SACW | 27-28 June 2004
Harsh Kapoor
aiindex at mnet.fr
Sun Jun 27 19:55:37 CDT 2004
South Asia Citizens Wire | 27-28 June, 2004
via: www.sacw.net
[1] A Kashmir solution (A.G. Noorani)
[2] Re-thinking Kashmir (Beena Sarwar)
[3] Dialogue on Kashmir in UK (Balraj Puri)
[4] India: Ashis Nandy's foundational
assumptions on secularism are flawed, uninformed
(Sanjay Subrahmanyam)
[5] India: Two extended comments on the film "Dev" (Umair Ahmed Muhajir)
[6] Upcoming Event: Social Scientist and Sahmat
Convention, "India: An Economic Agenda for 2004"
(New Delhi, July 5)
[7] Upcoming Event: Transnational Subregional
Cooperation and Northeast India - A Conference
organized by CENISEAS in cooperation with the
Institute of Chinese Studies, Centre for the
Study of Developing Societies, Delhi ()
[8] India: Press Release by rights activists on Capital Punishment
--------------
[1]
The Hindustan Times
June 28, 2004
Pg 10: Edit Page
A KASHMIR SOLUTION
by A.G. Noorani
Will the current Indo-Pak peace process end in
recrimination, as its predecessors did, when it
reaches the roadblock, Kashmir? That is certain
to happen unless each side seriously begins
to consider a solution to the tangle which it can
realistically expect the other to accept, no less
than its own people. The prime objective of CBMs,
trade and cultural exchanges is to create a
climate of trust in which that one major dispute
can be resolved; and to bring the parties to the
point where the end game begins. That is
precisely where previous efforts failed.
There has been no dearth of solutions to the
Kashmir issue aired on the subcontinent or
abroad. They were either self-serving -
plebiscite or LoC - or harebrained
(confederation, independence or the US Study
Group's Report). Solutions have been bandied
about without a thought to their acceptability,
practicality or the political process which could
yield them. At the minimum, the governments of
both countries must be strong and committed to a
solution, patient and creative in its pursuit,
and skilful in moulding public opinion in its
support.
India's fear that substantive negotiations will
reopen the state's accession to India is unreal.
President Musharraf has virtually abandoned the
UN's plebiscite resolutions. Pakistan's fear and
India's expectation that the dispute will fade
away have been belied by the people of Kashmir
who are now more assertive than ever before. The
state's Law Minister, Muzaffar Hussain Beigh, a
Harvard man, said on May 2, 2003: "While the
alienation can be traced back to 1951, the
militancy started in 1989 and even if the
militancy was rooted out, you will have the
problem of alienation."
A settlement must be based on both the realities
- secession is ruled out, but secessionism
exists. It must be reckoned with honestly and met
in a statesmanlike manner.
There has been little understanding of the
significance of the Abdullah duo's utterances
during the Lok Sabha election campaign. Why did a
Farooq who once advocated "war with Pakistan" cry
at election rallies: "Do not trust New Delhi
because it has always betrayed Kashmiris" and
praise Pervez Musharraf? Sunanda K. Datta Ray
reported from Srinagar: "No one in Kashmir's
electoral fray would dream of condemning the
militants." New Delhi's interlocutor, Umar
Farooq, led the funeral prayers of Rafiq Ahmed
Lidri, operation chief of the pro-Pakistan
Al-Umar Mujahideen, on February 6.
The truth is that even at the best of times there
was a pro-Pakistan constituency in Kashmir. On
August 5, 1948 Sheikh Abdullah pleaded with the
Maharaja, "I have got to turn the minds of
Muslims of the state from Pakistan to the Indian
Dominion." New Delhi's policies helped that
constituency to expand. India cannot yield to it
and concede secession. Nor will Pakistan accept
in a deal what it already has. Kashmiris
themselves reject the LoC. In 1963 Swaran Singh
offered Z.A. Bhutto 3,000 square miles of
territory. But the Valley is the core of this
'core dispute'. Pakistan does not seek tourist
right there. A Kashmir accord will soften the
Indo-Pak boundary. A soft LoC is no concession.
India and Pakistan must evolve the 'Elements of
Settlement' that go beyond the status quo without
entailing the state's secession.
That was the title of a document which the US and
Britain presented in April 1963 during the Swaran
Singh-Bhutto parleys. It said: "Neither India nor
Pakistan can entirely give up its claim to the
Kashmir Valley. Each must have a substantial
position in the Valley." None can accept the
obscenity of its partition. But the fundamental
can be adopted - India cannot give Pakistan a
territorial stake in the Valley, bar
rationalisation of the LoC. But it can give it a
juridical stake in the state, excluding the
strategic Ladakh district, without affecting its
own sovereignty. Pakistan must concede a similar
stake to India in respect of PoK, excluding the
Northern Areas. Parity of treatment preserves the
state's unity. The LoC, thus modified, becomes an
international boundary, notionally.
There are precedents of states resolving similar
disputes with their neighbours by agreeing to
limit the exercise of their sovereignty over a
piece of their territory and granting its people
autonomy, which is guaranteed by agreement with
the neighbour, and accepting its juridical locus
standi in respect of that guarantee. Its
sovereignty over the area is accepted by the
neighbour as part of the deal.
On February 20, 1948, Sheikh Abdullah told the
Under-Secretary of State in the Commonwealth
Relations Office, Patrick Gordon-Walker, in
Nehru's presence, that "the solution was that
Kashmir should accede to both Dominions India
was progressive on the other hand, Kashmir's
trade passed through Pakistan and a hostile
Pakistan would be a constant danger. The
solution, therefore, was that Kashmir should have
its autonomy jointly guaranteed by India and
Pakistan and it would delegate its foreign policy
and defence to them both jointly but would look
after its own internal affairs."
