[sacw] SACW | 6 Nov. 02

[Harsh Kapoor]

South Asia Citizens Wire | 6 November 2002

#1. Kashmir: Sangh Parivar's Waterloo (Navnita Chadha Behera)
#2. The opening in Kashmir: Turning over a new leaf (Praful Bidwai)
#3. Saffron Gastronomy (Susan Watkins ) [ Review of D. N. Jha's, The=20
Myth of the Holy Cow]
#4. Book Announcement: Humjinsi=A0- A=A0resource book on lesbian, gay and=20
bisexual rights in India edited by Bina Fernandez

__________________________

#1.

The Hindu
Wednesday, Nov 06, 2002
Opinion - Leader Page Articles =A0=A0=A0
http://www.hindu.com/stories/2002110600821000.htm

Kashmir: Sangh Parivar's Waterloo

By Navnita Chadha Behera

The BJP and the RSS fail to realise that their defeat was... because=20
their understanding of the socio-political realities of Jammu and=20
Kashmir society is fundamentally flawed.

THE TRIFURCATION of Jammu and Kashmir has become a bone of contention=20
within the Sangh Parivar. While the BJP has rejected this demand as=20
`anti-national', the RSS is sticking to its guns. The Prime Minister,=20
Atal Behari Vajpayee, and the RSS chief, V. Sudarshan met recently in=20
a peacemaking attempt and agreed to hold regular consultations for=20
resolving their differences. This truce, however, is likely to=20
boomerang in Kashmir. Kashmir has always been central to the Hindu=20
notion of rashtra-rajya. And yet, the proponents of Hindutva have=20
consistently failed in securing their political objectives because=20
their ideological and political tenets are at variance with Jammu and=20
Kashmir's deeply plural social realities.

Ideologically, the Hindu nationalist identity was predicated on the=20
notion of "Muslim disloyalty to the Indian nation", while=20
politically, it adhered to the strong state theory with total=20
subordination of the minorities to the Hindu majority. These=20
political forces represented by the Jan Sangh and the RSS lost the=20
battle for State formation in 1947 to the Nehru-led Congress'=20
modernist nationalism that upheld the idea of a secular and plural=20
India. They, however, persisted in their efforts to take control of=20
the Indian state. Jammu and Kashmir became important because of its=20
Muslim-majority character. It had become the new battleground of=20
contending nationalisms: secular nationalism vis-a-vis the two-nation=20
theory as well as Hindu nationalism. Nehru believed that Kashmir's=20
voluntary accession had strengthened the hands of secular=20
nationalism. Determined to keep it within India's fold, the State was=20
granted special status under Article 370 of the Constitution.

Nehru's extraordinary concessions to the State and his support for=20
Sheikh Abdullah, a popular Muslim leader, against the Hindu Maharaja,=20
Hari Singh, provided the Hindu nationalist forces with just the=20
`cause' they needed for springing back into action and galvanising=20
their cadres. It not only tended to reaffirm their core belief in the=20
`Muslim disloyalty' theory but Kashmir's special status was also=20
construed to be an instrument in weakening the Indian state. Jammu=20
and Kashmir, therefore, became central to the Hindutva ideology.

The first salvo was fired through the Praja Parishad agitation in=20
1952. Founded on the RSS' existing organisational base in Jammu, the=20
Parishad resented the transfer of power from the Hindu Dogra Maharaja=20
to the Muslim leadership of the National Conference. It believed land=20
reforms had fundamentally altered the pattern of social organisation=20
of the State to its disadvantage. The Parishad's eight-point=20
programme demanded the abrogation of Article 370; full integration of=20
the State into the Indian Union; full application of the Indian=20
Constitution; removal of the present distinction between=20
`state-subjects' and Indian citizens; complete jurisdiction of the=20
Supreme Court; removal of customs barriers between Kashmir and India;=20
fresh elections to the Kashmir Constituent Assembly; and=20
investigation of corruption in the State administration by an=20
impartial tribunal. The Parishad sought to end Kashmiri domination by=20
demanding the State's complete integration with the Indian Union. By=20
transferring power from the Valley-based Government to the Centre, it=20
hoped Kashmiri domination over the Jammu region would be reduced.

The Bharatiya Jan Sangh, the Hindu Mahasabha, the Ram Rajya Parishad,=20
the Punjab Arya Samaj and some Akali leaders supported the Parishad's=20
agitation. However, this movement failed to acquire a mass character=20
owing to its limited social base, especially in the rural areas. The=20
Parishad's identification with the Hindu landlords, jagirdars and=20
sahukars (money lenders) who had enjoyed a privileged position under=20
the Maharaja's rule delivered a body blow to its social and political=20
appeal. The State's peasantry (mainly in the Valley, but also in=20
Jammu) had reaped rich dividends from the NC's land reform policies.=20
By making it a Hindu-Muslim issue, the Parishad leadership failed to=20
gain the support of Jammu's Muslims who did not support the NC but=20
also rejected the former's communal agenda. It also failed to=20
mobilise the support of the small but influential minority of=20
Kashmiri Pandits in the Valley and the Ladakhi Buddhists who shared=20
its antipathy for Sheikh Abdullah.

