[sacw] SACW | 16 Feb. 03

[Harsh Kapoor]

South Asia Citizens Wire | February 16, 2003

#1. Book Review: Gendering the Spirit: Women, Religion and the=20
Post-Colonial Response edited by Durre S Ahmed (by Ayesha Jalal)
#2. Supporting the war may be suicidal (Iftikhar H. Malik)
#3. Interrogating Indianness (Shashi Tharoor)
#4. A Hindu Quest for Some Holy Water
Attempt to Unearth Ancient Waterway May Affect Indian History and=20
Politics (Rama Lakshmi)
#5. [Seminar Special Issue: "REWRITING HISTORY a symposium on ways of=20
representing
our shared past ]
The problem (Neeladri Bhattacharya)
#6. Indo-Pak yak, yak (Pamela Philipose)
#7. A travesty of justice (Kuldip Nayar)
#8. Baggage of hate (Bina Sarkar Ellias)
#9. Identity Politics and Crisis of Social Sciences (Rajen Harshe,=20
Sujata Patel)

-----------------------------------

#1.

The Economic and Political Weekly
February 8, 2003
Book Review

Women and Religion

Gendering the Spirit: Women, Religion and the Post-Colonial Response=20
edited by Durre S Ahmed; Zed Press, New York, 2002;pp 244, $ 19.95=20
(paperback).

Ayesha Jalal

With social and religious movements in parts of south and south-east=20
Asia targeting women more brazenly than ever to promote extremist=20
agendas, this collection of essays could not have appeared at a more=20
timely moment. They capstone a project on women and religion=20
sponsored by the Heinrich Boll Foundation between 1996 and 2000 that=20
resulted in the publication of four earlier volumes on the same=20
subject but which were not available to a broader international=20
audience. Striking a high note in critical thinking, Gendering the=20
Spirit charts the course of women's vital but for the most part=20
unacknowledged contributions to religious traditions as far afield as=20
Christianity, Buddhism, Hinduism and Islam. Uncompromising in=20
exposing the self- serving and sterile male dominated view of=20
religion in general and spirituality in particular, the volume will=20
undoubtedly touch some raw nerves. But the lucidity and sharpness of=20
its counter-narrative and the firmly grounded inter-disciplinary=20
research of the five women authors drawn from fields like psychology,=20
anthropology, gender studies, theology and political activism will=20
also elicit praise and admiration.

The essays are organised around three thematic clusters. Part I on=20
alternative perspectives, introduced by Durre S Ahmed, sets the=20
agenda with a combination of wit and provocation. The stated aim of=20
the volume is to energise the emergent global narratives on women and=20
spirituality by providing an alternative to male literalist thinking=20
on religion for which 'fundamentalism' has become a useful, if=20
inadequate, euphemism. One might quibble with Ahmed's critique of the=20
academy for its disengagement with real life issues, not least on=20
account of the reliance of the contributors on works produced by=20
those who inhabit the proverbial ivory towers. But it is difficult to=20
deny that the subject of women and spirituality has not received the=20
scholarly attention it deserves. Academic theology has relegated it=20
to the margins of intellectual discourse. The feminist movement for=20
the most part too has skirted around it because of the distaste with=20
which its luminaries look upon matters to do with religion. Ignoring=20
women's spirituality is to impoverish understandings of religious=20
traditions and privilege monochromatic, hyper-masculine=20
interpretations. For all too long, women's view of their own=20
spirituality has been dismissed as an aberration and, worse still,=20
heresy. This is what lies at the root of the psychological, social=20
and physical repression of women in all religious traditions.=20
Rejecting the homogenising and exclusionary idioms of the male=20
discourse on religion, Ahmed lauds heretics as 'cross-pollinators of=20
civilisations' in much the same way as Peter Wilson did in his book,=20
Scandal: Essays in Islamic Heresy (New York, 1988). Describing the=20
subject matter of the volume as the final frontier of=20
post-coloniality, she calls for a thorough decolonisation of male=20
interpretations and meanings of women and religion. What is needed is=20
a radical reclaiming of the past, reconceptualising it in terms=20
meaningful to the contemporary world, particularly for feminists, and=20
comparative insights which highlight the diversities of perspectives=20
in the different religious traditions while also identifying the=20
unifying threads in women's spirituality.

She sets about doing so in an interesting conceptual essay on women,=20
psychology and religion. Her main argument is that the diversities=20
inherent in earlier religious traditions were overwhelmed by the=20
ascent of an archetypal male heroic consciousness which saw conquest=20
and subjugation, not persuasion and accommodation, as the only=20
meritorious goal. What was symbolic, polytheistic and emotional was=20
transformed into literal, monotheistic and hyper-rational=20
understandings of spirituality and, by extension, religion. It is=20
with the rise of the latter consciousness that charges of heresy=20
proliferated and women's spirituality was repressed and marginalised.=20
It is a thesis which resonates well with Madhu Khanna's theoretical=20
essay on the goddess-woman equation in Sakta Tantra tradition of=20
Hinduism and Mary John Mananzan's analysis of the Catholic Church's=20
teachings on women with special reference to the Philippines. Both=20
point to the ways in which religious orthodoxy, brahmanical and=20
Catholic, have perpetuated patriarchal social structures and their=20
accouterments - notions of women's passivity, and subordination.=20
Khanna demonstrates how the Sakta Tranta strand in Hinduism has=20
resisted and subverted brahmanical discourse both in theory and in=20
fact. Rejecting the phallocentric images of woman as a passive sexual=20
symbol of male fantasies, the Saktas energise and feminise Hinduism=20
by conferring a remarkable degree of agency on goddesses who are=20
represented as the source of primal energy. Far from being a mere=20
theoretical construct removed from the social sphere, the Sakta texts=20
extend the autonomy of the goddesses to women, regardless of caste,=20
creed, age or personal status by viewing them as the physical=20
incarnations of 'Sakti', divine cosmic energy. Even if Sakta women=20
were not entirely immune from patriarchal norms embedded in=20
brahmanical social structures, they could aspire to become teachers,=20
saints and mystics. By contrast, such space as women possessed in the=20
early Christian tradition, Mananzan shows, was systematically=20
constricted by the Fathers of the Church. It was not until the Second=20
Vatican Council in the early 1960s that women could hope to stake a=20
claim within the Christian religious hierarchy. She documents her own=20
professional and personal experience to throw light on the social=20
awakening among women of religion in the Philippines. Far from=20
resigning themselves to the esoteric realm of spirituality alone,=20
women of Mananzan's ilk are becoming increasingly aware of the need=20
to participate in the political sphere to effect real change in their=20
religious and social status.

