[sacw] SACW | 7 Nov. 02

[Harsh Kapoor]

South Asia Citizens Wire | 7 November 2002

#1. Pakistan: The coming theocracy (Khurram Dastgir Khan)
#2. Pakistan: A systemic crisis (Praful Bidwai)
#3. India: Conversion politics - I and II (P. Radhakrishnan)
#4. Excerpts from State of Nepal Edited by Kanak Mani Dixit and=20
Shastri Ramachandaran
#5. An Agenda for Cultural Action and Other Essays by KN Panikkar
#6. Hindu Wife, Hindu Nation: Community, Religion and Cultural Nationalism
by Tanika Sarkar (reviewed by Charu Gupta)

__________________________

#1.

The News International
Thursday November 07, 2002

The coming theocracy

Khurram Dastgir Khan

By the end of 1990s, Pakistan's religious parties were=20
better-financed and better-organised than ever, and continuing their=20
deep liaison with sensitive agencies. Yet they were deeply frustrated=20
by their inability to reach power. The October 1999 coup opened the=20
gates for them. The military establishment needed to build up=20
alternative political forces on the right in order to counter PML(N).=20
Recognising the two major components of the right-of-centre vote, the=20
regime's technicians created PML(Q) to absorb the anti-PPP sentiment=20
and MMA to absorb the religious vote.

The first visible step towards MMA was taken months before 9/11. A=20
major meeting was held in Akora Khattak in spring 2001, around the=20
same time PML(Q) was being formed. The US attack on Afghanistan in=20
October 2001 merely hastened a process already underway. The same=20
parties now hold hands whose militant wings were busy decimating each=20
other in the last decade. Uniting of religious parties under the MMA=20
banner remains, wrote the London Economist, "something of a miracle,=20
brought about, some say, by the army, which wanted a counterweight to=20
the mainstream political parties besides PML(Q)."

The Musharraf regime allowed Islamists to continue political=20
activities and banned others. This allowance continued even after=20
religious parties protested against the regime's pro-US policy in=20
Afghanistan. The fizzling out of that protest, and later the fatwa=20
(religious edict) in favour of the presidential referendum, led many=20
to think that Gen. Musharraf had reached an accommodation with=20
Islamist groups. The regime's much-vaunted ban and crackdown on=20
domestic Islamists was eyewash meant for western countries.

MMA's stunning gains must not be attributed to the regime alone,=20
though. MMA's campaign nationwide was rich in resources, competed=20
head to head with established parties in terms of advertising, and=20
last but not the least, benefited from the perception that religious=20
parties now possessed the ingredients crucial for electoral success:=20
power of money and violence.

Furthermore, Pakistanis of all classes are seeking refuge in Islam.=20
They are vexed by failures of all previous non-religious governments=20
to provide good governance and economic growth. They also find=20
themselves unable to cope with swift social and cultural changes.=20
Anthropologist Clifford Geertz wrote in Islam Observed, "The=20
disjunction between the forms of religious life and the substance of=20
everyday life advances almost to the point of spiritual=20
schizophrenia. Whatever else Islam does for those who adopt it, it=20
surely renders life less outrageous to plain reason and less contrary=20
to common sense."

This, of course, is nothing new for Muslims. Whenever faced with=20
adversity, they rush back towards Islam. In Pakistan's case, Prof=20
Eqbal Ahmed has written that: "As the country has suffered --=20
increasingly over the last five decades -- from a crisis of=20
leadership, the promise of an 'Islamic state' has recurred as the=20
core symbol of failure."

The rush towards Islam occurs because self-analysis and finding=20
rational reasons for failure are difficult tasks. What the=20
philosopher Hannah Arendt called absolutism's ideological "sixth=20
sense" offers a simple diagnosis: Pakistan is in decline because it=20
has moved away from Islam, and that Islam is in danger from the=20
USA-Israel-India troika. This argument appeals to a widespread desire=20
to believe that external forces are responsible for Pakistan's=20
decline. Thus the obvious solution: move closer to Islam by voting=20
for religious parties.

It is tempting to argue that the Islamic resurgence in Pakistan is=20
the result of a one-time confluence of:

(1) reaction to the US destruction of Afghanistan;

(2) handicapped mainstream parties; and

(3) the tenuous unity of the MMA itself.

Analysts will undoubtedly point out that religious alliances of the=20
past have always splintered and MMA's vote bank is negligible in the=20
more populous provinces of Punjab and Sindh. Apologists of the regime=20
hope in vain that the US will not allow MMA any leeway.

In the 2002 election, both the militant and non-militant brands of=20
religious movements came together. To take just one instance: for the=20
first time in its history, the tableeghi group manifested its support=20
openly in a general election, and that too naturally went to MMA.=20
Militancy in any case is a product of the US-financed and=20
ISI-orchestrated Afghan 'jihad'. As The Washington Post wrote last=20
week: "To the extent that religious parties have enjoyed influence in=20
Pakistan, it is because of the army, which has played a long and=20
well-documented role in promoting Islamic militancy."

Some analysts have suggested that the junta actually preferred a MMA=20
victory. "They note that with hostile legislatures in the areas near=20
the Afghan border, [Gen. Musharraf] will be able to drive a harder=20
bargain in negotiations with Washington over the scope of Pakistan's=20
cooperation in the anti-terror war," says the Post.

