SACW #1 | 6 Nov 2004
sacw
aiindex at mnet.fr
Fri Nov 5 19:30:01 CST 2004
South Asia Citizens Wire Dispatch #1 | 6 November, 2004
[1] Bangladesh:
- Ahmadiyya Community Under Attack (Press Release by Amnesty International)
- Strong watch keeps bigots at bay (A report in Daily Star)
[2] America, Pakistan, and the limits of
militarism: An exchange of letters (Steve Coll
and Asma Jahangir)
[3] Kashmir issue - Pak's extraordinary thrust (M B Naqvi)
[5] Review Article: The Kashmiri mind (A.G. Noorani)
--------------
[1]
AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL
PRESS RELEASE
AI Index: ASA 13/021/2004 (Public)
News Service No: 278
5 November 2004
BANGLADESH: AHMADIYYA COMMUNITY UNDER ATTACK
Amnesty International is deeply concerned for the
safety of the Ahmadiyya community in Bangladesh
following threats by Islamist groups to attack
Ahmadi places of worship during today's Friday
prayers.
"The Government of Bangladesh must take decisive
action against anti-Ahmadi agitators who have
continued to attack members of the Ahmaddiya
community. These groups have been allowed to
attack Ahmadis with impunity", Amnesty
International said.
Last Friday the groups attacked an Ahmadi place
of worship in Brahmanbaria as a result of which
at least 11 Ahmadis received serious injuries.
Islamist groups have now threatened to carry out
the attacks more frequently and without prior
notice. They have named Ahmadi places of worship
as the targets of their attacks every Friday
during noon prayer time.
Places of worship in Narayangonj and Nakhalpara
are of special concern. In Nakhalpara, flyers
have been distributed calling for a culmination
of a year long anti-Ahmadi campaign in a
'celebration' that will create 'mass explosion'
and mark the completion of this campaign.
Announcements have been made in Narayangonj that
attacks against the Ahmadiyya community will take
place in the run up to Eid ul Fitr which marks
the end of the holy month of Ramadan.
Amnesty International calls on the Government of
Bangladesh to publicly condemn such acts of
violence. They should also take diligent steps to
ensure that members of the Ahmadiyya community
are protected. Full security must be provided
around all places of Ahmadi worship in
Nakhalpara, Narayangonj and Brahmanbaria which
have been threatened with attack on 5 November
2004.
The organization also calls upon the Government
of Bangladesh to launch a prompt and independent
investigation into the attack in Brahmanbaria on
29 October 2004.
Background
Members of the "Ahmadiyya Muslim Jamaat", a
religious community which considers itself a sect
of Islam, have been the target of a campaign of
hate speech organized by a number of Islamist
groups in the country in recent months. Islamist
groups are believed to be targeting the Ahmadiyya
community in an attempt to force the government
to declare them "non-Muslims".
In the past year, Amnesty International has
documented abuses by anti-Ahmadi groups including
the killing of an Ahmadi preacher, the
"excommunication" and illegal house arrest of
Ahmadi villagers, a ban on Ahmadiyya
publications, street processions against Ahmadis
and the rising wave of hate speech in public
rallies which incite acts of violence against the
Ahmadis. When warned in advance, the government
has acted to prevent the mobs supporting the
Islamist groups from entering Ahmadi mosques,
however, it has failed to bring to justice those
committing human rights abuses against Ahmadis.
Public Document
Amnesty International, 1 Easton St., London WC1X
0DW. web: http://www.amnesty.org
o o o o
The Daily Star
November 06, 2004
Strong watch keeps bigots at bay
Six EU envoys visit Ahmadiyya mosque, Amnesty concerned
Staff Correspondent
Strong police surveillance and civil society
resistance yesterday kept at bay religious bigots
who had threatened to seize an Ahmadiyya mosque
in the city's Nakhalpara while Ahmadiyyas in
Brahmanbaria held the Friday congregation sans
Azan under police guard.
In Narayanganj, too, fear of arrest held the
local fanatics off Missionpara Ahmadiyya Mosque
they had declared last month to capture yesterday.
Ahmadiyya Muslim Jamaat, Bangladesh (AMJB)
thanked the government and hailed the civil
society steps noting the government's role proves
it can resist the fundamentalist menace if it
wants to.
Expressing solidarity with the Muslim minority
sect and to lend a hand to the civil society
move, a delegation of the envoys of European
Union (EU) countries visited Ahmadiyyas at
Nakhalpara mosque. The delegation hoped the
government of Bangladesh would ensure the
fundamental rights of all the peoples including
Ahmadiyyas.
Amnesty International (AI), meanwhile, expressed
deep concern for the safety of the country's
Ahmadiyya community following threats issued by
Islamist groups during Salat-al-Jumaa yesterday
to raid what they termed were Ahmadiyya places of
worship.
International Khatme Nabuwat Movement, Bangladesh
(IKNMB), the most aggressive group of
anti-Ahmadiyya agitators, yesterday threatened
the government with a massive countrywide
movement if it does not pass a bill in the
current parliament session proclaiming the
followers of Mirza Golam Ahmad Kadiani
non-Muslims.
Against this background, the AI press release
yesterday said, "The government of Bangladesh
must take decisive action against anti-Ahmadi
agitators who have continued to attack members of
the Ahmaddiya community. These groups have been
allowed to attack Ahmadis with impunity."
AT NAKHALPARA MOSQUE
To thwart the IKNMB bid to capture the Ahmadiyya
mosque at Nakhalpara in Tejgaon, a large number
of civil society members led by Justice K M
Sobhan went there and took position inside the
mosque yesterday morning.
South Asian People's Union against Fundamentalism
and Communalism, Ekatturer Ghatak Dalal Nirmul
Committee, Awami League and different
left-leaning parties were the leading
organisations that mobilised the anti-IKNMB civil
force.
Among the prominent civil society members were
Shahriar Kabir, Salma Haq, Ferdousi Priyobhasini,
Doulat Ara Mannan, Kazi Mukul, Ruhin Hossain
Prince, Abu Osman Chowdhury, Abdus Samad, Meer
Hosain Akhter and Ali Hasan Tarun.
The six-member ambassadorial delegation of the EU
countries led by Ambassador of the Netherlands
Kees Beemsterboer joined the civil society
members before Jumaa. The other delegates were
the ambassadors of Germany, France, Italy, Sweden
and Denmark.
To the Ahmadiyya leaders present, the envoys
expressed their concern at the ongoing
anti-Ahmadiyya agitation and push.
Praising the civil society's proactive role to
maintain religious harmony in the country,
Beemsterboer said, "We are here not to take stand
against any one. Our main intention is to stand
by the Constitution of Bangladesh that guarantees
freedom of religion and expression to all its
citizens."
