SACW | 1-2 Nov 2004
sacw
aiindex at mnet.fr
Mon Nov 1 20:54:07 CST 2004
South Asia Citizens Wire | 1-2 November, 2004
via: www.sacw.net
[1] India / Pakistan /Kashmir:
(i) Mutual trust fund (A.G. Noorani)
(ii) Exile on main street (Sajad Lone)
[2] Pakistan: Pakistan Army Inc.: Propping up Musharraf (Ali Dayan Hasan)
[3] Pakistan: Excerpts: NAB: the early years (Hassan Abbas)
[4] India: 1984 in the life of a nation - Gujarat happened because of
the failure to punish the killers of '84 (Indira Jaising)
[5] India: Education under BJP
- School drops badges
- One School Two Badges
[6] India: Gujarat textbook mum on riots (Rathin Das)
[7] India: Upcoming events :
(i) LARZISH: International Film Festival of Sexuality and Gender
Plurality, Mumbai,
India, 2004 (Bombay, 4th-7th November, 2004)
(ii) South Asian Queer Shorts at Reeling, Chicago Lesbian and Gay
International Film
Festival 2004 (Chicago, 11th of November)
(iii) BASAS Annual Workshop 2004 'Chauvinism in South Asia'
(Bristol, 13 November 2004)
(iv) CERAS - Annual General Meeting 2004 (Montreal, 21 November)
20th anniversary of the anti-Sikh Delhi Riots
20th anniversary of the Bhopal Gas Disaster
--------------
[1]
(i)
Hindustan Times
November 2, 2004
MUTUAL TRUST FUND
A.G. Noorani
'Pandit Nehru gave his view that Kashmir could be divided into four
well-defined areas, viz. the valley of Srinagar itself, Poonch (with
which he included Mirpur), Jammu and the Gilgit Agency'. That was at
a meeting in New Delhi with Mountbatten, Liaquat Ali Khan, Sardar
Patel and Ghulam Mohammed on Nov. 28, 1947. The minutes record that
he was propounding a scheme whereby Liaquat's "wishes would be met".
That he overlooked Ladakh is less relevant than the fact that
demarcation of areas has ever been a part of the discourse on the
Kashmir problem.
Pervez Musharraf's offering of 'food for thought', after a hearty
iftar on Oct. 25, is in good tradition. His tally is seven regions
which "we will have to identify"; next, "demilitarise them forever,
and in the third stage change their status". That "can be
independence, condominium where there can be a joint control or there
can be UN mandate". It has to be defined by 'legal people'. Lawyers
should be consulted before a scheme is proposed.
If originality is not a feature of the serving, neither is realism or
practicality. Condominiums have been very rare: Austro-Prussian
condominium over Schleswig-Holstein and Lauenberg (1864-1866);
Anglo-Egyptian over Sudan (1898-1955); Anglo-French over the New
Hebrides, now Venuatu (1914-1980); and Anglo-American (1939-1989)
over the Islands of Canton and Endenberry, now part of Kiribatu.
India and Pakistan will be bad partners in such an exercise. Kashmir
is not Kosovo to be governed under a UN mandate. Independence is an
unreal idea.
Musharraf's venture took off from his understanding with Manmohan
Singh in New York on Sept. 25 to explore options. This is a quest
that goes beyond a Kashmir solution. It concerns the future of
Indo-Pak relations. Which is why New Delhi's churlish reaction is as
disappointing as are the outpourings of distrust by some. Yet, both
reactions are understandable. India is in a time wrap on Kashmir.
Having frozen its own thinking, it hopes that the status quo will
freeze as well and the world would accept it. Each day, however,
yields a new recruit for change. The latest is Commonwealth Secretary
General Don McKinnon who said on Oct. 23: "The resolution of the core
issue of Kashmir is necessary for durable peace."
Nehru spoke of areas in 1947 in the context of plebiscite to which he
had pledged himself. The minutes of a meeting on Dec. 21, 1947,
record: "Pandit Nehru reassured Mr Liaquat Ali that the Government of
India would never depart from the policy of holding a fair and
impartial plebiscite under UNO and that indeed they had declared this
policy often and too publicly to make it possible for them to
withdraw from it, even if they wanted to, which they did not." But
Indira Gandhi warned him in a letter from Srinagar of May 14, 1948,
"They say Sheikh saheb is confident of winning the plebiscite."
But, as he wrote to the (as then titled) Prime Minister of Kashmir,
Sheikh Abdullah, in a secret note of August 25, 1952, he had
privately changed his mind "towards the end of 1948" significantly.
He had concluded that "the only feasible solution... was the
acceptance of the status quo more or less". This was based on six
calculations. First, that "we are superior to Pakistan in military
and industrial power". Second, "a time will come when, through sheer
force of circumstances, [Pakistan] will be in a mood to accept a
settlement which we consider fair, whether in Kashmir or elsewhere".
Third, the people also would acquiesce. Though gifted, they "are not
what are called a virile people. They are soft and addicted to easy
living... They were interested only in honest administration and
cheap and adequate food". Fourth, he asked the Sheikh to finalise
Kashmir's accession to India. Fifth, tensions could be eased "between
India and Pakistan by tackling other problems... And development of
trade and other relations". He had offered partition on the basis of
the ceasefire line. Finally, "I am convinced that in the long run
India and Pakistan must come together." We must offer friendship to
Pakistan on this basis.
Everyone of these calculations has been proved wrong. Neither
Pakistan nor the Kashmiris have acquiesced in this scheme even after
half a century. Nehru's understanding of the people's psyche was
hopelessly wrong. His strategy of by-passing Kashmir by talking of
'other problems' and offering trade has failed. Military superiority
didn't settle the issue. But this note has governed - and continues
to govern - India's policy and the outlook of the bogus doves. Its
status on the Indo-Pak cold war is akin to the US National Security
Council's document NSC-68 of April 1950, the Bible on containment of
the Soviet Union.