That joint delegation is a constitutional
impossibility. But Kashmiris can negotiate with
both countries for maximum autonomy possible to
each part of the state, including the right to
conduct foreign trade. The issue of sovereignty
resolved, the LoC becomes an international border
with freedom of movement on both sides,
guarantees to human right, etc.
Now, for the precedents. The Anglo-Afghan Treaty,
signed at Kabul on November 22, 1921, reaffirmed
the validity of the Durand Line. However, by a
collateral letter given to Afghanistan at the
same time, the British representative wrote: "As
the conditions of the tribes of the two
Governments are of interest to the Government of
Afghanistan, I inform you that the British
Government entertains feelings of good- will
towards all the frontier tribes and has every
intention of treating them generously, provided
they abstain from outrages against the
inhabitants of India."
Sweden and Finland settled their dispute over the
predominantly Swedish Aaland Islands under the
auspices of the League of Nations on June 27,
1921. Finland promised "to guarantee to the
population of the Aaland Islands the preservation
of their language, of their culture, and of their
local Swedish traditions". It undertook to
enforce its Law of Autonomy of May 7, 1920. On
September 5, 1946, Italy and Austria signed an
agreement, under which Italy undertook to grant
its German-speaking Bolzano province adjoining
Austria, and the neighbouring bilingual townships
of the Trento province "autonomous legislative
and executive regional power", besides rights.
The details were settled in 1992, including
provision for international adjudication if the
autonomy is violated.
If these models are adopted, each country will
gain enough to sell the accord to its people;
yet, concede enough to make it acceptable to the
other country as well as to the people of the
state. Kashmiris will acquire double guarantees
of autonomy - domestic and international.
Pakistan can claim: "We have secured azadi for
Kashmir for which we are a guarantor." India can
claim "Kashmir's accession is no longer in
dispute". The peace dividends both will reap will
be colossal.
_____
[2]
The News Internatinal
June 27, 2004
RE-THINKING KASHMIR
by Beena Sarwar
For the last few months, we have been shown
tantalising glimpses of the possibility of peace
between Pakistan and India - with Kashmir, the
'core issue' lurking contentiously in the
background, bogging down both countries in their
own narrow notions of nationalism and threatening
whatever progress is made towards peace. To
emerge from this quagmire, it is necessary to put
aside prejudices, fears and positions, and engage
in a genuine dialogue that breaks through these
national versions of the Kashmir story that have
been developed on all sides of the conflict.
This is what the documentary 'Crossing The Lines:
Kashmir, Pakistan, India' (Eqbal Ahmad
Foundation, 2004; 45 minutes) by the well known
academics and peace activists Pervez Hoodbhoy and
Zia Mian courageously attempts to do. Screened at
private venues in Karachi, Lahore and Islamabad
over the last couple of months, the film is a
straightforward narrative presented by Hoodbhoy -
far more effectively than in his previous
documentary, 'Pakistan and India Under the
Nuclear Shadow' (2001), scripted by Mian.
"Nations and nationalism, borders and boundaries
- these are ways of separating people and land.
These are all old ideas, ideas that have failed
us again and again," says Mian, with reference to
the Kashmir film. He points out that there is a
new government in India, but no one expects
Indian position on Kashmir to change very much.
Similarly in Pakistan, civilian or military,
there is no change on Kashmir. Following up on
Gen. Musharraf's admission that Pakistan cannot
realistically hope for a plebiscite to end the
Kashmir dispute and, therefore, is willing to
explore other ways, Hoodbhoy in an article last
December had argued that for Pakistan to insist
on plebiscite "is the surest way of guaranteeing
that a bloody stand-off continues."
The film presents the urgent need for a dialogue
to discuss other options, challenging the people,
and civil and military establishments on both
sides to break out of their own national versions
of the Kashmir story. There are many who will
remain trapped in these notions, and refuse to
see the film in this spirit. They will attack
Hoodbhoy and Mian because they present both sides
of the story in a way that the public in either
country never sees.
Particularly moving and difficult to watch are
the scenes of a recent bombing, that Hoodbhoy's
cameraman in Kashmir caught by chance, although
one would have liked to see more on struggle of
Kashmiri women. Conservative Indian thought will
also resent the film's presentation of the
disillusionment of the Kashmirs with Indian rule,
as encapsulated through a candid interview with
the wild-bearded Hizb commander Syed Salahuddin.
The film traces the background of the conflict,
using interviews of key figures and ordinary
people from all sides, rare archival footage and
excellent computer animation. Neither Hoodbhoy
nor Mian have ever been afraid of controversy, or
of tackling contentious issues head on, whether
it is to demand equal rights for religious
minorities or contest distorted facts in our
history textbooks. Their respective stands on
peace with India and the nuclear issue are well
known. In taking on Kashmir, they continue this
tradition, of asking awkward questions that force
people to think about issues that it is more
comfortable to ignore.
These issues include the building of national
identity through cultivating prejudice and hatred
towards the other - by both India and Pakistan.
The result is views from both sides that mirror
each other. This in fact, is one of the strong
points of the film - its inclusion of footage and
interviews from India and Kashmir. Since the end
of the Afghan war, Pakistan's continued patronage
of religious militants has strengthened local and
foreign militants who not only threaten the
social fabric in Pakistan but have also upped the
ante in Kashmir. Their conviction that Kashmir is
part of a greater struggle, is reflected by
radical Hindu leaders in India - a side that we
in Pakistan don't hear about very often.
Also clear is Hoodbhoy and Mian's stand on the
nuclear issue, as the film shows how the nuclear
tests only served to intensify tensions between
both countries. In the end, one is left with more
questions than answers - but perhaps that is the
intention of the filmmakers.
"The past almost sixty years have brought war and
hate, big armies, nuclear weapons and mass
poverty. The past can be no guide to show us the
way to the future," says Mian. "It's time to make
a break with the old ways and the old dreams. We
need to search for new ideas, and find the
courage to take a step forward."
