SACW | 3 Jan. 2006

[Harsh Kapoor]

South Asia Citizens Wire | 03 Jan, 2006 | Dispatch No. 2196


[1] Romila Thapar in Karachi:  (Anwer Mooraj)
[2] Pakistan: Both Hare and Hound in 'War on Terror'(M B Naqvi)
[3] Pakistan - India - US: A Vital Task for Peace in 2006 (Jawed Naqvi)
[4] India: Making a ‘Menace’ of Migrants (Vir Sanghvi)
[5] India [culture policing]: Assam - A 'Sena' Rises (Nava Thakuria)

___


[1]

DAWN
January 2, 2006

THE REWRITING OF HISTORY

By Anwer Mooraj

THE recent international book fair held in Karachi’s Expo Centre was a
huge and truly memorable event. It was the first time in this philistine
city that so many representatives of Indian publishing houses jostled
with local publishers, booksellers and curious onlookers under one roof.
The spirit of bonhomie was unmistakable, and so was the enthusiasm of
the visitors.

For a change the guest of honour was a highly educated historian, Dr
Hamida Khuhro, who as Sindh minister of education has been trying to
come to grips with some of the endemic problems that have emerged from
the hideous maw of national education. And the guest speaker happened to
be one of India’s most distinguished and well known historians.

Dr Romila Thapar, is a recognized authority on Indian history. She is
emeritus professor of ancient Indian history at Jawaharlal Nehru
University in New Delhi, and has served as visiting professor at Cornell
University and the University of Pennsylvania. Oxford University Press,
who had organized the lecture, was lucky to have been able to play host
to such a distinguished scholar.

As so often happens in the subcontinent, great thinkers have great
detractors, and Dr Thapar is no exception. While she is held in high
esteem in her own country, she continues to be targeted for her
objectivity by members of the Hindu supremacist right who, like the
anti-secular lobby in Pakistan, believe that history, however
apocryphal, should be written with a religious slant and contain a
highly nationalistic flavour. And so, for want of anything better,
continue to label her as a Marxist and an anti-Hindu person.

Dr Thapar covered such a wide spectrum in the 45 minutes allotted to her
and moved across so much analytical territory that one wished one had
brought along a tape recorder or at least a notebook, instead of an
envelope which eventually became replete with scribbles.. Nevertheless,
as her presentation followed a logical train of thought, it wasn’t
really very difficult to remember the salient features of her discourse
and the various issues that she touched upon. Many of the points and
phrases stuck in the memory.

Around the time of independence and for a short period after, scholars
on both sides of the great divide inherited a long tradition of
historical writings. These texts essentially followed one of two
traditions. The first was the colonial approach with which a large
section of the audience was familiar, and the second was what has come
to be regarded as the nationalist approach. One was suddenly reminded of
how time had altered the way one looked at the great historical event of
1857. In a boarding school in British India it used to be called the
Indian mutiny. After independence it became the first war of independence.

The colonial approach which was introduced by James Mill in 1819, and
paved the way for other British historians, had the great merit of being
the first serious attempt to divide Indian history into periods. The
British like things to be nice and tidy and so Mill put the history of
India into three neat compartments: Hindu civilization, Muslim
civilization and the British period. This division was based on the
implied assumption that the basic units of Indian society are monolithic
religious communities and that these large groups of people are mutually
hostile. It was a view that had a profound effect on the politics of the
20th century.

British historians were obsessed with what came to be referred to as
oriental despotism; and the view shared by both historians and novelists
was that Indian states, whether they were ruled by maharajas or
‘nabobs,’ were static and did not undergo any evolutionary historical
change. And because of oppressive, despotic rule and the lack of private
property there was intense poverty. And so studies were conducted on the
caste system which was rigid and frozen and based on racial segregation
throwing up the Aryan history of race.

The audience then learnt that Indian historians, who conformed to the
nationalist view of history, as it emerged in the late 19th and early
20th centuries, challenged many of these theories and also the concept
of oriental despotism, even though they did not replace it with any
positive system of governance. But though they didn’t confront the
practice of placing Hindus, Muslims and the British into separate
periods, they presented a useful counterview. The systematic questioning
of the interpretation of history, however, did not begin in India before
the 1950s.