Sheikh Abdullah couldn't accept the note. He doubted the assurances
of respect for autonomy; knew that the dispute couldn't be settled
without an accord with Pakistan; and sensed the growing alienation
among the people. He was sacked as J&K PM and was jailed on Nehru's
orders, as the documents show.
Nehru's policy created an alienated populace and an aggrieved
neighbour, both deeply resentful at his breach of solemn pledges. To
both, the LoC, based as it is on force, signifies 'lump it'. Time
will not assuage the grievance or heal the wound. A solution alone
can do both. Alienation of the people of Kashmir has increased and
come to the boil. Hartals can be imposed on shopkeepers. There is no
way thousands can be forced to throng funeral processions of
militants, indigenous or Pakistani, or women driven to the windows to
wail over their deaths.
Musharraf's details are ill-considered. But hand it to him that ever
since he came to power on Oct. 12, 1999, he has consistently offered
alternatives to plebiscite. Three days later he told the US
Ambassador, Willian B. Milam, that both sides must move beyond
'stated positions'. Milam's assessment that he was a 'moderate' has
proved correct. Two extremes to be ruled out are 'the UN resolutions'
and Kashmir as a closed chapter rather than a live dispute. He became
bolder as he consolidated his power. An Indian journalist was told in
April 2001 that both sides should "reach somewhere in the mid-ground".
Then came the famous four points at the Agra breakfast on July 16,
2001: meet; accept Kashmir as an issue; 'negate' extreme positions;
and adopt a compromise acceptable to both. Indian visitors were told
on Oct. 12, 2004, that the last two steps should be merged. "If Step
3 is taken in isolation, all hell will break loose." The process of
elimination, dangerous in isolation, will be unnecessary if the
parties reach out for the outlines of the end product. It was on this
occasion that he said: "Identify the region, demilitarise it and
change its status." He wouldn't be talking of reaching an accord in
'a full day's sitting' unless he was prepared to meet India halfway.
Preceding all this was Musharraf's declaration on Dec. 18, 2003, that
he had 'left aside' the UN resolutions. His policy has aroused
opposition at home. The Indian PM is sincere in the quest for
options. It's plain that unless India reciprocates, the peace process
will end. Musharraf isn't one to use Kashmir for domestic support. He
wants to settle it to rebuild a fractured State. That's in India's
interests too.
_____
(ii)
Hindustan Times - October 31, 2004
EXILE ON MAIN STREET
Sajad Lone
It is important to identify the nuanced political distinction between
the terms 'resolution' to the Kashmir conflict and a 'solution' to
the Kashmir conflict. Resolution is more of a long-term concept and
is an improbability at this stage. It could mean settling of all
claims on Kashmir of all the actors, once and for all. The peoples of
India, Pakistan and J&K have grown up on a diet
of vicious rhetoric and hostile folklores and seen the bloody
manifestation in terms of violence. Bitter peoples, competing in
bitterness, are the most unlikely settings for a resolution. Add to
it the lack of exposure, the lack of free movement. For an average
Pakistani, an Indian is symbolised as a perpetual threat to a dream
called Pakistan. For an average Indian, Pakistan is symbolised by the
images of conspiring generals out to destroy India. And for the
fatigued Kashmiri, consumed with anger against both the countries, if
only violence could end he could express his true will.
The landless peasant of Sindh is either ignorant of the travails of
the bonded labour in Bihar or his scope for empathising is completely
crowded out by the patriotic fervour generated by malignant
demagoguery. The majority in both the countries - who are
economically persecuted - 'don't know each other', don't feel for
each other. Perhaps their bond of exploitation, hunger,
impoverishment could set the stage for a resolution somewhere in the
future. Realities don't blend while the surreal rules. Resolution
will have to wait for realities to blend.
In the interim period, we will have to look for a solution, a
short-term concept, whose aim should primarily be to set the stage
for an era of uninterrupted peace and reconciliation of realities. It
would entail concessions, bold decisions, resorting to the
unthinkable and yet not threatening geography. The actors are
obsessed with land and may have lost sight of the costs, and flirting
with geography may make solutions elusive.
The status quo and the three slogans, accession to India, accession
to Pakistan and an independent Kashmir, depict the problem. The
short-term concept of solution will have to rule out all these
options. In the Indo-Pak scheme of things, solutions need not be
announced or hyped. They invite stigmatisation. A solution will have
to be felt in the region. Summits and hyped bilateral talks need to
make way for a feeling of a solution having been reached.
The process of confidence-building measures initiated by India and
Pakistan needs to be institutionalised and an element of
irreversibility needs to be embedded in these measures. This will
mean a movement of these measures away from joint forums and
societies into the majority section - i.e. the peoples of the region.
A solution could grow to become a resolution, if the mindsets of the
peoples in the region change. A few decades down the line, stakes
against erratic movements in the contours of a solution could be
high. A solution could pave the way for a gradual, painless
resolution in the long run.
Economics could be a major input in defining the contours of a
solution. Economics could generate direct and indirect benefits for
the common man through increased trade. It could lead a frontal
assault on the per capita - an upwardly mobile journey, to relatively
respectable levels and increase in the purchasing power of the
existing per capita. An irreversible economic interdependence between
an average Indian and a Pakistani citizen is the essential paradigm
of a solution.
Gains could, however, be frittered away if economics is used in
isolation. A psychological strategy should try and tackle the psyche
of the people of the region. It should evolve naturally through
sustained economic, cultural, academic, social interaction. Political
management of economics and psychology is the key to a solution. We
will have to have an optimal blend of economics, politics and
psychology in order to pursue a solution. The blend will have to be
put to prudent use between New Delhi and Islamabad and between
Srinagar and New Delhi.
The onus of success will primarily be on New Delhi. And it means
magnanimity and acting like a great nation: abandoning the role of a
pedantic geographer and refusing to be a prisoner of geography. It
will have to shift the focus from the land to the people. And
especially in Kashmir, it should recognise that it has a problem.