The herald of a coming theocracy is the Legal Framework Order 2002,=20
through which the junta has assumed permanent command of the country.=20
The junta favours the religious parties because in addition to=20
bleeding PML(N) vote, they: (a) served as instruments of Pakistan's=20
foreign policy in Kashmir and Afghanistan, and (b) unlike mainstream=20
parties, the Islamists do not challenge the preponderance of the=20
armed forces over resources of the Pakistani state. The Islamists=20
will be content to just be able to follow their social agenda.

The jihad culture has acquired a financial and spiritual momentum=20
that will be difficult for any future Pakistani government to=20
curtail. To be sure, the fall of Taliban in Afghanistan and=20
withdrawal of Pakistan's support for independence struggle in Kashmir=20
are setbacks. And this is precisely where the danger lies, as the=20
Jihadi movement is now more likely to turn its energies inward to=20
turn Pakistan into a theocratic Islamic state. By uniting under the=20
MMA banner, Islamic parties have positioned themselves strongly for=20
the short-to-medium term future. They have all four factors needed=20
for political power in the coming years: access to finance and=20
weapons, a very large group of young and motivated political workers=20
in shape of madrassah students, access to intelligence sources and,=20
most importantly, instant public credibility based on religion.

Religious parties had credibility in the past, too, but that=20
credibility did not translate into votes. Nature, though, abhors a=20
vacuum. The Musharraf regime created a political void through its=20
vitriolic propaganda and extra-legal shenanigans of keeping Benazir=20
Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif out of the country. MMA's populist anti-US=20
and Islam-in-danger stance helped it storm the bare political field.=20
It is likely to stay there and flourish if once the public, which=20
innately respects religious leaders, finds in them the authority to=20
relieve their practical problems as well.

Historian Michael Burleigh's depiction of 1920s Germany rings true=20
for Pakistan: "A mass sentimentality, compounded of anger, fear,=20
resentment, and self-pity, replaced customary politics. Belief,=20
faith, feeling and obedience to instinct routed debate, scepticism=20
and compromise. Ordinary people chose to abdicate their individual=20
critical faculties in favour of a politics based on faith, hope,=20
hatred and sentimental collective self-regard."

History tells us that Germany's National Socialists contested five=20
general elections between 1928 and 1933, and went from a vote of two=20
percent to above 37 percent. Finally in power in 1933, they=20
demolished the electoral democracy that had brought them into power.=20
In its place rose a militant absolutism that mutilated German society=20
and plunged the region into a catastrophic war. Shall Pakistan learn=20
from history?

Concluded

_____

#2.

The News International
Thursday November 07, 2002

A systemic crisis

Praful Bidwai

Recent political events in Pakistan have put paid to all hopes that=20
the Muttahida Majlis-i-Amal would face some degree of isolation from=20
the "mainstream" moderate parties on account of its advocacy of=20
religious extremism and its thoroughly retrograde social agenda. Just=20
the contrary seems to be happening as the Pakistan People's Party=20
Parliamentarian woos the MMA in an attempt to form the next civilian=20
government after the National Assembly is convened.

Clearly, the "mainstream" parties are yet again readying themselves=20
to collaborate with the religious sectarian elements-much as they did=20
during the 1980s and 1990s, most infamously in pursuit of the=20
Taliban-based Afghanistan policy under Benazir Bhutto in 1994.

The difference this time around is that the pro-jehadi parties are=20
far stronger with their 11 percent national vote than they were 10 or=20
15 years ago. Secondly, today's political deals are taking place one=20
full year after September 11 and the other cataclysmic events which=20
followed, which should, logically, have widened the political=20
distance between the religious extremists and the "moderates".

Whatever the precise shape of the next government in Pakistan, the=20
weight of religion in the country's social and political life seems=20
set to increase at least in the immediate future. Seen in long-term=20
perspective, this not only represents a major setback to the cause of=20
advancement of democracy, but a potentially serious aggravation of=20
some of the basic, fundamental, systemic dilemmas that Pakistan faces.

The relationship between religion and the state, or more broadly,=20
politics or public life, is one of the three major axes around which=20
Pakistan has been shaped over the past 55 years. The importance of=20
the religion-politics connection has been starkly evident especially=20
since Ziaul Haq launched his Islamisation or Nizam-e-Mustafa campaign=20
in the late 1970s to acquire a figleaf of legitimacy for his regime.=20
But at a more fundamental level, the religion-politics relationship=20
has been at the very core of the definition of Pakistan's nationhood.

Indeed, the critical importance of Islam to Pakistan's dominant=20
nationalism, coupled with the relative weakness of its social=20
identity-a strong identity can only derive from a high level of=20
integration, social coherence and the "moral, mental and cultural=20
unity of (a nation's) inhabitants"-has impelled social scientists=20
like Christophe Jaffrelot to speak of "Nationalism without a Nation"=20
(the sub-title of this recently released edited volume of essays=20
published by Zed Books, London).

Regrettably, recent developments, including the national elections,=20
also highlight Pakistan's vulnerability as regards the other two axes=20
too: namely, the "nationality" question or the issue of=20
ethnic-regional imbalances; and the balance between military and=20
civilian authority in the country, reflected in the excessive weight=20
of the former.