The drifting away period, in which young historians explored new
approaches and distanced themselves from the colonial and nationalist
interpretations of history began in the 1960s when scholars looked for
something more meaningful and authentic which would enable them to
understand their past better. The first thing they had to do was to
discard James Mill’s initiative to divide the three civilizations and to
treat them as distinct entities — because they did not reflect the flow
of history. The historians also had to debunk the belief that 2000 years
of Hindu dynastic rule and 800 years of Muslim dynastic rule were
glorious, static and unchanging.

The new historians gradually moved from the traditional study of texts
and events to the social sciences which were concerned with questions
like what brought about the change that took place, and when and why did
it occur? There was now a focus on the historical discipline — on what
is referred to as the historical method. It became important to check
the reliability of the evidence, to investigate if a change which took
place had one cause or a number of causes. Archaeological finds were a
great help, especially inscriptions that were precise and chronological.

A reference was made to the objection of peasants to taxation and
oppression and the comparison that historians frequently made between
India and China. We were told that in China there is a certain frequency
of peasant revolts, while in India peasants don’t revolt, they migrate.
One wondered at the time whether the late Charu Majumdar and his
Naxalite friends would have agreed.

After that Dr Thapar became a little technical, and by the time she had
gotten onto the part where the Buddhist tradition allowed women to
become nuns, sections of the audience were finding it a little difficult
to concentrate. It was an excellent discourse, profound, deeply
researched and well delivered, but one couldn’t help getting the feeling
that the proper venue for such a dissertation was the history department
of the University of Karachi and not an international book fair. One had
also hoped that this learned professor would have concluded her talk by
throwing some light of the various philosophies of history that have
intrigued students during the last 100 years.

One is referring, of course, to the theories of Marx, Spengler and
Toynbee, who saw a definite pattern in historical events, and H.A.L
Fischer, who in the introduction to his eminently readable classic A
History of Europe famously claimed to detect no pattern whatsoever in
history, as saw events following each other like the waves on the ocean.

Talking of historical cycles reminds one of Mark Twain’s famous comment,
“History doesn’t repeat itself, but sometimes it does rhyme. There is
some degree of similarity or analogy to be found among historical
events, else we could not learn from history, or profit from its study.
Perhaps the history department in the local university could take up
this intriguing question in a seminar: Does a loose historical
similarity amount to historical cycles? Whether or not the students can
quantify historical phenomena, it would certainly represent advancement
in philosophical rectitude, of which there is a noticeable shortage in
this country.

____



[2]

Inter Press Service
January 1, 2006

PAKISTAN: BOTH HARE AND HOUND IN 'WAR ON TERROR'

by M B Naqvi

KARACHI , Jan 1 (IPS) - After Islamists defied an order by Pakistan
President Gen. Pervez Musharraf to expel foreigners enrolled in the
madrasas (religious schools) by Dec 31, questions have been raised on
the country's future role in the United States-led ‘war on terror'.

Revelations that the madrasas had a link to the Jul.7 bombings in London
compelled Musharraf to order expulsion of all foreign students by Dec
31. Three of the four men responsible for the bombings were British
citizens of Pakistan descent.

Open defiance of Musharraf's orders has come from the sensitive North
West Frontier Province (NWFP) that borders Afghanistan and is ruled by
the fundamentalist Muttahida Majils-e-Amal (MMA) party-- which is also a
partner in the provincial government in neighbouring, insurgency-hit
Balochistan.

The MMA is strongly opposed to Pakistan's role in the war-on-terror in
Afghanistan and came to power on a promise to enforce Shariah law in
territories under its control and also push for withdrawal of U.S.
troops from the region.

Just how the general handles the new situation is being watched by the
U.S. and its allies which suspect that the NWFP and Balochistan are
being used to harbour internationally-wanted terrorists, including
al-Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden.

As the recipient of frontline arms and billions of dollars worth of aid
from the United States and deemed Washington's ‘'closest non-NATO
ally'', Pakistan has limited options and must balance many conflicting
interests .

According to Rahat Saeed, political analyst and editor of the bi-annual
Urdu magazine ‘Irtaqa', presently, Musharraf's hands are tied because of
the exigencies of domestic politics on the one side and questions about
his own legitimacy as a man in uniform and in power for six years.

"Musharraf is now on electoral mode: his term of office as president
expires in 2007. He is riding a tiger and has to stay in power to ensure
that no one does to him what he did to his predecessors, Benazir
(Bhutto) and Nawaz Sharif,'' Saeed told IPS in an interview.

