SACW #1 | 21 March 2005
sacw
aiindex at mnet.fr
Sun Mar 20 18:11:03 CST 2005
South Asia Citizens Wire #1 | 21 March, 2005
via: www.sacw.net
[Interruption Notice: Please note there will be
no regular SACW Dispatches between 22 - 25 March
2005. ]
[1] Pakistan: Remembering Shahla Zia - Mind Behind Movement (Ayesha Khan)
[2] Indian-American community exerts growing clout back home (Ben Arnoldy)
[3] India Interview With Ms. C.K. Janu, Leader
of Tribals in Kerala (Subhash Gatade)
[4] Canada: South Asian Women's Community
Centre (SAWCC--Montreal) position on the
recommendation to use religious laws to settle
family legal matters
[5] Three Book Reviews:
(i) Review of Christophe Jaffrelot's collection
'The Sangh Parivar: A Reader' (Dilip Simeon)
(ii) Review of Amitava Kumar's, 'Husband of a
Fanatic' (Christopher De Bellaigue)
(iii) Review of Sanjib Baruah's, 'Durable Disorder' (Pradip Phanjoubam)
[6] Announcements:
(i) Meeting In Memory of Comrade Tarkunde (New Delhi, 22 March 2005)
(ii) A public meeting on Govt policies and human
rights of Asian women in Britain (London, 23
March 2005)
--------------
[1]
News on Sunday - 20 March 2005
MIND BEHIND MOVEMENT
We were so fortunate to have counted Shahla Zia
among us. Much work remains, and it will be very
hard indeed to proceed without her in our midst
By Ayesha Khan
The most outstanding citizens of this country
tend to pass away quietly, without many of us
even aware of who they are. Just as often, we
lavish mediocrity with praise and privilege,
giving the living a false sense of greatness in
their own lifetime. This is why Shahla Zia has
passed away in our midst and the country can go
on as if nothing major had happened. But for the
women's movement, precisely the opposite is true.
Shahla Zia was a founding member of the Women's
Action Forum, and a joint director of the Aurat
Foundation in Islamabad for over a decade. She
trained as a lawyer in Lahore, and in the early
years of her career helped to establish AGHS --
Asma, Gulrukh, Hina, Shahla -- the legal aid
organisation for women. She sat on the National
Inquiry Commission on the Status of Women, led by
Mr. Justice Nasir Aslam Zahid, and was a major
contributor to its 1997 report, which led to the
establishment of the Permanent Commission on the
Status of Women. Her advocacy work focused on the
increased political participation of women. She
lobbied with lawmakers patiently and persistently
to restore reserved seats for women in our
elected bodies, and later led efforts to train
new women entrants into local bodies to be
effective leaders.
The deeper truth is that Shahla was our mentor in
the women's movement in Pakistan. She achieved
that stature not through her public activities,
but through the manner in which she guided others
to work together in a group for social change and
in the unique clarity of her thought. She was
clear and firm on the principles of the Women's
Action Forum as it struggled to counter
discriminatory legislation, attacks from the
religious right, and derision from an uncommitted
public. She gave endless hours in meetings and
discussions groups to explain to us, and remind
us in times of confusion, what it was we were
fighting to achieve for this country.
I recall the lengthy internal debate within WAF
regarding the wording of the WAF Charter and our
position on the issue of secularism in the early
1990s. Members were stuck; if we demanded a state
that was secular did that compromise our belief
in Islam? Was it possible to reconcile faith and
politics without compromising the former and
diminishing women's rightful share in power? Even
harder, was it possible to have a charter that
accommodated the belief systems of all women,
believers and non-believers, and detracted
nothing from their rights as citizens?
I still have a memo she wrote after a WAF meeting
on this issue, articulating the fine points of
why it was correct for WAF to take such a
controversial stand. She wrote that taking a
stand in favour of a secular state "does not mean
that WAF is in any way against Islam, but merely
that WAF believes that religion is a personal
matter and not for the State to dictate or
control." If religion becomes the province of the
State, she added, "It has always been exploited
by the State for its own political gains and
motives, and this has invariably adversely
affected women, minorities and the poor." In a
country where the Hudood Ordinances (1979) are
still in force despite frequent recommendations
for their repeal, it is instructive to remember
the benefit of a clear secular approach even a
decade after Shahla made these notes.
She placed her faith in the Constitution and in a
legal system that could be turned into a support
for the poor and marginalised in society if we
fought for it. The first chapter of the 1997
Report of the Inquiry Commission puts the case
simply. "The Constitution is a country's basic
law. To the extent constitutional rule is
promoted andbecomes entrenched in a society to
that extent democratic culture flourishes. And it
is in a democratic culture that women's rights
have the best chance of recognition."
Can these arguments be dismissed as rhetoric of
the westernised elite of Pakistan, the
coffee-drinking, cigarette-smoking,
English-speaking women activists accused by their
detractors of misrepresenting women of this
country? For that is what opponents of the NGO
movement have claimed time and again in response
to activists' demands for women's rights and
social justice.
Nothing is quite what it seems when viewed from
such a distance. Shahla was calm, compassionate,
and soft-spoken. She was devoted to her large
family, devoid of material greed, and shy of
social or media attention. She genuinely loved
the law, and had the patience to study its
nuances and articulate subtleties that was beyond
many an enthusiastic activist. And in an
increasingly hypocritical society, Shahla's
stature grew because her honesty remained
undiminished, and her integrity as a friend and
colleague was never in dispute.