This can happen if a genuine, open-minded
dialogue is initiated, possibly catalysed by this
film through screenings at joint meetings of
parliamentarians, foreign offices and military
establishments. Most importantly it needs to be
brought out of private halls, and onto television
in both countries as well as in Kashmir.
The writer is a staff member
_____
[3]
The Deccan Herald
June 28, 2004
DIALOGUE ON KASHMIR IN UK
Religion, ethnicity and goodwill
There was a healthy respect for religious,
cultural and ethnic diversity at two conferences
on Kashmir held in the UK
By Balraj Puri
Two parallel international conferences on the
Kashmir issue held in London and Birmingham
recently by the organisations based in Britain
provided an opportunity to know their latest
thinking on the subject as also of those who
attended them from both sides of the LoC. The
London conference was organised by the
International Kashmir Alliance and attended by
the Pakistan People's Party leader Benazir Bhutto
and the Muslim League leader
and former minister Shafqat Mehmood from
Pakistan, Justice Abdul Majid Malik, former chief
justice of Azad Kashmir High Court from the
Pak-held part of the state, Mirza Wajahat Hasan
from Gilgit and Baltistan, a large contingent
from Kashmir Valley which included National
Conference delegation led by Farooq Abdullah and
representatives of the PDP, a group from Jammu
which included official spokesperson of the BJP,
four members of the Panthers Party and one each
from Leh and Kargil districts of Ladakh region,
apart from expatriates from the state settled in
the UK, including a few Kashmiri Pandits and a
large number of Mirpuris from the Pak part of the
state.
The Birmingham conference held, barely a week
later on 6-7 June, had a nominal representation
from the Indian part of the state but a larger
representation from the other side and from
Kashmiris settled abroad. Whosoever sponsored
these conferences and whatever be their motives,
one could discern realisation of new realities in
the state amidst the usual rhetoric. Firstly, the
fact that it is a plural, multi-ethnic,
multi-regional and multi-religious state. At
least five regions were clearly identified by
most of the speakers, namely Kashmir valley,
Jammu, Ladakh, "Azad Kashmir" and Gilgit
Baltistan. The demand of each region for
recognition of its identity received sympathetic
attention. In particular the plight of Gilgit -
Baltistan, which had lost its identity and was
renamed as Northern Area was highlighted by
Wajahat Hasan. The region where the state subject
law has been repealed and which has no
representation in the National Assembly of
Pakistan; nor any democratic institution at local
level was, according to Hasan, worse off than it
was during the Maharaja's time.
Need for internal dialogue
The conference stressed the need for internal
dialogue between people on either side of the LoC
and belonging to various regional and ethnic
identities to evolve a consensus on the future of
the state. The idea was also mooted that before a
discussion on the future of the state, the future
of each region within the state should also be
discussed. A plea was made for a democratic
federal and decentralised set-up to reconcile
divergent aspirations of different regions and
communities and help in evolving a harmonious
nature of the state which alone could aspire for
a stable and satisfactory status. Otherwise a
decision of the majority of various groups with
conflicting urges and interests could not be
called valid. For majoritarianism is a negation
of democracy. The final declaration at the
Birmingham Conference, too, assured protection to
all ethnic, regional and religious communities of
the state.
Secondly, the impact of 9/11 was widely
recognised. The British MP from a constituency of
predominantly Pakistani expatriates in the UK,
Khalid Mehmood, urged the audience at Birmingham
to realise that the world opinion no longer
sympathises with the use of violence by the
freedom movements.
He therefore advised the supporters of the
Kashmir movement to highlight human rights
violations by the Indian security forces to
regain world sympathy. Many participants in that
conference quoted figures from eighty thousand to
one lakh Kashmiris who were allegedly massacred
by the Indian forces. As a person who has been
monitoring human rights violations on either
side, I could also cite a series of incidents of
mass killings by the militants of Hindus or
Sikhs. There was obviously not much awareness
about other incidents of mass killings by the
militants. But none contradicted my suggestion to
isolate the incidents of killing of unarmed and
uninvolved innocent civilians whatever be their
religious or political beliefs and raise a voice
of protest jointly against that.
At the London conference where there were more
persons who had first hand experience of the
ongoing violence, its rejection was categoric.
Even those who believed in an independent state
had come to the conclusion that the role of the
gun - and that too a borrowed one - to achieve
their objective was over.
The proposed opening of the Srinagar-Rawalpindi
road was welcomed in this context. But the
Mirpuri audience, in both the conferences, was
more enthusiastic about my proposal to also open
a road between Nowshera (on the Indian side) and
Mirpur (on the Pakistan side), a distance of 25
miles, to enable people of the same ethnic stock
on both sides of the LoC to meet each other.
Religious divisions opposed
Both the conferences opposed division of the
state on religious or ethnic grounds. In fact the
factor of religion was downplayed in the
discussion on the Kashmir problem; except for the
issue of Kashmiri Pandits, whose right to return
to their homes with full security was conceded.
However those who pleaded for a unified state did
not spell out what would be its status vis a vis
India and Pakistan. On the whole, there was a
greater emphasis on starting a process than on
final goals.
Those who claim to be better representatives of
the people and suspect the bonafides of the
sponsors of British conferences owe it to
themselves and to the people of the state to
initiate internal dialogue, at least on its
Indian side, between different regions,
communities and viewpoints. For nobody can claim
to represent all the diversities of the state.
But there is hardly any dialogue not only among
these diversities but also among the same ethnic
and religious community. Unless a culture for
dialogue and respect for dissent and diversity is
restored, there is little scope for any headway
towards a solution of the Kashmir problem.