‘'Article 6 of Pakistan's constitution hangs over Musharraf's head since
it prescribes death as punishment for overthrowing a constitutionally
elected government-- which he is guilty of when the army overthrew Nawaz
Sharief and installed him as chief executive of the country over six
years ago. He cannot face being held to account for his actions by
succeeding leaders. He has to stay in power and get himself elected as
president in 2007 by hook or by crook,'' Saeed said.

Already there are signs that the government would go easy on
implementing the deadline rather than confront the MMA and its strident
leaders.

On Friday, interior minister Aftab Ahmed Khan Sherpao said at least 60
percent of the estimated 1,500 foreign students in the country have
left. But most of the remainder are believed to be in the NWFP.

Amanullah Haqqani, religious affairs minister in the NWFP has called for
a review of Musharraf's order saying it was prestigious for Pakistan, a
major Islamic country in the world, to be hosting foreign students.

Currently, Pakistan is thought to have about 12,000 madrasas that impart
religious teaching to boys from impoverished or orthodox backgrounds.
But they have also come under suspicion of breeding Islamist militants,
following the Sep. 11, 2001 aerial attacks on the U.S.

Analysts blame the phenomenal growth of the madrasa system on liberal
funding and support from the U.S. and several Arab countries that were
keen on producing mujahideen (holy warriors) capable of vacating the
occupation of Afghanistan by the former Soviet Union in the 1980s.

‘'While western purposes were served by the defeat of the Soviets,
Pakistanis inherited a lot of guns and far too much cash, giving rise to
a widespread Kalashnikov and heroin culture which continue to distort
politics and administration in the region,'' said Saeed. ‘'This legacy
of the Islamic jihad in Afghanistan in 1980s has not really helped
Pakistan.''

‘'Pakistan itself has continued to be a theatre of war,'' says Prof.
Syed Jafar Ahmed of Karchi University. ‘'The simple fact is that the
Taliban (which ruled Afghanistan until driven out by the war on terror)
is a Pakistani phenomenon and a creation of this country's madrasas.''

In Ahmed's view Pakistan has been known throughout its 58 year history
as an unstable country. ‘'The fact that Pakistan continues to be ruled
by a general in uniform alone shows it has no stable political system
although the Musharraf regime, in a strange way, is strong and faces no
serious threat to its survival.''

Musharraf, said Ahmed, enjoys the full support of the coalition fighting
the war on terror because his cooperation is considered vital for its
Afghanistan policy. But the academic added that Pakistani cooperation
contrasts against the background of ‘'widespread terrorist politics
inside Pakistan''. Musharraf and his army have created a political
system whereby politicians with flexible consciences have ousted and
marginalised popular political leaders like Benazir Bhutto of the
Pakistan People's Party and Nawaz Sharif, leader of a faction of his
Pakistan Muslim League. Musharraf refuses to let these politicians
return home from exile.

Ahmed said the system has been ‘'accepted by the U.S.-led coalition as
adequately democratic -- because it has all the institutions and
trappings of a democracy and a reasonably free press, though it
exercises self-censorship because of unexplained violence against
outspoken journalists''.

‘'The system's design is such that it ensures Musharraf's survival as
president while he can also continue as army chief. Polls are held,
although few Pakistanis outside the portals of power accept them as free
because of interference from military intelligence,'' Ahmed said.

A combination of circumstances--strategic location at the tri-junction
of Gulf region, South Asia and Central Asia, high standing in the Muslim
world, a large army and a nuclear arsenal make Pakistan important enough
for the West overlook the Musharraf regime's imperfections.

But the refusal of the NWFP to expel foreign students from its madrasas
is a sign that things are spinning out of control in that province--as
also in neighbouring Balochistan where the army has had to resort to
using helicopter gunships in recent weeks to quell spiralling insurgency.

"Pakistan's two western provinces, Balochistan and NWFP, constitute an
important theatre in the war-against-terror not only for proximity to
Afghanistan but also because of the presence in them of Taliban and
al-Qaeda militants in unknown numbers,'' said Saeed.

‘'If the intensity of the insurgencies in these two provinces increases,
it may become necessary to call in foreign forces and that would bring
in new factors into play with unpredictable consequences,'' Saeed said.
(END/2006)




____


[3]

DAWN (Pakistan)
January 2, 2005

A VITAL TASK FOR PEACE IN 2006

by Jawed Naqvi

THE PEACE process between India and Pakistan cannot possibly be called
irreversible, as some of our leaders want us to believe, while the
nuclear threat the old rivals pose to each other remains intact. From
this perspective one of the most important statements that were made in
2005 came at the fag end of the year from IAEA chief Mohammad ElBaradei.