We were so fortunate, and indeed honoured, to
have counted Shahla Zia among us in Pakistan. We
are a better people for it, since she taught us
through her intellect and example. Much work
remains, and it will be very hard indeed to
proceed without her in our midst. Yet her
tremendous composure under pressure, her warmth,
optimism and patience, remain the best example
for those who need to continue this struggle for
generations to come.
______
[2]
The Christian Science Monitor
March 21, 2005
INDIAN-AMERICAN COMMUNITY EXERTS GROWING CLOUT BACK HOME
As the US's wealthiest ethnic group, it is
divided over how funds sent abroad are used.
By Ben Arnoldy | Staff writer of The Christian Science Monitor
When Nishrin Hussain moved to the United States
in 1990, she left her parents behind in India.
But her American life was tragically interrupted
when her father, a Muslim, was burned alive by a
Hindu mob during the 2002 riots that shook
India's Gujarat state.
Since then, she has become a force in Indian
politics - from her home in Delaware. Like a
growing number of other Indian-Americans, Ms.
Hussain is using the considerable power of the
pocketbook and other forms of political activism
to influence events half a world away.
NARENDRA MODI: Denied a US visa for his role in riots.
DIVYAKANT SOLANKI/AP
And their efforts can have an impact: Last week
the US State Department - largely because of the
protests of Indian Americans - canceled an
upcoming tour in the United States by Narendra
Modi, Gujarat's chief minister, for the role he
played in the riots three years ago.
In one sense, the Indian American community
reflects the growing clout of many expatriate
groups in the US. From Mexican-Americans to
immigrants from the Muslim world, they are
becoming more aware of their influence back home
and are trying to capitalize on it.
Irish-Americans have influenced events in their
homeland for decades.
But the Indian-American community has gained new
visibility in recent years as its political - and
financial - clout has grown. As America's
wealthiest ethnic group, it is particularly
divided over allegations that some charities are
funneling money to sectarian violence like that
in Gujarat.
"We are seeing increased attention by
Indian-Americans to how their donations are used,
particularly in the wake of Sept. 11 and the
Gujarat events," says Mark Sidel, an expert on
Indian diaspora at the University of Iowa. "We
now see the emergence of controversy and of
watchdog groups of various kinds."
One such group, Sabrang Communications, released
a bombshell report in late 2002. It alleged that
the US-based India Development and Relief Fund
(IDRF) was quietly channeling abroad more than 80
percent of its discretionary funds to pro-Hindu
groups. Some of these groups, tied to an Indian
organization known as the Rashtriya Swayamsevak
Sangh (RSS), have been accused of fomenting
sectarianism that has led to violence.
Human Rights Watch and other groups say that the
RSS was among those "most directly responsible"
for the Gujarat riots. They also fault Modi for
doing little to rein in the organized mobs that
killed more than 2,000 people, mostly Muslims.
The riots started after Muslims set fire to a
train full of Hindu activists, killing 58 men,
women, and children.
Many of the groups that were preparing to protest
Modi's visit are also tracking Indian-American
charities that support RSS activities. "The
people who are sending donations to these groups
are not aware of where the money is going," says
Hussain. "And I do fear that after the [2001
Gujarat] earthquake that some of the money
collected was geared toward this hatred."
But Ramesh Rao, a professor of communications at
Truman State University in Kirksville, Mo., says
the IDRF has been unfairly targeted. At IDRF's
request, he published a detailed rebuttal to the
Sabrang report. While not denying that some IDRF
money may go to groups affiliated with the RSS,
he says that both the amount and the effect are
overblown. Mr. Rao calls the Sabrang report a
political attack by leftists, part of a
decades-long campaign to vilify the RSS and any
group directly or indirectly connected with its
work.
That the US should be center stage for this
long-running dispute has a lot to do with the
rising wealth of Indian-Americans.
In a first study of its kind, Devesh Kapur at
Harvard University found that Indian-Americans
donated an estimated $150 million in 2004. He
says they are the most educated ethnic group in
the US and have the highest median income. "I
think the real story is how little they give," he
says.
The way they give is also noteworthy. Sidel says
that as with other more established ethnic
groups, Indian-Americans are no longer just
sending money back to family, but are
increasingly putting it toward social and
charitable causes through nongovernmental
organizations (NGOs) and professional
associations.
One of the biggest professional groups is the
Asian American Hotel Owners Association. Modi had
been invited to the US by AAHOA to speak this
week at their annual convention in Ft.
Lauderdale, Fla. Nearly all the group's members,
who control more than half of America's economy
lodging, hail from Gujarat.
In a press release sent after the State
Department revoked Modi's visa, AAHOA said it
"understood" the government's position and
reasserted that Modi was invited to speak about
business opportunities and tourism in Gujarat.
Protest organizers, however, said the trip was an
effort to raise Modi's profile for an eventual
bid for prime minister. Modi was not the only
foreign leader to be snubbed by the US last week.
Breaking with a St. Patrick's Day tradition,
political leaders did not host Sinn Fein leader
Gerry Adams. Sinn Fein's militant wing, the Irish
Republican Army, is embroiled in a murder and
bank heist scandal. The killing of Robert
McCartney has touched off concern among
Irish-Americans, who are a key source of funding
for Sinn Fein.
