SACW | 23 Dec. 2003

Harsh Kapoor aiindex at mnet.fr
Mon Dec 22 17:53:56 CST 2003


South Asia Citizens Wire  |  23 December,  2003
via:  www.sacw.net

[1] Pakistan: NWFP Government bans display of mannequins in shops
[2] India: Invitation to the Release of the Final 
Report of the International Initiative for 
Justice in Gujarat (24 Dec., New Delhi)
[3] On two sides of the jihad partition - People 
speak out against the culture of extremism but 
palace does not listen (Bharat Bhushan)
[4] The colour of our passports (Tabish Khair)
[5] India: Social Engineering to the Fore - BJP 
Sweeps the Assembly Elections (Ram Puniyani)
[6] Three Book reviews: Sri Lanka / Dance /  Pakistan
[7] Erotic Buddha book raises [fascist's] ire in India (Sudeshna Sarkar)


--------------

[1]

The News International (Pakistan)

NWFP Government bans display of mannequins in shops
(Updated at 1250 PST)
PESHAWAR: NWFP government bans the display of 
dummies kept for the exhibition of cloths and 
jewellery. The government has ordered shopkeepers 
and traders in urban areas to remove the 
mannequins from their stores being used for 
exhibition of the ladies garments and ornaments 
saying that these mannequins are like idols, 
which are prohibited in religion.

The provincial police has confirmed the news that 
the orders were issued by the Chief Minister of 
NWFP Akram Khan Durrani.

_____

[2]

Invitation to the Release of the Final Report of 
the International Initiative for Justice in 
Gujarat (IIJG)

THREATENED EXISTENCE - A Feminist Analysis Of The Genocide In Gujarat

Wednesday, 24 December, 2003. 3.30 pm. Indian 
Women's Press Corps, 5 Windsor Place, Near Hotel 
Meridien, New Delhi.

The IIJG came into being to develop a feminist 
critique of justice and democratic governance in 
the context of the genocide of Muslims in Gujarat 
last year. The final report of the Initiative, 
Threatened Existence will be released in New 
Delhi by an eminent panel comprising :

1.	Leila Seth, first woman judge of the 
Delhi High Court, and the first woman Chief 
Justice of a state High Court (Himachal Pradesh) 
- who will speak on the urgent need for the equal 
and just application of the rule of law on all 
citizens of the country.
2.	Shabana Azmi, well known actor and former 
MP, who will speak on increased communalism in 
our times.
3.	Urvashi Butalia, feminist activist and 
publisher, who will focus on the specific impact 
of increased communalism on women.

The gathering will also be addressed by two 
panellists of the IIJG, Farah Naqvi and Uma 
Chakravarti.

Threatened Existence is a comprehensive document 
based on hundreds of testimonies, eyewitness 
accounts and other relevant information. It makes 
the following major points:

? Twenty two months after the massacres of 
February/March 2002, the violence continues 'in 
different and frightening forms with long-term 
consequences on the lives of all members of the 
Muslim community particularly womenŠ'

? Sexual violence is central to the Hindutva 
project in Gujarat, and the use of rape and 
sexual assault, occurred with the knowledge of 
highly placed State actors.

? The ongoing persecution of the Muslim community 
constitutes Crimes against Humanity under 
International Law.

PLEASE DO JOIN US FOR THE RELEASE EVENT.

For as the report states in the conclusion, "This 
report can operate as a reflection on the 
inadequacy of existing processes - both legal and 
otherwise - to provide justice and redress to 
victimsŠ we need to understand the genocidal 
nature of the Hindutva project so as to emphasize 
the critical responsibility of intervention that 
lies with both, civil society and the State."

The panelists of the IIJG were feminist jurists, 
activists, lawyers, writers and academics from 
all over the world: Anissa Helie 
(Algeria/France), Gabriela Mischkowski (Germany), 
Nira Yuval-Davis (UK), Rhonda Copelon (USA), 
Sunila Abeysekara (Sri Lanka), Farah Naqvi 
(India), Meera Velayudan (India), Uma Chakravarti 
(India) and Vahida Nainar (India).

The International Initiative for Justice in 
Gujarat and was set up by: Citizen's Initiative 
(Ahmedabad), People's Union for Civil Liberties 
(PUCL)-Shanti Abhiyan (Baroda), Communalism 
Combat, Aawaaz-e-Niswaan, Forum Against 
Oppression of Women (FAOW) and Stree Sangam 
(Bombay), Saheli, Jagori, Sama, and Nirantar 
(Delhi), and Organised Lesbian Alliance for 
Visibility and Action (OLAVA, Pune).


_____

[3]


The Telegraph
December 22, 2003

On two sides of the jihad partition
- People speak out against the culture of extremism but palace does not listen
BHARAT BHUSHAN
Karachi, Dec. 21: The "jihad project", a number 
of Pakistanis believe, is over. But they also 
think that their establishment does not seem to 
have fully realised this fact.