This is an angry population, crippled under the debt of thousands of
sacrifices, overwhelmed with anger and aspiring for eternal political
salvation.
It would be naive to mistake fatigue and defeat at the hands of
violence as consent. In Kashmir there are no grievances. There are
aspirations. New Delhi might have controlled the hostilities to
manageable levels but the aspirations are alive. Engagement rather
than management should be the key word in Kashmir. A solution will
have to be centred around Kashmir, the people, not the land.
Economics could be a part of a solution. However, defaming economics
in Kashmir by making it a part of theatre will only impede a
solution. Marketing economic intervention as a package to the
impoverished Kashmiris is tantamount to dishonouring their
aspirations and branding their aspirations as the desperately extreme
step of a hungry population. National dole is not the way out. A
solution-centric role of economics would mean institutional economic
intervention - empowering the Kashmiris with an independent economic
system, which would partly comply with the macro aspirations in
Kashmir.
Theatrical economics will have to make way for traditional economics.
The psychological aspect would mean tackling aspects pertaining to
the relationship between the Kashmirs on the two sides of the LoC.
With due respect to geography, a short-term solution could mean
psychological integration of the two regions of Kashmir followed by
economic integration. This could serve as a model for the future. The
political input could mean redefining the relationship between New
Delhi and Srinagar. It could further mean opening up Kashmir for the
average Pakistani and making travel for a Kashmiri between the two
regions of Kashmir a birthright.
Pakistan would have to facilitate the process of psychological and
economic integration between the two regions of Kashmir. It would
have to ensure that violence in the Valley is not encouraged by the
State of Pakistan and New Delhi will have to take steps to dilute its
military presence, or at least dilute the visibility of its military
presence. Both countries would have to match deeds with words and
ensure that proxies thrust by both the countries are reined in. The
diffused state of Kashmiri leadership may not be as diffused as it
appears to be. Consolidation of Kashmiri political voices into single
digit figures is imperative for a solution.
Srinagar is the source of anger and unfulfilled aspirations and any
solution skipping Srinagar is unlikely to succeed. New Delhi will
have to engage the Kashmiris and Pakistan will have to facilitate the
engagement. A mollified Kashmiri population is essential for a
solution. New Delhi will have to decide whether it wants to restore
peace in Kashmir or end violence in Kashmir, or settle scores with
Pakistan or hold on to the land or show the will to find a solution.
The writer is Chairman, People's Conference
______
[2]
International Herald Tribune
November 1, 2004
PAKISTAN ARMY INC.: PROPPING UP MUSHARRAF
Ali Dayan Hasan
LAHORE, Pakistan The word in Urdu is "be-sharmi." Think of it as
chutzpah, or shamelessness, and you'll understand what President
General Pervez Musharraf of Pakistan did in October in violating his
pledges to step down as army chief on Dec. 31, 2004.
.
In 1999, Musharraf took power in a coup. This year, in order to push
through controversial constitutional reforms that increased his
powers, Musharraf acceded to widespread demands to step down as army
chief as part of the process of returning the country to civilian
rule. Last month - the fifth anniversary of his coup - he reneged by
securing the passage of the "The President to Hold Another Office
Act." Pakistani democracy activists are reeling.
.
Last year, President George W. Bush, in a widely publicized speech,
admitted that the United States had turned a blind eye as dictators
and authoritarian rulers in the Muslim world trampled on basic rights
and ruled by fiat.
.
Bush spoke passionately about how democracy and human rights in the
Muslim world are critical to combating terrorism. He vowed that
future U.S. policy would be different.
.
Yet when the new Bush doctrine met its first real test, Pakistan, the
United States remained silent. Why? The general is a friend of the
United States. After Sept. 11, Musharraf immediately announced his
support for the United States against Al Qaeda and the Taliban.
.
Musharraf has successfully convinced the United States - and other
countries - that he is Pakistan's indispensable man. Claiming that
only he can save what he destroyed - Pakistan's fragile democracy -
Musharraf has essentially been given a pass on Pakistan's nuclear
proliferation, the exile and jailing of opposition political leaders
and serious human rights abuses by the Pakistani Army.
.
The Bush administration has uncritically accepted Musharraf's premise
that pressuring him too much on human rights and democracy could push
the country into the hands of Islamists.
.
This is a profound misunderstanding of power and political reality in
Pakistan. With or without Musharraf, the leadership of the Pakistani
military is dedicated to self-preservation and power. It was the
military that created the Taliban and then, after Sept. 11, made a
U-turn at full speed.
.
If Musharraf leaves office, it will primarily be because he is viewed
as an ineffective CEO for Pakistan Army Inc. His replacement, chosen
from within the ranks of the army command, will continue to pursue a
pro-U.S. policy with equal zeal. Pakistani generals know that Islamic
fundamentalists are just as opposed to the largely secular military
establishment as they are to the United States. For Pakistan Army
Inc., the United States is the only game in town.
.
While the Bush administration sees stability, we Pakistanis see a
nonperforming state, structured primarily around the preservation of
the institutional interests of its military.
.
The military prioritizes the acquisition of nuclear weapons over
accessible schooling, clean drinking water, basic medical care or any
meaningful reduction in the poverty of its citizens. It is a
systematic human rights abuser. Increasingly these abuses are
conducted under the umbrella of the U.S.-led "war on terror."
.
The Pakistani Army's traditional policy of denying fundamental rights
to the tribal belt, encompassing Waziristan along the Afghan border,
and its brutality in conducting recent antiterrorist operations
there, has created a rebellion that shows every sign of outliving
Osama bin Laden. Meanwhile, the southwestern province of Balochistan,
sullenly peaceful until recently, is rapidly moving toward an
insurgency as decades of resentment against the Pakistani military
come to a head.
.