But it is not easy to establish that donated
dollars end up funding violence abroad.
"I don't know if money given to RSS schools leads
to violence," says Rao. "While one can make that
causal stretch for political purposes, no good
social scientist would be willing to do that."
Biju Mathew, a professor at Rider University and
contributor to the Sabrang report, admits the
report found no legal smoking gun. But he
describes as a "relic of the past" the notion
that to catch someone red-handed "you would mark
a currency bill and see where it surfaces again."
After Sept. 11, the US released a new set of
regulations for charitable giving, and
established a blacklist of groups that finance
terror. There is anecdotal evidence, supported by
new research on the Pakistani community by Adil
Najam at Tufts University in Medford, Mass., that
Muslim-Americans are shifting their donation
dollars to local rather than international causes.
Corporations are also changing the way they
donate. Cisco Systems, Inc. was once a major
contributor to IDRF through its employee-matching
program. In May 2003 the company suspended its
program, a move a spokeswoman said was related to
uncertainty over the changing federal guidelines.
IDRF no longer receives matching funds from
Cisco, or from Oracle.
Despite these losses, IDRF's general funding did
not drop after the November 2002 report. The
group's president says IDRF raised $757,000 in
2003 compared with $702,000 in 2002.
Meanwhile, Nishrin Hussain takes satisfaction
that Modi cannot come to America. "I am
delighted," she says.
______
[3]
sacw.net - March 18, 2005
INTERVIEW WITH MS. C.K. JANU, LEADER OF TRIBALS IN KERALA
"NO LAND EVEN FOR BURIAL . . . ANY MEANING IN LIVING ON THIS LAND ? "
Ms C.K. JANU, leader of the tribals of Kerala has
carved out a niche for herself in the history of
people's movement in Kerala. Presently she is in
Delhi as member of a delegation of Five AGMS
(Adivasi Gothra Maha Sabha) members to meet
Ms.Sonia Gandhi - Chairperson UPA and Chairperson
of the National Human Rights Commission to bring
to their notice the hardships faced by the
adivasis of Kerala. In a recent with Mr Jaison
Chacko and Mr Subhash Gatade she discusses the
genesis of the struggle led by her, the role of
the political parties and her future plans.
Excerpts of the interview are given below.
Introduction :
It is now history that the 48 day dharana (sit
in) of hundreds of tribals before the Kerala
state secretariat led by Ms C.K.Janu for tribal
land rights compelled the then government led by
A.K. Antony to go in for compromise with the
tribals. The immediate provocation for agitation
of the tribals was the 32 starvation deaths among
the adivasis. A senior Kerala minister had
brushed aside these deaths as being caused by
consumption of illicit liquor. Driven by the
horror of such mass starvation deaths hundreds of
tribals stormed the state secretariat and erected
'refugee huts' before the offices of government.
The government bowing to the public pressure
negotiated with the tribals and promised lands to
the thousands of landless adivasis in a phased
manner. ( 16 October 2001) It was a sad
commentary on the state of affairs in India's
highly contested polity that the two mainstream
parties who were interchanging seats of power in
the state were found to be wanting on the
deprivation faced by the tribals.
Ofcourse the victory of the tribals remained
shortlived. After the initial euphoria was over
the Antony government started dilly dallying on
its promise. This led to another historic action
by the tribals. Hundreds of tribals alongwith
their families 'occupied' the Muthanga wildlife
sanctuary to expose the government's failure to
honour their commitment to the tribals (January
2003). Forcible eviction by the police resulted
in the death of one tribal and injuries to others.
It is significant that the autonomous militant
intervention for Land Rights by the tribals has
been able to influence a significant section of
the intelligentsia also. It was not surprising
that after the forcible vacation of the Muthanga
forest range by the police and the loss of human
life the famous activist-writer Ms Arundhati Roy
had blasted the state government with her famous
open letter "You have blood on Your Hands".
[...] .
Full text at:
http://www.sacw.net/Nation/gatade18032005.html
______
[4]
sacw.net - March 17, 2005
http://www.sacw.net/Wmov/Canada17032005.html
SOUTH ASIAN WOMEN'S COMMUNITY CENTRE
(SAWCC-MONTREAL, CANADA) POSITION ON THE
RECOMMENDATION TO USE THE ARBITRATION ACT OF
ONTARIO TO SETTLE FAMILY LEGAL MATTERS BASED ON
RELIGIOUS LAWS.
For Montreal panel presentation orgd by FFQ, at UQAM, Thursday 17 March 05
1. The SAWCC has been involved in information
gathering and discussions on this issue since
last summer. Our membership comprises women of
different religious backgrounds, many of whom are
observant members of Hinduism, Islam, Sikhism,
Buddhism, Judaism, Christianity and
Zoroastrianism. At our Annual General Meeting in
September 2004 we passed a resolution against the
possible adoption of religion-based forms of
family law for Muslims in Ontario [as an
alternative, community-based form of arbitration
in family law cases]. Our membership of the SAWCC
also wanted this kind of arbitration to end in
religious communities where it was already being
used since 1991.
