerned, it is a 
fact that the stability of the state following 
the people's movement was possible only because 
the house was reinstated. Similarly, 
international recognition of the landmark 
legislative events that followed only took place 
because it was done by the house. Against such a 
background, what is the "alternative arrangement" 
that could stand in for the revived parliament of 
elected representatives, and would such an entity 
ever get the same legitimacy in the eyes of the 
people and the world? If there is to be a 
compromise body, would it not receive full 
credibility only when it is anointed by the house 
before it disbands?
Without the legitimacy granted by such a process, 
how can the donor community and foreign 
governments be expected to come forward to the 
assistance of an incongruous coalition government 
of political parties and Maoists who have not yet 
renounced violence? Will there, then, be an 
entity within the government of Nepal that 
actually commands two armed forces: the Nepal 
army and the "people's army"?
But there is also the argument that accepting the 
Maoists into the government is exactly the way to 
"co-opt" them and force them to take the guns 
from their combatants. The argument is that such 
contradictions and ambiguities are the very 
elements that will allow the Maoist leadership 
the manoeuvrability needed to extricate itself 
from a difficult spot vis-à-vis their radicalised 
cadre and fighters.
A necessary ambiguity
Two matters will thus be at the centre of the 
energetic debate in Kathmandu in the weeks ahead: 
what do the Maoists understand by hatiyaar 
byabasthapan (management of arms), and what will 
be the shape of the "alternative arrangement" 
that is to follow a disbanding of the house of 
representatives? The creativity and forbearance 
with which the Maoists and the political leaders 
seek these answers will ensure whether Nepal will 
succeed in what so many have failed to do 
elsewhere in the world - bringing an insurgency 
to a decisive end so as to make up for lost time 
on the path to social and economic transformation.
The hazy ambiguity can be seen as necessary to 
bring the Maoists in from the cold, as long as 
there is careful monitoring of the process. But 
it must be said that the true transformation of 
Nepali society will not come from the CPN (M), 
which would become part of the social revolution 
that is still required only after it joins the 
mainstream, multiparty politics. Such a social 
revolution must emerge from the clearly expressed 
desires of the Nepali public by way of the 
people's movement, for a non-violent society 
where historical ills are tackled through 
discourse and political evolution rather than 
through atavistic violence.
The Nepali people are convinced - if the 
insurgent and political leaders are not - that 
social and economic advancement will be achieved 
only through a return to peace, disarmament, 
reconstruction of the economy, and rehabilitation 
of the national psyche. The "inclusive" Nepal of 
the future will come from a pluralistic state 
with social-democratic political leadership. The 
Maoists will also be part of this campaign, as a 
political party, once their fighters have been 
truly demobilised, in the process that begins 
with the "management of arms".
The Maoists began their insurgency against a 
democratic dispensation back in 1996, with the 
Gyanendra interlude making it a convenient 
conversion for them to fight a dictatorial 
monarchy. Now that the kingship has been 
defanged, its future to be decided by the 
citizenry through a constituent assembly, will 
the rebels revert to their old violent agenda or 
will they adjust to the new reality?
Over the past two years, after all, much has 
changed, even in the Maoists' own strategy and 
thinking. With the CPN (M) having taken a 
strategic decision to come to multiparty 
politics, the political parties open-heartedly 
decided to make space for them in Nepal's 
political spectrum. Will the rebel leadership now 
show their own magnanimity - and courage - by 
lowering their pitch and restraining their 
demands? Amidst the haze, and even taking into 
account the contradictions in pronouncements by 
the Maoists of Nepal, the view looks bright.

Kanak Mani Dixit is a Nepali journalist and 
editor of the Kathmandu-based south Asian 
magazine Himal

_____


[4] 

SEXUAL HARASSMENT REACHES SINDH ASSEMBLY

Sexual harassment's incident that took place in 
Sindh Assembly in which renowned TV personality 
and member Sindh assembly Shazia Maree was 
harassed by another member of the house Eshwar 
Lal is deplorable. Shazia Maree has been quite 
outspoken on such incidents of sexual harassment 
even before this particular one in Sindh Assembly 
but the present incident explains that nothing 
substantial had been done on her complains 
regarding the behavior of her male colleagues in 
the Sindh Assembly. It also shows that government 
has no policy to deal with the issue of sexual 
harassment.
However, we think that the way this problem has 
been handled is not advisable. A woman is 
nobody's honour as Maa and Behan to be protected 
by her so called protectors but she has her own 
identity and honor as a human being that should 
be recognized and respected by all the other 
human beings.

