[sacw] SACW | 20 Jan. 03

[Harsh Kapoor]

South Asia Citizens Wire | 20 January 2003

#1. Sri Lanka: Still Waters: Negotiation Process - From Phase I to=20
Phase II (Jayadeva Uyangoda)
#2. Sri Lanka: Ensure another year of peace - Press release of=20
People's Peace Front
#3. Pakistan: Eye of the Storm by Owen Bennett Jones (Book review by=20
Anatol Lieven)
#4. India: Gujarat: which way forward? (Balakrishnan Rajagopal)
#5. India: Pseudo-secularism - I (Gail Omvedt)
#6. India: Urgent Call to support the agitation on Right to=20
information related to development work in UP
#7. India - 2003 Bombay Sexual and Gender Minority Film & Video Festival

__________________________

#1.

Daily News (Colombo)
20 January 2003=09=20

Still Waters: Negotiation Process - From Phase I to Phase II

Jayadeva Uyangoda

When the UNF government and the LTTE began the fourth round of their=20
talks in Thailand in early January this year, the negotiation process=20
had already entered its Phase II. Phase I ended in December with two=20
significant and equally important developments that also marked the=20
beginning of Phase II.

The first is the announcement made by the LTTE's chief negotiator=20
that his movement would explore a federalist solution to the ethnic=20
conflict. The second is the debate on the re-settlement of Tamil=20
refugees in the villages that are now under the Sri Lankan army's=20
so-called High Security Zones in Jaffna. Both these developments=20
touch two contested areas that constitute the core of the conflict:=20
re-organization of the state power as a settlement framework and=20
dealing with the intricately poised military balance of power in the=20
Jaffna peninsula.

These two and other similar issues are most likely to be at the top=20
of negotiation agenda in 2003. They are not easy issues to be sorted=20
out.

Therefore, the forthcoming rounds of negotiation will most probably=20
be not as smooth as in the past year. Actually, a greater=20
responsibility for sustaining and stabilizing the negotiation process=20
will lay with the UNF government's leadership. This year in that=20
sense would be one that will really test Prime Minister=20
Wickramasinghe's capacity to manage and give leadership to a complex=20
process of negotiation at the center of which is the task of=20
stabilizing a peace-building process in a deeply divided and acutely=20
fragmented polity.

The political developments occurred in Sri Lanka in the year 2002=20
embodied some of the major contradictions in a society that has been=20
caught up in multiple intra-state conflicts. They included both the=20
dilemmas of emerging out of conflict as well as difficulties in=20
moving away from a culture of conflict, violence and war.

The absence of consensus within Sri Lanka's political class for=20
alternatives to war is quite paradoxically one of the key issues that=20
emerged as soon as the UNF government and the LTTE began to formalize=20
their political engagement early last year. The opposition to the=20
negotiation process first evolved along a thoroughly partisan=20
perspective. The only framework within which a joint approach to=20
negotiations by the political class appeared possible was through the=20
mechanism called 'cohabitation' between the parliamentary and=20
executive branches of the government. But cohabitation failed, and=20
continues to fail, not because it is difficult for the PA and UNP=20
leadership to design a working relationship, but because there is=20
simply no culture of cooperation among fragmented entities of the=20
ruling class in Sinhalese society.

This provides a rather strange backdrop for Sri Lanka's future=20
political possibilities through peace. Ruling class unity, even in=20
the face of a rare conjuncture of circumstances leading to resolving=20
the primary contradiction in the polity, cannot be forged=20
arbitrarily. As it appears, ruling class behavior in this country=20
evolves through processes of bitter debates, quarrels and even fights=20
among those self-centric factions of the political class. Perhaps,=20
one key lesson the Sri Lankan masses would have learned during the=20
year 2002 is that most of the factions of their political class are=20
pretty backward and clueless when it comes to making political=20
assessment of crucial turning points in the political process of=20
making the 'nation.'

The negotiation experience in the year 2002 also showed how Sri=20
Lanka's path to domestic peace has become almost totally=20
internationalized. Sri Lanka's ethnic conflict certainly involves=20
domestic political forces as main actors; yet its path to resolution=20
requires active participation of powerful global forces. Two reasons=20
appear to have led to this situation.