2. There are many issues that we considered while
coming to this conclusion. Some of them are:
i) We are very conscious that opposition can come
from a racist perspective, especially at this
historical juncture when Islam is demonized and
having a Muslim identity makes one immediately
suspect as a terrorist. We are also aware that a
sensitivity to feeding racist preconceptions may
make some reluctant to articulate their concerns.
ii) In a post 9/11 world where government laws
and agents of state demonstrate Islamphobia, it
is curious that official concern for
'multiculturalism' and 'religious freedom' are
cited by these same governments when it comes to
issues that will have a huge impact on women.
iii) It is curious that this kind of arbitration
is only being used for family law, not criminal
law. It is dangerous to categorize family matters
as occupying the private sphere. As women we are
aware of how the public/private distinction has
been used to control and oppress us. We won't go
back there. Anything that involves the rights of
women are a public concern. The personal is
political.
iv) In our work over the past quarter century we
have seen many women being forced by community
pressure to seek counsel/assistance/ intervention
from religious figures in temples, gurdwaras,
mosques -- institutions that uphold patriarchal
constructs of family and community - These
interventions often worked to the detriment of
the women - psychological, emotional and other
forms of coercions were brought to bear. In our
work trying to get justice for the murder of
Milia Abrar we have seen how community pressure
worked -- elders warned that this is what happens
when traditions are flouted and possible
witnesses were silenced.
v) We recognize that our secular laws are far
from perfect. Legislative bodies need to
strengthen laws, for example to protect women
from male violence -- a man who batters his
partner gets a rap on the knuckles. If that same
man were to assault a stranger on the street it
would be another matter.
AND
Most recently the discussions around same sex
unions have demonstrated how the reactionary
outcry from some members of cultural communities
can be very strident. We do not want to give the
slimmest opportunity to these kinds of
individuals to control our lives.
______
[5] [ THREE BOOK REVIEWS ]
(i) Outlook Magazine - March 28, 2005
REVIEWS
A Mild Engagement
A half-baked reader that ignores Gujarat and
concentrates only on internal organisation
Dilip Simeon
THE SANGH PARIVAR -- A READER
by Edited Christophe Jaffrelot
Oxford University Press
Pages: 445; Rs 675
This book belongs to a series on critical
issues in Indian politics, with 20 articles on
the RSS and its fronts, including the youth wing,
women's wing, trade unions, and its federative
and political organisations. The volume is less a
'reader' than a compendium of articles gleaned
from published work, dating mainly from the mid
to late 1990s. Older extracts are from Anderson
and Damle's Brotherhood in Saffron (1987), and
Graham's study of the Jan Sangh (1990).
Only two articles, on the Swadeshi Jagaran Manch
(Boutron) and the RSS global network (Therwath),
seem to have been written specifically for this
volume and carry a contemporary flavour-the
latter gives readers a brief introduction to the
extensive financial support for the RSS from NRIs
located in the western world. Even the editorial
introduction takes scant notice of the
ramifications of the 2002 Gujarat pogrom and the
2004 election. There is an article on ethics but
it addresses Hindutva's resonance with
capitalism, rather than raise questions about
private and public morality, ends and means or
organised violence.
And there is no index, a glaring omission in a
long and thematically dense volume.
It is arguable that the chief characteristic of
the so-called parivar is its paramilitary
organisation and style, borrowed from the fascist
movements in Europe of the '20s and '30s.
Right-wing totalitarianism
and the second world war have had a lasting
impact upon global politics, but the RSS has
surely enjoyed the greatest longevity of the
chauvinist paramilitaries born during the
troubled '20s. Defined succinctly, its goal is
the militarisation of civil society and the
subjugation of secular citizenship to the warrior
cult. Paradoxically, it is the shadowy zone of
nationalist militarism that provided the space
for the osmosis between left and right
radicalism--Subhas Bose is only the most glaring
symbol of an uncomfortable reality, rarely spoken
of. The emergence of a rampaging right wing
cannot be understood purely in terms of its
internal organisation and ideas, but must be
placed within a larger political and structural
context. The interests, strategies and alliances
of the Congress, left-wing and regional parties
is one contingent factor, the iniquitous social
relations and endemic informality in employment
(manifested in patriarchy and caste), are
another. Had it been taken into account, the
broader context might have yielded insights for
designing a volume such as this.
This book appears three years after the gruesome
events of Gujarat in 2002. It would have been
appropriate to have included recent assessments
and fresh data on the role of RSS and its fronts
in the violence, not to mention its own
statements and interpretations. I have in mind
the Report of the Concerned Citizen's Tribunal,
and numerous other citizen's reports that have
appeared since then. These, and Varadarajan's
Gujarat: The Making of a Tragedy (2002) contain
eyewitness accounts, analyses and source material
that could have been used in some way. The text
of Prime Minister Vajpayee's speech in Goa is an
example. Again, it is fairly well-known that
brutality towards their designated enemies is a
matter of pride for Hindutva cadre in their
street-level propaganda. Commissioned case
studies of rumour, small talk and election speech
by the Sanghis would have been a valuable
addition for the book, and made it more of a
reader.
That said, Sangh Parivar contains a great deal of
information on the activity of the RSS and its
fronts in post-1947 India. Tanika Sarkar's essays
on the gender predicament of the parivar are
informed and insightful. She has also contributed
one of three very cogent articles on education.