Hidden Women

Part II of the volume illuminates the role of hidden women, past and=20
present, who challenged male constructions of spirituality to secure=20
their rightful place in their respective religious traditions. In her=20
short essay, Hema Gonnatilake looks at the forgotten women of=20
Anuradhapura in Sri Lanka who, faced with unstinting hostility from=20
the Buddhist male hierarchy, took the initiative of recording their=20
own spiritual and intellectual experiences for posterity in an=20
ancient chronicle called the Dipavamsa. Written in the fourth century=20
AD but covering events from the third century BC, the Dipavamsa=20
contains an altogether rare account of the efforts made by the=20
Buddhist nuns to set up an order and the subsequent history of its=20
development and spread throughout the island. Significantly, there is=20
no mention of this early, if not the earliest, instance of a feminist=20
historiography in a later chronicle, the Mahavamsa, which attributes=20
the spread and accomplishments of Buddhism in Sri Lanka exclusively=20
to the monks. The erasure of the women's story and the absence of any=20
reference to their contributions in subsequent texts goes some way in=20
explaining why, contrary to the original teachings of the Buddha,=20
gender ine qualities have remained embedded in Sri Lanka.

Using theological, anthropological, historical and literary texts,=20
the four remaining essays in this section reveal that whether=20
silenced, marginalised or appropriated by the purveyors of male=20
discourses on religion, women have never failed to create their own=20
spiritual space. Binding them together is the ubiquitous archetype of=20
the Great Mother in different religious traditions. The two pieces on=20
the Philippines by Grace P Odal and Mary John Mananzan detail the=20
role of women, as symbols and agents in their own right, in the=20
spiritual consciousness and social development of their communities.=20
An anthropologist by training, Odal in her study of popular belief=20
and practice as a counter-discourse to established religion=20
juxtaposes the archetype of 'mutya' - the primordial and original=20
spirit - in Filipino consciousness to delineate the spiritual=20
significance of 'Mother' Victoria Vera Piedad, who remains larger=20
than life long after her death. Mananzan delineates the spiritual and=20
intellectual development of Isabel Suarez, the Suprema or spiritual=20
leader of a community of about 50,000 and the important contribution=20
of her feminist perspectives on religion for the women's movement in=20
the Philippines. Shifting the geographical focus to India, Madhu=20
Khanna provides a richly textured narrative of her encounters with=20
the incredible Madhobi Ma. From her miracle birth to her progression=20
as the embodiment of several strands of spiritual initiation, Hindu=20
and Muslim, Madhobi Ma like her Filipino counterparts enjoys a=20
pivotal role in her religious community. A wife, a mother, the fount=20
of wisdom and a spiritual healer all at the same time, Madhobi Ma is=20
the veritable sage and saint who reverses and subverts the normative=20
Hindu ideal of the passive, dependent and subjugated woman. She is in=20
the same tradition as the 13th or 14th century Kashmiri woman mystic=20
poetess, variously known to her devotees as Lal Ded, Lalla, Mai Lal=20
and Laleshwari. Deploying a Jungian framework for her analysis, Durre=20
Ahmed recounts the amasingly bold exploits of Lal Ded in defiance of=20
all authority, religious and temporal, in the quest of giving=20
expression to her unique spirituality. Born into a brahman family and=20
married at a young age, Lal Ded abandons social norms and embraces=20
nudity as her weapon of protest against the absence of real men in=20
Kashmir. Her fateful encounter with the Persian/Iraqi Sufi mystic Mir=20
Sayyed Ali Hamdani, the patron saint of Kashmir (popularly known as=20
Shah Hamdan), occasioned a cross-fertilisation of Hindu and Muslim=20
spirituality which finds expression in her poetry. Literalist male=20
interpreters in India and Pakistan have of late heroically sought to=20
appropriate Lal Ded for Hinduismand Islam respectively, in complete=20
violation of the eclectic and inclusionary spirituality which was=20
the hallmark of this inimitable female mystic.

Religious Violence

The third section probes the causes of what the authors call=20
'religiously inspired violence' and ways of resisting and overcoming=20
it by restoring and strengthening the feminine dimensions in the=20
different religious traditions. Khanna, Mananzan and Ahmed=20
convincingly argue that it is the suppression of the gentler and more=20
compassionate side in Hinduism, Christianity and Islam respectively,=20
which they equate with mysticism and women's spirituality, that=20
generates socially unaccommodating attitudes and aggression. Such a=20
positive view of mysticism and the feminine may arouse scepticism=20
among those aware of the excesses carried out in the name of=20
spirituality today. But the spirituality hailed by these authors is a=20
stretch removed from much of what is taken to be its contemporary=20
practice.

Making a case for the inseparable dyad of violence and non-violence=20
in Hinduism, Khanna describes Durga's battle with the demons in which=20
the goddess as an integral totality of the divine feminine appears as=20
slayer and saviour, wrathful and merciful. She broaches the issue of=20
women becoming agents of male-directed violence in the public and=20
private sphere with selective references to their depictions in=20
Indian cinema and popular folklore. Her contention that it was the=20
'hidden woman' in Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi which made him the=20
modern purveyor of the ancient Hindu philosophy of 'ahimsa' or=20
non-violence might raise eyebrows. An intriguing suggestion,=20
characteristic of the interpretations proffered throughout=20
the volume, it is substantiated by references to Gandhi's personal=20
life and relationships. But Khanna avoids any mention Gandhi's=20
alleged ill-treatment of his wife. Nor does she see any contradiction=20
between Gandhi holding up Ram's wife Sita as the model of the passive=20
and chaste Indian women and her claim that it was the feminine in him=20
which constituted the archetypal Gandhian personality.