The so-called jihadis have little support among 
the Pakistani masses. They are also realising 
that after 9/11, jihad is a word that shuts doors 
internationally.

Within Pakistan, the internal impact of the 
jihadi culture on society has been so great that 
youngsters are speaking out against it.

Amra Ali, a young art critic, said: "We were used 
by the Americans who first projected these 
jihadis as freedom fighters and branded them 
terrorists after 9/11. These terrorists that were 
created have had an impact on our society - 
today, there is a gun in front of every house. A 
Kalashnikov culture has taken birth in our 
society. Even our mosques need to be protected 
from the extremists."

A youngster who did not want to be identified 
felt that the Kashmir policy of the government 
has encouraged sectarianism within Pakistan. "A 
lot of people they train and send to Kashmir have 
a sectarian domestic agenda. When they return 
from Kashmir, they follow a sectarian agenda here 
and for a long time the state has turned a blind 
eye to them," he said.

Naveed Akhtar, a 27-year-old, went to the extent 
of saying: "I don't think states should be based 
on religion. Earlier, Hindus and Muslims used to 
fight. Now, in our country, Muslims are killing 
each other. Up to the time of Partition, the 
difference between the Shias and the Sunnis, the 
Barelvis and the Deobandis did not warrant their 
killing each other. So where has this 
sectarianism come from? Who is giving these 
maulvis money to create strife in our society?"

"The jihadis remain a force. But they cannot be a 
real threat without some support from the 
establishment," Ghazi Salauddin, a senior 
journalist, said.

Iqbal Haider, a former senator and human rights 
lawyer, felt the jihadi forces had damaged 
Pakistan. "They have grievously hurt Pakistan's 
international image, economy and society. What is 
the achievement of their so-called jihad? Our 
society has been brutalised by them," he said.

General Pervez Musharraf himself has been a 
target of these groups and after the latest 
assassination attempt against him, he has 
admitted to several other such bids in the past.

Yet there are those in Pakistan who believe there 
is reluctance in sections of the establishment to 
let go of the jihadis. "The pattern of this 
regime's policy since 9/11 is to do under 
pressure the minimum necessary to keep Washington 
sweet. They have not realised that the jihad 
project is passé," Rashed Rahman, former editor 
of The Frontier Post, said.

This view is supported by the fact that even by 
its own admission, out of the 500 people that 
Islamabad has handed over to the US, 490 are al 
Qaida members and only 10 are Taliban. There are 
periodic bans on the jihadi groups but they 
resurface in a different garb.

"Two years ago, a ban was imposed on internal 
jihadi groups. But the regime chose to look the 
other way while these groups continued to 
function. Once again, two years down the road, 
pressure is mounting on Pakistan. So there is a 
fresh wave of bans, freezing of assets, etc. What 
is interesting about this new campaign is that 
except for the Shia leader, Allma Sajid Naqvi, 
accused of the murder of Azam Tariq, the leader 
of a virulently anti-Shia group called the 
Sipah-e-Sahaba, no other leader or member of a 
banned group has been arrested," Rahman pointed 
out.

He said: "It is a policy of 'preservation' rather 
than elimination that the Pakistani establishment 
is following." Rahman argued that a three-way 
nexus had developed between "the domestic 
jihadis, the Afghan jihadis and the Kashmir 
jihadis - retaining one means retaining the 
others and abandoning one means abandoning the 
others".

Those supporting the jihadis "had merely put 
their head down in Afghanistan when the Americans 
had blood in their eye and waited for the storm 
to pass. Then they quietly put together a fresh 
triangular alliance between the Taliban, al Qaida 
and Gulbuddin Hekmatyar who was resurrected from 
exile in Iran. That forms the backbone of the 
resistance in Afghanistan today", he added.

"The nexus between the different kinds of jihadis 
is now causing rancour with the Americans. In 
Afghanistan, they are at the receiving end of it. 
And vis-à-vis India, it does not fit in with 
their grand design for the region of promoting 
trade, investment and possibly hoping that India 
would act as a counterweight to the new emerging 
power of China."

Rahman felt that regardless of Musharraf's 
secular credentials, "because of international, 
regional and domestic pressures, the regime will 
find it increasingly difficult to revive and 
continue with its past policies towards the 
jihadis".


_____

[4]


The Hindu
December 21, 2003

The colour of our passports

Stopped from boarding a flight to London, recently, TABISH KHAIR
reflects on how the new rule for transit visas had nothing to do with
terrorism but everything to do with the terror of people with the
wrong colour of passport.