There are two valuable, though slightly dated,
articles on the Bharatiya Mazdoor Sangh by Kiran
Saxena and Jaffrelot. Two short extracts from
Manjari Katju's study of the VHP introduce the
reader to an important activity of the RSS. The
editor also has a contribution on the VHP that
highlights its psychology of imitation, which he
names 'strategic mimetism'. He is keenly aware of
the parivar's strategic use of symbols and icons.
But his analytical stance is diffident: "The
components of this nebulae are more autonomous
than one may think at a glance", "the RSS complex
hardly form a family". Yet, their "tensions must
not be over-emphasised", and publicising internal
differentiation could also be a "well thought out
strategy for attracting support". The BJP may
emerge as the dominant party of the Centre, and
then again, it might not. His own extensive
researches (not to mention the 2002 events) could
have led him to more definitive conclusions.
Despite its flaws, Sangh Parivar is a useful
collection for students of political conservatism.
o o o o
(ii)
New York Times - March 20, 2005
'Husband of a Fanatic': Sleeping With the Enemy
By Christopher De Bellaigue
A DECADE ago, when I was living in India, a
Jewish American woman described for me a Hindu
boy who had enrolled in Hebrew lessons she was
giving to members of Bombay's tiny Jewish
community. When she had asked why he should join
a class for Jews, he had replied, ''We share an
enemy.'' I told the story to a group of Indian
friends I knew were worried by India's growing
communal discord. I expected them to shake their
heads solemnly. Instead, they burst out laughing.
In ''Husband of a Fanatic,'' his challenging and
at times eloquent rumination on Hindu-Muslim
tensions in India and its diaspora, Amitava Kumar
often summons the dark humor that South Asian
secularists use to combat their sense that the
battle is not going their way. He opens with his
encounter with Jagdish Barotia, a member of the
militant group Hindu Unity, who immigrated to the
United States over 30 years ago and whose
violence of feeling is absurd, even pitiful,
because he is doomed to live among Muslims in a
multiracial part of Queens. Kumar lets Barotia's
grossness stand unadorned and thereby lampoons
it. ''On the phone,'' Kumar recalls, ''he had
called me a haraami, which means 'bastard' in
Hindi, and, after clarifying that he didn't mean
this abuse only for me as a person but for
everyone else who was like me, he had also called
me a kutta, a dog.''
Soon enough, we learn the reason for Barotia's
contempt; Kumar, an Indian Hindu who is a
professor of English at Pennsylvania State
University, has married Mona, a Pakistani Muslim.
When they married, he says, he wallowed in a
''tepid tide'' of altruism and ''felt good about
myself for marrying 'the enemy.' '' To understand
the wider significance of his commitment as well
as his own ''complicities and contradictions,''
he embarks on a tour of Hindu-Muslim strife and
recalls wars between India and Pakistan --
''Hindu-Muslim riots fought with tanks and
fighter planes.''
At its best, Kumar's reportage has the immediacy
and respectful attention to detail of a
well-turned Granta essay (it is no surprise to
see Ian Jack, Granta's editor, cited in the
acknowledgments). Picking his way through lives
distorted or destroyed by hatred, Kumar
alleviates his own -- and the reader's -- gloom
by drawing attention to the fanatics' mordant
eccentricities. In the Indian state of Uttar
Pradesh, where Hindu nationalist cadres called
kar-sevaks destroyed the Babri mosque in 1992,
Kumar discovers that children now learn math by
answering questions like, ''If it takes four
kar-sevaks to demolish one mosque, how many does
it take to demolish 20?'' He is dismayed that the
nationalists have succeeded in making millions of
Hindus feel embattled in a country where they
form an overwhelming majority. But he is
painfully aware that he himself is the
anachronism, one of a dwindling band clinging to
the secular ideals of India's first prime
minister, Jawarharlal Nehru.
Kumar acknowledges his feeling of unease when he
is among the devout, Hindu or Muslim: their
language is an alien tongue for him. Nehru
gleaned many of his beliefs from his days as a
student in England. One senses the imprint of
America's tradition of intellectual tolerance and
its culture of candor on Kumar, especially when
he discusses his own bogus conversion to Islam --
bogus, because he long ago abandoned the remnants
of his adolescent Hindu faith, and has adopted
Islam only for the purposes of appeasing the
Pakistani authorities, who do not recognize
marriages between Muslims and non-Muslims.
Kumar's quest takes him from America to South
Africa -- where he is heartened by examples of
cooperation between Hindus and Muslims against
apartheid -- but it is to Pakistan and India that
he returns to confront his estrangement not only
from the Hindu nationalists but also from Indian
society as a whole. In his last chapter,
dominated by his inquiry into police brutality in
his native state of Bihar, he is discomfited by
many of the people he speaks to, perpetrators and
victims alike. They have sized him up as rich and
well connected, and their confessions turn to
supplications -- for money, for a passage to
America, for husbands for their daughters, for a
government vending license. Kumar writes of an
encounter with a blind man and his two daughters:
''I resent being bullied by their father, but I
also feel pity for the two. I take out some money
from my wallet. . . . As I shut the door, I hear
the loud, demanding voice behind me. 'How much is
it -- how much did he give?' ''
And so, the door slams and Kumar leaves us with
much but not one important thing, a proper
introduction to the cause of all this
soul-searching. Who, we want to know, is Mona?
Kumar barely refers to his wife. The ''fanatic''
remains elusive, an ironic allusion in the title
of a book that never quite answers the questions
that it poses, and only intermittently lives up
to the promise of its opening pages.