Pakistan continues to preside over a host of discriminatory and
dangerous laws and practices for women. And while waxing eloquent
about "real democracy," it was Musharraf who eviscerated the
judiciary by sacking Supreme Court judges who opposed martial law.
.
Indeed, Pakistan continues to run a pseudodemocracy put in place
through elections described as deeply flawed by independent
international observers. Musharraf ratified his own position as
president through a referendum in which he was the only candidate.
.
Javed Hashmi, president of the opposition Alliance for the
Restoration of Democracy, has been sentenced to 23 years in prison.
His crime? He read a letter critical of Musharraf to assembled
journalists.
.
The desire of the Bush administration for political stability in
Pakistan is no excuse for failing to pursue a proactive human rights
agenda with Pakistan. The United States has the leverage, and
Pakistan has the experience with democracy, to make it happen. No
Muslim country is more able to prove President Bush right, if only he
means what he said.
.
(Ali Dayan Hasan is the Pakistan researcher for Human Rights Watch.)
.
______
[3]
Dawn - 31 October 2004
EXCERPTS: NAB: the early years
By Hassan Abbas
Hassan Abbas writes about the inception of the National
Accountability Bureau and its sorry performance.
The first decisive step that Musharraf took was on the domestic front
- accountability of the corrupt. With every change of government
since the revival of democracy, the cry for accountability had become
louder and louder, but as the problem was so widespread and the
ramparts of vested interest so invincible, no government dared go
beyond a judicious mixture of flimsy steps and lip service toward
meeting this demand. By the time Musharraf found himself catapulted
to the helm he had no option but to bow to the overwhelming sentiment
of the people.
Thus before the month of October 1999 was exhausted, he announced the
formation of the National Accountability Bureau (NAB), with
Lieutenant-General Syed Mohammad Amjad as its first chairman. And by
a strange irony, it was fated that the 'Attock conspiracy' officers
who had paid a heavy price for attempting to conduct accountability
25 years before would have a fair representation on the Bureau.
Within two days of the formation of NAB, the services of Saeed Akhtar
Malik and Farouk Adam Khan were requisitioned.
General Amjad was the ideal and unanimous choice of the senior ranks
of the army to be NAB chairman. He was an officer of extraordinary
diligence and exemplary character, his name was a byword for
integrity... In the event, Musharraf's credibility and commitment
were to be defined by the performance of NAB...
From the survey of the NAB team, one could only draw optimism. Farouk
Adam had a courtly manner, an impressive personality, and a unique
ability to smile through the tedium of a 16-hour workday. Saeed A.
Malik had much idealism and passion and also a flair for winning the
esteem of those working under him...
The initial labours of NAB were dedicated to drawing up the NAB
Ordinance to provide a legal framework for this new organization. The
central principle that dictated the ordinance was the shifting of the
onus of proof to the accused, that is, that if the accused person
could not reconcile his wealth, earnings, expenses, and taxes that he
had paid, he must be deemed guilty of corruption. The framers of this
ordinance were very conscious that this draconian law would be
applied to a maximum of only 400 of the most corrupt in the land and
the principle that would determine the qualification of these
"selected few" would be that of either an association with a great
crime or having a big name adorned perhaps by a theft not that big.
Without such a law, the NAB would essentially have been a non-starter
because of the virtual non-existence of investigative and
prosecutorial resources
To implement this agenda, Amjad was given full authority to select
the "targets", though he regularly consulted the ISI and a few legal
experts while making vital decisions in this regard. Amjad had a free
hand to hold across the board and evenhanded accountability from
which no one was exempt, except the judiciary and serving armed
forces officials.
On November 17, 1999 NAB moved in for its first crop of arrests. Many
of those arrested were big names. There was great euphoria among the
people because many individuals who had always considered themselves
beyond the reach of law were now behind bars. Yet most of the arrests
were made on the charges of loan default, perhaps the easiest charge
to prove, but one that NAB could be horrendously wrong about because
it was very difficult to tell an honest from a wilful default. With
the first blood having been drawn, the public appetite was whetted
and they bayed for more. Their clamour could have been ignored, but
not that of the government, whose credibility and performance had
nothing but the achievements of NAB to show for itself.
The ordinary public was under the impression that the ISI and other
intelligence agencies had collected enough data on corrupt elements
when they were "monitoring" the civilian governments during the
1990s, but when a few ISI files were handed over to NAB officials,
these were mostly speculative and devoid of any sound material
necessary to prove a case in a court of law. To quicken up things,
General Amjad hurriedly developed a core team to run the organization
comprising bankers, economists, lawyers, and a few from intelligence
and police backgrounds. It was a combination never tried before, the
only handicap being a shortage of time to organize and deliver.
Around that time, a letter from Musharraf's office to NAB (dated
December 11, 1999) adequately reflects the anxiety of the government
and its dependence on NAB to shore up its credibility: "It has been
reported with... great concern that corrupt politicians are becoming
bold and the press is gradually becoming sympathetic to them. This
trend must be stopped and reversed. Following steps are suggested:
1. Move fast on all issues.
2. Expose the corrupt people very expeditiously.
3. Scoop on corruption on a daily basis."
Consequently, more people were arrested based on their reputations,
but proof of their corruption was lacking. NAB could have gained a
lot of credibility in its initial days by prosecuting the ones who
were already in custody, but the special accountability courts were
not in place yet as the selection of judges and establishing a new
chain of courts and developing a whole new infrastructure was taking
time. What the military hierarchy did not realize was that there is a
huge difference between deploying a military unit to a new location
and establishing a law enforcement institution that has to act within
the parameters of law. To overcome this shortage, dozens of retired
ISI officials were inducted who perhaps knew the art of interrogation
well, but had very little legal and investigative experience, which
was the core requirement in this case. There was a reason behind the
compulsion that the new inductees had to be former ISI officials -the
ISI was providing the funds for this NAB expansion and they opted to
benefit their comrades in the process.