The Parishad had erred in grasping the political imperatives of the=20
diverse social realities of Jammu and Kashmir. Given its deeply=20
plural character, a political mobilisation strategy could acquire a=20
mass support base only by evolving a political agenda that appealed=20
to different communities cutting across their ethnic, religious and=20
linguistic affiliations. The proponents of Hindu nationalism never=20
learnt this lesson. Fifty years later, the RSS is again resorting to=20
a communal strategy of political mobilisation by seeking the State's=20
trifurcation along a communal fault line.

The Jammu Mukti Morcha (JMM), a new regional outfit created by a=20
group of intellectuals in the early 1990s, had revived Jammu's demand=20
for separate statehood. Its rationale lay in political and regional=20
imbalances favouring the Valley at Jammu and Ladakh's cost. Owing to=20
Srinagar's total neglect and discrimination against Jammu in the=20
matters of political and economic development coupled with the=20
Central Government's Valley-centric thinking, the JMM argued that=20
separate statehood was the only way out. Its modus operandi had=20
remained largely confined to processions, strikes and memorandums to=20
the State and Central Governments. Many intellectuals, journalists=20
and politicians of Jammu insisted that it was a product of the Union=20
Home Ministry, which had propped it up as a counterweight to the=20
Kashmiri demand for independence.

The limited social base of the Jammu Mukti Morcha further dwindled=20
when it joined hands with the RSS and converted itself into the Jammu=20
State Morcha (JSM) to contest the 2002 Assembly elections. The=20
political character of the trifurcation demand became communalised.=20
Deploying a religious prism, the JMM-RSS alliance argued that the=20
State's three sub-regions have their own separate cultural and=20
religious identities. Jammu is largely Hindu, the Valley entirely=20
Muslim and most of Ladakh Buddhist.

The BJP played a double game. Deviating from its original demand for=20
statutory regional and statutory boards for development for the Jammu=20
region, the party's State unit quietly endorsed the trifurcation=20
demand of the JSM-RSS alliance. Notwithstanding the central=20
leadership's opposition, the BJP State unit persisted in negotiating=20
seat-sharing arrangements with the JSM. Although these did not=20
materialise, both fought elections on the trifurcation plank and lost.

The BJP and the RSS fail to realise that their defeat was not due to=20
divergent electoral strategies but because their understanding of the=20
socio-political realities of Jammu and Kashmir society is=20
fundamentally flawed. The Sangh Parivar is trying to transform the=20
multifaceted religious system of Hinduism into a monolithic brand. It=20
seeks to subsume different layers of community identity in terms of=20
culture, language and caste under a single overarching category of=20
religion. In Jammu and Kashmir's context, this is doomed to failure=20
because there are no cohesive or monolithic political grouping of=20
Hindus and Muslims at the grassroots level whose political=20
affiliations cut across ethnic (Dogra, Gujjars and Bakkarwals),=20
linguistic (Pahari, Gojri, Kashmiri and Dogri), caste lines and=20
regional differences. The Jammu Muslims, for example, do not support=20
the BJP's Hindu politics and a separate state of Jammu, nor are they=20
willing to be assimilated completely into the Kashmiri Muslim=20
identity. Moreover, the Jammu Muslims are in minority in the Jammu=20
region but form a majority in Poonch, Rajouri and Doda districts. If=20
the key issue is that Jammu Hindus must separate themselves from=20
Kashmiri Muslims and create a new political entity to ensure their=20
political and economic development, why should the Jammu Muslims=20
agree to stay with Jammu Hindus in a separate Jammu State? Thus,=20
attempts to superimpose the communal divide are not only part of a=20
divisive agenda but also bound to flounder. Kashmir has once again=20
proved to be the Sangh Parivar's Waterloo.

(The writer is Reader, Department of Political Science, Delhi University.)

_____

#2.

The Daily Star (Dhaka)
5 November 2002
Op-Ed.

The opening in Kashmir: Turning over a new leaf

Praful Bidwai, writes from New Delhi

The verdict was overwhelmingly against New Delhi's Kashmir policy, of=20
which the NC was seen as an uncritical representative. It was not an=20
endorsement of New Delhi's "anti-terrorist" measures, or of J&K's=20
categorical "integration" with India...The Kashmiris long for a=20
return to more peaceful, less violent, life and to human rights. They=20
also voted for an unconditional dialogue with all shades of opinion=20
and scrapping of draconian laws, including POTA.

The Congress has done something unusual. It has agreed to share power=20
with another party in a coalition with a negotiated agenda. It has=20
even handed over the leadership of the Jammu and Kashmir alliance to=20
the People's Democratic Party (PDP). This is something its instincts=20
militate against

The maturity, and one might say, grace, with which the Congress has=20
acted in the larger interests of Kashmir and of India, reduces the=20
damage from J&K's fortnight-long-jockeying for power.

It also conveys the seriousness with which the Indian political=20
system can sometimes respond to certain issues.