I SPENT most of November 4, 2003, at Kastrup, the shiny, efficient
international airport of Copenhagen, trying to board a flight to an
academic conference. I had a valid ticket, a valid (Indian) passport,
a valid (Danish) permanent visa and the usual letters from my
employers in Denmark and the conference organisers in Munich. I
had taken the cheapest route — as is expected of scholars flying to
academic conferences — via Heathrow, London. I had been to
England many times for readings and lectures and I had also
caught connecting flights from British airports in the past.

But this time I was not allowed on board the flight. Someone had
changed the rules in London a few days ago. Now, I was politely
and sympathetically informed at Kastrup, people with certain kinds
of passports need to have a transit visa even in order to catch a
connecting flight from the same airport in England. In the past,
transit visas were required only if you had to leave the airport. Not
so, any longer. The colour of my passport was wrong.

Finally giving up my plan of going to Munich, I returned to my
university in Aarhus and was asked, by concerned colleagues and
friends, the question that I had expected. Why don't you apply for a
Danish passport? After all, you became eligible for one about four
years ago.

It is a difficult question to answer. There is much I am proud of in
India, and there is much I am ashamed of. So, I am not a
nationalist in the sense in which parties like the Shiv Sena define
the nation. Being born a Muslim, I have grown up on the margins of
that nation; I have grown up having my identity, my past, my
languages questioned and subtly discredited in such "nationalist"
circles.

And yet, I have no desire to opt for a Danish (or any other)
citizenship. Yes, it would make my life in Europe easier (and
cheaper): I have given up on some conference invitations simply
because they came too late or I did not feel like penetrating, with
my wrong-coloured passport, the fortifications of the U.S. embassy
in Copenhagen to apply for a visa.

But is convenience and cash enough of a justification? Or aren't
they the very core of that heart of whiteness, as Arundhati Roy puts
it, that we often get to know as global capitalism? Aren't the evils of
capitalism finally reducible to two formulations: that financial profit
(cash) is the final end of human existence and that we can
conveniently murder, manipulate or ignore those who are different
and less privileged?

If I hang on to my Indian passport, I hang on to my memories. But
these memories are not of the sort that one hears canted in
popular ghazals about paper ships and the shade of trees in the
ancestral village. My memories are of difference, of alternatives.
Not necessarily their celebration, but their existence. And strangely,
every time I travel with my Indian passport, I am reminded of what I
share with people travelling on Nepali, Algerian, Nigerian, yes, even
Pakistani passports. Out in the world, the colour of all our
passports is the same. Our difference is the same.

No number of nuclear devices being tested by India and Pakistan
can change this defining "global" reality. The nuclear bombs we
explode are little more than firecrackers in the hands of children.
No, I am not under-estimating the damage they can do. I agree
with Roy that nuclear bombs are "man's challenge to god". I agree
with Amitav Ghosh that it is preposterous to justify their use. But
finally, it is more than likely that our nuclear bombs will go off, like
firecrackers do, in our own hands.

Perhaps because while we have the ambition and the hatred to
develop these devices, we do not have the cash to keep them at
the highest levels of maintenance. There are too many pressures
on the means available to our states. Some one will cut edges
some day and then what will be blown off will be Pakistani or Indian
hands.

And the world — the heart of whiteness that claims to be first in the
world — will remain largely unaffected. At the most, it will turn to us
and repeat a colonial prejudice: what else can you expect of
children and barbarians, it will ask. At best, it will give us pity and
dubious aid; at worst, it will shower us with scorn and dubious
legislation. The bomb has not and will not redefine our relationship
to this world of whiteness. It will not make a change where it
matters: our relationship to this world. But it might help us to forget
further the relationship that we share with another world, the so-
called Third World.

So, I hang on to my passport for I do not want to forget both these
relationships. My passport reminds me how marginal I am in the
global heart of whiteness, and how childish and superfluous are the
squabbles of our (Third World) governments. My passport reminds
me of what I share with Nepalis, Algerians, Nigerians, yes, even
Pakistanis. My passport reminds me that bin Laden and his ilk are
little more than excuses. The new rule for transit visas has little to
do with terrorism and everything to do with terror of people with the
wrong colour of passport. Europe and the U.S. — and their
satellites like Australia — have long been frightened of those who
have little cash and cannot be conveniently ignored. This fear goes
back a long way: it did not grow out of the foolhardy act of a handful
of young men flying planes into buildings in New York and
Washington. That tragic event simply provided the excuse to take
legislative and other action that many have wanted to take for
decades in the "West".

And so, I hang on to my passport. For I was born in India. If I were
to relinquish my passport, I would do so in favour of a country that I
found superior to India. But while there is much to be admired in
places like Denmark and England, there is also much to be
ashamed of. The heart of whiteness is lit with lamps of blood.