IKNMB ACTION
Members of Dhaka Metropolitan Police and Armed
Police Battalion (APBn) stood guard at the mosque
in the morning. Contingents of police, APBn and
paramilitary Bangladesh Rifles were deployed at
Nabisco intersection in Tejgaon before Jumaa.
Some 5,000 IKNMB zealots came in several
processions from different mosques after Jumaa
and gathered at the intersection.
Addressing a demonstration there, IKNMB leaders
said Ahmadiyyas have no right to live with the
identity of Muslims in Bangladesh.
IKNMB Ameer Mahmudul Hasan Mamtazi said, "We will
not do any harm to you (Ahmadiyyas) if you live
here as members of a non-Muslim minority sect.
But you will not be allowed to identify
yourselves as Muslims or your places of worships
as mosques."
Threatening the government of paralysing the
country if it does not legislate in the current
parliament session proclaiming Ahmadiyyas
non-Muslims, he said no government would be able
to stay in power without fulfilling their demand.
Accusing the coalition government of betraying
them by deterring their men from approaching
Ahmadiyya mosques, Mamtazi said, "Beware, we will
throw you out of office if you do not meet our
demands."
"No-one will be able to stop the forward march of
the soldiers of Islam in Bangladesh," he
challenged.
The IKNMB ameer also condemned the foreign
diplomats for what he said was meddling in the
country's internal affairs and visiting the
Ahmadiyyas at Nakhalpara.
Ruling coalition partner Islamic Oikya Jote
Secretary General Abdur Rab Yusufi, Islamic
Shasantantra Andolon Joint Secretary ATM
Hemayetuddin, Khelafat Andolon Secretary General
Zafrullah Khan, IKNMB Secretary General Nazmul
Haq and leaders Abu Zafar Kashemi, Abul Kashem
and Gazi Ataur Rahman also spoke at the rally.
Traffic on Tongi Diversion Road remained
suspended for two hours as IKNMB activists kept
it blocked from Mohakhali to Satrasta
intersection during the demonstration.
In Brahmanbaria
Instructed by police, Ahmadiyyas omitted Azan for
Salat-al-Jumaa at Bhadughar Mosque in
Brahmanbaria fearing it might incite the bigots
to attack their mosque, reported our Brahmanbaria
correspondent.
Riot police guarded the mosque and patrolled the
area since the morning to bar the zealots, who on
October 29 had attacked the mosque, injured 11
Ahmadiyyas and vandalised their houses, from
approaching the mosque.
police activism drove away the Khatme Nabuwat
members, who had threatened to burn down the
mosque and Ahmadiyyas if they pray there any more.
The town continues to be gripped by tension as
the Nabuwat activists has threatened to punish
the locals for protesting the October 29 attack.
NarayaNganj
Local anti-Ahmadiyya operatives who, after
failing to capture the mosque on October 8, had
threatened to make another bid yesterday or the
coming Friday, were not seen in the area.
______
[2]
Opendemocracy.net
November 2, 2004
AMERICA, PAKISTAN, AND THE LIMITS OF MILITARISM
Steve Coll
Asma Jahangir
Can America make allies of Pakistan's people
rather than its military? In the eighteenth - and
last - of our Letters to Americans series,
Pakistani human rights campaigner Asma Jahangir
writes to Steve Coll, Pulitzer-prizewinning
author of 'Ghost Wars: the secret history of the
CIA, Afghanistan, and bin Laden'.
o o o
Dear Steve Coll,
The despairing condition of my country, Pakistan,
has featured little in your country's election
campaign. This neglect reflects the way that
communication between Americans and Pakistanis
has been corroded through consistent
disinformation or a misreading of the realities
on the ground. The fallout from 9/11 has
destroyed earlier links between pro-democracy
elements in Pakistan and the United States. What
can be done to restore them?
I am no idealist. I realise that every nation
will serve its own interest first, and that every
country has to deal with rulers of other
sovereign states regardless of the nature of
their government. All US administrations have
long followed such a pragmatic policy, but -
because the American people demanded it of their
governments - they also stood their ground
whenever human rights were violated or democracy
subverted.
This expectation seems to have disappeared, and
as a result the super-rulers in Washington have
granted legitimacy to self-imposed dictators or
authoritarians. These fall into the category of
"good" dictators, while others remain on the
"evil" list. In this baleful ordering, Pakistan
is "blessed" with a military leader - General
Pervez Musharraf - who has even been described by
leaders in Washington as a "true democrat".
American media reports routinely view Pakistanis
as hooligans, corrupt, criminals and uncouth
people who are being herded by a single moderate
soul in uniform, a born-again messiah.
The history of my country shows how partial and
distorted a view this is. Pakistanis have been
ruled by their military - either directly or
indirectly - almost throughout their fifty-seven
years of independence. At the same time popular
sentiment has been consistently
anti-dictatorship. For decades Pakistan's civil
society has struggled against military rule and
also held civilian rulers publicly accountable.
Numerous leaders of the legal profession, trade
unions, press and women's rights groups have been
imprisoned, harassed, beaten, humiliated and
persecuted by successive military governments or
their sponsored Islamists.
We have never given up, even when successive
United States governments have supported our
military dictators. At the very moment when the
notorious General Zia ul-Haq, along with your
intelligence agencies and the rulers of Saudi
Arabia, were collectively trying to bring down
another "evil" empire (the Soviet Union) through
a multipurpose jihad, many of us were protesting
in the streets of Lahore against Pakistan's
Islamisation. Pakistani citizens put up brave
resistance to a process of "Talibanisation" that
was not confined to our neighbours in
Afghanistan, and many voices even within American
administrations were raised in our support.
I give this example for two reasons. First, to
indicate that in pre-9/11 days the United States
could adopt a twin policy - pursuing its own
vital interests (sometimes mercilessly) but also
denouncing human-rights violations and supporting
pro-democracy movements. Second, to emphasise
that Pakistan has a vibrant civil society that
aspires to create a democratic process.
Culturally we are part of the subcontinent and
remain so despite deliberate attempts by our
military rulers and mullahs to Arabise us.
In the post-9/11 era, Pakistan's civil society
feels abandoned by the international community.
The contradiction in American policy between its
foreign policies and its attitude to civil
liberties is more pronounced. For example, the
welcome attempt to initiate the process of
democracy in Afghanistan and Iraq is combined
with a disregard for Pakistan's political parties
and civil society when they call for the
restoration of democracy. We receive sermons
about the virtues of being governed by a moderate
military general instead of autocratic and
corrupt politicians.