In an interview to CNN after he was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize, Mr
ElBaradei had expressed serious concern about the nuclear threat that
came from three seemingly intractable issues that continue to worry the
world — the Palestine question in the Middle East, North Korea and Kashmir.

That Mr ElBaradei’s remarks highlighting the threat from the nuclear
hotspots went largely unnoticed speaks volumes of the cavalier attitude
many of us tend to betray towards an ever looming calamity.

And if Kashmir is a nuclear flashpoint as a person of Mr ElBaradei’s
eminence no less suggests it is then the year 2006 has to see to it that
the threat is weeded out with utmost priority. The proposed visit to
South Asia by US President George W. Bush can go either way in this
regard. It can legitimize India’s and Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal by
giving them Congressional approval, while leaving the Kashmir issue
simmering. Or it can leave India and Pakistan with the key task of
resolving their bloody dispute with the kind of seriousness that has so
far eluded them, more worryingly as nuclear states.

Opening up new routes along the Line of Control plus a few other
confidence-building measures in Punjab and Rajasthan-Sindh areas have
marked a tectonic shift in India-Pakistan bilateral relations no doubt.
In 2002 these measures would have looked unthinkable. But seen together
with the frequent negative comments that keep interrupting these signs
of hope, such as the jingoistic remarks that came from the Bharatiya
Janata Party on Kashmir last week, there are serious reasons to worry
for the future.

The medieval sultans of Delhi used to be addressed as a Zill-i-Ilahi, or
shadow of God on earth. President Bush may consider himself the latter
day avatar of the Delhi sultan with a global mission. But he needs to
heed the warnings from history if he wants his mission to Delhi to be
successful.

A 10-year old article by George C. Herring, Professor of History at the
University of Kentucky, deals with the problems faced in the Middle East
and South Asia by the Kennedy administration. There are vignette’s from
history that could serve as lessons for President Bush and for our
policy-makers too.

“In both the Middle East and South Asia, the Kennedy administration
launched bold initiatives to shift the world’s balance of power in
favour of the United States. In each case, the initiative ran afoul of
regional rivalries. In South Asia, John F. Kennedy’s efforts to
cultivate goodwill with India merely antagonized the United States’
longstanding ally, Pakistan, without tearing India away from its
neutralist cold war stance.

“In the Middle East, the administration’s efforts to befriend Gamal
Abdel Nasser’s United Arab Republic (the shrot-lived marriage between
Egypt and Syria) resulted in only limited, short-term success while
alienating the United States’ traditional ally, Israel, and the more
conservative Arab states such as Jordan and Saudi Arabia.

“The United States enjoyed the most success where it attempted the
least, with neutral Afghanistan. Fearing that a 1961 border dispute
between Pakistan and Afghanistan might force the latter into the arms of
the Soviet Union, the Kennedy administration dispatched diplomat
Livingston Merchant to encourage a peaceful settlement. Merchant failed,
and tensions between the two northern-tier nations persisted, but the
result was not what the United States had feared.

“As Pakistan leaned toward Communist China in the aftermath of the
Sino-Indian war of 1962, Afghanistan eased away from Moscow. A visit to
the United States in September 1963 by the Afghan king and queen seemed
to confirm Afghanistan’s neutralism and establish it as one of the prime
showcases of East-West ‘competitive coexistence’.

“In contrast, the Kennedy policy toward the more complex and intractable
rivalry between India and Pakistan was a notable failure. Kennedy and
his advisers agreed that the Eisenhower administration had erred in
condemning Indian neutralism and tying US fortunes in the region
exclusively to India’s bitter enemy Pakistan. The administration
attached special importance to India, the world’s largest democracy, and
set out to cultivate its goodwill. The president initiated a warm,
personal correspondence with Indian prime minister Jawaharlal Nehru,
dispatched Vice President Lyndon Johnson to New Delhi on a personal
goodwill mission, and initiated a large economic aid programme to
support India’s industrial development.

“Washington’s tilt toward New Delhi was already well along when a border
war between India and China in October 1962 provided what seemed a
splendid opportunity to tighten the relationship. The United States
immediately sent military aid to beleaguered India. To mollify an
increasingly concerned Pakistan, the administration sought to use the
leverage provided by aid to India to work out a settlement of the bitter
dispute between the two nations over Kashmir.