The deal between the Congress, PDP, Democratic People's Front led by=20
Mr Yusuf Tarigami, and other, falls in the same class as the=20
Rajiv-Longowal (Punjab) Accord, or the Mizoram and Assam agreements.=20
These had the potential to create a political breakthrough in a=20
situation of great social turmoil, administrative chaos, popular=20
alienation and militant violence.

The central issue in J&K is how to convert today's opportunity into a=20
solid, enduring gain. This needs a three-pronged approach: roll back=20
the damage wreaked by 13 years of violence; establish responsible=20
governance to win the people's hearts and minds; and engage the world=20
on the J&K issue to bring about a peaceful settlement.

The Congress-PDP alliance's Common Minimum Programme outlines this=20
approach's domestic component. This must be supplemented by the=20
international component, including a dialogue with Pakistan.

The onus here falls squarely upon the Centre. It also holds the key=20
to the success of Mr Mufti Mohammed Sayeed's attempts at=20
reconciliation. India's national leadership must seriously=20
reconceptualise its entire understanding of Kashmir and radically=20
rethink strategy.

J&K's electoral verdict was a resounding rejection of the National=20
Conference, and in the Jammu region, of the BJP. The NC was punished=20
for its opportunist national-level alliance with the communal BJP,=20
for its monumental corruption, betrayal of "autonomy", and=20
unresponsiveness to people's needs. The BJP was virtually wiped out=20
from Jammu.

The verdict was overwhelmingly against New Delhi's Kashmir policy, of=20
which the NC was seen as an uncritical representative. It was not an=20
endorsement of New Delhi's "anti-terrorist" measures, or of J&K's=20
categorical "integration" with India.

The Kashmiris long for a return to more peaceful, less violent, life=20
and to human rights. They also voted for an unconditional dialogue=20
with all shades of opinion and scrapping of draconian laws, including=20
POTA.

Going by opinion polls and field reports, including this writer's=20
recent visit, the Kashmiris regarded this as the most credible and=20
fair election since 1977. They voted without prejudice to their views=20
about a long-term Kashmir solution. They want an administration more=20
alive to their immediate needs related to water, jobs and roads.

The elections were undoubtedly fair, if not entirely free. But that=20
doesn't mean the "Kashmir problem" has gone away, and popular=20
alienation has ended. The problem has only acquired a less malign,=20
more manageable, shape.

The CMP recognises this. Seventeen of its 31 points are welcome=20
peace-restoration measures, including putting POTA on hold,=20
rehabilitation of violence-affected families, establishment of an=20
ehtisab institution to enforce accountability, and abolition of the=20
STF-Special Operations Group of former militants.

Implicit in the promise to heal "emotional wounds" is acknowledgement=20
that such wounds were indeed inflicted by hawkish policies which=20
involved cheating on India's own Constitution, rigging elections,=20
imposing unrepresentative governments, and committing large-scale=20
human rights violations.

These wounds will take long to heal, but the process must begin with=20
a demonstration of good faith.

The CMP is somewhat overcautious -- reflecting the Congress' sense of=20
vulnerability to the BJP's criticism that it is "compromising" with=20
pro-azadi opinion. Instead of an unconditional dialogue with all=20
currents of opinion, as promised by Ms Sonia Gandhi, it limits itself=20
to "requesting" the Centre to "hold ...

wide-ranging consultations and dialogue, without conditions, with the=20
members of the legislature and other segments of public opinion ..."

The CMP drops the PDP's promise of investigating allegations against=20
SOG/security forces relating to disappearances/custodial killings. It=20
leaves a dialogue with Pakistan entirely to the Centre.

Some of this caution may restrain pro-Jamaat-i-Islami elements in the=20
PDP's support-base. However, for the people, any realistic solution=20
to the Kashmir problem must involve Pakistan. They include the vast=20
majority, not just supporters of the Hurriyat (which has lost much=20
credibility).

That's what the international community too wants. It is in India's=20
own interest to start a dialogue, however tortuous -- without=20
conceding anything to Pakistan in advance.

India's greatest asset lies in the credibility of the democratic=20
process and the moral case against terrorist violence. There is no=20
substitute for peaceful, patient diplomacy and engagement with the=20
international community.

Domestically, the litmus test will be how soon the new government can=20
end state and militant violence, and restore the people's faith in=20
the possibility of elementary justice. Here, it needs the full=20
backing of the Centre, whose leadership will have to break with=20
clich=E9d "pro-active" (read, hardline) strategies.

Equally crucial will be tackling unemployment among J&K's educated=20
youth. Here, ironically, the Jammu region is as important as the=20
Valley. It's in Doda, Rajouri and Poonch that the militants are=20
recruiting.

So, J&K will need an extraordinarily imaginative development plan --=20
not a souped-up version of the "packages" the Centre periodically=20
announces, nor a replica of earlier plans for Punjab and Assam, such=20
as setting up an Institute of Technology or big public project. Only=20
a plan which takes into account the state's endowments and people's=20
skills, and targets their needs, will work.

Without such an initiative, there is a danger that the window of=20
opportunity in J&K will slam shut -- as in the Northeast, in the=20
past. If, on the other hand, India's leaders show wisdom and=20
foresight, things could change dramatically. India's appeal to=20
Kashmir's people will grow if they feel assured of the representative=20
character of its democratic system. That's worth fighting for.