And today the heart of whiteness is closing its arteries. It is doing to
people with the wrong colour (of passport?) what it tried to do to its
own poor in the 18th and 19th Centuries. Even the discourse
sounds familiar: undeserving poor, accountability, violence,
criminality, free market, etc, we have heard all this before. But this
time the struggle will be longer and more bitter as the poor cannot
be deported and settled in "newly-discovered" continents, where
they can get rich by their own sweat or the blood of the aborigines
and slaves. Today the poor of the world can only be attracted like
moths to the rich heart of whiteness. And hence the arteries of
Europe and U.S. are being closed with new rules and regulations.

Medically, of course, we know that the choking of arteries to the
heart leads to a heart attack.

The writer is an Indian scholar based in Denmark.

_____


[5]


Social Engineering to the Fore
BJP Sweeps the Assembly Elections
by Ram Puniyani
(December 22, 2003)

available at:
www.sacw.net/DC/CommunalismCollection/ArticlesArchive/ram22dec2003.html

_____


[6]        THREE BOOK REVIEWS: Sri Lanka /  Dance / Pakistan


Daily News
22 December 2003

Book Review - Collection on the war and economy in Sri Lanka

Working Paper 1 - An Introduction to the Conflict 
Time Economy of the North & East Province of Sri 
Lanka.

Working Paper 2 - What Impedes Economic Revival 
in the North & East Province of Sri Lanka?

Working Paper 3 - Economic Imperative for Peace in Sri Lanka

by Muttukrishna Sarvananthan

Published by the International Centre for Ethnic 
Studies, Colombo, Sri Lanka, 2003.

Reviewed by N. Balakrishnan

Former Dean - Faculty of Arts, University of Jaffna

The signing of the Memorandum of Understanding 
(MoU) between Government of Sri Lanka (GOSL) and 
the Liberation Tigers of tamil Eelam (LTTE) in 
Feb 2002 raised the hopes and expectations of the 
people, yearning for peace and stability in the 
country. This has also renewed interest, 
notwithstanding the still prevailing 
uncertainties in the peace process, on economic 
regeneration of the North East economy and 
long-term economic transformation of the conflict 
affected areas.

The prolonged and fierce conflict in Northern and 
Eastern provinces brought devastation to the 
region through displacement of a large number of 
families, considerable destruction or damage to 
basic infrastructure services, loss and/or 
destruction of productive assets and property, 
severe disruption of the region's major economic 
activities in agriculture, livestock fisheries, 
small industry and services and thereby people's 
basic livelihoods. Given the scale of devastation 
that took place, even with peace restored, it 
will take several years for the North East 
economy to be substantially reactivated and 
transformed and to 'catch-up' with the rest of 
the country.

What factors can contribute to the speedy revival 
of war-affected areas? What are the main 
constraints that militate against rapid economic 
regeneration? What role should the Government and 
the private sector play in this process? What 
should be the appropriate role for the LTTE in 
mobilizing and competent management of resources? 
These and other related questions about the 
myriad aspects of the conflict-affected areas are 
addressed in a recent commendable study by a 
young and competent economist Dr. Muttukrishna 
Sarvananthan. He has had his professional 
training in the Universities of Delhi, Salford, 
Bristol and Swansea, Wales - where he earned his 
Doctorate in Development Economics.

Working Paper 1 gives a detailed descriptive 
analysis of the depressed state of the major 
production sectors, backed up by sufficient 
district-wise statistical information mainly for 
the 1990s and highlights:

(i) The substantial drop in agricultural 
production including fisheries in absolute terms 
as well as in relation to national production;

(ii) Decreasing share of the North-East 
provincial economy's contribution to national 
economy in the 1990s even though the Eastern 
province share in the GDP increased marginally 
and that of Northern province declined steadily 
during the same period;

(iii) Marked deterioration in the availability of 
basic infrastructure services in the North-East 
such as safe-water, sanitation, electricity, 
transport and communications;

(iv) Decline in the health standards of the 
population in general and fall in educational 
levels.

The available statistics and analysis presented 
by the writer points to a major conclusion, "the 
combined North East Province has been 
economically the most deprived province in Sri 
Lanka throughout the 1990s (Working Paper 1, p4).

Working Paper 2 by the author focuses on a number 
of inter-related issues, about conflict affected 
North East, drawing particular attention to 
factors that act as impediments to the region's 
speedy economic revival particularly after the 
signing of the MoU - what the author prefers to 
call as a 'pause in-conflict' situation, rather 
than 'post-conflict' situation. He has identified 
a number institutional impediments largely 
'non-market institutional impediments, to 
economic recovery and transition.

The important institutional impediments identified are:

(i) High security zones still occupied by the security forces,

(ii) 'Arbitrary and illegal' taxation by the LTTE,

(iii) Prevailing political uncertainties in the post-MoU period,

(iv) Restrictions that still operate on fishing, and

(v) Constraints on access to bank finance.