As if these problems were not enough to hamper NAB's work, all of the
arrested persons were kept in different cities under the custody of
respective military commands where the local military officials and
intelligence operatives started investigating/interrogating the
accused on their own. Every single institution was trying to spy on
NAB, making the task further complicated. This was symbolic of the
general state of affairs in Pakistan.
Amjad and Farouk Adam, the two public faces of NAB, were now under
immense pressure from the public, the press and the government. As
they addressed the press, it seemed to the military hierarchy that
they were hogging the limelight, and they became victims of
gratuitous envy. Shaukat Aziz, the finance minister then, who had
Musharraf's ear, was for blanket protection to businessmen despite
the fact that some of the latter, in cahoots with the bankers, were
the biggest crooks. Amjad, on the other hand, was heading toward
making an example of those industrialists and businessmen who had
established their business empires through corrupt practices. This
was a risky business as big money was involved.
One of Amjad's problems was the subtle increase of government
interference with his functioning. As it was, NAB had an ominous
start to begin with. In its first two weeks of operations, it cracked
open a multimillion-dollar case of fraud and corruption. Nortel, a
Canadian telecommunications company, had unfairly been handed a fat
contract to build a mobile telephone network in Pakistan. This was an
open-and-shut case as all the evidence was there, but when Amjad
wanted to move in and scuttle the contract, he was refrained from
doing so. The only man who had the power to do this was Musharraf
himself.
As NAB moved along, two questions were frequently asked of Amjad,
that is, whether there were any holy cows, and if the army generals
involved in corruption would also be arrested. The government
position was that only serving army officers and the judiciary were
exempt from NAB because both institutions had effective in-house
correction systems, but technically, retired armed forces officials
were not a part of this category Amjad was absolutely dedicated to
having them probed, but was restrained from doing so.
In another high-profile case, a leading politician from the
North-West Frontier Province (NWFP) known for his corrupt practices
threatened NAB officials during his interrogation by saying that he
was a CIA agent, and that political instability would be created in
the country if he were not released immediately. Amjad responded by
making things harsher for him and by appointing more investigators to
probe his case. The politician was ultimately convicted.
It was becoming obvious to NAB that the task before it was gigantic.
Realizing this, NAB hired a couple of foreign investigative and law
firms to get the corruption money stashed in foreign banks back to
Pakistan. It did not work well in the long run but at least sent a
strong warning to many Pakistanis abroad who had stolen the money and
were now enjoying life in Europe and America. Foreign governments
were also contacted for cooperation in this endeavour, and the first
positive reply came from the US government. In August 2000 a US team
led by Mr Harry Marshall, a senior legal adviser in the US Department
of Justice, landed in Pakistan to discuss US-Pakistan cooperation in
the domain of the extradition treaty between the two states.
NAB presented its cases for extradition of five Pakistanis who were
reported as to be in the United States. That led to a successful
collaboration between the US Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)
and NAB in pursuit of the short-listed cases. From Pakistan's list,
one of the cases involved former chief of the Pakistan Navy, Admiral
Mansurul Haq, against whom NAB had a sound case. The admiral had been
involved in the famous French submarines kickback case in the
mid-1990s. Due to the superb efforts of FBI official Michael Dorris,
the accused was traced and picked up by the FBI from Austin, Texas,
and extradited to Pakistan for the NAB case.
* * * * *
The saddest commentary on Musharraf's much-vaunted commitment to the
cause of accountability is that each member of this team of officers
was hounded out of NAB soon after Amjad's departure from the
institution. Their only handicap was that not one of them was prone
to entertaining any adverse dictates. And so ended a heroic chapter
of the war against crime by a handful of officers in a corrupt
environment.
Reportedly, Amjad had asked to be relieved of his duties more than
once. He was not one to take government partiality lying down. He
left the NAB at the end of September 2000. The NAB's change of
command, in the words of Mohammad Malick's commentary in Dawn, was "a
clear sign of NAB's tailored, if not changed priorities". No one then
knew who the real "tailor" might be, but there was an acknowledgment
that "Amjad remained a very fair accountability chief". But Tariq Ali
in his book The Clash of Fundamentalisms: Crusades, Jihadis, and
Modernity was much more perceptive when he observed that Amjad was
ready to push through, but "Musharraf balked at the scale of the
enterprise". The new chairman was Lieutenant General Khalid Maqbool,
whose reputation was no match for Amjad's. NAB was dead for all
practical purposes. A noble experiment had ended because those who
had initiated it did not have the moral stamina to carry it through.
But it would not be them who would pay the price for this failure.
This would be paid once more by those who have always paid it, the
people of Pakistan.
Musharraf had made a clear choice - he would compromise with those
politicians who were ready to side with him. He had given into
pressure from various sectors that wanted the regime to behave
"normally" and not as a revolutionary one. This was the dilemma
Musharraf faced - the masses were looking for a Messiah in him,
whereas the political and military elite wanted the status quo to
continue. Musharraf was still swinging in between.
Hassan Abbas is a visiting scholar at the Negotiation Project,
Harvard Law School, and a PhD candidate at the Fletcher School of Law
and Diplomacy, Tufts University. He has served in the Government of
Pakistan for ten years.
This book probes into the rise of religious extremism in Pakistan and
examines its linkages with the military and fluctuating US-Pakistan
relations.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Excerpted with permission from: Pakistan's Drift into Extremism:
Allah, the Army, and America's War on Terror
By Hassan Abbas
Copyright (c) 2005 M.E. Sharpe, Inc Available with Mr Books, 10-D
Super Market, Islamabad
Tel: 051-2278843-5.