Praful Bidwai is an eminent Indian columnist.

______

#3.

New Left Review 17, September-October 2002

Susan Watkins on D. N. Jha, The Myth of the Holy Cow. The gastronomic=20
legends and taboos of India=B9s modern Hindu chauvinism, as the BJP=20
reshapes the country=B9s curricula.

SUSAN WATKINS

SAFFRON GASTRONOMY

That Jesus roamed the Himalayas, absorbing Vedic wisdom from the=20
gurus he encountered; that the human race originated in Tibet; that=20
the gods reside in the body of the cow, mother of us all=8Ball this has=20
long been taught as established fact in the 20,000 Vidya Bharati=20
schools run under the auspices of the Sangh parivar, the hardline=20
Hindu-nationalist network that lies behind India=B9s ruling party, the=20
BJP. The Vidya Bharati agenda has already been introduced into=20
primary and secondary schools in BJP-run states, where education=20
policy is often a pawn in coalition deals with regional parties. In=20
2001, the Sangh-dominated National Council of Educational Research=20
and Training began deleting and rewriting sections of the history=20
textbooks=8Bremoving, among other things, any reference to Indian=20
traditions of eating beef. In January 2002, NCERT produced a new=20
history syllabus, founded on its =8Cvalue-based=B9 national curriculum=20
framework for the country=B9s schools, which had proposed introducing=20
courses on Vedic mathematics and a =8Cspirituality quotient=B9 as a form=20
of academic assessment. On 12 September 2002, the Supreme Court set=20
its seal on the new policy, rejecting the contention that the=20
education system was being =8Csaffronized=B9 with the dismissal of a=20
petition brought against it by a group of educationalists. Prime=20
Minister Vajpayee, schmoozing with Indian millionaires in New York,=20
greeted the decision with glee=8Badding, for domestic consumption, =8CAnd=20
if saffronization is taking place, what=B9s wrong with that? Bhagwa is=20
a good colour, long associated with the battlefields.=B9 The opposition=20
Congress party announced that it had =8Cno legal problem=B9 with the=20
judgement.

The teaching of history in post-Independence India, the revisionists=20
argue, has been too =8Cwesternized=B9=8Bdominated by the =8Cchildren of=20
Macaulay=B9. Instead, they propose to develop =8Ca sense of belonging in=20
every individual learner=B9, by focusing on =8CIndia=B9s contribution to=20
world civilization=B9. The Vidya Bharati narrative that this ambition=20
threatens to draw from is a genuinely postmodern fiction, seamlessly=20
conflating mythology and fact. The Aryan race, indigenous to India,=20
is the nucleus of its proud culture. During the golden age of the=20
Vedic period, the country was the envy of the world; its trade=20
networks spread across the globe, and foreign markets were filled=20
with Indian goods. Its treasure chests flowed with jewels, silver and=20
gold. Marauders and barbarians have always viewed the country with=20
greedy eyes. Bacchus and Dionysus were among the first invaders=8Bthey=20
suffered such a crushing defeat that Ancient Greece quaked with=20
terror. After the rout of Darius, Iran could never raise its eyes to=20
India again. Alexander the Great had to beg for Puru=B9s forgiveness.

But Buddhist influence, and the non-violent doctrine of ahimsa,=20
weakened the kingdom. Cowardice spread throughout the land. Since the=20
state bore the burden of filling the monks=B9 begging bowls, the=20
Buddhists gained many recruits. The troops guarding the borders grew=20
listless as army morale was sapped. Arab aggressors, sword in hand,=20
imposed their religion, destroying books and temples, humiliating=20
mothers and sisters. Practices of child marriage, jauhar, sati and=20
purdah were defences against Muslim rapaciousness. Under the Moghuls,=20
the country was divided into two classes: minority Muslim rulers, and=20
the vast majority, the long-suffering Hindus, constantly oppressed.

At stake is the creation of a monolithic national narrative, focused=20
around the supposed essence of Hinduism, an unchanging Brahmanical=20
core. The complex social history of the priestly caste=8Bits mutations=20
through the millennia, its class character and the numerous=20
challenges to its hegemony=8Bis drowned out by shrill proclamations of=20
innate Brahmanical purity, of which vegetarianism and, in particular,=20
the immemorial sanctity of the cow are important aspects. The actual=20
treatment of India=B9s often lame and rack-ribbed bovine=20
population=8Bbumbling between the Hyundais and Toyotas, or browsing on=20
street-corner rubbish heaps=8Bis not the issue. As last year=B9s protests=20
by outraged customers at the Mumbai McDonald=B9s make clear, it is the=20
ancient link with Hindu purity that counts.