As an active advocate of democratic rights Shazia 
Maree knows about the efforts being made by women 
organizations to address the issue of sexual 
harassment at the work place. A code of conduct 
against sexual harassment had been made by 
Alliance against sexual harassment at the 
workplace and being presented to the ministry of 
women's development and social welfare in 2002 to 
pursue much needed legislation and subsequent 
enforcement by various courts of law. In fact 
ministry had taken a very active role in 
preparing that code which is generally known as 
Code of Conduct for Gender Justice.

We as women activists show our solidarity with 
Shazia Maree and look forward for the same 
support from her for all women who languish in 
jails under huddod laws, victimized bonded 
labourers at farms and kilns, factories, 
hospitals and other service and commercial sector 
organizations, and many more women who bear 
violence as their fate in most of our households.

Lastly we suggest that Shazia Maree should take 
lead in pushing government to do required 
legislation on sexual harassment at the workplace 
not only for the men and women in assemblies but 
also at all workplaces.

Network for Women Rights
June 23, 2006

_____


[5] 

PRESS RELEASE

Srimati Sushma Baidhya, wife of arrested Maoist 
leader of Nepal Shri Mohan Baidhya and their two 
daughters Chetana and Srijana met Association for 
Protection of Democratic Rights (APDR)  and 
Bandimukti Committee (BMC) on 18.6.06 and 20.6.06 
respectively at their offices.
            
They requested the two organisations to help 
secure the release of Shri Mohan Baidhya and 
other political activists from Nepal who are now 
detained in various Indian Jails.
            
Though exact figures are not available, it has 
been learnt that at least 250 political activists 
from Nepal were arrested during the last 3/4 
years. They came to India for medical treatment 
or to visit relatives and friends. Though about 
100 of them were subsequently released on bail, 
about 150 are languishing in different Jails of 
West Bengal, Bihar, Jharkhand, Uttar Pradesh and 
Tamilnadu.
            
Apart from Mohan Baidhya, at least fourteen other 
Maoist political activists from Nepal, including 
Rekha Subba, Baburam Rai are now detained in 
Siliguri Jail. Mohan Baidhya was arrested from a 
Siliguri Nursing Home on 28.3.2004, when he was 
still recuperating in a Siliguri Nursing Home 
after an opthalmic surgery.
            
Earlier, APDR, BMC and other democratic voices 
protested against detention of Maoist and other 
political activists from Nepal in India, which 
goes against international norms and our 
countries tradition. We consider the continued 
detentions are more unethical and illegal because 
of
(i) the current changed political situation in 
Nepal with the installation of the new government
(ii) Understanding reached between Nepal Maoists and the present government
(iii) Withdrawal of cases against Maoist 
political activists in Nepal and their release, 
and also because
(iv) there is no real allegation of criminal activity against them in India.

In the above context, we demand :
1. Withdrawal of all the false cases against 
Mohan Baidhya, Rekha Subba, Baburam Rai and other 
Maoist political activists from
Nepal, who are now detained in jails of West 
Bengal and other Indian states and their 
immediate release.
2. West Bengal Government and the Union 
Government immediately release a list and other 
details of Maoist and other political
activists from Nepal detained/arrested  in India.

             We also call upon all democratic 
forces in India and elsewhere, particularly the 
political parties and the intelligentia to raise 
the demands and impress upon the state and 
central governments for withdrawal of  cases 
against  Maoist and other political activists 
from Nepal and their immediate release.