The first is the incapacity of the domestic political forces to=20
address the conflict from a perspective of sustained dialogue and=20
constructive engagement. All attempts at resolving the conflict=20
through non-military means have failed largely due to the=20
incapability of governments, the LTTE and other political forces at=20
home to politically grapple with the conflict with any measure of=20
commitment to conflict termination in a framework of mutual gain.

Secondly, in the post-Cold War world order, Sri Lanka has ceased to=20
be an island in conflict. Sri Lanka's conflict is enmeshed in global=20
and regional politics. Similarly, Sri Lanka's conflict touches the=20
very foundations on which the modern nation-state system in the=20
global arena is built. Global forces who manage the contemporary=20
world order do not seem to remain mere onlookers of a process in=20
which one nation-state, despite its relatively insignificant size,=20
decomposes itself due to internal infirmities. In the globalized=20
world order today, conflicts may arise due to domestic causes, yet=20
the trajectories of their spread as well as termination escape the=20
grip of the conflict creators or conflict actors at home. A new=20
constituency has emerged in the post-Cold War world to intervene in=20
shaping conflict trajectories. They are called 'international=20
custodians of peace.' For these global actors, Sri Lanka at present=20
has become a test case for a specific agenda of what one may call=20
'post-Cold War peace building.'

The internationalization of Sri Lanka's negotiation and=20
peace-building processes took its most visible and concrete form=20
towards the middle of last year. It involved not only negotiation=20
facilitation and mediation undertaken by Norway. It indeed was=20
characterized by active involvement in the process of (i) major=20
political and economic powers of the world, (ii) leading=20
multi-lateral economic and financial institutions in the world that=20
govern the global economy and (iii) prominent actors in the so-called=20
global civil society. Some of the names that figured prominently in=20
recent months - from Richard Artmitage and Christina Rocca to Yasushi=20
Akashi, Ian Martin and Jeffrey Sachs - indicate the extent to which a=20
global web has already been woven around Sri Lanka's peace building=20
process.

But, it is precisely these trends of internationalization of peace=20
efforts that have also generated resistance to the UNF-LTTE political=20
engagement.

There is a growing feeling among many Sinhalese nationalists that=20
some powerful international forces have ganged up to back the LTTE=20
and that the settlement being worked out by them would weaken the=20
Sinhalese nation and its hold of the Sri Lankan state. President=20
Kumaratunga's reluctance to back the UNF-LTTE negotiation process and=20
the PA's alliance with the nationalist JVP have also been concretized=20
in this context of a fear of foreign mediated political re-division=20
of Sri Lanka. The assertion being made by some influential Sinhalese=20
groups that India should re-intervene in Sri Lanka's conflict needs=20
to be understood in this context. Some of them appear to feel secure=20
if India intervenes on the assumption that India will deter what they=20
see as pro-Tamil West's presence in Sri Lanka.

Notwithstanding such nationalist discomfiture, a key political=20
achievement made by the Ranil Wickramasinghe administration=20
concerning the negotiation exercise with the LTTE is the putting=20
together of a powerful international coalition to back the=20
government's peace initiative. Prime Minister Wickramasinghe has=20
succeeded exactly where President Kumaratunga and her Foreign=20
Minister Kadirgamar failed two years ago. Given the fact that there=20
is absolutely no way to guarantee even the partial success of a=20
negotiation initiative with the LTTE, Prime Minister Wickramasinghe=20
has secured the best insurance policy possible through this=20
international coalition to support and push through the negotiation=20
process.

Meanwhile, on the UNF's part, its leaders have not so far explained=20
to the people any convincing way what the present negotiation=20
exercise is all about. They often pronounce platitudes and make=20
vague, though stylistically well-crafted, public statements. Their=20
enthusiasm to explain the intricacies of the peace process to the=20
diplomatic community is in no way being matched by any conviction on=20
their part that the average masses, who silently suffer the worsening=20
economic difficulties, should also be kept informed. Actually, the=20
vast sections of Sri Lankan people continue to support the peace=20
process despite the government's arrogance, not because the=20
government has educated them about negotiation process and its=20
possible outcomes, but because the people desperately look for=20
lasting peace and stability. A government that does not take the=20
people into full confidence is less likely to succeed in a major=20
exercise in political reform, as presupposed in the present=20
negotiation initiative.