The choices here are not about people but about a
system. Can anyone doubt that a democratic
process is far more beneficial than a military
dictatorship? This is especially true in a
country where political forces remain the best
antidote to religious fanaticism. In Pakistan
today, the only two players in the political
field are the military rulers and the religious
parties. In moments of crisis they join ranks to
save one another and at the same time remain
spoilers in the progress of democratisation. They
play as a team to confuse Pakistanis as well as
their foreign allies.
Where militarisation has gripped the country, a
mixture of disrespect and intimidation causes a
serious crisis in governance. The rulers turn to
oppressive methods in order to demand the moral
authority they do not possess. Civilians obey
them out of fear, and thus their output is
uncoordinated and insincere. Many disgruntled
young people who in the past could be persuaded
to join political struggles are now looking
towards the jihadi groups to deliver them from
the present impasse.
Will the "war against terrorism" be won in such a
situation? No: it will only drive an even deeper
polarisation between American citizens and the
citizens of countries where America protects
dictatorships.
In this bleak political environment, there are a
few glimpses of light. The peace talks between
India and Pakistan are continuing. Pakistan's
media is relatively free. Over the years people
have become less willing to submit to the
military authorities. But Pakistan's people
cannot simply count on small mercies and depend
on fate to send us a not-so-evil dictator. We
need to be allowed to make systems that minimise
the role of fate.
But the fight against terrorism has deprived
Pakistanis even of our few existing civil and
political rights. Arbitrary arrests,
extra-judicial killing and torture are routine.
Under preventive detention laws, a form of
collective punishment is being meted out. Even
children as young as 7 years old are detained.
There is a crisis of information. Reports appear
of families of suspected "terrorists" being
imprisoned but there are no details. The courts
are silent, helpless. All these measures are
implemented under the guise of counter-terrorism.
No one has bothered to follow the stories of the
wives of al-Qaida members who were abandoned in
Afghanistan and treated as spoils of war. Where
are they? Whose slaves? What did they go through?
In failing to pursue their cases, we are
collectively guilty of blindly following the
clarion-call of fighting terrorism.
As a Pakistani, a neighbour of Afghanistan and a
citizen of the world I am very disturbed. The
world is being divided into Muslim and
non-Muslim. Ordinary Muslims suffer the wrath of
the extremist fringe and remain tormented at the
erosion of human values by leaders of the United
States. Last night I saw a woman dig out a worm
and eat it and I wondered if her life had any
connection to domestic or international politics.
It does. The worms that rule us determine the
worm that goes in her mouth.
In this way we are all linked. My suffering could
hurt your cause and your policies have an impact
on us. This is why I welcome the dialogue
initiated by openDemocracy and hope to continue
it.
Yours Sincerely,
Asma Jahangir
o o o o
Dear Asma Jahangir,
Thank you for your eloquent letter. Its
intelligence and passion signal the enduring
strengths of Pakistan's hidden leadership - the
lawyers, journalists, human rights advocates,
community organisers and teachers who struggle to
shape a Pakistan free from inequality, violence
and political abuse. It will be a long, difficult
and uncertain struggle; we have all dug Pakistan
a deep hole to climb out from. Yet I do believe
that you and your colleagues will prevail.
I agree with many of the observations in your
letter. It is a particular shame that at the very
moment that the United States and Pakistan need
to understand each other better than ever before,
our interactions are often limited and distorted
by military-to-military channels and news cycles
that emphasise arrests, battles, and suicide
attacks.
Unfortunately, few Americans - even those in
government - know the aspects of subcontinental
Pakistan that I think we both admire: its open
culture, its relatively free press, its
entrepreneurial ambitions, and its long history
of political struggles for democratic
constitutions and civil rights. These are the
qualities that should truly bind Pakistan and the
United States, as they are more reliable and
enduring sources of understanding and alliance
than are short-term military pacts based on
common enemies. Yet they are now barely visible
or remarked upon in Washington.
How did we reach the point you describe? How is
it that even the Bush administration, which has
preached passionate Wilsonian sermons - to use
your word - about the need to spread democracy in
the middle east, appears to have no interest in
applying its doctrines to Pakistan, and instead
repeatedly accommodates the army leadership's
oppressive and self-interested dominance of
domestic politics? Clearly, the hunt for Osama
bin Laden and his senior lieutenants has taken
precedence over everything else in American
foreign policy, as well it should. I do believe
that the nihilist wing of the jihadi movement
constitutes an existential threat to the United
States - and indeed, to Pakistan. Yet I do not
believe we are making anywhere near an adequate
effort to confront and defeat that threat, in
part for the reasons you highlight in your letter.
As to Pakistan, the logic of this phase of the
American government's campaign against al-Qaida
is painfully clear. The Saudi and Egyptian
architects of 11 September 2001 are hiding in or
near Pakistan's federally-administered tribal
areas. The United States depends on collaboration
with the Pakistan army to reach these fugitives,
but the Pakistan army pays a high political price
at home and abroad for such collaboration. So, in
exchange, the Pakistan army demands that
Washington forgive its other transgressions -
domestic repression, corruption, and a repeated
refusal to open Pakistani politics to the
country's secular, civilian parties. Washington,
keeping its side of this dubious bargain, pours
billions of dollars in military aid into a
country that ought to be spending such sums to
increase literacy and create jobs.
The US's narrow, militarised definition of its
self-interest in relation to Pakistan has
contributed to a flawed alliance. Three years of
intimate collaboration with the Pakistan army and
intelligence services has produced a few
important arrests (Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, Abu
Zubaydah), but - as Osama bin Laden's video
intervention on the eve of the US presidential
shows - it has not produced any success against
al-Qaida's top leaders. Perhaps this is no
surprise: if Pakistan's army succeeded in
capturing bin Laden or his deputy Ayman
al-Zawahiri, it calculates that Washington would
likely either lose interest in Pakistan or start
pressurising the country to democratise. The
interests of the two sides, in short, are not the
same.
Some members of the American foreign-policy
establishment have argued that the United States
failed to prevent the 9/11 attacks in part
because its policy toward Pakistan was too
soft-headed and diffuse. If only we had not spent
so much time hectoring Pakistan about democracy
and nuclear proliferation, the argument runs, we
might have made clearer to the Pakistani army and
intelligence services how important it was to
crush al-Qaida.
This is a misreading of history, which ignores
America's lack of understanding of the jihadi
threat in the 1990s, and our consequent failure
to communicate clearly about it with anyone,
including ourselves. It leads elements of the US
national-security bureaucracy to seek to organise
the relationship with Pakistan around the jihadis
alone. This is the fashionable, hard-headed
Realpolitik that governs much American
foreign-policy thinking these days.