Released at a Press Conference held at BMC Office 
in Calcutta on 21 June 2006 in presence of 
Srimati Sushma Baidhya, wife of arrested Maoist 
leader of Nepal Shri Mohan Baidhya and their two 
daughters Chetana and


Amitadyuti Kumar
Vice President,
Association for Protection of Democratic Rights (APDR)
Senpara, PO Burashibtala, Chinsura, Dist Hooghly
WB          PIN 712105 [India]

_____


[6]


Rediff.com
June 20, 2006

MODI'S MANTRA: GUJARAT FIRST
Aditi Phadnis

Chief Minister Narendra Modi will use any trick 
in the book to get Gujarat its due.
Modi accompanied Union Agriculture Minister 
Sharad Pawar to Israel last week -- possibly the 
only foreign country that will host him now, 
after the 2002 Gujarat riots. Modi managed to 
establish an impossible connection between India 
and Israel -- that of water. "You are a desert 
and so are we. So we have the same sorts of 
problems, whether in the field of agriculture or 
food," he said. The Israelis were ecstatic, the 
Gujarat government would have us believe.
To Modi's critics -- and there are lots and lots 
-- Israel's endorsement of Modi cannot come as a 
surprise. Israel is a military industrial state, 
pogroms, anti-Muslim; Modi isŠ (geddit? 
geddit?!). But for those of us who are 
uncomfortable with labels like pseudo-secular, 
communal, secularist, and so on, it is galling to 
admit that Modi represents a challenge. He needs 
to be deconstructed to be understood fully in 
context.
First, his administrative record is excellent. 
His critics in the Gujarat unit of the Bharatiya 
Janata Party may say that Gujarat has got 
investments only worth Rs 500 crore and that his 
claims that Rs 70,000 crore had been invested in 
the state since he came to power is rubbish. You 
could also say that phrases like economic freedom 
for which the Rajiv Gandhi Institute of 
Contemporary Studies ranked Gujarat among India's 
best administered states, mean little for an 
entrepreneurial state like Gujarat and had 
nothing to do with Modi in any case.
But on some counts you have to give Modi credit. 
One, based on anecdotal evidence it would seem 
corruption has come down significantly in the 
state. The way an industrialist tells it, he paid 
a minister in the Gujarat government and Modi 
came to know of it. He asked if bribes had been 
paid. The industrialist first demurred and then, 
greed getting the better of him, admitted 
(possibly in the hope he would get his money 
back) that he'd paid Rs 10 lakh. Modi telephoned 
the minister, informed him that the industrialist 
was sitting with him and asked when the Rs 10 
lakh was being deposited with the party. This was 
the clearest message to investors -- if there was 
to be any corruption, Modi had to know about it.
Second, Modi is unequivocally, totally, 
passionately devoted to Gujarat. During the 
recent Narmada Dam controversy, Union Water 
Resources Minister Saifuddin Soz who was appalled 
at the way rehabilitation was handled by Madhya 
Pradesh, tried to stall Gujarat from raising the 
height of the dam so that he could secure some 
kind of deal for the oustees.
Modi came to Delhi for secret talks with Soz 
where Soz virtually begged him to postpone the 
decision. "I will issue a public statement saying 
you are India's greatest statesman," Soz told 
Modi, possibly expecting that an endorsement from 
a Kashmiri Muslim would help Modi wash away some 
of the Godhra black.
The only statement I want, Modi told Soz, is from 
the people of Gujarat. He then returned to 
Ahmedabad, made public the fact that Delhi wanted 
him to cut a deal that he refused and challenged 
the Gujarat Congress to tell the state where it 
stood -- with the UPA at the Centre or with 
Gujarat? MPs and political leaders from the state 
cutting across party lines rushed to Delhi to 
tell the prime minister not to punish Gujarat for 
it had committed no fault. It was Modi's 
initiative all the way.
You could argue that this is politics and that it 
has nothing to do with administration, but there 
is a direct link between the two. In Gujarat, 
historically, Hindu mass organisations such as 
the Rashtriya Swyamsevak Sangh and the Vishwa 
Hindu Parishad have had a base that has deepened 
after the decline of Ahmedabad's textile 
industry. Having been a pracharak in the RSS, 
Modi is intimately acquainted with the politics, 
ambitions and goals of all three.
If there is such a strong, communally polarised 
populace in Gujarat, who do you reckon they would 
vote for - Vishwa Hindu Parishad leader Pravin 
Togadia, a Gujarati, or Gujarat leader Narendra 
Modi?
Conscious that voters have a choice, Togadia and 
Modi have tried to steer clear of each other's 
path. The Trishul movement launched by the VHP 
found resonance in Rajasthan, not in Gujarat 
(although recognising the dangers, the Rajasthan 
government had Togadia arrested and jailed).
Modi is more than familiar with the lifestyle of 
VHP leaders and how it is supported. There was a 
time during previous BJP regimes that the Gujarat 
government used to pay VHP workers' salaries. No 
longer. Modi tells his colleagues clearly that if 
industry is to be brought to heel, he will do it 
-- he doesn't need the VHP's help.
The VHP had to vent its frustration very publicly 
recently when after L K Advani's remarks about 
Jinnah, it undertook a "shuddhi" of a road the 
BJP leader had inaugurated in Gujarat. Modi 
watched all these contortions quietly and from a 
distance. By contrast, when he supported 
anti-Aamir Khan protests, it was over an issue 
that had at its heart the interests of Gujarat, 
not Hindutva. Those who know the leader were also 
surprised when of all the second-generation 
leaders in the BJP, he emerged as the only one to 
support Advani during the Jinnah episode. This 
was because for most of these leaders, the 
discrediting of Advani by the RSS represented an 
opportunity. Only Modi was farsighted enough to 
see it as a threat -- of the RSS exerting more 
control over the BJP.
When a spokesman of the RSS was unwise enough to 
hint that Modi was behind the circulation of 
compromising CDs featuring RSS leader Sanjay 
Joshi, Modi called intermediaries between the BJP 
and the Sangh to say he was willing to hand over 
the whole matter to the Central Bureau of 
Investigation -- but then that would reveal 
everything and everyone. The statement was 
quickly contradicted by BJP President Rajnath 
Singh.
Modi's position is: Gujarat first, everything 
else later. He is the only mass leader the BJP 
has. Paradoxically, this owes to the tension 
between the branches of the Hindutva family. 
Logically, this will propel Modi to the 
presidentship of the BJP. What will happen then 
is anyone's guess.