Looking into the possible developments in the year 2003, what appears=20
to be quite certain is that the negotiation with the LTTE this year=20
is likely to be far more difficult than it was in the past year. Two=20
fundamental reasons may be adduced to the difficulties ahead.=20
Firstly, the LTTE's negotiation behavior is most likely to be shaped=20
by its agenda of consolidating its presence in the entire North and=20
East. Their understanding of peace is one in which the society in the=20
North and East would be governed by them and them alone. The idea of=20
federalism, now conceded to by the LTTE negotiators, provides the=20
best deterrence to such a monistic and authoritarian view of=20
self-rule and regional autonomy.

Federalism pre-supposes a dual government. It means the simultaneous=20
presence of both central and the provincial governments within a=20
particular region. Federalism also presupposes that the regional=20
unit's autonomy is conditional to its acceptance of democratic norms=20
and principles as laid down in the federal constitution. There should=20
be a constitutional package that defines the powers of the central=20
and regional governments and the modalities for the organization of=20
the dual government. One productive option for the government and the=20
LTTE in their talks in 2003 would be to focus on these constitutional=20
modalities of power sharing.

Secondly, the LTTE is most likely to judge the seriousness of=20
government's commitment to peace by the way in which the promises=20
made in 2002 at the negotiation table are actually implemented at the=20
ground level. It is in the implementation of policy promises made to=20
the LTTE that any government in Colombo is liable to be most=20
vulnerable, precisely because the state machinery that should=20
implement those promises has not yet been won over to the new=20
realities and demands of reconciliation and peace building. The UNF=20
government does not seem to have done much to explain its peace=20
policies to the armed forces, police and the bureaucracy. Prime=20
Minister Wickramasinghe should consult President Kumaratunga to learn=20
some past lessons about the damage that an uncooperative state=20
machinery can inflict on the negotiation process, as happened in 1995.

______

#2.

Sunday Observer
19 January 2003=09=20

Ensure another year of peace

Press release of People's Peace Front

Lakshan Dias, DADNC Wimalaratne, Malini Dissanayake, Co-coordinators=20
S. Sivagurunathan, Treasurer Milton A. Perera, M.S. Selvendran=20
Joint-Secretaries

People's Peace Front which is a coalition of more than 140 peace=20
organizations working in all parts of Sri Lanka emphasize the above=20
note as we believe that the peace dividends resulted in changes of=20
mentality of all the people of Sri Lanka remarkably during the year=20
2002. Absence of war during the past twelve months provided all=20
nationalities to think positively on cohabitation within a united=20
country.

We are stepping into another year with anxiety and hope therefore all=20
people will expect the continuation of the existing ceasefire and=20
peace talks to end the decades old political and ethnic war. When we=20
step into another year it is useful to have some reflections on what=20
kind of landmarks and goals we have to achieve together. What we=20
experienced throughout last year was that different factions emerge=20
as parties to the conflict, and it seems to be further expanded.

We have to find solutions for all those grievances. It is unavoidable=20
that different identities and groups, who are victimized by the war=20
and conflict, raise their voices when they breathe the air of=20
freedom. Therefore all must look at these demands of different groups=20
as a positive sign towards peace. We all must try hard to guarantee=20
the aspirations of all parties to the conflict and reach to a win-win=20
position.

Broader political consensus among the nationalities and groups to the=20
conflict will be the most difficult target that negotiating parties=20
and the Norwegian facilitators will face in the coming year. We must=20
look at the Norwegian Mediation as the most fruitful way to achieve=20
sustaining peace and should not allow negative thinkers to obstruct=20
the process. Deprived and dissatisfied groups may deviate from peace=20
process and they may use even violence as a bargaining power point.=20
Therefore addressing these challenges are in front of us.

Very importantly people of this country must ensure larger=20
participation in the peace process by actively taking part in the=20
peace discourse, be critical of each step taken and by side lining or=20
exposing the hard liners or pressurize the hard liners to change=20
their position on the peace process.

The international community should tighten its grip on democracy,=20
human rights and the Justice for the aggrieved parties, while=20
ensuring the major partners of the conflict will not be affected due=20
to their commitment towards peace. Importantly the international=20
community should not act on vested interest or geopolitical interest=20
but with interest of the People of Sri Lanka.