While this approach prevails, the traditional
heart of American "soft power" - the universal
appeal of our core values of democracy, social
equality, and human rights - has been undermined
by the invasion of Iraq and our failed public
diplomacy since 9/11. The United States is today
the universal country, a military hyperpower -
led by "super-rulers", in your word - and an
inexorably spreading culture. I fear that by our
conduct and incompetent communication, we have
helped discredit the very ideas that are the most
enduring source of our global influence.
Even worse, the promotion of democracy and human
rights abroad has been discredited in important
circles in Washington. During the cold war, the
United States constructed a largely bipartisan
foreign policy grounded in a belief - shared by
Republicans and Democrats alike - that American
ideas of freedom, self-government, and individual
rights would ultimately defeat Soviet communism.
A bitter presidential campaign has emphasised how
far American foreign policy today has become the
subject of sharp, angry partisan disputes.
This has produced perverse results. For example,
Democrats like John Kerry, who once would have
advocated the promotion of civil society and
democracy in countries such as Pakistan, today
tend to denounce such ideas as the naïve,
ill-judged fantasies of Republican
neo-conservatives. If elected, Kerry promises to
be the most tough-minded of realists, working
with whatever regimes he must - dictators,
despots, no matter - in order to confront the
jihadi threat. Meanwhile, a second Bush term
would likely see the idealistic, democratising
strain of neo-conservatism become less
influential than its national-security impulse.
Thus, whatever the outcome of America's election,
I fear that for the United States and Pakistan
the result will mean more of the same.
I echo your cautious optimism over the peace
talks between India and Pakistan, especially
their support by public opinion on both sides.
What worries me is whether Pakistan, led by such
a narrow and self-interested army - unable to
develop the stable, self-correcting national
consensus that a democracy provides - can really
make the hard decisions that peace with India
will require?
Let's hope reason prevails. After the last few
years, at the very minimum, we could all use some
breathing-space.
With admiration,
Steve Coll
______
[3]
Deccan Herald
November 6, 2004
KASHMIR ISSUE
PAK'S EXTRAORDINARY THRUST
Musharraf wants a quick solution to the Kashmir
tangle but is reluctant to take Nawaz and Benazir
on board
By M B Naqvi
Pakistan President Pervez Musharraf is trying to
force the pace on the Kashmir issue. On Monday
last week (Oct 24), he made a composite proposal
on Kashmir to his countrymen. It has amazed
Pakistanis by its sweep and startling newness.
His stated purpose was (a) to force people to
think outside the box; and (b) to start a
national debate on possible solutions of the
Kashmir problem other than the UN supervised
plebiscite.
It is a historic first for a Pakistan ruler to
publicly acknowledge that India is not going to
accept Pakistani demands and Pakistan cannot
militarily wrest Kashmir out of India's grip.
Therefore it is necessary for Pakistanis to start
thinking and debating alternative approaches. He
rolled out a number of possible options. He later
had it officially clarified that he had made no
specific recommendation or proposal; he merely
wanted a national debate on various likely
options with a view to evolving a consensus
option in place of the demand for UN resolutions
being implemented. A vacuous denial was made by a
Minister that Pakistan has not changed its
traditional stance by discussing alternatives.
Before talking about reactions to this new line,
it is necessary to see the absurdity of this
denial that Pakistan has not changed its official
stance on Kashmir. When the country's head of
state - never mind who he is and with what
legitimacy - publicly says that the traditional
stance stands no chance of success and therefore
the nation has to debate the alternative
approaches to the problem, what is left of that
old stance? It is a shame-faced denial of so
clear a departure. Who can believe that denial?
The need for this silly denial arose because
stalwarts of the extreme Right like Qazi Hussain
Ahmed, the Jamaate Islami Chief, have cried foul.
Musharraf was attacked for this new U-turn on
Kashmir. Out of the mainstream opposition
parties, Nawaz's Muslim League is attacking him
for this betrayal, although it was Nawaz Sharif
who was quite upbeat about a possible agreement
with former prime minister A B Vajpayee over
Kashmir then being worked out.
Benazir's party
The other big party, now in opposition, is the
PPP of Benazir Bhutto. It could also easily have
enthusiastically taken up Musharraf's mission. In
fact both Benazir and Nawaz want to make peace
with India on whatever terms can be sold in
Pakistan as honourable. But they stay in
opposition largely because of Musharraf's
personal hatred of the two. It is a dictator's
privilege to choose his enemies or friends and
Musharraf has chosen the mullahs as his real
friends, although they have links with Islamic
extremists.
It is obvious that Musharraf is anxious to
educate the public opinion on the need to diverge
sharply from traditional stances on Kashmir. He
is preparing the public for whatever he may have
to settle for in the light of what India will
finally concede. Now, successive governments,
mostly military, have tried to earn legitimacy by
being full-throatedly for the National Cause,
conceived as military liberation of Kashmir as
the last resort.
The Kashmir Cause helped the Pakistan Army no
end. It could claim a growing share of national
resources in addition to justifying its generals'
political incursions in the political field.
Naive sections certainly bought some of this in
the past. They now feel jilted. Hence the need
for national debate.
All said and done, it is a revolutionary
proposition from a Pakistani general in power,
after so many wars, that Pakistan cannot succeed
in militarily liberating Kashmir. In view of
prevailing popular mood of desiring friendship
with India - even in religious quarters - it is
odd to require such a high pressure drive for
moulding public opinion which was unlikely to
make any trouble in any case. But perhaps he
desires a wide-ranging media debate in order to
educate his own constituency: the Army. The
military is perhaps one of the few exceptions to
the general mood of wanting to be friends with
India.
Even so Musharraf's hurry seems strange. The
Indians seem perplexed by his extraordinary drive
for a quick settlement with India. Has he some
special timetable in mind that inexorably demands
results in the here and now? He does not face any
challenge from the political forces at home.
There is no other known or cognisable opposition.
He is master of what he surveys - within Pakistan
borders. Why then he gives the impression of
being driven by a hard taskmaster?
US hurrying Musharraf?
Could it be that it is the US desire for an early
disengagement between the Indo-Pakistan armies
through CBMs and an early settlement on Kashmir
that lies at the heart of the hurry being
displayed by Musharraf. America's leverage on
India is next to nil. But it has lots of it over
Pakistan. There may also be a time-frame of some
description.
The US cannot like two of its allies squabbling in its own rear.
Whatever the cause may be, it remains odd that
Musharraf goes on refusing to allow Nawaz and or
Benazir to return and play a part in Musharraf's
quest for a realistic settlement with India.
Indeed, in view of the obscure sources of
opposition to Musharraf's Kashmir-related
initiatives which the President seems to fear so
much, it will strengthen him immensely to have
both Nawaz and Benazir on board - whether in a
composite (national) government or as leaders of
their parties that happen to be out of power.