_____
[4]
Outlook
Jul 05, 2004
Our Only Colonial Thinker
Ashis Nandy's foundational assumptions on secularism are flawed, uninformed
Sanjay Subrahmanyam
The essay by Ashis Nandy, A Billion Gandhis (June
21), demonstrates once more that this celebrated
Indian psychologist and maverick thinker is
exactly as dazzlingly clever as he is tiresomely
repetitive and profoundly ill-informed. And he is
as innocent of the facts about India and her past
as he is of Europe and hers. Armed with this
blissful innocence, he can then brilliantly
develop paradox after paradox. The fact that none
of them has any basis in reality has rarely fazed
him. So let us begin with his view of the history
of concepts.
Nandy claims that "the concept of secularism
emerged in a Europe torn by inter-religious
strife, warfare and pogroms". When and where did
this happen? In the France of Charles IX and
Henri IV? During the Thirty Years' War? Can he
give us some specific periods and societies? No.
Because Nandy's Europe does not exist except in
his own imagination. It is a non-place that only
exists to be an 'anti-India' and he believes
he can attribute anything he wants to it just because it tickles his fancy.
In point of fact, the term 'secularism' has very
little purchase in most European or indeed other
western societies as a part of normal political
vocabulary. Even today, no one in the political
sphere much talks about 'secularism' in the
United Kingdom, Germany, Italy, France, Spain or
Portugal or in the United States, Argentina, or
Brazil. Neither Tony Blair nor Mrs Thatcher has
ever used the word in a speech that I can
remember. The only Europeans who use some sort of
term like that are the French, with their idea of
laïcité. But the French did not mean this term to
be one that mediated between religious groups.
Rather, it had to do with separating the state
from one particular religion, Catholicism, in the
French Revolution and its aftermath, leading up
to the well-known Separation Act of 1905. This is
not quite the same thing as 'secularism'.
Europeans do talk of 'secularisation', but this
simply means the turning away from religion, the
fact that churches are less and less attended and
so on.
The idea of 'secularism' propagated in
nineteenth-century Britain by George Holyoake and
then Charles Bradlaugh (who founded the National
Secular Society in 1866) was for the most part
one linked to promoting rationalism in education
rather than education through religious schools.
It is therefore a profound error to assume that 'secularism' is a
Secularism has acquired a deep meaning
and significance in India that many Europeans
simply don't understand. Thus, 'secularism' has
become almost as Indian a word as 'preponed' or
'denting' (for removing a dent in a car).
common word in political use in the West that has
simply been transferred to India as an 'imported
idea'. In reality, the term has a political
weight in India that it has never had in the
West, and it has acquired a deep meaning and
significance in India that many Europeans simply
don't understand. Thus, 'secularism' has become
almost as Indian a word as 'preponed' or
'denting' (for removing a dent in a car).
This said, one can only applaud Nandy on one
point: when he suggests that one should look to
traditions and political concepts that have long
existed in India for notions of tolerance. But
one equally wishes he practiced what he preached.
What is Nandy's own record on this matter over
the years? He has never deigned to study Indian
history. He has no idea what took place or what
people thought or wrote in India before colonial
rule. When pressed, he refers to the Ramayana and
the Mahabharata as if this were the sum total of
India's past. His own knowledge of colonial
history is essentially limited to the British
themselves and Bengali authors living under
colonial rule. What sort of intellectual
resources are these, if not those of "the
dominant, colonial culture of India's knowledge
industry"? Not only has Nandy never read a single
work from the fifteenth or sixteenth century, he
does not even read those who write about these
texts.
Truly, to be a 'great thinker', one must first be
a great innocent, one who can blithely claim-as
Nandy does-that India never had historians before
colonial rule. Apparently Abu'l Fazl came from
Mars.
Nandy appears at his worst when he wishes
pompously to hand out lessons. He wants others to
learn from "the concept of convivencia that
apparently existed in medieval Islamic Spain. Did
anybody in Islamic Spain ever use this "concept"?
So far as I know-and I have studied the history
of Spain in that period unlike him-no one did.
This idea was imposed on the Spain of that period
by romantic modern historians, and it is no more
indigenous to it than 'secularism' is to Mughal India.
And the idea that Spain in this epoch was "the
only truly plural polity Europe has produced in
the last one thousand years" is simply another
example of what passes for scholarship in some
circles. It is just another case of the Golden
Age syndrome.
So perhaps Nandy should begin by reflecting on
the rather widespread of forms of "obscene
arrogance", and not hand out lessons before doing
his homework. If he does so, I am sure he will
find plenty of examples of tolerance not just in
the villages that his rather tired populist
rhetoric wants to hold up as an example, but in
other parts of Indian society in both the past
and present. But it may involve harder work than
producing the cotton candy that passes for
cleverness in 'indigenist' circles.
And it may also involve the sad admission that in
his romantic adulation of India's Hindu past, his
desire to preserve indigenous 'purity', his
mythification of an ahistorical Europe, and his
links to the lachrymose tradition of the romantic
underside of the so-called Bengal Renaissance,
Ashis Nandy is today our only true colonial
thinker-now that Nirad Chaudhuri has passed on.
He may be a colonial romantic, but that does not
make him any less colonial in his mentality.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Sanjay Subrahmanyam is Professor of Indian
History and Culture at Oxford University, and
author of Mughals and Franks and From the Tagus
to Ganges, both to appear with OUP in 2004
_____
[5]
Date: Sun, 27 Jun 2004 01:14:31 GMT
Dear Mr. Kapoor.
Two pieces on "Dev" follow, one that I had
written prior to Farah Naqvi's piece, and one
that I wrote after reading her piece. Please
include them in South Asia Citizens' Wire. Thank
you.
Umair Ahmed Muhajir
1.
In recent years, the films produced by the Bombay industry have become
synonymous to many with dewy love stories/NRI fantasies, with all the depth and
grace of a Hallmark greeting card; combined with the (welcome) decline of what
used to pass as parallel cinema in the Hindi film
industry (welcome because much
parallel cinema simply confused realism and angst with high art, and ended up
boring everyone in the audience), this has meant
that for those not in school or
those not simply desirous of remembering the motherland as if through a cartoon
prism, there has been precious little to cheer about where Hindi cinema is
concerned, the exceptions that prove the rule notwithstanding.