We the People's Peace Front therefore appeal to GOSL, LTTE, SLMC and=20
the President to maintain a multi partisan approach to the conflict=20
and ensure justice for all aggrieved nationalities and ethnic groups=20
and specially to all the victims of conflict.

_____

#3.

London Review of Books
Vol. 25 No. 2 dated 23 January 2003=20

Preserver and Destroyer

Anatol Lieven

Pakistan: Eye of the Storm by Owen Bennett Jones | Yale, 328 pp, =A318.95

Pakistan has been described as 'the most dangerous place on earth',=20
yet Owen Bennett Jones's title is appropriate, for though storms rage=20
all around Pakistan, the country itself is surprisingly calm -=20
surprisingly at least to anyone depending for information on the=20
Western media, which have all too often been given to hysterical talk=20
about state collapse, military tyranny, imminent Islamist revolution,=20
terrorist takeover and a nuclear war with India. All these dangers=20
are present, but with the possible exception of war with India, none=20
is as great as is usually argued.

By far the greatest long-term threat is one that our media hardly=20
ever discuss, since it is too long-term and insufficiently=20
fashionable: the growing shortage of water, due to a combination of=20
over-population, appallingly inefficient use and conservation, and=20
the effect of global warming on the Himalayan glaciers. If present=20
trends continue, it is virtually certain that in fifty years time,=20
much of Pakistan will be as dry as the Sahara - but a Sahara with a=20
population of hundreds of millions of human beings. (The same will be=20
true of northern India.)

Political violence in Pakistan has declined greatly in recent years,=20
with the suppression of ethnic clashes between Sindhis and Mohajirs=20
in Karachi and Hyderabad. What has increased, however, is the level=20
of terrorism directed against Westerners. But it is also the case=20
that Western journalists, or Asian journalists working for Western=20
publications, seem to operate on the assumption that one Western life=20
is worth a hundred Asian ones. Such reporting is especially=20
irresponsible in Britain, where large numbers of citizens are of=20
Pakistani origin, with close emotional and familial links to that=20
country. Their position was difficult in many ways even before 11=20
September. Since then, British involvement in the US 'war against=20
terrorism' has risked making their relationship to the British state=20
extremely painful, and undermining social cohesion. We have a clear=20
duty to inform ourselves accurately concerning Pakistan, and Bennett=20
Jones's intelligent book is an excellent source of information. [...]

{ FULL TEXT AT: http://www.lrb.co.uk/v25/n02/liev01_.html }

_____

#4.

The Hindu
Monday, Jan 20, 2003
Opinion - Leader Page Articles

Gujarat: which way forward?

By Balakrishnan Rajagopal

What is needed is an ideological remobilisation that can lead to a=20
total societal response. If that cannot be done without religion, it=20
must be appropriated from the Sangh.

AS WE drove into Ahmedabad from the airport in December, my friend=20
showed me a patch on the road opposite the Police Commissioner's=20
office where the tomb of a respected poet, Wali Gujarati, stood=20
before rampaging Hindu mobs destroyed it during the pogrom that=20
followed the Godhra train attack in Gujarat last year. The erasure of=20
that place of worship is in fact a metaphor for the erasure of our=20
memory of the violence and its causes, as Gujarat settles into a=20
period of post-election `democracy'. Our memory is also littered with=20
patches that conceal a massive amount of violence as we pretend that=20
everything is back to normal.

Indeed, one of the most astonishing lessons of the Gujarat massacre=20
is our capacity to forget, to simply get going. From the Partition=20
violence to last year's violence in Gujarat, India, as a society, has=20
never systematically grappled with the causes and consequences of=20
mass violence and attempted to heal social wounds or rebuilt=20
shattered institutions.

Yet, this is what most societies that witness horrific mass violence=20
do. In countries around the world, from Germany to South Africa to=20
Argentina to Cambodia, people struggle with the question of how best=20
to acknowledge what happened and how best to ensure that it does not=20
happen again. Ranging from truth commissions and international=20
criminal prosecutions to educational reform, societies generate a=20
range of strategies for dealing with these difficult questions of=20
guilt, complicity and accountability. Such questions are never easily=20
answered but the effort to try to answer them is itself part of a=20
national cathartic process that leads to a more healthy society. Such=20
a process is nowhere to be seen in India.