Mananzan in her theological reflections on violence against women=20
furnishes textual evidence of the misogynist writings in church=20
history. Women can counter these by developing a spirituality for=20
life based on self-affirmation, self-empowerment and inner freedom.=20
Given her own background as an activist, Mananzan is firmly of the=20
opinion that only through participation in the public sphere can=20
women hope to play their part in reconditioning patriarchal social=20
attitudes which inculcate in them a victim consciousness. The final=20
essay by Durre Ahmed bemoans the effects of sidelining the feminine=20
in Islam with an analysis of the minority Zikri sect in Pakistan.=20
>From being largely invisible in the past, the Zikris have in more=20
recent years attracted the attention of orthodox elements in socially=20
conservative and mainly tribal Baluchistan. While socio-economic and=20
political factors have much to do with the spate of attacks on the=20
sect, Ahmed suggests that the centrality accorded to women in Zikri=20
rituals has evoked fears among the orthodox of the feminine and=20
unknown 'other' which they have suppressed or rejected as intrinsic=20
parts of their own psyches. Only by liberating the feminine side in=20
all religions, then, can the social and psychic balance be restored=20
to stem the tide of 'religiously inspired violence'.

With a wealth of depth and originality, this volume of essays=20
deserves to be read and absorbed widely by scholars and students=20
alike. While some of the essays are more dense and closely argued=20
than others, the collection overall makes for an excellent read and=20
is a welcome addition to both gender and post-colonial studies.

______

#2.

[ Date: Sat, 15 Feb 2003 19:24:22 +0000 (GMT)
From: Iftikhar malik

Dear colleagues,
AA.
Am forwarding a piece that appeared today (15 Feb) in
Dawn. I must also inform you that today 2 million
people from all walks of life turned up in London for
the biggest anti-war demonstration in the country's
history. It was, of course, an inspiring experience in
every sense. Speakers included Tony Benn, Jesse
Jackson, Bianca Jagger, Ken Livingstone, George
Galloway, Imran Khan (the lawyer-activist), Charles
Kennedy (the leader of the Lib Dems.) and several
others. A huge section of British Muslims participated
in the march and rally.

-Last night at London University's SOAS, the hall was
packed with a huge crowd to listen to Pervez Hoodbhoy,
Khalid Nadwi, Praful Bidwai and Amartya Sen on the
dnagers of South Asian nuclearisation. Pervez's film
received an overwhelming appreciation. Presentations
followed with an interesting discussion. It was
compered by Jon Snow, Channel Four's anchor and the
produceer of documentary on VHP-led Diasporic funding
to Hindutva in Gujarat.
Iftikhar ]

o o o

DAWN
15 February 2003

Supporting the war may be suicidal

By Dr Iftikhar H. Malik

While an overwhelming majority of Pakistanis and
likewise their counterparts across the globe are
understandably least enamoured with the approaching
Anglo-American invasion of Iraq, one can hardly be
oblivious to the pressures on the governments in the
developing world to side with the massive offensive
now in the full making. The battle over Iraq has
already begun between the public opinion and the
governments in the United States and Britain, where
one can witness massive protests, weekly vigils and
volunteering human shields to foreclose the aerial
bombing.

While President Bush and Prime Minister Blair have
been strenuously trying to conjure up support for
their regime change programme and beyond, the civil
societies have also geared up their anti-war campaign
with the 15th of February slated for the largest
rallies in the fifty countries, outdoing even the
anti-Vietnam demonstrations of yester-year.

Iraq, to the Anglo-American alliance, is an unfinished
agenda, a destabilizing threat to the regional
security and a threatening dictatorial regime that may
presumably supply its weapons of mass destruction
(WMDs) to Al Qaeda type groups to launch attacks in
the North Atlantic region. To the anti-war groups,
accounting for 60 to 80 per cent of the population in
the same region, the war has no causes but only lame
excuses. The hidden agenda is to complete "Daddy's
unfinished business", implement ultra-right manifesto
in the Mideast and elsewhere and is a holistic
strategy to bolster a rent-seeking Israel and also to
secure a guaranteed supply of oil for the American gas
guzzlers.

For Pakistani public opinion understandably, the Iraq
crisis is a sad reflection on the debilitation of the
United Nations and the Organisation of the Muslim
Conference (OIC), as both the multilateral
organisations remain sidelined. Once again, in a
unipolar world we see millions of people finding
themselves helpless at a time when a devastating war
looms on the horizons. For a vast majority of the
Muslim opinion, it is a war against Islam though Bush
and Blair have tried to pacify Muslims but not to much
avail. Their own religiosity, usage of Christian
symbols (for instance, the daily morning service in
the White House, which even an invited Indian film
producer Bhatia refused to attend unlike some other
loyal Muslim flag carriers in Washington!) and gung-ho
exhortations have lost the battle of hearts.

While the war may be aimed at further controlling the
geo-politics of the region by denying Islamicists or
other groups from overthrowing all the 'moderate' and
overwhelmingly non-democratic regimes, it is basically
a mundane affair which, ironically, brings into open
the disempowerment of a huge portion of the world
population including a major section of Muslims. Thus,
the Muslim agony is bi-dimensional: owing to their own
surrogate leaders and to their external props, which
brings in the Muslim factor in the entire imbroglio.

No doubt, war may unleash a Yugoslavia-style ethnic
mayhem in Iraq; still it may even prove a death knell
to many regimes in the neighbourhood. The longer
occupation, as being planned at the moment, may be
confined to oil installations, with a Karazai-like
leader ensconced in Baghdad, but the Kurds - backed by
Turkey and Iran - and the Shia Arabs in the South
supported by Iran may signal the end of Iraq as a
plural state besides intensifying the Iranian-Turkish
dissensions. Thus, a turbulent Muslim factor,
destabilisation of Arab states, Iranian-Turkish
configuration, the outflow of four to five million
refugees to all directions, amidst a sudden departure
of the American troops may not bode well for regional
states such as Pakistan.

In the days to come, Pakistan may apparently have two
choices, either to join the attack as a loyal foot
soldier or try to oppose it. However, a third
possibility does exist stipulating proactive
diplomatic and political initiatives to rescue the
region from an impending tragedy. If the regime openly
sides with the Anglo-American alliance, we may see
further fissures within the body politic of Pakistan,
much more severe than those experienced in 1956 or
2001.

Pakistan, like in the case of its turn-about on the
Taliban, may not get anything tangible except for a
knee jerk from Washington or it could receive some
token sweeteners in the form of military hardware,
which seems to be Pakistan's single-factor obsession.
Generals Tommy Franks and Musharraf may hammer it out
between themselves over and above the heads of
Pakistanis like the Saudis and others but Pakistanis,
unlike the latter, are deeply politicised and their
anger will fill the streets even in Punjab, the Army's
heartland.