To someone across the border, who watches the Pakistani political=20
scene with keen interest and empathy, it is apparent that the=20
elections, especially to the provincial assemblies, have widened=20
regional political differentiation. The MMA's impressive success in=20
the Northwest Frontier Province, and its only slightly less=20
spectacular performance in Balochistan, sharply contrasts with the=20
Pakistan Muslim League (Qaid-i-Azam) or PML(Q)'s domination of the=20
Punjab and the salience of the PPP and the MQM in Sindh.

This means that the country's most prosperous province remains=20
largely supportive of the military and receptive to anti-India=20
chauvinism. The mohajir problem and the issue of the Sindhis'=20
alienation broadly remain where they were. But a major change has=20
occurred in the provinces bordering Afghanistan, especially in=20
Balochistan, whose left-leaning politics and distinctive ethnic=20
identity have given way to a strongly Islamicist politics.

Such a situation is particularly conducive to authoritarian and=20
religious-nationalist politics. For a period of time, such politics=20
might suppress the nationality issue or put it on the back burner.=20
But it will eventually exacerbate the problem of uneven development=20
and inter-province disparities. As it is, such disparities are bound=20
to grow under the skewed model of market-driven economic growth which=20
Pakistan, along with most of countries of the region, has adopted.=20
The overall long-term result could be an aggravation of ethnic=20
tensions and discontent.

The third axis, the military-civilian (im)balance is also the site of=20
a retrograde shift. Instead of inaugurating a transition to civilian=20
rule, as the late 1980s did, the latest elections do not herald a=20
transfer of power to the elected representatives of the people.=20
General Pervez Musharraf already precluded this before the elections=20
through his arbitrary Constitutional amendments, especially through=20
the establishment of a National Security Council and by giving=20
himself the power to dismiss a future civilian cabinet.

It might be argued-and some in the Establishment do precisely=20
this-that given the poor quality of Pakistan's party-political=20
leadership, and its inability to address the root-causes of the=20
country's crisis, the military has necessarily to act as a safety=20
valve or even as the social arbiter of last resort. But such an=20
excessive, metastatic, role for the armed forces can only occur at=20
the expense of the civilian leadership, and aggravate the primary=20
crisis of politics, and further weaken the processes of=20
democratisation.

The military-civilian imbalance poses an acute problem today.=20
Musharraf, demarcating himself from other military rulers, has placed=20
large numbers of armed forces personnel in administrative positions:=20
some 18,000 posts, including some key ones. A civilian=20
administration, no matter how progressive, will be hard put to roll=20
this back, or to dismantle the gargantuan structure of, say, the=20
Fauji Foundation. This overt re-militarisation of the state, itself a=20
setback, could worsen if there is no process of thaw or=20
reconciliation with India, and tension and mutual hostility grows.

Pakistan's systemic crisis is likely to deepen on all these fronts.=20
The country is not set on the path of progress and prosperity, but=20
headed for greater discontent and turmoil. India's rulers have no=20
reason to rejoice in this. The destinies of the two states are=20
closely bound up with each other: the failure of one state will=20
inevitably produce an adverse impact on the other. But India has its=20
own grim crisis of governability, rooted in extreme poverty,=20
widespread deprivation, uneven and inequality-enhancing growth,=20
widening class and regional disparities, severe environmental=20
degradation, growing politicisation of caste, efforts to insinuate=20
religion into politics, and growing lack of legitimacy of a=20
malperforming, bumbling, corrupt, predatory state.

In the past, India's crisis would be blamed-conveniently, but to a=20
large extent, rightly-on the limitations of the Nehruvian model of=20
development, on the "Congress system", and also on the cynicism and=20
power hunger of leaders like Indira Gandhi and the callow immaturity=20
of Rajiv Gandhi. Now for four and a half years, the Indian people=20
have tried a non-Congress coalition, led by a party "with a=20
difference", and found it to be much worse than the Congress, indeed=20
utterly despicable.

As things stand, the Bharatiya Janata Party seems certain to lose the=20
next general election. Such is the popular anger against its=20
appalling performance that the people will deliver exemplary=20
punishment to it by sending it packing. Yet, there is no alternative=20
in sight, which can offer a truly, radically, different set of=20
programmes and policies and provide a government which frontally=20
addresses the root-causes of India's myriad problems.

______

#3.

The Hindu
6 Nov 2002
Conversion politics - I
By P. Radhakrishnan
http://www.hinduonnet.com/2002/11/06/stories/2002110600831000.htm

The Hindu
7 Nov 2002
Opinion
(http://www.hinduonnet.com/2002/11/07/stories/2002110700301000.htm)

Conversion politics - II
By P. Radhakrishnan

EIGHT, IN the absence of hard data, the reference in the Ordinance to=20
anti-social and vested interest groups exploiting the innocent=20
people, and religious fundamentalists and subversive forces creating=20
communal tension under the garb of religious conversions, is inane,=20
tendentious and insulting to the sensibilities of all religious=20
minded persons.

Nine, as the Ordinance is clear in its objective to prevent Dalit=20
conversions, it raises a serious question. When the state has hardly=20
any concern for them, and they are still victims of untouchability=20
and social ostracism, why should it be a stumbling block to their=20
regeneration with the help of other religions?