In Gujarat, it is obvious that the causes and consequences of mass=20
violence are so complex that only a total societal response will=20
begin to deal with it. By total societal response, I mean a response=20
that starts at the level of each individual and family and=20
encompasses every social, cultural, economic and political=20
institution. At the individual level, it is evident that Gujarat has=20
witnessed a complete breakdown of elementary social ties between=20
communities. This ranges from the lack of ordinary social interaction=20
such as dinners, friendship and neighbourly ties to active hostility=20
between individuals of different faiths. Few Hindus have Muslim=20
friends (or vice versa) or invite each other over for dinner.

This level of mutual hostility is comparable to the separation=20
between whites and blacks in the U.S. before and during the civil=20
rights movement, but at the social level, much improvement has been=20
made in the U.S. in bridging this racial divide. It has been made=20
possible only through a total societal response.

Additionally, this social disarticulation is strengthened by the=20
strict Brahminical customs in Gujarat including vegetarianism.=20
Indeed, it is one State where it is hard to find even eggs in the=20
market. In such an atmosphere, there is hardly any scope for social=20
interaction between Muslims and Hindus. This social disarticulation=20
extends into economic, cultural and political spheres. For example,=20
in the housing/rental market, there is blatant discrimination by both=20
Hindus and Muslims and for some decades now it has been that way.=20
There have always been Muslim apartments and Hindu apartments and the=20
social norms including vegetarianism, prevent a free market from=20
operating without constraints. If people do not live together, they=20
do not understand each other.

Indeed, in the wake of last year's violence, there is a virtual=20
ghettoisation of the Muslim community, for example, in the old=20
section of Ahmedabad. While the VHP's much criticised call for=20
economic boycott of the Muslims did not overtly succeed last year,=20
the fact is that there is already a yawning chasm between Hindus and=20
Muslims in the market place in Gujarat. This gulf is likely to grow=20
in the coming years.

It is the deep social embeddedness of the hostility between Muslims=20
and Hindus that makes it so challenging to deal with the aftermath of=20
last year's pogrom. For, unlike initial estimates, the problem is not=20
restricted to the penetration of the state by the Sangh, or even the=20
collapse of the state. Rather, the social networks that underlie=20
formal institutions are themselves deeply corroded or non-existent.

In these circumstances, it is rather meaningless to talk about=20
re-establishing the rule of law because the social conditions for its=20
establishment must first exist. The heroic attempt made by many human=20
rights groups to bring accountability, including assisting victims to=20
speak out, to re-file FIRs, to issue reports and so on, must=20
continue. But in my view, these attempts will not truly address the=20
root causes of the violence in Gujarat. Everyday acts by ordinary=20
individuals, from kitchen table conversations to cricket matches, are=20
as important to build trust and social capital. There are clear=20
alternatives: between institutional reform and everyday acts of=20
resistance and change.

In addition to individual acts of courage and responsibility, there=20
is also a fundamental need for alternative social mobilisations that=20
challenge the Sangh Parivar's monopoly over organising in Gujarat.=20
The Sangh has successfully reached out to the common people and=20
offers an attractive package of ideological purpose and material=20
benefits that the secular political parties are unable to match.

The NGOs remain too weak, without a real mass base. The organisations=20
that do have a mass base seem to have failed to stand up to the=20
challenge. Part of the problem is that secularism as an ideology=20
seems to be hopelessly weak when competing with religious=20
mobilisation. What is needed is an ideological remobilisation that=20
can lead to a total societal response. If that cannot be done without=20
religion, it must be appropriated from the Sangh. It seems very=20
difficult to rebuild the state and reestablish rule of law without=20
such an ideological remobilisation and re-appropriation of religion.

It is also evident that a lot of ordinary people in Gujarat have=20
blood-stained hands. The killings, mass rapes, destruction of=20
property, arson, and other depraved acts have not been committed by=20
special squads of the Sangh Parivar that then lie in wait. Rather, as=20
numerous investigative reports have made clear, including that of the=20
Concerned Citizen's Tribunal, the violence has been committed by=20
local political and governmental leaders, with the active or passive=20
assistance of the local people. They are not going anywhere.

Accountability under these circumstances is extraordinarily hard and=20
must take a myriad forms to succeed. Even if the state is independent=20
and capable of arresting everyone involved in the violence (which it=20
is not), it may lead to a deep social schism due to the deeply=20
embedded nature of the religious hostility in Gujarat. Indeed, when=20
faced by similar circumstances, many societies have combined a=20
variety of mechanisms of accountability. South Africa, with its Truth=20
and Reconciliation Commission and limited prosecution/amnesty=20
mechanisms, is a prominent example.