Other important institutional constraints 
highlighted are related to a wide range of 
infrastructure, economic and social-services, 
which had not been rehabilitated and 
reconstructed. All these impediments to different 
degrees have had a debilitating effect on new 
business initiatives, new productive activities 
and economic revival.

In the author's discussion of institutional 
impediments, much attention is devoted to a 
critique of the LTTE 'tax regime' which operated 
in the LTTE controlled areas before the MoU and, 
ironically, continued and expanded with much 
vigour in both the LTTE dominated areas and 
government controlled areas of the North and East 
in the post-MoU period in the context of the 
on-going peace process.

In the 'command economy' model, as the author 
refers, of the LTTE both before and after the 
MoU, taxation has been one of the important 
instruments of LTTE control and influence. It is 
well-known that ever since the time it developed 
into a clandestine guerrilla organization, the 
LTTE's 'fund raising' work, both locally and 
overseas (where Tamil Diaspora in the West became 
a significant component) have been based on an 
elaborate network of activities and organizations.

In the local context of the North East, taxation 
and other compulsory levies play a significant 
role. The author's contention is that both direct 
and indirect taxes and other compulsory levies 
pushup prices of goods and services in the 
region, and can have a crippling effect on 
entrepreneurial or business activities, going 
contrary to the idea of creation of an 'enabling 
environment' for promoting new business or 
reviving old ones. It is further argued that with 
no accountability and transparency and no visible 
quid pro quo services to the people, other than 
'protection', it has no justification during 
peacetime.

Working Paper 3 looks further on the economic 
implications of the prolonged ethnic conflict 
drawing attention to two important issues, namely 
cost in terms foregone aggregate economic growth 
on account of the protracted conflict, and the 
steadily escalating defense expenditure in the 
last two decades and serious imbalance between 
defence expenditures and social expenditures (the 
former exceeding the latter). The major thrust of 
the argument presented is that high economic and 
financial cost of the war became intolerable and 
unsustainable by the early 1990s and therefore, 
made peace an urgent imperative sought by the 
government.

The other important theme highlighted in WP 3 is 
the rapidly escalating defence expenditure in the 
1980s and 1990s, which was relatively 
insignificant in the earlier period. With its 
rapid increase, both in relation to the GDP and 
total public expenditure, defence expenditure in 
proportionate terms exceeded social expenditure 
(education, health, anti-poverty program and 
rehabilitation) in the late 1990s. As the 
conflict became intensified and defense spending 
rose substantially, Sri Lanka, other than 
Pakistan, showed the largest spending relative to 
GDP in South Asia. That defense spending imposed 
a serious burden on the public finances is a 
relatively recent phenomenon imposed by the war. 
It is further argued that the rapidly escalating 
defense spending in the 1990s was caused by what 
the writer calls, the 'labour intensive miliary' 
strategy that was pursued and which substantially 
increased the recruitment of personnel to the 
armed services. In the circumstances in which the 
Sri Lankan government and the military were 
confronted with a fierce and protracted guerilla 
as well as a conventional warfare, the military 
probably had no alterative other than to rely on 
a large number of soldiers to be deployed in 
different theatres of war in the North East.

This study provides a comprehensive review 
covering a wide range of interrelated activities, 
economic issues and problems of the North East 
during the period before the MoU and afterwards. 
Author's professional competence and familiarity 
with ground situation are clearly reflected in 
his work. Most activities and policy actions 
whether it be on the side of the government or 
the LTTE (and other players) came within the 
purview of his critical evaluation, scrutiny, 
forthright comments and strictures. For those who 
wish to familiarize themselves with the economic 
aspects of the North East situation, the study 
provides a ready and easy reference and this 
enhances the value of the contribution made. The 
study undoubtedly is a welcome addition to the 
relatively limited literature available on the 
economic dimension of North east conflict, seen 
in the context of the challenges facing the peace 
process. The search for durable peace and 
post-conflict economic transition in the region 
are, needless to say, inextricably linked.

ICES deserves praise for sponsoring such a 
worthwhile set of publication that has 
considerable relevance in the contemporary setting.