“US policy failed on all counts. Under pressure from the United States,
India and Pakistan did agree to talks on Kashmir, but the gap between
the two could not be bridged and the talks broke down without tangible
results.

“Deeply alarmed at the US tilt toward India, Pakistan moved noticeably
toward Peking. It concluded a provisional border demarcation agreement
with China in December 1962 and arranged a series of much-publicized
state visits between the two nations’ top leaders. Still enticed by the
idea of luring India into close ties with the United States, Kennedy in
his last months in office toyed with the possibility of a vastly
expanded military aid programme. The administration eventually bowed to
budgetary pressures and Pakistani protests, however, and approved a
programme of only $50 million per year. Annoyed at Washington’s lack of
support, India turned increasingly to the Soviet Union for aid. US
policies thus broke down in the face of intractable regional tensions,
alienating Pakistan while failing to gain the United States significant
influence with India.”

The China factor is again being touted by President Bush’s advisers as a
reason to engage more closely with South Asia. Unlike Kennedy’s $50
million military aid to India they seem even willing to commit the
disaster of changing the definitions of non-proliferation to indulge
India and Pakistan. President Bush perhaps needs to have a word with Mr
ElBaradei before coming here in late February or early March.


____


[4]

The Hindustan Times
January 1, 2006

MAKING A ‘MENACE’ OF MIGRANTS

Counterpoint | Vir Sanghvi
			
Do you know how many illegal Bangladeshi immigrants there are in India?
Are there 30 million of them? What about 20 million? Or is the figure as
low as 10 million?

I ask because the truth is that nobody knows how many illegal
Bangladeshi migrants have made India their home. Every figure you read
will be an approximation or — and this is more likely — a simple guess.
The 30-million figure, for instance, is usually quoted by people who
want to claim that the problem of migration has now veered dangerously
out of control. Because 30 million sounds more alarming than 10 million,
it is this figure that will get quoted. But nobody knows that there are,
in fact, 10 million illegal immigrants (the 30 million figure is just
plain ridiculous) because no statistics exist.

At an intuitive level, however, we do recognise that there are many
illegal migrants in India. The border between India and Bangladesh is
porous and there is little that anyone can do to check migration.
Moreover, many people in the border villages do not recognise that an
international boundary exists. It is not uncommon for a man to cycle
from a Bangladeshi village to a town in India to buy something — and for
him to then cycle back home on the same day.

So, there are many Bangladeshis in the border districts of West Bengal.
Because there are few cultural differences, they fit in easily with the
local people. Many of these Bangladeshis do then make their way to such
cities as Calcutta or Delhi.

This by itself should not be a cause for much concern. We were all part
of the same country till 1947 and it is inevitable that people will keep
moving between the nations of South Asia, no matter how the
international boundaries are drawn.

But, we are repeatedly told, the “problem of Bangladeshi migrants” is
different. First of all, there are supposed to be too many of them.
Secondly, there is a danger that some of them will have terrorist links.
And finally, there is no way that India can sustain such a huge burden
on its resources. There are simply not enough jobs to go around.

If you think about it, none of this makes much sense. The figures, as we
have seen, are just concoctions. The terrorism stuff is nonsense. There
is very little evidence that Bangladeshis foment terrorism in India and
no evidence at all that the rag-pickers, sweepers and domestic servants
who constitute the bulk of the illegal migrant population have a
terrorist agenda.

That leaves us with the not-enough-jobs-to-go-around argument. This
seems reasonable enough till you realise that nobody objects to
immigration from Nepal. In fact, we actually encourage Nepalis to come
and seek employment in India and have special laws in place that enable
them to cross the border without passports and to work without visas.

So, why are there enough jobs for Nepalis and not enough jobs for
Bangladeshis?

Not only is the answer obvious but here’s another fact: many of those
who have left Bangladesh and opted for India are Hindus who feel
increasingly alienated because of the Islam-isation of Bangladeshi
society. But, do you ever hear of a drive against illegal Hindu
immigrants? On the contrary, such parties as the BJP have invited
Bangladeshi Hindus to seek shelter in India.

No doubt, there are enough jobs to go around when it comes to Bengali
Hindus.