In part that is because Kumar the professor has
an unfortunate way of intruding on Kumar the
reporter. Thus he unnecessarily supplements his
own neat description of Hindu political symbolism
with the (borrowed) observation that televised
Hindu epics had created ''a shared symbolic
lexicon around which political forces could
mobilize communal praxis.''
We learn much more when Kumar is describing small
things impenetrable to outsiders, like the
pungency of a communal slogan, the paradoxes and
passions of South Asian cricket and the nuances
of an Urdu story. Under the kitchen sink of his
parents' home, one memorable childhood vignette
runs, there was ''a dirty glass and, beside it, a
ceramic plate that was white with small pink
flowers,'' reserved for a tubercular uncle. ''The
only other occasion when the plate and glass were
taken out was when a Muslim driver who sometimes
ate at our house needed to be fed.''
Christopher de Bellaigue is the author of ''In
the Rose Garden of the Martyrs: A Memoir of
Iran.''
HUSBAND OF A FANATIC
A Personal Journey Through India, Pakistan, Love, and Hate.
By Amitava Kumar
301 pp. The New Press. $24.95.
o o o o
(iii)
Economic and Political Weekly, Book Review
March 5, 2005
Debating Statehood
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Durable Disorder: Understanding the Politics of North-East India
by Sanjib Baruah;
OUP,
New Delhi, 2005;
pp xi+265, Rs 495.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Pradip Phanjoubam
This recent book by Sanjib Baruah is a departure
from available literature on the problems of
Indias north-east. This is not surprising
considering most previous works were either
written by former administrators or other
professionals who by training and loyalty looked
at the north-east as an aberration from
mainstream life and politics. Baruahs is an
attempt to present the problems raw and honestly.
The book is refreshingly bereft of the
patronising sympathy so familiar with writings on
the subject. The narrative is a curious mix of an
overview by a detached observer and a sensitive
introspection of one who has a stake in the
issues involved. Baruahs career background
perhaps is the explanation. He is an Assamese,
who teaches political studies at New Yorks, Bard
College, on lien now as a senior fellow at the
Omeo Kumar Das Institute of Social Change,
Guwahati.
The book is argumentative, and although the
prescriptions are debatable while being
thought-provoking, the diagnosis is convincing.
Baruah achieves this by his ability to seamlessly
sew together information, personal experience,
impressions, available theories and journalistic
reportage to illustrate his own incisive
insights. Unmistakable also is the influence of
some immensely well endowed libraries as well as
the disciplined reading and scholarship that have
gone into the writing of the book. The book is
for this reason, also very much a digest of
current and past theories and thoughts on the
subjects of identity, ethnicity, conflict,
development, etc, and their related problems.
Baruah negotiates these ideas and builds up the
pitch of the debate until he is able to establish
his points powerfully and with clarity. He is
thus able to articulate certain deeply embedded
but often nebulous anxieties of the communities
in the north-east, which would help immensely in
correcting past perspectives and
misrepresentations. Durable Disorder attempts,
rather successfully, to establish why the usual
attribution of the problems of the north-east to
vested interests, corruption, underdevelopment,
etc, are pathetically inadequate, for the causes
of the problems are much more fundamental in
nature. The wrong diagnoses have also led to
disastrously wrong responses.
Chapter Outline
The book has 10 chapters. Each looks at a
different aspect of the north-east and adds to
the central argument that of the inadequacy of
interpreting the problems from the perspective of
national security alone. This standpoint, Baruah
implies is what has led to the unenviable trap of
what he calls durable disorder in which hopes of
a lasting solution is allowed to recede too far,
leaving only as the sole administrative objective
the intent of not allowing these troubles to blow
up into unmanageable crises.
The first chapter outlines the subject and the
authors strategy to tackle it. The unveiling of
the north-east agenda begins from the next
section titled: Governance Structure, Formal and
Informal. By far this section hits hardest at the
Indian establishment and its north-east policy
priorities. While it is meant to hurt, what is
missing is the usual bitterness and annoying self
pity. This is achieved by well-rounded
intellectual arguments supported appropriately by
data. The section has two chapters, one called
Nationalising Space: Cosmetic Federalism and the
Politics of Development and the other Generals as
Governors.
In one, Baruah tackles the messy and
controversial issue of immigration. While most
writers and analysts have concentrated on the
pull factors that attract immigrants in large
scale from neighbouring countries as well as from
other parts of India into the sparsely populated
poor region threatening to radically overturn the
demographic balance, Baruah also points out the
more systematic push factors prompted by the
Indian nations need to nationalise space. This
involves tuning local population towards the
national outlook as well as physically filling
the poorly charted spaces with nation-bearing
populations. While this agenda has not been
pursued as aggressively as China has done, partly
because in the case of India there is no single
nation-bearing population, Baruah argues that the
distinction between ethnic groups marked as
indigenous to the region and those that are
marked as immigrants from the rest of the
subcontinent, has remained quite significant in
the politics of north-east India. Extending state
institutions with a developmental agenda
therefore has had political functions Baruah
underscores. It is significant that the
developmental trajectory in the region is
controlled solely by New Delhi, as most
development projects in the region are financed,
planned and designed in New Delhi, or in central
organisations located in the region. The
philosophy behind the North-East Council (NEC),
comes up for some harsh criticism.