Yet as Dwijendra Narayan Jha=B9s new work reveals, the connexion is far=20
less ancient than it seems. In contrast to many of the revisionists,=20
Jha has studied the Vedic writings in detail=8Bas his thicket of=20
footnotes reveals=8Bas well as surveying a far wider body of textual=20
and archaeological data. His book=8Bthe subject of initial banning=20
orders and ritual burnings=8Bis a welcome addition to a growing body of=20
literature that gives a far more complex picture of ancient India. To=20
the Aryan-speaking, semi-nomadic pastoralists who migrated to=20
northwest India from the area of present-day Iran=8Band whose prayers=20
and chants are recorded in the earliest extant document of the=20
Subcontinent, the Rigveda, dating from between 1500 and 1000 bc=8Bthe=20
cow was neither sacred nor unslayable. The Aryans=B9 gods=8Bcombining, it=20
seems, some of the Avesta deities of Iran, strong-armed Indra and=20
fiery Agni, with the mother goddess and Horned Being of the Indus=20
valley=8Bwere particularly partial to offerings of roast ox, goat and=20
beef. Animal sacrifice was a crucial element of their religion.=20
Cattle were also valued for their leather, which was worked up into=20
elaborate trappings for the Aryans=B9 chariots=8Bimportant symbols of=20
power in a mobile, pastoral world.

The textual evidence for this period relates essentially to northern=20
India. But archaeological excavations have revealed charred and cut=20
cattle bones from virtually all parts of the Subcontinent, suggesting=20
that the consumption of beef, along with mutton, goat, ox and various=20
fowls and fish, was fairly commonplace. At Hastinapura=8Bthe ancient=20
capital of the Mahabharata, north of Delhi=8Bbone fragments of sheep,=20
buffalo, goat, pig, elephant and short-horned cattle have been found,=20
many of them cut or charred, and dating from the eleventh to the=20
third century bc. The social universe of the sprawling epic=8Bits=20
original nucleus generated around 800 bc=8Bis exuberantly=20
non-vegetarian. One section=8Bthe Vanaparvan=8Brecounts the daily=20
slaughter of two thousand cows in the kitchens of King Rantideva,=20
renowned for distributing vast quantities of beef and grain to his=20
brahmans. The Ramayana, too, contains numerous references to the=20
killing of cattle, both for sacrifice and for food: as she is ferried=20
across the Yamuna, Sita vows to sacrifice a thousand cows and a=20
hundred jars of wine to the river, if Rama keeps his vows.

The later Vedic texts, products of the settled agrarian communities=20
around the Ganga=ADYamuna doab, provide detailed descriptions of cattle=20
sacrifice, and make clear that humans (as well as gods) consumed the=20
results. As the Satapatha Brahmana comments: =8Cmeat is the best kind=20
of food=B9. Beef should not only be served to honour important guests=20
or to celebrate a new house, but on far more banal occasions:=20
according to Upanishadic precept a veal stew, served with rice and=20
ghee, could ensure a father the happiness of a long-lived, learned=20
son. That cows were highly valued, a symbol of riches, is not, Jha=20
argues, synonymous with their being either sacred or unslayable.

On the other hand, with the beginnings of caste stratification and=20
mercantile development, there is evidence to suggest that the=20
brahman=B9s cattle began to acquire a certain degree of inviolability=20
at this time. The cow was the preferred form of daksina, or=20
sacrificial fee, paid to the priest, and the later Vedic texts warn=20
of the dire consequences that might befall those who injure or=20
misappropriate the brahman=B9s kine. =8CO king,=B9 cautions the=20
Artharvaveda, =8Cthe gods did not give that cow to you to eat. O=20
warrior, do not eat the brahman=B9s cow, she is not to be eaten.=B9 Such=20
passages should perhaps be seen as brahmanical attempts to assert the=20
hegemony of the priestly caste against kshatriya challenges from=20
below. The emergence in the sixth and fifth centuries bc of=20
anti-brahmanical and anti-caste sects and movements=8BBuddhism and=20
Jainism pre-eminent among them=8Bwould seem further indicators of such=20
tensions. Both were founded by members of the kshatriya, or warrior=20
caste. Buddhism tended to draw its followers from the mercantile,=20
farming and artisan layers, Jainism from the trading and financial=20
elite. A strength of Jha=B9s work is that his analysis of early=20
brahmanical attitudes is integrated into this wider panorama of=20
Indian practice.

Both Buddhism and Jainism were resolutely opposed to animal=20
sacrifice, and there are many stories of the Buddha counselling=20
brahmans against it. The principle of =8Cright action=B9 included=20
abstaining from the conscious destruction of any sentient being,=20
while the principle of =8Cright speech=B9 is illustrated by the protests=20
of the ox, Nandivisala, against the abusive language of his brahman=20
master. Nevertheless, as Jha points out, the Middle Path soon=20
acknowledged the =8Cthree blameless ways=B9 of eating meat=8Bthe beast=B9s=
=20
slaughter need only be =8Cunseen, unheard or unsuspected=B9; in a=20
broadening of the Path, the three were later increased to nine. Among=20
these, presumably, were the contents of the Buddha=B9s last supper, a=20
vexed subject for his followers; although the Milindapanho assures us=20
that he did not die from the pork itself, which was =8Cin good=20
condition, light, pleasant, full of flavour and fine for the=20
digestion=B9, but from =8Cthe extreme weakness of his body=B9. While the=20
scornful Jains accused the Buddhists of regarding as pure anything=20
that fell into their begging bowls, in practice they too discovered=20
exceptions to the rule of non-slaughter: Jain monks who found=20
themselves in a deserted village, or a settlement of robbers, where=20
meat was the only food on offer, were permitted to tuck in with the=20
rest.