Email: mrbooks at isb.comsats.net.pk
Website: www.mrbooks.com.pk
ISBN 0-7656-1497-9
275pp. Rs1,795
______
[4]
Indian Express - November 01, 2004
1984 IN THE LIFE OF A NATION
GUJARAT HAPPENED BECAUSE OF THE FAILURE TO PUNISH THE KILLERS OF '84
Indira Jaising
Twenty years in the life of a nation is not too long a time. Today is
the 20th anniversary (if one can call it that) of the massacre of
Sikhs in Delhi following the death of the Indira Gandhi. December 3-4
will be the 20th anniversary of what is described as the Bhopal Gas
Leak Disaster. In between we have had the genocide in Gujarat in
February-March '02.
Is there perhaps a pattern emerging from these events which should
alert the nation to its failure in preventing and then dealing with
the wanton killing of innocents? Twenty years after the Sikh
killings, justice has not been done. There have been no convictions
of the politicians who led crowds to kill Sikhs for no other reason
than that they were Sikhs. The question arises, are we perhaps using
obsolete legal concepts to deal with mass killings which have the
backing of the state? A charge of murder alone does not seem to
adequately describe the crime. Was '84 a crime without a name and
hence a crime without a remedy? To charge people with murder and
nothing more fails to point the finger to the real accused. It does
not address the issue of constitutional responsibility for preventing
such killings. Although what happened in '84 was not described as
"genocide", that is what it was. Our legal system failed to answer
the question: what is the constitutional and personal responsibility
of the head of state for mass killings?
In December '84, a gas leak in the UCC facility killed more than
2,000 people living in the vicinity instantly and left thousands
seriously injured. Those victims, too, are still awaiting justice.
The liability of UCC was never determined. Instead, the apex court
recorded a settlement to which the victims were not a party,
accepting US$470 million as compensation on their behalf. The
question, who was responsible for this disaster, was it UCC, the
government who failed to monitor safety standards, the directors of
the Indian subsidiary who were managing the facility, or was it all
of them - was never answered. The Supreme Court's role was reduced to
that of a bargainer mediating between the highest offer and demand.
As a result, the legal system offered no solutions, whether civil or
criminal.
With the killings of the Muslims in Gujarat in '02, it became clear
that they were genocidal in nature. Many of us, who responded on
behalf of Gujarat victims, were equally active in the '84 Delhi
massacres. Having been through that experience, we realised that
unless the question of state complicity was addressed, justice would
remain a distant dream. Soon it became apparent that this was not
just an act of failure but part of a design. It seemed that through
periodic communal violence, the state had gained experience not only
in organising violence but also organising the denial of access to
justice. It is now clear that the cover-up plan was in place before
the violence was unleashed. Failure to investigate the crimes,
refusal to name leaders in FIRs, appointing public prosecutors who
were VHP members, ensuring witnesses turn hostile, were only some of
the methods used to ensure acquittals. While this happened, the
judiciary remained a mute spectator until the NHRC moved the apex
court with the active assistance of members of civil society.
The final verdict on Gujarat is not out, but human rights activists
have learned certain lessons. One of them was the immense importance
of holding the perpetrators of the violence legally liable. In a
manner of speaking, it is the entire legal system that is on trial.
It is the failure to hold the killers of '84 liable, the failure to
hold the UCC liable, that led to the belief that criminals enjoy
immunity from the legal process. It is easier to convict for a single
murder, than it is to convict for 2,000 mass murders. The
significance of describing the Gujarat killings as genocide is that
they enable us to hold the CM personally liable for the killings that
took place on the theory of command responsibility. The position of a
CM or PM is one of command and neither can claim that they were not
responsible for the acts of their subordinates. Apart from holding
those who committed the acts of killing liable, we also have to hold
liable people in positions of power, who not only failed to prevent
the killings but encouraged it by hate speech, justified it as an
understandable response. All chargesheets in the Gujarat cases began
with the assertion that the killings took place as a "reaction" to
the burning for the Sabarmati train in Godhra. The police have
already decided, even before any trial, that the killings were not
planned but were a "spontaneous reaction" to the Sabarmati Express
burning.
In the district court in Himmatnagar, a suit has been filed by two
widows who lost their husbands against the CM, the State of Gujarat
and the accused in the criminal trial which have has been commenced
against those accused of murdering their husbands. This suit squarely
raises the issue of the personal responsibility of the CM for his
complicity in the genocide that took place in March '02 and invokes
the theory of command responsibility. India is a party to the
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide.
The chief merit of invoking the Convention is that it destroys the
theory of state immunity. It also enables us to hold people
personally liable for their actions without hiding behind the
juristic personality of the state. What will happen to the suit is
anybody's guess, but the fact that it has been filed means that the
CM has a case to answer. The suit has come 20 years too late. Had
such legal action been taken against the PM in power in '84, perhaps
the legal system would have been tested and accountability for human
rights violations established. What Gujarat has done is to help us
understand '84 better. Equally, '84 helped us to understand what was
required to be done in the post-Gujarat killings.
I am amazed when people say, "What's new about Gujarat?" The
difference is that in Gujarat, those at the helm of power have been
challenged by human rights activists. The very act of challenge hold
promise for the future. But there are similarities too. In the final
analysis, the legal system is the steel frame of accountability. That
steel frame crumbled in '84 in Delhi. It crumbled again in the face
of the UCC killings. By '04, it was literally non-existent. It was
these failures of the legal system and more specifically of our
judiciary, that made Gujarat happen.
Surprisingly, in situations of mass killings and disappearances it
has proved easier to get justice in societies which have been
governed by military regimes - take the case of Argentina - than in a
democracy like India. This leads me to conclude that the illusion of
justice that we in live with is more dangerous than the absence of
it. Or is illusion perhaps a necessary component of our democracy
that sustains our politicians in power?
The writer is a senior Supreme Court advocate
______
[5]
The Telegraph
October 29, 2004
SCHOOL DROPS BADGES
Ahmedabad, Oct. 28: Eight years after the practice was started, a
school in a town 25 km from Godhra has removed separate badges for
its Hindu and Muslim students following a showcause notice from the
district authorities.