The war with China in 1962 as well as rebellions
by the Nagas followed by many others, made the
agenda of nationalising space all the more
urgent. As a direct result, the state of Nagaland
was created in 1963, hoping to end the Naga war
by creating stakeholders in the pan-Indian
disposition. With this Baruah writes, state
creation in India became de-linked from the
question of either fiscal viability or of
compatibility with the constitutional
architecture of the pan-Indian polity. He calls
this the first step in a cosmetic federal
regional order. Yet, Baruah argues, the creation
of mini states, completely dependent on New Delhi
for their finances, and thus vulnerable to New
Delhis direct involvement in their affairs on a
daily basis, fitted very well with Indias
national security goals in the region.
In the next chapter, Generals as Governors Baruah
pushes the argument of a security concerns-driven
agenda in the north-east even further. He talks
of a parallel government, not referring to the
clandestine administrations run by militant
organisations alone, but the one run by the
central government in the states through its
agents, the governors. It is hardly a
coincidence, he says, that the men appointed as
governors of these states are usually retired
army generals and intelligence officers. The
result is a de facto parallel political system,
somewhat autonomous of the formal democratically
elected government structure. Since in Indias
weak federal structure, the centre through the
governors can easily dismiss elected governments
in states, the apparatus becomes an important
tool to facilitate direct control by New Delhi of
action in the north-east. A mistrust of the state
governments for their possible nexus with
militants which in a way becomes somewhat
inevitable as the politicians have to share a
good deal of their constituencies as well as
concerns with the militants makes New Delhi put
a premium on the need for the autonomy of the
parallel governance structure.
Baruah laments the compromises on democratic
responses towards the problems in the region. Not
so much in the belief that such responses would
bring Indian democracy crashing down, but because
in the long run it would have systematically
activated and enlarged the worst in people. The
truth in this prediction is there for all to
witness in the disappearance of the rule of law,
not just in the hands of the insurgents, but
equally, by legitimate institutions of the
democratic establishment. Baruah calls this
phenomenon diminished democracy, the title of
another chapter. The questionable and brutal
counter-insurgency strategy that created the
SULFA (surrendered ULFA) in Assam, or the pardon
accorded outside the provisions of the law to
surrendered insurgents including those accused of
serious felonies during their underground days,
are also cited as example of this compromise in a
later chapter.
Baruahs economy of words makes it unnecessary for
him to give too much space to repetitive
narration of the now familiar histories of
insurgencies. He rushes through them but without
seriously missing out on their salient features,
leaving him ample time and energy for discourses
on the driving forces behind them.
Identity and Homeland
However, on the question of ethnic identity and
the ethnic homeland question, Baruah seems to be
on unsure ground. His explanation of the
problematic nature of non-state communities
coming out of isolation and beginning to aspire
to be states, as in the case of the Nagas, is
less than adequate. On the question of the
expanding identity of the Nagas which has seen
the embracing of communities with closer
linguistic and anthropological ties with other
ethnic groups, his sympathy are clearly with the
former saying in matters of identity the only
thing that should matter is how a group wishes to
be known... The problem arises, when this
expanding identity is tied to territory. The
newly born state consciousness can come into
direct collision with existing historical states.
Baruah does acknowledge this but with no effort
or intent to elaborate: the goal of creating a
single political unit out of all Naga-inhabited
areas puts the Naga project of nationhood in
collision course with a parallel Manipur project.
For some reasons, in dealing with this issue, he
is also rather silent about the Kukis, who share
virtually the same homeland with the Nagas. This
appears as a big lacunae considering notions of
exclusive ethnic homelands was the primary cause
of the bloody Kuki-Naga conflict in the mid-1990s.
Baruah does, however, bring up the issue again in
a later chapter, Citizens and Denizens, but the
discussion becomes more abstract and devoid of
the urgency demanded. Here he is talking of the
provisions of the Sixth Schedule of the Indian
Constitution drawn up for the administration of
minority tribal areas in the north-east which
creates the closest thing to exclusive ethnic
homelands. Within these tribal enclaves where
tribal customary laws prevail, non tribal
domiciles, and even tribals of other ethnic
stock, end up deprived of many democratic rights,
including that of exercising their franchise.
Baruah suggests experimenting with a regime of
dual citizenship aimed at shifting what has come
to be an ethnic issue to a civic one.
The book has three chapters on Assam and the
genesis of sub-nationalism in the state. This
event does not coincide with the birth of the
ULFA. He traces the roots of the Assamese
sub-nationalism to British colonial land reform
policies, and then to the cosmetic federalism of
independent India. One of the chief anxieties of
the Assamese, (Baruah qualifies this term on
account of the fundamentally heterogeneous
Assamese society and of the Bodos and other
tribal groups unwillingness to be referred as
such) has been immigration of outsiders into
Assam.
At the time of Partition, leaders of the Assam
Congress had expressed their wish that fewer
refugees be resettled in Assam and asserted that
the prerogatives in matters of citizenship and
immigration should rest with the state.