But why blame the BJP alone? The Congress is as responsible for creating
the scare about illegal Bangladeshi immigrants. In 1993, when Narasimha
Rao was Prime Minister, we made the mental shift from seeing Bangladesh
as a source of cheap labour to suddenly seeing it as a menacing country
from which millions of illegal immigrants would deprive happy Hindus of
their jobs.

It was in 1993 that the government launched Operation Pushback which
authorised the police to pick up thousands of poor Bengali Muslims from
all over Delhi and to send them to the border. Bangladesh refused to
accept these people — claiming that they were not Bangladeshis at all —
and many were stuck in the no-man’s land on the edge of the border
before eventually sneaking back into India after bribing soldiers and
officials.

Operation Pushback — and its equivalents in other cities — continues to
this day even if the name has changed. It is still the responsibility of
the police to round up illegal Bangladeshis and to send them back across
the border. The Delhi Police, for instance, has ten Task Forces whose
primary function is to scour Delhi looking for Bangladeshis to ship back
to Dhaka. In other cities too — and the Bangladeshi scare has now taken
hold in Bombay — more and more policemen are being pulled away from
their normal duties (i.e., the maintenance of law and order) and being
told to concentrate on looking for Bangladeshis.

In my view, the police should have better things to do. But even if you
disagree with me and believe that illegal immigration is a serious
problem, I don’t think it is possible for anybody to support the manner
in which alleged Bangladeshis are being deported.

I have been reading a pamphlet produced by the Citizen’s Campaign for
Preserving Democracy. Members of this group studied the way in which the
police rounded up Bangladeshis. And what they found is truly disturbing.

First of all, many of the people being deported are not even
Bangladeshis. Under the Foreigners Act, the burden of proof is on the
accused and not on the police (you are guilty till proved otherwise). So
the only way for a Bengali Muslim to prove that he is an Indian is to
produce documentation. But few poor people in India possess any
documents at all. So, the police can pick up and deport anybody they
like as long as: a) he speaks Bengali, b) is a Muslim, and c) looks like
he lacks the resources to defend himself.

Secondly, the notion of due process does not exist. All civilised
countries constitute some kind of judicial body that serves as a court
of appeal and allows the man who is being deported a chance to be heard.

In theory, India also allows for this kind of appeal. According to the
Foreigners Act, there should be a tribunal. And the Illegal Migrants
(DT) Act of 1983 has a provision for a tribunal.But no tribunal has been
constituted in Delhi under the Foreigners’ Act. And as for the Illegal
Migrants (DT) Act, well, that’s not valid in Delhi.

In effect, this means that the authorities can decide that anybody is an
illegal immigrant and can throw him out of the country. There is nothing
a victim can do by way of protest. There is no appeal at all.

Thirdly, because the police are not very good at identifying illegal
immigrants, they rely on a network of local informers who point out the
so-called Bangladeshis. Because these informers are trusted implicitly
by the police, they have complete power over their communities. Anybody
who does not keep them happy will be deported unless he then pays off
the local police. This is a system that lends itself to injustice and
corruption and, of course, these are exactly the consequences that follow.

Fourthly, the Task Forces work on the basis of a quota. In a manner
reminiscent of the sterilisation quotas during the Emergency, each Task
Force has to identify 100 illegal Bangladeshi immigrants every day.
Obviously, the police cut corners in an effort to fill this quota — even
if this means deporting non-Bangladeshi Muslims.

And finally, there is a complete violation of all international
protocol. Diplomatic procedure requires that if you are deporting
nationals of another country, you inform that country’s embassy or high
commission. But nobody bothers to inform the Bangladeshi Mission.

What worries me the most about all this is that we in the media have
been happy to go along with the Bangladeshi migration scare despite its
plainly xenophobic and frankly communal nature. Perhaps this is because
the victims of the injustice — the poorest of the poor, rag-pickers,
slum-dwellers etc — do not constitute our readership or viewership or
impinge on our world.

But this is no longer about poor people or even about Bangladeshis. It
is about how we define ourselves as a society. Are we to become a
country that allows policemen to pick up anybody they like and throw him
out without any kind of due process? Or are we to be a society of laws
where everyone has the right to be heard and where justice is freely
dispensed?

How you answer those questions does, I think, determine your response to
the drive against Bangladeshi migrants.