These debates are not new. In the Balkans, for example, there have=20
been serious discussions about how best to build trust and social=20
capital in a situation where neighbour has killed neighbour. The=20
choices are not restricted just to criminal prosecutions. In India,=20
such debates are hardly beginning. This must change quickly.=20
Otherwise, the paradox of Gujarat - a developed State with a Gandhian=20
tradition, strictly vegetarian and enforcing prohibition against=20
liquor, but also a State with a history of communal violence, savage=20
pogroms and state erosion - may be repeated all over India.

(The writer is the Ford International Assistant Professor of Law and=20
Development and Director of the Program on Human Rights and Justice=20
at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, U.S.)

_____

#5.

The Hindu
Jan 20, 2003
Opinion - Leader Page Articles=20=20=20=20

Pseudo-secularism - I

By Gail Omvedt

The subtraction of Hindutva from Hinduism has proved impossible for=20
the defenders of secularism to make, since their arguments remain at=20
an abstract level without an analysis of the historical construction=20
of Hinduism itself.

OUT OF the agony that most progressive forces in the country are=20
feeling about the results of the Gujarat elections have come many=20
analyses, many musings about what lies ahead.

At one level, the BJP has proved its point about the uselessness of=20
"pseudo-secularism". It has proved it over the bodies of thousands of=20
Muslims and Hindus who have been victims of the communal hatred and=20
fanaticism of both sides; it has proved it through appealing to=20
Gujarati pride and anger at being targeted by "outside" forces; it=20
has proved it through an appalling poisoning of the political culture=20
of a whole linguistic region, a poisoning which it has been=20
attempting to whip up and use throughout India. It is no use any more=20
having any confidence in the moderate tones occasionally used by Atal=20
Behari Vajpayee, L. K. Advani or even Narendra Modi himself; these=20
are plays in the game, indeed they are responses to that same=20
external pressure which has apparently angered many Gujaratis.=20
Gujarat's face, and India's face, stands blackened in the world=20
today, even more so with Mr. Modi's victory, and the ruling party=20
feels the necessity to whiten it a bit. We should be grateful if that=20
leads to a little slowing down on the chauvinism and the terrorism.

It is hard to have sympathy for the claims of Hindutva's followers of=20
being defenders of religion; they have shown they are ready to kill=20
for what they consider to be their religion, but not to die for it.=20
But who has shown any resolve against them? Only one Congress leader,=20
Digvijay Singh, has consciously sought to build on forces firmly=20
opposed to Hindutva, and he was not to be seen in Gujarat. Instead,=20
in campaigning in Gujarat, the Congress truly showed its secularism=20
to be pseudo. The details of the way in which its leaders became=20
"Hindutva's B team" are rather appalling. Publicising a different=20
election manifesto in Gujarati and English; having Sonia Gandhi start=20
her campaign from a temple; refusing to even put up a significant=20
number of Muslim candidates or try to consolidate the Muslim and=20
Dalit vote; Congress activists running after Mr. Modi's Gaurav Yatra=20
to cleanse it with cow dung chanting Vedic hymns all the while - and=20
so on. The Congress somehow expected that it could win by combining=20
this soft Hindutva with an appeal to development and caste vote=20
banks. This has proved a disastrous strategy.

Voters no longer take any party at face value on development issues,=20
and caste vote banks are not enough. A political party needs a=20
vision; the Congress failed to show it in Gujarat. Had the Congress=20
stood up for its Nehruvian-Gandhian secular ideals it might still=20
have been defeated - but at least it would have gone down with some=20
honour, and it would have paved the way for some restoration of a=20
sane political culture in Gujarat, rather than adding to the poison.=20
It might even have won it a few more votes, since - it should not be=20
so surprising after all - voters like integrity.