Jawaharlal Nehru had sarcastically remarked in a
letter to then chief minister of Assam, Gopi Nath
Bordoloi, I suppose one of these days we might be
asked for the independence of Assam. For the same
reason, the home minister Sadar Vallabhbhai Patel
called Bordolois successor Bisnuram Medhi,
parochial. The idea of Assams independence did
not remain a joke for long, Baruah notes. In the
constituent assembly, Assams proposal for a
federation with strong autonomous states did not
succeed. But this locally felt need was again the
driving force behind the Assam Agitation of the
1970s and 1980s, and so too behind the ULFAs
militancy. ULFAs ideas are located in a political
discourse that has occupied centre-stage in
Assamese civil society for more than half a
century, Barua notes, concluding that it is not
surprising despite military defeats ULFA still
lives on.
The concluding chapter, Beyond Durable Disorder
is the most prescriptive. But the solution sought
is unconventional and distinguishes itself from
the security-driven approach that pivots around
success in counter insurgency strategies. Baruah
recommends a little deconstruction of the
hardened notion of the nation state so that
national boundaries are softened, if not opened,
and natural economic and geographic zones are
given a fresh leash of life. Taking the cue from
Keniche Ohame who proposed that the idea of
region state to replace nation state, that has
become dysfunctional in the modern era, Baruah
writes: when the natural economic region is
allowed to emerge without the constraints of
national boundaries, the locational advantages
and disadvantages are necessarily very different
from those in a situation when border effects are
in full force. Indias new Look East policy, as
well as the ongoing efforts for a rapprochement
with China, are steps in the right direction, the
book concludes.
If not for the recommendations, then for the
richness of ideas it throws up,Durable Disorder
definitely will serve as an invaluable companion
for serious scholars of the north-east and for
policy-makers.
______
[6] [Announcements: ]
(i)
INDIAN RENAISSANCE INSTITUTE
& INDIAN RADICAL HUMANIST ASSOCIATION
A-12, Neeti Bagh, New Delhi-110049.
Dt.17th March,2005.
MEETING IN MEMORY OF COMRADE TARKUNDE
Dear friend,
Comrade Tarkunde had left us on 22nd
March,2004. In view of his death anniversary,
Indian Renaissance Institute and Indian Radical
Humanist Association have organized a meeting to
remember him.
Time & Date: 5 PM, Tuesday, 22nd March,2005
Venue : Dy. Chairmanís Hall, Constitution club, Rafi Marg, New Delhi-1.
The participants will deliberate how
to promote and strengthen the ideals which were
dear to him and for which he struggled.
You are invited to participate.
N.D.Pancholi
Secretary
Indian Rnaissance Institute
o o o o
(ii)
NEW LABOUR POLICIES VIOLATING BASIC HUMAN RIGHTS
Three key sets of government policies are
seriously affecting the human rights of Asian
women in Britain
- The Supporting People Programme which
threatens the continued running of refuges for
Asian women
- The Two Year Immigration Rule which is
sending women back to violence and often death in
'honour killings' in India, Pakistan and
Bangladesh
- The cut backs in legal services which
have serious implications for women facing
domestic violence.
A public meeting organised by Asian Women Unite
will examine these policies and possible ways
forward.
6.30pm Wednesday 23rd March 2005, Conway Hall,
Red Lion Square, London WC1, nearest tube: Holborn
SPEAKERS INCLUDE: Shamshad Hussain (Imkaan);
Hannana Siddiqui (Southall Black Sisters);
Ranjit Kaur (Rights of Women)
The Supporting People Policy
Shamshad Hussain will speak about the effects of
the Supporting People Policy which despite its
name, is (as Imkaan's research shows) threatening
the very survival of Asian Women's refuges.
According to Shamshad Hussain, 'Although
presented by New Labour as an opportunity for
refuge providers, the policy is pushing the
sector back twenty five years to a time when
Asian women had to defend the case for having
specialist refuges to meet the specific needs of
Asian women. At the same time by cutting funding
in crucial areas such as outreach work it will
effectively ignore many women facing domestic
violence'.
The Two Year Immigration Rule
Hannana Siddiqui will speak about Black women's
groups’ campaigns against the Two Year Rule led
by Southall Black Sisters. The rule she says is
'inherently racist and sexist' - under the
British government's Two Year Immigration Rule,
women from abroad who enter or stay in this
country on the basis of marriage or a
relationship with a British citizen or someone
settled in Britain are subject to a 'probationary
period' of two years. If the marriage breaks down
within this period the spouse from abroad is
liable to be deported’.
The probationary period reinforces the imbalance
of power within marriages -- the threat of
deportation can be used as a powerful weapon to
force women to remain in a relationship against
their will. Hannana Siddiqui will examine how the
law affects women's actual experiences
Can justice be done when Legal Aid is denied?
Ranjit Kaur will be examining the deepening
crisis in public funding (legal aid) and the
implications of this for Black and Minority Women
particularly those who experience domestic
violence.
The government's recent paper 'A New Focus for
Civil Legal Aid' proposes to change the criteria
for applying for public funding (legal aid) and
exclude so-called 'low priority' cases, these
include the drafting and filing of divorce papers
or judicial separation papers. Ranjit Kaur says
'This will disqualify even more Black and
Minority Women from public funding and strengthen
the very oppressive forces which Asian women are
struggling against'.
The meeting will be attended by women from all
over the UK many of whom have been personally
affected by these government policies.
Details: asianwomenunite at hotmail.com
Asian Women Unite! is an umbrella group of all
the main Asian women’s organisations in Britain
_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/
Buzz on the perils of fundamentalist politics, on
matters of peace and democratisation in South
Asia. SACW is an independent & non-profit
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