The controversy, however, broke only early this week when two
trustees of the SJ Dave High School in Shehra highlighted the emblems
on the uniforms - one with Goddess Saraswati and another with a star.
"It was a practice of convenience and not compulsion. Some vested
interests are trying to harm peace, which was not disturbed here even
after the Godhra carnage," school board vice-president Iqbal Pocha
said.
Panchmahal district collector Dinesh Brahmbhatt said: "The
controversy appears to be a fallout of local political rivalry." He
did not elaborate.
Last week, the Shiv Sena had set up an office in Shehra.
The collector, who ordered to "discontinue this discriminatory
practice", admitted that residents had never complained. The school
of 714 students, 150 Muslim, has been asked why its state grant
should not be suspended.
o o o
The Tribune - November 2, 2004
Editorial
ONE SCHOOL, TWO BADGES!
Gujarat must end this practice
Long before a man called Narendra Modi and his politics gripped
Gujarat, the mindset on which communalists thrive was becoming
increasingly pervasive in the state of Mahatma Gandhi. So much so
that an abhorrent practice, which reinforces and deepens the communal
divide, is accepted as the norm, rather than being seen for the
deviation it is from civilised conduct. The case of the S J Dave
School in Shehra village of Godhra district - where, as a part of the
uniform, Muslim students are required to wear a badge with a star and
Hindu students one of the goddess Saraswati - is too shocking an
outrage. It is abominable that the school administration should have
even thought of such a scheme when uniforms were introduced some
years ago. More appalling is the defence of the practice - as an
example of "communal amity" - by some school functionaries now, when
the matter surfaced with the District Education Officer acting to end
the uniform divide. The communal identification enforced is
rationalised on the ground that since parents of Muslim students had
reservations over sporting badges with Saraswati, they were asked to
wear one with a star. This is clearly in gross violation of the
Constitution and ought not to have been initiated or allowed in the
first instance.
It is all to the good that two of the trustees of the school have
come out against the deplorable practice and resolved to end it. The
principal, who has been in charge for about two years, has confessed
that he was opposed to the practice. While criticism of the principal
for continuing the uniform divide may be valid to the extent he did
not act earlier, it is mischievous and motivated to criticise him
with the expectation that he should continue to enforce what he had
merely put up with earlier.
As in all things, here too politics and politicians of different hues
have pitched in to muddy the situation. The school and the
authorities should forthwith bury the divisive uniform code and let
all students wear the same uniform and the same badge-of an Indian,
irrespective their religious affiliation.
______
[6]
Hindustan Times - October 2, 2004
Gujarat textbook mum on riots
Rathin Das
Ahmedabad, October 2
The post-Godhra riots of 2002 may have brought international media
attention to Gujarat but the state's history textbooks don't think
the events are worth even a mention.
The Class VIII social sciences textbook - published by the Gujarat
State Board of School Textbooks - makes no mention of the Godhra
episode or of the anti-minority pogrom that followed. But it does
have the Akshardham attack - an event that took place much after the
riots.
The omission is in tune with the thinking of the BJP and Sangh
Parivar, which has always tried to underplay the riots. It has become
almost a trademark of chief minister Narendra Modi to say in public
that the adverse publicity the riots gave rise to was a conspiracy by
the national English media to defame the people of Gujarat. In fact,
one industry association in the state had described the riots as a
'social mishap'.
Besides the omission, the book has plenty of spelling and grammatical
errors - mostly due to inefficient translation from the original
Gujarati version - as well as several historical inaccuracies.
For instance, the move of eminent lawyers like C.R. Das, Motilal
Nehru, Vallabhbhai Patel and Rajagopalachari to quit the legal
profession and join the freedom movement has been described as a
'negative aspect' of Mahatma Gandhi's non-cooperation call.
In another chapter, mention is made of Subhash Chandra Bose's
10-month-long tour through the country in 1939 but among the leaders
he met, only Veer Savarkar is named.
The Prashant Centre for Human Rights, Justice and Peace - which
pointed out these and many other mistakes on Friday - has demanded
that the textbook be withdrawn immediately. State education minister
Anandiben Patel said if it were true, the book would be withdrawn in
the next session.
Five years back, some textbooks had described minorities as the
problem of India. These books were corrected in the subsequent
editions.
______
[7] Upcoming Events:
(i)
LARZISH: Tremors of a Revolution, the 2nd
International Film Festival of Sexuality and Gender Plurality, Mumbai,
India, 2004
Larzish welcomes you back in its second year!
This year we bring to you, new and diverse programs. Expect to catch
about 90 films spread over four days from Argentina, Brazil, Croatia,
Canada, Columbia, France, Hong Kong, India, Israel, Iraq, Japan,
Kenya, Spain, Sweden, Thailand, USA, UK, Uruguay and Uganda.
Festival highlights include:
A RETROSPECTIVE OF FILMS BY FILMMAKER PRATIBHA PARMAR - Daily
The festival brings the first ever retrospective of Pratibha Parmar
to India. She is an award winning independent director and producer.
Her films have exhibited widely at international film festivals and
broadcast on television in many countries. (Kindly refer to the
festival catalogue for timings)
DISCIPLINING BHUPEN - SEXUAL TRANSGRESSIONS AND NORMATIVE VISUALITIES
A talk by Parul Dave Mukerjee - 4th November, 15:00 - 16:00hrs
Themes of homosexuality have either been anathema, viewed as
transgressions to be contained or reductive modes of organizing
Bhupen Khakhar's entire oeuvre by institutions of art. Art historian
Parul Dave argues that the radicalism of his work lies elsewhere and
that homosexuality emerges as one among several positions of
marginality.