However, we should also be ready to admit that something may be wrong=20
with Nehruvian-Gandhian secularism or at least with the way=20
secularism has been projected as an ideal. Editorial and analytical=20
discussions following the elections have shown a kind of desperation=20
on the part of most defenders of secularism. The following decades=20
will see "a frontal attack on the concept of secularism", writes K.=20
K. Katyal (The Hindu, December 30); but he does not acknowledge that=20
the frontal attack has been going on for some time or attempt to=20
evaluate the successes of varying strategies of dealing with it.=20
Dipankar Gupta, in turn, writing in the Economic and Political Weekly=20
(November 16), calls for an "intolerant secularism," meaning that the=20
state must be ready to forthrightly enforce the rights of citizens=20
against violence and terror, regardless of the religious rhetoric=20
used to justify this. But without any suggestion as to how to=20
convince or pressure the state to do so, this remains a pious hope.

The dominant Left analysis today of the growth of violent Hindutva=20
and other forces of religious nationalism attributes it to capitalism=20
and globalisation. This is also a council of despair because it does=20
not analyse why some capitalist and globalised countries are=20
significantly more tolerant and non-violent than others; it thus=20
prescribes no action other than to fight globalisation and=20
capitalism. The distinction that Marxists had once made between=20
advanced and backward capitalism, or democratic capitalism and=20
fascism, has almost vanished. Thus, Father Nathan can lament in The=20
Hindu open pages (December 31) that "the voice of reason is powerless=20
against the myth" projected by the Hindutva forces - the=20
powerlessness is itself a demonstration of desperation. His talk of=20
building as an alternative "people's movements on people's issues"=20
does not suggest what these movements might be. The Left parties=20
which have in the past built such movements have been conspicuously=20
unsuccessful in recent years; the strongest mass movements, those of=20
farmers and Dalits, have been outside the Left framework, while the=20
most decisive political steps on Dalit issues have been taken by a=20
Congress leader who is a liberal of the Amartya Sen type.

Secularism, meaning simply the neutrality of the state towards=20
religious communities, may well be necessary in today's plural=20
society - but it still requires a foundation, a moral vision to make=20
such a state possible. The theoretical attack on the=20
Left-Gandhian-Nehruvian version of secularism has been a strong one.=20
It has come not from the virulent Hindutva crowd but from leading,=20
sophisticated intellectuals such as Ashis Nandy, Partha Chatterjee=20
and others. Their argument has been that the concept of secularism=20
has been "western" (i.e. European, Christian-influenced) in the way=20
it presumes the possibility of separating religion from politics.=20
They argue that, in contrast, religion has been so intertwined with=20
all aspects of life in India that this is impossible (or, as Lata=20
Mani has poetically put it, "is a dewdrop sacred or secular?"). Their=20
alternative is to argue that Indian tradition was inherently=20
tolerant, that it is rather the modernising state, homogenising and=20
interventionist, requiring a monolithic "national culture" to back it=20
up, which has been the root cause of the rise of the various forms of=20
violence and growing alienation of religious groups seen in India=20
today. Mr. Nandy and Mr. Chatterjee differ in various ways, and=20
neither would like to have his position identified with that of the=20
Hindutva ideologues. Yet, since neither says anything concrete about=20
Islamic tolerance, we are left with the position that it is above all=20
Hinduism that is tolerant. The progressives want to say that Hinduism=20
is not Hindutva; the Hindutva people say that they are the same. But=20
the subtraction of Hindutva from Hinduism has proved impossible for=20
the defenders of secularism to make, since their arguments remain at=20
an abstract level without an analysis of the historical construction=20
of Hinduism itself.

This position ends by giving a theoretical foundation to the charges=20
of virulent Hindutva: the state needs a religious foundation and this=20
can only be provided by Hinduism, the majority religion (or "true=20
religion") of the Indian people. Hinduism is tolerant, Islam is not;=20
the Congress and Left who proclaim secularism are ignoring the=20
cultural and historical realities of India and so are=20
"pseudo-secularists." Unless these theses can be dealt with at a=20
theoretical and ideological level, it seems to me to be very=20
difficult to deal practically with the Hindutva ideological challenge.

_____

#6.

18 Jan 2003 17:43:15.0636

Urgent Call to support the agitation

dear friends,
tonight at 8:30pm i spoke to Sandeep Pandey (of Asha, a senior=20
activist who is also the national coordinator of National Alliance of=20
People's Movement - the largest network of grassroot organizations in=20
India), and he voiced the disillusionment brewing in the villagers=20
because of NEAR DEAD response from the government to the agitators=20
who are braving even the ZERO degree chill in the open to fight for=20
their right - right to information.