In the immediate future, there may be no threat to
Musharraf as such since his constituency - the
military top brass - may as per tradition, stay loyal
to him but within Pakistan his already thinned
credibility will certainly nosedive. However,
continued law and order situation could show an exit
to the thin veneer of Jamali-led democracy with a
fully-fledged marital law taking over the country.
Pakistanis may shed their blood unnecessarily on the
streets with the fundamentalists and
Mullah-Soofi-style hotheads sloganeering for
volunteers.

The anti-Americanism, already so pervasive across the
world, may further solidify fundamentalists and could
inflame the Jihadi outfits waiting in the wings. As
was the case in Afghanistan, these Jihadis may soon
discover their irrelevance in the Iraqi dilemma and
will surely turn their guns on Pakistani civil society
especially targeting the minorities and women. That is
the most horrible scenario that a massive reaction may
generate in the form of self-immolation accruing out
of an all-out support for war.

On the other hand, if Pakistani regime does not
support the Anglo-American military action and the
resultant occupation of Iraq, the Indian card to hot
up the borders, further open allegations of
terror-sponsorship and of the export of nuclear
technology to the 'axis of evil' may come back into
currency for arm twisting. Even without supporting
Iraq Pakistan's ambivalent stance may generate
antagonism given its nuclear capabilities and the past
role in promoting Taliban. Pakistan's dependence on
the United States - both in the military and economic
realms - plus a sizable section of pro-West elite may
preclude the possibility of an open defiance.

The pragmatists are already suggesting that rather
than counting on a sinking ship, we must highlight our
strategic assets and old-time commitment to the West
to gain further commendation from Washington. The
feeling is that a continued alliance will preclude the
possibility of any surgical operations against
Pakistani nuclear installations, though public may
overwhelmingly fear that in any case.

Already, there are whispers of Pakistani mission at
the Security Council being probed for some possibility
of influencing its vote in the Council. Our UN
representative's own escapades with an allegedly
abused partner have anyway put him in an embarrassing
and vulnerable position. While the Syrian regime may
withstand a muffled public anger after siding with the
rest on the Security Council, supporting a
war-oriented resolution may be difficult for Pakistani
elite to sell to their people. They have already given
so many pills of Pan-Islamism to their people in the
past two decades that within the establishment, there
may be quite a few resentful voices. (Don't forget
Baig-Gul duo in 1991-1992!) Pakistan's strained
relations with all its neighbours make the possibility
of even watchful neutrality impossible.

The ideal policy - away from both an unbridled support
and an open defiance - must ensure Pakistan a greater
space to manoeuvre without causing a public uproar.
This 'third option' must preclude the possibility of
further aggravating the lack of trust that the
Iranians and Afghans have, not unreasonably, fostered
against us. One could think of a gradualism, based on
the following considerations:

- The UN monitors should be given a clear template and
time span to complete their work.

- The demonstrations should be allowed in the country
not simply to ventilate the pent-up feelings but to
let people fully use their democratic rights.

- Since some demonstrations may result in disorder and
economic loss, special parks, places and parameters
should be demarcated for such assemblies.

- The police should provide protection to the
demonstrators rather than confronting them.

- The regime must activate the OIC for an extended
emergency session.

- The Pakistani leaders - both in khaki and civvies -
must learn something from history for a change! You
cannot run the country without proper democratic,
consensual and participatory systems. Individual
decisions, however genuine, lack force and legitimacy
and invite havoc.

-A wider debate on pros and cons of Islam and politics
must begin in Pakistan as this continued ambivalence
is harming our politico-cultural fabrics. Islam has to
be rediscovered as a civilisational force - more than
an oppressive ritualism - guaranteeing human rights,
equality of citizenship and a peaceful coexistence for
all.

-The best possible way-out is a Jinnahist model of
polity without religion vetoing anyone's human rights.
Don't call it secularism, give it some other name but
that is the only way forward. Without democracy,
debate and professionalization of public servants,
including the army, authoritarian and intolerance will
keep on spawning thoughtless policies inviting more
troubles.

- We must initiate serious parleys with Iran and Arab
countries by maintaining an equi-balance and should
not be seen as the Trojan Horse for Washington.
Similarly, America or anybody else has no right to
trample others' sovereignty, as the days of empire are
long gone.

-Our leaders must realize that Iraq like Afghanistan
is once again exposing the vast divide between what
the people want and need and what the regime's
prerogatives are. We need to resolve our own problems
of governance by going back to the Jinnahist ideals of
unfettered democracy.

We should not forget Iraq is suffering under a
dictatorship and Pakistan suffered and even was
partitioned under a similar dictatorship. The solution
to a bad democracy is through more democracy and not
through the GHQ-ordained, ISI-crafted tempering with
the national institutions. Wise are those who learn
from others' mistakes whereas the real fools refuse to
even learn from their own blunders.

______

#3.

The Hindu, Feb 16, 2003
Magazine
THE SHASHI THAROOR COLUMN

Interrogating Indianness

Shashi Tharoor

How secular are we?

"THERE is a certain kind of secularism which sometimes scares me even=20
more than the militant fundamentalism of the mosque-bashers", began=20
an e-mail I received the other day in response to my recent series of=20
columns on Hinduism and Indianness. "It wears a smiling face and=20
speaks in a tender voice, asking Muslims to participate in Hindu=20
`culture' rather than `religion'. `Celebrate Deepavali with us,'=20
these secularists say, and they perceive no irony in the way=20
Deepavali takes over civil life in India the way Id or Muharram can=20
never aspire to. They are proud of the fact that rural Islam is=20
almost indistinguishable from Hinduism, but they do not stop to=20
wonder why it is not the other way around."

I sat up and took notice. I am used to criticism from all sides in=20
our wretched national agonising about secularism, but rarely in such=20
terms from an Indian Muslim. The author of these words, Shahnaz=20
Habib, went on: "You write about the Amritraj family, `To give their=20
children `Hindu' names must have seemed more `nationalist'.' You have=20
just equated Hindu with nationalist, a religion with the country, the=20
part with the whole. You go on to add that Muslim Indians still `feel=20
obliged to adopt Arab names in deference to the roots of their=20
faith'. I wish I knew how you defined `obliged to'. Is it merely a=20
compulsion of faith as you seem to see it or is it a joyous=20
affirmation of being able to participate not only in a local heritage=20
but also in a culture that goes beyond national boundaries? Or could=20
it be a political act? Could it be the insecurity of living in a=20
country where you walk into a nationalised bank to be faced by a huge=20
oil painting of goddess Lakshmi? Why are there so few Muslim or=20
Christian symbols in our public spaces if cultural assimilation has=20
been so successful?"