o o o


Dawn, 21 December 2003

REVIEW: How much is a dancer worth?
Reviewed by Sheema Kermani

One is always amazed to discover the various 
elements that become part of traditions and 
culture. I have always believed that it is not 
religion alone that creates different cultures! 
In fact, living in Pakistan one has for the last 
so many years been told that dance is not part of 
our culture and that it is part of the Indian 
culture. Thus it is obviously implied that dance 
is part of Hindu life and not Muslim life. 
Reading Mirrors and Gestures: Conversations with 
Women Dancers, by C.S. Lakshmi was an affirmation 
of my belief that it is not religion but the 
patriarchal system that determines the status of 
women and the status of artists.
In our society artists are looked down upon, but 
female artists are simply considered of no value. 
In the performing arts women are presented as two 
kinds; one is the "family woman" who is 
considered pure, chaste, loyal and obedient, the 
other is the "professional artist" who is 
considered no less than a prostitute.
As early as 1883 the colonial government had come 
out with a report in South India that the higher 
pursuits of art were the preserve of Brahmins and 
upper caste men and the female artists, specially 
dancers, belonged to the lower castes.
I have often been told by many of my female 
students that "my father says dance is against 
our religion". Is it? No, it is not religion that 
is the determining factor; it is patriarchy and 
the gender bias that does not allow us to dance.
In the book under review, the women dancers with 
whom C.S. Lakshmi holds her conversations are 
almost all Hindu, with the exception of Zohra 
Segal. In fact it is difficult to find a Muslim 
name in the dance world of the subcontinent. 
Almost all the dancers have talked about how 
difficult it was for them as women to learn dance 
and to find a respectable place for themselves in 
society.
Mirrors and Gestures is the second of C.S. 
Lakshmi's three volumes of detailed interviews 
with notable women musicians, dancers and 
painters in India. Gender bias exists, not only 
for the dancers but also, though much less, for 
the musicians. Gangubai Hangal, a very respected 
female classical vocalist had once said, "If a 
male musician is a Muslim, he becomes an Ustad, 
if a Hindu he is a Pandit, but women like 
Kesarbai and Mogubai and Akhtaribai always remain 
just Bais."
All of the dancers interviewed talk about the 
difficulties of combining art and family life, 
with some opting to remain single, and others 
giving up dance after marriage. A woman taking up 
music even today as a profession still does not 
find entry easy. The decision to take up dance 
has always been a challenge whether the family 
was Muslim or Hindu.
The interviews were carried out over a period of 
time from 1991 onwards. The first dancer 
interviewed is Sita Pooviah. Sita belonged to an 
educated liberal family - her father was a 
lawyer, and both the parents were very 
revolutionary. They had four daughters who were 
all given very good education and they all learnt 
classical dance. The whole family was involved in 
the political movement against the British and 
supported Mahatma Gandhi.
Sita was known as a nationalist and she was 
associated with the Women's India Trust. She had 
done her PhD on dance and her thesis was entitled 
"The Art and Science of Indian Classical Dancing 
and its Social Bearings." Sita lived as a single 
woman and even though she started dancing at a 
late age she gave it up because it was difficult 
to continue it professionally without male 
support. Talking about marriage Sita mentions two 
very famous dancers, Rita Chatterji who "would 
get up early in the morning, practice dancing and 
do all her wifely duties and everything but when 
her husband made it unbearable she had to leave 
him. Also Kamala Laxman who was an excellent 
dancer but whose life was ruined by her husband".
The next dancer is Zohra Segal who was from a 
Muslim family and came out of her burqa, both 
metaphorically and literally to learn dance at 
Uday Shankar's dance academy at Almora. Here she 
met Rameshwar Segal who later became her husband. 
Zohra also mentions Ghanshyam who came to 
Pakistan and established an academy in Karachi 
and then during Ziaul Haq's time was forced to 
migrate to America. Zohra herself gave up dancing 
after her husband died and became an actress.
Sucheta Joshi began to learn dance at the late 
age of 45. In her youth her parents taught her 
everything but did not approve of dance. After a 
master's in economics she became a Labour 
Officer. She waited to find a partner who would 
allow her to dance and got married at the age of 
37 to a man who allowed her to learn and perform. 
He was very fond of dancing himself and really 
encouraged his wife. Sucheta says "since 
childhood I had wanted to dance but it was not 
possible at that time. Fifty years back dancing 
was looked down upon and my parents told me that 
if you are lucky, you will get a husband who will 
allow you to learn. It is very rare for a husband 
to be so cooperative and encouraging regarding a 
woman's art A man would normally look to his own 
interest."
Maya Rao started dancing at a time when girls 
dancing on stage was not viewed very favourably. 
She had to fight to learn dance and was finally 
allowed on condition that she would not perform. 
When she grew older she had to give up altogether 
and keep her dancing secret. She went back to it 
only after the death of her father. Maya remained 
single, as she did not want marriage at the cost 
of her dance.
And the stories go on and on - the stories of the 
lives and struggles of women who dared to dance.
------------------------------------------------------------------------