They can cooperate from outside also, especially
over a Kashmir compromise. But will Musharraf do
what common sense demands?
______
[4]
Frontline
Volume 21 - Issue 23, Nov. 06 - 19, 2004
REVIEW ARTICLE
The Kashmiri mind
A.G. NOORANI
History is the most dangerous product evolved
from the chemistry of the intellect. Its
properties are well known. It causes dreams; it
intoxicates whole people; gives them false
memories; quickens their reflexes; keeps their
old wounds open; torments them in their repose;
leads them into delusions, either of grandeur or
persecution; and makes nations bitter, arrogant,
insufferable and vain.
- Paul Valery; History and Politics
We have not got a clean slate to write upon; we
are limited, inhibited by the United Nations, by
this, by that. But, nevertheless, the basic thing
still remains, that we have declared, and even if
we have not declared, that fact would remain -
that it is the people of Kashmir who must decide.
And I say with all respect to our Constitution
that it just does not matter what your
Constitution says; if the people of Kashmir do
not want it, it will not go there. Because what
is the alternative? The alternative is compulsion
and coercion... the decision... ultimately lies
with the few million people in Kashmir, not even
with this Parliament... . That is the important
thing. And if we seek to gain their goodwill we
should act accordingly... . Do not think you are
dealing with a part of U.P., Bihar or Gujarat.
You are dealing with an area, historically and
geographically, and in all manner of things with
a certain background... . We have to be men of
vision and there has to be broadminded acceptance
of facts in order to integrate really. And real
integration comes of the mind and the heart and
not of some clause which you may impose on other
people.
- Jawaharlal Nehru in the Lok Sabha on June 26,
1952 (Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru: Volume
18; pages 418 and 421).
IT is hard to divine precisely what Jawaharlal
Nehru truly meant when he spoke thus. Was it
rhetoric to cover his moves for "real
integration"? Exactly a week earlier, he had
indicated to Mirza Afzal Beg and Maulana Masoodi
in Delhi that Kashmir's accession to India must
be made final. His secret Note to Sheikh Muhammed
Abdullah on August 25, 1952 was more candid. He
had ruled out a plebiscite in Kashmir in his own
mind as far back as in 1948; public pledges were
evidently for international consumption. He urged
the Sheikh, now facing growing unpopularity, to
help him (Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru:
Volume 19; pages 322-330; a brilliantly argued
piece of destructive cynicism).
The country has paid and continues still to pay a
heavy price for Nehru's arrogant disregard of
history; and not in this case alone. Zhou Enlai's
letter of January 23, 1959, offered "to take a
more or less realistic attitude towards the
McMohan Line". India's vital interests were thus
secure. He proposed an overall settlement on the
boundary "particularly in its western section",
adding "border disputes do exist between China
and India". Nehru did the incredible. He replied
on March 22, 1959, obviously after full
deliberation to contest the obvious and to assert
that the border in that crucial western sector
had been settled by "a treaty of 1842 between
Kashmir... and... China" and Tibet.
Even if he was not a student of history he could
- and should - have sent for the files in those
two months. He would have learnt, what he was
later to admit in August-September 1959 though
only to retract it in November that a lot had
happened since.
Under the 1899 British offer, China would have
retained the Aksai Chin and the strategic
Xinjiang-Tibet road, which passes through it, and
India would have retained all the areas it lost
to China from 1959-1962. Zhou Enlai's offer to
Nehru in New Delhi in April 1960 would also have
broadly ensured as much - plus recognition of the
McMohan Line. Nehru rejected it.
History is a liberating force if one is
open-minded and seeks its truths honestly. It
becomes a tyrant if its facts are ignored and
perverted and made fodder for propaganda. The
nation, charged with nationalist fervour -
particularly to intellectuals and journalists -
and fed on the myths finds it impossible to
discard them. The leader of the day, now a
prisoner to this past, has no desire to lose his
office in the pursuit of conciliation.
Forty years ago, Robert A. Huttenback published
an article in The China Quarterly (April-June
1964) entitled "A Historical Note on the
Sino-Indian Dispute over the Aksai Chin" in which
he published the full text of a letter of March
14, 1899 from the British Ambassador Sir Claude
MacDonald to the Tsungli Yamen (China's Foreign
Office) proposing a compromise boundary line
stretching from the trijunction of the
Indo-Sino-Afghan boundaries right to "a little
east of 80° East longitude" (pages 201-207). It
gave the Aksai Chin through which ran the
Xinjiang-Tibet road to China but preserved for
India much that China was to occupy after
September 1959, after the dispute erupted in the
open. Nehru's stand cost India dearly. Huttenback
rightly opined that the letter "has a profound
bearing on the whole Aksai Chin issue". Zhou
Enlai was prepared to accept a boundary on these
lines when he met Nehru in New Delhi in April
1960. Nehru rejected it. The Sino-Pak border pact
of 1963 is based on the 1899 line.
But there is another aspect to it besides the
national interest - it is the truth. Nehru's
assertion, based on the 1842 Treaty, was palpably
untrue. In 1899 at the zenith of its power, the
British Empire proposed the line because the
boundaries had "never been clearly defined" and
it sought a definite line "for the sake of
avoiding any dispute or uncertainty in the
future". In 1899 a weak China ignored the British
offer. In 1959 India arrogantly said that there
was no need for negotiation since the matter had
been settled in 1842.
Huttenback was also co-author of a book,
Himalayan battleground: Sino-Indian Rivalry in
Ladakh, along with Margaret W. Fisher and Leo E.
Rose, based on archival material. His present
work is based almost entirely on archival source
materials, mostly in the India Office Library in
London (now called the British Library). One is
struck by the overlay between the Kashmir and the
boundary disputes. Kashmir became part of the Raj
in 1847 when it was seized from the Sikh Darbar
in Lahore. The British immediately set about
defining its boundaries by accord with China
(emphasis added, throughout). That is one part of
the story. The other is the wound its transfer by
the British to the Dogras inflicted on the
Kashmiri mind. Nehru was well aware of that. But
he wrote off Kashmiris contemptuously in his Note
of August 25, 1952 to, of all persons, their
proud leader Sheikh Abdullah - "not what are
called a virile people. They are soft and
addicted to easy living" (para 23, page 328). We
have, at much cost, learnt better.
INDIA is a country of continental dimensions. The
northeastern region's understanding of history
differs from that of Indians elsewhere. In his
excellent article "Burdens of the past", M.S.
Prabhakara noted that "almost every account of
modern Manipur written by Manipuri scholars
begins with a recital of the circumstances under
which the territory lost its independent status
and was merged into the Union of India... in the
case of Manipur there is a little more substance
to such grievances" (Frontline, September 10). He
cited the Constitutional and Legal History of
Manipur by M. Ibohal Singh (Samurou Lakpa Mayai
Lambi Law College, Samurou, Manipur).