_____


[7]

(The Hindu, June 20, 2006)

Book Review

Living through horror

Dionne Bunsha

Each communal attack only worsens the poverty and 
marginalisation of Muslims... A nuanced narrative 
from the heart of the ghettos

TREMORS OF VIOLENCE - Muslim Survivors of Ethnic 
Strife in Western India: Rowena Robinson; Sage 
Publications India Pvt. Ltd., B-42, Panchsheel 
Enclave, New Delhi-110017. Rs. 295.

`Chota Pakistans' are the most maligned areas of 
our cities. They are considered dirty, `breeding 
grounds' for `anti-social elements'. The harsh 
reality is that they are the poorest areas where 
some of the most marginalised are hemmed in - by 
deprivation, prejudice and riot after riot.

In this book, Rowena Robinson gives a voice to 
Muslims living in these ghettos - people who are 
never heard and are often misunderstood. 
Robinson's empathetic analysis disperses the fog 
of bigotry and provides insights into how people 
stitch back the pieces of their lives after 
riots. Based on interviews of Muslim survivors of 
communal violence in Mumbai, Vadodara and 
Ahmedabad, the book also brings out the 
experiences in different cities and also the 
varying responses of people within the Muslim 
community. Through revealing narratives, Robinson 
tries to understand how people live through one 
or several violent attacks, and how it alters 
their perceptions of time, space and identity.

Boundary

After Mumbai's communal violence in 1992-93, 
Muslims huddled together in certain areas in 
central Mumbai, Jogeshwari in the western suburbs 
and Mumbra in the eastern fringe. In Ahmedabad, 
the old, walled city, and Juhapura, a new 
settlement on the city's border are the only 
places for Muslims.

The Sabarmati that runs through the city forms 
the boundary for Muslims. In fact, a Muslim 
rickshawman who the author interviewed narrated 
how one of those he dropped on `the other side' 
told him, "Now Muslims don't have any excuse to 
be on this side of the Sabarmati." Even public 
spaces like parks become less accessible. 
Vadodara also has certain places where Muslims 
are confined - the walled city and newer 
settlements like Tandalja on the periphery. Every 
riot brings more people to these areas, seeking 
safety in numbers. Juhapura has doctors, lawyers 
and judges as residents, yet it is difficult to 
shake off the mini-Pakistan label. Not only 
physical, but even mental `borders' are tightly 
sealed.