Mirrors and Gestures: Conversations with Women Dancers
By C.S. Lakshmi
Kali for Women, K-92 Hauz Khas Enclave, New Delhi-110016
Tel: 91-11-6864497, 6964947
Email: kaliw at del12.vsnl.net.in
ISBN 81-86706-15-1
472pp. Indian Rs400

o o o

Dawn
December 21, 2003

21 December 2003

REVIEW: Search for right friends
Reviewed by David Taylor

The potential reader must be warned at the 
beginning - this book, originally published in 
French, is not a history of Pakistan in the 
conventional sense, not to be compared, for 
example, to the recent major work by Dr Ian 
Talbot. In fact, the original French edition, 
published in 2000, was entitled simply Le 
Pakistan.
What it is, is a collective effort by a group of 
scholars from France (plus one solitary 
representative from Pakistan) to reflect on 
Pakistan's efforts to achieve a settled identity, 
to develop economically, and to find the right 
friends and allies in a changing international 
world. France has generally taken rather little 
interest in South Asia, except as an export 
market, and what interest there has been is 
focused primarily on India. It is good, 
therefore, that we have this present set of 
essays to show that Pakistan is not totally 
ignored in Paris.
An excellent introduction by the editor, 
Christophe Jaffrelot, who has established a 
reputation as a perceptive analyst of Hindu 
nationalism in India, sets out the basic issue of 
the nature of Pakistani cultural and political 
identity. Islam of course is a principal element, 
but is this always sufficient, given the internal 
differences that exist, and how far can it 
succeed in overlaying other distinctions, for 
example those based on language? Such questions 
need to be tackled with great care and 
understanding, and Jaffrelot demonstrates both 
qualities in the way that he explores the 
multiple and sometimes contradictory elements 
that make up the national identity of Pakistan.
He also contributes two of the essays in the 
first section of the book. In the first he sets 
out the history of the Pakistan movement and then 
of the early history of independent Pakistan in 
terms of competing ethnic identities in the 
country and deftly weaves together his main 
themes of the imbalance in the distribution of 
power between East and West wings, the rise to 
dominance of Punjab, and the complex 
interrelationship of economic power and social 
identity. While this is hardly new, Jaffrelot is 
well informed on the detail of regional movements 
in Pakistan as well as on the Mohajir movement. 
He does not anticipate further division of the 
country but instead points to the negative impact 
of some of the measures by which the power elite 
maintains itself in power.
The second essay by Jaffrelot focuses more on the 
failure of political institutions in Pakistan, 
where he sees the malign consequences both of the 
ethnic tensions mentioned above and of an 
"obsession with security" occasioned by the 
confrontation with India ever since 1947. He 
remarks that civil society and political parties 
in Pakistan are still too weak to sustain 
democratization over the long term. He sees some 
hope in the willingness of a liberal 
intelligentsia to speak out and to take action, 
although it can hardly take on the whole burden 
of major social and political change.
As Jaffrelot remarks, there has been no real 
equivalent in Pakistan of the peasant-based 
political movements that have become such a 
feature of the Indian political landscape. Yet 
ultimately the social conditions in the two 
countries are not so very different, leading to 
speculation about what might happen in the 
future. Jaffrelot points too to the impact of US 
policy on Pakistan's politics as a major factor 
restricting democratic development.
The remaining chapters are something of a mixed 
bag, both in length and quality. The articles on 
economic and social structures by Gilbert 
Etienne, well known for his work on South Asian 
economic history, are descriptive and diffuse, 
and rely heavily on statistics from the annual 
Economic Survey volumes and similar sources. 
Pierre Lafrance takes an ethnographic approach in 
his comprehensive analysis of social groups which 
may appear in some places outdated in its 
assumptions about the links between economic 
roles on the one hand and ascriptive group 
membership on the other, although his final 
section does recognise the changes that have 
occurred in the past few decades.
His conclusion that in Pakistan (as of course in 
many other societies) "the system of social 
hierarchies is in the realms of the implied and 
the unspoken" challenges all modes of social 
analysis. Tariq Rahman's brief but very 
thoughtful chapter puts forward a careful 
analysis of the way that language intersects not 
only with ethnic difference but also with class 
and inequality. English and to a lesser extent 
Urdu are the languages of power in contemporary 
Pakistan, and the opportunity to learn them is 
unevenly distributed across the country and 
across social classes.
Aminah Mohammad lists the many groupings among 
Pakistani Muslims. She shows how social change is 
transforming traditional divisions into sectarian 
conflict, particularly in the cities. Marc 
Gaborieau develops similar themes but in a more 
speculative manner. He blames Zulfikar Ali Bhutto 
for allowing an opening to fundamentalism by his 
panic measures of 1977 suggests that Ziaul Haq's 
actions were "coolly reasonable" in the way that 
they set limits to it. Not everyone will agree 
with this formulation, but most will accept his 
point that the consequences of decisions taken in 
the 1970s and 1980s have not yet been fully 
worked through. Gaborieau concludes nevertheless 
that the state rather than religious leaders is 
still in a position to have the last word on the 
relationship between religion and politics.
Two chapters by Jean-Luc Racine and one by 
Olivier Roy make up the section on Pakistan's 
foreign policy. Racine applauds Pakistan's past 
skill in manoeuvring between the great powers in 
the past, but sees the country as needing to move 
beyond the past, especially in respect of the way 
the relationship with India dominates 
policy-making. Olivier Roy, well known for his 
work on Islamist movements in other countries, 
looks at Islam and foreign policy in Pakistan. In 
an overstated conclusion he sees Pakistan as 
becoming "the protector and promoter of a 
virulent Islamic radicalism".
The book concludes with an epilogue by the editor 
that sketches in developments since the 
publication of the French edition in 2000. The 
main focus is on President Musharraf's strategy 
vis-a-vis the Islamist forces on the one hand and 
the Americans on the other. The events of 
September 11 enabled him to move against the 
Islamists, as the US wanted, and also allowed him 
to gain some economic breathing space. However, 
echoing the tone of many of the contributions to 
the book he highlights the outstanding social and 
political problems that remain unresolved.
The book was not thoroughly edited and there are 
many minor mistakes that will irk a Pakistani 
readership, for example the use of ulama as a 
singular noun and the anachronistic use of 'Sind' 
instead of Sindh. The translation reads well, but 
there are places where the double translation of 
Pakistani terms first into French and then back 
into English produces odd results. Chief 
Justices, for example, become Presidents of their 
respective courts. Similarly, Hanafite becomes 
Hanaphite when it has passed through the 
translation filter and Jaffer Djaffer, and the 
Basic Principles Committee is called the 
Committee on Fundamental Principles.
------------------------------------------------------------------------