None can accuse Govind Nihalani's "Dev," of either the sort of addled
lovesickness or pointless bellowing that has
plagued Hindi cinema in years past.
In constructing a tale of two senior police officers set against a backdrop of
communal violence (a tale that should have become stale by now; that it has not
is sad testimony to our propensity to slaughter each other), Nihalani is
scrupulous, grief-stricken, and quite clever. But that is not all; he has that
rarest of qualities in a film that bills itself as a "commercial"
film: unexpectedness.
What makes "Dev" unexpected is its refusal to succumb to the easy
secularism/liberalism of "Hindu-Muslim bhai bhai" ("Hindus and
Muslims are brothers"), or of the notion that "the people are
basically good, no matter of what community." I stress that these are not
mean or contemptible notions by any means (indeed I would argue that the notion
of the fraternity of Indians, of whatever religious affiliation, and even of
none, is the very essence of citizenship), merely
that these are rather banal or
unremarkable ones (to the extent they would be particularly welcome, it speaks
volumes on the pass we have come to).
"Dev" gives us something far more rich and strange than Dev
(played by Amitabh Bachchan) the Nehruvian secularist versus Tejinder Khosla
the hard-core adherent of Hindutva (Om Puri); "Dev" offers a
meditation on ethical obligation and responsibility, from within the Hindu
tradition. Bachchan's character is no card-carrying secularist: at the film's
outset, he is quite aggrieved by what he sees as the politics of
"minorityism," and his demeanor when meeting with certain Muslim
clerics, combined with a stray remark during the interrogation of a Muslim
suspect, and his lack of vehement protest at the
extreme views articulated by Om
Puri's Khosla (a close friend) all confirm the
impression. Indeed his strongest
disagreement with Khosla in the first half of the film is with the drastic
nature of Khosla's methods, Om Puri's grizzled senior police officer being of
the
"get rid of them all" persuasion. Nihalani appears to have cast his
lot in with the Khoslas of the world in the first half of the film, replete as
it is with anti-national politicians, a bitter Farhan Ali (played with
unsurprising ineptitude by Fardeen Khan) determined to assassinate DCP Dev to
avenge the death of his father, and even a Muslim
Gandhian who we learn has been
tormented for decades by his murder (during the 1969 Ahmedabad violence) of an
unarmed Hindu, and by the fact that his life is ultimately saved by yet other
Hindus. In short, Nihalani constructs the first half of the film so as to air
just about every stereotype about Muslim Indians currently prevalent-- yet all
this is, in a sense, sleight of hand: Nihalani attempts to seduce the viewer,
all the better to startle him/her.
The second half of the film is occupied by depictions of communal violence,
led by prominent members of the state's ruling party, and by Dev's inability to
prevent some of the worst outrages. By way of background, Dev reports to
Khosla, who has been especially appointed by the ruling party, and part of his
job description apparently includes ensuring that the "people's
sentiments" are respected when Muslims are massacred after a bomb explosion
at a temple of Ganesh, although the massacres are
committed by the cadres of the
ruling party. Dev's report on the burning of a basti (reminiscent of Naroda
Patiya) threatens to embarrass the government, and he is slain by his friend
Khosla as he is ascending the steps of the courthouse to hand his report in.
Khosla himself ultimately commits suicide, haunted by his betrayal of his
one-time friend.
What is one to make of this film, specifically of the juxtaposition of its
two halves? One way of reading the film would be to interpret its first half as
presenting "the Muslim" as a "problem," or perhaps more
accuartely, as "problematic." For Khosla, this definitional issue
settles the entire debate: he sees a problem to
be solved, indeed a problem with
only one solution. The film's second half,
however, jolts the viewer out of any
uncritical acceptance of Khosla's views, and does so by illustrating the
enormous gap between the "problem" and Khosla's proffered solution.
To put it another way, whereas for Khosla there is no ethical issue to be
considered once he has settled the definitional one in his mind, for Dev it is
precisely the opposite. From the first half of the film he does not appear to
be the standard left-liberal secularist, and it would be a mistake to read the
second as inverting this; for Dev it is simply the case that the definitional
issue does not settle the ethical question. Indeed, for the film as for its
lead protagonist, it is only when the definitional issue is deemed settled that
the ethical conundrum begins.
Thus the central question "Dev" grapples with is not who "the
other" is or how this "other" is to be defined, categorized,
characterized, not, that is, a metaphysical
question, but an ethical one: how is
one to be with respect to one who has been marked out as "other"?
What is one's obligation and responsibility in
such a situation? Through all of
this, the Gita casts a long shadow over "Dev" (indeed the film begins
with a sloka from the Gita), and more
particularly with a certain interpretation
of the famous Krishna-Arjun dialogue at the text's core. When Dev thinks of
exposing those who perpetrated or were complicit in atrocities, he begins to
write a report-- presumably he thinks (at least at that point) that submitting
such a report will make a difference. Certainly
that appears to be at one point
Furhan Ali's primary concern-- towards the end of the film he asks Dev if the
latter really feels that writing such reports will make a difference; Dev says
that it will make a difference, though he does not seem to say this with any
great conviction, almost as if he himself were in need of such consolation.