And there was a particular poignancy to Ms Habib's concluding=20
paragraph: "I wish for you the knowledge of what it feels like to be=20
a minority. What it feels like to be on the wrong side of an accident=20
of numbers. On one hand, the adventure of having more than one=20
culture to call mine. The magic of constantly challenging my=20
preconceptions. And the pain of wishing that my Hindu friends knew as=20
much about my Muslim festivals and customs as I know about theirs, of=20
wishing that I didn't have to explain my actions in my own country.=20
And worse, feeling guilty for feeling this pain."

The e-mail gave me much to think about, both because of its own=20
thoughtfulness and because it is always salutary for a writer to be=20
reminded that one must never become too complacent in the belief that=20
one's own good intentions are self-evident. I responded by pointing=20
out that certain cultural symbols are identified with a religious=20
community but used by both - I mentioned the smashing of coconuts in=20
my piece; I know Muslim women who wear the bindi for decorative=20
purposes, and Hindu men who wear an achkan. I have written elsewhere=20
of Hindu worshippers at Sufi shrines and the Dagar brothers singing=20
Hindu devotionals. Though I did not do so in my "Hindu" column, in my=20
novel Riot I have cited a Hindu exponent of qawwali.

That kind of cultural mingling, I suggested, is not particularly=20
one-sided. As for festivals, most Hindus do join in Muslim=20
celebrations when invited politicians suggests both tokenism and=20
opportunism.

In my column I had put the "Hindu" in "`Hindu' names' within quotes=20
because the names of the Amritraj trio are actually no more Hindu=20
than the names Bashir or Jamal are Muslim. Vijay and Anand are merely=20
Sanksrit words connoting victory and bliss respectively, which have=20
been used as names for millennia. Ashok in fact is the name of a=20
Buddhist king. They are indeed names with a hoary pedigree on Indian=20
soil, which is why I suggested their use might have seemed more=20
"nationalist". I believe my entire published work would demonstrate=20
vividly that I have never identified Indianness with Hinduness, "a=20
part with the whole".

Having said that, though, I told Shahnaz Habib that I was concerned=20
by her reference to the Muslim use of Arab names as "a joyous=20
affirmation of being able to participate not only in a local heritage=20
but also in a culture that goes beyond national boundaries". First of=20
all, what is the culture she refers to? It is not Islam, because Arab=20
names are pre-Islamic and the same names are used by all Arabs,=20
Christian, Muslim or Druze. Was she suggesting, I asked, that an=20
Indian Muslim should feel more affinity with Arab culture than with=20
Indian? I hoped not, because then she would be giving ammunition to=20
the worst bigots on the Hindutva side.

Ms Habib's reply was impressive. "If we go back to the linguistic and=20
geographical roots of `amrit' and `bashir', there is indeed nothing=20
remotely religious about them," she wrote. "But to do so is to deny=20
the cultural associations that have accrued to them over centuries of=20
use. Most Indian Muslims naming their childen are not trying to=20
create a mini-Arabia.

"But religion plays an important role in culture (and the=20
cultural-identification process of naming). A name is not its=20
original meaning; it is what it represents. Arab names may represent=20
a geographical affiliation to Christian Arabs; to Indian Muslims, it=20
represents the religion which originated in the Middle East. Piqued=20
by your use of the phrase, `obliged to', I was trying to point out=20
that Indian Muslims have a dual heritage - that of the national=20
culture encompassing the Ramayana and the freedom struggle as well as=20
that of the Muslim civilisation."

Fair enough - though I sense much room for further debate on this=20
point. I was struck, nonetheless, by her observation about the=20
paucity of Muslim or Christian symbols in our public spaces - of=20
holidays being granted for Deepavali and not for Muharram in the=20
Delhi publishing house in which she worked. These are, for the most=20
part, unintentional slights. But her raising it is one more reminder=20
that one can never fully put oneself in the shoes of another. And=20
yet, as I have often written, who in India is not a minority? A=20
Keralite friend recently reminded me of the "southern discomfort" the=20
journalist Madhavan Kutty wrote about in describing his experience of=20
North India. In that case it's not being on the "wrong side of the=20
accident of numbers"; it's being on the other side of the accident of=20
geography and location. But if we were to remain perpetually on our=20
own side, where would be the "magic of constantly challenging" not=20
only our preconceptions, but our expectations of what Indianness can=20
be?

Shashi Tharoor is the author of India: From Midnight to the=20
Millennium, The Great Indian Novel and other books. Visit him at=20
www.shashitharoor.com

_____

#4.

The Washington Post
Saturday, February 15, 2003; Page A23

A Hindu Quest for Some Holy Water
Attempt to Unearth Ancient Waterway May Affect Indian History and Politics

By Rama Lakshmi
Special to The Washington Post

KATGARH, India -- In a verdant valley amid the foothills of the=20
Himalayas, Hindu villagers prayed in silence and piously threw petals=20
into a small puddle they believe was a mighty river some 4,500 years=20
ago. Not far away, an archeologist leaned over a trench to examine=20
freshly excavated pieces of broken pottery.

"We have found remains of so many ancient settlements here. There=20
must have been a very important river flowing," said Sanjay Manjul,=20
35, squinting as he held up a piece against the sun. "It must have=20
been our holy Saraswati River."

Manjul is not the only one looking for the Saraswati, which was=20
mentioned in the oldest Hindu religious text, the Rig Veda and which=20
devout Hindus believe disappeared mysteriously thousands of years=20
ago. Dozens of archeologists like him have fanned across the northern=20
Indian state of Haryana in the last seven months to look for traces=20
of the river. A group of geologists and glaciologists, armed with=20
satellite imagery maps and remote sensing data, are studying rocks,=20
glaciers and sediments in the Himalayas, seeking any trace of the=20
river's course.

A heady mix of religion, politics, science and archeology drives=20
their efforts, and the results of the search may not only challenge=20
some fixed notions about the earliest civilization on the Indian=20
subcontinent, but could also confirm fears among India's secular=20
historians that the country's Hindu-nationalist ruling party is=20
trying to rewrite history to suit its agenda.

For decades, history books have maintained that the Indus Valley=20
people, who settled an area that straddles modern India and Pakistan=20
about 3000 BC, were the subcontinent's earliest civilization,=20
preceding the birth of Hinduism. Historians have held that the=20
Aryans, said to be the descendents of an Indo-European race who came=20
to India from near the Caspian Sea around 1500 BC, gave birth to=20
Hindu thought.