Kashmiris feel even more intensely about the
Treaty of Amritsar (March 16, 1846) and the
Instrument of Accession to India (October 26,
1947). Huttenback describes how the Treaty came
to be concluded and the bitter regrets it caused
all round; the tightening of British control over
the state; British conquest of Hunza, Nagar and
Chitral, the "Great Game" between Britain and
Russia in the Pamirs and political developments
in Kashmir from 1901-1947 as recorded in British
archives. Prof. M.L. Kapur of Jammu University
wrote Kashmir: Sold and Snatched based on the
records in the National Archives of India. It is
sympathetic to the Maharaja.
Prof. Ghulam Hassan Khan of Kashmir University
wrote a detailed account, Freedom Movement in
Kashmir 1931-1940 (Light & Life Publishers, New
Delhi, 1980). F.M. Hassnain has authored British
Policy towards Kashmir (1846-1921). Neither the
Congress' Quit India resolution nor the Muslim
League's Pakistan resolution forms part of the
lore of Kashmir's freedom movement. The two
events that stir him are Martyrs' Day July 13,
1931 and Sheikh Abdullah's Quit Kashmir movement
in 1946. The roots of both lie in the treaty of
Amritsar. In the last decade a whole corpus of
literature on "the freedom movement" has cropped
up - based on Kashmiri understanding of history,
some of good, some of poor quality. One
particularly able work is Kashmir in Chains
1819-1992 by Mohammad Sultan Pampori, a civil
engineer (Pampori Publishing House, Srinagar,
190008), one of the rare documented works. All
these are outpourings of Kashmiri nationalism,
which India does not understand; still less does
Pakistan.
The Dogras had established themselves as rulers
of Jammu in the declining years of the Mughal
empire; but, as feudatories of the Sikh Kingdom.
In 1834 Gulab Singh conquered Ladakh. It was his
commander Zorawar Singh's forays into Tibet that
resulted in the 1842 Treaty, which Nehru famously
cited. The East India Company coveted prosperous
Punjab. When hostilities broke out, Gulab Singh,
true to form, betrayed his Sikh masters and
allied himself secretly with the British. The
Treaty of Lahore (March 9, 1846) made the Sikh
State a British tributary and imposed on it an
indemnity of Rs.1.5 crores. Since it could not
pay, it ceded the territories between the Beas
and Indus rivers including Kashmir and Hazara.
The company, in turn, transferred these areas to
Gulab Singh for Rs.1 crore. It was reduced to
Rs.75 lakhs a week later by the Treaty of
Amritsar, with the British occupying Kulu and
Manali. Thus was the State of Jammu and Kashmir
formed.
During his visit to Srinagar in August 1947,
Gandhi declared that he had "no hesitation in
saying that the will of the Kashmiris was the
supreme law in Kashmir and Jammu. He was glad to
say that the Maharaja and Maharani readily
acknowledged the fact. He had the good fortune to
read what was euphemistically called the Treaty
of Amritsar but was in reality a deed of sale. He
supposed that it would be dead on the 15th
August" (Mahatma: Volume 8, by D.G. Tendulkar;
page 79). The famous Urdu poet Hafiz Jullundari
wrote an elegy lamenting the humiliation that the
"Deed of Sale" inflicted. Two of its couplets ran:
"Loot li insaan ki qismat pachattar lakh mein
Bik gayee Kashmir ki jannat pachattar lakh mein."
(The fate of human beings was sold for Rs.75
lakhs/ Kashmir's paradise was sold for Rs.75
lakhs).
The fiery poem ended with these ringing words:
"Haan pachattar lakh mein
Haan haan pachattar lakh mein."
(Yes, for Rs.75 lakhs/Yes, indeed, for Rs.75 lakhs).
THE HINDU PHOTO LIBRARY
Sheikh Abdullah.
To Sheikh Abdullah this deed made Kashmir a
"unique" State, altogether different from others.
Under Section 7(1)(b) of the Indian Independence
Act 1947, the British Crown's suzerainty over the
Indian princes lapsed "and with it, all treaties
and agreements" in force between them. A
clear-headed lawyer that he was, Gandhi had
raised a valid point.
But when Sheikh Abdullah launched his Quit
Kashmir movement in 1946, without consulting
Nehru, he put his friends in the Congress in an
embarrassing position. If Maharaja Hari Singh's
title to rule was not valid, how could he sign
the Instrument of Accession to the Union of India
on its independence? Nehru and the Sheikh's
defence counsel, Asaf Ali, had to give it a
different spin at his trial for sedition.
Abdullah cited as a precedent the Sikh ruler's
Governor of Kashmir, Sheikh Imamuddin, who
resisted Gulab Singh's attempt to take possession
of the Valley under the "Deed of Sale".
The British regretted the transfer for two
reasons. In London Sir John Hobhouse, President
of the Board of Control, recorded: "These reports
of the character of Golab Singh are such as to
promise ill for his subjects and for the
arrangements made in Cashmere." Colonel
Steinbach, commander of some of Gulab Singh's
troops, contended, in 1851, "that the British had
made a great mistake in turning Kashmir over to
Gulab Singh. Not only had his military resources
been exaggerated `but of his avarice and
pecuniary oppression your Lordship can form no
correct conception - in fact, had your Lordship
visited Cashmere, as fully expected, the entire
population intended prostrating themselves at
your Lordship's feet, to beg to be relieved from
the Maharaja's rule - a fact upon my honour'.
Steinbach could not understand how Englishmen who
railed against slavery at home could at the same
time turn an entire people into slaves."
On February 25, 1880, the Viceroy, Lord Lytton,
wrote to the Secretary of State Lord Cranbrook:
"I consider the time has come when we must
decisively intervene for the rescue of a
perishing population, on whose behalf we
certainly contracted moral obligations and
responsibilities when we handed them over to the
uncontrolled rule of a power alien to them in
race and creed, and representing no civilisation
higher than theirs." Cranbrook agreed "that
[while] we are not directly responsible but we
have relations with Cashmere which would justify
strong interference with their enormities and the
use of a tone which ought to have its effect...
We ought to have influence to prevent the
annihilation of a race whose only crime is a
different religion from that of the powers in
authority... ".
On May 23, 1884 Cranbrook's successor, Kimberley,
wrote to Calcutta: "As to the urgent need for
reforms in the administration of the State of
Jammu and Kashmir, there is, unfortunately, no
room for doubt. It may indeed, be a question
whether, having regard to the circumstances under
which the sovereignty of the country was
entrusted to the present Hindoo ruling family,
the intervention of the British Government on
behalf of the Mahommedan population has not
already been too long delayed."