Shortly thereafter, however, all such doubt has melted away for Dev: in a scene
reminiscent of the Krishna-Arjun dialogue in the Gita, Dev explains to Furhan
that the crucial thing for a warrior is not that the letter live or die, but
that he fight; likewise, as a police officer his
dharma, his infinite obligation
in a sense, is to do his duty and serve the constitution. Dev does not serve
the constitution because he seems to have analyzed it and found it to be a good
document, but because as a police officer it is his dharma to do so. Implied
here is a gentle rebuke of Furhan in the previous scene, who seems to be
suggesting that struggling in this manner and writing such a report would only
be worthwhile if it "made a difference"; Furhan, in short, subscribes
to an instrumental logic that is quite alien to Dev's worldview in the next
scene. DCP Dev does what he does because he cannot do otherwise and yet be DCP
Dev. Furhan, I would argue, takes the lesson to heart, and the last scene of
the film shows him ascending the courthouse steps to practice as the lawyer he
had trained to be, but had never actually been,
preferring more violent modes of
being.
The dharma of Dev is not the dharma of Khosla; indeed it seems doubtful that
"dharma" is a word that would have much resonance to Khosla, for all
the latter's obsession with "Hinduness." Nihalani's barb at Hindutva
cannot be missed: for all the talk of affirming the "Hindu-ness" of
India, the political ideology Khosla subscribes to is really quite uninterested
in Hinduism or Hindu philosophy, preferring to mortgage them at the altar of
nineteenth century Western-style nationalism, dreaming of an India co-extensive
with a spirit, the spirit in turn animating the volk, in the image of dutiful
German, French, and other nationalists of eras
gone by. Dev, who is depicted as
far more devoutly Hindu than his friend, is by the end of the film a
"traitor" to "his own" according to Khosla-- a dialogue that
reveals how little Khosla has to do with Dev's Gita. "Meri Gita shakti ki
Gita hai" ("My Gita is the Gita of Strength) Khosla says at one point
early in the film; we are never told what Dev's Gita is. That it is
irremediably other than Khosla's own is revealed to him when Furhan confronts
him after Dev's death; Khosla asks Furhan to come to his apartment to collect
certain of Dev's things. Once there, Furhan accuses Khosla of having killed
Dev, and refers to the latter as his "roohani pita" ("spiritual
father"). Bewildered by this, Khosla finally sends Furhan away, telling
him that he (i.e. Khosla) has nothing of Dev's with him; when Furhan's back is
turned, Khosla shoots himself.
The logic of Nihalani's film brings one to
this pass: Khosla has done all he
has in the name of "the Hindu," yet in the course of doing his all he
feels compelled to murder the most classically Hindu of all the film's
characters, indeed one who is at different points
Arjuna and Krishna in the film
(and indeed who is even named "Dev" ("god")). I would argue
that Khosla does not realize until the instant he shoots himself that he has
horribly compromised his ultimate referent--Hindu/Hinduism--while claiming to
serve its cause, and has ended by killing Dev, thereby symbolically destroying
the referent. Once this has happened, there is no ground left for Khosla
himself to stand on, who prefers to end his life rather than make his way
through the dark realization that he has betrayed that which he claimed to
serve.
Umair A. Muhajir
2.
Ms. Naqvi's is not a fair review. It is patently false that "Dev"
depicts communal violence as between two equals: the unequal nature
of the contest is illustrated by the fact that whereas the
unscrupulous Muslim politician/gangster is ultimately taken away by
the police, Milind Gunaji's Hindutvawaadi has to be released in a few
hours, and returns home to loud cheers; more graphically, the scenes
of Muslims burning and attacking Hindu-owned shops last for barely a
minute, a fraction of the footage devoted to Sanghi hordes ravaging
a Muslim mohalla. Nor is it only a question of footage, but of the
KIND of images shown: the Muslim goons are shown ransacking shops and
assaulting people, the Sanghi goons are shown stabbing, burning,
raping, etc. To put it another way, Ms. Naqvi's problem is not
with "Dev" so much as with the Ahmedabad audience. That the latter
buys into Khosla's ideology does not make the film communal in some
ultimate sense.
Ms. Naqvi is criticizing the film for not being secular in the
liberal sense, but that is simply not Nihalani's concern; HIS focus
seems to be: "EVEN IF you dislike/fear/despise the Muslim, what
then?" It is not that Nihalani is propagating the sort of
patronising secularism that has become the hallmark of India today
(as Ms. Naqvi claims), it is that secularism is not the subject
of "Dev" at all! It speaks volumes about how much the discourse
of "secularism" (read: good) has colonized the political space that
anything that is not secular is dismissed as "bad" or even sinister.
Now, the reaction in the Ahmedabad cinema hall Ms. Naqvi is talking
about IS sinister, but that is not because the people who were
tittering were not secular, but because they appear to be viciously
bigoted, and seem to be unable to regard difference as anything other
threatening. To impose a "secularist" framework on what is patently
a meditation on what happens to Hinduism in the face of Hindutva, and
then to complain if the clothes don't fit, is hardly fair.
In the world of "Dev," there will be no Hindu dharma left if the
Khoslas of the age hold sway-- the targeting of Muslims in "Dev" is
thus not just the killing of innocents (thought it is manifestly
that), it is ALSO the losing of one's soul, a fratricide that ends in
a suicide.
[And lest I be accused of playing fast and loose with the film, I
submit that my reading is firmly grounded in the film's text.
Consider the following:
i. The film begins with a sloka from the Gita, explicitly evokes the
Gita at numerous points, and in the pivotal scene between Dev and
Furhan towards the end, Bachchan's dialogues seem to be paraphrases
of Krishna's words to Arjun.