There are three answers to this: (a) What B. R. Ambedkar wrote of the=20
"untouchable" legislators elected after the Poona Pact: "They were=20
completely under the control of the Congress Party Executive. They=20
could not ask a question which it did not like. They could not move a=20
resolution which it did not permit. They could not bring in=20
legislation to which it objected. They could not vote as they chose=20
and could not speak what they felt. They were there as dumb, driven=20
cattle." Though most Dalits are still like dumb, driven cattle that=20
is the way Hindu society wants them — for carrying its dirt and=20
drudge. (b) Dr. Ambedkar's related observations on conversion:=20
"Fortunately for the Muslims there is a large mass of non-descript=20
population numbering about seven crores which is classed as Hindus=20
but which has no particular affinity to the Hindu faith and the=20
position of which is made so intolerable by that faith that it can be=20
easily induced to embrace Islam... This is sufficie!
nt to cause alarm among the elite of the Hindus... What would be=20
their fate if their following was depleted by their conversions to=20
Islam? Herein lies the origin of the Shudhi Movement or the movement=20
to reclaim people to the Hindu faith."

(c) Seen against the above two, and given their numerical strength,=20
a united front of the Dalits, a majority of the Hindus (who are not=20
yet on the lunatic fringe), Muslims and Christians can halt the march=20
of Hindutva.

The Advanis and the Malkanis are conscious of this danger of nemesis=20
catching up with them.

Ten, if the Tamil Nadu Chief Minister, Jayalalithaa, did not repeal=20
the Ordinance despite vociferous criticism and condemnation of it by=20
the entire media, with the exception of the Sangh Parivar's, despite=20
widespread protests by Christians and Muslims who found common cause=20
in fighting against the Ordinance which brought them together on=20
common platforms, despite the protest-closure of minority educational=20
institutions, and despite a writ petition against the Ordinance=20
admitted in the Madras High Court, it does not show her in good light.

On the contrary, her total lack of sensitivity to the shrill and=20
strong negative response of civil society raises at least two issues:=20
One is, as the Tamil Nadu Prohibition of Forcible Conversion of=20
Religion Bill, 2002, was passed by the Tamil Nadu Assembly on October=20
31, despite strong protests and by out-voting the combined opposition=20
of the DMK, the Congress, the PMK and the Left parties, which lost=20
the battle by 140 to 73, it raises a larger constitution question of=20
the future of democracy in Indian States when a particular party=20
having brute majority in the Assembly is bent upon destroying the=20
very same democratic fabric.

The other is, while debating the Bill, Ms. Jayalalithaa claimed that=20
the AIADMK would not move away from its Dravidian moorings. In this=20
context, it is important to note that the anti-Brahmin, anti-Aryan,=20
anti-North, anti-Hindi, anti-Sanskrit and anti-Congress acrimony and=20
agitations, and the concomitant glorification and deification of=20
Tamil and Dravidian culture by the Dravidian movement, especially=20
during the 1930s and 1940s, were necessitated by certain=20
socio-political and cultural contexts.

As though responding to another historical necessity, successive=20
Dravidian parties have undone the legacy of this movement by=20
diluting, distorting and discarding it. In his exasperation with the=20
failure of Hindu society to draw the Dalits into its honourable fold=20
and its persistence with and perpetration of age-old injustices of=20
untouchability, and exclusionary and discriminatory practices,=20
despite his decades-long Self-Respect Movement, Periyar E.V. Ramasamy=20
Naicker repeatedly exhorted the Dalits to leave Hinduism and embrace=20
Islam. Eleven, even if it remains a dead law, it is not without its=20
precipitant and pernicious consequences. Instances are (a) the claim=20
by the BJP president, Venkaiah Naidu, who showered praise on Ms.=20
Jayalalithaa for the Bill, which has the support of both the BJP and=20
the Sangh Parivar, that banning conversions will be endorsed in=20
BJP-ruled States; (b) along with Mr. Naidu, the BJP's L.K. Advani and=20
Arun Jaitley voicing the need for an anti-conversio!
n Bill similar to the Tamil Nadu one; and (c) the VHP's Praveen=20
Togadia declaring that Ms. Jayalalithaa has done the nation proud;=20
and so on.

Twelve, irrespective of how the Ordinance and the Bill are seen by=20
the outside world, they make sense only when Ms. Jayalalithaa is=20
placed in the larger political context of Hindutva.

On this, the observations from an editorial in are relevant to note:=20
"The Jayalalithaa Government... has taken a leaf straight out of the=20
Sangh Parivar's viciously sectarian agenda and has, in a sense,=20
`outranked' even the BJP's own regimes that have stopped short of=20
enacting such a regressive and patently anti-minority legislation=20
with serious Constitutional implications for a citizen's fundamental=20
right to personal freedoms affecting profession, practice and=20
propagation of religion (Article 25)."

To conclude, Ms. Jayalalithaa's anti-conversion agenda is an attempt=20
to play to the Hindutva gallery.

______

#4.