But vulnerable rulers were manipulable. They were
deposed only when it suited the British to depose
them. Maharaja Partap Singh was removed for
imperial reasons.
British regrets were based also on another score.
Some Englishmen wanted to establish a European
settlement in Kashmir. Lieutenant Colonel R.N.
Innes urged such a course on Lord Randolph
Churchill on September 21, 1883 when he was at
the India Office. "The benefits of a European
colony in Cashmere were originally intended to be
conferred on the deserving British soldiers of
the local army... I still think that the scheme
of forming a colony of Europeans in Cashmere
would be in every way an advantage to the State."
W. Wakefield lamented in 1879 that the British
wantonly threw away "the chance of doing what
seems impossible in India otherwise - colonising
a portion of our eastern possessions". He added:
"It is well known to all conversant with Indian
affairs that, unfortunately for us, our
countrymen cannot settle down in India and bring
up families, like our representatives in our
other colonies. The climate and other reasons
forbid it... Now, no such factors exist against
the colonisation of Kashmir by us or by any other
European nation. The climate is all that can be
desired; sufficient land exists, which properly
tilled and cultivated, would support any number;
while water is good and distributed abundantly
all over the valley. In fact nothing is left that
could be desired to form, by the means of our
retired soldiers and others, a miniature England
in the heart of Asia."
Wakefield regretted that "it was not to be. The
huckstering spirit that so often pervades our
national policy, and which caused the great
Napolean to apply to us the term of a nation of
shopkeepers, was dominant in this case;
relinquishing all the advantages that accrued to
us from its possession, the Supreme government
sold this fair province to the Raja Gulab Singh
for the paltry and insignificant sum of 75 lakhs
of rupees."
One can well imagine the unabated, smouldering
Kashmiri resentment at the Treaty. Had the
British made it another province of British
India, it would have enjoyed similar advantages
and would have been governed by the democratic
tests of the Partition Plan of June 3, 1947 as to
its future.
CONSIDER another crucial phase of Kashmir's
history. In 1938 Sheikh Abdullah decided to
convert the All Jammu and Kashmir Muslim
Conference into a secular National Conference.
The decision was ratified by its General Council
on April 26, 1939. The seeds of the
Jinnah-Abdullah rift were sown then. They merely
sprouted during Jinnah's visit to the Valley in
1944. In 1939 as in 1944, Jinnah behaved
arrogantly and with utter disregard for
democratic values.
On April 1, 1939, in his reply to an address
presented by Kashmiri students at the Aligarh
Muslim University, Jinnah declaimed: "I can say
with certainty that he [Sheikh Abdullah] is in
the wrong. Having got himself ensnared by the
Congress, which is thoroughly a Hindu
organisation, he has put the ship of his
community in a whirlpool. I understand that he is
doing this out of ignorance and some
misunderstanding. But I am fully satisfied that
he will soon realise his mistake and will return
to the right path, and will come to know that
those whom he is considering his friends and at
whose beck and call he is acting, are not his
true friends but his enemies."
The Sheikh, then on a tour of Punjab, pleaded
earnestly on April 14, 1939, as he was to in
1944: "How can we tie ourselves to you [the
League]? You are the people who in a resolution
in Patna threatened to create difficulties for
the Congress in the affairs of the States. While
we were in greater stress, the Congress came to
our rescue. It was the Congress which voiced our
grievances and supported us. Maulana Zafar Ali
has in a speech at Kapurthala declared that the
Congress is an enemy of the Princes and they in
the League are their friends and protectors. If
that is right let me say clearly that we cannot
be with these who want the present state of
affairs to continue."
He added: "Will anybody tell me how am I wrong,
representing a majority community as I do, in
trying to win the confidence of the minority
community which happens to be the Hindus, the
Sikhs and others in Kashmir? May I know what
irreligious act am I committing in trying to take
the minorities with me to have self-Government
for the people? Is it not absurd that what is
right here becomes wrong in the case of Kashmir?"
(Ghulam Hassan Khan; pages 371-372).
When will Pakistanis admit that while Jinnah was
the architect of Pakistan, he was also the
architect of its alienation of Abdullah and of
East Pakistan? Indians also have much heart
searching to do. Abdullah was for accession to
India even before the tribal raid. His secularism
was beyond question. Yet it was this man who was
dismissed in August 1953 as Prime Minister of the
State and put in prison for 11 years - on Nehru's
orders; a fact which he denied to the President,
to Parliament and to his daughter (Selected Works
of Jawaharlal Nehru: Volume 23; pages 309-311).
The Sheikh could not accept Nehru's Note of
August 25, 1952 for two reasons - he wanted to
retain Kashmir's identity and autonomy and he
wanted a final solution of the dispute with
Pakistan. He could not ignore the pro-Pakistan
constituency in the State. Nehru rejected both
these grounds. He was battling against the Jan
Sangh, whose rise alarmed Abdullah.
The communal divide within this was bad enough.
The split between the National Conference and the
Muslim Conference was no better. In November 1943
the British Resident in Kashmir, Col. L.E.
Barton, estimated that while the Muslim
Conference was in ascendancy in Jammu, which was
61 per cent Muslim, the National Conference held
the lead in Kashmir, which was 93 per cent
Muslim. Now, 40 years later, the Rashtriya
Swayamsewak Sangh (RSS) talks of partition of the
State on communal lines. It will yield only
two-and-a-half districts to India; for, three of
the six districts of Jammu have a Muslim
majority. This is the ruin the RSS works for.
On November 1, 1947, Mountbatten offered Jinnah
in Lahore plebiscite in all the three States -
Kashmir, Junagadh and Hyderabad. Jinnah refused.
So much for his commitment to democracy and
indeed to the people of Kashmir. He was more
interested in the Nizam of Hyderabad.
On November 10, 1947, V.P. Menon, Secretary in
the Ministry of States, and Chaudhari Mohammed
Ali, Pakistan's Cabinet Secretary, concluded an
agreement in writing in the presence of Lord
Ismay, Chief of Staff to the Governor-General of
India, Lord Mountbatten. Huttenback reproduces
its text:
"Both governments agree that all forces whether
regular or irregular must be withdrawn from
Kashmir soil at the earlier possible moment. The
withdrawal will commence on the 12th of November
and will be concluded by November 26th. The
Government of Pakistan solemnly pledge themselves
to do their utmost to assure that the tribesmen
are withdrawn according to this programme and
that they make no further incursions. The
Government of India for their part undertakes to
withdraw their forces according to programme."
To the British High Commissioner in India, "Menon
said that he entirely agreed that Kashmir would
go to Pakistan but emphasised that in view of
what had passed, a formal plebiscite was
essential."