Inside the ghetto, people's sense of security 
shrinks with every riot. Living just a few 
streets away from those who attacked and looted 
has narrowed the space of safety and trust. For 
example, one woman in Vadodara told Robinson, 
"Our area is okay. This street is fine. It is 
there, behind from where people attacked." 
`Behind' was just two lanes away.

Prejudice

More than `Hindus' as a whole, people distrust 
the police, Robinson observes. After every riot, 
witnesses' testimonies are not properly filed. 
False cases are lodged against survivors. And, 
every riot is marked by another police `chowky' 
outside the Muslim area. They are the most 
policed areas. `Combing operations' and illegal 
arrests are a regular occurrence. All this feeds 
the popular prejudice of Muslims being 
`anti-nationals' and `terrorists'.

In most Muslim areas, municipalities deny them 
the basic facilities, further propagating the 
stereotype of `them' being `dirty'. Common 
celebrations are also rarer now. Every big 
festival, be it Ganesh Chaturthi or Eid, is now 
considered unsafe. Earlier, Hindus and Muslims 
celebrated these together. Now, people stay 
indoors, fearing trouble. At certain points in 
the book, one wishes Robinson had also spoken to 
the Hindus on the `other side' of the `border' to 
get an interesting counterpoint, but maybe it did 
not fit in with the brief of her research.

Robinson devotes an entire chapter to women's 
narratives, examining how they deal not only with 
physical and economic survival, but also with 
changing family and community ties after the 
violence. She found the narratives from Mumbai 
more linear, while those from Gujarat, where the 
trauma is still being lived in the present, more 
chaotic. Many people said their tragedy was heard 
and acknowledged by the Srikrishna Commission 
that inquired into the Mumbai riots. But there 
was much less faith in Gujarat's Nanavati-Shah 
Judicial Commission.

Every violent incident also makes people slip 
into the stereotype of Muslims being 
`fundamentalist'. As they retreat into their 
community, many find comfort in their faith while 
dealing with the trauma. Not surprising, 
considering that the only organisations doing 
relief work in Gujarat were mainly religious 
charities. Women who didn't wear `hijab' start 
wearing one to protect themselves from outsiders 
in case there is another attack. Many people who 
didn't want to move from a mixed neighbourhood to 
a Muslim area narrate how they found it difficult 
to adjust, but later got involved with their 
community. Robinson has sharply captured these 
nuances. She has also pointed out the differences 
among Muslim sects not only in the way they view 
their religion but also in the way they view 
violence, marginalisation and prejudice, and how 
they adjust themselves to it.

In certain cases, identity becomes more 
straitjacketed, Robinson points out. But she also 
interviews young social activists engaged in the 
relief and rehabilitation work, who want to 
distance themselves from religion. For them, 
adversity led to a different self-realisation and 
made them community leaders, in some sense.

Poorly represented

India has the third largest Muslim population in 
the world, more than what many Muslim nations 
have. Yet, this 12 per cent of India's population 
is just a little better off than the Scheduled 
Castes, the poorest in the country. The income of 
the average Muslim is 11 per cent less than the 
national average.

Muslims are very poorly represented in the 
police, administration and politics. Only five 
per cent of Muslim women have completed high 
school education and only one per cent have 
studied beyond that level. Each communal attack 
only worsens the poverty and marginalisation of 
Muslims.

The book provides a nuanced narrative from the 
heart of the ghettos, very appropriate and 
essential at a time when prejudices against 
Muslims are reaching hysterical pitch world over. 
It is a sensitive presentation that gives voice 
to a people who are otherwise drowned out by hate 
speeches and irrational intolerance.


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Buzz on the perils of fundamentalist politics, on
matters of peace and democratisation in South
Asia. SACW is an independent & non-profit
citizens wire service run since 1998 by South
Asia Citizens Web: www.sacw.net/
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