ii. Dev is the most devout person in the film (Furhan's father
probably comes in second); Dev is regularly shown praying, Khosla not
even once. Furhan himself, who takes it upon himself to avenge his
father's death by killing Dev, is the arch-secularist, not
religiously inclined at all, his face "un-marked" by beard, etc., but
most importantly he is "secular" in his desire for retribution in the
world, the political sign of which is that he cares more for
his "qaum" than his God (whom he never mentions or involkes at any
point in the film);
iii. The most memorable instance of prayer in the film belongs to
Mangal Rao (played by Milind Gunaji), right before he embarks on his
pogrom, when he TURNS HIS BACK ON GOD after completing his prayer--]
iv. As for the point about Muslims needing "broad minded" Hindus
like Dev to make their case for them, let us accept certain facts: if
the opposition to Hindutva were coming only from the 10-12% of the
population classified as Muslim, and the 2-3% classified as
Christian, then the game would have been lost a long time ago. The
fact is that there are plenty of non-Muslims and non-Christians in
India who are also resisting Hindutva. It is also sad but true that
ABSENT Hindutva-resisting-Hindus, the anti-Hindutva struggle would
take on simply a communal hue (this helps to explain how and why,
when confronted with Hindus who are opposed to Hindutva, the Sangh
resorts to outlandish theories of how such people are really anti-
Hindu Marxists, that they are "self-loathers" or "Macaulayputras" or
what not). Indeed I submit that the day opposition to Hindutva
simply becomes a question of whether is Hindu or not, that is the day
Hindutva will have triumphed in its long-term goal: of
defining "Hindu" and "Hinduism" so that it is co-extensive
with "Hindutva" and with the ideology of the Sangh
There is yet another reason why Dev speaks "for" Muslims in a
sense, and Nihalani makes it explicit in the film, when Mangal Rao
threatens Latif (the Muslim gangster/politician) that post-violence,
if he and "his people" want to stay in "this country and this town,"
they will have to observe certain rules: (i) No-one is to complain
about ill-treatment by Hindus; (ii) No-one is to file complaints
against any Hindu who participated in the violence; (iii) No-one is
to cooperate with any policy inquiry, media person, etc. Dev "speaks
for" the Muslims in the film not because Nihalani has made a
patronizing film, but because, as we are reminded everyday from
Gujarat, the position of Muslims has become very tenuous where
Hindutva reigns supreme.
v. Ms. Naqvi ignores the very last scene of the film, when it is
Furhan Ali who is ascending the steps of the courthouse, with Dev's
report in hand. At that point no-one is speaking "for" him,
certainly not Dev. Ultimately this is an optimistic end no doubt
(the embittered Furhan Ali decides to take up the cause in a legal
way, abandoning the path of the gun), and perhaps this is unpalatably
reassuring to Ms. Naqvi. Fine, one could certainly read it that way,
but I think it is difficult to square that resolution (the Furhan
Alis of Bombay setting aside their alienation and using the
Constitution as their bulwark to speak for themselves and demand
justice) with the notion that Muslims in the film can be spoken-form
by the likes of Dev. One may critique the former for being too re-
assuring, but not for being the latter.]
Umair Ahmed Muhajir
______
[6]
Sahmat, Convention on July 5, at 10 a.m.on the
theme "India: An Economic Agenda for 2004"
Subject: Sahmat, Convention on July 5, at 10
a.m.on the theme "India: An Economic Agenda for
2004".
Social Scientist
35A/1,Shahpur Jat
Near Asiad Village ,New Delhi-110049
SAHMAT 8, Vithalbhai Patel House, Rafi Marg,New Delhi-110001
e-mail-sahmat@ vsnl.com
24.6.2004
Dear friend,
The vote against the NDA government in the recent
elections was also a rejection of the neo-liberal
economic policies which have been in vogue for
the last thirteen years and which the NDA in
particular was pursuing relentlessly. The
peoples verdict against neo-liberalism was
scarcely surprising: the pursuit of these
policies has led to a severe deflation of the
economy, reducing the purchasing power in the
hands of the rural population in particular; it
has reduced per capita foodgrain absorption to
levels prevailing at the beginning of the second
world war; it has played havoc with the agrarian
economy with extreme tangible consequences by way
of mass suicides by farmers; it has aggravated
greatly the problem of unemployment in both rural
and urban India; and it has not only accentuated
income inequalities but also handed over public
assets to favoured private individuals at
throwaway prices.
The peoples preference for an alternative
trajectory of development has found recognition
in the Common Minimum Programme adopted by the
UPA and supported by the Left. The basic feature
of this Programme is an acceptance of the
proposition that improving the living condition
of the people is the responsibility of the State
which has to start discharging it with immediate
effect. If the State enfeebles itself by pursuing
neo-liberal policies, then its culpability does
not in any way get reduced. The Programme
promises increased bank credit for rural areas,
and an Employment Guarantee Scheme which is part
of an alternative trajectory of development
giving pride of place to agriculture.
If this Programme is to be translated into some
real achievements for the people, then it is
necessary to keep asserting its relevance against
the predictable attacks on it by financial
interests, by the other beneficiaries of the NDA
dispensation, and by the votaries of
neo-liberalism, especially those owing allegiance
to the Fund-Bank ideology. It is also necessary
to make concrete suggestions for the realization
of the objectives of the Programme.
To this end the journal Social Scientist, in
collaboration with Sahmat, is organizing a
one-day Convention on July 5, starting at 10
a.m., at the Speaker's Hall, Constitution Club,
New Delhi, on the theme "India: An Economic
Agenda for 2004". The provisional list of
speakers at the Convention includes Ashok Mitra,
Amiya Bagchi, Utsa Patnaik, Madhura Swaminathan,
Jayati Ghosh, C.P.Chandrasekhar, Ashok Rao,
Sukhdeo Thorat and others. We shall be very
grateful if you could attend the Convention and
enrich it with your presence and participation.
With warm regards,
Yours sincerely,
Prabhat Patnaik Rajen Prasad
______
[7]
The Centre for Northeast India,
South and Southeast Asia Studies
[CENISEAS] OKD Institute,
39 Sapta Sahid Path, Guwahati 781006,
Assam,
India
http://www.ceniseas.org
Transnational Subregional Cooperation and Northeast India
A Conference organized by CENISEAS in cooperation
with the Institute of Chinese Studies, Centre
for the Study of Developing Societies, Delhi
Guwahati, Assam, September 10th and 11th 2004
Northeast India has been described
metaphorically as one of South Asia's three most
landlocked "states" along with Bhutan and Nepal.