Hinduism became the region's predominant religion. Today, 84 percent=20
of India's 1 billion people are Hindus.

That predominance, however, did not prevent India from embracing=20
secularism when it achieved independence in 1947 and enshrining it in=20
the country's first constitution. Ruled by the staunchly secularist=20
Congress party for most of the past five decades, India pursued=20
policies designed to ensure equality for Muslims, Christians and=20
followers of other minority religions.

Nevertheless, many Hindus regarded their religion and culture as=20
supreme. A political force since the 1920s, Hindu nationalism reached=20
the peak of its influence in 1998, when the Bharatiya Janata Party=20
(BJP) formed a coalition government with several other parties. The=20
BJP-led coalition set about a slow but systematic program to place=20
historians sympathetic to Hindu-nationalist ideology in charge of=20
research institutions and to introduce changes in history textbooks=20
in schools.

Last summer, the Culture Ministry appointed a special committee of=20
experts to prove that the Saraswati was not merely a mythological=20
river, dismissed by historians as nothing more than a figment of the=20
imagination of Hindu sages who praise it as the "greatest of mothers,=20
greatest of rivers and greatest of goddesses" in the Vedas. If the=20
panel succeeds, the birth of Hinduism would be pushed back at least=20
1,000 years by establishing that the ancient Indus Valley=20
civilization was Hindu in character.

"Saraswati is not only a matter of Hindu faith, but also fact," said=20
Ravindra Singh Bisht, director of the Archaeological Survey of India,=20
who supervises excavation along what is believed to be the course of=20
the river. "The overwhelming archeological evidence of ancient=20
settlements along the course of what was once the Saraswati River=20
proves that our earliest civilizations were not confined to the Indus=20
river alone. Those who wrote the Hindu Vedas on the banks of the=20
Saraswati were the same as the Indus Valley people."

The BJP-led government already has taken steps to make these findings=20
official. In October, it ordered several significant changes in the=20
history textbooks, one of which was to change the name of the Indus=20
Valley civilization to the Saraswati River civilization.

The first real boost to the Saraswati believers came in the 1970s,=20
when American satellite images showed signs of channels of water in=20
northern and western India that disappeared long ago. When popular=20
folk memory was matched with the images, some historians ecstatically=20
claimed they had cracked the riddle of the revered river. In 1998,=20
groundwater experts dug wells along the dry bed identified in the=20
images and they found potable water, even under vast stretches of=20
desert.

"We still need to study the sediments to prove the origin of the=20
river was in the Himalayan glacier like our Vedas claimed," said=20
Baldev Sahai, a member of the Culture Ministry's expert committee,=20
who was the first, in 1980, to use remote sensing data to study the=20
course of the river. "After that, we can proudly claim to be the=20
oldest living civilization and culture with an unbroken link to our=20
past."

Once the entire course of the river, "from the Himalayas to the=20
Arabian sea" is established, the Culture Ministry plans to turn=20
archeological sites of lost cities along the Saraswati into tourist=20
hubs. And water specialists in the government wish to give new life=20
to the Saraswati River, by reviving old water channels.

The Hindu-nationalist government's quest for the Saraswati has split=20
historians along political lines, with some accusing the government=20
of giving a deliberate Hindu slant to Indian history and others=20
alleging that much of Indian history was written from a Eurocentric=20
perspective by British colonizers and needed to be "Indianized."

"Hinduism was not brought to us by a foreign race called Aryans. It=20
was born here on our land. The Rig Veda was composed here on the=20
banks of Saraswati by indigenous people around the time of the Indus=20
Valley period," said Arun Kesarwani, professor of ancient history at=20
Kurukshetra University. "That is why the quest for Saraswati is=20
important. It will shatter all the prevalent theories to pieces."

But many say that history is being distorted to suit the ruling=20
political ideology.

"This is an assault on history," said historian Arjun Dev. "This=20
version of the past is crucial to their political and religious=20
ideology of Hindu supremacy. They will go to any lengths to achieve=20
this -- even put forth a fake, invented past."

"It is propaganda work," said Suraj Bhan, a retired archeologist.=20
"The quest for Saraswati is not about history, it is myth-making."

For the devout Hindus who pray at tiny ponds and puddles, the=20
Saraswati is both a real river and a deity.

"In our hearts we know this is the water of holy Saraswati," said=20
Prem Vallabh, 75, head priest at a Saraswati temple. "We don't need=20
any scientific proof."

=A9 2003 The Washington Post Company

_____

#5.

Seminar
No. 522=20
February 2003
http://www.india-seminar.com/2003/522.htm

REWRITING HISTORY
a symposium on ways of representing
our shared past

The problem
by Neeladri Bhattacharya, Professor, Centre for Historical Studies,=20
Jawaharlal Nehru University, Delhi

THE idea of rewriting history is under a cloud. From the discussion=20
that has followed the ICHR move to stop the publication of the=20
Towards Freedom project volumes and the NCERT directive deleting=20
passages from the existing school textbooks, the very notion of=20
rewriting has emerged tainted, as if it inevitably means the play of=20
hidden hands, unrevealed agendas, manipulating minds. This is tragic.=20
For historians, rewriting is a creative act; it is the way history as=20
a mode of knowledge develops. In developing new perspectives=20
historians critique dominant frameworks - their enclosing limits and=20
repressions, their silences and erasures - and rework accepted=20
notions of the past.

[...]

In what sense is history writing under attack? Professional=20
historical scholarship matured in India in the years since=20
independence. The writing of history in a sense became tied to the=20
elaboration of the democratic, liberal, socialist, humanist vision of=20
Nehruvian India. As postcolonial India sought to define its identity=20
in relation to its colonial heritage, historians turned to a critique=20
of imperial narratives and colonial stereotypes of India's past. With=20
the general consolidation of a humanist intelligentsia in the=20
Nehruvian era, the field of history came to be dominated by left=20
liberals committed to the idea of a secular, democratic society.=20
Through the fifties and sixties the growing hegemony of this=20
intelligentsia was manifest in its control of the cultural=20
institutions of society and their active involvement in fashioning a=20
new public. Moved by the optimism of the age and the urge to provide=20
the children of new India with a post colonial history of India's=20
past, many of the finest minds plunged into the task of writing=20
textbooks when the NCERT was set up in the mid-sixties.

[...]