It was not easy to curb the varied appetites of the Subcontinent by=20
priestly precept. The edicts of the third-century bc King Asoka,=20
himself a Buddhist, which prohibited the slaughter of a long list of=20
animals throughout the Mauryan empire=8Bstretching from present-day=20
Afghanistan to Karnataka in the far south=8Bappear to have been=20
ignored; not least in the royal kitchens, where two peacocks and a=20
deer were dished up every day. While the Mauryan court=B9s brahman=20
adviser Kautilya also proscribed the killing of calves, bulls and=20
milch cows, he fixed the fine for such offences at a nominal 50=20
panas, and still managed to recommend the salutary effects of cow=20
bones as manure.

The legal codes of ancient India are equally equivocal. That of Manu,=20
compiled between 200 bc and 200 ad, sanctions meat-eating in honour=20
of the gods or important guests=8Bindeed, the brahman who refuses=20
consecrated flesh is condemned to be reborn as a beast for twenty-one=20
existences=8Bwhile condemning it in less exalted contexts. Manu=B9s code=20
recognized five major sins: first, killing a brahman; second,=20
stealing; third, drinking liquor; fourth, having sexual intercourse=20
with a guru=B9s wife; fifth, associating with those guilty of any of=20
the above. Cow slaughter, however, did not feature on the list.=20
Sanskrit medical treatises of the same period are markedly pragmatic.=20
The renowned compilation of Caraka (first=ADsecond century ad)=20
prescribes a gruel of beef gravy sharpened with pomegranate juice for=20
fevers, and Susruta (third=ADfourth century ad) recommends the meat for=20
coughs, catarrhs and =8Ca morbid craving for food=B9. Secular literature=20
provides a host of similar references right up to the eighteenth=20
century.

Jha argues, nevertheless, for a distinct shift in attitudes towards=20
the cow, at least in northern India, from around the middle of the=20
first millennium ad. This period=8Bcharacterized by warring kingly=20
states, social and political instability, a catastrophic decline in=20
trade, the emergence of land as the primary source of wealth and the=20
consolidation of large landholdings by an important brahmanical=20
layer=8Bwas understood at the time as the age of Kali, of destruction=20
or decay, necessitating deep changes in social mores. It saw the=20
transition from a sacrificial to an image-based religion, more=20
appropriate to the kaliyuga, with the incorporation of the cults of=20
Shiva, Vishnu, and their avatars=8Bthe classic Hindu pantheon. The=20
transformation, however, affected the gods rather than the priests.=20
The epoch witnessed the reassertion of brahmanical authority, the=20
emergence of an orthodox Vedanta school of thought, triumphing over=20
its rivals, and the re-writing of the bardic epics as sacrosanct=20
texts.

During the kaliyuga, mores acknowledged to have been appropriate in=20
earlier, less troubled times=8Bbeef-eating among them=8Bwere now=20
condemned, especially when practised by lower castes. In normative=20
literature, the brahman=B9s life and possessions were now consistently=20
represented as more valuable than those of other caste categories.=20
Narratives in several different genres elaborate on the dire=20
consequences of defying these rules=8Bkings who humiliate brahmans=20
invariably come to no good. It seems likely that such grim=20
reiterations were necessitated by a social reality in which=20
brahmanical ideals were actively contested. It is in this context=20
that the cow was co-opted into the survival strategies of the=20
priestly elite.

Yet privilege should not be mistaken for uniform dominance: even=20
within Hinduism=8Blet alone the many other traditions=8Ba wide variety of=20
religious and dietary practices have persisted down to the present=20
day. Jha=B9s fascinating book inevitably tells only a fraction of the=20
story. The vast and complex history of the south, the northeast, the=20
tribal areas and forest regions has still barely begun to be=20
explored. The origins of the current =8CHinduization=B9 of Indian=20
culture, asserting a continuity with a monolithic, unbroken=20
tradition, lie not in the ancient Vedas but in the colonialist=20
confections of nineteenth-century European Indologists who, with=20
their own conceptions of the Aryan race, focused their attentions=20
upon the Sanskrit texts, scanting the many other regional traditions=20
whose languages they did not know. The concept of an essentially=20
=8CHindu=B9 India was a product of modernity=8Bof tensions induced by the=20
demands of an industrial-capitalist occupying power.