DAWN
03 November 2002

EXCERPTS: The receding state
By Saubhagya Shah

Nepal is in transition. As the state disengages itself from its=20
cardinal responsibilities, the market fills the vacuum. The situation=20
in Nepal described by Saubhagya Shah is what we are also experiencing=20
in Pakistan.
Most of the societal movements in Nepal have been parochial rather=20
than social in nature. Bereft of any economic vision or commitment to=20
broad social issues, these mobilizations have been driven by a single=20
quest for the capture of political power by overthrowing the existing=20
regime, without reforming the nature of the state or economy. The=20
quest for office has metamorphozed headhunting radicals into=20
bourgeois apparatchiks, while pedigreed socialists have come around=20
to embrace privatization and free market as life itself. This is one=20
reason why even with several regime changes in the last fifty years=20
the nature of the Nepali state has not changed substantially,=20
contrary rhetoric and rituals notwithstanding.
It remains Nepal's singular misfortune that the political forces are=20
always engrossed with changing the regime, but never with altering=20
the substance of governance. As a consequence, the country is made to=20
live from one 'revolution' to the next with the intervening periods=20
muddled through in ad hocism and make-do solutions. For the political=20
elites and counter-elites, establishing rule-based governance and=20
institutional procedures has so far proved less attractive than=20
simply overthrowing the political opposition and ruling through=20
patronage and fiat.
The regularity of the ten-year cycle of 'movements' and upheavals=20
would suggest that Nepal has fatefully institutionalized a condition=20
of perpetual revolution. Cyclical upheavals every decade or so=20
preclude a process of accumulative depth in governance and=20
creativity. Instead, each cycle further exacerbates the polarization=20
of Nepali society and the emasculation of the state.
The hyper-fragmentation of society by forces jockeying for brute=20
power is disabling any articulation above or beyond the clique level.=20
This is not a progressive politicization of the social but the=20
fragmentation of the very spirit of community. It is not surprising=20
that commentators still have to belabour the point about 'national=20
consensus' even on minimal issues of providing food, shelter, health,=20
education and ensuring the right to life and limb.
Outside of power, there is little space left where broader=20
non-partisan engagements can take place on vital issues. Efforts and=20
initiatives that seek to engage the public and transform the nature=20
of power are hemmed in from two sides: on the one hand the=20
colonization of all public space by the party (for a citizen it=20
matters very little whether public space is colonized by one, two or=20
many parties), and on the other the depoliticization of the remaining=20
by NGOs and the market.
If the political parties and their networks have disabled the=20
community impulse by their petty politicization of life, the=20
NGOization of society and intellect has circumvented and further=20
emasculated the state rather than reform it.
Some Nepali intellectuals have begun to express despair that a decade=20
of NGO effervescence in the country has not made any significant dent=20
in the country's socio-economic condition or led to any sustainable=20
social movement that would address public issues. These expectations=20
and disillusionments generally tend to erroneously conflate NGOs with=20
civil society, democracy and social movements.
By its very constitution, NGOdom in Nepal appears unlikely to play a=20
vanguard role in social movements. Participation in civil society and=20
engagement in social movements pre-supposes a certain degree of=20
autonomy and commitment that is not feasible from agents lacking=20
agency. But first, what is this foisted civil society-Hegelian ideal,=20
de Tocqueville's civic association or late capitalism's post-class=20
imagining? Or, is civil society the political arm of the=20
translational economic regime? The fetishized object itself neither=20
explains nor brooks interrogation.
In the context of a surplus of authorized engagements with 'civil=20
society', 'democracy' and 'good governance', authentic movements that=20
surface independently suffer the violence of cognitive deficit. This=20
is a condition in which society fails to perceive and acknowledge=20
impulses that are not sponsored by the logic of development.
What is both surprising and promising is that despite the generally=20
bleak climate, Nepal has witnessed a remarkable resurgence in=20
small-scale grassroots mobilizations on issues of community and=20
livelihood. Some of these examples include the creative initiatives=20
of 'untouchable' castes for dignity and equality; struggles by=20
agricultural labourers for justice; and the voices of the rural=20
against domestic violence, gambling, alcoholism, and for women's=20
rights.
* * * * *
The most insidious form of this cognitive deficit operates by denying=20
any legitimacy and recognition to issues that might be raised outside=20
of party or development patronage. Authorization through funding=20
becomes the normative worth of any issue and engagement; anything=20
outside of the hegemonic discourses of development and democracy=20
appears weird or even outright sinister.
The obstacles to broad social coalitions come in many forms: the=20
hyper-fragmentation of life by the parties on the one hand and the=20
NGOs on the other. The community sense that propels movements appears=20
out of place at a time when the ideology of individualism, free=20
market and privatization of everything from education, health care=20
and public transportation is intensifying.
It is a sign of the times that instead of pooling resources and=20
energies to improve dilapidated drinking water services, tottering=20
public transportation and eviscerated health services, people now=20
seek solutions in private tubewells, exclusive schools and nursing=20
homes. In such a climate, those small signs of community spirit that=20
still manage to surface slowly wither away as society continues to=20
avert its gaze. However, the persistence of such eruptions opens the=20
possibility that the remedy for the fractured polity might come not=20
from the authorized agencies but from these grassroots impulses.
The logic of privatization and deregulation has been taken to its=20
perverse conclusion in Nepal where fundamental community issues such=20
as drinking water and public security are being turned into market=20
commodities. The drying up and contamination of drinking water supply=20
has given birth to a booming bottled drinking water industry, as well=20
as private tanker-trucks which transport hundreds of gallons at one=20
go from outskirt rivulets to Kathmandu Valley's privileged homes.
Amidst the background of a rising tide of political and criminal=20
violence, the state has backed out of the 'social contract' to assure=20
a minimum level of security. The state's rollback from this vital=20
arena has led to a budding market for private security companies in=20
the past few years. Rather than shoring up the deteriorating law and=20
order situation, the government has instead reduced the fees and=20
duties on firearms so that individuals can purchase their own private=20
security.
The increasing tendency of privatizing the state's cardinal=20
responsibilities is having tragic consequences on millions of people=20
who cannot afford to pay the going rate for what otherwise should be=20
the Nepali state's first obligation to its citizens. The ordinary=20
masses therefore find themselves in an unenviable position, with a=20
soft state being led by the neo-liberal market on one side and Maoist=20
violence on the other.
The efforts of the neo-liberal ideology to frame progress in an=20
antagonistic relationship with the state is both ahistoric and=20
disingenuous. The discourse meant for third world consumption=20
constitutes an historical amnesia of an experience in which no=20
society - whether western or any of the new Asian Tiger variety -=20
achieved prosperity with the help of NGO development in the absence=20
of an effective state system.
Without a competent regulator and mediator there can be no=20
development, human rights, civil society or even market economy, at=20
least nothing more than a rhetoric that gets shriller by the day as=20
if to discursively compensate for its actual absence. As the violence=20
and human suffering escalates to new heights, there is an urgent need=20
for political parties, the intelligentsia and the market to go beyond=20
conventional power politics and the equally debilitating logic of the=20
substitution and dismantling of the Nepali state in order to=20
contemplate creative ways of 'bringing the state back in'.
A part of this will entail reassessing the dominant discourses=20
relating to free market, development, democracy and human rights, and=20
making them critically relevant to specific Nepali needs=20
andconditions. Despite claims of universality, the inherent cultural=20
and ideological inflections of the dominant ideas preclude=20
off-the-shelf application as some brand-name consumer product.
Obviously, the one-size-fits-all approach to development and=20
deregulation is not working for Nepal. For example, there is a need=20
to discern between social democracy and market democracy and decide=20
if the welfare state is, as Susan George put it, a 'public good or=20
public enemy'. Two decades of NGO-led development and a decade of=20
market economy have amply demonstrated that there can be no=20
substitute for a reformed and enabling state and its constructive=20
role in society. A socially conscious engagement must transcend both=20
the limitations of traditional party politics and a cynical rejection=20
of the state in addressing the basic questions of Nepali polity.
In the final analysis, only a competent and compassionate state can=20
be a durable guarantor of security and welfare to the masses.
Kanak Mani Dixit is editor of Himal: the South Asian magazine
Shastri Tamachandaran is Senior Assistant Editor with The Times of India
Saubhagya Shah is assistant professor at the department of=20
sociology/anthropology at the Tribhuvan University, Kathmandu.
This book describes how the uniquely diverse country of Nepal is=20
grappling with change and continuity. Sixteen areas of critical=20
importance ranging from ethnicity, politics, gender, identity,=20
technology, to media, economy, development, etc have been addressed.
------------------------------------------------------------------------