The vision of a new Nehruvian India was expressed in the histories=20
produced by the NCERT. Written in opposition to colonial and communal=20
representations of the past, the NCERT texts sought to present a=20
secular nationalist history that focused on our common past, our=20
shared heritage, our collective struggles, foregrounding the bonds=20
that tied the nation together rather than the sectarian and communal=20
strife that tore communities apart.

While these texts were increasingly prescribed all over India, the=20
number of schools that accepted the NCERT system remained small. Out=20
of a total of around 1,25,000 recognized secondary and higher=20
secondary schools in India no more than 6200 schools are at present=20
under the CBSE, though a larger number of schools accept the NCERT=20
syllabus up to class eight. Outside the NCERT system, within schools=20
run by community organizations and political parties, children were=20
being socialized into a different cultural sensibility.

The Saraswati Shishu Mandirs that the Jan Sangh began setting up in=20
the early 1950s proliferated all over the country, the number of=20
schools controlled by the Vidya Bharatis booming to over 4000 by the=20
1990s. In these shishu mandirs - discussed by Tanika Sarkar in this=20
issue - the nationalist secular history was turned upside down. While=20
the NCERT texts were formally accepted in these schools for the=20
purposes of public examination, a supplementary course on Bharatiya=20
Sanskriti initiated children to the 'real' history of India.

In this history, all creativity is traced back to the pre-Muslim=20
past, all glory is discovered in ancient India. From the medieval=20
times follows a long history of Hindu suffering and Muslim=20
oppression. Hindus are inevitably the heroes of this history,=20
Christians and Muslim the embodiment of all that is evil, the enemies=20
of the nation. Hinduism provides the unitary essence of India, and=20
Hindus are its only true citizens. For centuries Hindus had fought=20
against injustice, against the aggression of invaders, and they=20
needed to continue this struggle for freedom to eliminate the stains=20
of the Muslim past.

If the past has been witness to a history of Hindu tolerance and=20
Muslim tyranny, the present requires the Hindus to empower=20
themselves, transcend their effeteness, assert their masculinity and=20
erase the painful history of past wrongs. The call to Hindu assertion=20
here becomes a metaphor for a war against Muslims. In the madrasas,=20
as Nita Kumar shows in her essay, we again see a multiplicity of=20
texts and heterogeneity of teaching. The NCERT texts are accepted for=20
the purposes of examination, but students are initiated to the=20
teachings of Quran, reaffirming the significance of defining their=20
identity in relation to the text. This is particularly so in the=20
madrasas run by the madrasa boards.

Outside the schooling system, in the bazaar, popular tracts on local=20
and national histories circulate another mode of historical=20
knowledge. Cheaply produced and widely read, these tracts, in fact,=20
structure the quality of popular historical sensibility. Many of=20
these tracts are cast in a mythic mode, but they are sites of present=20
sectarian battles. We see seemingly ancient myths refigured to convey=20
communal meanings, and present political projects legitimated through=20
mythic returns to the past. Popular faith and belief, notions of=20
collective hurt and wrong, do not exist frozen in an immemorial time;=20
they do not come down to us with a fixed essence - already formed in=20
the mists of time. They are constituted and refigured through=20
practices of cultural production and modes of socialization, through=20
ideological battles and pedagogic interventions: the nature of=20
teaching, the ideas naturalized through textbooks and circulated=20
through popular tracts. The politics of Ramjanmabhoomi and the=20
nightmare of Gujarat cannot be imagined without the passion and=20
emotion that this structured faith generates.

Symbolic power often breeds a sense of complacency. The iconic status=20
of many left and liberal intellectuals, the international=20
appreciation of the histories they produced, their control over the=20
key academic institutions of society, created a deceptive sense of=20
self-assurance, a false idea of the hegemonic power of secular,=20
nationalist ideals. Events of the last decade and a half have=20
gradually dented this self-confidence of the Nehruvian=20
intelligentsia. Denied academic status and lacking symbolic power,=20
the other 'histories' that flourished outside academia, are now=20
questioning the status of academic history, the premises of its=20
knowledge and craft.

In a perverse enactment of the return of the repressed, these other=20
'histories' threaten to arise from their submerged locations, their=20
life in the bazaar and shishu mandirs, and assert their right to=20
power - their right to be patronized by the state, prescribed in the=20
textbooks that children read. Academic historians have for long=20
ignored the reality of these alternate 'histories', the logic of=20
their production, the nature of the historical sensibilities they=20
produce. If we have to resist the threat they pose to the practice of=20
academic history, we need to understand these other histories,=20
explore their inner structure and the premises of their popularity.=20
And as Chatterjee emphasizes, we need to think of ways in which=20
creative history writing, as yet confined to the academia, can enter=20
the domain of the popular.

[...]

That is why we need to be more than wary of efforts to cleanse=20
textbooks, erase evidence of the past, repress uncomfortable traces,=20
or stop the production of an archive of sources that reveals=20
disconcerting realities. When we are told that Aryans were actually=20
the original inhabitants of India, or that the Indus Valley=20
civilization is post-Aryan, or that the Indus people domesticated=20
horses, and that cows were never slaughtered in ancient India, we=20
need to recognize that these claims represent something more than=20
minor disputes over factual details of our past, something more than=20
a conflict over reading and representing evidence. When community=20
sentiments of pain and hurt become the ground on which we rework our=20
past, when we rewrite history to cleanse it of all that we seek to=20
disown, then we are witnessing a practice of rewriting that is=20
disturbingly problematic. These are moves that attack the very=20
discipline of academic history.

[...]

But when history is mobilized for specific political projects and=20
sectarian conflicts, when political and community sentiments of the=20
present begin to define how the past has to be represented - what can=20
be told and what had to be erased, when history is fabricated to=20
constitute a communal sensibility, and a politics of hatred and=20
violence, then we need to sit up and protest. If we do not then the=20
long night of Gujarat will never end. Its history will reappear again=20
and again, not just as nightmare but as relived experience,=20
re-enacted in endless cycles of retribution and revenge, in gory=20
spectacles of blood and death.

NEELADRI BHATTACHARYA

_____

#6.

The Indian Express
Sunday, February 16, 2003
STRAIGHT FACE

Indo-Pak yak, yak
Pamela Philipose

It gives me great pleasure to report that the deep, almost=20
unfathomable, diplomatic ties between South Asia's two largest=20
nations are thriving in the best traditions of subcontinental=20
football. Here's a brief history of the violently passionate,=20
ardently animated, compulsively inflamed, cross-border diplomatic=20
encounter.
http://www.indianexpress.com/full_story.php?content_id=3D18500

______

#7.