Mass mobilizations around the slogan of the =8Choly cow=B9 are a graphic=20
representation of this, as recent scholarship by Gyan Pandey and=20
others has revealed. The first Gaurakshini Sabhas=8BCow Protection=20
Societies=8Bwere launched by the Hindu Arya Samaj in 1882. A network of=20
local groups was established across north and central India in the=20
following decades, targeting not the British authorities but local=20
Muslim communities as source of their ills. Leading donors to the=20
Gaurakshini Sabhas were often big landowners, bankers and traders;=20
local zamindari landlords, facing declining agricultural returns,=20
sought to hegemonize their recalcitrant tenantry on a communalist=20
basis; priests saw an opportunity to re-establish their spiritual=20
ascendancy; in an age of growing social insecurity and increasing=20
levels of exploitation, a new layer of clerks and petty bureaucrats,=20
undervalued intermediaries between the colonial administration and=20
the populace, found an outlet for the unbearable tensions of their=20
lot; rising castes, seen as only marginally =8Cclean=B9, could assert a=20
fuller purity by loudly demonstrating their piety on the question of=20
the cow; fakirs and swamis played an essential role. The inept or=20
opportunist decisions of the colonialist authorities=8Bbending now to=20
one reactionary authority, now another, in the name of an=20
=8Cestablished usage=B9 that they themselves had overthrown=8Bprovided=20
innumerable causes for dispute. The result was a series of=20
provocations=8BMuslim butchers, herding cows to a wedding feast, beaten=20
or killed, and their kine appropriated=8Brising to communally incited=20
slaughter before the celebrations of Baqr-Id in Maunath Bhanjan in=20
1893, of a sort that would pave the way for the disaster of Partition.

There are obvious parallels with the present day. The current=20
hinduization of the curriculum=8Bthe stress on =8CIndia=B9s contribution to=
=20
world civilization=B9, while rigorously stamping out any sense of other=20
civilizations=B9 contributions to India=8Balso comes at a time of intense=20
pressure from outside, with the country thrown wide open to the=20
manipulations of international capital; a drastic reversal, in terms=20
of the self-sufficiency of the Nehru years. While state universities=20
exhibit the symptoms of advanced malnutrition, extra funds have been=20
provided for kamarkanda courses to produce certified priests. The=20
expansion of an elite layer of private education=8Bspared the yoga=20
courses and spirituality quotient=8Bhas been forcefully promoted by the=20
World Bank. The recent Ambani report on private investment in=20
education enthuses about the possibility of creating a =8Ccompetitive,=20
yet co-operative, knowledge-based society=B9, an environment that =8Cdoes=20
not produce industrial workers and labourers but fosters=20
[cutting-edge] knowledge workers . . . placing India in the vanguard=20
of the information age=B9. Funds from the social sciences, in other=20
words, are to be shifted to IT, to fill the niche in the global=20
market for highly trained software technicians. The scenario is=20
uncannily reminiscent of the British government=B9s Hunter Commission=20
report of 1882, which recommended a switch to technical training for=20
the Indians, on the grounds that liberal education was threatening to=20
produce a critical native intelligentsia, whose thoughts might tend=20
to national independence.

What is abandoned in the NCERT proposals is any concept of education=20
as rational endeavour, or methodologically guided inquiry into the=20
unknown. It could be interesting to introduce Vedic =8Cmaths=B9 into a=20
comparative history of methods of mental arithmetic; to memorize the=20
Sanskrit shlokas off by heart is another story. Many of the wildest=20
claims for a martial Hindu civilization come from the websites of=20
NRIs=8Bthe enormous Indian diaspora whose wealth and influence, within=20
whichever niche of the domestic class system they hail from, is=20
vastly amplified by their residence abroad. For computer scientists,=20
engineers, investment bankers or development advisers in Buffalo,=20
Manhattan or Des Moines, a Vedic capsule swallowed twice daily may be=20
exactly the required boost for identity-deficiency levels, allowing=20
for a homely sense of smugness as one chooses Chicken McNuggets over=20
Big Mac. But=8Bfaced with a complex, uneven, rapidly evolving social=20
reality=8Bit ill equips the mass of India=B9s children to articulate=20
their own collective needs.

______

#4.

Date: Tue, 5 Nov 2002 09:41:58 +0530

Dear Friends,

[...]
This is just to tell everyone=A0that the revised edition for Humjinsi=A0-=20
A=A0resource book on lesbian, gay and bisexual rights in India was=20
released a couple of weeks back.=A0=A0This updates the first edition=20
which came out about four years back and like that one, this has been=20
edited by Bina Fernandez and published by the Mumbai based India=20
Centre for Human Rights & Law (ICHRL).
Humjinsi=A0copies are available from ICHRL and at suggested=20
contribution of Rs. 180/-. Those interested can contact Amar at (022)=20
3759657, 3716690, 3790699 (fax) or email to=20
<mailto:huright@v...>huright@v... or go to their offices in=20
Dongri.

About Humjinsi

For those who haven't seen it, Humjinsi is a really indispensable=20
handbook on lesbian, gay and bisexual issues in India. Its focus is=20
on legal issues, but it contains a great deal of other information=20
such as:

- a listing of all the community organisations in India
- a timeline that shows the growth of the movement in India
- a compilation of media reports on the queer community
- a compilation of all the cases where Section 377 (of the Indian=20
Penal Code, which is used to criminalise homosexuality) has actually=20
been applied by courts which demystifies a lot of the assumptions=20
that exist about this Section
- reports on community activities across the country
- discussion papers and reports on the legal issues and some of the=20
general issues facing the community

Its a fascinating book and certainly not all dry reading. For=20
example, it reproduces the intensely moving letter received by a=20
Calcutta lesbian organisation from a sender identified only as NP. In=20
it she told them how her husband had learned of her lesbian affair,=20
and had her lover killed, before then coming home to rape her and=20
tell her what he had done. She wrote that her life was over, her=20
story done, but she wanted others to know it so they might not suffer=20
as she did.