Excerpted with permission from State of Nepal
Edited by Kanak Mani Dixit and Shastri Ramachandaran
Himal Books, P.O.Box 166, Pattan Dhoka, Lalitpur, Nepal.
Tel: 977-1-542544.
Email: himassn@m...
ISBN 99933-13-22-X
312pp. Rs490

______

The new book by well-known historian KN Panikkar has been published=20
by Three Essays Press.

Title: An Agenda for Cultural Action and Other Essays
It contains the following essays and interventions, and an introduction:

Colonialism, Culture and Revivalism=A0
Hindu Revivalism, a Political and Cultural Project=A0
History and Cultural Heritage=A0
Globalisation, Culture and Communalism=A0
Outsider as Enemy=A0
Whither Indian Education?=A0
Left Cultural Intervention, Perspectives and Practice=A0
An Agenda for Cultural Action

It can be ordered from Three Essays Press=20
<http://www.threeessays.com>www.threeessays.com

______

Biblio
Vol. VI Nos. 7 & 8 November-December 2001

Domesticating the Nation

Charu Gupta

Hindu Wife, Hindu Nation: Community, Religion and Cultural Nationalism
by Tanika Sarkar
Permanent Black (New Delhi 2001) 290 pp
ISBN: 81 7824 007 6

>From the margins to the mainstream, women's history in India,=20
particularly pertaining to the colonial period, has come a long way.=20
The struggle from the time when women were not even considered a part=20
of Indian history writing, to when they were treated as 'soft'=20
subjects, to the present when gender history is breaking new=A0

grounds and is in many ways determining the very terms of debate has=20
not been easy. And yet, in the past two decades, there have been a=20
string of edited collections and monographs, stimulating discussions=20
and dissents which have led to the most creative phase of the=20
relationship between gender and history in India. Ironically, this is=20
also the time when the onslaught of the Hindu Right on women and=20
history writing in particular, is assuming dangerous proportions.
Tanika Sarkar can be regarded as the foremost among the extremely=20
creative and thinking scholars and historians, who have contributed=20
to Indian women's histories in colonial times. Her new book, a=20
vintage collection of the best of Tanika Sarkar, represents what=20
history writing should be like. Written in a lucid style, it combines=20
rich and rare empirical data with rigour and creative insights.=20
Without adopting explicit theoretical jargon or clich=E9s, the work=20
nonetheless questions some of the neat, commonsensical assumptions=20
and formulations that have often been made on the subject. Unlike=20
many studies on colonial India that emphasise only the hegemonic=20
function of colonial rule, in which the colonised is denied all=20
agency, the central locus here are the indegenous voices. In so=20
doing, she constantly and effectively challenges writings influenced=20
by Edward Said,where western knowledge and Enlightenment are=20
identified in totality with power and hegemony, without