MARRIAGE, FAMILY & COMMUNITY - A PANEL DISCUSSION, 6th November,
17:00 - 19:00Hrs
Panelists: Anupama Rao, Mary John, Rinchin and Rohini Hensman
It is apparent that the institution of the 'natural family', as
decreed through marriage, has remained a dominant organising
principle. In what ways has feminism, dalit, queer or left politics
attempted to transgress the familiar boundaries of family? The panel
will address these issues and look at more fluid forms of family and
community.
APPEARANCES & IDENTITY, A PANEL DISCUSSION, 7th November, 15:00 - 17:00hrs
Panelists: Kajol, Maya Sharma and Shohini Ghosh
The panelists will make linkages between gender and sexuality within
a bi-gendered society. What happens when people's appearances seem to
create fissures in the binary of 'male' and 'female'? What identity
does one carry, and how is that perceived in the reading of our
gender?
Venue: 4th-7th November, 2004, Rama Watumull Auditorium, KC College,
Dinshaw Wachha Road, Churchgate, Bombay-20
Please check the web-site for further
details: <http://www.larzish.org>http://www.larzish.org
For invitation passes to the festival, please contact: 23439651 or
23436692 or write to
<mailto:larzish_india at yahoo.com>larzish_india at yahoo.com
(ii)
Showcasing four films from LARZISH: Tremors of a Revolution, the 1st
International Film Festival of Sexuality and Gender Plurality, Mumbai,
India, 2003 at Reeling, 23rd Chicago Lesbian and Gay International Film
Festival 2004
Date: 11th of November, Thursday, 2004
Time: 8:30pm
Venue: Chicago Filmmakers
5243 North Clark Street
Chicago, IL 60640
Ph: 312-458-0639
Ticket: $7 (or festival passes)
For more information on the film festival and tickets, go to:
www.reelingfilmfestival.org
One of its kind in India, LARZISH is a festival of films that address
sexuality and gender issues. It is a fitting answer to the state, which
recently proclaimed that homosexuality couldn't be tolerated in India. This
program of four films is being screened in the Reeling, 23rd Chicago Lesbian
and Gay International Film Festival 2004.
Gautam Bhan, a queer activist, writer and performance artist from New Delhi,
India, currently studying at the University of Chicago will introduce this
program of four films. Gautam is closely related to the Larzish Festival and
queer movements in India.
Film Descriptions:
1. Untitled III
Dir: Tejal Shah/India/2000/3 mins/Silent
An abstracted and quiet exploration of bodies in space, at once negotiating
contact between the two bodies in the video and their relationship with the
viewer.
2. Bombay Longing
Dir: Georgina Maddox & Shalini/India/2001/3:30 mins/English
A coming out story that uses poetic excerpts from a daily journal of
everyday encounters ending moaningly happy.
3. Beauty Parlour
Dir: Mehreen Jabbar/Pakistan/2000/18mins/Urdu with English subtitles
4 faces, 4 masks: 4 short sketches of the lives and loves of 3 women and a
eunuch as they talk about their desires traced through their visits to the
beauty parlour and other everyday events.
4. My Friend Su
Dir: Neeraj Bhasin/India/2001/54 mins/Hindi & English with English subtitles
Traditional Indian and contemporary trance music sets the mood for a night
with Su, the filmmaker's friend from art school. Though he is outwardly
male, Su feels that inside he is really female. The film revolves around
Su's halting monologues about his feelings about society, his upbringing and
family, his identity crisis, and his art. Shot at night the images are
fluid, sensual.
(iii)
British Association of South Asian Studies Annual Workshop 2004
'Chauvinism in South Asia'
13 November 2004
Governance Research Centre
University of Bristol, UK
in conjunction with the Politics of South Asia Specialist Group of
the Political Studies Association
PROGRAMME
10.30: Arrival & coffee
11.00-12.00:
Neil DeVotta (Hartwick College) Chauvinism and Ethnic Conflict in Sri Lanka
Discussant: James Chiriyankandath (London Metropolitan University)
12.00 - 1.00:
Prasun Sonwalker (University of the West of England) Assamese
Chauvinism and the Political Dynamics of North East India
Discussant: Gareth Price (Royal Institute for International Affairs)
1.00-1.45 pm: Lunch
1.45 - 2.45 pm:
Emma Mawdsley (Birkbeck College) The Abuse of Religion and Ecology:
The Vishva Hindu Parishad and the Tehri Dam
Discussant: Barbara Harriss-White (University of Oxford)
2.45 - 3.15: Tea break
3.15 - 4.15 pm:
Dibyesh Anand (University of Bath) Imagining Muslims: Hindutva's
politics of representation
Discussant: John Zavos (University of Manchester)
4.15-4.45: Tea and close
REGISTRATION
The workshop is free of charge to members of BASAS and the Political
Studies Association subgroup.
However, the room has a limited capacity so participants will need to
register their attendance with Ben Kisby at Ben.Kisby at bristol.ac.uk
(iv)
ANNOUNCEMENT
CERAS - Annual General Meeting 2004
20th anniversary of the anti-Sikh Delhi Riots
20th anniversary of the Bhopal Gas Disaster
Sunday 21 November
at the SOUTH ASIAN WOMEN'S COMMUNITY CENTRE
1035 Rachel est
(between Boyer & Christophe Colomb - metro Mt-Royal and bus 11 to
Christophe-Colomb and Rachel)
12-1:30pm
panel presentation -- SOUTH ASIA IN THE WORLD TODAY
1:30-2:30pm
light lunch [if participating in lunch, please reply so that we have
an accurate count]
2:30-4pm
Business meeting:
Agenda
1. Approval of the agenda
2. Minutes of the last AGM
3. Business arising from the minutes of the last AGM
4. Annual Report of the Board of CERAS by the President
5. Accounts by the Treasurer
6. Organizational matter
7. Varia
[pl note that we have set the day up so that if people only have time
to attend the business part of the meeting that can do so]
info and replies:
daya varma ceras at insaf.net
_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/
Buzz on the perils of fundamentalist politics, on matters of peace
and democratisation in South Asia. SACW is an independent &
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