The timeline is also fascinating. It starts with the way from the=20
publication of Ismat Chugtai's 'Lihaaf' in 1941. Then there's a=20
largish gap till the Eighties during which there are only fragments=20
of information, like Shakuntala Devi's 1978 book The World Of=20
Homosexuals or Gay Scene, a Calcutta based journal brought out by=20
people of whom nothing is now known.

And then from mid-Eighties onwards a sudden explosion with Ashok's=20
coming out interview in Savvy and the setting up of Trikone in San=20
Francisco and Anamika in New York. From then on its a steadily=20
growing list of publications, productions, conferences and events=20
both positive and negative, right upto this September where news=20
reports in Tamil Nadu came out about the suicides of two young women=20
in Erode district who killed themselves because they felt their=20
families would never accept their love for each other.

With stories like that its undeniable that much of the information is=20
depressing. And yet overall I think this is a very hopeful and=20
positive book. Because especially in comparison with the first=20
edition four years back, it is incredible how much change has taken=20
place and how fast. Gay and lesbian groups are springing up across=20
the country - and not just in the metros, but in smaller towns as=20
well where people are deciding they can't live in the closet forever=20
and are joining hands for support and openness.

Media reports are now commonplace and mostly positive. When, as the=20
book records, a magazine as mainstream as Femina carries a very=20
sympathetic lead story on lesbians, you know that some sort of basic=20
shift has taken. There are more films, more books, more helplines,=20
more resources of all kinds. And there is the petition on Section 377=20
(of the Indian Penal Code, which is used to criminalise=20
homosexuality) in the Delhi High Court which is currently due for=20
hearing at the end of this month.

As the external environment changes, so are there changes taking=20
place within the community. From an initial emphasis just on=20
establishing that the community exists and that its basic human=20
rights need to be respected, now more specific areas are being=20
discussed. For example, there's an essay by Akshay Khanna of the=20
Lawyer's Collective on Rights issues related to Bisexuality. Arvind=20
Narrain and Tarunabh Khaitan talk about the mistreatment of=20
homosexuality by the psychiatric profession.

Of course, as those recent suicides indicate, its not always a=20
positive picture. Increasing visibility could mean increasing=20
antagonism, as could be seen with the Lucknow incident (there's a=20
report by Aditya Bandopadhyay on this). And there is always the=20
increasing spectre of AIDS. Yet overall, so much is happening and it=20
is important to recognise this.

My own realisation of this actually happened at the same time the=20
book came out, at the recent Asia-Pacific conference of the=20
International Lesbian & Gay Association in Mumbai. There were=20
activists from around the region, including from countries like the=20
Philippines where the queer movement seems so much more visible, and=20
where there seem to be so many more queer spaces than in India.

Even in Malaysia where the state is very certainly now approving of=20
queer issues, a city like Kuala Lumpur has several gay bars and had a=20
pride parade the likes of which we still only able to dream about. So=20
I was all prepared to feel backward and unprogressive.

Instead, as the delegates heard presentations about the Indian scene,=20
including from some of the people who have contributed to Humjinsi,=20
it was they who were impressed. "I can't tell you how amazing it is=20
to see all this happening in India," one of the delegates from=20
Malaysia told me. "You guys in India are just doing so much!" The=20
delegates were bowled over by the range and depth of activities=20
happening in India.

Which was a learning experience for me. Sometimes it seems that being=20
to close to what's happening, or being up against all the problems=20
all the time, or just being distracted by all the problems within the=20
community, one can lose sight of the big picture. And in that big=20
picture a lot of great stuff is taking place.

What this means is that every now and then we need to step back to=20
remind ourselves of this. Taking that step back helps us to see all=20
the things that are happening, to find out where we can get help and=20
what mistakes to avoid and who the different groups and people=20
involved are. Perhaps the biggest benefit of Humjinsi then, even more=20
than all the information it provides, is that it helps us take that=20
step back in order to help us focus ourselves again on all the tasks=20
ahead.

So congratulations to Bina, ICHRL and everyone else involved with=20
producing the book. And for everyone else on these lists - buy it!

Vikram & Amar

_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/

SACW is an informal, independent & non-profit citizens wire service run by
South Asia Citizens Web (http://www.mnet.fr/aiindex) since 1996.
To subscribe send a blank message to:
<act-subscribe@yahoogroups.com> / To unsubscribe send a blank
message to: <act-unsubscribe@yahoogroups.com>
________________________________________
DISCLAIMER: Opinions expressed in materials carried in the posts do not
necessarily reflect the views of SACW compilers.
\\|//\\|//\\|//\\|//\\|//\\|//\\|//\\|//\\|//\\|//|//\\|//|//\\|//|//\\|//|
--=20