taking on board how nationalism too was often complicit with domination.
Most of the essays have been published elsewhere before. Written over=20
a decade, when read here together, they raise provocative=20
possibilities and weave a narrative thread, imparting new meanings=20
and visions to the 'Hindu Wife' and the 'Hindu Nation', while=20
simultaneously illuminating and strengthening some of the core=20
arguments of the author. The essays at once differ and then converge,=20
sharing a common problematic on the development of Hindu cultural=20
nationalism, largely in 19th century Bengal, interwoven with=20
perceptive insights on how women are embedded in the production of=20
community, religion and nation.
Sarkar's main argument is that there was a decisive shift among the=20
Hindu middleclass Bengali intelligentsia from an earlier liberal=20
reformism to Hindu cultural revivalism and nationalism in the late=20
19th century. And gender identity underpinned this process. Using=20
distinct methods, multiple sources, sights, events and places, the=20
various essays explain the 'how' of this in a detailed fashion. The=20
Introduction, which is absolutely new, not only contextualises these=20
developments but also comprehensively attempts to elucidate the 'why'=20
of it. The use of vernacular by Sarkar points to the limits of=20
restricting to just the official documents. Often it is the=20
vernacular sources, which offer social history in its most=20
stimulating form.
Sarkar is mainly concerned with the voices of the Hindu=20
revivalist-nationalists, and not so much with those of the reformers=20
or liberals. However, I do think that such divisions are often=20
untenable. The same person could well take a reformist stand on one=20
issue and a revivalist one on the other. There could also be=20
convergence of reformism and revivalism on the question of caste,=20
gender and religion.
The opening essay, from which the book takes its title, gives the=20
reader a taste of what is to come. It gives an overall view of how=20
concerns with domestic practices initiated much discussions and=20
debates in the period and how Hindu nationalism established its=20
relationship with the politics of the family. Sarkar argues that the=20
domestic domain was the inner core of national culture, and the Hindu=20
woman was the harbinger of the spiritual essence of the home. The=20
home was in a sense the last refuge of the colonised Bengali male's=20
masculinity and self-esteem. This is a point which has been made by=20
various scholars, especially in the context of Bengal, including=20
Partha Chatterjee. While Sarkar has disagreed with many of his=20
formulations, here a convergence between their viewpoints is=20
perceptible. However, this model can be neatly applied to the whole=20
of colonial India, as many subsequent writers have shown. Though the=20
domestic sphere was a crucial arena of Hindu assertiveness, for=20
example in colonial north India, more important was the fact that the=20
discursive management of female bodies cut across any neat boundaries=20
of 'home' and 'outside', 'private' and 'public'.
The book then begins with two events in the 1870s in Bengal. My=20
personal favourite in the collection is the exploration of the social=20
history of a scandal in which Elokeshi, a young wife, was seduced and=20
then raped by the mohunt of Tarakeswar, a great Shaivite pilgrimage=20
centre in Hooghly, and then subsequently killed by her husband,=20
Nobin. He then turned himself in at the local police station with an=20
unequivocal confession. Ultimately he received a pardon because of=20
massive public petitions for mercy, and the mohunt was sentenced to=20
three years' rigorous imprisonment and a fine. This violent event and=20
the stories circulating around it were vividly narrated in farces,=20
newspaper editorials, reports, journals, bazaar paintings, street=20
songs and most important on the stages of the new public theatre. At=20
least 25 farces were published on the subject, many in the form of=20
plays, and some of them staged. The amazing range of debates, where=20
opinions were open-ended and relational rather than univocal, also=20
reflected a sense of guilt among the Hindu public, which the later=20
Hindu cultural nationalism suppressed and displaced. The essay makes=20
for a fascinating reading, covering an enormous range, including=20
Bengali theatre; sexual scandals; the making of a Bengali public=20
sphere; law; class, caste and conjugal tensions; and the role of=20
print explosion, which gave the Hindu publicists a much wider arena,=20
helping in the public dissemination and consumption of events, and at=20
the same time criss-crossed with oral and visual media.
The next essay explores how in the 19th century, Rashsundari Debi, an=20
upper-caste housewife from a deeply conservative village household,=20
not only taught herself to read in the greatest secrecy, but also=20
went on to write the first full-length autobiography, Amar Jiban (My=20
Life) that was printed in Bangla. Here, she explained the nature of=20
her life as she saw it, elaborated on her very individual=20
understanding of Bhakti, and reflected on the new times that were=20
unfolding around her. It was also living proof of how a woman,=20
finding received wisdom and prescriptions unsatisfactory, insisted on=20
developing an individual social and theological understanding of=20
herself. While a remarkable piece, Sarkar has already explored=20