_________________________________

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____


[5]


The Statesman (India)
January 3 2006

Open Forum : A SENA RISES

By Nava Thakuria
The media in the rest of India may be pre-occupied with the Shiv Sena,
but their counterparts in the North-east have been indifferent to the
emergence of the Asom Sena which has pledged to “safeguard the
socio-political rights of the indigenous people of Assam”. The birth of
this group, at Barpeta, an important centre of the state’s Vaishnavite
culture, led by the influential All Assam Students Union (AASU) at the
end of this year presents a major development in the state’s complex
politics.
In fact, amid the region’s militant groups with its gun-toting youth,
the Asom Sena (Assam soldiers) takes a different tack: it has pledged to
work non-violently (although the concept is borrowed from that of the
Shiv Sena, founded by Balasaheb Thackarey in Maharashtra), to fight the
imposition of vulgarity in the name of culture, to strengthen unity
among different ethnic and religious groups and press for local
employment. AASU, which led the agitation against illegal immigration
from Bangladesh in the 1980s, says the group will lead its agenda in a
“more aggressive way”.
Samujjal Bhattacharya, the long-time adviser to AASU, says, “The
deprivation of local youths in matters of appointment in various
departments of the governments both in New Delhi and Dispur (Guwahati)
will be a major issue to be taken up.” He asserts that the Asom Sena is
a “non-violent organisation” and a non-political group although he also
shelters behind the line that it may “adopt a radical stand on issues of
regional interests”, without spelling out what that means.
But clearly, as currently envisaged, the Sena will be a pawn of the
student union, with more storm troopers to push local demands. Its
creation comes just five months before state elections are due and that
is not surely merely a coincidence: probably its cadres will side with
the Brindabon Goswami faction of the Asom Gana Parishad although the
group may keep an official distance.
The media in Assam has shown little interest in analysing this
development although The Shillong Times criticised the move to form a
“cultural policing” force of vigilantes as alarming. The second oldest
English daily of the North-east, the newspaper argued that AASU had
fuelled sub-nationalism by mounting an offensive against Indians from
other states over a long period.
“Assam has for years been plagued by a sense of isolation from the
Indian mainstream and this has spawned a narrow chauvinism.” The Assam
Tribune remarked that “in today’s world of globalisation and
liberalisation, the Asom Sena shouldn’t become a deterrent for those
willing to set up ventures in this investment-starved state”.
It added that “in pursuing the demand for cent per cent reservation of
jobs for ‘locals’ the AASU should focus on tapping its influence and
resources to mount pressure on those to set up a mechanism for creation
of a pool of skilled human resources which will be too qualified to
ignore in the present-day’s job market not only within Assam but outside
also. There is no denying the fact that our education system needs
radical changes to produce quality products. That should remain an area
of concern for all of us in the interests of the future generation”.
Student leader-turned politician Apurba K Bhattacharya says that the
Asom Sena will be crucial in the next elections as AASU still enjoys
“mass support” in Assam. His comment is well taken in perception of the
“hidden participation” of armed rebels in elections in a region that has
nurtured over 30 active insurgent groups these past decades.
One can cite the example of the Asom Gana Parishad (AGP), the regional
party now in the opposition, which was born of the AASU leadership in
1985. The AGP ruled the state for two terms but like other political
parties had shown its ugly face to the public, with non-performance and
unbelievable corruption. It has split twice since its birth yet both
factions are hoping for a good showing in the Assembly elections in April.
Though Asom Sena has been widely welcomed in Brahmaputra Valley, there
are opposing views which should make AASU uncomfortable. A minority
organisation, the Mutahidda Majlis-e-Amal, has raised its voice against
the group. Expressing “deep concern” at the Sena’s formation, the MMA
says AASU’s initiative is aimed at terrorising “Bengali-speaking voters
and to harass all non-Assamese living in the state on the eve of the
Assembly election”.
On the other hand, the Vishwa Hindu Parishad has created more confusion,
as is its wont, with its recent declaration that it would launch another
organisation called the Hindu Sena in Assam.
While the metro media across the country has been flooded with news
about the Shiv Sena, especially after the exit of Raj Thackeray, the
media in Assam appears unwilling to analyse the emergence of the Asom
Sena and what it portends for the region.
Perhaps the media has lost interest in the premier student organisation
and its leaders, as much for their style of functioning as well as for
pursuing political ambitions from the comfortable bastion of AASU.

(The author is a Guwahati-based freelance journalist.)


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Buzz on the perils of fundamentalist politics, on
matters of peace and democratisation in South
Asia. SACW is an independent & non-profit
citizens wire service run since 1998 by South
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