A History of Pakistan and its Origins
Edited by Christophe Jaffrelot
Anthem Press, London
Distributed in Pakistan by Sethi Books, 14-B Temple Road, Lahore
Tel: 042-6361478, 6373392
Email: sethi at brain.net.pk
ISBN 1 84331 030 9
326pp. Rs1,995


______


[7]

The Statesman
December 23 2003

Erotic Buddha book raises ire in India

Sudeshna Sarkar in Kathmandu
Dec. 22. - Whenever the Baileys propose to launch 
a book in India, the Bajrang Dal and the Shiv 
Sena seem to dispose. Mr Jack Bailey, former 
resident of Sheffield, United Kingdom, and now a 
globe-trotting guru with ashrams in the USA, UK, 
New Delhi, Kathmandu, Australia and Japan, along 
with his literary as well as living partner Ms 
Claire Marie Bailey, a former Salvation Army 
member, have become the newest targets of the two 
organisations.
Rather, it is the "autobiography" penned jointly, 
Diary of a tantric priestess, that has made the 
Bajrang Dal and Shiv Sena create a bonfire of it, 
even though the book in the world's only Hindu 
theocracy, Nepal, passed without any controversy.
Mr Bailey, a septuagenarian who claims he 
mastered the art of Buddhist tantric sex by 
meditating for years in the freezing caves of the 
Gangotri region and can cure patients of all 
diseases including cancer and even AIDS, has 
narrated how he achieved "enlightenment" and 
prescribed a nine-day tantric sex session and 
"coin meditation", a psychic breathing exercise 
for physical healing and spiritual awareness.
Ms Claire Marie, the 43-year-old mother of seven, 
claims being cured of bulimia and stomach cancer 
by the "White Guru" as he is known, and 
transformed into a tantric practitioner with now 
her own group of devotees in the US. In the book, 
estimated to have sold 300,000 pre-publication 
copies on the Internet, she narrates their life 
in Sri Lanka and sexual encounters with various 
people as a result of which they were cured of 
their ailments.
The book was recently launched in Kathmandu in 
the presence of a former Miss Nepal without any 
untoward incident. But the publishers ran into 
trouble in India where the Bajrang Dal and Shiv 
Sena took umbrage, reportedly at the book jacket 
showing Buddha sitting in the lotus position and 
in a sexual union with a naked woman, reminiscent 
of the Khajuraho erotic sculptures. The 
publishers, Pilgrims Publishing, has decided to 
redesign the cover and the launch in India is on 
hold till then.
This is the second time the authors have evoked 
the ire of Indian organisations, the first time 
being about five years back, when they wrote a 
similar book that raised the hackles of the Shiv 
Sena and Bajrang Dal because of some reportedly 
sexually explicit passages. Copies of it were 
burnt at the Gateway of India. But Mr Bailey, who 
now calls himself Swami Krishna Chaitanya, is 
unfazed. He spoke about how several Indian 
magazines, had "belittled" his "art".

_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/

Buzz on the perils of fundamentalist politics, on 
matters of peace and democratisation in South 
Asia. SACW is an independent & non-profit 
citizens wire service run since 1998 by South 
Asia Citizens Web: www.sacw.net/
The complete SACW archive is available at: 
bridget.jatol.com/pipermail/sacw_insaf.net/

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DISCLAIMER: Opinions expressed in materials carried in the posts do not
necessarily reflect the views of SACW compilers.

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