The Hindu
Sunday, Feb 16, 2003

A travesty of justice
By Kuldip Nayar
http://www.hindu.com/stories/2003021604990800.htm

______

#8.

The Hindu
Feb 16, 2003
Magazine

Baggage of hate

Almost a year after Gujarat burned, we need to reflect on why we do=20
what we do. Close encounters with real people give us the answer,=20
says BINA SARKAR ELLIAS.

Modi on his gaurav yatra ... riding high after his victory.

NARENDRA MODI is surfing high on his recent victory. He is on a=20
corporate yatra to reiterate his claim that Gujarat has boosted the=20
national income by drawing Rs. 8,000 crores of investment in the last=20
eight months alone. We are to conclude that the post-Godhra carnage=20
awakened a resurgence of faith in one religion, and is rewarded by=20
this deluge of corporate gratuity.

Proclaiming at every such meeting that Gujarat is the most peaceful=20
State in the country, Mr. Modi hopes that the old dictum of an=20
oft-repeated lie becoming truth will prevail. He does not know that=20
you can fool some people some of the time but you cannot fool all the=20
people all the time. He has faith in the brevity of memory, but there=20
are tenacious people out there who cannot be bought, who will=20
eventually trounce a megalomaniac's mission of hate.

Nearing a year since the burning of Gujarat, it is time to reflect=20
why we do what we do. Why a Chief Minister who presided over carnage=20
is re-elected. It is close encounters with real people that mirror=20
the vacuity of arguments that support and lead to the victory of a=20
Narendra Modi. Within the ramblings of these unguarded conversations=20
lie the essence of our follies.

Recently, two citizens of Ahmedabad's high-end business community=20
visited my home. They had contributed in votes to Narendra Modi and=20
were flush with his thumping victory. They were gentrified echoes of=20
the Chief Minister, made to believe that Ahmedabad was in turmoil for=20
merely a few days and the five months of simmering conflict reported=20
by the press was the usual media hype.

"The pro-minority coverage of post-Godhra carnage, the media=20
`accusations' of violent Gujaratis (the most docile people in the=20
nation) and the relentless Modi-bashing, is what really incensed the=20
Gujaratis and plugged the victory," they explained. "Should the=20
elections have taken place soon after Gujarat burned, Narendra Modi=20
would have lost."

It was with their Gujarat-bashing, that ironically, Rajdeep Sardesai=20
and Barkha Dutt ensured the victory for the BJP. Sonia Gandhi sealed=20
it with her presumptuous `Godse's Gujarat' speech. Gujarat would not=20
take this lying down. Modi, knocked about by the media, could still=20
stand his ground. He understood the pulse of his people and the=20
well-timed slogan `Gaurav nu Gujarat' was the winning ticket.

"There have always been communal riots in the State," my friends=20
continued. "In Ahmedabad's walled city, regular eruptions between=20
Hindus and Muslims are common place. Did the media ever cover the=20
skirmishes all these decades? Then why has it suddenly woken up to=20
make such a hideous splash of post-Godhra events, muddying the image=20
of the city?

"Did you know," they continued, "95 per cent of Ahmedabad was=20
unaffected, and just wanted to earn their rokda, get going with their=20
dhanda (even as the last embers were glowing). After all, Gujaratis=20
are a peace-loving community. In fact, it is Modi who revived pride=20
in Hinduism."

Unfazed by their contradiction, they offered: "Gujaratis are the most=20
hardworking, industrious community in India, and Gujarat, the=20
foremost State generating and importing wealth for the nation; it is=20
`that woman' Medha Patkar, for instance, who tried to disrupt our=20
economics with her Narmada Bacchao campaign and it is because of our=20
tough Government having thwarted her that we have enough water today=20
for our homes and our fields. Our farmers have the latest cars and=20
phones."

But what about those whom you have displaced? The homes and lands=20
that are submerged and livelihood snatched away? "Well, those are a=20
mere handful of people. Why think of a handful when ten times their=20
numbers benefit from the water diversion."

"Gujaratis are intrinsically docile, they are vegetarians and=20
wouldn't hurt an insect," they claimed.

Were these the very same docile people who carved a foetus from the=20
womb of an innocent woman, who burned, ravaged and murdered, who=20
converged on department stores during the riots in their cars with=20
cell phones to loot and celebrate the riots? "Well, the carnage was=20
conducted by a faceless frenzied mob and the looters were a breed of=20
`new-money' Gujaratis. Unfortunate, really. It is a question of=20
provocation that leads to aggression."

Would they consider preconceived biases having influenced their=20
conjectures? That we have inherited a knee-jerk response to=20
minorities since Partition? That it suits our governments to keep us=20
in conflict. That textbooks are being re-written to erase historic=20
truth. The response is well practised. "Who says so? What books? It=20
is pseudo-secularists like you who are a danger to the nation."

Do you want to perpetuate the baggage of hate we have inherited, I=20
persist, or do you want a toxin-free world for your children?=20
"Despite the polarisation in Gujarat," they offer, "where even our=20
lift man and the school bus driver constantly raise identity queries,=20
when our daughter asks, `Are Muslims bad people?'; we tell her that=20
all Muslims are not bad. It is governments that make us fight."

We come full circle. So, if governments are the villains then why do=20
we elect a Chief Minister who presided over the most gruesomely=20
engineered Gujarat riots? I am told: He is human. He made a mistake=20
in sanctioning the initial bloodletting. He did not know it would go=20
so out of bloody control. After all, even Gandhiji made mistakes.

(The writer is the Editor, Gallerie. E-mail her at gallerie@v...)

_____

#9.

The Economic and Political Weekly
February 8, 2003 | Perspectives

Identity Politics and Crisis of Social Sciences

Identity politics has undermined institutional concerns to provide=20
sound scholarship and good pedagogy. Further, it has encouraged a=20
culture of intolerance in academic discourses.
Rajen Harshe, Sujata Patel
http://www.epw.org.in/showArticles.php?root=3D2003&leaf=3D02&filename=3D547=
1&filetype=3Dhtml

_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/

SACW is an informal, independent & non-profit citizens wire service run by
South Asia Citizens Web (www.mnet.fr/aiindex).
DISCLAIMER: Opinions expressed in materials carried in the posts do not
necessarily reflect the views of SACW compilers.