Recent efforts at promoting transnational
subregional cooperation might be able to remove
some of the inefficiencies in trade and other
disadvantages faced by the region. Two sets of
subregional cooperation projects are relevant:
1. Those involving India and the South Asian
countries of Nepal, Bhutan and Bangladesh. Among
these projects are the South Asia Growth
Quadrangle [SADQ] supported by SAARC and the
South Asia Subregional Economic Cooperation
program (SASEC) supported by the Asian
Development Bank.
2. Those that promote cooperation between South
Asian countries and countries across Northeast
India's eastern and northern borders. Among them
are the Mekong-Ganga Sub-region, the Bangladesh,
India, Myanmar, Sri Lanka, Thailand Economic
Cooperation [BIMST-EC] and the
Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar Regional Economic
Forum [BCIM Forum].
Emerging informal trade links as well as the
pattern of population movements point towards an
embryonic new transnational region in the making.
The people of Northeast India have significant
stakes in the transnational subregional projects.
With the interests of Northeast India as its
primary concern, the conference will examine the
opportunities and risks presented by this
reconfiguration of economic space. Those
interested in making a presentation - a paper, a
power-point presentation or some sort of
creative/artistic intervention - may contact
Sanjib Baruah at baruah at ceniseas.org
______
[7]
PRESS RELEASE
DATE: 27 JUNE 2004
· A serious deficiency of almost all public
opinion polls regarding capital punishment is
that they generally ask too simple a question:
whether the subject is in favour of the death
penalty or not. They rarely offer any real
alternatives to execution in their polling
questionnaires. · Actually the real deterrence
is a function not only of a punishment's
severity, but also of its certainty and
frequency. Which in turn is a function of
conviction rates and expeditious judicial
processes. · We must not allow ourselves to be
caught up in the spiral of violence. Violence
begets violence. Capital Punishment is really no
answer.
The word "capital" in "capital punishment" refers
to a person's head. In the past, people were
often executed by severing their head from their
body.
To speak out against capital punishment in
today's emotionally charged environment is to
invite misunderstanding. A quick succession of
horribly violent crimes has rendered us numb,
frustrated and angry. To call for capital
punishment in such a climate is understandable.
But we need serious thoughtful discussion in the
society.
Let us clarify that those of us who oppose
capital punishment are not soft on heinous crimes
like rape, murder, terrorism, etc.. However,
capital punishment is not the only way for a
society to be protected from such heinous crimes.
How should we deal with the rape and violence or
murder in our society? First, we should recognize
that it is wrong in itself. It is not wrong
because it is discovered or proved. How can we as
a society effectively address the epidemic of
sexual crimes and of domestic violence? The
answers to these and similar questions are not to
be found in developing a list of capital offenses.
We must not allow ourselves to be caught up in
the spiral of violence. Violence begets violence.
Capital punishment is really no answer.
A serious deficiency of almost all public opinion
polls is that they generally ask too simple a
question: whether the subject is in favour of the
death penalty or not. They rarely offer any real
alternatives to execution in their polling
questionnaires. Public support for capital
punishment declines greatly when alternatives to
the death penalty are considered. From the
utilitarian perspective, capital punishment is
justified as it (1) prevents the criminal from
repeating his crime; and/or (2) deters crime by
discouraging would-be offenders. For, both of
these contribute to a greater balance of
happiness in society. There are several immediate
problems with this line of reasoning. The
retributive notion of punishment in general is
that (a) as a foundational matter of justice,
criminals deserve punishment, and (b) punishment
should be equal to the harm done.
The first argument that we shall contend with is
that capital punishment does not deter crime. We
strongly feel that capital punishment is not
necessary to deter, and long term imprisonment is
a more powerful deterrent since execution is
transient. We think that making the prisoner
suffer by rotting in jail for the rest of his/her
life is more torturous then the capital
punishment. Actually the real deterrence is a
function not only of a punishment's severity, but
also of its certainty and frequency. This is very
important for us to note particularly in case of
sexual crimes like rape. It is a proved fact that
in case of rape the rate of conviction goes down
as punishment increases. As such very few cases
of sexual crime come to light due to social
stigma attached to the victim instead of
perpetrator. In cases which can reach up to court
it is very difficult to prove it. If the
punishment is more sever than the expectation to
prove it beyond doubt is much stronger which
leads to acquittal in most cases. Thus capital
punishment for rape is mostly used by politicians
to show their pro-women stand to raise emotions
but in reality it remain slogan-mongering and
does not result in actual punishment to the
rapist. We strongly feel that the capital
punishment should be abolished since it is
undignified, inhumane. The capital punishment is
a barbaric remnant of an uncivilized society. It
is immoral in principle, and unfair and
discriminatory in practice. The death penalty is
irrevocable. In case of a mistake, the executed
prisoner cannot be given another chance. Justice
can miscarry.
However strongly you may support capital
punishment two wrongs do not make one right.
There may be a brutalising effect upon society by
carrying out executions. If we are however
really serious in our desire to reduce crime
through harsher punishments alone, we must be
prepared to punish every criminal who commits a
capital crime.
Trupti Shah
Rohit Prajapati
S. Srinivasan
Renu Khanna
Nandini Manjrekar
Deeptha Achar
Human Rights Activists of Gujarat
_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/
Buzz on the perils of fundamentalist politics, on
matters of peace and democratisation in South
Asia. SACW is an independent & non-profit
citizens wire service run since 1998 by South
Asia Citizens Web: www.sacw.net/
The complete SACW archive is available at:
bridget.jatol.com/pipermail/sacw_insaf.net/
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archive for SACW: snipurl.com/sacip
See also associated site: www.s-asians-against-nukes.org
DISCLAIMER: Opinions expressed in materials carried in the posts do not
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