various dimensions of the making of this modern autobiography in her=20
full-length monograph Words to Win (1999). This essay is a brief=20
version of that.=A0
The two essays on Bankim Chandra delineate the location of the Muslim=20
and the Hindu nation in his works as an interlinked formation that=20
has to be situated simultaneously within his novels and essays. The=20
two set up an internal dialogue and self-interrogation that moves=20
across his earlier, relatively open-ended and often radical phase and=20
later more dogmatic and recognisably revivalist work. Sarkar is=20
centrally concerned with the profound breaks in thinking and=20
expression as well as with the fundamental continuities that were=20
preserved through certain narrative tropes and devices by which=20
Bankim continued to destabilise his seemingly unambiguous agenda of a=20
triumphant Hindu people. The focus of the latter essay is on Bankim's=20
last five years when he composed three historical novels on=20
Hindu-Muslim antagonism and two polemical essays on an authentic and=20
reinvigorated Hinduism to be attained through a disciplinary regime=20
that he spelt out in some detail.
Conjugal debates and legislative activity on Hindu marriage issues in=20
the last decades of the 19th century form the discursive field of the=20
next two essays. Sarkar shows how constructions of Hindu conjugality,=20
defined around non-consensual, indissoluble infant marriage, were at=20
the very heart of the formative moment for militant nationalism in=20
Bengal. Cultural nationalists underlined the distinctiveness of Hindu=20
conjugality by maintaining that non-consensual Hindu marriage was=20
basically a spiritual relationship, a higher form of love than the=20
Victorian ideal of a companionate one. The infant-marriage ritual was=20
drenched in a warm, suffusing glow of loveability. However, the=20
famous Rukhmabai case of 1887-the death of 10-year-old Phumoni due to=20
injuries sustained during sexual intercourse with her 35-year-old=20
husband and the passing of the Age of Consent in 1891-marked a=20
turning point in the arguments of revivalist-nationalists. They moved=20
from the realm of reason and pleasure to that of discipline and pain.=20
The essays explore the grim coercive and disciplinary power behind=20
avowals of love and self-surrender.
At the turn of the century, according to the author, conjugality=20
receded somewhat into the background and the focus shifted more on=20
the icon of the mother, a particularly potent one in colonial Bengal.=20
It needs to be reiterated that Sarkar is deeply embedded in her=20
sources and contexualises this development. The same does not hold=20
true for other places, colonial north India, the area I am familiar=20
with for instance, does not see this shift so clearly. Here=20
husband-wife relationship, and concerns with the wider position of=20
the woman within the household continued to hold sway well into the=20
20th century. In the case of Bengal, the ideology of motherhood could=20
be specifically claimed as their own by the Hindu nationalists and=20
could help in emphasising their selfhood. Here Bharat Mata was often=20
a cultural artefact, or a distinct personality, represented in=20
different situations as a glorious figure of abundance; as a powerful=20
mother Kali and Durga; a destructive Shakti; or as an enslaved,=20
all-suffering figure, a tearful victim and a frail widow.
The last essay takes a leap by a century, examining certain aspects=20
of the contemporary Hindu Right through the strident feminine voice=20
of Sadhvi Rithambhara. By this Sarkar points to certain ideological=20
continuities between the past and the present and how certain=20
patterns are still current today, especially vis-=E0-vis Muslims in=20
different forms. Simultaneously however, she makes it clear that no=20
neat linear connections can be drawn between then and now.
The book opens up many exciting avenues, and shows the tremendous=20
reach of the author. At the same time, Tanika Sarkar is one of the=20
most component persons to draw a comprehensive bibliography of=20
Bengali vernacular sources, tracts, pamphlets, and secondary readings=20
on gender, history, colonialism and Bengal. While the footnotes are=20
good, a bibliography at the end of the book is sorely missed. An=20
index too would have been handy. The essays while tying beautifully=20
together could also have done with some updating of footnotes and=20
sources as a lot of new research has been done since Sarkar wrote her=20
essays. These minor missings apart, as a historian working on similar=20
issues, though in a different context, I was enthralled with the=20
book. There is not a moment when one is bored. A must for all=20
concerned with any aspect of gender, nationalism, colonialism or=20
social history in general. A landmark indeed.

_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/

SACW is an informal, independent & non-profit citizens wire service run by
South Asia Citizens Web (http://www.mnet.fr/aiindex) since 1996.
To subscribe send a blank message to:
<act-subscribe@yahoogroups.com> / To unsubscribe send a blank
message to: <act-unsubscribe@yahoogroups.com>
________________________________________
DISCLAIMER: Opinions expressed in materials carried in the posts do not
necessarily reflect the views of SACW compilers.
\\|//\\|//\\|//\\|//\\|//\\|//\\|//\\|//\\|//\\|//|//\\|//|//\\|//|//\\|//|
--=20