The draft accord added: "A plebiscite will be
held as soon as possible under the aegis of two
persons nominated by the Government of India and
Pakistan with a person nominated by the Kashmir
Government as observer. The plebiscite will be
conducted by a British officer." This draft was
rejected by Nehru and Jinnah.
This draft evidently found its way to the U.N.
Commission for India and Pakistan (UNCIP). It
formed the basis of its two plebiscite
Resolutions of August 13, 1948 and January 5,
1949, which both sides accepted. They made three
changes; two in India's favour. The plebiscite
was to be conducted by a Plebiscite Administrator
appointed by the U.N.; Pakistan had no role in
the conduct of the plebiscite; and India was not
required to withdraw all its forces but only "the
bulk" of the forces. Nehru never agreed to any
reasonable figure for "the bulk", proposed by the
UNCIP, and ensured collapse of the 1948-49
Resolutions and thereby any possibility of a
plebiscite.
Neither India nor Pakistan has cared or dared to
publish that draft in their respective White
Papers. The records of 1947 on Kashmir remain
classified. Academia in both countries is
quiescent. The secrets of the subcontinent are
open to the public in the British Library in
London.
WHY did Nehru renege on his promise to hold a
plebiscite? Indira Gandhi wrote to him from
Srinagar on May 14, 1948: "They say only Sheikh
Sahib is confident of winning the plebiscite."
This was while the raiders and Pakistan's army
were battling with Indian troops who defended
Kashmir from the brutal raiders. The
distinguished public servant Mohammad Aslam Khan
Khattak's memoirs, A Pathan Odyssey, reveal
official Pakistani complicity in the raid (Oxford
University Press, Karachi; pages 271, Rs.395).
THE HINDU PHOTO LIBRARY
Jawaharlal Nehru and Mohammed Ali Jinnah.
On the partition of India in 1947, Kashmir had a
real choice. Even if Pakistan was not a Muslim
state, Kashmir's people had every right to
declare, through a plebiscite, their decision on
accession to either state; a decision on their
future and their destiny. No leader, no matter
how popular, no legislature, no matter how freely
elected - least of all an alien and oppressive
ruler whose title to rule derived from a Deed of
Sale of a century ago - had any business to
determine the people's future. They and they
alone had that inalienable right. Referenda on
joining the European Union are an established
practice now. Be it remembered that it was Nehru
and Mountbatten who stipulated the communal
criterion in respect of plebiscites in all the
three States - Kashmir, Junagadh and Hyderabad
respectively, on November 8 and 1, 1947.
Nehru's cynical breach of a solemn pledge in a
formal accord has had lasting consequences. It
alienated the people and aggrieved a neighbour.
He could do so, as he said explicitly in his Note
of August 25, 1952, because "we are superior to
Pakistan in military and industrial power".
Neither the U.N. nor Pakistan could do a thing,
he told the Sheikh. While the people became
resentful, Pakistan became a country with a deep
sense of having been wronged. Its grievance
became a festering sore. All the calculations
Nehru recorded in that Note have proved wrong.
One of them was that over time Pakistan and
Kashmiris would both accept the status quo. Fifty
years later both reject the Line of Control
(LoC). Pakistan regards the proposal humiliating
- it sanctifies breach of promise and triumph of
military power. Bluntly put, it means - "lump
it". This is an aspect advocates of the LoC
overlook, especially some retired American
diplomats who have set up shop as "experts" on
the subcontinent and peddle their shop-worn
wares, with insolent confidence, to ignorant
Americans and fawning Indians.
At last, in desperation, Pakistan sought to
settle the dispute by recourse to war in 1965.
India needed no excuse to renege on its pledges,
anyway. It now acquired one which was plausible,
and perfectly valid - Pakistan could not acquire
through a plebiscite what it had failed to
acquire at its own chosen forum, the battlefield.
But why should the people of Kashmir suffer for
the criminal folly of Pakistan? This was even
more true of Nehru's false excuse of U.S.
military aid to Pakistan in 1954. Pakistan's
aggression in 1965 affected its demand for
plebiscite. It did not affect other venues for
accord, still less the Kashmiris' right to demand
that India fulfil its pledges to them. Falsehoods
have been the staple of discourse on Kashmir.
"Self determination cannot be claimed by a part
of a nation," goes one such plea. But plebiscite
in Kashmir was official policy from 1947 to 1956.
Both media and academia were complicit in
retailing this falsehood and more. Nationalism
overpowers commitment to truth. Witness the
American press on Iraq.
However, time has established other truths,
meanwhile (Vide "Harsh truths about Kashmir",
Frontline, August 15). Competing equities have
arisen. One harsh truth is that there is no
popular "alienation". Alienation implies a former
affection. The people were never for acceding to
India even in 1947. The other harsh truth is that
at least since Pakistan's attack on Kashmir in
1965, no Indian government can hold a plebiscite
and survive for a day. People shy away from
acknowledging one truth or the other depending on
their predilections. Some "scribes" suddenly
discovered in 2002 that the word Azadi needed
definition. Such is the stuff of Indian discourse
on Kashmir.
The correct approach is honesty, and courageously
to accept both the truths and evolve creatively a
via media acceptable to India, Pakistan and all
the regions and communities of Jammu and Kashmir.
Meanwhile the least one can do is to listen to
Kashmiri reportage of events and opinions in
Kashmir Times and Greater Kashmir. They should
open the eyes of those who profess to interpret
Azadi. It might surprise some of us, but on
October 16, Greater Kashmir published an article
by Haroon Rasheed in which he lamented that on
October 16, 1586 "the Mughal Army invaded this
land and thus Kashmir ceased to remain an
independent country". In his view there followed
417 years of foreign rule to this day.
Significantly, he deplores Pakistan's hold on
Kashmir as much as he does Kashmir's accession to
India. The weekly Chattan has been sharply
critical of India, Pakistan, the militants as
well as the People's Democratic Party and the
National Conference. It, nonetheless, expresses
the deep popular rejection of the status quo. A
noted publicist discovered that even Sufis in
Kashmir are separatists.
Neither plebiscite nor independence is an option.
But nor is the LoC. It is not beyond the wit of
man to devise an arrangement that satisfies, in
as large a measure as is realistically possible,
the aspirations and needs of all the interests
involved in this tragic State. Therein lies the
value of President Pervez Musharraf's four
points. He has abandoned plebiscite and is
anxious to remove the half-century-old festering
sore. He is prepared for a compromise and is
desperately eager to settle Kashmir so that he
can build his fractured country. It would be
tragic if India persists in its old policy and
misses a fine opportunity to make a new beginning
in India-Pakistan relations.
_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/
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