As you might be aware of, an agitation has been going on since=20
January 11, 2003, (please note, that this agitation started (on Jan=20
11) just a day after President of India gave his accent to Central=20
Act on Right to Information on Jan 10), where over 250 people of=20
Bharawan Block Panchayat collected and staged a dharna, demanding=20
INFORMATION related to development work in their respective gram=20
sabhas. There are 51 gram sabhas that come under Bharawan Block=20
Panchayat. This also smells pungently of the rampant hypocritical=20
attitude in our system. President of India gives his nod to Central=20
Act to Right to Information for all citizens of this country and at=20
the very grassroot, people are denied even the pertinent relevant and=20
most basic information related to development work in their own=20
village. Or pension is being denied to old people. Or food rashion is=20
being pilfered and stopped from reaching the people who most need it.=20
Is it surprising that there are few families who were driven to near=20
starvation and 'Asha Ashram' in Lalpur volunteers had to give daily=20
rashion to such families. But Government is quiet. All opposition and=20
sitting political candidates from this region, are Quiet. A deathly=20
chill paralyses the corridors of power in this region. Not even a=20
whisper comes across.

Sandeep Pandey joined the agitation on Jan 12, alongwith National=20
Secretary of PUCL and a noted social activist KAVITA SRIVASTAVA=20
(Jaipur Rajasthan). The dharna is continuing till date.
They are demanding information with details of all sanctions and=20
expenses (vouchers etc) related to development work in their gram=20
sabhas.
The struggle continues unabated. Gross irregularities and=20
discrepancies have been noticed in the manner in which pradhans=20
function. Corruption is rampant at the very grassroot of our social=20
structure.

For instance NO MEETING HAS BEEN HELD OF VILLAGE PANCHAYAT since=20
last TWO years and therefore SIX panchayat members joined the=20
agitators. An old lady was denied her pension because she was not=20
able to give a bribe of Rs.1500. Similarly a small young girl of=20
hardly 10 years, who has no guardian to take care of, and only a=20
younger brother to live with, was denied a dwelling because the=20
Pradhan told her that your house has been sent to 'bhookamp'=20
(earthquake) - this happened sometime after the Gujarat earthquake in=20
2001.

Now after 8 days of continuous dharna and agitation, today a=20
handwritten account was handed over to Sandeep. This too, is cooked=20
up and points to corruption and gross irregularities going within the=20
system. Because :
1. this account has been signed on the date of December 25, 2002=20
- but expenses and income has been shown till December 31, 2002.
2. no amount has been given for expenses rather just the mention=20
of the task done.

>From Tomorrow, Sunday January 19, 2003, two natives of this region,=20
Munna Lal Shukla and Vishwanath Mishra, will start a fast-unto-death=20
stir to intensify the movement. Sandeep will join the fast-unto-death=20
bid later on but not today because he will focus his energies to link=20
this andolan to larger cause of corruption and make all out bid to=20
involve our youth and students across the nation.

What we all wish is that activists and socially conscious people who=20
feel for this issue but are unable to physically come to Bharawan and=20
join the agitators, may complement the cause in many ways. You may=20
stage a protest in support of the ongoing struggle in Bharawan, you=20
may link it to corruption and denial of information issues around you=20
and initiate a movement .... but do break the SILENCE. Be vocal in=20
your support.
please do come or do what you can best from your place, and try to=20
complement the agitation and really enhance the impact meaningfully,

banking on your support and blessings,

bobby
for
Sandeep/ Arundhati
national convenors of NAPM (National Alliance of People's Movement)
A-893, Indira Nagar, Lucknow-226016. India Phone : 0522 2 347365
email : <mailto:ashaashram@y...><ashaashram@y...>

_____

#7.

India - 2003 Bombay Sexual and Gender Minority Film & Video Festival

Address: Humjinsi, C/O India Centre for Human Rights and Law,=20
CVOD Jain High School, 4th Floor, 84 Samuel Street (Hazrat Abbas St.)=20
Dongri, Bombay-9 INDIA
Phone: +91-22-2371 6690/ Fax: +91-22-2379 1099
Dates: Dates not-yet announced (Submission Deadline: February 20,=20
2003; Selection notification on June 15, 2003)
Contact:
Email: <festival_humjinsi@y...>

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